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-Review of 1977

LACK CONC. + EXPLANATION OF MEDIA + ACTUAL

* -The Carter Administration and Congress COMPLETE

* -The 1978 Congressional Elections COMPLETE

* -Setting Priorities and the Decision-Making Process

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* -The 1980 Presidential Campaign

* -Maintaining a Political Base for Governing Effectively

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CONCLUSION - '77
SUMMARY

I think that it is an instructive exercise to review 1977 with a critical eye to identify our weaknesses and mistakes.

PAGE 2
? MILLION
METHODOLOGY FILE
HUXUR ON TIME CHART

REVIEW OF 1977

INTRODUCTION

It is possible for us to engage in the kind of comprehensive planning for 1978 that we were unable to do in 1977 for good and obvious reasons.

A year ago, we were all preoccupied with the problems of transition, the organization of the White House staff, the selection of your Cabinet and numerous other decisions which dealt with organizing and assuming the responsibilities and powers of the Presidency.

I believe that we have all profited from the last ten months and are wiser from our collective experiences. We have also experienced some setbacks and made mistakes which can be avoided and should not be repeated.

I have attempted in this review to answer several questions:

- What do the American people expect from President Carter?

- How as President Carter perceived by the American people in his first year in office?

  was

- How did President Carter actually spend his time?

In answering these questions, I have compared the foreign policy and domestic dimensions of each subject. I did this for several reasons:

- Foreign policy and domestic issues bring conflicting political pressures to bear on a President.

- The foreign policy and domestic institutions of government compete actively for the President's political support.

-Foreign policy and domestic advisers compete vigorously for the interest, time and attention of the President.

-These conflicting political and institutional pressures must be continually reconciled and do not lend themselves to either long-range planning or easy solutions.

THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

As a beginning, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine and understand the reasons for your election as President. Certainly, your moral and political right to lead this country is anchored in the collective hopes and desires of the American people.

Why then was Jimmy Carter elected President of the United States? What do the American people expect of this particular President? It is certainly reasonable to expect that the American people will continually measure your performance as President against their collective expectations.

To develop a bnechmark against which we can measure our progress and failures, I have reviewed the post-~~general~~ election survey of the American people conducted for us by Pat Caddell and Cambridge Survey Research. The persons interviewed were asked to state what four things they thought President-elect Carter should do as President. The graph that follows is stated in terms of what per cent of those persons interviewed thought that each topic was <u>one of the four</u> most important matters and/or problems deserving Presidential attention and action.

*

In January 1977, the American people were asked to list their top four areas of concern for President Carter to work on - their response:*



*Source: Cambridge Survey Research. January, 1977 Survey

Some observations ~~on this~~

1. The media studies point out the difficulty of maintaining sustained public interest on an issue or program.

[redacted]

Only two domestic issues - energy and the economy - received major, sustained news coverage over the 10 month period studied. The energy issue received five times as much coverage as the economy. And, to some extent, the coverage of the economy is automatic as stock market reports and monthly indicators dictate that a certain amount of attention will be devoted to this topic every month by the media.

Conversely, some domestic issues which are high priorities of this Administration received sporadic and/or slight coverage. Reorganization and the budget - two issues which you are exclusively identified with as a result of your campaign promises, did not receive the major coverage they deserved.

Consequently, if you asked the American people today, "Does J.C. have much to reorganize the Fed. govt. and balance the budget?" I would suspect they would respond negatively because they have not seen or been part of our activities.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are obvious and not surprising:

1. The American people continue to show that their major personal concerns are economic - jobs, unemployment, inflation and the general condition of the economy.

2. Foreign policy issues have a secondary political impact on the voting attitudes of the American people. In this particular survey, the broad topic of "domestic issues" was ascribed a value of approximately 80% and the broad topic of "foreign policy issues" was ascribed a value of about 20%.

Another comment on health welfare reform and social security. Both issues generated considerable [redacted] at the time our programs were announced, only to rapidly fade from the [redacted] consciousness of the American public.

~~High visibility~~

[redacted] Highly visible, dramatic announcements of programs might give ~~the~~ particular ~~program~~ initiative a good send-off, but it will certainly require a sustain public effort to build understanding and political support.

As relates to foreign issues, the media analysis [redacted] indicates that three [redacted] issues — the Mideast, SALT/[redacted] Soviets and the Panama Canal — received ~~[redacted]~~ significant sustained coverage for the period studied.

Human rights — which you have described repeatedly — as the "basis for our country's foreign policy — received a significant amount of coverage in the early months of the Administration but
* has diminished steadily ever since. This certainly implies a reduction of Administration interest in this issue.

It is also interesting to note the ~~[redacted]~~ major sustained coverage of the PC. tactics. This is due in part to the controversy surrounding this issue, but also is a result of ~~the~~ our massive ~~pre-activities and [redacted]~~ political and pre-activities.

THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Introduction

Studies have shown that the news media is the dominant force in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of the American people about political figures, issues, and news events.

The President of the United States is able to dominate the American news media in a way that is impossible for political leaders at other levels of our political system. I would contend that the American people develop a tolerance - if not an immunity - to what their President says. There is a consious or subconscious expectation and

In summary, the media survey illustrated several things:

acceptance of the fact that something the President says or does will be in the newspaper ~~almost~~ every day and on the evening news.

This presents interesting problems and opportunities for us which should be analyzed in terms of the goals and objectives of your Presidency. A good start is a detailed analysis of the media coverage given your Presidency in the first ten months you were in office.

Methodology

As was previously stated, the dominant force in shaping American public opinion is the news media. Studies have shown that the evening network news programs are the single dominant force in the perceptions of the American people about their poli-

*

Summary

(2) 1. Although an argument could be made that you are spending excessive amounts of time on foreign policy, you will have to make that determination yourself. I would argue that the amount of time spent on foreign policy in the last ten months left you less time than you needed to deal with domestic issues and maintain an effective political base.

2. And while no one would expect the time you spend on domestic issues and foreign policy to mirror the expectations of the American people (domestic/80% vs. foreign policy/20%, according to the Cambell survey) it is not unreasonable for us to a conscious effort to be more visible on domestic issues and less visible on foreign policy issues.

If we fail to maintain an effective political base, we will lack the continuing support we need for the numerous foreign initiatives of your Adm.

tical leaders. It is estimated that the three evening network news programs - ABC,CBS and NBC - have a combined national viewing audience of approximately ? million viewers.

Consequently, to measure how the first year of your Presidency was perceived by the American people vis-a-vis the news media, we have conducted a detailed analysis which uses the network news programs as the basis for the study.

As you know, each day the Press Office prepares a "Daily News Summary" based on an analysis of the network news programs, wire stories and newspaper editorial comment. In their analysis, they measure very precisely (to the second) how much time each story was allotted on the news program.

As the basis for my study, we have done the following:

*

-Broken the news stories from the network evening news into simple catagories by issue or topic.

-Calculated for the month and the year how much time cumulatively was devoted to each issue and/or topic by the three networks.

