Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-10

February 18, 1977

TO: The Vice President
    The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
       The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
       The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
       The Director of Central Intelligence
       The U.S. Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review (U)

I hereby direct that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities. This examination will consist of two parts to be done concurrently.

One part of the examination will be conducted by the Policy Review Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense. It will define a wide range of alternative military strategies and construct alternative military force postures and programs to support each of these military strategies. Among other topics, this segment will consider: military force levels; technological developments with regard to new weaponry; alternatives to our reliance on foreign bases; deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels; viability and desirability of the "triad" posture. This portion should also evaluate the relative ability of the U.S. and its allies to achieve U.S. objectives in specified military contingencies. It will identify the key issues for Presidential decisions, including the budgetary implications of each of these postures.

The other part will be a dynamic net assessment conducted by the Special Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will consist of review and comparison of the overall trends in the political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and military capabilities of the United States, its allies, and potential
adversaries. It will evaluate the objectives and national strategies that may be pursued by our principal potential adversaries and examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate to the United States.

This two-part analysis should identify for Presidential decisions alternative national strategies and the major defense programs and other initiatives required to implement them. The two parts should be carefully coordinated with one another. In order to achieve this, I have directed the Assistant to the President/National Security Affairs to develop additionally more detailed terms of reference for this analysis.

These terms of reference will be presented for my review by February 24. I also want interim reports to allow further guidance as the study progresses. A summary of the entire report, not to exceed 70 pages, should be submitted for NSC consideration not later than June 1, 1977; the final version should be completed by June 15, 1977.

[Signature]

Jimmy Carter
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: PRM-10 Force Posture Study (C)

The PRM/NSC Force Posture Study has served a useful purpose in focusing attention on the value of developing a strategy to guide the evolution of our military forces for the next decade and in raising a number of key military strategy issues. I do not think the study provides the basis for a selection of an overall integrated military strategy at this time. None of the notional AIMS is completely satisfactory. Instead, I see the study as the first step in a process of refining our strategy choices and of eliciting initial Presidential policy guidance on key military strategy issues.

The President's guidance needs to insure our flexibility pending the definition of an overall US national strategy. The importance of the choices ahead of us, the size of the investments involved, and the possible consequences of misjudging the Soviets all warrant that we do nothing now to foreclose our ability largely to determine the nature of our long-term competition with the USSR, rather than to react to their initiatives in a context set by them.

The PRM-10 study and the Presidential guidance which follows will provide a framework for my review within DoD of specific program and budget issues. Establishment of guidance on military strategy issues will also provide one of the bases for the conduct of our foreign policy, our arms control negotiations, and priorities for our intelligence efforts. This study does not provide a sufficient basis for specific decisions on US military force structures or force planning.

With this in mind, I attach an Agenda defining "Issues for Discussion" for the two PRC meetings on the Force Posture Study.

8/3/93

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N. Nyman (F88-1406)

Upon removal of the attachments, this document is downgraded to:

SECRET
I would like the first meeting on 8 July to cover the first four sections of the Agenda, i.e., the AIMS and general purpose forces issues. The second meeting on 13 July will address the AIMS and strategic forces issues.

I attach as TAB A of the Final Report an analysis prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the "Military Implications of the AIMS." This analysis evaluates the AIMS on the basis of the objectives spelled out in the Defense Guidance.

Harold Brown

Enclosure
AGENDA

PRC MEETINGS ON PRM/NSC-10

MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW

Issues for Discussion

1. US Military Strategy for Europe (Key Questions 1 and 2, Section IV of the Final Report)
   - How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense?
     - What should be US military strategy in Europe to (1) deter a Warsaw Pact attack (or intimidation) and (2) to terminate conflict successfully if deterrence fails?
     - For deterrence, is it necessary to plan military capability to restore the original borders or only to blunt an initial Warsaw Pact conventional attack?
     - Is it necessary to have a military sustaining capability greater than that of the Warsaw Pact?
     - If deterrence fails, what conventional military capability is required? To what extent should the US rely on the early first use of nuclear weapons?
   - To what extent should the US for political or military purposes state objectives for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance? Specifically, does it make sense for the US to plan military capabilities in excess of those of our NATO Allies?

II. US Military Strategy Outside Europe in Relation to US-European Military Strategy (Key Questions 1 and 3)
To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

What should be US military strategy toward China?

III. US Military Strategy for Crisis Management and Potential Local Wars (Key Question 4)

What should be the planned extent of US military forces (and supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars?

-- To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?

-- In what individual regions of the world should the US plan for the use of US military forces in crises and potential local wars (Middle East, Korea)? Are there any regions where the US should plan for the use of land combat forces?

IV. US Military Strategy for East Asia (Key Question 5)

What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

V. US Military Strategy for Strategic Forces (Key Question 6)

To what extent should the US procure nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to US-Soviet force asymmetries? What serious options should the President consider? What should be the trend in US strategic forces: (a) to stay ahead or equal in major indices of strategic power or (b) to deemphasize the importance of advantages in the major indices of strategic power?

What kind and level of retaliatory capability is necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression?

To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target-kill capability and for what purposes?
- Should the US acquire forces for a Strategic Reserve Force, i.e., forces in excess of other requirements or for protracted withholding in a strategic nuclear war.

- What should be the relationship between the choice of a Strategic Force substrategy and the other components of an overall US military strategy. What difference does it make for a US nuclear strategy whether the US chooses a limit-loss strategy in Europe or something else; chooses a strategy requiring an increase or reduction in forces outside Europe, etc.??
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose. The purpose of the PRM-10 Force Postures Study is to elicit policy guidance from the President on key issues pertaining to national military strategy. The scope of this study is intentionally broad. It partakes of all, but exhausts none, of the numerous topics and factors which enter into the determination of national military strategy. It is designed to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program issues, using either the Interagency process or the normal PPBS decision process, as appropriate.

Approach. In order to develop alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS), Substrategy building blocks were constructed to identify a range of options in each of five analytical areas:

1. NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe (including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic).
2. Operations outside Europe during a NATO-WP war.
3. East Asia.
4. Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars.

The major issues in each analytical area, or conflict category, were isolated. Then, using this building block technique, the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement.

Summary of Substrategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO-WP in Europe</th>
<th>Non-European Operations during a NATO-WP War</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Activities and Potential Local Wars</th>
<th>US-USSR Nuclear Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counteroffensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offset attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct defense</td>
<td>Initiatives</td>
<td>Increased Presence</td>
<td>Heavy Intervention</td>
<td>Clear Superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elastic tripwire</td>
<td>Minimal Effort</td>
<td>Reduced Presence</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripwire</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modified Withdrawal</td>
<td>Proxy Reliance</td>
<td>Assured Retaliation Only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) were formulated from the analytical area substrategies by excluding unworkable combinations of substrategies. Eight final AIMS were selected for detailed evaluation in terms of their military, economic, political (both in technical and domestic) and arms control implications. Each AIMS addresses in a different way the major military issues facing the United States. The range of AIMS is intentionally broad so that they will provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluation of the major elements of defense policy.

