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INTRODUCTION

As we go into the Summer with the prospect of a visit from the new Israeli head of state and the possibility of a new Vance mission to the Middle East, I think that it is important that we appreciate and understand the special and potentially constructive role that the American Jewish community can play in this process.

I would compare our present understanding of the American Jewish lobby (vis-a-vis Israel) to our understanding of the American labor movement four years ago. We are aware of its strength and influence, but don't understand the basis for that strength nor the way that it is used politically. It is something that was not a part of our Georgia and Southern political experience and consequently not well understood.

I have attempted in the following pages to do several things:

- 1) Outline the reasons and the basis for the influence of the American Jewish community in the political life of our country;
- 2) Define and describe the mechanism through which this influence is used;
- 4) Describe - as I understand it - the present mood and situation in the American Jewish community as relates to you and your policies; and
- 5) Define a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community with the ultimate goal of gaining their understanding and/or support for our efforts to bring peace to the Middle East.

VOTING HISTORY

To appreciate the direct influence of American Jews on the political processes of our country, it is useful and instructive to review their extraordinary voting habits.

1. Of all measurable subgroups in the voting population, Jews vote in greater proportion to their actual numbers than any other group. In the recent Presidential election, for example, American Jews - who comprise less than 3% of the population - cast almost 5% of the total vote.

2. Of all subgroups in the voting population, Jews register and vote in larger numbers than any other group. Voter turnout among Jewish voters measures close to 90% in most elections.

3. Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic. Heavy support for the Democratic Party and its candidates was founded in the immigrant tradition of the second and

third generation of American Jews and reinforced by the policies and programs of Wilson and Roosevelt. Harry Truman's role in the establishment of Israel cemented this party identification. And despite an occasional deviation, Jewish identification with the Democratic Party has remained intact and generally stable despite economic and educational pressures which have traditionally undermined party identification.

In recent national elections, Jewish voters have given the Democratic candidates the bulk of their vote, ranging from the low received by McGovern (75%) to the high received by Humphrey (90%). You received approximately 75% of the Jewish vote nationwide.

4. As Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic and turn out in large numbers, their influence in primaries is often decisive. In New York State, Jews comprise 12% of the population but traditionally cast about 28% of the votes in Democratic statewide primaries. In New York City, the Jewish population is 20% but Jews cast

about 55% of the votes in the citwide Democratic primaries.

5. The variance in turnout between Jewish voters and other important subgroups in the voting population is staggering and serves to inflate the importance of the Jewish voter. Again, New York State is the best case in point. In New York, Jews and blacks comprise about the same percentage of the state's population. Whereas the turnout in the black community was 35% in the recent Presidential election, the turnout in the Jewish community was over 85%. This means that about 500,000 blacks voted in this election and about 1,200,000 Jews voted. You received 94% of the black vote and 75% of the Jewish vote. This means that for every black vote you received in the election, you received almost two Jewish votes.

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Nowhere in American politics is Jewish participation more obvious and disproportionate than in the area of financial support for political candidates and political parties. But it is a mistake to take note of Jewish contributions to political campaigns without seeing this in the larger context of the Jewish tradition of using one's material wealth for the benefit of others.

The amount of money the American Jewish community contributes to political campaigns is slight when compared to the monies contributed to favorite charities. In 1976, the American Red Cross raised approximately \$200 million. In that same year, Jewish charities raised \$3.6 billion. In the two week period following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the American Jewish community raised over one billion dollars.

Whereas disproportionate Jewish voting is only politically significant in areas where Jewish voters are concentrated, Jewish contributions to political campaigns are disproportionate nationally and in almost every area of the country.

Some facts that confirm this premise:

- Out of 125 members of the Democratic National Finance Council, over 70 are Jewish;
- In 1976, over 60% of the large donors to the Democratic Party were Jewish;
- Over 60% of the monies raised by Nixon in 1972 was from Jewish contributors;
- Over 75% of the monies raised in Humphrey's 1968 campaign was from Jewish contributors;
- Over 90% of the monies raised by Scoop Jackson in the Democratic primaries was from Jewish contributors;
- In spite of the fact that you were a long shot and came from an area of the country where there is a smaller Jewish community, approximately 35% of our primary funds were from Jewish supporters.

Wherever there is major political fundraising in this country, you will find American Jews playing a signif-

icant role. As a result, Bob Dole is particularly sensitive to the tiny Jewish community in Kansas because it is not so small in terms of his campaign contributions.

THE JEWISH LOBBY

Having previously discussed and established the great influence that American Jews have on the political processes of our country, it is equally important to understand the mechanism through which much of this influence is wielded.

When people talk about the "Jewish lobby" as relates to Israel, they are referring to American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). AIPAC is an aggregate of 32 separate organizations which was formed in 1956 in response to John Foster Dulles' complaint that he did not know which of the many Jewish groups to deal with.

The member organizations of AIPAC, although active on behalf of their own organizations on domestic issues, have ceded to AIPAC overall responsibility for representing their collective interests on foreign policy (Israel) to the Congress.

It is important to understand that AIPAC has one continuing priority - the welfare of the state of Israel as perceived by the American Jewish community. AIPAC has wisely resisted efforts to broaden their scope and has continually concentrated on the issues that relate to Israel.

Leadership/Organization

AIPAC is headed by Executive Director Morris Amitay and Legislative Director Ken Wollack. As an umbrella organization, AIPAC is composed of every major Jewish group in the United States, including:

- American Jewish Congress
- American Mizrachi Women
- American Zionist Federation
- Anti Defamation League
- B'nai B'rith
- B'nai B'rith Women
- B'nai Zion

- Central Conference of American Rabbis
- Hadassah
- Jewish Labor Committee
- Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation
- Jewish War Veterans
- Labor Zionist Alliance
- National Committee for Labor-Israel
- National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods
- National Jewish Community Relations Council
- National Jewish Welfare Board
- North American Jewish Youth Council
- Pioneer Women
- Rabbinical Council of America
- Rabbinical Assembly
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations
- Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
- United Synagogue of America
- Womens' League for Conservative Judaism
- World Zionist Organization
- Zionist Organization of America
- Council of Jewish Federation and Welfare Funds

Although the combined membership of these organizations is only several million, their collective mobilizing ability is unsurpassed in terms of the quality and quantity of political communications that can be triggered on specific issues perceived to be critical to Israel. When AIPAC feels that the interests of Israel might be affected by a legislative or executive action, their target lists are mailgrammed.

Several thousand mailgrams to the leadership of the member organizations can be counted on to generate thousands of telegrams, letters and telephone calls for pivotal Congressman and/or Senators. As vote counts are developed, targeted efforts by AIPAC are accelerated. Key Jewish leaders and/or financial contributors are encouraged to visit personally the wavering legislator.

Qualitatively, the principal contacts are articulate, bright and well informed on issues related to Israel. They do not have to be briefed, and many have visited Israel and speak with first-hand knowledge of the

issues they are lobbying on. The organizations and people represented by the AIPAC umbrella are the most motivated and skilled primary contact group in the country. They have good relations with other important political constituencies (labor groups, civil rights organizations, etc.) and will not hesitate to use the pulpit to generate support for those issues perceived as being critical to Israel.

The cumulative impact of the Jewish lobby is even greater when one considers the fact that their political objectives are pursued in a vacuum. There does not exist in this country a political counterforce that opposes the specific goals of the Jewish lobby. Some would argue that even the potential for such a counterforce does not exist. It is even questionable whether a major shift in American public opinion on the issue of Israel would be sufficient to effectively counter the political clout of AIPAC.

Support for Israel in the Senate

The following is a brief analysis of the support for

Israel in the United States Senate. On a given issue where the interests of Israel are clear and directly involved, AIPAC can usually count on 65-75 votes. Their breakdown of support in the Senate follows:

Hard Support/Will Take Initiative

Anderson
Bayh
Brooke
Bentsen
Case*
Church*
Cranston
Danforth
DeConcini
Dole
Eagleton
Glenn*
Heinz
Humphrey*
Inouye
Jackson
Javitz*
McIntyre
Matsunaga
Metzenbaum
Moynihan
Morgan
Packwood
Ribicoff
Riegle
Sarbanes*
Schweiker
Stone*
Zorinsky
Williams

*Member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Local Leaders from Key Communities - About 80% of the American Jews are situated in ten cities and/or areas (See attached listing).

Persons with Close Relationships with Israeli Government Officials - There are a number of persons who have unofficially represented Israeli interests in our country and have close ties to the leadership of the Israeli government. With the Labor Party out of power, this will change; but it is inevitable that the new government will develop close ties with some of the leadership of the American Jewish community. We should develop relationships with these people.

In the following pages, I have outlined a program that will allow us to take the initiative in dealing with the American Jewish community in a positive manner. Using very little of any one person's time, we could begin and complete this consultation process in the next eight weeks. This plan is targeted at the groups and individuals previously mentioned.

At the end of the process, I believe that we would have the good faith and trust of the American Jewish community going into the next stage of talks. It is difficult for me to envision a meaningful peace settlement without the support of the American Jewish community.

To develop a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community, it is first necessary to develop a list of individuals, groups and institutions who should be reached.

They include:

Key members of the U.S. Senate - Senators like Humphrey, Jackson, Ribicoff and Church who have been close to Israel and supported it in the Congress.

Key members of the U.S. House - A comparable group in the House who have been close to Israel.

Jewish members of the House - There are 22 members of the House who are Jewish (See attached listing).

Senate Foreign Relations Committee - It is important to keep them informed and involved.

House International Affairs Committee - It is important to keep them informed and involved.

The American Jewish Press - The American Jewish Press is a powerful instrument for pro-Israeli statements, news and solicitations. These papers - collectively - provide the main analysis of American policy vis-a-vis Israel to the American Jewish Community.

Leaders of National Jewish Organizations - The lay, political and religious leadership of the Jewish community.

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

| | President | Vice-President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Adviser | Surrogate(s) |
|--------|---|--|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Week 1 | Working session with key members of the United States Senate ¹ (1 hour) | Same as President | Briefing for House Committee on International Relations | - | - | - |
| Week 2 | Briefing #1 for leaders of national Jewish organizations (1 hour) | Working session with key members of the House ² | - | - | Coordinates President's briefing | - |
| Week 3 | Briefing #1 for key members of the Jewish press (1 hour) | Briefing #2 for leaders of national Jewish organizations | <u>Briefing New York City</u> | - | Coordinates briefings | <u>Briefing in Miami - Lipshut and Eizenstat</u> |
| Week 4 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #1 (30 minutes) | Briefing #2 for key members of the Jewish press | - | <u>Briefing Los Angeles</u> | Coordinates briefings | - |

¹Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.

²Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jewish constituencies

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

| | President | Vice-President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Adviser | Surrogate(s) |
|--------|--|---|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| Week 5 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #2 (30 minutes) | <u>Briefing Boston</u> | - | - | Coordinates briefing | Briefing in Baltimore - <u>Lipshutz & Eizenstat</u> |
| Week 6 | - | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #3 | <u>Briefing Chicago</u> | - | Coordinates briefing | - |
| Week 7 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #4 (30 minutes) | - | - | <u>Briefing Detroit</u> | Coordinates briefing | Briefing in <u>Philadelphia</u> |
| Week 8 | - | <u>Briefing Cleveland</u> | - | - | <u>Briefing Washington</u> | - |

Jewish Members of the U. S. House of Representatives

Tony Bieleon, D -Calif.
Dan Glickman, D-Kansas
Ted Weiss, D-NY
Marc Marks, R-Pa.
Elizabeth Holtzman, D-NY
Ed Koch, D-NY
Richard Ottinger, D-NY
Fred Richmond, D-NY
Ben Rosenthal, D-NY
Jim Scheuyer, D-NY
Stephen Solarz, D-NY
Lester Wolfe, D-NY
Ben Gilman, R-NY
Abner Mikva, D-Ill.
Sidney Yates, D-Ill. (Dean of Jewish Delegation)
Elliot Levitas, D-Ga.
John Krebs, D-Calif.
Henry Waxman, D-Calif.
Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa.
Willis Gardison, R-Ohio
Gladys Spellman, D-Md.
William Lehman, D-Fla.

MAJOR CENTERS OF JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

| City/Area | Jewish Population | Percent of Total Jewish Population |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. New York - N.E. New Jersey | 2,687,000 | 46.5 |
| 2. Los Angeles | 500,000 | 8.7 |
| 3. Philadelphia | 330,000 | 5.7 |
| 4. Chicago | 269,000 | 4.7 |
| 5. Boston | 208,000 | 3.6 |
| 6. Miami | 130,000 | 2.2 |
| 7. Washington, D. C. | 100,000 | 1.7 |
| 8. Baltimore | 100,000 | 1.7 |
| 9. Cleveland | 85,000 | 1.5 |
| 10. Detroit | 85,000 | 1.5 |
| <hr/> | | |
| TOTAL: | 4,500,000 | 77.8% |

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

If you agree with the premises stated in this memorandum and the recommendations presented, I would recommend the following actions:

1. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig and Frank Moore to discuss the overall consultation process with the Congress.

I agree.

Lets talk first.

Include Cy

2. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig, Frank Moore, Bob Lipshutz and Stu to discuss the overall consultation process with the American Jewish community.

I agree.

Lets talk first.

3. That I undertake a planning process that attempts to: 1) inventory our political resources; 2) develop a specific workplan for each foreign policy initiative that focuses on public education; and 3) develop an informal mechanism for the overall

coordination of this process. I would plan to
work closely with Zbig on all of this.

✓
_____ I agree.

_____ Lets talk.

THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

For many years, the American Jewish community has simply reflected the attitudes and goals of the government of Israel. The American Jewish community has seldom questioned - or had reason to question - the wisdom of the policies advocated by the Israeli government. The tremendous financial and political support provided to Israel by the American Jewish community has been given with "no strings attached."

One of the potential benefits of the recent Israeli elections is that it has caused many leaders in the American Jewish community to ponder the course the Israeli people have taken and question the wisdom of that policy. As a result, I think that there is a good chance that the American Jewish community will

be less passive and more inclined to provide the new government advice as well as support.

This new situation provides us with the potential for additional influence with the Israeli government through the American Jewish community, but at present we are in a poor position to take advantage of it.

The American Jewish community is very nervous now for a combination of internal and external reasons.

It is important that we understand the reasons for their apprehension.

1. The election of a new President whose policies have been developed and presented in a manner different from previous Administrations. It is not so much what you have said as the fact that the things you have said ("defensible borders", "homeland for the Palestinians", etc.) have been publicly discussed. The leadership of the American Jewish community has heard

these things before, but they were always said privately with ample reassurances provided.

2. You are not known personally to most of the national Jewish leaders. And even those that know you have not worked with you over a long period of time at the national level on matters of direct interest to Israel. Whereas they know and instinctively trust a Humphrey or a Jackson, you are less well known and more unpredictable.

