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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 19, 1978

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Memorandum for: The Secretary
From: EA - Dick Holbrooke *h7*
Subject: Questions on China

In reference to your question, May I first refer you to a poll conducted in April of 1977 by Potomac Associates. This study, published on the eve of your trip to China, contains some fascinating data, especially pages 21-36.

That poll suggests some particularly valuable areas of questioning. In addition, Hodding Carter's office has done several excellent analyses of American public opinion about China.

Every survey that I have ever seen has shown a marked American preference on the present situation, and an aversion to the severing of ties with Taiwan. Americans see the value of better relations with the PRC, but they also do not want to see the U.S. assist China in becoming a great power. Considering the American reactions to our involvement in Southeast Asia, it is surprising that 61% of the people polled last year felt that it was either "very" or "fairly" important to them that, "in considering the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Mainland China . . . the U.S. continue our interest in the security of Taiwan."

However, the depth of American feelings have not been well measured. It seems apparent that there is a great deal of misinformation or lack of knowledge of the issues involved. In fact, 39% of the respondents last year said they didn't know whether the "Republic of China on Taiwan" had a communist government or not! 29% did not know if the Mainland was communist or not.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 6/20/00 STATE NLC-00-136

BY BAE NARS. DATE 6/23/03

6. The Chinese have said that they will only agree to full diplomatic recognition and exchange of regular Ambassadors with us if we break diplomatic relations with the government on Taiwan which also claims to be the legitimate government of China. Do you think we should break relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan in order to establish such relations with Mainland China?

7. The Chinese have also said that in order to establish full diplomatic relations with us the U.S. must also terminate its defense treaty with the government on Taiwan. Do you think we should terminate that defense treaty in order to establish relations with Mainland China?

8. In regard to the entire issue of full diplomatic relations with Mainland China, would your opinion be changed if the Mainland Chinese would publicly state their intention to settle the question of Taiwan peacefully, and if we were able to maintain all present commercial relations with Taiwan, including arms sales?

9. In considering the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Mainland China, how important is it to you personally that the U.S. continue our interest in the security of the people of Taiwan?

10. Suppose the United States broke off diplomatic and defense treaty relations with the Republic of China, on Taiwan, and established full diplomatic relations with Mainland China, on the assumption that Mainland China would not use force against Taiwan. And suppose further that sometime later Mainland China attacked Taiwan in order to take it over. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. coming directly to the defense of Taiwan with our naval and air forces?

11. In the event of such an attack, would you favor or oppose helping Taiwan defend itself by sending military supplies only, without involving our own armed forces?

Attachment: Policy Perspectives from Potomac Associates

With this in mind, I would suggest questions that tried to test the degree to which American attitudes towards normalization would be affected by different circumstances on Taiwan after normalization. Here are some illustrative questions, building from, but not identical to, those asked by Potomac Associates:

1. What is your general attitude towards Mainland China: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?
2. What is your general attitude towards the Republic of China on Taiwan: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

While I find both these questions somewhat vague, they were asked last year in a longer form, and it might be useful to see if there is any significant shift. 1977 answers can be found on page 28-29 of pamphlet.

3. Mainland China is anxious to prevent the increase of Soviet power and influence in Asia and other parts of the world. We have fundamental political and ideological differences with China. Do you think the U.S. should:

a. Assist China to build up its military strength to resist Soviet power and influence, or should we not help China in this way?

b. Sell China advanced technology, such as computers, to assist them in speeding up their economic development?

4. Two different governments claim to be the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. Which one do you think is the legitimate government of China -- the government on the Mainland in Peking, or the one on the Island of Taiwan? (This is an informational question, and could be dropped.)

5. How important do you think it is for the United States to establish full diplomatic relations with Mainland China -- very important, fairly important, not particularly important, not important at all, don't know. (Asked in longer form last year.)

December 17, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Hamilton Jordan
SUBJECT: Proposed call to Nixon on Normalization

Having President Ford publicly supporting normalization, has been very helpful. If we could gain President Nixon's public support, it would make it difficult for the Republicans to make this a partisan issue.

I would recommend that you consider calling President Nixon today and telling him that you would like to send your representative (possibly Mike Oksenberg) to review with him the details of normalization.

***ZB concurs. Nixon asked me Friday night to convey his congratulations to you and you could use that as the reason for the call. (Zbig)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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August 29, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR RICK INDERFURTH

FROM: DENNIS CHAPMAN ^{DLC}

SUBJECT: Secretary Vance's PRC Trip

The following highlights Secretary Vance's reports to the President on his meetings in Peking.

--Secretary Vance gave a two and one-half hour presentation on global issues during the first meeting on August 22 and the Chinese appeared primarily interested in the comments on Korea, the Soviet Union, India, and our policy to strengthen NATO. Foreign Minister Huang Hua frequently indicated his desire to discuss normalization and moved Tuesday's meeting to the morning, apparently to permit the PRC leaders more time to consider our views before responding on Wednesday. (TAB A)

--At the Tuesday meeting, the Chinese side was extremely attentive during the Secretary's presentation on our approach to normalization and appeared to have taken the presentation as a serious one. (TAB B)

--Teng Hsiao-ping, during Wednesday's session, reiterated the PRC's standard line on the Soviet threat and frequently raised and questioned parts of PRM-10. Regarding normalization, Teng had evidently studied our proposal carefully and concluded that it represented a retreat, not a forward step, from the 1975 position. Teng concluded by commenting that we should continue talking. The Secretary believes we are clearly launched on the "beginning of a long and undoubtedly difficult road." (TAB C)

--On the final day in Peking, Huang Hua discussed bilateral questions and seemed somewhat responsive to increasing trade, although he continued to tie trade to normalization. Chairman Hua, during an afternoon meeting, noted that normalization had been extensively discussed with Huang Hua and Teng and stressed that we should consider each others views further and continue our discussions. (TAB D)

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BY J NARS DATE 7/21/200

--On the way to the airport, Huang Hua emphasized the significance of the Secretary's meeting with Hua and Teng and said they were very pleased with the visit. In Tokyo, Secretary Vance briefed Prime Minister Fukuda on the results of the trip and discussed general aspects of Japanese-U.S. relations. (TAB E)

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