The composition of the eight final AIMS in terms of their analytical area substrategies is shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIMS</th>
<th>BART/POP Conflict in Europe</th>
<th>Operations Outside Europe in US/USSR War</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Peacekeeping and Potential Local War</th>
<th>US/USSR Nuclear Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Limited Loss: Nato 95-95 division threat at mid-long w/30-day sustainability</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Reduced Presence</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Initiatives</td>
<td>Current Presence</td>
<td>Heavy Intervention</td>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Initiatives</td>
<td>Current Presence</td>
<td>Heavy Intervention</td>
<td>Maintain US Force Advantages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Direct Defense: Restores pre-war time against 120 division threat w/90-day sustainability</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Reduced Presence</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Initiatives</td>
<td>Current Presence</td>
<td>Heavy Intervention</td>
<td>Assured Nuclea- tion only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Direct Defense: offsets enemies w/90-day sustainability</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Reduced Presence</td>
<td>Limited Action</td>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Initiatives</td>
<td>Increased Presence</td>
<td>Heavy Intervention</td>
<td>Clear Superiority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS, as summarized below.
AIMS E - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be
achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US
still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of
short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would
be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would
an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear
threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with
NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold
a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line
for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line
yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the
Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability
to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced
presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would
reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce,
but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships
there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic
and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require
drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be
met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military
forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of
our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all
present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be
retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against
all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is
currently. As in AIMS E, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would
plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact
conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus
involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain
a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of
European war. In contrast to AIMS E, the current programmed military
deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained.
Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for
unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to
other purposes.

AIMS F Variant - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives
can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial
increase in sustainibility by our NATO Allies. This strategy is identical
to AIMS F except that in a European war, sustainibility is commensurate
with that currently programmed for US forces, with a requisite increase
in sustainibility by our NATO Allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies,
the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined
Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90
days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed
to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe
beyond the first month of conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces
than AIMS F. AIMS F-Variant requires forces at least comparable to
those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those
currently programmed by the NATO Allies.
AIMS G - This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximatley the current programmed military deployments—russian forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS H - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an
indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated.) In addition, the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS 1, essentially the current pro-
grammed military deployments in East Asia—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capa-
ibility for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I—This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only—the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources—and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets' favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in con-
junction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS M—This AIMS is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indices—forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and a major intervention capability in other regions.
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Assumptions. The study is based on six fundamental assumptions as to US policy and the international environment. If these assumptions are not valid, a reappraisal of these AIMS would be required. The major assumptions are:

1. The Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary threat to the physical security of the United States and to US interests worldwide.

2. The United States will continue to view the security of Europe as a vital interest and will continue to participate actively in the defense of NATO, which is threatened by the Warsaw Pact.

3. The United States will continue to regard aggression against Japan as a threat to vital interests.

4. The PRC and the Soviets will not effect a rapprochement sufficient to allow significant reduction in forces oriented towards each other.

5. So long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists, the US will not need to procure specific conventional forces to counter a PRC military threat.

6. In an interdependent environment, the US will continue to have major global interests.

Limitations. The study has several limitations, some intentional, others due to constraints on time or information.

---It is not based on overall US national objectives because no agreed set of national objectives exists.

---It does not evaluate the Soviet threat; best available national intelligence on the threat was used in estimating force postures and evaluating the alternative strategies.

---It does not study manpower or industrial mobilization preparedness.

---It does not address specifically theater nuclear forces issues.

Current Capabilities. An analysis of the capability of the FY1978 force structure was accomplished for a worldwide war with the Soviet Union and also for some lower level contingencies.
--In Central Europe, the chance of NATO stopping a Warsaw Pact attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time. It is also considered unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would achieve its full objective of defeating NATO forces in Central Europe and reaching the French border and North Sea Coast.

--If NATO could stabilize a defensive line in Central Europe the flanks could probably be defended, though not without some loss of territory. The establishment of a full NATO air and ASW barrier in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap would probably result in significant attrition over time of Soviet forces attempting to interdict the North Atlantic SLOC. The naval campaign on the Southern Flank would depend initially on the ability of the Allied forces to absorb the initial Pact attack, but it is judged eventually to result in Allied control of the Mediterranean.

--The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe is uncertain.

--The results of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be described as a 'winner.' Further, there is no decisive advantage to either side in terms of residual resources. Today, this is true regardless of who strikes first, or whether the attack is a surprise or occurs after a period of warning. With some slight variations, it is true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side. In the three cases examined in the analysis, the US suffers at least 140 million fatalities, and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 million fatalities. Both the US and the USSR would incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources.

Examination of three lower level contingencies reveals the following:

--The US would likely prevail against the Soviets if the two powers fought one-on-one in the Middle East.

--The US would have substantial advantage over the Soviet Union in the deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa.

--If the North Koreans were to obtain tactical surprise in a major attack on South Korea, it is possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most likely major objective—the capture of Seoul. However, the North Koreans would probably not be able to gain and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK in sustained combat. With US contributions in tactical air and materiel support, the US and ROK would prevail against North Korea in the longer term.
Key Questions for Presidential Consideration. Six key questions for Presidential consideration are discussed in the context of the AIMS. The intent is to illuminate the various aspects of each question, rather than provide a single "right" answer. The questions are interrelated and should be addressed completely before final judgments are rendered on any of them.
QUESTION ONE.

Question. How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense? If deterrence fails, to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons?

Discussion. The major threat to US interests and security is posed by Soviet power worldwide. A US national military strategy must address the need to deter a US-USSR war and the ability to wage war in such a way as to terminate conflict on conditions acceptable to the US. Europe, because it is where the US and USSR have substantial interests and confront each other militarily, is the area of principal military concern. Thus, while any US strategy to deal with the threat of Soviet aggression must be worldwide in scope, it is appropriate to focus the military elements of the US national strategy on Europe.

For illustrative purposes, it is analytically useful to group the AIMS described in Section III into three broad categories.

AIMS E, F, G

In AIMS E, F, G (Group One), deterrence is based on both conventional and nuclear forces which are designed to make the costs of military aggression outweigh potential gains.

NATO conventional forces to resist a Soviet attack are planned to deny the Soviets the prospects of a quick, inexpensive, low-risk victory. They are not planned to deny the Soviets territorial gain. While Warsaw Pact sustainability and short-term mobilization capabilities may exceed NATO's, in conventional conflict with NATO destruction of a significant element of Soviet military power would occur. The conventional forces, through their ability to engage in high-intensity combat, would also increase the credibility of a US/NATO nuclear response. While the Soviets might hope that the mutual hostage effect of the US-USSR strategic systems would make an American use of nuclear weapons in Europe unlikely, they could not be certain. Moreover, Soviet planners would have to consider British and French nuclear systems. Finally, deterrence is enhanced by the fact that the Soviets must consider their relationship with the Chinese and divide their finite military resources between widely separated military regions.

* Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility both requires the Soviets to allocate their military resources between Europe and Asia and limits the Soviet ability to directly threaten US interests in Asia. This Sino-Soviet hostility permits greater relative American concentration on Europe.

** Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 days combat, prescribes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply for a theater, and calls for national reserves of war materiel. If ammunition and PDL storage capacity are used as an index, the Pact could have available 2 to 3 months of PDL and more than two months ammunition, including that stored in the western USSR. Great uncertainty attaches to such estimates of Pact sustainability, however, as they assume optimal stockage.
If, in spite of the considerations outlined above, conflict should occur, this group of strategies does not provide, at a high level of confidence, the capability to defeat a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack. Whether the Soviet objective of a victory within several weeks could be achieved is uncertain. The Soviets may be able to sustain combat for longer than the 30 days for which these AIMS provide. If the Soviets can persist in their attack, a US/NATO conventional defeat in Central Europe is likely. In that event the US could be forced to:

- Negotiate an end of the conflict.
- Resort to first use of nuclear weapons.
- Fall back from Central Europe and continue the war conventionally elsewhere.