3. The cumulative effect of your statements on the Middle East and the various bilateral meetings with the heads of state has been generally pleasing to the Arabs and displeasing to the Israelis and the American Jewish community. You have discussed publicly things that have only been said before privately to the Israelis with reassurances. Press reports of your meetings with the Arabs were always

very positive while your meeting with Rabin was described as being "very cool". The simple fact that there were four Arab heads of state to meet with - and each meeting was perceived accurately as being positive and constructive - and only one meeting with the Israeli head of state - which was widely reported as being unsuccessful - added to this perception problem.

4) The election of Begin has resulted in widespread uncertainty among the Jewish community in this country. The leadership of the American Jewish community has had close personal relationships with the leadership of the Labor Party since the creation of the state of Israel. They do not have the same close relationship with the leaders of the Likud Party and are suddenly dealing with new and unpredictable leadership in both countries.

5) With the election of Begin, the American Jewish community sees for the first time the possibility of

losing American public support for Israel if the new
government and its leaders prove to be unreasonable
in its positions and attitudes. This would put the
American Jewish community in the terrible position of
seeing its emotional and political investment in
Israel over the past 30 years rapidly eroded.

TAKING THE INITIATIVE WITH THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

I think it is accurate to say that the American Jewish community is extremely nervous at present. And although their fears and concerns about you and your attitude toward Israel might be unjustified, they do exist. In the absence of immediate action on our part, I fear that these tentative feelings in the Jewish community about you (as relates to Israel) might solidify, leaving us in an adversary posture with the American Jewish community.

If the American Jewish community openly opposed your approach and policy toward a Middle East settlement, you would lack the flexibility and credibility you will need to play a constructive role in bringing the Israelis and the Arabs together. I am sure you are familiar with Kissinger's experience in the Spring of 1975, when the Jewish lobby circulated a letter which had the names of

75 Senators which reaffirmed U. S. support in a way
that completely undermined the Ford-Kissinger hope for
a new peace initiative.*

APIC's Unofficial Listing of Carter Actions/Statements
on Middle East Since Taking Office *

1. Denial of CBUs.
2. Denial of Kfir sale to Equador.
3. Approval of HAWK and Maverick Missiles to Saudi Arabia.
4. Castigation of Israel over Gulf of Suez oil drilling.
5. Carter statement on "minor adjustments" during Rabin visit and retraction of statement on "defensible borders."
6. Carter leaks on nonproductivity of meeting with Rabin.
7. Carter remark on "Palestinian homeland" at Clinton Town Meeting.
8. Carter greets PLO representative at U.N. reception.
9. Vance statement that the U. S. would make its suggestions on all the core issues of the Middle East and that the difference between suggestions and a U.S. plan was only one of semantics.
10. Carter statement that he would "not hesitate...to use the full strength of our country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement."
11. Carter statement that "borders of Palestine" was a core issue of the conflict.
12. Excessive laudation by Carter of Sadat, Hussein, Fahd and particularly Assad.
13. PRM-12.
14. Powell statement on "recognized borders" of a Palestinian homeland.
15. May 26th Carter statement on Palestinian homeland and compensation and his suggestion that American Jews and the U. S. Congress moderate Begin.
16. Powell clarification of May 26th statement of Carter referring to U. S. support for U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194.

(continued on next page)

* given to me by Morris Amitay



(APIC's Unofficial Listing of Carter Actions/Statements
on Middle East Since Taking Office - continued)

17. Delay of Israeli requests for coproduction agreements and advanced weapons, i.e., FLIRs, F-16, Grummen Hydrofoil patrol boats, Gabriel missile components.
 18. Denial of Kfir sales to the Phillipines and Taiwan.
 19. The paucity of statements by Carter since the March 16th Clinton Town Meeting on defining the nature of peace.
 20. Private statements by Carter that the Arab leaders all desire peace and that Israel is less forthcoming.
 21. Administration support for weakening amendments to anti-boycott legislation.
-

Sympathetic/Can Be Counted On In Showdown

Allen
Baker
Bumpers
Byrd, H.
Byrd, R.
Cannon
Chiles
Curtis
Biden
Chafee
Clark
Culver
Domenici
Durkin
Ford
Gravel
Hart
Haskell
Hathaway
Hayakawa
Huddleston
Johnston
Kennedy
Laxalt
Leahy
Lugar
Magnuson
Mathias
Muskie
Nelson
Nunn
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Roth
Sasser
Stafford
Stevens
Talmadge
Tower
Weicker

Questionable/Depends on Issue

Bartlett
Bellmon
Burdick
Eastland
Garn
Goldwater
Griffin
Hansen
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Long
McClellan
McGovern
Melcher
Metcalf
Schmidt
Scott
Stennis
Sparkman
Thurmond
Wallop
Young

Generally Negative

Abourezk
McClure
Hatfield

Summary

| | |
|----------|----------------------------------|
| 31 | Hard Votes |
| 43 | Sympathetic/Count On In Showdown |
| 23 | Depends on Issue |
| <u>3</u> | Generally Negative |
| 100 | |

To gain a majority on any issue before the Senate, the Jewish lobby has only to get its "hard" votes and half of the votes of those that are "sympathetic". This would concede all of the votes of those in third category.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

- 1945: World War II ends with six million European Jews murdered by Nazi Germany. Hundreds of thousands of survivors seek entry into the Mandate of Palestine, which is controlled by the UK. British policy bars all but a few thousand.
- 1946: The Jewish community of Palestine, already 500,000 strong, begins a campaign to bring in displaced persons through the British blockade. Many blockade-running ships are seized by the British, (e.g. "Exodus") and the people aboard are interned on Cyprus.
- Jewish guerrillas (Irgun-Begin) begin a campaign to smuggle in Jews and undermine British control of the Mandate.
- Haj Amin el Husseini, the Grand Mufti, the leader of the Mandate's Arabs and a wanted Nazi collaborator and war criminal returns to the Middle East and begins a terror campaign against Jews and moderate Arabs.
- Britain unilaterally grants independence to 80% of the Mandate of Palestine, producing the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan (now Jordan).
- 1947: The UN dispatches a Special Committee on Palestine, composed of smaller nations. The UNSCOP recommends that the remaining Palestine Mandate be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab state.
- The General Assembly votes on November 29 to partition the Mandate. Within two days, Arabs call a general strike and begin a campaign of terror against Jews and the British.
- 1948: On May 15, Israel declares its independence. The armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Lebanon invade the new state within hours. Despite initial Arab victories, Israeli forces repel the invaders within six months at the cost of 6,000 lives.
- 1949: Israeli and Arab delegations meet on the Isle of Rhodes, but the Arabs refuse to sit in the same room with the Israelis. Under the U.N.'s Dr. Ralph Bunche, armistice agreements are reached, establishing lines of truce.
- Jordan begins its occupation of the West Bank, which was to have composed most of the Arab Palestinian state. The West Bank is later annexed by Jordan.
- Egypt occupies Gaza, and institutes military rule over its inhabitants.
- Israel establishes the "law of return", begins assimilation of 1.5 million immigrants who will arrive in next 20 years, including some 700,000 from Arab lands.
- 1951: Palestinians assassinate Jordan's King Abdullah in Jerusalem in front of then-Prince Hussein. Abdullah's son, Talal, succeeds but is adjudged insane, and is succeeded by his son Hussein, in 1953.
- Egypt begins terrorist attacks against Israeli settlements.
- 1952: Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers (including Anwar Sadat) overthrow King Farouk and establish a republic in Egypt.
- 1955: Nasser signs a major arms deal with the USSR, which, through Czechoslovakia, delivers jet aircraft, tanks and artillery to Egypt. This is the first Russian entrance into the Middle East since the time of the Tsars.

- 1956: Egypt steps up its terror against Israel, killing dozens of Israelis.
Egypt unilaterally annexes the Suez Canal, heretofore controlled by the UK.
In response to Egyptian terror attacks, Israel launches a salient into the Sinai in coordination with a French/British invasion to regain the Suez Canal.
- 1957: Under extreme pressure from Pres. Eisenhower and Sec. of State Dulles, Israel withdraws from Sinai. Egypt refuses to honor its pledges to the U.S. to open the Suez Canal to Israel, to not re-occupy Gaza, and to begin negotiations towards peace.
- 1962: The Imam of Yemen is overthrown by pro-Soviet military rebels. A civil war begins with Egypt and Saudi Arabia backing rival sides.
- 1964: Nasser organizes the Palestine Liberation Organization in an attempt to compete with the rival Syrian regime.
- 1966: Syria steps up artillery bombardment from the Golan Heights of Israeli farmers in the Galilee.
Syria and Jordan begin work on a project to divert the sources of the Jordan River, in order to cut off Israel's major water source.
- 1967: The USSR falsely tells Syria that Israel is planning to attack it.
Egypt mobilizes, and orders the UN buffer force in Sinai (placed there after the 1956 war) to leave.
Egypt sends five divisions into Sinai and Gaza. Syria mobilizes two divisions in Golan. Jordan readies two divisions in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
Nasser orders that the Straits of Tiran, opened in 1956, be blockaded at Sharm el-Sheikh and closed to all Israeli shipping.
Iraq and Saudi Arabia move their troops to Israel's borders.
Responding to the Arab blockade, threats, and war preparations, Israel launches the Six Day War, destroying the armies of Egypt and Syria, and occupying the nearby Arab military staging areas: Sinai, Gaza, Golan and West Bank.
Meeting at Khartoum, the Arab states agree to the "3 No's" Policy: No Peace, No recognition, No negotiations with Israel.
After two months of negotiation, the UN Security Council passes the purposefully ambiguous resolution 242, which calls for an end of belligerency, acknowledgement of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of every state in the region, the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal from territories (specifically and purposefully not "all") recently occupied and a just settlement of the refugee problem.
- 1968: PLO terrorist groups, led by Yassir Arafat's Fatah, begin a campaign against civilians in Israel and abroad.
- 1969: Nasser begins the War of Attrition to drive Israeli forces from the banks of the Suez Canal.
Arabs and Israelis both reject the peace plan of Sec. William Rogers.

1970: The War of Attrition becomes a major conflict. With Soviet airmen actively joining air battles, the U.S. achieves a cease-fire. Within hours, despite pledges from the USSR and Egypt, a massive SAM missile network is installed up to the banks of the canal by the Soviets and Egyptians.

Palestinian guerrillas of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine who are operating from Jordan try to overthrow King Hussein, forcing a civil war known as Black September during which the guerrillas are crushed and expelled from Jordan.

1971: The USSR begins a massive upgrading of the armed forces of Egypt and Syria, totaling more than \$4 billion by 1973.

1972: PLO-controlled Black September guerrillas murder 11 members of the Israeli Olympic Team at Munich.

Sadat, President of Egypt since Nasser's death in 1970, orders that 15,000 Soviet military advisors leave the country. Sadat later acknowledges that this was to throw Israel and the U.S. off of his war plans. Soviet-Egyptian military cooperation continues.

1973: Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir repeats Israel's annual call for direct negotiations with the Arab states.

Egypt and Syria, joined by the forces of nine other Arab states, invade Sinai and Golan on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year. At a cost of 2,600 dead, Israel defeats the Arab armies and is prevented from destroying the Egyptian Third Army by threats from Sec. Kissinger.

Arab oil producing states quadruple prices of crude oil and impose an embargo on the U.S.

Security Council Resolution 338 ends the conflict, reiterates Resolution 242 and calls for negotiations.

1974: Sec. Kissinger negotiates a separation of forces agreement between Egypt and Israel; Israel withdraws from mainland Egypt. Egypt refuses to open Suez to Israel.

Kissinger negotiates a similar separation agreement between Israel and Syria; Israel withdraws from part of the Golan.

Palestinian terrorists step up their campaign, murdering dozens in Israeli towns and villages.



1975: Kissinger tries and fails to negotiate a second Sinai agreement. A "reassessment" of U.S.-Israel relations is instituted in late March. In September, a Sinai II pact is reached. Egypt refuses to honor its pledges to end diplomatic warfare against Israel.

Israel gives up the strategic Sinai passes and the oil fields.

1976: Arabs initiate "Peace Offensive," designed to force a total Israeli withdrawal and establishment of a PLO state without normalization or Arab relations with Israel.

1949-1967 ARMISTICE LINES

WITH DETAILED VIEW
OF DISTANCE FACTORS
FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES



UNITED NATIONS
BUFFER ZONE

1949-1967 ARMISTICE LINES



ISRAEL-ADMINISTERED
TERRITORIES

POPULATION FIGURES AS OF JANUARY 1976

"The battle with Israel must be such that, after it, Israel will cease to exist."

President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya
al-Uebu al-Arabi (Beirut), quoted by
Algiers Radio, November 12, 1973

"After we perform our duty in liberating the West Bank and Jerusalem, our national duty is to liberate all the Arab occupied territories."

King Hussein of Jordan
Radio Amman, December 1, 1973

"Perhaps in ten years' time another decision will be taken to liquidate the arrogant enemy completely... We were asked, 'Why do you train the Young Lions? (boys' troops)' We replied, 'It is this generation which will reach the sea.'"

FLO Chairman Yassir Arafat
Voice of Palestine (San'a, Yemen Arab Rep.)
January 24, 1974

"...Palestine is not only a part of our Arab homeland, but a basic part of southern Syria."

President Hafez Assad of Syria
Radio Damascus, March 8, 1974

"...we shall respect the unanimous Arab will...giving the PLO sole responsibility to discuss, strive and work for the restoration of the occupied Palestinian territory, including the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as for Palestinian rights." (See following quote)

King Hussein of Jordan
Radio Amman, May 1, 1974

"If the rights of the Palestinian people are merely the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, then what did we fight for as an Arab nation in 1967?... we agreed on the presence of a delegation representing the PLO at the Geneva Conference...to discuss the Palestinian people's rights, which go beyond the June 5 (1967) lines."

Zeid al-Rifai
Prime Minister of Jordan
Radio Amman, May 12, 1974

"You are the generation that will reach the sea and hoist the flag of Palestine over Tel Aviv."

FLO Chairman Yassir Arafat
Speech to guerrilla training camp
ANSA from Cairo, July 25, 1974

"And Egypt has proclaimed the following Arab strategy: the need for the return of all the occupied territory, and the realization of the Palestinians' rights which only the Palestinians themselves are authorized to define." (See following three quotes)

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt
Radio Cairo, February 2, 1975

"...the revolution is marching with the tide of history and towards...a nationalist base from which our revolution and people will surge forward to continue the war of liberation and armed struggle, until the racist Zionist base falls and the democratic state in Palestine is established.

Editorial in Palastin ath-Thawrah
The official journal of the PLO
February 2, 1975

"...there is a minimal Palestinian national position. This minimum is the rejection of any recognition of the Zionist entity...our rejection of any settlement based on the continued existence of this foreign entity."

