United States History
Section II
Total Time – 1 hour, 30 minutes

Questions 1-2 (Document-Based Questions)

Suggested reading period: 15 minutes
Suggested writing period: 40 minutes

Questions 1-2 are based on the accompanying documents. The documents have been edited for the purpose of this exercise.

In your response you should do the following:

- **Thesis:** Present a thesis that makes a historically defensible claim and responds to all parts of the question. The thesis must consist of one or more sentences located in one place, either in the introduction or in the conclusion.
- **Argument Development:** Develop and support a cohesive argument that recognizes and accounts for historical complexity by explicitly illustrating relationships among historical evidence such as contradiction, corroboration, and/or qualification.
- **Use of Documents:** Utilize the content of at least six documents to support the stated thesis or a relevant argument.
- **Sourcing the Documents:** Explain the significance of the author’s point of view, author’s purpose, historical context, and/or audience for at least four documents.
- **Contextualization:** Situate the argument by explaining the broader historical events, developments, or processes immediately relevant to the question.
- **Outside Evidence:** Provide an example or additional piece of specific evidence beyond those found in the documents to support or qualify the argument.
- **Synthesis:** Extend the argument by explaining the connections between the argument and one of the following
  - A development in a different historical period, situation, era, or geographical area.
  - A course theme and/or approach to history that is not the focus of the essay (such as political, economic, social, cultural, or intellectual history).

1. Explain how President Carter wielded the powers vested in the American Presidency and the prestige of that office to successfully negotiate a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel.

2. Explain how the language of United Nations Resolution 242 may or may not have complicated negotiations concerning withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories.
Background Information

The description below is for background information. Analysis of it is not required and will not count toward the required documents.

In early September 1978 in the isolation and solitude of the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, three world leaders came together seeking a way out of the years of distrust, manipulation, war, and political posturing in the Middle East. At the invitation of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt came to the secluded presidential retreat, Camp David, hoping to find avenues to peace in their troubled part of the world. Each leader took enormous risks to be there, but the successful outcome of their meetings brought immediate worldwide attention to each one’s courage and resolve.

A formula for resolving conflict evolved during the Camp David meetings. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin expressed a new willingness to attempt resolution of the conflict, while U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered to serve as a mediator. He also suggested Camp David, the private presidential retreat, as a setting conducive to these meetings without the disruption of the press. When it became clear that both sides were holding to predictable statements and worn arguments, President Carter developed his own strategy of getting agreement in bite-size portions—first from one side and then from the other. Back and forth, idea and detail, getting consensus on certain parts, outlining what still needed work, Carter convinced Begin and Sadat to stay for thirteen days until they developed and agreed upon a framework for peace.

On September 17, 1978, the Camp David Accords were signed. These documents established A Framework for Peace in the Middle East and a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel. Within the outline of these agreements, the two signatory countries would work out other issues leading to a peace treaty and later would involve other neighboring countries. The following day, President Carter addressed a joint session of Congress to explain the agreements and to reiterate active U.S. support for a continuing peace process.

Ten days later, the Israeli Knesset voted on the Camp David Accords. After much debate on the issue of dismantling settlements in the Sinai, the Knesset approved by a vote of 84 to 19, with 17 abstentions. Secretary of State Vance, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and Secretary of Defense Brown spent the following months traveling and meeting not only with Israeli and Egyptian leaders but also with leaders of the other Arab countries. President Sadat faced heavy criticism from Arab leaders, and Prime Minister Begin had to answer opposing factions within Israel.

By March of 1979, there was still no progress. Once again, President Carter decided that he would intervene in a dramatic way by personally visiting Egypt and Israel. As he did at Camp David, Carter again reminded Sadat and Begin of what peace would mean to the people of the Middle East. After seven days, they agreed on a schedule for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, a promise that Israel could access oil from Sinai oilfields, and timing for the exchange of Egyptian and Israeli ambassadors.
On March 26, 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed with a grand ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House. The desire for peace had won the day. The search for peace continues today in the Middle East, yet the discussions held in Camp David those 13 days in September 1978 laid a new, strong and hopeful foundation for future efforts.
Document 1

Source description: United States Constitution, Article 2, Sections 2-3

Section 2
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 28, 1977

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We write to you because the Senate will play a major part in decisions affecting the Middle East in the time ahead, and, like any President, you will need strong support in your efforts to contribute to the cause of peace in the Middle East.

With this in mind we join in assuring you that you do have strong support in the Senate for your efforts to help Israel and the Arab nations secure a genuine and lasting peace.

We understand that the key elements of your approach -- which we believe to be consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 242, supported by all the nations involved -- are:

(1) No alteration of our historic commitment to assure the security of Israel, and no use of our military aid to place pressure on Israel.