-Using these catagories and totals, it is possible to make some judgements about the interaction between the news media and your Presidency.

The single criteria in this study for a news story to be included in this analysis is what I call "Presidential involvement". This means that if a news story contained the comments that, "The President said today that....." or, "It was learned today that President Carter plans to send the Congress a message....." or, "Carter reacted today to reports that.....".

My point here is that <u>the controlling factor in determining whether or not a story was included in this analysis was the mention of the President's</u>

name in connection with an event, a story, a program or an issue.

And although this is certainly not an exact or perfect measure of the perceptions of the American people, I would contend that it is less arbitrary than other methods which might be used.

Underline

EXPLANATION OF CHARTS IN MEDIA STUDY

The charts which follow deserve some comment and explanation; and are preceded by a general listing of the issues which comprised three broad categories: "Foreign Policy/Defense," "Domestic Goals and Programs," and "Other."

- The first two charts in this section measure the amount of time devoted to domestic issues cumulatively and by month.

- The second group of charts in this section measures the amount of time devoted to foreign policy issues cumulatively and by month.

- The summary chart compares the cumulative time spent on foreign and domestic issues.

LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY

FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL SECURITY

Arab boycott

Arms sales

B-1 bomber

CIA payment

China

Concorde *

Cruise missile

Cuba

Foreign visitors

Human rights/SAkharov

Illegal aliens *

Korea/Singlaub/Copter down

Latin America

Mideast

Northern Ireland

NATO

Neutron bomb

Nuclear test ban

Panama Canal treaties

Pipeline

SALT

South Africa

Trade issues/shoe imports/ textiles *

Travel - foreign

Uganda

Uruguay

USSR

Vietnam

Zaire

---

* covered in both domestic and foreign policy issues

LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Abortion

Airline deregulation

Bakke case

Blacks/minorities

Breeder reactor

Budget

Cargo preference

Concorde *

Congressional relations

Consumer agency

Disaster relief

Education/busing

Economy/$50 rebate

Election law reform

Energy

Environment

ERA

Ethics

Farm bill/policy

Food stamps

Hospital cost-containment

Illegal aliens *

Jobs bill/unemployment

Labor law reform

Minimum wage

Marijuana decriminalization

Mass transit

No-fault insurance

Oil tanker standards

Pipeline *

Reorganization/staff reduction

Retirement - mandatory

Social security

Steel prices

Stripmining

Tax reform

Trade issues/shoe imports/ textiles *

Travel - domestic

Urban policy

Veterans/draft

Water projects/draught

Welfare reform

Wiretapping/bugging

---

*covered in both domestic and foreign policy issues

LISTING OF ISSUES IN MEDIA SURVEY BY CATEGORY

MISCELLANEOUS

Major Appointments

Democrat/Campaigning

Ford and Carter

Carter Inauguration

Lance

Liddy

V.P. Mondale

Style (personal/family/vacations)

Andrew Young

Domestic Issues As Reported By The National Media*



*Cumulative minutes of coverage of three major network news programs.
From detailed analysis Jan.-Oct. 1977.

Domestic Priorities of the Carter Administration*



*Detailed monthly analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)

Foreign Policy Issues As Reported By The National Media*



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Foreign Policy Priorities of the Carter Administration*



*Detailed monthly analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)

How President Carter Spent His Time (Jan 77-Oct 77)

As Reported by the Media*



*Detailed analysis of network evening news (Jan - Oct 1977)

HOW THE PRESIDENT SPENT HIS TIME

You can certainly make a valid argument that the President's priorities are generally reflected by the way he spends his time.

With the help of Tim Kraft's office, we have conducted a very extensive and detailed study of how you spent your time in the first ten months of 1977.

The details of this study will be presented to you later in the month in a comprehensive report, but the following chart takes the major components of that report and measures the comparable amount of time you spent on foreign and domestic issues.

Summary of Presidential Meetings, Jan–Oct 1977

*

(over)

Domestic/Political*	hours
Members of Congress	162
Govenors, Mayors & Local Officials	21
Other Political Leaders	18
Special Interest Groups (includes Labor, Blacks, Hispanics, Women, Consumers, Environmentalists, Ethnic Groups, etc)	35
	236

Foreign Policy/Defense**	
Foreign Heads of State (received in U.S.)	141
Meetings with Heads of State Abroad (London)	40
Other Foreign Officials	54
Separate & Group Meetings with Vance, Brzezinski, & Brown on Foreign Policy/ Defense Matters	156
	391

* Excludes daily Brzezinski briefings and meetings with NSC staff on Foreign Policy matters

** Excludes private meetings with White House Staff on ~~domestic issues~~

Disclaimer - "Presidential Meetings" Chart

It is difficult - if not impossible - to measure precisely the amount of time spent on foreign and domestic issues. It is important, however, that I point out one discrepancy in this analysis that could not be avoided because it was impossible to get the information for several more weeks.

In the "Foreign Policy/Defense" portion of the chart, you will see the catagory "Separate and Group Meetings with Vance, Brzezinski, and Brown on Foreign Policy/Defense Matters". In the "Domestic/Political" section of the chart you will not find a comparable component which measures the amount of time that you spent in meetings with domestic members of your Cabinet.

It was not possible for me to obtain this information from the Scheduling Office for several more weeks.

However, I would still contend that the general time comparison presented in this chart is valid* (62% of your time spent on foreign policy/defense matters and 38% of your time on domestic issues).

The fact that we do not have included in this chart the amount of time you spent with domestic members of your Cabinet on issues is offset by:

- A good portion of time spent with members of Congress was on foreign policy issues.
- A portion of your time with special interests groups was on foreign policy issues.
- In terms of your private time for reading, study and preparation, more of your time is spent on foreign policy than domestic issues.

*The archivist who accounts for your time and provided me this information supports my argument that the 62%-38% figure is accurate.

Greg

In support of my contention, let's consider the amount of time that is actually required for an official State Visit.

In addition to the "actual scheduled time" which appears on your offical schedule, there is:

- Preparation time which requires reviewing the Briefing Book, determining what you will say at the Welcoming Ceremony and at the State Dinner.
- Bilaterals usually go longer than scheduled.
- Private time after the State Dinner that you spend with almost every important visitor.

I believe that you will find the following chart interesting. It shows the extraordinary emphasis that you have placed on building relationships with other nations. It also shows that an enormous amount of your time was spent in this effort.

Meetings between US Presidents and Foreign Chiefs of State/Heads of Government — in first year of office



* If scheduled foreign trip takes place this year, this number will increase to 71.

SUMMARY

I have attempted in this section to measure the following things:

- What the American people expect President Carter to work on and/or accomplish.
- What President Carter was perceived as working on.
- How President Carter actually spent his time.

These three dimensions are measured and reconciled in the following chart. And although my methods are not exact and somewhat arbitrary, I believe the conclusions are sound.

The American People . . .



THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS

It is important that we understand and appreciate the critical role that the Democratic leadership and the Democratic members of Congress have played in our legislative progress this year.