PFLP leader Dr. George Habash
Al-Bayrak, (Beirut), February 4, 1975

"We do not differ with the PLO on principles. We sometimes differ on tactics and methods."

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt
April 12, 1975, MENA

"The Zionist existence in our homeland is one of those errors which human history is witness to. This error cannot continue and is bound towards demise."

Editorial in Al-Ba'ath (Damascus)
The official organ of the ruling Ba'ath Party
May 2, 1975

"Syria's firm stand is the rock on which Israel shall be destroyed together with all imperialist, racist and Zionist plots."

Tewfik Hassan
Radio Damascus Commentator, November 25, 1975

"This racist entity in the Middle East must be destroyed and it will be destroyed one day."

Mansour Rashid Kikhia
Libyan Ambassador to the UN
Statement to Security Council, March 24, 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ HAMILTON JORDAN
LONDON BUTLER

FROM: RICK INDEBERTH *RI*

Attached is a copy of the "Middle East
Calendar" that I requested from Bill
Quandt. Most of the dates are his best
guess (but it's the best guess we have).

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HJ

Looking at NSC's list
and your proposed
policy consultation,
2 things stand out

During the 4th week-
(mainly briefings with
Jewish leaders & press)
Begin will be here,
obviously limiting President
time for these...
and during week of July 18-22
Vance will be in Middle
East, so someone else
would have to do Chicago
briefing or it could be
moved earlier.

E.

6/14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICK INDERFURTH
FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT *W.B.Q.*
SUBJECT: Middle East Calendar

Our Middle East calendar in coming weeks looks about as follows:

June 20 - 25 - Begin forms government.

June 21 Histadrut election in Israel.

June 27 - 30 - Possible Arab Summit to coordinate strategy.

July 5 - 7 Begin visits Washington.

Mid-July OPEC Conference on oil prices in Stockholm.

July 18 - 22 - Vance visits Middle East.

August Possible Pre-Geneva consultations in Washington or elsewhere.

Late September - UN General Assembly. Vance will meet Foreign Ministers of Middle East countries.

This is only a rough guess, and we will try to add items as they come along. For example, there may be an Arab move to call for a UNSC debate on the Middle East in July.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

| | President | Vice-President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Adviser | Surrogate(s) |
|---|--|---|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| <p><i>July 11</i></p> Week 5 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #2 (30 minutes) | Briefing <u>Boston</u> | - | - | Coordinates briefing | Briefing in <u>Baltimore</u> - <u>Lipshutz</u> & <u>Eizenstat</u> |
| <p><i>July 18</i></p> Week 6 | - | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #3 | Briefing <u>Chicago</u> | - | Coordinates briefing | - |
| <p align="center"><i>(Vance to handle post)</i></p> | | | | | | |
| <p><i>July 25</i></p> Week 7 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #4 (30 minutes) | - | - | Briefing <u>Detroit</u> | Coordinates briefing | Briefing in <u>Philadelphia</u> |
| <p><i>Aug 1</i></p> Week 8 | - | Briefing <u>Cleveland</u> | - | - | Briefing <u>Washington</u> | - |

FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION

| | President | Vice President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Advisor |
|---------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Week 1 | Nunn | Moynihan | Bentsen Ford | Glenn Chafee | Abourezk Bumpers |
| Week 2 | Stennis Talmadge | Hart Culver | Church Kennedy | Inouye Hollings | Griffin Domenici |
| Week 3 | Sparkman Eastland | Leahy Matsunaga | Muskie | Eagleton Clark | Durkin Danforth |
| Week 4 | Ribicoff Long | Sarbanes Nelson | Case Bayh | Zorinsky Hathaway | Gravel Schweicker |
| Week 5 | McClellan Cannon | Percy Heinz | Burdick Hatfield | Stafford Lugar | Roth Young |
| Week 6 | Morgan Sasser | Anderson Brooke | Mathias Stevenson | Magnuson Randolph | Goldwater Curtis |
| Week 7 | Johnston Stone | Williams DeConcini | Biden McGovern | Packwood Pearson | Hayakawa Wallop |
| Week 8 | Chiles Huddleston | Melcher Metcalf | | Allen Byrd, H. | Schmitt Hansen |
| Week 9 | McIntyre Haskell | Proxmire Weicker | | Stevens Laxalt | |
| Week 10 | Javits Metzenbaum | Reigle Pell | | Tower Thurmond | |

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

| | President | Vice-President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Adviser | Surrogate(s) |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| Week 1 | Working session with key members of the United States Senate ¹ (1 hour) | Same as President | Briefing for House Committee on International Relations | - | - | - |
| <i>June 15</i> | | | | | | |
| Week 2 | Briefing #1 for leaders of national Jewish organizations (1 hour) | Working session with key members of the House ² | - | - | Coordinates President's briefing | - |
| <i>June 20</i> | | | | | | |
| Week 3 | Briefing #1 for key members of the Jewish press (1 hour) | Briefing #2 for leaders of national Jewish organizations | Briefing <u>New York City</u> | - | Coordinates briefings | Briefing in <u>Miami - Lipsh</u> and <u>Fizenstat</u> |
| <i>June 21 Possible Arab Summit</i> | | | | | | |
| Week 4 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders ? Group #1 (30 minutes) | Briefing #2 for key members of the Jewish press | - | Briefing <u>Los Angeles</u> | Coordinates briefings | - |
| <i>July 4 Begin visit (5-7)</i> | | | | | | |

¹Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.



²Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jewish constituencies

FOREIGN POLICY CONSULTATION


| | President | Vice President | Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense | NSC Advisor |
|---------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Week 1 | Nunn | Moynihan | Bentsen Ford | Glenn Chafee | Abourezk Bumpers |
| Week 2 | Stennis Talmadge | Hart Culver | Church Kennedy | Inouye Hollings | Griffin Domenici |
| Week 3 | Sparkman Eastland | Leahy Matsunaga | Muskie | Eagleton Clark | Durkin Danforth |
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| Week 5 | McClellan Cannon | Percy Heinz | Burdick Hatfield | Stafford Lugar | Roth Young |
| Week 6 | Morgan Sasser | Anderson Brooke | Mathias Stevenson | Magnuson Randolph | Goldwater Curtis |
| Week 7 | Johnston Stone | Williams DeConcini | Biden McGovern | Packwood Pearson | Hayakawa Wallop |
| Week 8 | Chiles Huddleston | Melcher Metcalf | | Allen Byrd, H. | Schmitt Hansen |
| Week 9 | McIntyre Haskell | Proxmire Weicker | | Stevens Laxalt | |
| Week 10 | Javits Metzenbaum | Reagle Pell | | Tower Thrumond | |

CARTER WANTS ISRAEL TO NEGOTIATE WITH AMERICA INSTEAD OF WITH THE ARAB STATES. WELL, WE'RE READY!! AND BEGIN'S GOT THE MAPS SHOWING...

WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES



STAGE 1.



STAGE 2.



STAGE 3.



STAGE 4.



STAGE 5.

EVACUATION OF ILLEGAL SETTLEMENTS WEST OF THE 1763 PARTITION LINES.



STAGE 6.

DESCRIBED AS ENOUGH TERRITORY TO SATISFY AMERICA'S EXPANDING POPULATION FOR A HUNDRED, PERHAPS A THOUSAND GENERATIONS."

NOTE 1: AFTER ITS FINAL WITHDRAWAL TO A STATE SMALLER THAN ITS NAME, AMERICA WILL BE IN POSITION TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF ITS RIGHT TO EXIST.

NOTE 2: ALL AMERICANS WHOSE FAMILIES ARRIVED BEFORE 1776 WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN.

and NEW YORK... THE INTERNATIONALIZED CITY.

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purposes."

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PUT IN SAFE
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LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.

AN IN-DEPTH STUDY
OF THE VOTING PUBLIC OF ISRAEL

July 1977

Conducted by
LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.

A Word About This Study

Between June 24th and July 3rd, 1977, Louis Harris and Associates, through its affiliates in the state of Israel, undertook an in-depth study of public opinion in that country. In all, 1,026 Jewish voters, a cross-section of the Jewish electorate in the country, were surveyed in interviews which took 57 minutes on the average to conduct. In addition, 150 Arab voters nationwide were surveyed in a comparable interview. In all cases, indigenous Israeli interviewers did all of the surveying, with Jews interviewing Jews and Arabs interviewing Arabs. The field operation was supervised by Helene Sashin, a key executive from the Harris firm in New York.

The results of this study are confidential and are not intended for publication. The study or parts of it can be published only with the express consent of Louis Harris and Associates and the sponsors. If any part of the study is made public, then the Harris firm will be compelled to release the entire contents.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

The Basic Political Set in Israel Today

A clear plurality of the voters of Israel today are committed to a coalition government headed by the Likud. The following table sums up the depth of commitment of the entire electorate to the present political line-up in the country. The results are drawn from three separate questions put to both Arab and Jewish voters -- one asking them for whom they voted in the May national election, another asking them for whom they would vote if another election were held, and a third that asked them whom they "felt closest to in Israeli politics:"

THE BASIC PARTY PREFERENCES OF ISRAELI VOTERS TODAY

| | Voted In May 1977 Election | Would Vote In New Election | Party Feel Closest To Today | Voted in 1973 Election (Base: Voted in 1973) |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| | % | % | % | % |
| Likud | 37 | 38 | <u>37</u> | <u>24</u> |
| Mapai | 27 | 27 | <u>31</u> | <u>47</u> |
| Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) | 10 | 9 | 10 | X |
| National Religious Party | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 |
| New Communist Party | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Other | 6 | 3 | 4 | 8 |
| Not sure | 11 | 15 | 10 | 11 |

By any measure, the plurality preference of the Israeli electorate gives the Likud a clear edge over its chief rival, the Mapai or Labor coalition.

In fact, in any new election in the near-term future, the Likud lead in the May election would be widened marginally. However, in terms of basic loyalties, an 11-point Likud voting lead narrows to a 6-point edge.

Fundamentally, Israeli voters feel that a watershed was reached in May in the national election, and most voters are prepared to live with the results. By 56-21%, a majority feel that the new government will be in office for a full four years, despite the close 63-vote majority which the new Prime Minister has put together in the Knesset. Indeed, when the Jewish part of the electorate are asked how satisfied they are with the outcome of the May balloting, 41% say "highly satisfied," 28% "somewhat satisfied," and only 21% "not satisfied at all." Thus, by 69-21%, a sizeable majority are satisfied with the result. By contrast, among Arab voters, a 63-30% majority say they are "not satisfied at all," a phenomenon of unreconstructed difference which is evident among the Arab minority throughout this survey.

Keys to the Election Outcome

Each voter was in turn asked the extent to which 12 commonly assumed issues in the election in May were major reasons for their casting their votes the way they did. The table below sums up not only the rank order of importance of each issue with the electorate as a whole, but also with each key party and group's vote:

WHAT TRIGGERED THE OUTCOME OF THE MAY ELECTION

| Cited as Major Reasons for Voting Choice: | Total Electorate | Voted Likud | Voted Mapai | Voted DMC | Voted National Religious | Voted Arab Voters |
|---|------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Need for a strong leader | 76 | 84 | 70 | 67 | 72 | 52 |
| Need for a government that wants to make a just peace with the Arabs | 63 | 63 | 70 | 51 | 59 | 92 |
| Need for a government that could be tough in negotiating with the Arabs | 61 | 75 | 53 | 47 | 56 | 42 |
| Need to have experienced leaders running the government | 60 | 61 | 69 | 50 | 50 | 58 |
| Scandals among key leaders in the Labor government | 59 | 74 | 31 | 72 | 63 | 34 |
| Need to have a reform-minded government running Israel | 58 | 68 | 43 | 68 | 52 | 69 |
| Bad state of the economy here at home | 55 | 67 | 39 | 56 | 57 | 47 |
| Time for a change after so many years of Labor rule | 52 | 72 | 21 | 65 | 50 | 32 |
| Need for a government that would be able to get along with the United States | 47 | 47 | 58 | 33 | 35 | 23 |
| Need for a government that will not just do everything the U.S. government wants Israel to do | 41 | 51 | 34 | 33 | 32 | 11 |
| Desire to make certain that Israelis have the right to start settlements in Judea and Samaria | 36 | 53 | 21 | 11 | 44 | 18 |
| Need to have a government that is sensitive to what the religious parties stand for | 25 | 33 | 14 | 13 | 48 | 7 |

Six key issues clearly impacted most heavily on the election outcome:

-- The country clearly was in a mood to find a strong leader, and this issue tended to work more decisively for the Likud than any other party.

-- The need to have a government that wants to make peace with the Arabs was the second-highest ranking issue in the election. However, this issue tended to work more among those voting for the Mapai coalition than for the Likud or other parties.

-- The third most important reason also dealt with peace, but with the need for a government that "could be tough in negotiations with the Arabs." This issue worked decisively for the Likud.

-- The fourth top issue was "the need to have experienced leaders running the government," and this worked for the Mapai.

-- In fifth place emerged the "scandals among key leaders in the Labor government," which clearly brought voters to the Likud and the DMC.

-- And in sixth place was "the need to have a reform-minded government running Israel," an issue that again helped the Likud and the DMC.

On balance, then, the election hinged on the desire for a strong leader, embodied in the personal effectiveness of Menachim Begin, and the peace issue. While the Mapai was associated with a greater willingness to negotiate, the Likud reputation for being "tough in negotiations" allowed the peace issue to work for that party in the election, or at least to neutralize what might otherwise be a Mapai advantage.

As significant as the top six issues in the election might have been, the six that finished as "also rans" are also highly pertinent in interpreting what kind of mandate the new government has been given:

-- The "bad state of the economy" was an issue and tended to work for all of the "out" parties, including the Likud, DMC, and National Religious Party.

-- The notion that "it was time for a change after so many years of Labor rule" had some appeal and was particularly effective among Likud and DMC voters. However, this was not a dominant issue.

-- The dimension of relations with the United States was not one of the top issues by any measure, with well under a majority of the voters affected by it. One part of the issue, "the need for a government that would be able to get along with the United States," tended to work for the Mapai, and the other part, "the need for a government that will not just do everything the U.S. government wants Israel to do," also brought voters to the Likud. However, the inability of the ruling Labor government to use its perceived ties to the U.S. government simply did not have the drawing power that this issue might have had in past elections.

-- The so-called religious issues, summed up in making "certain that Israelis have the right to start settlements in Judea and Samaria" and "the need to have a government that is sensitive to what the religious parties stand for," simply were not major issues in this past election. While these issues mattered more to Likud and National Religious Party voters, even with these segments of the electorate the religious question

was not a high priority. It is fair to conclude that there is not a strong religious mandate to emerge from the recent Israeli election, despite the clear dependence of the Begin government on the religious parties for its parliamentary majority.