The probability of NATO obtaining a satisfactory negotiated settlement to European hostilities is slim, since the Soviets would be winning militarily.

If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, rather than terminating hostilities, provoked a Soviet nuclear response, the consequences are not clear, but it is doubtful that US/NATO would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing situation. If war escalated to strategic nuclear exchange, major destruction would result without any foreseeable US advantage.

Finally, the US would find it exceedingly difficult to continue the war by conventional means, since its forces would have been sized and sustained only for the initial battle in Central Europe and not for a protracted worldwide conventional struggle.

AIMS H, I, J

In AIMS H, I, and J (Group Two), deterrence rests on the US/Allied capability to repel a Soviet conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. The objective of NATO forces is to deter a Soviet attack through a clear conventional capability to defeat it rather than to make a conventional "victory" too costly for the Soviets.

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* The OMB representative believes that because of the large uncertainty in Pact sustaining capability, it cannot be confidently predicted that the Pact could conduct an offensive operation longer than NATO could sustain a less militarily demanding defense. The uncertain reliability of non-Soviet Pact forces (which contribute over one third of the total Pact forces) contributes to this judgment. The OMB representative also believes that AIMS E, F, and G significantly upgrade NATO early combat capabilities.

** If NATO forces succeeded in containing a Soviet attack and establishing a stable defensive line, the eventual outcome is not clear.
If conflict should occur, the US would have planned the capability to defeat a Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons. In Central Europe these strategies are designed to allow the US/NATO to move back to the original borders after first blunting and stopping the Soviet/Pact attack.

Having achieved their war objectives, the US/NATO could then initiate negotiations for conflict termination. Although the Soviets would not have achieved their war objectives, they might choose to limit their own losses and terminate the conflict. If not, the US/NATO would still have conventional and nuclear forces which could be used to threaten the Soviets. If a period of prolonged stalemate ensued, the superior economic power of the US, NATO, and Japan, could be brought to bear.

AIMS M

In Group Three strategies (AIMS M), deterrence rests on the threat of offsetting a Soviet attack in Central Europe with a capability to seize other territory, supported by superior US strategic forces. The threatened response to Soviet aggression in Europe is not confined to that theater; rather, Soviet aggression would be countered by US military initiatives against the Soviet Union itself. Should conflict occur, the probability of Soviet success is remote. Unlike the options available in Group Two, AIMS M provides sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to obtain a military advantage over the Soviet Union. US/NATO, possibly in cooperation with China, could either threaten or actually use these capabilities to force a termination of hostilities.

Policy Tensions

The basic policy tension is that, on the one hand, Group One strategies, which can be supported within current defense expenditures and are consistent with the capabilities of our NATO Allies, promote deterrence; but if conflict occurs, probably would not provide satisfactory options for conflict termination. On the other hand, Group Two strategies, which offer more satisfactory options for conflict termination and lessen the probability of nuclear war, would require large increases in US and Allied defense spending and may provoke adverse Soviet and Allied reactions.

Affordability of military forces depends on the perceptions of the US/NATO as to the urgency of the situation. If it were perceived that a major Soviet/Pact conventional attack were intended, great expenditures for defense would be acceptable to the NATO governments. At present, such a perception does not exist. It is not that the US and its Allies cannot "afford" greatly increased defense expenditures but rather that the perceptions of the Soviet threat do not justify radical increases. Furthermore, while the US and NATO possess the necessary resources, there is intense domestic competition for these resources in non-defense sectors.
The Allies desire an American commitment to a restoration of the status quo ante but, unlike the US, show little inclination to provide conventional forces to accomplish such a goal. (The NATO Allies currently provide no more than 30 days of ammunition and supplies.) For them, deterrence appears assured by US military involvement in European security affairs and the potential escalation of any conventional conflict to strategic nuclear war. Given such views, dramatic increases in conventional forces and sustainability, such as in Groups Two and Three, would probably be viewed as either inconsistent with the Soviet threat or undermining deterrence.

However, if Group One AIMS were interpreted as reducing the US commitment to Europe, this would probably provoke serious Allied concern, especially in the FRG. Significantly increased German perceptions of vulnerability can only jeopardize the US ability to influence FRG defense policies, including German nuclear decisions. Moreover, the flank allies, perceiving a reduction in US support for the defense of their territorial integrity, may seek security assurance outside of NATO. Groups Two and Three strategies avoid these difficulties through the US commitment to restoration of the status quo ante. However, US/NATO movement to acquire and deploy forces capable of first absorbing and then defeating a Soviet attack might provoke a similar Soviet counter-buildup. Thus, while Group Two and Three strategies might provide the basis for stable deterrence if the capabilities described in the strategies existed, movement from current capabilities towards the increased force levels might actually be destabilizing.

Elements of a Solution

A number of ways exist to try to reconcile the policy tensions posed by the different AIMS. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the US currently pursues portions of a number of them. In seeking resolution:

-- The US could have as its declared strategy a restoration of the status quo but acquire forces for a more modest strategy. A public NATO commitment to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante would ease anxieties in the FRG even without full US or Allied funding for the necessary forces. US reassurance of European allies concerning US nuclear reliability forces the Soviets to consider the consequences both of a failure to achieve their objective in a timely fashion and NATO nuclear response to a conventional attack. (See Question Two.)

-- The US could acquire conventional forces to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside the European theater. AIMS G, for example, provides forces specifically to undertake non-European initiatives against the USSR. Because this AIMS also plans for heavy intervention in local wars, additional forces could be available for initiatives. (These same forces, if employed in Europe, could provide a limited enhancement of the conventional capability NATO possesses in Group One strategies.) (See Question Three.)
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-- The US could, individually or in cooperation with NATO, expand the conventional sustainability of Group One forces to delay or avoid reaching a nuclear decision point. AIMS F(v), for example, provides the US/NATO with 90 days of sustainability. This would not permit restoration of the status quo ante; but, if also attained by the Allies, it might avert a conventional defeat. Increased US sustainability above that provided by the Allies may be useful as an example for them and to provide the US additional non-nuclear options should conflict occur.

-- The US could enhance its nuclear capabilities to increase the deterrent value of the various groups of strategies. AIMS F, F(v) and I include strategic forces which maintain US advantages in certain indices. AIMS M seeks clear superiority in strategic forces. (See Question Six.)

-- The US could undertake political, economic, and arms control initiatives to promote Soviet-American cooperation and thereby decrease the likelihood that war would break out in Europe. Or the US could undertake foreign policy initiatives which seek to undermine the reliability of the military contribution of the Eastern European countries to Warsaw Pact strength. For example, the US/NATO might adopt a public TNF targeting practice which excludes either non-Soviet Pact forces not participating in attack on NATO; all East European targets except Soviet military formations, installations and logistic support; or both.

-- The US could actively seek closer security links with the PRC to force the Soviets to devote additional resources against China. Such a US-China policy might include military sales, intelligence sharing, or other Sino-American security ties.

-- The US, in conjunction with its NATO Allies, could plan to maintain in peacetime the forces and sustaining capability needed to stabilize a defense line in Europe and plan to create in wartime the additional forces needed to counterattack to restore the original borders. This would require manpower and industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis. At present we do not have such capabilities; neither our manpower mobilization capability nor our industrial base have been planned on this basis. To estimate the cost of such a capability would require study of (1) Warsaw Pact capability to sustain its existing forces in protracted combat while simultaneously creating new forces and (2) the cost to the US and NATO of maintaining in peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules. Insufficient work has been done on such total mobilization planning in recent years to permit even gross estimates of the costs involved.