Although party discipline in the Congress is not rigid (some would say not effective), we are the benficiaries of partisan feelings that do exist and are evident.

With the help of Frank Moore's staff, I have attempted to measure and present the degree of support for key Administration issues by party in the following chart.

Congressional Support for Administration Priorities, by Party*



* Based on 34 key votes in House, and 26 key votes in Senate as determined by Congressional Relations Staff

We have also analyzed and tried to demonstrate not only the high proportion of Democratic support for key Administration bills but also our slight margin of victory in passing these measures.

We have chosen votes in both houses that are key Administration measures to demonstrate the party alignments this year that have been typical.

Close votes in Congress on key issues

HOUSE

- Motion to kill Energy Bill
  Administration position won 219 - 203



- Coal Conversion
  Administration position won 221 - 198



- Natural Gas De-regulation
  Administration position won 227 - 199



- $1.4 billion for construction of five B-1 bombers
  Administration position won 204 - 194



Close Votes in Congress on Key Issues

SENATE

- Motion to table Pearson/Bentsen Amendment (de-regulation)

  Administration position won 50-46



- Social Security Financing

  Administration position won 42-41 (with VP breaking tie)



- Presidential Pardon of Draft Resisters

  Administration position won 48-46



CONCLUSIONS

It becomes apparent from this analysis that the Carter Administration is the chief beneficiary of the heavy Democratic majorities in the Congress, and that we also benefit from the partisan attitudes that develop on specific programs and goals of this Administration.

This has several clear implications:

1. We should be very active and very visible in the 1978 elections. More on this in the next section of this memorandum, but heavy Democratic losses in either house of the Congress

will seriously jeopardize our chances of passing progressive legislation (welfare reform, tax reform, national health insurance, etc.) in 1979 and 1980.

2. To the extent that your actions as President - substantively and symbolically - are those expected of a Democratic President, it will help us tremendously among Democrats, the traditional Democratic consitutuencies and particularly with the Democartic members of Congress.

For example, rightly or wrongly, Dr. Burns represents symbolically traditional Republican philosophy. To most Democrats, he represents the flawed economic policies of the last eight years, a lack of concern for the disadvantaged

and a strong bias for big business. I don't think that this perception is fair or completely accurate, but it is the way that Dr. Burns is perceived by the people who elected you.

My argument to you in simple: Without abandoning your conservative fiscal approach, you will be a stronger and more effective President politically if your actions are those expected of a Democratic President.

ASSASSINATION PLOT
* GUARD FOUND POISON DEALING IN DRUGS
* AMERICAN COLONEL & OTHERS MET TO DISCUSS PLOT TO OVERTHROW TORRIJOS

2ND CT. / MARIJUANA /
* COL. LUIS MARTINEZ / FRANK FIORINI - WATERGATE BURGLARS
* CUBAN BRIGADE

DAY 1

ARRIVAL
HELICOPTER
TAKEN TO HOUSE
DRINKS / SOME CONVERSATION → TORRIJOS / RORY / JORDAN / GABRIEL / ARTURO / NIKO
GABRIEL'S HOUSE
AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE → LATE NIGHT DRINK

MET WITH ARIAS / MIAMI / AT HOUSE OF PEDRO MARTINEZ, BROTHER OF COLONEL.

DAY 2

GOT UP EARLY - AWOKENED BY TORRIJOS
SAUNA / SWIM
WITNESS AT CIVIL CEREMONY OF DAUGHTER → NOT [redacted] DESIGNED TO GIVE DAUGHTER AWAY / IGNORED HIM / ABUSED HIM
OTHER HOME / SON - OMAR / MINIMUM SECURITY
DROVE AROUND / TORRIJOS' MERCEDES / HE DRIVE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY / UNEMPLOYMENT LINES / COLONELS HAVE TO LOOK THERE
CANAL ZONE VISIT / LOCKS / IMPRESSIONS
LUNCH WITH COLONELS / GOOD ORDER / RESPECT
PAUS MORE ATTENTION TO ENLISTED MEN THAN OFFICERS
SPECIAL FORCE
KEEPS COLONEL SEPARATE, REPORTING TO HIM
BACK TO AMBASSADOR'S HOME / CONVERSATION
CANAL ZONE GOVERNOR / PARFAIT / OUTLINED CONCERNED
MAJOR GENERAL / ENGINEER /
MATCH MONDAY
AMERICAN EMBASSY / TORRIJOS WITH SENATORS
NAP
MIDNIGHT TO CONTADOR - ISLAND PURCHASED BY GABRIEL LEWIS

[redacted]
PORTUGESE IN INTERROGATION SAYS THAT HE GOT THIS INFO FROM JOSE CELSO GARCIA IN MIAMI
4355 N.W. 5TH TERRACE MIAMI
1255 49 CT. HIALEAH

PORTUGESE CARLOS MANUEL PEREIRA DE OLIVEIRA CABRAL
PLAN TO ASSASSINATE TORRIJOS

DAY 3

BREAKFAST TOGETHER
TRIP AROUND ISLAND
PLAYED TENNIS / HUMIDITY UNBELIEVABLE / END OF RAINY SEASON
LUNCH
GENERAL CALLED
FLEW TO FARALLON → MILITARY WEST OF PANAMA CITY
PRIVATE TALK WITH TORRIJOS → 1 HOUR
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 1/11/93 NSC ltr RE MR-NLC-92-10
BY [illegible] NARS, DATE 1/20/93

THE 1978 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

The 1978 Congressional elections are important to your Administration and to your Presidency for two reasons:

1. The real damage to our policies and programs. If we suffer Congressional losses of the magnitude that have been predicted by some of the knowledgeable Democratic observers, we would lack the margins to pass many of our controversial programs through either house of the Congress.

* NOT INTERESTED IN MANAGEMENT OF COUNTRY
* LIKES TO VISIT AROUND COUNTRY, MILITARY, DRINK + SCREW.

* INTENSITY OR LOYALTY TO HIM AMONG MINISTERS/
* NOT INTERESTED IN DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF HIS COUNTRY BUT NOT IN A POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH WILL ALLOW FOR HIM TO DO OTHERWISE

IF WE GAIN RATIFICATION, MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT HE WILL MAKE SOME CHANGES IN MILITARY, AND RUN FOR PRESIDENT

* SOME AROUND HIM GET FRUSTRATED WITH LIFESTYLE/

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 1/11/93 NSC HTCRE MR-NLC-92-10
BY ___ NARS, DATE 1/20/93

2. <u>The perceived political damage which will be attached by the press and political critics to the President if we suffer large Congressional losses</u>. The result will be that we are held politically accountable for our losses in 1978 and given very little credit for the successes.

It is worthwhile first to understand the recent history of the Congressional losses suffered by the party in power in the off-year elections. The following chart illustrates this history.