In a significant way, the major issues of concern to the electorate -- the substantive matters the voters now would like to see given a priority by the new government -- reflect the central triggers of the election:

-- A substantial 61% of the people feel that top priority should be given to "restoring the economic health of the Israel." Although this was not one of the top triggers in the election, it is obviously a basic matter, close to the daily lives of the people.

-- But close behind is "finding a way to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Arabs," given a top priority by 56%. The peace issue clearly shares top billing with the economic issue.

-- All other priorities receive a much lower order of attention -- 33% cite "running a scandal-free government," 29% "unifying the country," 20% "keeping good relations with the U.S.," 19% "handling strikes and demands of labor unions," 15% "bringing the most capable people into the government," 12% "inspiring the confidence of the people of Israel," 9% "adequate wages," 8% "getting military help from the U.S.," 8% "handling the question of allowing more religious settlements in the occupied West Bank," 4% "getting economic help from the U.S.," and 4% "receiving support from Jews who do not live in Israel."

The Political Map, by Key Demographic Groups

The following table lays out the basic current political affiliation (which party feel "closest to") in Israel today, broken out by key segments of the public:

BASIC PARTY AFFILIATIONS IN ISRAEL TODAY

| | Likud | Mapai | DMC | National Religious | New Communist |
|------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------------|---------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| <u>Total Electorate</u> | <u>37</u> | <u>31</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>3</u> |
| <u>Jewish</u> | <u>41</u> | <u>29</u> | <u>11</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>-</u> |
| <u>Age</u> | | | | | |
| 18-29 | 50 | 24 | 12 | 4 | - |
| 30-39 | 49 | 23 | 13 | 6 | - |
| 40-49 | 44 | 24 | 10 | 7 | - |
| 50-59 | 27 | 42 | 9 | 4 | - |
| 60 and over | 17 | 48 | 5 | 6 | - |
| <u>Education</u> | | | | | |
| 8th grade or less | 43 | 30 | 4 | 9 | - |
| High school | 45 | 29 | 10 | 3 | - |
| College | 32 | 29 | 21 | 5 | - |
| <u>Birth</u> | | | | | |
| Israeli born | 45 | 23 | 16 | 4 | - |
| Came through 1947 | 20 | 50 | 9 | 5 | - |
| Came 1948-1952 | 41 | 27 | 9 | 6 | - |
| Came 1953 or later | 47 | 29 | 8 | 6 | - |
| <u>Country of Father's Origin*</u> | | | | | |
| KEY TO ELECTION Asia | 49 | 20 | 10 | 6 | - |
| Africa | 55 | 21 | 3 | 7 | - |
| Other (EUROPE) | 7 | 42 | 2 | 1 | - |
| <u>Arab</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>42</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>27</u> |

*These data are for the actual vote in 1977, rather than the party felt closest to.

The party affiliation division within Israel is sharp and clear-cut:

-- The Likud has built its new plurality on the heavy backing of younger voters, the less well educated, those born in Israel, the newer immigrant groups, and those whose parents came from either Africa or Asia. Clearly, these groups are the ones who have felt most left out of the power structure that has ruled the country for most of its 29 years of existence.

-- The Mapai, now reduced to a definite minority status, is heavily rooted among older voters, those who came to the country prior to 1948, and voters whose original country of origin was European or Russian.

-- The DMC draws most heavily among young voters, the college educated, Sabras, and those whose parents were born in Asia.

-- The National Religious Party finds its base among those whose education was least formal, the later immigrant groups, and those whose parents came from Asia and Africa.

Expectations and Assessments of the New Prime Minister

By a decisive 59-25%, a majority of Israeli Jews are convinced that Prime Minister Begin will do a "good-to-excellent" job as the new head of state.

Here is a rundown of the expected performance of the new Prime Minister in 12 key areas:

-
 EXPECTED PERFORMANCE OF PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
 IN SPECIFIC AREAS

| | <u>Positive</u> % | <u>Negative</u> % | <u>Not Sure</u> % |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| Handling the question of allowing more religious settlements in the occupied West Bank area | 70 | 18 | 12 |
| Receiving support from Jews who do not live in Israel | 69 | 19 | 12 |
| Running a scandal-free government | 65 | 21 | 14 |
| Inspiring the confidence of the people of Israel | 61 | 24 | 15 |
| Handling strikes and demands of labor unions | 59 | 28 | 13 |
| Getting economic help from the U.S. | 58 | 28 | 14 |
| Getting military help from the U.S. | 58 | 28 | 14 |
| Keeping good relations with the United States | 58 | 31 | 11 |
| Unifying the country | 56 | 30 | 14 |
| Restoring health to the Israeli economy | 55 | 30 | 15 |
| Bringing the most capable people into the government | 53 | 34 | 13 |
| Finding a way to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Arabs | 48 | 40 | 12 |

It is significant that, on every count tested, the Israeli electorate are optimistic about the future performance of the new Prime Minister. However, it should be noted that optimism is lowest about "finding a way to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Arabs," a first sign of the pessimism in the country about the real prospects for permanent peace.

It is also significant that no more than a 55-30% majority believe Mr. Begin will be able to restore economic health to the country.

By contrast, Israeli Jewish voters are highly optimistic about Prime Minister Begin's ability to properly handle the question of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, receiving support from Jews who do not live in Israel, running a scandal-free government, and inspiring confidence from the people. This last dimension, on which he receives a 61-24% positive expected rating, is another sign that most Israelis are convinced that the Begin government will be able to remain in office for a full four years. Indeed, by 56-21%, a majority expect precisely that eventuality: a full four-year rule by the new leader.

On a more personal dimension, Prime Minister Begin emerges as being an inspirational, experienced, able new leader, who will be both a tough negotiator with the Arabs and one who will not "give in easily on Israel's best interests." By the same token, a sizeable majority are worried about his health, feel he is not experienced in dealing with the U.S., and may have trouble bringing the best leaders into his government. By a narrow plurality, however, most Israelis do not believe "he is too rigid and not flexible enough in foreign affairs."

Here is a summary of the Begin profile, as drawn from this survey:

BEGIN PROFILE

| | <u>Agree</u> % | <u>Disagree</u> % | <u>Not Sure</u> % |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Positive</u> | | | |
| <u>He is tough and will not give in easily on Israel's best interests</u> | 77 | 12 | 11 |
| <u>He is an inspirational leader</u> | 65 | 17 | 18 |
| <u>He will be a tough, shrewd negotiator with the Arabs</u> | 64 | 21 | 15 |
| <u>He is an experienced leader of the biggest party and is well qualified to be Prime Minister</u> | 62 | 23 | 15 |
| <u>Negative</u> | | | |
| I worry about his health | 63 | 27 | 10 |
| He may have trouble bringing the best leaders into his government | 58 | 27 | 15 |
| He is not experienced in dealing with the United States | 46 | 40 | 14 |
| He is too rigid and not flexible in foreign affairs, and that is bad | 36 | 45 | 19 |

Israeli Relations With the U.S.

By an overwhelming 93-4%, the Israeli Jewish electorate is nearly unanimous in believing that the United States is friendly to Israel, far more than any other country in the world. For example, a 63-28% majority feel the same about Great Britain; a 68-24% majority the same about West Germany; a 52-33% majority the same about the Union of South Africa; and a 46-37% plurality believe Iran is friendly to Israel. By contrast, a 61-34% majority feel that France is unfriendly to Israel; by 61-32% that the U.N. is unfriendly; by 72-11% that the black states of Africa are unfriendly; by 94-1% that the Soviet Union is unfriendly; and by 85-2% that China is unfriendly to Israel.

By a thumping 74-20%, a sizeable majority of Israeli Jews are convinced that Israel could not defend itself militarily "without the support of the United States," almost identical to the 74-19% majority who felt the same in a comparable Harris survey of Israel back in 1970.

By the same token, a 76-19% majority of Jews feel that it would be "difficult if not impossible" for Israel to run its economy without "economic aid from the U.S. government."

Thus, it is immediately apparent that sizeable majorities of Israelis are well aware of the pivotal "life-line" role of the United States in their national economic and military existence. For example, by 61-26%, a majority of Israeli Jews are convinced that Israel cannot become self-sufficient in producing its own military equipment and supplies in the next five years. This is even higher than the 54-35% majority who felt that way in Israel back in 1970.

Despite this acknowledged central role of the U.S. government in

the survival of Israel, the electorate in that country do not think Prime Minister Begin will have an easy time dealing with the United States. A substantial 35% of all Israeli Jewish voters feel he will have "a great deal of difficulty" in getting on with the U.S., another 45% feel he will have "some but not a lot" of difficulty, while only 14% believe he will have "not much difficulty at all."

One of the keys to the future of Israeli-U.S. relations is the fact that President Carter is something of an enigma with Israeli public opinion. On the overall job he is doing as President, Mr. Carter is given positive marks by a 48-42% margin. LOWER THAN MOST PRESIDENTS He is rated 52-39% positive by Likud Party adherents and an even higher 57-30% positive by National Religious Party followers. POPULAR WITH LIKUD But among Mapai supporters, his rating is no better than 49-43%.

By contrast, President Carter's statements about Israel receive a 66-26% negative rating from the Jews. Only the Arabs, who give his statements a ringing 73-20% endorsement, are positive about his stated views on Israel. It is not hard to find which Carter statements are found to be disturbing to Israeli public opinion: by 84-11%, a lopsided majority of the Jewish electorate report being "worried" by Carter statements that "the Palestinians should have a homeland." An almost identical 84-11% majority are more worried than pleased by his statements that "to insure its defenses, Israel should return to its 1967 borders, except for neutral buffer zones and except for Jerusalem, which would remain in Israeli hands." By the same token, an overwhelming 82-13% majority of Jewish Israelis are pleased by the President's statements that, "In a war, the U.S. would never let Israel down."

Israeli Jews tend to place great store by their ties with Jews in the

United States. By 90-3%, they favor "building closer ties" with Jewry in America. A 69-19% majority believe Mr. Begin will do a positive job in getting the support of American and other Jews outside Israel. A majority of 55% hold the view that "Jews in America have a great deal of influence on the American Congress," with another 31% who believe they have "some influence," and only 4% holding the view that they have "hardly any." In the case of President Carter, a smaller 39% feel American Jews have a "great deal of influence," 41% "some," but only 10% feel "hardly any."

When asked about "American Jews who have been openly critical of President Carter for not standing firmly by Israel," a 70-20% majority of Israeli Jews feel such criticism is "helpful to Israel." A 66-27% majority of Arabs disagree. By contrast, a 52-36% majority of Israeli Jews feel that "American Jews who have been openly critical of Prime Minister Begin for being too rigid on peace" are "not justified in their criticism." A 70-24% majority of Israeli Arabs feel such charges by American Jews are justified.

It is evident that Israelis are well aware of the close and indispensable links Israel must have with the U.S. to survive economically and militarily. They foresee a period of delicate and even difficult negotiations between Prime Minister Begin and President Carter. In the end, however, they think the basic, underlying friendship of the U.S. will prevail, albeit helped along by American Jews who will be able to apply real influence at the Congressional and, to a lesser extent, White House levels. Although a clear majority of Israeli Jewish voters are critical of President Carter's statements about Israel, nonetheless a narrow 48-42% plurality give him positive marks on his overall performance to date.

And when asked if they feel they "could trust President Carter as a friend of Israel or not," a 45-35% plurality of Israeli Jews and an even higher 65-25% majority of Israeli Arabs think he could be trusted. Significantly, among Likud followers, a higher 51-31% majority feel Mr. Carter can be trusted as a friend of Israel.

The Critical Issue of Peace

On a wide assortment of issues not directly related to peace negotiations, Israeli public opinion is clearly supportive of some early positions staked out by Prime Minister Begin. This is important news, for it means that the new Israeli leader apparently will not be beset internally by deep divisions on issues other than the pivotal issue of peace.

For example, an 81-13% majority of Israeli Jews favor "the government taking drastic steps to control inflation;" an 81-10% majority support "the government putting in a system of much closer control of financial activities of top government officials;" an 88-3% majority favor "the government encouraging the building of Israeli warplanes for its own defense;" a 70-16% majority support "the government taking steps to encourage more private business to operate in Israel;" a 69-19% majority favor the "appointment of General Weizman as Defense Minister;" a 57-31% majority support the naming of General Moïse Dayan as Foreign Minister; and a 58-26% majority support "the government encouraging more religious settlements in Judea and Samaria on the West Bank." Although some of these obviously impinge on the peace question, they are not central to the need to find a way to establish peace on a permanent

basis with Israel's Arab neighbors.

One cannot sit down for better than an hour with a cross-section of Israelis these days without becoming deeply aware of the dominant pessimism they feel about the prospects for peace. Back in 1970, a solid 63-27% majority of Israelis thought that "in the next few years, it is likely that Israel will reach a peace agreement with the Arab countries." Today, a complete reversal has taken place, and by 53-24%, a majority of Israeli Jews feel such a peace is "unlikely." Back in 1970, 56% felt that the "prospects for a meaningful settlement with the Arab countries were better than five years ago." Now, no more than 18% feel the prospects for peace are "better."

It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the prevailing pessimism over peace is a mark of Israeli defeatism or a sense of inevitability of another war. By a substantial 82-6%, a majority of Israelis Jews feel that the Arab countries cannot become strong enough to defeat Israel, that the country will be able to defend herself, albeit with substantial military help from the U.S.

When asked if Prime Minister Begin might be able to negotiate a lasting peace settlement, by 44-23%, a plurality do not think this is possible. Among Likud supporters, no better than a 37-32% plurality think he can. DMC backers feel he cannot by 57-7% and Mapai followers share that view by 62-8%.

One of the reasons Israelis are pessimistic is that they see little hope for any of their Arab neighbors agreeing on lasting terms. In the case of Jordan, by 68-27%, a majority of Israeli Jews are negative about the prospects of reaching a settlement. With Egypt, a 74-21% majority are pessimistic about finding a peace accord. In the case of Syria, a lopsided

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92-3% majority feel the chances for finding peace are low, and with the PLO a 91-2% majority are convinced as of now that the chances for successful negotiations are slim.

On most of the initial statements the new Prime Minister has made about potential peace terms, sizeable majorities of the Israeli electorate give him their support; by 71-22%, a majority of Jews back him on "insisting that Israel will not sit down to negotiate with the PLO;" a 73-18% majority of Jews agree with him that it is correct to "claim the West Bank is territory that Israel is entitled to historically."

However, in one of the most significant results of this entire study, on Mr. Begin's initial indication of unwillingness "to give up any of the West Bank in any peace settlement with the Arabs," the new leader is able to carry no better than a 46-45% plurality in support among the Jewish population. Among Arabs, he meets with a not surprising 94-4% opposition, adding up to a 51-41% opposition in the country as a whole, when both Jews and Arabs are weighed into the totals.

