

5/21/77

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THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Saturday - May 21, 1977

9:00 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

9:30 Acting Secretary Warren Christopher,
(30 min.) Under Secretary Philip Habib, Secretary
Harold Brown, and JCS Chairman General
George Brown. (Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski).
The Cabinet Room.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
KITTY SCHIRMER

SUBJECT STATEMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE

Attached is a statement which you might consider making at the start of the press briefing on the Environmental Message on Monday. Such a statement would have two advantages: it would increase the visibility of the Message; it will help make the House vote on the Dingell amendments to the Clean Air Act closer.

The House will consider the Clean Air Act on Tuesday and Wednesday, with a vote on the auto emissions issue likely on Tuesday. It now appears that John Dingell has the votes to defeat Paul Roger's auto provision, which is identical to the Administration's recommendation. The margin of the Dingell vote, however, is uncertain. While some estimate he may win by as much as fifty votes, Rogers believes that a Presidential statement could cut this back considerably. The purpose in narrowing the margin is to avoid a Dingell mandate (and a possible instruction of Conferees) in Conference. The Senate will consider the Clean Air Act right after Memorial Day, and while the vote may be close, the more stringent Muskie provision is likely to prevail. The Administration's provision is a possible compromise in Conference.

The Clean Air section of the attached statement is drafted to avoid a direct conflict between your recommendation and the likely outcome of the House vote. Rather than addressing the House vote directly, the statement describes the kind of auto emissions provision you would like to see when the bill reaches your desk.

The statement also includes a short section on the strip mining bill, which is about to go to Conference. The Senate action on the surface owner consent issue is of particular concern and will hopefully fall to the House language in Conference.

STATEMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE

Maintenance of a healthy environment for all Americans, whether in the workplace, in our cities, or in the great natural areas of the country, is a necessary companion to our goals of ensuring a sound economy and an adequate supply of energy.

Without adequate environmental controls, we cannot hope to accomplish our public health goals. Without attention to the problems of our urban environment, our cities will lose their attraction as places to live. Without firm standards for protecting our air and water and our land, development of acceptable energy supplies will be impeded. Without committed, sensitive stewardship of our natural resources, parks, and wilderness areas, we will devalue, and perhaps lose forever, the natural heritage which makes this land of ours unique.

The program which I am sending to the Congress today builds on the strong statutory base which environmental leaders in the House and Senate have put into place over the last seven years. Much of their legislative work is complete, and the responsibility now falls to the Executive Branch to provide strong leadership and insight into implementation of these laws to see that our joint efforts succeed.

There are, however, two particularly important pieces of legislation now before the Congress which will determine the adequacy of our tools to realize several of our environmental goals. I congratulate the Senate on its passage of the strip mining bill last Friday, with many environmentally responsible provisions. I hope, however, that the Conference Committee can move toward a more equitable approach to the question of surface owner consent, and that it will choose the environmental protection provisions which Secretary Andrus submitted.

The Clean Air Act Amendments, as they deal with stationary sources such as industrial plants and utilities and with the question of automobile pollution, will determine how promptly we can move to protect public health from air-pollution related disease and illness. The bill which the Congress sends to me for signature will, I hope, follow the lines of the proposals EPA Administrator Costle made to the Congress on my behalf last month. These recommendations were carefully designed to ensure that all sectors of our industry do their fair share in meeting our air quality standards.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1977

Jack Watson -

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Agenda for Cabinet Meeting

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Jack Watson
Jane Frank *Jane* May 20, 1977

RE: Proposed Agenda for the Cabinet Meeting, Monday, May 23, 1977

(No 15-minute presentations are scheduled)

*good **

1. Summary by Cy Vance of his recent trip, and status reports of visits of the Vice President and Ambassador Young.
2. Your forthcoming meeting with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia.
3. Reminder to attend the Democratic Congressional dinner of Wednesday, May 25, 1977.
4. Reports from Cabinet members.

** In future cut them down to a strict 10 minutes.*

Attachments

CC: The Vice President

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1977

Frank Moore -

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
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Rick Hutcheson

Re: Senate Action on Strip Mine Bill

Frank
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DAN TATE^{AT}/BOB THOMSON/KATHY FLETCHER

SUBJECT: Senate Action on Strip Mine Bill

1. Written Consent of Private Surface Owners over Federal Coal

The Senate reached a compromise between a Bumpers amendment to remove the right of written consent and the Committee language which provided the right with no limit on financial compensation to consenting landowners. The compromise provides for "written consent" except where the Secretary finds that the coal lease would be in the "national interest." No criteria are given for the finding, and a determination of the need for a large lease area could be done without making "national interest" findings for each landowner. While this provision might be acceptable with a sensitive Secretary of Interior, it does not provide the certainty of tenure ranchers and farmers are seeking, and is certainly susceptible to abuse. This will be a difficult issue in conference. The House language provides written consent without exception.