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QUESTION TWO.

Question. To what extent should the US, for political or military purposes, state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance?

Discussion. NATO's official strategy, expressed in MC-14/3*, calls for preserving peace and providing for the security of the NATO area by maintaining a credible deterrent effected by forces which would cause the Warsaw Pact to conclude that, if they were to launch an attack, the chances of a favorable outcome would be too small to be acceptable, and fatal risks could be involved. Should aggression occur, NATO's objective would be to preserve or restore the integrity of the NATO area by employing such forces as might be necessary within the concept of forward defense. NATO's response to aggression could take the form of:

-- Direct defense—a response in kind to deny the attacker his objective;

-- Deliberate escalation—raising the scope and intensity of combat to raise the cost and risk, not solely to defeat the enemy, but also to weaken his will; or,

-- General nuclear response.

While direct defense would be NATO's first response to any aggression short of full nuclear attack, NATO should always be prepared to escalate; and the main deterrent to aggression is the threat of escalation. As a result, the strategy calls for conventional forces to be designed to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by presenting the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities at a scale that could involve grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.

Within the ambiguities of this statement, the US has been able to urge improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities and the Allies have been able to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent. None of the Allies considered in this study is completely consistent with a strict

* This paragraph paraphrases portions of MC-14/3 relevant to the issue at hand.
reading of the NATO strategy, although the force capabilities of all but AIHS M could be interpreted as adequate to execute the strategy. However, certain AIHS require a level of conventional capabilities which considerably exceed those presently planned by our NATO Allies, and it might be difficult to persuade the Allies to procure the capabilities needed without raising questions about strategy.

In AIHS E, F, or G, the US would, in essence, be adjusting its planning for conflict in the European theater to correspond more closely to that of the Allies. Consequently, there would be no need to challenge the current acquisition policy of our NATO Allies. The small decreases in total US forces that might result in AIHS E and F could, if desired, be explained as a way to obtain funds for increases in capability to reinforce Europe rapidly in the early days of a war. NATO's conventional capabilities would continue to be inadequate to implement the wartime objective of preserving or restoring territorial integrity against a large scale attack, and first use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution. Many of the adverse political implications of adoption of these AIHS probably could be avoided if the US continued to publicly support MC-14/3, particularly with reference to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante. The fact that the Warsaw Pact is aware of NATO's formal strategy may be an additional reason for the strategy to espouse goals and intentions other than those which would actually govern NATO force planning in AIHS E, F, or G.**

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** One divergence between formal NATO strategy and all the AIHS considered in this study is the concept of accepting, either temporarily or permanently, a significant loss of NATO territory. The amount of loss of NATO territory contemplated in all AIHS is likely to be viewed by the Allies as inconsistent with the concept of forward defense. Consequently, regardless of the AIHS proposed, there will be the question of whether to continue to subscribe to the concept of forward defense in our declaratory policy or whether to reconcile declaratory policy and capability. As we presently model land warfare, implementation of a defense at the West German border would require significant increases in NATO's peacetime deployed forces and in their day-to-day readiness posture. Such changes are unlikely to be politically acceptable given the current assessment of the likelihood of an attack. In addition they might appear threatening to the Pact and thus be counterproductive. Failure to address with our Allies the problem of reconciling strategy and capabilities makes war planning difficult. Yet it cannot be addressed without also raising the question of the circumstances under which the US would be willing to initiate nuclear warfare.

** The JCS representative believes that adoption of any of these AIHS contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation of a nuclear response, should deterrence fail.
On the other hand, implementation of AIMS H, I, or J, which call for the development of conventional forces adequate to restore lost NATO territory, would require major increases in Allied as well as US capabilities. It is uncertain as to whether the Allies could be persuaded to make such increases (given current public perceptions of the threat) without opening up the issue of strategy. If a strategy debate should develop, it might be divisive and might guarantee that the US would not be able to persuade the Allies to make further force improvements.

AIMS F(v) falls between these two categories. The Allied forces required are not much larger than those currently planned, and the principal difficulty would be obtaining the necessary sustaining capability for the Allies. We might succeed in persuading the Allies to make the necessary improvements in their capabilities if we did not question NATO strategy but continued to urge improvements in the conventional leg of NATO's TRIAD in reaction to Pact activities. Mechanisms such as a common NATO war reserve stockpile have been suggested recently. If the Allies could not be persuaded to develop the needed capability, the US could consider planning to supply them in wartime from its own stocks, recognizing the problems associated with commonality. Congressional appropriations for a policy of stockpiling for the NATO Allies is, however, doubtful.

If neither of these solutions is achievable in the near term, the question arises as to the extent to which the US is willing to fund sustaining capability in excess of that of the Allies. Some greater capability might serve as an inducement to greater Allied effort and would be available for use in other, perhaps more likely, contingencies. In addition, no contingency considered in this study other than sustained conflict in Europe generates significant stockpile and industrial base requirements. If such a contingency is not to be planned for, it must be decided how much (or how little) sustaining capability is enough—a question somewhat analogous to the political sufficiency question for strategic forces.

Summary

In summary, the US could implement AIMS E, F, or G without questioning formal NATO strategy, because the Allied capabilities required correspond roughly to those currently planned. Full implementation of AIMS F(v) or M would require Allied cooperation, but such cooperation might best be obtained by working within current NATO strategy. Implementation of AIMS H, I, or J requires Allied cooperation in making major increases in capabilities. There is doubt about whether such Allied cooperation could be obtained without raising the issue of strategy. Thus, choice of a strategy which requires a major increase in Allied capabilities would require a decision on whether to raise the issue of strategy within NATO.

* The JCS representative believes that a variant of AIMS I which relaxed the criteria for early restoration of pre-war borders and provided for D-day to P-day sustainability, vice 90 days, would not require the major increases in active NATO peacetime forces.
QUESTION THREE.

Question. To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

Discussion. Recent strategic planning has necessarily focused on Europe and there has been little analysis of the conduct of the non-European aspects of a worldwide war. However, the steadily growing ability of the USSR to employ military force worldwide makes it prudent for the US to assess the need to confront them on that basis and determine whether the US should provide more forces either to counter Soviet initiatives or to take its own initiatives.

A major purpose of operations outside Europe would be to promote US objectives in a European war. At a minimum, the US would undertake operations to insure that the war in Europe could be prosecuted effectively. Additional forces might permit the US to put off the decision to use theater nuclear forces or could provide hedges to reduce the risk inherent in any European strategy. If the NATO defense in Europe were unsuccessful or a stalemate were achieved, operations outside Europe might improve the US negotiating position.

The AIMS as presented all require "Limited Action" or "Initiatives" as the options for outside Europe operations. Essentially the two categories represent the limits of a range of defensive and offensive capabilities. AIMS E and F are basically deterrence strategies and provide a limited military capability to counter Soviet initiatives outside Europe.

AIMS H and I, which also have "Limited Action" as the outside Europe option, are less dependent on nuclear deterrence and provide a more formidable conventional warfighting capability for a longer period of time. In these two AIMS, "Limited Action" is designed to allow the US to focus on Europe but prevents the Soviets from concentrating on Europe by confronting them worldwide.

The other three AIMS, G, J, and M, have "Initiatives" as the outside Europe option. In the case of AIMS G, also basically a deterrence strategy, "Initiatives" raise the nuclear threshold and provide a hedge against failure in Europe.

