

**Carter--Camp David Accords  
Box 7**

**Americans Since Hoover: Selected Documents from  
Presidential Libraries, 1929-1980  
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library**

cc Jody  
J

Settlements in West Bank and Gaza

Late in the evening, Saturday, September 16, 1978, Prime Minister Begin, Foreign Minister Dayan, Attorney General Barak, Secretary Vance and I were concluding discussions on the final wording of the section on the West Bank and Gaza.

Section 6 referred to the Israeli settlements, and as drafted in the American proposal, stated:

"6. After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established and there will be no expansion of physical facilities in existing settlements unless otherwise agreed by the parties."

Prime Minister Begin objected to this language, and began to make several alternate proposals. They included: (a) a fixed time (three months) during which no new settlements would be constructed; (b) prohibitions against civilian settlements only; (c) right to build a limited number of new settlements; etc. All of these proposals were rejected by me.

Finally, we agreed on the exact language concerning the settlements, and that the paragraph would be removed from the West Bank-Gaza section and included in a letter from Begin to me. I told him it could not be a secret letter and the Prime Minister replied that the text would be made public.


The agreed text was:

"After the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties."

It was clear and obvious that the "negotiations" applied to the West Bank and Gaza.

Early the next day I informed President Sadat of the agreement.

On Sunday afternoon Mr. Barak brought to me from Prime Minister Begin a proposed text which differed substantially from that on which we had agreed. I informed him that it was unsatisfactory, and read to him the text on which we had agreed, which was still lying on my desk. He did not disagree with the agreed text.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1978

*all done -  
or better  
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*  
SUBJECT: Middle East Agreement

Please permit me to make the following suggestions regarding the solidification of your Middle East triumph:

1. Talk with both Sadat and Begin -- particularly Begin -- as soon as possible while they are in this country and urge them -- particularly Begin -- to recognize the political sensitivity of the other party's position and to give as flexible an interpretation to the agreement as possible. At the Vice President's reception last night for Jewish leaders, a number conveyed to me their concerns that Begin will both "crow" about what he has obtained and give the strictest interpretation possible, as evidenced by his interview with Barbara Walters. They urge that you tell Begin that he must be sensitive to Sadat's problems and attempt to help, not hinder, Sadat's selling of this accord.
2. To reinforce this statement to Begin, I think that a number of Jewish Congressmen and Senators would be willing to convey the same message. Frank and/or the Vice President might help accomplish this.
3. Perhaps most important, since the success of these accords will depend heavily on the Saudi reaction, I suggest that the Vice President and/or Frank very quietly get a group of moderate Senators who supported the Saudi arms sale to visit the Saudi Ambassador. They might state that they had supported the arms sale despite the political objections here because they knew Saudi Arabia would be a strong friend of the United States and peace in the Middle East. They might also say that now is a critical time for Saudi Arabia to show moderation and support for Sadat. They might leave the clear message that Saudi Arabia cannot expect future support in the United States Senate if it "blows" the Sadat/Begin agreement. I think this is of critical importance.

cc: The Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Hamilton Jordan, Frank Moore

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

EDWARD SANDERS *ES*

SUBJECT:

U.S. Aid to Israel - FY 80.

I understand from the State Department that you will be considering an appeal from Secretary Vance tomorrow to retain the current package of aid to Israel. I hope you will accept the Secretary's appeal and override OMB's recommendation that the proportion of foreign military sales grants and economic grants be reduced.

Despite our budgetary considerations, I think OMB's recommendation would be counterproductive at this time for several reasons:

1. Israel has real and substantial economic difficulties, which will be increased when a peace treaty is signed. Cutting the proportion of grants for Israel could harm the negotiating process because it would erode Israeli trust for the United States at a time when such trust is necessary to promote Israeli flexibility.
2. The message we should be sending to the Israelis, is that if they can muster the courage to make necessary concessions the United States can be counted on, within reason, to help Israel meet the financial burden.
3. We should defer decisions as to Israel's economic needs until we have completed review of the Israeli request for aid in connection with the Egyptian treaty. There is no need to enter into a difficult argument with the Israelis twice this year.
4. OMB's recommendation could cause an uproar in Congress and could very well be the subject of an attempted override.

ES:ss

2:00 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JERRY RAFSHOON *Jerry*  
RICK HERTZBERG *Rick*

SUBJECT: TIME interview on the Egypt-Israel treaty

*I particularly like 4, 5, + 6.  
JR*

Here are some ideas to stimulate your own thoughts before your conversation Friday with the gentlemen from TIME. *→*

1. The treaty does not, by itself, guarantee peace in the Middle East. But it is extremely important as the foundation stone for a comprehensive peace in what has been, ever since World War II, perhaps the most volatile region of the world.

--Throughout the postwar era, the Middle East has been a cockpit for almost every kind of conflict: ideological, religious, national, economic, ethnic, political.

--At various times, in various ways, the armed forces of the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the United Nations, as well as those of the nations in the region itself, have been involved there.

--The treaty reduces the danger of general war in the region and of great-power confrontation there. The momentum of history in the Middle East has been turned toward peace.

2. Prime Minister Begin spoke of "civil courage" as the key element, and he credited President Sadat with that kind of courage. I would agree--but, as usual, with a broader interpretation.

--Not only the two leaders but also their people have demonstrated civil courage.

--Beyond that, they have displayed sympathetic imagination. To an unprecedented degree, each country has managed to see the problems from the other's point of view.

3. These qualities of civil courage and sympathetic imagination will be even more important in the next, extremely difficult stages of the peace process.

--The Arabs must understand Israel's special concern about physical security. They must try to see how the world looks to a people who have suffered persecution for centuries, culminating within living memory in the murder of twice as many Jews as live in Israel today, and who see the refusal of the P.L.O. and others to accept their national existence in the light of that historical experience.