$ 250,000 CASH / ATLAS WILL COME TO POWER IN EXCHANGE FOR GAMBLING CASINO

SCHAR / COMMENT

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 11/19/93 NSC Hvc RE MR-NLC-92-1
BY [illegible] NARS, DATE 11/20/93

Congressional Losses to Party in the White House in Off-Year Elections



Since the 1950 elections, the party in power has experienced consistent losses in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, the only exceptions being the slight Senate gains in 1962 and 1970.

The losses in the Senate appear less dramatic due to the fact that only thirty-three seats are up every two years.

Because the present Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress are so heavy, an argument could be made that an active President confronting controversial issues must expect Congressional losses in the off-year election at least as great as the historical average - thirty (30) House seats and three (3) Senate seats.

The Democratic leadership in the Congress and the leadership of the Congressional Campaign Committees which monitor these races closely expect us to do worse than the historical average. If this proves true, we will find ourselves politically handicapped during 1979 and 1980 as we try to pass progressive legislation through the Congress.

Our Role in the 1978 Congressional Campaigns

You have already made a commitment to the leadership of the House and the Senate that you will be active in the 1978 Congressional campaigns. Our collective help can and should take many forms, including:

- Presidential campaigning
- Vice-Presidential campaigning
- Spouses and families of President and Vice-President campaigning
- Cabinet members campaigning
- White House staff campaigning
- Direct financial assistance from DNC
- Technical assistance from DNC on campaign management, polling, issue analysis and fund-raising

As a practical matter, it will be impossible for you to campaign in the marginal House seats as there are so many involved. We can have Administration officials at the Cabinet and sub-cabinet level represent us in many of the House races.

My own recommendation would be that you and the Vice-President focus almost exclusively (with some exceptions) on the Senate races for several reasons:

- The marginal Senate seats are a manageable numbers of races that you and the Vice-President can concentrate on and have a great impact on.

- While campaigning in key Senate races, you will be helping the entire ticket, including the House members. Also, in choosing where we go in a particular state to assist the Senate candidate, we can be sensitive to marginal House races in that same state.

- We have been stronger politically in the House this year than in the Senate as is witnessed by the legislative successes we have had in both bodies. We need to minimize our losses and/or make gains in both Houses of Congress, but this is particularly true of the Senate.

Assessment of the Senate Races

With the assistance of the Vice-President's staff and Frank Moore, I have conducted a political survey of the Senate seats that are up in 1978.

To begin with, it is important for us to analyze not only who is up, but what their record of support for key Administration measures has been. This is illustrated on the following chart.

DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR KEY ADMINISTRATION ISSUES AMONG SENATORS UP FOR RE-ELECTION IN 1978*

Clark, Iowa	Democrat	92.0%
Biden, Delaware	Democrat	91.3
Anderson, Minnesota	Democrat	87.5
Pell, Rhode Island	Democrat	87.0
Haskell, Colorado	Democrat	85.0
McIntyre, New Hampshire	Democrat	82.6
Hathaway, Maine	Democrat	79.2
Abourezk, South Dakota	Democrat	78.9
Sparkman, Alabama	Democrat	78.9
Metcalfe, Montana	Democrat	78.3
Randolph, West Virginia	Democrat	74.1
Hatfield, Oregon	Republican	72.7
Huddleston, Kentucky	Democrat	69.2
Percy, Illinois	Republican	68.2
Case, New Jersey	Republican	64.0
Brooke, Massachusetts	Republican	64.0
McClellan, Arkansas	Democrat	62.5
Pearson, Kansas	Republican	60.9%
Eastland, Mississippi	Democrat	59.1
Johnston, Louisiana	Democrat	59.1
Nunn, Georgia	Democrat	57.7
Baker, Tennessee	Republican	50.0
Griffin, Michigan	Republican	47.6
Thurmond, South Carolina	Republican	45.8
Domenici, New Mexico	Republican	42.3
McClure, Idaho	Republican	39.1
Stevens, Alaska	Republican	36.4
Curtis, Nebraska	Republican	33.3
Helms, North Carolina	Republican	33.3
Hansen, Wyoming	Republican	29.6
Scott, Virginia	Republican	23.1
Bartlett, Oklahoma	Republican	21.1
Tower, Texas	Republican	16.7

* Based on analysis by Congressional Relations Staff on 26 key issues.

Several observations on this chart:

-All the Democratic Senators up for re-election in 1978 have at least a 50% rating of support for key Administration issues.

-Most of the Republican Senators who are up for re-election this year who have supported us more than 50% of the time are considered "safe". The exception is Case who will have good Democratic opposition.

-The group of Senators who receive the highest rating from our analysis are without exception the moderate and liberal members of the Senate.

-This same group of Senators are the ones who face the greatest amount of opposition in 1978. Anderson, Pell, Haskell, McIntyre and Hathaway all have very difficult races. Clark would have had a tough race if Governor Ray had decided to oppose him.

-Conversely, the Democratic Senators who have shown the least support for our legislative initiatives are the ones who are considered "safe" in terms of their re-election campaigns. Eastland, Johnston, Nunn and Huddleston fall into this catagory.

-There are as many opportunities to pick up Republican seats as there are opportunities to lose Democratic seats.

With the help of Frank Moore, the Vice-President's staff and friends on the Hill, we have made a joint assessment of the Senate seats up in 1978. The chart which follows is an attempt to present the best current thinking as to what will happen in each state. The focus of this analysis is whether or not the seat will go Democratic or Republican. The focus is on the seat, not the political personalities involved.

For example, in spite of Senator McClellan's recent death, there is a feeling that the Democratic nominee will win that seat because Arkansas is a Democratic state and there are a number of good potential candidates for his seat. Consequently, for the purpose of this analysis, we put Arkansas in a "leaning Democratic" column.


POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SENATE SEATS — 1978
WASHINGTON
Olympia
OREGON
73
MONTANA
78
Helena
39
NORTH DAKOTA
Bismarck
MINNESOTA
88
SOUTH DAKOTA
79
Pierre
WYOMING
30
Cheyenne
CALIFORNIA
Sacramento
NEVADA
Carson City
UTAH
Salt Lake City
COLORADO
85
Denver
NEBRASKA
33
Lincoln
IOWA
92
Des Moines
KANSAS
61
Topeka
MISSOURI
Jefferson City
ARIZONA
Phoenix
NEW MEXICO
42
Santa Fe
OKLAHOMA
Oklahoma City
TEXAS
17
21
Austin
ARKANSAS
62
Little Rock
LOUISIANA
59
MISSISSIPPI
52
ALABAMA
50
GEORGIA
59
FLORIDA
Tallahassee
SOUTH CAROLINA
46
Columbia
NORTH CAROLINA
33
Raleigh
VIRGINIA
23
Richmond
TENNESSEE
69
KENTUCKY
68
INDIANA
Indianapolis
OHIO
Columbus
MICHIGAN
48
Lansing
WISCONSIN
Madison
Lake Superior
Lake Michigan
Lake Huron
Lake Erie
Lake Ontario
NEW YORK
Albany
PENNSYLVANIA
Harrisburg
N.J.
Trenton
DEL.
MD.
Annapolis
WASH. D.C.
MAINE
79
Augusta
VT.
Montpelier
N.H.
Concord
MASS.
Boston
Providence
R.I.
CONN.
Hartford
83
64
87
64
91
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MEXICO
GULF OF MEXICO
BAHAMA ISLANDS
U.S.S.R.
ARCTIC OCEAN
CANADA
BERING SEA
Juneau
36
0 MILES 600
PACIFIC OCEAN
Honolulu
HAWAII
(principal islands)
PACIFIC OCEAN
0 MILES 150
SAFE DEMOCRATIC
LEANING DEMOCRATIC
TOSS-UP
LEANING REPUBLICAN
SAFE REPUBLICAN
Figures represent % of support to Administration on 26 key issues by incumbent Senators.