In AIMS J and M, "Initiatives" and increased presence outside Europe coupled with a strong conventional defense in Europe provide the US with a credible conventional deterrent. Additionally, AIMS M provides a substantial capability to wage war and defeat the Soviets worldwide.
Representative forces envisioned for operations outside Europe are shown below.*

**TABLE IV-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces (Representative)</th>
<th>Limited Action **</th>
<th>Initiatives ***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>2****</td>
<td>2 ****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Amphibious Forces</td>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>1 3/9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As earlier indicated, all of the AIHS contain some air and naval forces for operations outside Europe in the context of worldwide conflict. However, AIHS G, J and H, which have initiatives outside Europe, also have heavy intervention for potential local wars. Some of the forces perform a dual role and are not completely additive.

**US-Soviet Advantages/Disadvantages**

It is useful to note the relative advantages that each major power enjoys when considering options to pursue in a worldwide war. Essentially the USSR has near term energy self-sufficiency, and the US and its allies are increasingly dependent of foreign sources of energy. The USSR has either internal or short length SLOC's and LOC's to the potential area of conflict while the opposite is true for the US.

* The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies.

** Limited Action forces were sized to accomplish the following tasks: protection of oil SLOC's; limited conventional attacks against Soviet facilities and deployed air and naval forces; extensive mining to deny Soviets free use of the seas; assistance to allies in maintaining Pacific SLOC; and assistance in the defense of South Korea with forward deployed forces.

*** Initiatives forces were sized to do the Limited Action tasks and, in addition: increased attacks on Soviet facilities, as well as air and naval forces, and attacks on Soviet fishing fleet. Marine forces are employed in support of naval campaigns.

**** Army force structure provides two divisions as part of the NATO requirement, which are planned only for employment in the Mid-East.

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On the other hand, the US has greater open access to the seas than do the Soviets. (Soviet limited access to the sea may be a disadvantage on the offensive but an advantage on the defensive, since the sea avenues of approach are also limited.) As opposed to the Soviets, the US is free from hostile neighbors and has relatively reliable allies; has greater industrial, economic, technological and agricultural strength; greater power projection capability; and does not need to withhold considerable military power to defend national borders or control internal situations.

Soviet Initiatives

The Soviet Union has a capability to take initiatives against US interests outside Europe. The problem for the US would be compounded if the Soviets undertook a variety of different initiatives simultaneously. Potential Soviet initiatives include:

-- Attack US nuclear capabilities (carrier, submarine, air forces and support bases) in the Pacific to limit damage from US attack.

-- Attack Japan's sea lanes of communication and air and naval bases in order to tie down US forces in the Pacific, as well as limit Japan's war supporting potential.

-- Support a North Korean attack on South Korea.

-- Threaten Persian Gulf oil by attacking oil SLOC's or conducting land/air attacks on these oil sources.


US Initiatives

The US has limited forces available, after European requirements are met, to do what current strategy calls for:

-- Defending SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska.

-- Attacking deployed Soviet naval and air forces.

* Present planning also requires that some US forces deployed worldwide "swing" to reinforce the European war. The concept of "swinging" forces is more credible if a US-USSR war starts in Europe or if the swing is started as soon as Pact mobilization is detected. However, if conflict is initiated by crises in other areas and expands subsequently to a NATO-Pact war in Europe and worldwide US-USSR conflict, then considerable portions of the swing forces may already be engaged and not readily available to move to the North Atlantic/European theater. Also, in the case of a short war (less than 30 days), naval swing forces may not be able to reach the European theater in sufficient time to accomplish designated tasks. On the other hand, if the war is extended, then these forces become critical.
-- Conducting limited attacks against Soviet facilities when beneficial to do so.

-- Assisting allies in defending Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOC's.

At issue is whether additional forces should be acquired to take initiatives against the Soviet Union to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities and for better defense against Soviet initiatives. The US could consider a number of different initiatives:

-- Attack Soviet air and naval facilities. Considerable advantage accrues to the power that can attack first in areas outside Europe, as the other must adopt a defensive posture, thereby immobilizing a large portion of his forces. The ability to deny the Soviets free use of the seas or the ability to conduct air attacks against US forces would be enhanced by destroying forces before they deploy. Preemptive strikes or actions such as mining passages prior to Pact D-day, however, might not be desirable politically. More forces will be required, and more US losses taken in attacks on Soviet bases after D-day, but it may be prudent to determine Soviet intentions before attacking.

-- Defend Persian Gulf oil SLOC's and oil fields. The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil is crucial to the war capability of the NATO Alliance. Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could ignore the importance of these resources, and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to interdict oil SLOC's or take over the oil fields themselves.

-- Deny seas to Soviet merchant and fishing fleet. Attacks on the Soviet merchant fleet would limit critical logistic support to the northeast Soviet provinces. The Soviets also rely heavily on food from the sea, and attacks on the fishing fleet would create problems in terms of a long war. The northeastern provinces are particularly vulnerable and denial of economic and military reinforcement by sea renders the maritime provinces susceptible to possible PRC initiatives.

-- Power projection into Soviet littorals. The principal goal would be a diversion of Soviet resources disproportionate to our own. Therefore, limited objective operations with the purpose of tying down Soviet defensive forces and possibly encouraging support from other powers would be more appropriate than a unilateral attempt to open a second front. In this regard, Petropavlovsk and the Kuriles are prospective objectives. In addition to actual combat operations, the mere threat of such operations and unconventional warfare operations can tie down Soviet defending forces.
Deep interdiction of Soviet territory. If reinforcement and supply by sea of the maritime provinces has been disrupted, the only alternative transportation from the Soviet Union's western economic and industrial heartland is the Trans-Siberian railway which can be interdicted by the US or PRC. Attacks of this nature against Soviet territory would provide military, political, and psychological benefits. However, in this context, as in all major US-USSR conflicts, there is a corresponding risk to US territory.

Summary

The US currently has the capability to perform limited operations, both offensive and defensive, outside of Europe during a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. A greater capability could be retained by delaying the "swing" of PACOM forces to NATO with an attendant risk for the European war.

The USSR has the capability to conduct a range of initiatives against the US to which the US should be able to respond with those actions necessary to protect vital interests. There are increased initiatives that the US can consider based on the objectives desired and the relative costs/benefits derived.

The key issue is whether the US should plan for only those actions to protect vital interests or should the US plan for specific actions (which will require additive forces and incur increased costs) outside of Europe in an overall strategy for worldwide war against the Soviets.
QUESTION FOUR.

Question. To what extent should the US plan to have military forces (or supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?

Discussion. The focus of previous questions has been on deterring or waging a major war with the Soviet Union. While consideration of this critical dimension remains central to US national security planning, other militarily significant events are more likely. International crises and local wars, variously affecting US interests, have punctuated the years since the last war between great powers. The probability is high that during the next decade similar conflicts will occur which, while not directly threatening the territory of any major power, may warrant the use of US military power.

Potential US actions in these circumstances range from crisis management or peacekeeping activities—where military presence provides a complement to diplomacy—to armed intervention in order to protect US interests. The utility of military action, as well as the degree of involvement which is appropriate, is a function of many variables. Physical proximity to the US is a dimension, as is the extent of US commitment, whether via formal treaty or perceived obligation. The significance of interests in some regions, such as the Middle East, may justify a degree of military involvement under any circumstances, while other areas may assume sufficient importance only in a great power context. Thus, an insurgency in Rhodesia might not warrant US military presence unless the USSR introduced forces there. This dimension, which could produce a direct confrontation between US and Soviet units, continues to gain importance as Russian involvement in the Third World grows and their capability to project military power beyond their borders increases.