On this pivotal stand, a sizeable 66-27% majority of Likud supporters agree with their leader. Among National Religious Party backers, a 52-26% majority agree with the Prime Minister when he has said he would not give up any of the West Bank. But, among DMC followers, an even higher 72-20% majority disagree; while among Mapai supporters, there is 61-30% opposition. Obviously, any flat stand over a sustained period of time by Mr. Begin that the West Bank is not negotiable will split the country down the middle into the deepest kind of controversy.

However, by a significant 51-30%, a majority of Israeli Jews do not believe their new leader is "taking a hard and unbending stand on the West

Bank," but instead that "he is being deliberately tough as a way to start bargaining with the Arabs, in order to achieve a settlement later on by softening some of his conditions." By 49-38%, a plurality of the Jewish voters believe that tactic is "a sound way to begin bargaining with the Arabs." Even more significant, by 53-39%, a majority of Israeli Jews are convinced that "it will be impossible to obtain a peace settlement with the Arab countries, if Israel refuses to give up any of the West Bank territory."

Yet, when taken on their own merits, Israeli Jews are far from convinced that some of the conventional terms for a potential settlement with the Arabs are proper and correct:

-- By 78-15%, a big majority oppose the notion of "returning the entire Sinai Desert to Egypt, including control of Gaza."

-- By 60-26%, a majority also oppose "Israel giving back most of the West Bank territory to Jordan, except that land necessary for the proper defense of Israel, which will be a neutral zone jointly occupied by Israeli and Jordanian troops."

-- By 55-32%, a majority also oppose "a demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan Heights and two kilometers on the Israeli side, with the neutral zone occupied jointly by Israeli and Syrian troops."

-- A relatively narrow 48-41% plurality oppose "a demilitarized zone along the Lebanese border, jointly occupied by Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian troops."

Two proposals which meet with majority support are:

-- By 75-15%, a majority favor "a guarantee that all Jewish religious settlements on the West Bank will be allowed to remain unmolested

and secure."

-- By 70-23%, a majority also favor "permanent Israeli control of all of Jerusalem, with a separate corridor in and out of the city to give Arabs and Christians free and unrestricted access to their holy places."

It is apparent from these results that Prime Minister Begin is not under severe pressure from the Israeli public to make any quick concessions to produce a peace -- even though coming to a permanent peace is one of the highest priorities among the rank and file of the people. On the other hand, there is little doubt that, with his reputation as a tough and even hard-line negotiator, he would be more effective than nearly any other current potential leader of Israel to be able to come to agreements and get the Israeli public to accept them.

There are two other results which point to some real flexibility in the basic stand of the Israeli public. They indicate that Israelis, underneath their initial tough position, have some notion of how far they might be willing to go to achieve peace.

The first deals with the occupation of any neutral territory that might emerge from a settlement involving land currently occupied by Israel. Only 4% of Israeli Jews would opt for joint U.S.-Russian troop occupation of neutral land. A somewhat higher 12% would favor U.S. troops. A higher 22% would opt for U.N. forces. But a clear majority, coming to 53%, would much prefer "joint Israeli-Arab troops" as the peacemaking troops. It is clear that the Israelis sense they will have to work out the ultimate peace with Arabs and then will have to share the peace-keeping with Arab nations.

The second area where Israeli Jews indicate they have some real

flexibility is on the Palestinian issue. Although 84% express resentment toward President Carter's statement about the need for a Palestinian homeland. by 52-30%, a majority of Israeli voters concede that the Palestinians are entitled to a homeland.

But by 81-12%, they are opposed to an "independent Palestinian state on the West Bank." However, by only a narrow 49-43%, a plurality oppose a Palestinian homeland "on the West Bank as part of Jordan." And an even narrower plurality, 45-44%, oppose a "Palestinian homeland in Lebanon, where most Palestinian Arab refugees are located."

On the even more controversial subject of negotiating with the PLO, which a 71-22% majority agree with the Prime Minister ought not be negotiated with, nonetheless, by only a razor-thin 46-44% plurality, the public express opposition to sitting down with a Jordanian delegation in Geneva, part of which would be "Palestinians, as an unidentified part of that delegation." And, by 45-45%, there is an equal division over "Israel sitting down with the PLO in direct negotiations in Geneva, if the PLO agrees that, once peace is agreed upon, it will recognize the right of Israel to exist."

Thus, it is evident that the Israeli public have a sense that compromises must be made to achieve any ultimate peace. But, it is equally apparent that Israelis are not willing to commit yet to any categorical conditions of giving up specific pieces of occupied territory, before the negotiations have commenced. However, it is also clear that there is more bend in Israeli public opinion on the peace issue than meets the eye initially.

Yet, there is an overriding skepticism about Arab intentions to want to make peace. By 71-16%, a majority of Israeli Jews feel that a "declaration of non-belligerency by Arabs to Israel" would not be a sign the Arab

nations were serious about making peace. More surprising is the fact that, by 62-21%, a majority also feel that Arab agreement to "give formal recognition of the right of Israel to exist and to exchange ambassadors" also would not be enough by itself to convince them the Arabs are "really serious about peace."

What the Israeli Jews appear to be saying is that they are willing to make some compromises to begin the dialogue with the Arabs to ultimately achieve peace, but that an ultimate settlement will take some very tough bargaining, and, until they see more concrete evidence of Arab willingness to make concessions of their own, they are skeptical and pessimistic about the prospects for peace. Nonetheless, it is evident that most Israelis want peace, and are willing to make serious explorations to find out just how much the Arabs really want a lasting peace.

The Religious Issue at Home

When asked what their religious inclination is, only 13% of all Israeli Jews classify themselves as "religious." A much higher 48% describe their religious views as "traditional," and a substantial 38% claim they are "non-religious." As was seen earlier, the religious issue receives a rather low priority among the key issues they would like to see the new government tackle.

By a 48-39% plurality, most Israeli Jews feel that in the new majority coalition "the religious parties have too much power." Likud backers deny this by 53-37% and National Religious Party followers deny it by a much higher 65-13%.

A minority of 38% feel that "Orthodox Judaism plays too important a role in Israeli life," while only 14% feel it plays "too small a role." A plurality of 42% feel it plays "just about the right role." However, by 74-20%, a sizeable majority feel that, under the new Begin government, they expect Orthodox Judaism to play "a more important role." However, by 51-41%, a majority feel this is "wrong." Likud supporters feel such a more important role is "right," but only by a relatively narrow 52-43%.

Support for Other Parties' Leaders and Proposals

Despite the apparent bitterness of the recent election, the public in Israel are not only high on their new Prime Minister, but also many of the leading members of the opposition. By 69-26%, a majority of the Jews say they are favorably disposed toward Shimon Peres. By 66-30%, a majority are favorable to former Prime Minister Rabin. By 63-32%, a majority are favor-

able toward Golda Meir. And by 56-31%, a majority are also favorable to Yigall Yadin.

On the DMC proposal for electoral reform, under which a majority of seats in the Knesset in the future would be elected from districts, with a minority still elected at large nationally, a 48-29% plurality opt for that reform. And, on holding mandatory elections under a new system of electoral reform, either two or four years hence, a 46-33% plurality stand in favor.

QUESTIONNAIRE

LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, INC.
1270 Avenue of the Americas, N.Y.N.Y. 10020

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

Questionnaire No. 5-5-7-8

Study No. 2751

Sample Point No. 10-11-12-13-14

me 1977

Interviewer's name (PLEASE PRINT): _____

City/Town: _____ County: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

I'm _____ from Public Opinion Research of Israel Ltd., the national polling firm. We are doing a survey on current events and issues. We've been asking your neighbors some questions and would now like to ask you some. Under no circumstances will we ever identify or quote you without your permission. Let me just see whom I'm supposed to interview here.

HOW TO DETERMINE WHOM YOU ARE TO INTERVIEW IN THIS HOUSEHOLD:

- 1. If only one woman or man 18 years or older lives here, interview that person provided your quota for that sex has not been completed.
- 2. If more than one woman or man 18 years or older lives here, list below all the women OR all the men -- NOT BOTH -- according to age, the oldest first. Then, starting at the bottom of the list, move upward until you come to the first "X" next to which you have entered a name (or described by position). The person next to this "X" is the only person you can interview.

IMPORTANT: List only the women or men -- NOT BOTH -- who are at home.

How many women/men 18 years or over live here and are at home now?

(write in)

Who is the oldest woman/man who lives here and is at home now? And the next oldest? (STARTING WITH THE OLDEST, LIST (BY AGE) EITHER ALL OF THE WOMEN OR ALL OF THE MEN -- NOT BOTH -- NOW AT HOME)

EITHER WOMEN OR MEN

Identify by name or position in the household
(Women -- wife, mother, daughter, boarder, etc.)
(Men -- husband, father, son, boarder, etc.)

- | | <u>AGE</u> |
|-------------------|------------|
| 1. <u>X</u> _____ | _____ |
| 2. _____ | _____ |
| 3. _____ | _____ |

Respondent's name (PLEASE PRINT): _____

Address: _____

City/Town: _____ Zip: _____

Telephone area code: _____ Telephone No. _____

1a. Did you get to vote in the last national election here in Israel in May, or didn't you get around to vote?

Voted.....(15(100-1(ASK 1b)
 Didn't vote.....-2
 Can't recall.....-3 } (SKIP TO FACTUAL AND TERMINATE)

1b. (IF "VOTED" IN 1a) Regardless of how you may have voted in the May election, which party do you usually feel is the party you are closest to in Israeli politics -- the Mapai coalition, Likud, the National Religious Party, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), the New Communist Party, Poalei Agudat Israel, the Independent Liberal Party, or what?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---|-------|-------|
| Mapai coalition.....(16(| 29 -1 | 42 |
| Likud..... | 41 -2 | 7 |
| National Religious Party..... | 5 -3 | 1 |
| Democratic Movement for Change (DMC)..... | 11 -4 | 2 |
| New Communist Party..... | - -5 | 27 |
| Poalei Agudat Israel..... | 1 -6 | - |
| Independent Liberal Party..... | * -7 | 1 |
| Mahane Sheli..... | * -8 | 1 |
| Shlonzion..... | * -9 | - |
| Citizen Rights Party..... | * -0 | - |
| Other (SPECIFY)..... | * -x | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 10 -y | 16 |

1c. And in this past election in May, which party did you vote for?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---|-------|-------|
| Mapai coalition.....(18(| 26 -1 | 42 |
| Likud..... | 42 -2 | 7 |
| National Religious Party..... | 5 -3 | 1 |
| Democratic Movement for Change (DMC)..... | 11 -4 | 2 |
| New Communist Party..... | - -5 | 27 |
| Poalei Agudat Israel..... | 2 -6 | - |
| Independent Liberal Party..... | 1 -7 | 1 |
| Mahane Sheli..... | * -8 | 1 |
| Shlonzion..... | 1 -9 | - |
| Citizen Rights Party..... | 1 -0 | - |
| Other (SPECIFY)..... | 1 -x | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 11 -y | 16 |

1d. Did you vote or not in the 1973 national election, the last election before the one this past May?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|----------------------------|----------------|-------|
| Voted.....(17(85-1(ASK 1c) | | 81 |
| Didn't vote.....13-2 | } (SKIP TO 2a) | 17 |
| Can't recall.....2-3 | | 2 |

1e. (IF "VOTED" IN 1d) Which party did you vote for back in the 1973 election?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---|-----------|-------|
| Mapai coalition..... | (19) 48-1 | 37 |
| Likud..... | 27-2 | 4 |
| National Religious Party..... | 7-3 | 4 |
| Democratic Movement for Change (DMC)... | -4 | - |
| New Communist Party..... | 1-5 | 26 |
| Poalei Agudat Israel..... | 2-6 | - |
| Independent Liberal Party..... | 2-7 | 1 |
| Mahane Sheli..... | -8 | 13 |
| Shlonzion..... | -9 | 15 |
| Citizen Rights Party..... | 2-0 | - |
| Other (SPECIFY)..... | 2-3 | - |
| Not sure..... | 11-7 | - |

2a. As far as you personally are concerned, were you highly satisfied by the outcome of this past election, only somewhat satisfied, or not satisfied at all?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Highly satisfied..... | (20) 41-1 | 17 |
| Only somewhat satisfied..... | 28-2 | 13 |
| Not satisfied at all..... | 21-3 | 63 |
| Not sure..... | 10-4 | 7 |

2b. How would you rate the job you think Menachim Begin will do as Prime Minister -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|------------------|-----------|-------|
| Excellent..... | (21) 26-1 | 13 |
| Pretty good..... | 32-2 | 9 |
| Only fair..... | 17-3 | 11 |
| Poor..... | 8-4 | 49 |
| Not sure..... | 17-3 | 17 |

2c. Now let me ask you about how you think Menachim Begin will do in some specific areas. On (READ LIST) do you think he will do an excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor job? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | EXCELLENT | | PRETTY GOOD | | ONLY FAIR | | POOR | | NOT SURE | |
|---|-----------|------|-------------|------|-----------|------|------|------|----------|------|
| | JEN | ARAB | JEN | ARAB | JEN | ARAB | JEN | ARAB | JEN | ARAB |
| 1. Unifying the country..... | 23 | 10 | 36 | 7 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 55 | 15 | 14 |
| 2. Finding a way to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Arabs..... | 18 | 5 | 31 | 7 | 20 | 7 | 20 | 74 | 12 | 7 |
| 3. Restoring health to the Israeli economy..... | 19 | 11 | 37 | 8 | 21 | 18 | 9 | 53 | 14 | 7 |
| 4. Running a scandal-free government..... | 34 | 12 | 30 | 8 | 15 | 17 | 6 | 49 | 14 | 13 |
| 5. Bringing the most capable people into the government.. | 21 | 9 | 32 | 9 | 22 | 19 | 12 | 50 | 13 | 14 |
| 6. Handling the question of allowing more religious settlements in the occupied West Bank area..... | 41 | 49 | 29 | 17 | 11 | 2 | 7 | 21 | 12 | 10 |
| 7. Keeping good relations with the United States..... | 21 | 15 | 37 | 30 | 22 | 17 | 9 | 25 | 11 | 13 |
| 8. Getting military help from the U.S..... | 22 | 23 | 37 | 26 | 20 | 17 | 8 | 23 | 14 | 11 |
| 9. Getting economic help from the U.S..... | 21 | 23 | 38 | 33 | 21 | 15 | 7 | 20 | 13 | 9 |
| 10. Receiving support from Jews who do not live in Israel. | 32 | 23 | 37 | 22 | 15 | 17 | 5 | 21 | 12 | 17 |
| 11. Handling strikes and demands of labor unions..... | 27 | 8 | 32 | 7 | 18 | 10 | 9 | 65 | 13 | 11 |
| 12. Inspiring the confidence of the people of Israel..... | 33 | 7 | 28 | 5 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 44 | 15 | 35 |