In afraid of excessive payments to some surface land right holders - Compromise may be o.k.

2. Alluvial Valley Floors

Although the Administration amendment which would have matched the House language failed, a substantial strengthening amendment did pass. This will put us in a good position to obtain a satisfactory provision in conference. The Senate language would allow strip mining in certain alluvial valley floors if the land is undeveloped range land. The House language does not include this land use exemption, and thus is stronger and more easily administered.

House better

3. Elimination of Highwalls

A Ford amendment to weaken the prohibition against leaving unreclaimed highwalls was unexpectedly accepted by Senator Metcalf. This will be an important issue in conference as the House has repeatedly refused amendments diluting the "approximate original contour" requirements.

House better

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4. Prime Agricultural Lands

A modification of the Administration's amendment restricting new strip mines in prime agricultural lands was accepted by voice vote. There is no parallel provision in the House bill. *letter*

5. Other Issues

All other significant weakening amendments were defeated, and with the exception of the above issues, the House bill is very similar. The conference may be protracted over the written consent and highwall issues, however.

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Habib/Dowd → ROK
5-21-77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Consultation - ROK

- a) Ground Force - schedule
- b) Nuclear - sched (Park only)
- c) Mil assistance. 2nd Div.
FMS - War Reserve
- d) Command & Control
- e) Public/private commitments
- f) Japan - inform - Fukuda
ck - Park = Japan help only
- g) Follow up discussions
- h) Human Rk
- i) Public comments - US officials
- j) Defense finances
- k) Maneuvers together
- l) Air - Navy deployments
- m) Emphasize ROK strength
- n) No nukes
- o) Technology level / Training

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1977

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox and is
forwarded to you for your
information.

Rick Hutcheson

Re:
Call to Congressman Paul Rogers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Love
J*

FRIDAY - 7:10 P.M.
MAY 20, 1977

MR. PRESIDENT

CONGRESSMAN PAUL ROGERS

CALLED.

TIM KRAFT

*Clean Air Act - Can win -
Senior citizens. Lk for
Schlesinger - Dingell says
Cost \$15 billion gallons*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1977

Stu Eizenstat
Z. Brzezinski

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re Survey Results from Israel

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4(b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, FEB. 24, 1983
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 9/22/99

12-14 Mifflin Place Cambridge Massachusetts 02138 617/661-3212
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., Suite 1250
Washington, D. C. 20006 202/223-6345

*To Stu,
then To Jbig
J*

MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

TO THE PRESIDENT AND ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM PATRICK H. CADDELL *PHC*
RE SURVEY RESULTS FROM ISRAEL
DATE MAY 19, 1977

I have just received most of the data that we had requested. Unfortunately, little data exists in the U.S. and sources had to be approached directly in Israel. I apologize for the time expended in securing this data but no other course was possible that would maintain confidentiality.

The data we have comes from two sources: (1) Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and (2) Israpoll -- the Gallup affiliate. However, the surveys that have been taken tend to be limited, even somewhat crude and not very indepth. One of our sources has been promised data taken during the election but it has not been available until today.

I have studied the data received quite carefully. Because some of the questions have been repeated over time there is an opportunity for analysis of change. The major conclusions I would cite are as follows:

- 1) Israeli public opinion tends to fluctuate greatly.
Despite a knowledgeable and interested public on foreign and defense issues it appears that the bulk of Israeli public opinion moves quickly to support the efforts and positions of government leadership when that leadership is united in approach. One observer Asher Arian (Department of Political Science at Tel-Aviv University) describes this as "deference." He argues that "Israeli public opinion is quite malleable when leaders of stature attempt to change its course." In the United States, increasing knowledge and sophistication creates a tendency for intransigence in public opinion on issue positions.

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May 19, 1977

In Israel this tendency does not appear as strong and indeed within certain significant constraints, public opinion on these major issues can be influenced markedly. Not unlike the U.S., public opinion in Israel, according to Mr. Arian, tends to react to given situations rather than to shape them.

- 2) Israeli's are generally hawkish. This comes as no surprise given the reality of their situation.
- 3) There have been significant movements of public opinion in believing that Egypt wants an acceptable place but that perception is not extended to the Arab world in general.