The Importance of Planning

A de facto capability to deal with crises and local wars would exist even if forces were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war. However, in the absence of an independent decision establishing planning guidance for local wars, drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satisfactory capability for crisis management or intervention. For example, to make sure that these major war forces were in Europe when needed, significant portions of the force and its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict, time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules. If it were subsequently decided to employ these forces in a crisis or local war, the capability to make initial, forcible entry, such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces, might be lacking. Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable. Additionally, the strategic lift available might be inappropriate to deploy these "European" forces and equipment in a timely manner. Their training
and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European environment, and they might have inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission. Such potential shortcomings might be consciously accepted as the result of a planning decision. They should not come as "surprises" based on the assumption that large forces acquired for one purpose are automatically employable for other missions.

Planning Levels

A planning decision on peacekeeping and local wars can be made by establishing a level of effort which forces and supplies in the structure must be capable of supporting. Implicit in this approach is the possibility of employing other available forces to support higher levels of effort should US interests warrant, but the capability to do so would not be programmed.

A set of representational levels of effort were defined in the study and are outlined below. They describe three points on the capability planning continuum and provide the components of global flexibility (strategic mobility, initial entry capability, environmental suitability and sustain-ability) in varying amounts. These levels and the resultant forces reflect approximately the three general groupings which emerged from the analysis of several local war force posturing scenarios, postulated in the 1985 timeframe. (Amounts of sustainability, though rather arbitrarily assigned, are consistent with the options described and provided a basis for costing.) The levels of effort for planning are:

--- Limited Action - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support* and limited naval and tactical air forces to support US interests anywhere in the world for 90 days. The commitment of US land combat forces would not be planned. (AIMS E and H incorporate this planning concept.)

--- Light Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and moderate naval and tactical air forces, but only limited land combat forces anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 180 days would be planned. (AIMS F, F(v), and I incorporate this planning concept.)

--- Heavy Intervention - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and considerable land, naval and air power anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 360 days would be planned. (AIMS G, J, and H incorporate this planning concept.)

--- Supplies would be planned to sustain both US and host nation forces. Currently, except for certain nations, the acquisition of such war reserve stocks for use by non-US forces is prohibited by law.

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The chart below depicts representative forces associated with the three planning options.*

**TABLE IV-2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces (representative)</th>
<th>Limited Action</th>
<th>Light Intervention</th>
<th>Heavy Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Amphibious Forces</td>
<td>0-1/9</td>
<td>1-3/9</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide-bodied Aircraft</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional Forces versus Drawing Down**

Once a planning level of effort has been specified, the forces and supplies required to support it need not increase the total structure. In many cases, the capability required may already be present in the forces provided for other purposes. Where there are deficiencies, e.g., in strategic lift or sustainability, the shortfall would constitute, at a minimum, the additive requirement to achieve that particular level of planned effort. Beyond this, it may be desirable to acquire further additive capability at additional cost to reduce the need to draw on other assets in order to cope with crises and local wars. Such decisions must span the considerable range of choice from completely inclusive forces for "limited action" to completely additive forces for "heavy intervention."

The balance struck between drawing down and acquiring additive capabilities depends on the significance attached to several interrelated factors. These include force redeployability, sequence of events, available sustainability, relative force sizes, source of forces, and the desirability of flexibility/hedging.

Force redeployability, or the ability of forces to disengage and redeploy rapidly, can best be appreciated by posing two conditionals. If the US does not want to draw down major war capabilities for crisis management and local wars:

-- Land combat forces and associated support must be additive, since they can only be disengaged and redeployed slowly, if at all.

* The JCS representative believes that, given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of national military strategies.
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--- Some tactical air forces must be additive. While such units are easily redeployable, complete withdrawal would leave land forces without air support. In addition, attrition of aircraft in local wars must be considered.

--- Naval forces and strategic mobility forces need not be additive, since they can be disengaged and redeployed relatively quickly and easily.

--- Airborne and amphibious forces may or may not be additive depending on whether the US plans to commit such forces to sustained combat or use them for initial entry only.

If the US is willing to draw down:

--- The requirements for local wars may affect the mix of forces, e.g., numbers of heavy and light divisions.

--- Local war planning may influence the deployments of forces acquired primarily for other purposes. For example, the requirement to structure a single force for both local and major wars may lead to a different mix of POMCUS and airlift for Europe than would be optimum if Europe were the only contingency.

--- As noted above, local wars may still generate the largest requirements for certain types of forces, e.g., airborne and amphibious forces. The increment between local war and other requirements would have to be additive.

Differences in redeployability are the operative factor in considering the possible sequence of events between a local and a worldwide war with the USSR. If US intervention in a local war occurred prior to the outbreak of a war with the USSR, some intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviets in Europe or elsewhere. If the intervention forces are additive, no adverse impact would occur in the US-USSR war. If the intervention forces are inclusive, there would be a reduction in US forces available for the US-USSR war. The effect might be to limit US capability in the critical early days of the major war.*

On the other hand, if the US-USSR war started before the local war, the US would have already committed inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to undertake an intervention. In this situation, any additive intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed in Europe or elsewhere to influence the war outcome.

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* This problem might be offset at least partially by mobilizing reserve forces in numbers corresponding to those active forces committed to a local war. In this way, readiness for the initial phases of a major war could be maintained, possibly providing sufficient time for local war forces to redeploy in the event of a major US-USSR war. There could, however, be significant political ramifications of such a reserve call-up.
Another factor is the amount of available sustainability. In most cases, even though forces may exist elsewhere which can be drawn down to wage a local war, adequate logistic support will not be available. Major draw downs of stocks for a protracted local war may prove disastrous if a major war occurs. Thus, even if intervention forces are even partially inclusive, attention must be paid to the possibly additive sustainability needs, both for US and host nation forces.

The degree of risk associated with relying on inclusive intervention forces, if a major war follows a local war, is a function of relative force sizes and resultant margins for error. Thus drawing down on a limit loss defense in Europe (AIMS E, F, F(v), and G) to completely satisfy the requirement for a heavy intervention would invite disaster. The diversion of forces from a European direct defense (AIMS H, I, J, and M), especially if the intervention forces were taken from CONUS reinforcements, (perhaps with compensating activation of reserve units) would not be as significant.

If the forces for initiatives against the Soviet Union in the event of a worldwide war are acquired (AIMS G, J, and M), a source of forces for certain aspects of crisis management and local wars has already been created. If these initiative forces are to be used for intervention, some delay in commencement of actions against the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable. It should also be noted that in several instances, a local war requiring significant US participation might already involve a direct confrontation with the USSR. In such situations, the question of relative leverage (who is tying down whom) must also be considered.

Ultimately, the degree of draw down which is acceptable represents an assessment of the probability and impact of military involvement in crises and local wars, with appropriate hedging against uncertainty. The desire for sufficient flexibility to provide the optimum response to any military contingency must be balanced against such constraints as political and fiscal feasibility. Any resultant risk of inadequate military response must be acceptable.

Summary

Planning for peacekeeping and local wars represents an important dimension in developing a US military strategy. Establishment of a level of effort for planning is essential. Beyond this, it is necessary to decide to what extent the capability to support this level will be additive or drawn from forces planned for a major US-USSR war.

* It should be noted that the reverse is also true--the acquisition of additive intervention forces creates a source of some initiative forces. This potential for partial interchangability becomes particularly useful at "Heavy Intervention" levels.
QUESTION FIVE.