3. Now I want to ask you about the election in May and why you voted the way you did. Was (READ LIST) a major reason why you voted the way you did, a minor reason, or hardly a reason at all? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | JEWS | | | | ARABS | | | |
|---|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Major Reason | Minor Reason | Hardly A Reason | Not Sure | Major Reason | Minor Reason | Hardly A Reason | Not Sure |
| 1. The bad state of the economy here at home..... | (34) <u>55</u> -1 | <u>25</u> -2 | <u>15</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 | (<u>47</u> -1 | <u>12</u> -2 | <u>29</u> -3 | <u>12</u> -4 |
| 2. The scandals among key leaders in the Labor government.... | (35) <u>59</u> -1 | <u>19</u> -2 | <u>17</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 | (<u>34</u> -1 | <u>15</u> -2 | <u>41</u> -3 | <u>10</u> -4 |
| 3. It being time for a change after so many years of Labor rule..... | (36) <u>52</u> -1 | <u>17</u> -2 | <u>25</u> -3 | <u>6</u> -4 | (<u>32</u> -1 | <u>10</u> -2 | <u>42</u> -3 | <u>16</u> -4 |
| 4. The need for a government that could be tough in negotiations with the Arabs..... | (37) <u>61</u> -1 | <u>21</u> -2 | <u>13</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 | (<u>42</u> -1 | <u>5</u> -2 | <u>35</u> -3 | <u>17</u> -4 |
| 5. The need for a government that would be able to get along with the United States..... | (38) <u>47</u> -1 | <u>35</u> -2 | <u>12</u> -3 | <u>6</u> -4 | (<u>23</u> -1 | <u>14</u> -2 | <u>48</u> -3 | <u>16</u> -4 |
| 6. The need for a government that will not just do everything the U.S. government wants Israel to do..... | (39) <u>41</u> -1 | <u>34</u> -2 | <u>17</u> -3 | <u>8</u> -4 | (<u>11</u> -1 | <u>10</u> -2 | <u>58</u> -3 | <u>21</u> -4 |
| 7. The need to have experienced leaders running the government..... | (40) <u>60</u> -1 | <u>22</u> -2 | <u>12</u> -3 | <u>6</u> -4 | (<u>58</u> -1 | <u>16</u> -2 | <u>21</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 |
| 8. The need to have a reform-minded government running Israel..... | (41) <u>58</u> -1 | <u>26</u> -2 | <u>11</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 | (<u>69</u> -1 | <u>11</u> -2 | <u>16</u> -3 | <u>4</u> -4 |
| 9. The desire to make certain that Israelis have the right to start settlements in Judea and Samaria..... | (42) <u>36</u> -1 | <u>27</u> -2 | <u>28</u> -3 | <u>9</u> -4 | (<u>18</u> -1 | <u>4</u> -2 | <u>62</u> -3 | <u>16</u> -4 |
| 10. The need for a government that wants to make a just peace with the Arabs..... | (43) <u>63</u> -1 | <u>22</u> -2 | <u>9</u> -3 | <u>6</u> -4 | (<u>92</u> -1 | <u>2</u> -2 | <u>5</u> -3 | <u>1</u> -4 |
| 11. The need to have a government that is sensitive to what the religious parties stand for..... | (44) <u>25</u> -1 | <u>25</u> -2 | <u>41</u> -3 | <u>9</u> -4 | (<u>7</u> -1 | <u>3</u> -2 | <u>57</u> -3 | <u>33</u> -4 |
| 12. The need for a strong leader..... | (45) <u>76</u> -1 | <u>12</u> -2 | <u>7</u> -3 | <u>5</u> -4 | (<u>52</u> -1 | <u>7</u> -2 | <u>20</u> -3 | <u>21</u> -4 |

4. Here is a list of some issues (HAND RESPONDENT CARD "A") that other people have told us they feel are serious problems that the new government should do something about. If you could say, which 2 or 3 would you choose as the most serious and most in need of government attention? (MULTIPLE RECORD BELOW)

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|---|-----------|-------|
| 1. Unifying the country..... | (46) 29-1 | 5 |
| 2. Finding a way to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Arabs..... | 56-2 | 98 |
| 3. Restoring health to the Israeli economy..... | 61-3 | 72 |
| 4. Running a scandal-free government..... | 33-4 | 34 |
| 5. Bringing the most capable people into the government..... | 15-5 | 20 |
| 6. Handling the question of allowing more religious settlements in the occupied West Bank area..... | 8-6 | 1 |
| 7. Keeping good relations with the United States..... | 20-7 | 5 |
| 8. Getting military help from the U.S..... | 8-8 | - |
| 9. Getting economic help from the U.S..... | 4-9 | - |
| 10. Receiving support from Jews who do not live in Israel..... | 4-0 | 1 |
| 11. Handling strikes and demands of labor unions..... | 19-x | 15 |
| 12. Inspiring the confidence of the people of Israel..... | 12-y | - |
| 13. Adequate wages..... | (47) 9-1 | 40 |
| None..... | * -2 | * |
| Not sure..... | 3-3 | 3 |

5. Now let me ask you about some current issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose (READ LIST)? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | ARABS | | |
|---|------------|--------|----------|
| | Favor | Oppose | Not Sure |
| JEW'S | JEW'S | JEW'S | JEW'S |
| 1. The government taking steps to encourage more private business to operate in Israel..... | (49) 70-40 | 16-2 | 57 14-3 |
| 2. The government taking drastic steps to control inflation (the continued rise in prices)..... | (50) 81-80 | 13-2 | 19 6-3 |
| 3. The government encouraging more religious settlements in Judea and Samaria on the West bank..... | (51) 58-3 | 26-2 | 96 15-3 |
| 4. The government putting in a system of much closer control of financial activities of top government officials..... | (52) 81-70 | 10-2 | 13 9-3 |
| 5. The appointment of Moïshe Dayan as foreign minister..... | (53) 57-20 | 31-2 | 72 12-3 |
| 6. The appointment of General Weizman to be defense minister.... | (54) 69-15 | 19-2 | 62 12-3 |
| 7. The government encouraging the building of Israeli war-planes for its own defense..... | (55) 88-21 | 3-2 | 55 9-3 |
| 8. The shipment and sale of arms to the government of South Africa..... | (56) 47-7 | 27-2 | 73 26-2 |
| 9. Building closer ties with American Jews..... | (57) 90-18 | 3-2 | 34 7-3 |

6. Now let me read you some statements about Menachim Begin. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree. (READ STATEMENTS AND RECORD BELOW FOR EACH)

| | ARABS | | |
|---|------------|----------|----------|
| | Agree | Disagree | Not Sure |
| JEW'S | JEW'S | JEW'S | JEW'S |
| 1. He is an experienced leader of the biggest party and is well qualified to be Prime Minister..... | (58) 62-26 | 23-2 | 64 15-10 |
| 2. I worry about his health..... | (59) 63-24 | 27-2 | 51 10-2 |
| 3. He is tough and will not give in easily on Israel's best interests..... | (60) 77-31 | 12-2 | 57 11-12 |
| 4. He is not experienced in dealing with the United States.... | (61) 46-68 | 40-2 | 21 14-11 |
| 5. He will be a tough, shrewd negotiator with the Arabs..... | (62) 64-74 | 21-2 | 21 15-3 |
| 6. He is too rigid and not flexible in foreign affairs, and that is bad..... | (63) 36-85 | 45-2 | 13 18-2 |
| 7. He is an inspirational leader..... | (64) 65-16 | 17-2 | 61 18-3 |
| 8. He may have trouble bringing the best leaders into his government..... | (65) 58-70 | 27-2 | 19 15-11 |

7a. In general, do you feel the prospects for a meaningful peace settlement with the Arab countries are better than they were a year ago, worse, or about the same as a year ago?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---------------------|-----------|-------|
| Better..... | (66) 18-1 | 21 |
| Worse..... | 21-2 | 60 |
| About the same..... | 51-3 | 9 |
| Not sure..... | 10-4 | 10 |

7b. Looking ahead, do you feel it is likely or unlikely that Israel will reach a peace agreement with the Arab countries within the next few years?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---------------|-----------|-------|
| Likely..... | (67) 24-1 | 30 |
| Unlikely..... | 53-2 | 57 |
| Not sure..... | 23-3 | 13 |

7c. If peace is not reached in the next few years, do you feel it is possible that the Arab countries can become strong enough to defeat Israel, or do you feel Israel will still be able to defend herself militarily?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---|----------|-------|
| Possible Arab countries can defeat Israel.... | (68) 6-1 | 26 |
| Israel still able to defend herself..... | 82-2 | 42 |
| Not sure..... | 12-3 | 32 |

7d. How difficult would it be for Israel to defend herself militarily without the support of the United States -- would it be impossible, difficult but not impossible, only slightly difficult, or not difficult at all?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Impossible..... | (69) 19-1 | 71 |
| Difficult but not impossible..... | 55-2 | 11 |
| Only slightly difficult..... | 16-3 | 6 |
| Not difficult at all..... | 4-4 | 5 |
| Not sure..... | 6-5 | 7 |

7e. Israel is currently developing the capability to produce its own military equipment and supplies. Do you feel that, within the next 5 years, Israel can become self-sufficient in the production of military equipment, or will it still be necessary to receive important military equipment from other countries?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Can become self-sufficient..... | (70) 26-1 | 13 |
| Necessary to receive from others..... | 61-2 | 74 |
| Not sure..... | 13-3 | 13 |

8a. Do you personally think it is possible or not for Israel to come to an agreement on lasting terms for peace with the Arab countries under a Begin government?

| | JEWS | ARABS |
|-------------------|-----------|-------|
| Possible..... | (71) 23-1 | 11 |
| Not possible..... | 44-2 | 73 |
| Not sure..... | 33-3 | 16 |

8b. How would you rate the chances of Israel now coming to an agreement on lasting terms for peace with (READ LIST) -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | JEW'S | ARABS | | ARABS | | ARABS | | ARABS | | ARABS | |
|---|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | | Excellent | pretty Good | Only Fair | Poor | JEW'S | Not Sure | JEW'S | JEW'S | JEW'S | |
| 1. EGYPT..... | (72) 3-1 | 5 | 19-2 | 11 | 36-23 | 38-46 | 69 | 5-5 | 2 | | |
| 2. Syria..... | (73) * | 2 | 3-2 | 3 | 17-39 | 75-83 | 83 | 5-5 | 2 | | |
| 3. Jordan..... | (74) 4-1 | 4 | 23-21 | 16 | 35-31 | 34-46 | 67 | 5-5 | 2 | | |
| 4. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)..... | (75) * | 2 | 1-2 | 3 | 4-16 | 82-86 | 86 | 7-5 | 3 | | |

9a. Now let me ask you about some other countries and organizations in the world. Would you say (READ LIST) is very friendly, somewhat friendly, somewhat unfriendly, or completely unfriendly to Israel? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | Very Friendly JWS | ARABS | Somewhat Friendly JWS | ARABS | Somewhat Unfriendly JWS | ARABS | Completely Unfriendly JWS | ARABS | Not Sure JWS | ARABS |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------|--------------------------|-------|----------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| 1. The United States..... | (76 (67 - 69 | | 26 - 21 | | 4 - 3 | 6 | * - 4 | 2 | 3 - 5 | 2 |
| 2. France..... | (77 (4 - 9 | | 30 - 36 | | 48 - 3 | 43 | 13 - 4 | 11 | 5 - 5 | 1 |
| 3. Iran..... | (78 (10 - 18 | | 36 - 34 | | 26 - 3 | 32 | 11 - 4 | 5 | 17 - 5 | 10 |
| 4. Great Britain..... | (79 (13 - 17 | | 50 - 50 | | 29 - 3 | 29 | 4 - 4 | 1 | 9 - 5 | 3 |
| 5. Russia..... | (80 (- - 1 | | 1 - 1 | | 9 - 3 | 7 | 85 - 4 | 87 | 5 - 5 | 4 |
| 6. China..... | (10 (* - 1 | | 2 - 2 | | 8 - 3 | 2 | 77 - 4 | 89 | 13 - 5 | 7 |
| 7. The United Nations..... | (11 (8 - 5 | | 24 - 19 | | 35 - 3 | 36 | 26 - 4 | 46 | 7 - 5 | 4 |
| 8. West Germany..... | (12 (23 - 35 | | 45 - 38 | | 17 - 3 | 21 | 7 - 4 | 3 | 8 - 5 | 2 |
| 9. Union of South Africa..... | (13 (17 - 67 | | 35 - 16 | | 22 - 3 | 6 | 11 - 4 | 6 | 15 - 5 | 5 |
| 10. Black states of Africa..... | (14 (2 - 3 | | 9 - 2 | | 26 - 3 | 10 | 46 - 4 | 79 | 17 - 5 | 7 |

9b. How would you rate the job President Carter is doing as the new President of the United States -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (RECORD BELOW)

9c. And how would you rate President Carter's statements about Israel -- excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor? (RECORD BELOW)

| | 9b. Over-all JWS | ARABS | 9c. On Israel JWS | ARABS |
|------------------|---------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| Excellent..... | (15 (8 - 16 | | (16 (2 - 15 | 52 |
| Pretty good..... | 40 - 2 | 16 | 24 - 2 | 21 |
| Only fair..... | 34 - 3 | 9 | 45 - 3 | 11 |
| Poor..... | 8 - 4 | 9 | 22 - 4 | 9 |
| Not sure..... | 11 - 5 | 6 | 8 - 5 | 6 |

9d. When President Carter said that (READ LIST), were you very worried, somewhat worried, somewhat pleased, or very pleased by what he said? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | Very Worried JWS | ARABS | Somewhat Worried JWS | ARABS | Somewhat Pleased JWS | ARABS | Very Pleased JWS | ARABS | Not Sure JWS | ARABS |
|--|---------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| 1. Israel is a special ally of the U.S..... | (17 (5 - 30 | | 7 - 2 | 25 | 28 - 3 | 17 | 54 - 4 | 11 | 6 - 5 | 17 |
| 2. To insure its defenses, he wanted Israel to return to its 1967 borders, except for neutral buffer zones and except for Jerusalem which would remain in Israeli hands..... | (18 (49 - 20 | | 35 - 2 | 12 | 8 - 3 | 29 | 3 - 30 | 5 - 5 | 9 | |
| 3. The Palestinians should have a homeland..... | (19 (61 - 6 | | 23 - 2 | 3 | 6 - 3 | 8 | 3 - 80 | 8 - 5 | 3 | |
| 4. In a war, the U.S. would never let Israel down..... | (20 (7 - 13 | | 6 - 2 | 16 | 24 - 3 | 26 | 58 - 19 | 5 - 5 | 25 | |

INTERVIEWER: TURN OVER AND CONTINUE

9e. All in all, do you feel you can trust President Carter as a friend of Israel or not?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|-------------------|-----------|-------|
| Can trust..... | (21) 45-1 | 65 |
| Cannot trust..... | 35-2 | 24 |
| Not sure..... | 20-3 | 11 |