55308 3-67

Early Campaign Trips

I believe that there are very good reasons for your taking two campaign trips in the first few months of the year.

Trip I would take you to Delaware for Biden, Maine for Hathaway, New Hampshire for McIntyre, and Rhode Island for Pell.

Trip II would take you to Minnesota for Anderson, Colorado for Haskell and Iowa for Clarke.

The advantages of your taking these specific trips are:

1. It will be clear signal to other Democrats that you are going to be active on behalf of the party and its candidates.

2. This particular group of Senators are all in trouble and your early and active help will indicate to the Congress that we do not forget our friends and are not reluctant to campaign for Senators in tough races.

3. As was demonstrated earlier, this same group of Senators have supported the Administration on key issues more than 80% of the time. These seven Senators are the top seven in terms of their support on key votes.

4. You will have to campaign for this same group some time during the year. If you do it early and get it out of the way, then you will be able to

Recommended Early Presidential Campaign Trips, 1978



spend time later in the year helping Democratic challengers (like Ravenal in South Carolina) to Republican incumbents who will not be nominated until late in the Spring or the Summer.

5. Reports of the help you are able to give these Senators will get back to the Hill and will help to counter the rhetoric that "Carter is going to be a liability" and "Carter has no coattails."

CONCLUSIONS

You have already made a strong commitment to be active in the 1978 Congressional elections.

In terms of other things which need to be decided soon and/or done, I have two recommendations:

> First, that you take the two early trips I suggested during the first several months of the year, February, March or April.
>
> Second, that you reinforce with the Cabinet directly the political mechanism for their appearances on behalf of members of Congress. Frank Moore's office is set up to clear Cabinet appearances to avoid having us campaign for people who have not supported us or turn down invitations from people who have supported us.

SETTING PRIORITIES AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Introduction

I don't think that anyone in your Cabinet or on the White House staff has any serious objections to the quality of your decisions as President or major criticism of the processes used to make these decisions. I do think that we have not dealt adequately with the continuing relationship of foreign policy decisions to the domestic political situation. An analysis of

of the foreign policy decision-making process is presented for your review and consideration.

Secondly, I have tried to present what I believe to be a simple and very practical system for setting priorities and goals for this Administration. Building on the excellent work done by the Vice-President in preparing for 1978, I believe that the system presented here will be a useful tool.

And finally, I have presented an example of the kind of comprehensive policy/political planning which should be an integral part of this process.

DELETE

SETTING PRIORITIES FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

It is my strong contention that we cannot expect the American people to understand the purpose of your Presidency if the leadership of your Administration - your Cabinet and staff - does not have a collective sense of your goals and priorities.

Although you have a strong personal sense of the relative importance of each program and policy, you find it difficult - if not impossibe - to say that "this problem is not important enough to merit my personal attention". As a result, too

*

many policies, programs and issues receive what I would describe as excessive "Presidential attention" and absorb too much of the precious "political and moral capital" of your Presidency.

We need to devise and seek a consensus on a system that will allow you to assess the relative importance of issues and programs and make decisions which will have clear implications as to how each program will be managed, politically and substantively.

I believe the following chart outlines a system that meets the practical need we have for setting priorities.

*

SETTING PROGRAM AND POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

	PROGRAM/POLICY DEVELOPMENT	PUBLIC PRESENTATION/EDUCATION	CONGRESSIONAL PLANS	COORDINATION
PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE	Subject matter designated by President as "Presidential Initiative" Options paper presented to the President Briefing(s) with President, affected agency heads and White House Staff to discuss options Decision made	Public announcement by President of initiative Continuing statements of focus and support Use of maximum public relations tools i. e. major speech, fireside chat, etc.	White House Congressional Relations Staff has primary responsibility Coordinates lobbying efforts of affected agencies Consultation with Congress during program development Presidential involvement at briefings and at critical stages of Congressional debate Cabinet involved when necessary	Designation of lead Agency and White House Staff Coordinator Formation of Working Group to coordinate White House/Agency activities Development of political work p for approval by the President
ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVE	Subject matter designated by White House as "Administration Initiative" Agency—White House reviews options and makes final recommendation to President President reviews and approves final program	Joint announcement by President and Agency head Agency head has primary responsibility for public education Very limited Presidential involvement	Agency Congressional liaison has primary responsibility Limited White House involvement Presidential involvement only in an emergency situation when recommended by White House Congressional Relations Staff	Agency workplan prepared and approved by agency head White House Staff (Domestic Council or NSC) reviews and approves work plan
AGENCY INITIATIVE	Subject matter designated by Agency head as "Agency Initiative" Agency head makes program decisions Final program reviewed by White House to insure compatibility with Administration policy and goals	Program announced by Agency head No White House involvement	Agency Congressional liaison has exclusive responsibility No White House involvement	Internally as directed by Agency head

THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

I have attempted in this section to analyze the manner in which foreign policy and national security problems are presented to you for decision and implementation.

MOVE DOWN.

I would contend that the process you have devised for making these decisions is efficient, deliberate and well-organized to insure inpurt from your principal foreign policy advisers.

You have heard the allegation that there is no systematic or organized political input into the many foreign policy decisions that you must make. This weakness in our system is perceived and also

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real. It has been greatly exaggerated, but it is a fact that information, problems and recommendations on foreign policy matters are presented to you for decision without the benefit of comment or reaction from the members of your staff who will have to explain your decision or action (Powell), deal with the Congress in passing related legislation (Moore), and develop a strategy for winning political and public support (Jordan).

As is demonstrated in the following chart, there are four people who are primarily involved in foreign policy decisions: the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are involved in those decisions that have major defense and intelligence components.

*

Foreign Policy & National Security Decision Making Process



None of the principals involved in these decisions are immune to political considerations, but they are preoccupied with other dimensions of the problems and decisions.

As President, you are focused on understanding the problem and making quality decisions that are compatible with your view of the world and our foreign policy goals.

Vice-President Mondale is learning with you and trying to assist you in making these difficult decisions.

Secretary of State Vance is preoccupied with the management, implementation and negotiation of these decisions and policies.

National Security Adviser Brzezinski is responsible

for presenting you with the views and opinions of your other advisers while trying to reconcile your day-to-day decisions with long range policy goals.