In June 1971 only 24% of Israel felt that Egypt was "definitely or perhaps" interested in achieving an acceptable place. That percentage in 1974 was at 54%, declined to 36% in mid 1975, and increased to 61% in mid 1976. However, in looking at the responses to a similar question involving the general Arab world we find the figures fluctuating between 23% and 38% since 1968 with a peak figure in 1973 which declined to 28% in 1976.

- 4) War is not believed to be imminent this year. In a large 1,200 interview sample by the Gallup affiliate in April-May 1977, 12% thought there was a strong chance for another war during the next year, 13% a medium chance, 27% a weak chance, 14% no chance at all, and 13% didn't know. These figures are significantly down from a couple of previous years.
- 5) While large percentages are still opposed to territorial concessions some of the significant movements in public attitudes have been toward some concessions.

In 1969, 90% Israelis took the combined position of returning nothing (38%) or returning only a small part (52%). That figure stood at 83% in 1973. Last year the figures stood at 47% for those two options while 52% favored returning a certain part or almost all the territories -- a four-fold increase since the Spring of 1973.

- 6) The willingness to yield particular territory varies widely. As of 1976:

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- SINAI -- 63% are willing to give up a small part (18%), a certain part (31%), or a large part or all (22%) of the Sinai - 29% favor returning nothing.
- GOLAN HEIGHTS -- Thirty four percent are willing to give up a small part (17%), a certain part (12%) a large part or all (8%) of the Golan. While 63% favor returning nothing.
- EAST JERUSALEM -- Almost no one favors giving up control of Jerusalem. Eighty three percent want the city kept under Israeli control, only 16% favor joint Israel-Jordan control.
- WEST BANK -- (Excluding Jerusalem) In 1976, 43% favored returning any part of the West Bank while 56% favored returning no part. However, new figures from the Gallup affiliates indicate significant change in April-May 1977. Only 30% favored returning no territory -- a decline of 26 points from 1976. The percentage willing to give all West Bank territory starts at 11% compared to 5% in 1976, the percentage for a large part is up to 22% from 8% in 1976. So in 1977, 11% favor returning all territory, 22% are willing to give up a large portion, 33% willing to give up small portions, and 30% not willing to give up any territories.

In summary, there seems to be movement toward giving up at least some of the occupied territory.

- 7) The most recent survey results suggest significant movements on questions of negotiating with the PLO and on settlement in the occupied territories.

The April-May 1977 figures indicate a majority that favor some negotiating positions vis-a-vis the PLO.

- 5% - felt Israel should negotiate without any conditions;
16% - felt Israel should negotiate with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people only if they will recognize Israel.
34% - felt Israel should "accept to negotiate with the PLO as a part of the Jordanian delegation and only if the PLO will recognize Israel."

Page four
May 19, 1977

41% - Opposed negotiating with the PLO "under any circumstances."

While a plurality still oppose any negotiations, I gather from the material that the decline in the last three years in the numbers holding that view is dramatic.

Also in the April-May 1977 survey, when asked about Israeli settlements in occupied territories, 34% favored such settlements, 27% opposed, and 39% had no opinion--hardly a hard line view.

8) The openly accepted American role in formulating an Israeli peace position is quite astounding for any sovereign nation.

The image of American pressure haunts Israeli public opinion. In 1976 when asked a hypothetical * question how Israel should react to intense pressure by the U.S. on Israel to withdraw to the pre 1967 borders -- 47% thought Israel should resist, 22% were less definite but leaned toward opposition, 20% tended to prefer acquiescing, 11% "definitely thought capitulation was appropriate."

Thus, through a hypothetical question, less than a majority favored definitely standing up to the U.S. on this tough issue. Given other movements since Spring 1976 in Israeli opinion one probably would be safe hypothesizing that the percentage favoring acquiescing have increased.

A different question asked by the Gallup affiliate in April-May 1977 lends further credence to this notion. Twelve hundred Israelis were asked to agree to disagree with this statement:

* Memo from Asher Arian.

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May 19, 1977

"There are some people who claim that with respect to peace chances, it does not matter what Israeli leaders say or do. At any rate, everything will be decided by the Americans and the Russians."

Fully agree	24%	57%
Partially agree	33%	
Disagree	39%	
Don't know	4%	

While a heavy handed approach in real terms could easily upset the numbers above, it still suggests the importance of American pressure in shaping Israeli's public opinion.

Final Thoughts

These opinion results are most interesting particularly in light of Tuesday's election results. I am convinced that from even this limited data there has been important movements of attitudes on the question of a peace settlement. If the trend data is credible, one could only conclude that Likud's victory (or more realistically Labor's decline) was due more to domestic political issues than foreign policy. Indeed when studying the survey results, one the question of returning territories -- only 50% of Likud voters in 1976 favored "no return" despite that position being an integral part of Likud ideology.