(2) A commitment to a comprehensive and genuine peace, including concrete acts to normalize relations among the nations of the area.

(3) The establishment of mutually accepted and secure borders, recognized by all.

(4) A fair and permanent solution to the problem of the Palestinians in a way that will contribute to a lasting peace.
We endorse your view that peace cannot be imposed from the outside and that the United States does not intend to present the nations involved with a plan or a timetable or a map. Peace can only come from a genuine recognition by all the states that their interests are served by reconciliation and not by war.

Robert C. Byrd
Hubert H. Humphrey
Alan Cranston
Daniel K. Inouye
John Sparkman
Abraham Ribicoff
Edward M. Kennedy
Gaylord Nelson
Edmund S. Muskie
October 21, 1977

Dear President Sadat,

When we met privately in The White House, I was deeply impressed and grateful for your promise to me that, at a crucial moment, I could count on your support when obstacles arose in our common search for peace in the Middle East. We have reached such a moment, and I need your help.

Secretary Vance has provided clarifications to many of your questions regarding the procedure outlined in the United States working papers. There is adequate flexibility in the language to accommodate your concerns.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The time has now come to move forward, and your early public endorsement of an approach is extremely important—perhaps vital—in advancing all parties to Canada.

This is a personal appeal for your support.

My very best wishes to you and your family.

Your friend,

Jimmy Carter
Document 4

Source description: Israeli Prime Minister Begin engages United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in a game of chess during negotiations at Camp David.
Document 5

Source description: United Nations Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 calling for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied during the Six-Day War

RESOLUTION 242 Nov. 22, 1967

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

EXPRESSING its continued concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

EMPHASIZING the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

EMPHASIZING FURTHER that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. AFFIRMS that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict:

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force

2. AFFIRMS FURTHER the necessity

   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. REQUESTS the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. REQUESTS the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
Document 6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Begin, May 1, 1978, 1:30 - 2:00 p.m.

In the brief time you will have with Prime Minister Begin, it will not be possible to cover much substantive ground. He will have spent the morning with Secretary Vance, who will call to brief you on those talks before Begin arrives for his meeting with you.

Although this meeting is primarily of symbolic importance, there are a number of points that you will want to emphasize. To review where we now stand, Sadat has most recently emphasized the need for a clear Israeli commitment to the principle of withdrawal from all occupied territories, with some minor modifications in the 1967 line on the West Bank, and provided that Israel's security needs are adequately met. This last point is potentially significant.

When Dayan was asked about withdrawal once Israel's security requirements were satisfied, he emphasized that the continuation of Israeli settlements was also essential and that these could not be withdrawn. He also stated that there was no chance of getting this Israeli government to commit itself to withdrawal from the West Bank under any conditions.

Dayan also said to Secretary Vance that after a five-year interim period, the only significant unresolved issue concerning the West Bank/Gaza would be sovereignty (or, more concretely, borders, withdrawal and security). He was unable to say anything about how this issue would be settled, but he emphatically rejected the idea of a referendum. At Vance's request, he said that he would seek a cabinet decision on how and whether the question of sovereignty would be decided after five years.
With this background in mind, you might make the following substantive points after appropriate remarks about Israel's 30th anniversary and the deep friendship between our two countries:

-- The US commitment to Israel's security is unavering. We believe that practical security arrangements can be worked out in negotiations. Sadat has most recently conditioned his call for Israel's withdrawal on the willingness of the Arab parties to negotiate with Israel on satisfactory security arrangements.

-- Sadat has told us that he remains committed to the search for peace, and that he is willing to help work out arrangements for an interim agreement for the West Bank/Gaza. But for further progress to be made, he feels that he needs an Israeli commitment to eventual withdrawal in exchange for peace, recognition and security.

-- The idea of a five-year interim agreement concerning the West Bank/Gaza seems to be gaining acceptance, and many of the elements of the "self-rule" proposal could be incorporated into such an agreement.

-- One question that requires some further clarification is the means by which the question of sovereignty will be resolved after the five-year period. Our idea of a limited-choice referendum has been criticized by Israel, but what does Begin have in mind as an alternative? It is not enough simply to say that the question can be raised. At a minimum, could Israel make a commitment to negotiate a final agreement for the West Bank/Gaza after a five-year interim agreement which would be based on the principle of 242, i.e., peace for withdrawal?

You should not expect answers on these questions from Begin, but it will be important for him and his colleagues to know that we think some clarifications along these lines will be needed. You will want to strike a balance between your remarks in support of Israel's security and the need for hard decisions concerning the West Bank if progress is to be made in negotiations with Egypt. This is no time to signal to Begin that we are pulling back from positions we have previously taken.