With these responsibilities, it is understandable that when the four principals sit down to make a major decision, there is not a person who is preoccupied exclusively with the political dimensions of the decision, including:

- What are the domestic political implications of this action or decision?
- Will Congressional action be necessary?
- Is Congressional notification and consultation needed?
- Which groups and organizations should be consulted and/or notified in advance of a public announcement?
- How should this action/decision be presented to the American people?

-Are the political implications of this decision compatible with our priorities, the Congressional schedule and our own political schedule?

In the previous chart, I outlined the fourteen most obvious ways that information and decisions are presented to you and the several ways that these decisions are implemented. There is not a single person on the White House staff outside of the National Security Council who sees or reviews any of the information going into or coming out of your office. Dozens of foreign policy bureaucrats will see these materials and know about your decisions, but your political staff will hear about them from someone on the Hill who has good contacts in the State Department or read about them in the newspaper. And from that point on, we are reacting politically to a decision made by the Administration instead of taking the political initiative.

I should emphasize that none of us on the White House staff want to be or expect to be foreign policy experts or decision makers. We could point out political problems and opportunities if involved early enough in the process.

In fairness to Zbig and his staff, they have made a continuing effort to keep us informed. But until some slight adjustment is made in the process that has evolved that requires systematic political input, the high quality of your foreign policy decisions will be undermined unnecessarily by domestic political considerations. I believe that this slight flaw can be corrected very simply and in a way that does not complicate nor compromise the process by which you presently make decisions.

THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

It is not too early to begin to think and plan for the 1980 Presidential campaign.

And in our planning, we should presume the worst, and resist the historical arguments and notions that you will be re-elected President simply because you are the incumbent.

In fact, the recent history of American politics would suggest that that theory about incumbent Presidents is no longer valid, or at least, it is less valid than at any other period in our nation's history.

Recent examples to support this argument:

- Lyndon Johnson announced his intention not to seek re-election after Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire. There is little doubt that Johnson would have sought re-election absent strong political opposition to him within his own part.

- Gerald Ford barely won the nomination of his own party. He won the nomination at the Republican National Convention.

- Gerald Ford lost the general election to Jimmy Carter.

In summary, I feel strongly that we should presume the worst and assume that we will be challenged within our own party and also face strong opposition in the general election.

Need for Early Planning

There is also a tendency to think of the next election as being further off than it actually is.

In a little more than two years from now, the Democratic primaries and caucuses will begin. Without involving you unnecessarily or taking any of your time, we should begin a planning process that is informal and comprehensive with the goal of developing a 1980 campaign strategy that is compatible with the goals and objectives of your own Presidency.

The general process is outlined in the following "1980 Timetable" for your review and comment.

Timetable for 1980 Presidential Campaign

	1978	1979	1980
Major Political Events	Congressional Elections	Midterm Conference	Democratic Primaries Begin / Democratic National Convention / Ger Ele
1980 Strategy Development	● Planning Group Formed ● Plan for 1980 Developed ● Reviewed and Approved by President and Vice-President ● Implementation Begins	Meets on Monthly Basis	
National Organization	● Carter-Mondale '80 Committee Formed	● National Headquarters Opened ● National Staff Hired	
State Organization	● Low-Profile Work in Key States ● Key Leaders and Workers Identified ● State Plans Developed	● State Headquarters in Key States ● Staff for Key States Hired ● State Headquarters in Every State	
State Presence and Activities	● State Functions at White House ● President and Vice-President Active in Targeted States on Behalf of Democratic Candidates		
Fund Raising	● 1980 Fund-Raising Plan Developed ● National Budget Developed and Reviewed by '80 Planning Group	● Begin Implementation of Fund-Raising Plan ● Budgets for Key States Prepared	
Collateral Activities	● DNC National Surveys Continue on Quarterly Basis	● State Surveys in Early Primary States Begin ● Media Plan for 1980 Prepared for Planning Group	

The Planning Group

The first step would be the formation of the 1980 Planning Group. It should be relatively small, informal and would attempt to keep its activities out of the news although I think we all know how difficult that is to do.

The membership of that group should include:

Kirbo for his general advice and counsel.

Powell for his knowledge of the news media.

Rafshoon for his advice on media and themes.

Caddell for his understanding of the mood of the country.

Moe for his political knowledge and to represent the Vice-President.

Lipshutz for his knowledge of the Federal Election Law and fundraising.

Kraft/Wise for political organization.

Strauss for general advice and counsel.

Political Prognosis

Some of my own thoughts on will happen in the 1980 Presidential campaign:

- We will face a serious challenge from within our own party and also in the general election.
- The chances are greater, in my opinion, that we will be ambushed in our own party than defeated in the general election.
- There will be a coalition of persons and groups within the Democratic Party that will form to deny you the nomination.
- The challenge in the party will come from the left.

If I had to paint the worst possible situation, it would be that we would be challenged by both Jerry Brown and Ted Kennedy. They will agree that their first objective will be to defeat you and that they will fight it out later, to see who gets

the nomination. Their collective strategy:

- Brown will concentrate on the West where Carter was weak in 1976 and where Brown is strong.

- Kennedy will focus on the Northeast and the Midwest where the traditional Democrats, ethnics, and urban Catholics are concentrated.

- Brown and Kennedy will encourage favorite son candidacies in key states (New York) to deny Carter successes and momentum.

- The Brown-Kennedy coalition will be comprised of disenchanted party activists, liberals, Jews, urban ethnics, organized labor, minorities, women activists and key big city political machines.

This then is the worst possible case. The only way to insure that it does not happen is to prepare for it happening.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a political leader to maintain the same precise political coalition over an extended period of time. A political leader's base usually changes, but there are very few politicians who are able to survive major shifts in their basic coalition.

Consequently, it is necessary to counter loss of support within a particular group or constituency with gains in other groups.

In terms of what was previously described as the "Key Carter Constituent Groups", I find the slight increase of support among Southerners and Hispanics encouraging, the slight decrease in support among Democrats and union members predictable, and the sharp decline in support among Jews and blacks a cause for real concern.

PROFILE OF KEY CARTER CONSTITUENT GROUPS

In the following chart, I have identified the key constituent groups that were responsible for your election. The disproportionate support given us by these overlapping constituencies were responsible for our narrow general election victory.

The basis for this comparison is the amount of support each group provided in the general election (as was determined by a post-election survey conducted by Cambridge Survey Research) and the "job performance" ratings from an October survey from Cambridge Survey Research.

Key Carter Constituent Groups*



*Based on Cambridge Survey Research, Post Election Analysis & October, 1977 National Survey

A Plan for Dealing with Constituent Groups

Although you spent a modest amount of time this year dealing with organized constituent groups, it was almost always in reaction to some problem they had or specific need we had. I would like to outline for your consideration a positive plan whereby we take the initiative in dealing with these groups in a way that enhances the quantity and quality of their support for the goals and programs of this Administration.

