THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2.24

Cy
Harold

The end. contains
some minor changes made
by the President himself.

2/7

9-3-94

Released
under provisions of F.D. 1336
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

9-3-94

Released
under provisions of F.D. 1336
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council
February 24, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ALSO: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Attached is a copy of PD/NSC-32 regarding U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa. This PD is to be held extremely closely and shown only on a strict need to know basis.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1978

Presidential Directive/NSC-32

TO: The Vice President
    The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense

    ALSO: The Director of Central Intelligence
          The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Following the National Security Council meeting of February 23
regarding U.S. policy towards the Horn of Africa, the President
has directed the following:

1. **Diplomatic Steps**

   The United States will temporarily defer pressing our
U.N. Security Council resolution on the Horn, while
encouraging the Nigerians to undertake a diplomatic
initiative at the OAU summit in Tripoli based on our
resolution. Should the OAU approach stall, we will
encourage the Africans to bring the issue back to the
United Nations as their own initiative. This matter
is to be expedited.

2. **Illicit Arms Transfers**

   The United States will seek consultations with the
governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Pakistan
with the following objectives:

   -- To inform them that transfer of U.S.-origin equip-
      ment to Somalia without U.S. authorization would
      be contrary to our arms sales agreements.

   -- In the case of Saudi Arabia, also to present evi-
      dence of the transfer by Saudi Arabia of U.S.-
      origin weapons to Somalia, to underscore our
      concern about such transfers as contrary to our
      bilateral arms sales agreements and as posing a
      potentially adverse impact on Congressional approval
      of the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

Declassified/Released on 12-19-98
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by S. Tileby, National Security Council
-- To inform them that we have no objection to their supplying non-U.S. origin weapons to Somalia (particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons). However, we would emphasize the importance of their pressing Somalia to withdraw from the Ogaden and to use such weapons only for the defense of Somalia, as opposed to the continued occupation of the Ogaden.

-- To state that should Somalia agree to announce and implement a decision to withdraw from the Ogaden, the United States would be prepared to initiate Congressional consultations to authorize third country arms transfers of defensive U.S.-origin weapons to Somalia for the defense of Somalia's territorial integrity, and to supply some items of our own (trucks, etc.).

-- To state if asked that, in the event of an invasion of Somalia, should the countries of the region decide to deliver military equipment to Somalia, or to provide air cover or other units to counter Ethiopian or Cuban air capability, the United States would be prepared to offset Soviet threats or actions directed at such assistance measures.

-- To indicate U.S. willingness to consider authorizing third country arms transfers to Somalia in the event Ethiopia aided by the Soviet Union or Cuba invades Somalia, even in the absence of a Somali commitment to withdraw from the Ogaden.

3. U.S. Carrier Task Force

The President did not approve at this time the deployment of a United States aircraft carrier into the area but indicated willingness to consider moving a carrier closer to the area. -- for example, Diego Garcia.

4. Publicity and Congressional Consultations

The United States should undertake efforts to publicize more widely the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia including, for example, the command responsibilities of Soviet General Petrov and the number of Cubans in Ethiopia. We also should ensure that key U.S. allies and members of the OAU understand the situation in the Horn and collectively deplore the Soviet and Cuban role in Ethiopia.
Consultations with the Congress are to begin to ensure complete understanding on the part of the Congress with respect to the role of Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia, and the strategic and political implications of their role and of an Ethiopian-Cuban invasion of Somalia, and regarding possible U.S. third-country transfers.