Question. What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

Discussion. In the years following the Korean War the US maintained strong sea and land-based forces forward deployed in the Western Pacific to combat Sino-Soviet inspired and supported aggression against a weakened Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia. The situation today is quite different. As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated from alliance to military confrontation, a similarity of Sino-American security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets has evolved. The threat of a Taiwan invasion has moderated because of Chinese hostility toward the USSR, preoccupation with internal economic problems, and the advent of a less radical Chinese leadership. Japan has become the third largest economic and industrial power in the world. The Republic of Korea has developed its economic and military capabilities to the point where it is less reliant upon the US for its security needs.

As the circumstances in East Asia have changed, the primary US objective in that region has become a stabilization of the current, relatively favorable balance among the great powers as opposed to containment of a Sino-Soviet threat. Defense links with US Asian allies enhance the stability of this East Asian great power balance. The US strategy in the Pacific should, in addition to supporting US political interests, provide for military requirements such as protection of the approaches to the continental United States and LOCs to deployed US forces.

The Soviet Union is perhaps less sensitive to changes in US deployments. Although they are as concerned as the US about the security of the sea approaches to their homeland, they are particularly concerned about China.

Of the major powers, the PRC is perhaps least sensitive to changes in US force deployments in East Asia but has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to US global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR. Chinese security needs are dominated by their Soviet requirements. Inasmuch as the PRC does not appear, at this time, to constitute a threat to US interests, it would appear to be advantageous for the US to avoid a threatening posture relative to China.
In this political environment, the PRC can play an important role in a US worldwide strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet security problem, which confronts them with powerful adversaries in both Europe and Asia, is an important American advantage. Perhaps paradoxically, US military policy and actions in Europe may have a more important effect on the Chinese ability or inclination to remain hostile to the USSR than US military presence in Asia. A strong US/NATO position in Europe forces the Soviets to allocate substantial forces to that theater. But increases in US air and naval forces in East Asia could prompt Soviet buildups in the Far East which China would not view as desirable. Substantial increases in US forces deployed to East Asia could result in a conflict of interest between the US and PRC at the expense of the mutual interest of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior.

US interests in East Asia are defined in terms of both great power and regional considerations. The exact causal relationship between the level of US peacetime military presence and degree to which US regional interests in East Asia are secured is not known. However, five basic reasons for peacetime forward deployments are to:

-- Accomplish initial wartime tasks against the Soviet Union
-- Protect US interests.
-- Promote regional stability.
-- Discourage nuclear proliferation.
-- Enhance US influence.

The presence of US military forces in East Asia demonstrates tangible US military power and provides a sense of security to our friends. The visible evidence, provided by US presence, and active US involvement in regional security affairs inhibits aggression, provocation and coercion by local or outside powers and discourages nuclear proliferation. While US influence is not measured solely by our military presence, it does contribute to our influence.

The visibility of involvement is greater in those AIMS with current or increased East Asian presence.
The East Asia forces generated for all AIMS were developed primarily to satisfy wartime requirements against the Soviet Union and, secondarily, to provide air and naval combat support during Korean hostilities or other local wars for the appropriate AIMS (AIMS F, F(v), G, I, J, M). The minimum military mission requirements against the Soviet Union in East Asia are the same in Reduced and Current East Asian Presence substrategies. Increased forces for use against the Soviets as in AIMS G, F and M are the result of planned initiatives during hostilities. Forces were not generated to satisfy peacetime presence requirements in support of US political interests in East Asia over and above those needed to satisfy military requirements, except in the case of AIMS E and H in which the low range of carrier forces was based in part on maintaining a peacetime presence in Asia.

As can be seen in the table below, the forces provided in all AIMS insure that the US would retain significant anti-Soviet military capabilities in the Western Pacific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces Deployed in the Pacific</th>
<th>Reduced Presence</th>
<th>Current Presence (Without wartime initiatives)</th>
<th>Current Presence (With wartime initiatives)</th>
<th>Increased Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>F/F(v)</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Div</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF Ashore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTGs</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Patrol Sqdr</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What may be of considerably greater significance than the actual combat power of US forces deployed to the Western Pacific is East Asian perceptions of the nature and extent of US participation in regional security affairs that US force levels convey. In the altered East Asian political environment, the forces allocated to East Asia have declined steadily from the pre-Vietnam posture. Vietnam aside, the US has already withdrawn one division from Korea and announced plans to remove all remaining ground combat forces; the airborne brigade has been withdrawn from Okinawa;
deployed carrier task groups have been reduced from three to two; US forces have been removed from Thailand and significantly reduced in Japan; US military presence in Taiwan has been significantly reduced; the level of military assistance to East Asian nations has declined; and the US is publicly committed to consideration of proposals which would limit US military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Both US allies and potential adversaries are keenly aware of these trends and it may be difficult to persuade Asian nations of a continuing US involvement in regional security affairs. The exact point at which further reductions may harm US interests is not known. The question is whether further reductions in either US deployed forces or retraction in the US base line can be made without risk to US regional interests.

There are differing views whether reductions in US forces and/or retraction in the US base line (AIMS E and H) could be conducted in a manner which would continue to provide for major US security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets without upsetting regional stability or discouraging Chinese hostility towards the Soviets. Further, such reductions might encourage Japan to do more in its own defense and assume a greater regional military role. There is no question but that Japan could contribute a much greater share of its national effort to its own defense. This may be desirable and could, ultimately, permit further reductions in wartime requirements for US air and naval forces in East Asia.

The current situation is relatively favorable to the US. The US is moving towards an offshore military posture which avoids automatic involvement in regional hostilities but is capable of combat operations throughout East Asia; the Soviets are in check; China persists in its anti-Soviet attitude and military orientation while showing little inclination towards aggressive action against Taiwan; nuclear proliferation incentives in Japan, Korea and Taiwan are not pervasive; North Korea must take into account powerful US air and naval assets in any decision to attack the South; Japanese-American relations are close and cooperative; and ASEAN cooperation is both relatively high and hostile to DRV expansion.
QUESTION SIX.

Question. What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture?

Discussion. Assessments of alternative strategic force structure should begin by specifying objectives: What is it the United States expects to accomplish with these forces? Clearly, satisfying our strategic objectives depends on many factors; declaratory policy is no doubt fundamental,* as are operational factors (i.e., where the weapons are deployed and their operational readiness).

Specific objectives for US strategic nuclear forces are:

-- Deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US.

-- In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, enhance deterrence on non-nuclear aggression, particularly against NATO and our Asian allies.

-- Should deterrence fail and nuclear conflict occur, control escalation, limit damage to the degree possible, and terminate the conflict quickly on acceptable terms. If escalation cannot be controlled, obtain the best possible outcome for the US and its allies.

-- Insure that the US, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US can act without intimidation stemming from perceptions that the strategic balance favored or was increasingly favoring the USSR.

* Five distinct but interrelated elements of nuclear policy can be identified.

-- Declaratory statements on policy: how we describe our nuclear policy to the public, allies, and adversaries.

-- Acquisition policy: the planning criteria for both developing and procuring nuclear weapon systems for the future.

-- Employment policy: how available weapons are targeted and planned for use in the event of nuclear conflict (addressed by NSDM 242).

-- Deployment policy: how we deploy nuclear forces.