--The Israelis must also understand the feelings of the Arabs, especially the Palestinians. There can be no doubt that history has not dealt justly with the Palestinian people. This is not a question of guilt or blame. It is a question of human sympathy and the universality of human aspirations.

\*  
good  
4. The peace treaty is also important as an answer to easy cynicism. The cynical view is that human beings are base creatures, more responsive to fear than to love, more attracted to revenge than to reconciliation. Egypt and Israel have proved that the cynics are not always right.

\*  
good  
5. I hope that those Americans who almost eagerly proclaim the false notion of American weakness will learn something from this. National strength has other uses than violence or bullyboy boasting. This peace treaty was the product not only of Israeli and Egyptian wisdom but of American power.

\*  
good  
6. As I said when I returned from the Middle East, I am glad our efforts had a happy result--but the effort was worth making regardless of the outcome. We have a duty as human beings to each other and to God to exert ourselves to the limit in pursuit of peace. Only if we do our utmost for peace have we the right to say of war, as Lincoln did in his Second Inaugural Address, that "The Almighty has His own purposes."

7. There has been a unity of ends and means in the peace process in the Middle East. A peaceful solution was the goal, and peaceful negotiation was the method of reaching it. Peace was the way to peace. It may not be too much to say that we have witnessed an example of the practical utility of the Golden Rule.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Congress briefing 3-14-79

Priority of obligation  
Review of treaty terms

O.I.

Sub phasing vs ambassadors

Target date

Access to Gaza.

Unilateral. polit. move -  
prisoners - families. maneuvers

Sign in Wash, then Eg, Is  
S.A. & Jordan & Palestinians

Eg move 5 div's, Is 2 div's  
Two airdromes  
Egypt may lose Arab support

Cost. for 3 years.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

9/5/78

Mr. President:

Do you plan to walk Sadat and  
Begin to their cabins today?

*Yes*

Have you made a decision with  
regard to a daily meeting with Zbig  
and Vance?

*Each a.m.  
will decide  
regular time*

Sadat arrives at Camp David at  
2:30 pm and Begin at 4:45 pm.

*ok*

Do you plan on meeting with  
Begin tonite?

*Good idea - I  
told Cy to set it up.*

Phil

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1977

Dear President Sadat,

When we met privately in the White House, I was deeply impressed and grateful for your promise to me that, at a crucial moment, I could count on your support when obstacles arose in our common search for peace in the Middle East. We have reached such a moment, and I need your help.

Secretary Vance has provided clarifications to many of your questions regarding the procedures outlined in the United States working paper. There is adequate flexibility in the language to accommodate your concerns.

DECLASSIFIED  
NSC memo 1/30/84 re 7160-84-  
BY WTE NARS, DATE 5/1/89

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The time has now come  
to move forward, and your  
early public endorsement of  
our approach is extremely  
important - perhaps vital - in  
advancing all parties to Geneva.

This is a personal appeal  
for your support.

My very best wishes to  
you and your family.

Your friend,

Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
NSC memo 11/8/84 re/KC-84-2  
BY MTE NARS, DATE 11/4/84

August 3, 1978<sup>1</sup>

To Prime Minister Begin

This is a private and personal letter, and I would appreciate your honoring its confidentiality. I want to express myself frankly and directly to you personally.

During the past year under your leadership of Israel we have made remarkable progress toward peace. The boldness and leadership qualities exhibited by you and President Sadat have contributed to a new and better relationship between Israel and Egypt which was not anticipated by the rest of the world. In my opinion you are the leader who, in the foreseeable future, can and must continue this progress. You have a strong hold on the government, loyalty among your associates, and the

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well deserved confidence of the people  
of your country.

It is imperative that every  
effort be made to capitalize on  
this unprecedented opportunity to  
consummate a definitive peace  
treaty between Israel and Egypt  
and then to match this achievement  
with other agreements between your  
nation and your other neighbors.

Although the recent discussions  
have produced minimal progress,  
broad areas of agreement do exist,  
providing a basis for sustained hope.  
Unless we take advantage of this  
opportunity now, however, those of  
us who presently serve as leaders  
of our respective nations may not  
again have such a chance to advance  
the cause of peace in the Middle  
East.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

After hours of detailed discussions on several occasions with both you and President Sadat, in private and in group sessions, I am convinced of your mutual desire for peace. That desire is obviously shared by the people of both nations. Nevertheless, the high hopes of last winter have now been dissipated, with potentially serious consequences.

It is time, therefore, for a renewed effort at the highest level. My hope is that during this visit by Secretary Vance to the Middle East progress and harmony will be indicated by positive statements and the avoidance of public disputes.

Then, as soon as is convenient, I would like to meet personally with you and President Sadat

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

to search for additional avenues  
toward peace.

Secretary Vance can discuss  
with you the arrangements for a  
time and place. Unnecessary  
delay would be a mistake. I  
have no strong preference about  
the location, but Camp David  
is available. My hope is that  
the three of us, along with our  
top advisors, can work together  
in relative seclusion. Maximum  
direct contact between you and  
President Sadat is very important.

To create the best climate  
for our meeting, public statements  
should be constructive and positive,  
expectations should not be raised  
too high, and quiet and mutual  
preparation should lay a foundation  
for optimum progress.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

It is important that this proposal be kept completely confidential. President Sadat is being similarly approached. A time for announcement can be mutually set after we have fixed the date. Secretary Vance is familiar with my schedule, and I hope that through him you will send to me your ideas and advice.

I look forward to an early opportunity to consider with you again one of the most important and challenging issues ever decided by political leaders.

Please remember that you have my continuing friendship and personal best wishes as we work together as partners in a common search for peace.

Sincerely,  
Jimmy Carter