If we don't present our programs and plans to these groups and their leadership, they are put in the position of sitting on the sidelines,

analyzing and usually criticizing your programs not because they are against you, not because they want you or your programs to fail, but because they were not consulted and do not understand what it is we are trying to accomplish.

I believe that we all become callous (if not immune) to the great attraction of the Presidency and the White House. The plan that I recommend calls for our taking the initiative in doing a series of things with these various groups. It has the following components:

White House Dinners. A small number of White House Dinners.

Major Speech/Address. A substantive speech on an issue of concern to several of these groups.

Informal White House Events. Picnics or receptions for several groups, particularly for groups of early Carter supporters from key primary states: New Hampshire, Iowa, Florida, etc.

Meetings with the President. Private brief meetings with you. I would recommend that we do this early in the year so you can present to these various groups your legislative priorities for 1978.

Special Constituency Press Briefings. Some of these groups - particularly labor, Jews and blacks - have very extensive and effective ways of communicating. Your spending thirty minutes every six months with some of these groups would insure positive support of our programs. A good example is the UAW newsletter which is attached. The AFL-CIO has a newsletter than has a circulation of 14 million people.

CAL NEWSLETTER

Constituent Plan for 1978

Activity	Blacks	Labor	Hispanics	Jews	Democratic Leaders	Southerners	Primary State Friends	Business Leaders	Women	Consumers	Environmentalists	Total Activity Hours
Major Speech or Address Convention	1	1		1	1			1	1			6
White House Dinner	2	2	1		1							6
White House Informal Social Event Picnic/Reception					1	1	4					6
Meeting With the President	4 (4 x 1 = 4)	6 (6 x .7 = 4.2)	2 (2 x .5 = 1)	3 (3 x .7 = 2.1)	2 (2 x .5 = 1)			6 (6 x .7 = 4.2)	2 (2 x .5 = 1)	2 (2 x .5 = 1)	2 (2 x .5 = 1)	19.5
Special Constituent Press Briefing	2		1	2								5
Total Group Hours	9	7.2	3	5.1	4.0	1.0	4.0	5.2	2.0	1.0	1.0	Cumulative Total 42.5

THE ROLE OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

For a variety of reasons, the Democratic National Committee has not been as effective a political mechanism as it can be and should be. There are a number of reasons for this, including:

- Ken Curtis is a wonderful person, but he has not been a strong and effective chairman.
- Phil Wise's early departure left Ken without a strong and effective internal manager that could work closely with us.

-I did not pay enough attention to the continuing problems of the DNC.

Although there are certainly limitations to what the DNC can do, it can and should be a political assest, not a liability. In the past few months it has become a political liability that requires our attention and action.

For the purpose of making these decisions, I would like to outline for you what the DNC should be.

Purpose of the DNC

The goals of the DNC should be to:

-Mobilize support for the President's programs

-Monitor the processes of the Party, particularly those dealing with the rules for selecting delegates for 1980

-Stay in touch with Carter supporters and Democratic leaders and activists

-Pay off old debts

-Provide financial and technical assistance to Democratic candidates, and

-Try to build and develop the Party.

Measuring our performance this year against these objectives, I would say that:

-We have done a good job in monitoring the party rules.

-We have done a very good job in terms of retiring the old debt.

-We have done an adequate job in terms of providing technical assistance to candidates.

-We have done a less than adequate job in keeping in touch with party leaders and activists and our Carter supporters.

-We have done a poor job in mobilizing support for the President's programs and in trying to build the party.

Long-Range Political/Policy Planning

Although we have denied any substantive "linkage" between our various domestic and f.p. initiatives, it is inevitable that "linkage" does occur at the political ~~or perception levels~~ and at a perception level.

I believe that it is necessary for the key makers of our administration to perform what I'll describe as macro policy-political planning that attempts to reconcile our f.p. initiatives, our domestic programs with the domestic political situation and the realities of our Presidency.

The Mondale role in planning for 1978 is a step in that direction. Let me present to you an example of the kind of comprehensive policy/political planning which I think could and should occur.

I will begin by examining the perceptions of our foreign policy as determined by the media analysis presented earlier. We have taken the positions which received the greatest coverage (with the exception of SALT/Soviet-US Relations because no survey information effectively covered both subjects) and demonstrated the following chart the support for each. The raw figures on each topics.

Domestic issues comparison

This charts the amount of time devoted by the news media to each of numerous issues. For comparison, i made an arbitrary judgment that certain issues were prioirtiy isses. They included:

-The economy

-Energy

-Reorganizaiton

-Welfare reform

-Budget

-Social security

The amount of time eac h of these isseus attracted on the networks is presented here.

I then presented other issues which received time ~~int~~ in exceess of 15 minutes. These issues are gauged on this same chart and deserve special attention and comment later.

Overall, if pressed to grade the quality of the performance of the Democratic National Committee, I would give it a C or C-. We can and should do better.

Need for New Leadership

I have had a frank talk with Ken Curtis and he will be ready to leave in January if we can come up with a replacement by then.

Let's look at the ideal qualities which a chairperson should possess:

- The ability to work well with the political people at the White House
- Knowledge of and credibility with our early Carter supporters
- Someone with technical political skills who can plan for 1980 and also see that the DNC is a politically sensitive operation

Second observation:

(1) Only two of the foreign policy initiatives of this Administration are supported by the American people – our H.R. policy and our Korea policy.

(2) [redacted] The policies and initiatives which elicited the support of a majority of the American people received four times as much coverage as the two issues supported by a majority of the American people. (440 to 111 minutes of coverage)

(3) The single f.p. issue with the overwhelming support [redacted] of the American people – human rights – received a major coverage initially at _____.

~~These the are if~~

These then are the facts about the perception of American f.p. when you Presided.

As related,

We should be able to look at our policies in this way and make some judgments and/or recommendations. (1) A far reaching implication of this analysis is that as Pres. you are personally identified with too many of these initiatives. Some identification should and indeed is inevitable, but I believe you have become identified in an almost extraordinary way.

(2) If you agree with that assessment, you should make a conscious decision to let the State Department and/or A. Young to take the lead – publicly and/or privately – on a specific issue. For example,

-A good fundraiser

-A good manager and a leader

Joel McCleary is doing a superb job as Treasurer of the DNC so the fundraising component is less essential. There still obviously are very few people who possess all or even most of these qualities.

I have reviewed numbers of lists of people in trying to develop some good candidates. I have reviewed lists of current state party chairmen, previous chairmen, early Carter supporters, former governors and members of Congress, party activists, and asked people I trust for some suggestions. I must confess that we have identified very few good, new names for your consideration. These are the best candidates, in order of my own personal preference and evaluation.

You could take the position that all future public statements and official reactions on V. South Africa and with the

Give the lack of interest in the f.p. area, in this phase.

(3) Your identification personally with a large number of complex f.p. initiatives is at the expense of the few that have to be dealt with in more future.

(4) It also creates the perception of

and puts you in the position as Pres. to have to continually reconcile each of your actions with the other.