Given such limited data, no opportunity to really cross computer analyze any of it, and my own limited knowledge of Israel, I hesitate to make too many concrete statements. However, from the data available, my intuitive analytic sense is that while most Israeli's personal preference would be to retain the territories, to ignore the PLO, etc. that in their heart of hearts vast numbers know that such positions are unrealistic. While Tuesday's results may be confusing, I would suspect that the attitudes we saw in April-early May have not altered since there are no events that are traditionally necessary to move Israel opinion. The new survey data taken during the campaign, that I hope to receive immediately, should provide more illumination.

The prospect for American leverage on Israeli public opinion seems good. However, I fear we are hampered by the problem of too little, too simplistic, too under analyzed data. I have some thoughts on this which could be pursued in a discussion.

May 19, 1977

APPENDIXA. Peace

Q. Do you think Egypt is interested in achieving a settlement which would be acceptable to us?

	<u>June 1971</u>	<u>7/1-2 1974</u>	<u>7/15-18 1975</u>	<u>6/30-7/4 1976</u>
Definitely interested	3%	6%	9%	19%
Perhaps interested	21	48	27	42
Not interested	40	23	31	36
Definitely not interested	35	24	33	4
Sample total	3763	550	596	524

Q. After everything that has happened, do you think that the Arab states will be willing to discuss real peace with Israel?

	<u>Feb-Apr 1968</u>	<u>Nov-Dec 1970</u>	<u>10/7-15 1973</u>	<u>7/1-2 1974</u>	<u>8/20-24 1975</u>	<u>9/29-30 1976</u>
Definitely willing	8%	5%	8%	3%	3%	2%
Perhaps willing	24	26	30	30	20	26
Not yet willing	62	59	47	58	61	57
Less willing than before	7	8	15	9	16	14
Sample total	1530	3779	400	550	559	541

Q. In your opinion, what are the chances of another war during the next year?

1200 - April/May 1977

Strong chances	12%
Medium chances	34
Weak chances	27
No chance at all	14
Don't know	13

May 19, 1977
APPENDIX - 2

B. Territory

Q. Opinions regarding territorial concessions.

	August 1969	May 1973	7/8-9 1976
Return nothing	38%	31%	19%
Return a small part	52	52	28
Return a certain part	5	10	36
Return all or almost all	1	2	16
No answer	4	5	-
Sample total	380	1905	568

Q. Opinions regarding specific territorial concessions
September 14-16, 1976

	<u>Golan Heights</u>	<u>West Bank</u>	<u>Sinai</u>
Return nothing	63%	56%	29%
Return a small part	17	12	18
Return a certain part	12	18	31
Return a large part	5	8	14
Return all	3	5	8

	<u>East Jerusalem</u>
Under Israeli control	83%
Joint Israel-Jordan control	16%
Jordan control, Israeli presence	1
Jordan control	1

Q. Willingness to withdraw from the Western Bank of
the Jordan (Judea & Samaria)

	<u>1200 - April/May 1977</u>
Willing to give up all Western Bank (Excluding Jerusalem)	11%
Willing to give up large portion of Western Bank	22

May 19, 1977
APPENDIX - 3

	<u>1200 - April/May 1977</u>
Willing to give up small portions only	33%
Not willing to give up any territories	30
D.K./N.S.	4

C. PLO - Settlements

Q. The proportion of respondents in favor of Israeli settlement in occupied territories.

	<u>1200 - April/May 1977</u>
In favor	34%
Against	27
No opinion	39

Q. Under what conditions would you think Israel should accept to negotiate with the P.L.O.?

	<u>1200 - April/May 1977</u>
Under no conditions	41%
As a part of the Jordanian delegation and only if the P.L.O. will recognize Israel	34
As the representative of the Palestinian people only if they will recognize Israel	16
Israel should negotiate with them without any conditions	5
D.K./N.A.	4

May 19, 1977
APPENDIX - 4

D. U.S.

- Q. There are some people who claim that with respect to peace chances, it does not matter what Israeli leaders say or do. At any rate, everything will be decided by the Americans and the Russians. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

1200 - April/May 1977

Fully agree	24%
Partially agree	33
Disagree	39
D.K./M.P.	4

- Q. How should Israel react to U.S. imposed settlement to pre 1967 border?

47%	resist
22%	Less definite but lean resist
20%	Lean to acquiesce
11%	Totally acquiesce to U.S.