9f. How difficult do you think it would be for Israel to run its economy without (READ LIST) -- impossible, difficult but not impossible, only slightly difficult, or not difficult at all? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | | Difficult | | Only Slightly | | Not Difficult | | Not Sure | |
|--|------------|------------|--------------------|---------------|--------|---------------|-------|----------|-------|
| | | Impossible | But Not Impossible | Difficult | At All | | | | |
| | JEWIS | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS |
| 1. Economic aid from the U.S. government..... | (22) 27-76 | 49-2 | 15 | 17-3 | 2-3 | 5-3 | | | |
| 2. Financial aid from American and other Jews living outside Israel..... | (23) 35-70 | 41-2 | 20 | 17-3 | 2-3 | 5-4 | | | |

9g. How much influence do you feel Jews in America have on (READ LIST) -- a great deal, only some, or hardly any? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | | A Great Deal | | Only Some | | Hardly Any | | Not Sure | |
|-------------------------------|------------|--------------|-------|-----------|-------|------------|-------|----------|-------|
| | | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS | JEWIS | ARABS |
| 1. The American Congress..... | (24) 55-72 | 31-27 | 4 | 7-10 | 4 | | | | |
| 2. President Carter..... | (25) 39-50 | 41-34 | 10 | 13-10 | 3 | | | | |

9h. Do you think, as Prime Minister, Menachim Begin will have a great deal of difficulty dealing with the United States, some but not a lot of difficulty, or not much difficulty at all?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|---------------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Great deal of difficulty..... | (26) 35-1 | 49 |
| Some, but not a lot..... | 45-2 | 39 |
| Not much difficulty at all..... | 14-3 | 9 |
| Not sure..... | 6-4 | 3 |

9i. Some American Jews have been openly critical of President Carter for not standing more firmly by Israel. Do you think such criticisms are helpful to Israel or not?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|------------------------|-----------|-------|
| Helpful to Israel..... | (27) 70-1 | 27 |
| Not helpful..... | 20-2 | 66 |
| Not sure..... | 10-3 | 7 |

9j. Some American Jews have been openly critical of Prime Minister Begin for being too rigid on peace. Do you think such criticisms are justified or not?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|--------------------|-----------|-------|
| Justified..... | (28) 36-1 | 70 |
| Not justified..... | 52-2 | 24 |
| Not sure..... | 12-3 | 6 |

10a. Prime Minister Begin has spoken out on several things since he began to form a government. Do you tend to agree or disagree with him on (READ STATEMENTS)? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ONE)

| | Agree | | Disagree | | Not Sure | |
|---|-------|---------|----------|------|----------|------|
| | JEW | ARAB | JEW | ARAB | JEW | ARAB |
| 1. Insisting that Israel will not sit down to negotiate with the PLO..... | (29) | (71-11) | 22 | -257 | 7 | -32 |
| 2. Encouraging more Jewish religious settlements on the West Bank..... | (30) | (65-2) | 24 | -296 | 11 | -32 |
| 3. Not being willing to give up any of the West Bank in any peace settlement with the Arabs..... | (31) | (46-4) | 45 | -294 | 9 | -32 |
| 4. Claiming the West Bank is territory that Israel is entitled to historically..... | (32) | (73-1) | 18 | -291 | 9 | -38 |
| 5. Insisting Israel will not give up any territory it now occupies until Israel is recognized as a state by all Arab neighboring countries..... | (33) | (78-9) | 15 | -289 | 7 | -32 |

10b. Of course, there is much speculation about the tough statements Menachim Begin has been making on foreign policy and West Bank settlement. Some people think he is being deliberately tough as a way to start bargaining with the Arabs, in order to achieve a settlement later on by softening some of his conditions. Others think his stands are firm and inflexible and the sooner the Arabs realize this, the better it will be for everyone. How do you react to Prime Minister Begin's statements -- do you think he is taking stands in order to bargain later on, or do you think he is stating a hard and unbending position?

| | JEW | ARAB |
|--|------|-----------|
| Taking a bargaining position..... | (34) | (51-1) 41 |
| Taking a hard and unbending stand..... | 30 | -2 44 |
| Not sure..... | 19 | -3 15 |

10c. Regardless of what you think Menachim Begin's intent is in making his tough statements, do you think his taking a tough stand is a sound way or not to begin bargaining with Arabs?

| | JEW | ARAB |
|--------------------|------|-----------|
| Sound way..... | (35) | (49-1) 14 |
| Not sound way..... | 38 | -2 80 |
| Not sure..... | 13 | -3 6 |

11a. Now let me ask you some questions about possible terms for a peace settlement between Israel and the Arabs. All of these terms assume that in return the Arabs will agree to give full recognition to the state of Israel. Do you tend to favor or oppose (READ LIST)? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | Favor | | Oppose | | Not Sure | | | |
|--|-------|------|--------|------|----------|------|----|----|
| | JEW | ARAB | JEW | ARAB | JEW | ARAB | | |
| 1. Permanent Israeli control of all of Jerusalem, with a separate corridor in and out of the city to give Arabs and Christians free and unrestricted access to their holy places.... | (36) | (70) | 13 | 23 | 28 | 7 | 36 | |
| 2. A return of the entire Sinai Desert to Egypt, including control of Gaza..... | (37) | (15) | 83 | 78 | 2 | 15 | 7 | 32 |
| 3. A demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan Heights and two kilometers on the Israeli side, with the neutral zone occupied by Israeli and Syrian troops..... | (38) | (32) | 52 | 55 | 2 | 40 | 13 | 34 |
| 4. A demilitarized zone along the Lebanese border, jointly occupied by Israeli, Lebanese, and Syrian troops..... | (39) | (41) | 30 | 48 | 25 | 11 | 37 | |
| 5. A guarantee that all Jewish religious settlements on the West Bank will be allowed to remain unmolested and secure..... | (40) | (75) | 9 | 15 | 28 | 10 | 36 | |
| 6. Israel giving back most of the West Bank territory to Jordan, except that land necessary for the proper defense of Israel, which will be a neutral zone jointly occupied by Israeli and Jordanian troops..... | (41) | (26) | 72 | 60 | 26 | 14 | 34 | |

11b. In the occupation of neutral territory in any peace settlement, which would you prefer to have as peacekeeping troops -- joint Israeli-Arab troops, U.S. troops, U.N. forces, or joint U.S.-Russian troops?

| | JEW | ARAB | |
|--------------------------------|------|--------|----|
| Joint Israeli-Arab troops..... | (42) | (59-1) | 39 |
| U.S. troops..... | 12 | 2 | 1 |
| U.N. forces..... | 22 | 3 | 37 |
| Joint U.S.-Russian troops..... | 4 | 4 | 10 |
| Not sure..... | 9 | 5 | 13 |

11c. If Israel refuses to give up any of the West Bank territory, do you think it will be impossible to obtain a peace settlement with the Arab countries, difficult but not impossible, or not difficult?

| | JEW | ARAB | |
|---------------------------------|------|--------|----|
| Impossible..... | (43) | (53-1) | 94 |
| Difficult but not impossible... | 36 | 2 | 2 |
| Not difficult..... | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 8 | 4 | 1 |

12a. Suppose the Palestinians were an unidentified part of the Jordan delegation to a Geneva peace conference. Should Israel sit down to negotiate with such a delegation or not?

| | JEW | ARAB | |
|-----------------------|------|--------|----|
| Should negotiate..... | (44) | (44-1) | 85 |
| Not negotiate..... | 46 | 2 | 9 |
| Not sure..... | 10 | 3 | 6 |

12b. If the PLO agrees that, once peace is agreed upon, it will recognize the right of Israel to exist, then do you favor or oppose Israel sitting down with the PLO in a Geneva peace conference?

| | JEW | ARAB | |
|---------------|------|--------|----|
| Favor..... | (45) | (46-1) | 97 |
| Oppose..... | 45 | 2 | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 9 | 3 | 4 |

12c. Would you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian homeland (READ LIST)? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | Favor JEWIS | ARABS | Oppose JEWIS | ARABS | Not Sure JEWIS | ARABS |
|--|----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| 1. On the West Bank as an independent state..... | 46 | 12-86 | 81 | 26 | 7 | 36 |
| 2. On the West Bank as part of Jordan..... | 47 | 43-19 | 49 | 280 | 8 | 311 |
| 3. In Lebanon, where most Palestinian Arab refugees are located..... | 48 | 44-11 | 45 | 295 | 11 | 34 |
| 4. Nowhere..... | 49 | 30-13 | 52 | 292 | 18 | 35 |

12d. Now let me ask you, do you think the Arabs would be really serious about making peace (READ STATEMENTS), or don't you think they would be really serious then? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH STATEMENT)

| | Would Be Serious JEWIS | ARABS | Not Serious JEWIS | ARABS | Not Sure JEWIS | ARABS |
|--|------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| a. When they all declare non-belligerency to Israel.. | 50 | 16-1 | 78 | 71 | 2 | 9 |
| b. When they give formal recognition of the right of Israel to exist and exchange ambassadors..... | 51 | 21-1 | 71 | 62 | 2 | 10 |
| | | | | | 17 | 39 |

13a. Do you feel that in the new majority coalition Menachem Begin has put together, the religious parties have too much power, the right amount of power, or not enough power?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|----------------------------|-------|-------|
| Too much power..... | 52 | 48-1 |
| Right amount of power..... | 39 | 2 |
| Not enough power..... | 6 | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 7 | 4 |
| | | 5 |

13b. Do you feel that Orthodox Judaism plays too important a role in Israeli life, too small a role, or about the proper role in Israeli life?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|--------------------|-------|-------|
| Too important..... | 53 | 38-1 |
| Too small..... | 14 | 2 |
| About proper..... | 42 | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 6 | 4 |
| | | 6 |

13c. Under the new Begin government, do you expect Orthodox Judaism to play a more important role or not in Israeli life?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|------------------------------|-------|-------|
| More important role..... | 54 | 74-1 |
| Not more important role..... | 20 | 2 |
| Not sure..... | 6 | 3 |
| | | 9 |

13d. Do you think it is right or wrong to have Orthodox Judaism play a more important role in Israeli life?

| | JEWIS | ARABS |
|---------------|-------|-------|
| Right..... | 55 | 41-1 |
| Wrong..... | 51 | 2 |
| Not sure..... | 8 | 3 |
| | | 15 |

13e. Do you favor or oppose (READ LIST)? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH ITEM)

| | Favor JEWIS | ARABS | Oppose JEWIS | ARABS | Not Sure JEWIS | ARABS |
|---|----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| 1. Allowing Israelis to be married in civil ceremonies..... | 56 | 35-14 | 61 | 257 | 4 | 2 |
| 2. The policy of serving only Kosher food in government institutions and in the military..... | 57 | 83-19 | 11 | 227 | 6 | 54 |
| 3. The policy of having state agencies and institutions subject to the rules of Sabbath observance..... | 58 | 72-9 | 20 | 235 | 8 | 56 |

FACTUAL

TOTALS ONLY

1. What is your age?

| | | | |
|------------------|------|------|----|
| 18-29..... | (68) | (30) | -1 |
| 30-39..... | | (24) | -2 |
| 40-49..... | | (20) | -3 |
| 50-59..... | | (13) | -4 |
| 60 and over..... | | (13) | -5 |

2. Sex:

| | | | |
|-------------|------|------|----|
| Male..... | (69) | (51) | -1 |
| Female..... | | (49) | -2 |

F3. Education:

| | | | |
|------------------------------|------|------|----|
| College..... | (70) | (25) | -1 |
| High school..... | | (46) | -2 |
| Grade school or none..... | | (29) | -3 |

F4. Father's country of birth:

| | | | |
|----------------------|------|------|----|
| Europe, America..... | (71) | (43) | -1 |
| Asia..... | | (23) | -2 |
| Africa..... | | (31) | -3 |
| Israel..... | | (3) | -4 |

F5. Seniority:

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|------|------|----|
| Israeli born..... | (72) | (28) | -1 |
| Immigrated through 1947..... | | (12) | -2 |
| Immigrated 1948-1952..... | | (30) | -3 |
| Immigrated 1953 or later..... | | (30) | -4 |

5. Are you a member of a labor union, or is any other member of this household a member of a labor union? (MULTIPLE RECORD IF NECESSARY)

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|----|
| Self is member..... | (73) | (69) | -1 |
| Other is member..... | | (45) | -2 |
| No union member in household..... | | (19) | -3 |
| Not sure..... | | (2) | -4 |

July 15, 1977

FROM: Louis Harris and Associates

SUBJECT: An Analysis of the Sephardic Vote

1. In terms of the origins of their fathers, a majority of 54% of the entire Israeli electorate now are descended from those who immigrated from African or Asian countries (31% Africa and 23% Asia). This compares with 43% whose national roots can be traced back to Europe or to Russia or to America, with the final 3% second-generation Israelis.

2. There is no doubt that this Sephardic vote was the most shifting part of the electorate in this past election. Back in 1973, our results show that this vote went narrowly by 43-41% for the Mapai over the Likud. In this election, it went 52-21% for Likud over the Mapai. This is a massive shift by any standard.

3. Yet this Sephardic vote is not highly religious, with no more than 18% classifying themselves as "religious," compared with 13% of the country as a whole. But they are committed to the Judea and Samaria settlement idea by 68-18%, and 83% of them are critical of President Carter for calling for a Palestinian homeland and 85% do not like the President's statements about Israel going back to 1967 borders with certain adjustments for defense. Only 26% are critical of Begin for being "too hard-line" and an even smaller 24% favor Israel giving back parts of the West Bank. However, a majority of 51-41% give President Carter high marks on the job he is doing and by only 58-34% are they critical of his statements on Israel, lower than the national average. And on the prospects for making peace, it is highly significant that those descended from Africa feel only by a very close 33-29% that peace isn't possible, with a high 38% simply not sure. (A higher

45-27% plurality of Asian-descended Israelis are pessimistic.) On the question of a homeland for the Palestinians, only 33% of the key Sephardic group want "no homeland for the Palestinians," although an even lower 12% want an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank.

4. The point is that this Sephardic group is perhaps even more emphatic on wanting peace than other groups. And, in many ways, they are the "sleeper" in Israeli politics today. For they feel they are the underdogs, those left out of the mainstream by the previously dominant European-descended segments. Now they are riding high, and in many ways, even more than the Likud Party itself, they form the real base of Menachim Begin. They seem to sense that a hard-liner can achieve peace better than a politician who is known as a dove. They may have been attracted to Begin because he was the underdog in politics, much as they are socially. But, there is much evidence they would follow him if he negotiates a viable peace settlement.

13f. How would you define yourself -- as religious, traditional, or non-religious?

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|--------------------|------------|-------|
| Religious..... | (59) 13 -1 | 20 |
| Traditional..... | 48 -2 | 37 |
| Non-religious..... | 38 -3 | 41 |
| Not sure..... | 1 -4 | 2 |

14a. As you know, the new coalition headed by the Likud in the Knesset has only 63 votes, with 61 necessary for a majority. Do you feel the new government will be in power for four years, or do you think it will fall before that time and new elections follow?