(5) A criticism of our f.p. is that it is unprincipled and lacks coherence. I feel personally that politically and substantively that ~~the~~ our human rights policy can be and should be the glue that ~~that~~ only provides the moral basis for our ~~[illegible]~~ policies but also ~~the~~ ~~[illegible]~~ the political support necessary to pursue these controversial issues.

~~[illegible]~~ This comprehensive planning and the meshing of the major component parts of your Presidency will ~~[illegible]~~

Tim Kraft is the best person possible to be chairman of the Party.

The advantages of Tim Kraft are:

- He is totally loyal and committed to you;
- He knows the early Carter supporters and also the Democratic party leaders and activists;
- He is sophisticated politically and can deal effectively with the diverse groups and people who make up the Democratic Party;
- He is well organized and hardworking;
- He is a natural leader and earns the respect and loyalty of those who work for him;
- He is a good manager and can make the changes and improvements at the DNC that are needed;
- By being Chairman of the Party, it would be a natural thing for him to run the 1980 campaign. He has always been my choice for 1980.

His disadvantages:

- He is valuable to you where he is, although I would argue that Phil Wise could easily move up and take over Tim's present responsibilities;

~~This memorandum has attempted to review the first two months of your Ad., identify some of our problems and weaknesses, anticipations.~~

In conclusion, I would like to summarize [redacted] the [redacted] of this memorandum and provide you with [redacted] recommendations:

I. 1. Review of 1977. As a result of the conclusions drawn in this study, I would recommend the following actions:

1. That T.K. and the scheduling office prepare a master schedule that will allow you to consider adjustments in the time spent on various activities. [redacted]

— A
— D

2. That Jody be asked to review the major issues coming up this year and submit to you a plan for making you more visible on domestic issues and less visible on foreign policy issues.

— A
— D

3. Because [redacted] you had so many state visits in your first year and because they are so time consuming, I would recommend that you ask NSC and State to submit a long range plan for the next three years which will give you their priorities and will allow us sufficient flexibility

— A
— D

-You will probably find him reluctant to leave the White House. You would have to either ask him to do it for you or talk him into it.

The

II. Carter Adm. and Congressional Congress

1. I hope ~~that~~ ~~major~~ impact of this analysis was to impress on you ~~[illegible]~~ the tremendous benefits we derive from ~~[illegible]~~ our partisan association with the Democratic Congress. Also, the great stake we have symbolically and substantively in the 1978 Congressional election.

2. To insure the proper and efficient ~~[illegible]~~ political coordination of Adm. officials in the 1978 Congressional elections, I would recommend a short briefing for the Cabinet by Frank Moore and his staff at which you would reinforce ~~[illegible]~~ the need for all political appointees to be cleared by the C.R. staff and express your desire that they be active on behalf of Dems.

— A

— P

3. That you ask T.K. and the scheduling office to begin to ~~[illegible]~~ work ~~[illegible]~~ with FM. to plan the campaign trip in the most concentrated months of 1978.

— A

— D.

Bert Lance is another person who could be considered.

His advantages are numerous and obvious:

- He would be totally loyal to you;
- He would be a strong leader;
- He would be a great help in fundraising;
- As Chairman, he could be a great help in working with the Congress;
- He would be very popular in the South and with certain elements of the Party;
- He would make the changes and improvements that are needed at the DNC;
- He is anxious and willing to help us anyway - this would provide him with a base of operation.

His disadvantages are:

- We would have to wait until his legal problems are resolved and the DNC needs new leadership as soon as possible;
- He probably could only be a part-time Chairman and would need the support of a strong Executive Director;

III. Setting Priorities and the Decision-Making Process

1. If you agree generally that we need a more precise mechanism for setting priorities, I would recommend that:

   - V.P. Mondale and the Exec. Com. review and modify the system I have proposed and then make specific judgments about each issue/program. The final document should be presented to you for your review.

     ___ A

     ___ D

   - The Cabinet should be briefed about this system so that we all understand fully the implications of assigning a specific level of activity.

     A ___

     D ___

2. I would like an opportunity to present to you personally several more things we can do to insure adequate political input into the D.P. decision making process

   ___ A

   ___ D

-His selection would be controversial with some elements of the Party and might result in a messy fight to get the DNC to approve his selection;

-He would not be a candidate for the 1980 campaign manager's position.

The 1980 Presidential Election

IV ~~I would like~~

1. I would like to have your permission to have a meeting early in the year of the planning group for 1980 as was outlined. We would do it on a weekend at away from the WH.

— A
— D

2. I would like to know if you agree generally with the timetable presented. If so, this will be our general approach

— A
— D.

Meeting

1. If you agree with the need for our taking the initiative with these very constituent groups and ~~[illegible]~~ the plan outlined, I would like to ~~[illegible]~~ arrange a meeting between Rosalynn's staff, Tim Kraft and the appropriate WH staff members to begin to plan for 1978

— A
— D

Anne Wexler would be my third choice to head the Party. She is the most effective woman I know in American politics.

Advantages:

- Widely respected by Democratic Party activists and leaders;
- She is totally loyal to you;
- She is a superb manager;
- She is good at political organization;
- She would provide strong leadership for the DNC;

Disadvantages:

- She has the reputation of being a "liberal" and would not be well received initially by conservative labor people and conservatives in the Party;
- She does not know our early Carter supporters.

2. In terms of the D. Party Chairmanship, I would like to have your general reaction to the three names submitted. Are you:

—— Interested in some of these people

—— Want more names,

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that the plan outlined here is positive, practical and takes a modest amount of your own time. Going into the 1978 elections and a tough legislative sessions, we will need the goodwill and support which will come from the implementation of such a plan.

Rosalynn might have different and/or better ideas about how to deal logistically with these various groups. This was just my first attempt to present a listing of groups that need to be included.

There is no question in my mind that Tim Kraft is by far the best choice we have to be DNC Chairman. He comes as close as anyone possibly can to having all of the necessary traits. You will have to decide first whether or not you can afford to lose him here. He does a superb job managing your time and the scheduling staff. I believe you can afford to lose him because I think Phil Wise can quickly learn the job.

Tim is capable of providing the kind of leadership and management at the Democratic National Committee that will transform what has become a political liability into a political asset.

The decision about the DNC chairmanship should be addressed and decided before Christmas if at all possible so to prepare for the transition between the old chair and the new chair. If you decide to go with Tim, you will have to make that request personally and probably have to talk him into it.

(2)

DAN
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* ~~SGT. JESUS MARTINEZ~~ | CHU CHU
* RODRIDGO ~~GONZ~~ GONZALEZ R ?
* ~~JOSE LUIS SOSA~~
* ~~ARTURO McGOWAN~~
* EDWARDO NAVARRO
* ALFREDO DE LA GUARDIA

~~JORGE CARRASCO~~
~~RUFINO FLORES~~
~~NIKO~~
NICHOLAS GONZALEZ - REVILLA ?
ROMWLO ESCOBATE
~~BILL JORDAN~~