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|--------------------------------------|------------|-------|
| Will be in power for four years..... | (60) 56 -1 | 20 |
| Will fall before then..... | 21 -2 | 58 |
| Not sure..... | 28 -3 | 22 |

14b. If there were new elections held right now, which party would you vote for?

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|---|------------|-------|
| Mapai coalition..... | (61) 26 -1 | 40 |
| Likud..... | 42 -2 | 7 |
| National Religious Party..... | 5 -3 | 2 |
| Democratic Movement for Change (DMC)..... | 10 -4 | 2 |
| New Communist Party..... | - -5 | 24 |
| Poalei Agudat Israel..... | 1 -6 | - |
| Independent Liberal Party..... | * -7 | - |
| Mahane Sheli..... | * -8 | 1 |
| Shlonzion..... | * -9 | - |
| Citizen Rights Party..... | * -0 | - |
| Other (SPECIFY)..... | * - | 3 |
| Not sure..... | 13 -y | 21 |

14c. How do you feel about (READ LIST) -- highly favorable, moderately favorable, moderately unfavorable, or highly unfavorable? (RECORD BELOW FOR EACH NAME)

| | Highly Favorable | | Moderately Favorable | | Moderately Unfavorable | | Highly Unfavorable | | Not Sure | |
|-----------------------|------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|----------|-------|
| | JEW'S | ARABS | JEW'S | ARABS | JEW'S | ARABS | JEW'S | ARABS | JEW'S | ARABS |
| 1. Shimon Peres..... | (62) 30 -1 | 27 | 39 -2 | 30 | 16 -3 | 7 | 10 -4 | 28 | 5 | 7 |
| 2. Yigall Yadin..... | (63) 19 -1 | 12 | 37 -2 | 15 | 20 -3 | 16 | 11 -4 | 33 | 13 | 25 |
| 3. Golda Meier..... | (64) 33 -1 | 20 | 30 -2 | 17 | 17 -3 | 21 | 15 -4 | 34 | 5 | 8 |
| 4. Yitzhak Rabin..... | (65) 30 -1 | 50 | 36 -2 | 15 | 18 -3 | 7 | 12 -4 | 24 | 4 | 4 |

15a. Do you favor or oppose the electoral reform proposed by the DMC, under which a majority of seats in the Knesset in the future will be elected from districts with a minority still elected at large nationally?

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|---------------|------------|-------|
| Favor..... | (66) 48 -1 | 35 |
| Oppose..... | 29 -2 | 51 |
| Not sure..... | 23 -3 | 14 |

15b. Do you favor or oppose holding elections in two to four years under a new system of electoral reform?

| | JEW'S | ARABS |
|---------------|------------|-------|
| Favor..... | (67) 46 -1 | 38 |
| Oppose..... | 33 -2 | 47 |
| Not sure..... | 21 -3 | 15 |

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The Jews and Jimmy Carter

As Norman Mailer says, only the unsayable is really worth saying. And one of the unsayable things in our political life these days is that most leaders of the American Jewish community are acting as if President Carter is risking Israel's survival for an illusory Middle East settlement. Meanwhile Administration officials and other influential citizens are increasingly annoyed by the formidable resistance the President's diplomacy is getting from the American Jewish community. It is a quarrel of general concern. All Americans have a stake in the wisdom and success of Mr. Carter's effort to move toward an enduring Middle East peace. And his relations with the influential Jewish community bear on that success.

The confrontation now brewing seems to us to transcend any single issue relating to the Middle East negotiations. Some collaboration with the Russians in the diplomacy of a Geneva conference may or may not be helpful. A Palestinian "homeland" may or may not be a danger to Israel. Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank may or may not be justifiable. What is more irritating to American Jews than any specific Carter position, we suspect, is the belief that Mr. Carter and also American business interests are so eager to cement ties to the Arab nations that they would even sacrifice the vital interests of Israel. And what is irritating the Administration, we think, is the belief that Israel's friends are misjudging the President's motives, underestimating the settlement that might be within reach and using their political clout in the unselective, often tactical service of the Government of Prime Minister Begin—whom many American Jews regarded as too much the hawk just a few months ago.

There is not much that can be said to mend this unfortunate breach; the traditional code words of support for Israel and respect for the President are wearing pretty thin. There is, however, a national interest in understanding the special fervor of the Jews and in persuading them to direct it wisely.

At the core of the American Jewish community's concern for Israel lies the holocaust, the systematic destruction of six million European Jews for the crime of being Jewish. It is a memory encased in guilt, the guilt of past helplessness and the guilt of present survival in prosperous America. Against that guilt stands Israel, a symbol of redemption and a cause that uniquely identifies and unifies the scattered tribes of Jewry. Non-Jews do not experience these same emotions; the horror of American Jews is that their own children may not, either. But their emotions ought to be respected before there is more complaint about the dedication of "the Jewish lobby" for Israel. Dedicated they are and lobby they do, not for narrow profit or group interest but for their humanity, indeed sanity, as individuals and as a community.

That is why, as Senator Javits recently observed, American Jews have felt especially fortunate that their commitment to Israel has never yet conflicted with any administration's definition of the national interest in the Middle East. But now the likelihood of such a conflict has been raised, even by moderate American Jewish leaders like the New York Senator, and they seem to be preparing the Jewish community for a time of tense contest against President Carter's diplomacy.

"We may now have to face a much more dire situation in which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel see the national interests of the two countries as diverging," Senator Javits has said. Jews, he added, will have to try to bridge the gap, "and we will only be able to do so by persuasion." What is "dire" for him, clearly, is the prospect that Jews would be perceived in the process as preferring the policies of Israel to those of the United States. What is unspoken is the further fear of a revival of anti-Semitism and of the charge of "dual loyalty."

As this debate unfolds, American Jews deserve reassurance that multiple loyalties—to faith, to conscience, to communal, national and even international bonds—are at home in the American tradition. They are no more suspect in Jews than in Americans of Greek, or Irish or Lithuanian background who periodically hurl themselves against the American diplomacy of the day. And Jews deserve respect for the special torment of their community; by their history as well as abundant contributions to American life they have well earned the right they exercise to try to influence their country's policy.

Yet there are troubling aspects in the present posture of the American Jewish community that may exacerbate its dilemma and, indeed, undermine its objectives. There has been a recurring tendency to represent Jewish opinion as virtually unanimous on most diplomatic issues concerning the Middle East. And there has been a tendency often to confuse the transient policies of the Israeli Government with the cause of Israel's survival. Common sense alone refutes this stance—and so does the very broad range of opinion that can be heard on these same issues even among Israelis.

The desire of leading American Jews to present a united front at every turn is understandable. It reflects a conviction that Israeli, not American, lives are on the line and that Israel already faces too much pressure and criticism from other quarters. And if the United States, too, is perceived as tilting away from Israel, then American Jews are easily persuaded that they cannot afford the luxury of an open debate that might undercut the Israeli Government's resistance to American pressure. Thus it is that even Senator Javits spoke of opposing not merely those American policies that he deemed dangerous to Israel but also those that any government of Israel might find intolerable.

Such a siege mentality runs two grave risks for both American and Israeli diplomacy. The first is that the spokesmen of American Jews, while always respected for their political strength, could cease to be taken seriously in Washington on the merits of the issues. If, at every turn, the most that a President hears from them is a dutiful echo of Israeli policy, he must be forgiven if he seeks more sophisticated instruction elsewhere. It is a fact of recent history that politically difficult but valuable Israeli concessions have come only in response to American pressure. The President who manages that pressure must judge from day to day which resistance protects a vital nerve and which only an expedient interest. If ever there is an unwitting American betrayal of Israel it will be due to miscalculation on this point. The credibility of the American Jewish community is the best defense against such ghastly error.

The second danger is that the spokesmen of American Jews might cease to be taken seriously in Israel, too. If their considerable influence in the United States can be played too easily, it will be taken for granted—and even misplayed for unworthy goals. Political divisions in Israel have enfeebled the diplomacy of all its recent governments, causing it too often to be pegged to the lowest common denominator—the most zealous of its parties. If the views of American Jews are also reduced to that level, they will surely lose the capacity to instruct Israelis in the perceptions and imperatives of American opinion and policy, on which, above all, Israel's security depends.

Israel's ultimate defense line runs through the conscience and political stature of an American President, whose help in a moment of peril would be vital. That help is assured so long as the failure of any negotiations is perceived in the United States as the failure of the Arab nations to respond to a truly forthcoming Israeli diplomacy. The best link between that Israeli diplomacy and American perceptions is a credible, independent and influential American Jewish community.

As this debate unfolds, American Jews deserve reassurance that multiple loyalties—to faith, to conscience, to communal, national and even international bonds—are at home in the American tradition. They are no more suspect in Jews than in Americans of Greek, or Irish or Lithuanian background who periodically hurl themselves against the American diplomacy of the day. And Jews deserve respect for the special torment of their community; by their history as well as abundant contributions to American life they have well earned the right they exercise to try to influence their country's policy.

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September 19, 1977

FILE

TO: Hamilton Jordan and Robert Lipshutz
FROM Edward Sanders and Roger Lewis
SUBJECT: Reasons Why the Jewish Community and Other
Israeli Supporters are Disturbed by Administration
Actions and Inactions Since the July 6 Meeting

PURPOSE

This memo is based on face-to-face conversations with numerous Jewish leaders in Los Angeles and San Francisco, reports from recent meetings of national Jewish organizations and numerous telephone conversations. As a result, we feel that it is our obligation to warn the White House about the growing crisis over Israel policy which is boiling just below the public political surface. We are not pleased to be placed in the position of bearing bad news, but we believe that it is critical that you receive this information before a political explosion erupts.

BACKGROUND

After the meeting of July 6 between the President and Jewish leaders and the apparently successful Begin-Carter meetings, the President's policies received new support, many fears were alleviated, and for the President, a general environment of cautious hope and initial trust developed in the Jewish community. Gradually, and at an accelerating rate, however,

this positive beginning has been eroded in the last six to seven weeks. The perceptions we present below constitute a crystallization of both grass roots and leadership attitudes.

CONCERNS

1. A general and serious malaise has spread like wildfire throughout the Jewish community based on the fear that the Administration's Middle East policy is a failure and that Israel will be faulted for perceived impatience.

2. No issue is more controversial than the question of the Palestinians. There is overwhelming acceptance of the notion that the Administration does not adequately distinguish between the PLO and the Palestinians, that it has been too anxious to deal with the PLO, and that the President and his aides have been trying too hard to find a formula which the PLO can accept in order to initiate direct contacts with Arafat.

3. A credibility problem has definitely developed. Many believe that the Administration has not kept the spirit of the President's campaign promises on behalf of Israel. In addition, there is a widespread impression of unwillingness to keep commitments and make good on promises. On the Palestinian issue, for example, the Administration appears to have backed

down on the September, 1975, Kissinger promise that American dealings with the PLO would not begin until the PLO recognized 242 and recognized Israel's right to exist. In addition, the Administration seems to have shelved the Vance February promise that the PLO should change its covenant before the United States would deal with it. Certainly, a PLO acceptance of 242 - however unlikely - would not be considered an actual recognition of Israel's right to exist and should not result in American dealings with the organization. The Palestinians appear to be far more popular in the Administration than in the country at large.

4. As substantiation for the argument that the Administration is less than evenhanded, it is often pointed out that when the Israelis establish settlements, harsh statements are issued; but the State Department is silent when an organ of the PLO, Arafat, himself, or President Assad denounce American policy or when the Arabs announce boycott measures or sponsor anti-Israeli resolutions at international organizations.

5. There is a general feeling that the President and his staff have overreacted to Israeli settlements, which it is felt have been limited in size and number. Many believe that the Administration should have at least attempted to calm

Arab reaction rather than practically inviting harsh Arab responses in imitation of the United States.

6. The Administration has developed an image of insensitivity toward Jewish concerns for Israel. The President stepped into a minefield when he suggested after the Israeli elections that American Jews might moderate Begin. More recently, the State Department declaration that Palestinians must be represented at Geneva was issued a few hours before the Jewish New Year. This triggered a wave of resentment as much for timing as for content and our soundings suggest that it intensified Rabbinical criticism of the Administration in holiday services across the country.

7. The Administration has developed an image of harshness toward Israel. Whatever its diplomatic achievements, the Vance trip was a public relations disaster. Every major newspaper carried stories indicating that Vance found it easier to deal with the Arabs than the Israelis - thereby reinforcing the "pro-Arab" picture. Reporting on the trips was even more confusing because optimism with the Arabs was based on an anticipated moderation of past PLO attitudes which in retrospect was not forthcoming and because Begin did accept the Sadat proposal for working groups. Whatever the actual situation,

the image presented by the media and press was of a Secretary of State who preferred dealing with the Arabs rather than Israelis.

8. The Administration appears to have developed a further image of saying "no" to Israel on specific defense items. Kfirs and F-16 coproduction agreements are some of the issues which are often mentioned in private sophisticated discussions. Even though a major broad-based arms deal was announced at the time of the Begin visit, it is generally believed that the Administration is holding back on new arms and aid agreements with Israel and delaying deals already made.

9. Rumors persist that the Administration either is preparing or already has prepared a list of ways to pressure Israel. It is assumed that Carter will not try to "Eisenhower," i.e., an abrupt confrontation, but rather a step-by-step approach, gradually tightening the knots. Whether or not this is actually the case, it is almost universally believed to be true.

10. The Administration is seen as having encouraged false expectations among the Arabs which is likely to lead to the kind of disillusionment which is now occurring in the Arab League. For example, the President is regarded as having talked too much about "minor modifications" in 1967 borders and recently, too much about Palestinians.

11. The Administration is seen as too optimistic on Arab intentions for which it seems to have nothing from the Arabs except polite but vague conversation by Arab leaders at meetings with the President and since July 6, with Secretary Vance.

12. There is a widespread concern in leadership circles about future increased arms aid to Arab states, especially the possibility of an F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. Such a sale would be intensely opposed by Israel's supporters.

13. The Administration's policies are potentially leading to the loss of a major base of support in the foreign policy area. On Panama, Cuba, China, Africa and U.N. policy, many of Israel's staunchest supporters are likely to back the President on all or most of his policies in these areas. However, the continued appearance of tension with Israel could lead to an erosion of a body of support the Administration requires in these and other areas.

14. Although the energy program is generally admired, its de-emphasis of the international supply problem and of supply alternatives reinforces assumptions listed above.

15. In sum, the Carter Administration is seen as so preoccupied with achieving peace by its own timetable and preconceived

means, that it is insensitive to the authentic needs and concerns of Israelis. Starkly put, despite its rhetoric on human rights, it is seen as less friendly to the Israeli democracy than its predecessors.