-- Arms control policy: how we seek to maintain a stable force balance and, if possible, reduce force levels through negotiations.
Alternative force structures were derived by selecting a combination of criteria, one for each objective. All told, there are more than one thousand possibilities. The Interagency Working Group has illustrated these possibilities by grouping combinations of critical into "substrategies," each representing a logical combination. Substrategy 1, for example, utilizes the least demanding criteria for each objective. Substrategy 4 utilizes the most demanding. The other two substrategies lie between these two extremes and illustrate the high and low side of the range of capabilities that could be derived from current US policy and plans.

Even with agreement on the criteria appropriate for each substrategy the derivation of force structures which could satisfy it requires that a number of additional assumptions be made, e.g., as to the capabilities of Soviet forces, the desired diversity/redundancy in US forces, and the alert status of US and Soviet forces. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Soviet capabilities for the mid-1980's was applied in all cases; the sensitivity of results to these assumptions was not tested. The target data base was derived from the 1977 National Target Base revised to reflect projected changes in the number and hardness of Soviet sites and related facilities for the 1986 time period. Growth rates of other types of targets were ignored. The consequences of maintaining various forms of diversity in US forces, in terms of the resulting costs and size, were demonstrated by configuring alternative forces* for each substrategy based on differing combinations of existing or planned strategic force components.

Current policy is to maintain a TRIAD of strategic forces--ICBM's, SLBM's and manned bombers. This TRIAD provides mutually reinforcing and partially overlapping capabilities which give high confidence that the US can achieve current US objectives.

* The JCS representative notes that the planning factors used in developing forces to test the notional strategic substrategies fail to take into account significant current nuclear tasking requirements. The current nuclear tasking criteria which are ignored are the requirement to achieve 90% damage against Soviet military recovery resources and the requirement to allocate some alert weapons against the nuclear threat and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact and PRC. Additionally, the modeling used to generate forces does not recognize real world considerations such as: MIRV footprint constraints, target base growth (no growth or hardening of industrial sites was considered), cross targeting or timing considerations, operational bomber loadings, availability of strategic nuclear material, and sensitivities of the planning factors to uncertainties in the Soviet threat. Given these factors, the JCS representative believes the force postures and costs that are displayed are not appropriate for use in discussion of notional strategic forces.
The TRIAD also poses major problems to a Soviet planner contemplating a first strike. Because Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's would have different flight times to their targets, one or the other would provide enough warning time for the US to launch one of its two land-based components while still maintaining the options to employ sea-launched missiles. For example, if Soviet SLBM's and ICBM's were launched simultaneously, the SLBM's would detonate first—probably on US bomber bases and command/control—thereby creating the option for the President to launch the US ICBM's in the 15-20 minutes prior to arrival of the Soviet ICBM attack. Alternatively, if the Soviet ICBM's were launched first, there would be additional warning to US bombers on alert to enhance their escape from their bases.

The central acquisition issue related to force diversity is whether or not the US needs a TRIAD with relatively equal legs. The major alternative would be a force with the required retaliatory capability primarily residing in two legs with equal capabilities. This issue has arisen because of the projected vulnerability of fixed silo ICBM's. The US choice is whether (a) to modernize our land-based missile forces with a mobile ICBM (M-X) to maintain a fully hedged TRIAD, or (b) to permit the present ICBM force to become less survivable and to rely to a greater degree on SLBM's and bombers, or (c) rely on a launch-on-warning policy for the present ICBM force.

Objectives

-- Assured Destruction and Counter-Recovery Criteria. The US approach to achieving deterrence is, and has been for some time, to maintain forces which could sustain a massive Soviet first strike and survive with sufficient capability to inflict retaliatory damage which would be regarded as unacceptable by Soviet leaders. There is, however, no universally agreed set of criteria for "unacceptable" damage. Possible criteria would include the destruction of 50% of the enemy's economic and political resources critical to recovery, or the destruction of 70% of the economic, political, and military resources critical to recovery.

Various other criteria have been cited publicly by US officials in the past. In 1965, then Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that he believed an aggressor would be effectively deterred by knowledge that an adversary had the capability to destroy one fourth to one third of his population and two thirds of his industrial capacity. These criteria were modified in 1968 to one fifth to one fourth of the population and one half of the industrial capacity. Even so, the actual employment policy, set forth at one point in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), was materially different. It contained no specific criterion with respect to population, but set a damage expectancy of 70% of the war-supporting economic base and 90% damage expectancy against nuclear threat targets as goals, recognizing that damage levels would vary (no single US delivery system at that time could achieve a 90% damage expectancy against a hardened Soviet silo).
US policy today is oriented on maximizing US post-war power and influence relative to the Soviet Union. Thus, while there have been differences in views of deterrence criteria, these apparent differences are not as important as are the similarities; namely, that retaliatory forces are planned to be adequate to inflict some specified level of damage to Soviet society.

* Current US policy (as defined in NSDM 242 for the employment of US nuclear forces and in the Secretary of Defense Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP)) defines the targets in terms which emphasize the objective of reducing to the minimum the strategic power and influence of a potential enemy in the post-war era and to prolong post-war recovery. To this end, the targeting is defined under four criteria:

a. Damage 70% of the war-supporting economic base.

b. At least one weapon on an industrial facility in the top 250 urban areas of the Soviet Union.

c. At least one weapon on major centers of government.

d. Neutralize other targets, including military targets, critical to post attack recovery not covered above.

In this light, the levels of damage to resources critical to post-war recovery have been further defined as:

a. Inflict that damage to the industrial sector of the economy critical to post-war recovery which will reduce the assessed value of the national output by approximately 70% of the USSR.

b. Place special emphasis on targets, the loss of which would cause economic bottlenecks and extend recovery time.

c. Damage approximately 90% of the military resources critical to postwar recovery in the USSR.

d. Damage other targets critical to post-war recovery not covered above.

These levels were chosen to maximize US post-war power and influence related to the Soviet Union.

** An alternative way, not examined in the PRM-10 Study, of defining deterrence criteria could emphasize the relative post-war balance of usable power (which is suggested by Soviet writings on warfighting) as opposed to absolute measures.
-- Limited Attacks. A second US objective is to deter smaller nuclear attacks. Forces acquired for this purpose are additional to those obtained to deter massive attacks, so that the latter can be held in reserve to deter escalation to a massive exchange. The general rule adopted in the study is that the US should have some capability to respond to limited Soviet attacks. The substrategies differ as to whether the US should acquire forces capable of matching or offsetting any limited Soviet attack, i.e., to be able to respond with a comparable number of weapons against a comparable set of targets. The most demanding requirement would be to match Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets, especially missile silos and associated launch facilities. The criteria utilized range from an ability to deliver up to 200 weapons against relatively soft targets, to an ability to deliver up to 4,000 weapons—including a capability to destroy up to 90% of the 1,300 Soviet ICBM silos and 400 associated launch control centers.

-- Deterring Attacks on Our Allies. The next objective, the use of strategic forces to contribute to the deterrence of an attack on our allies, proves to be relatively less important for force sizing. Strategic forces are maintained to enhance the deterrence of conventional or nuclear attacks against US allies in Europe and East Asia by threatening nuclear strikes, primarily against the East European members of the Warsaw Pact and China. Insofar as these strikes are envisioned only following the outbreak of large scale conventional crisis or war, it was assumed that, for the purpose of evaluating force requirements to meet these objectives, US strategic forces would have been placed on a generated alert.*

Given this assumption, no additional strategic forces were found to be necessary to satisfy this objective. Some of the demand was already met by forces acquired to deter limited Soviet attacks; in most cases, the same strategic forces which could satisfy the other objectives when in a day-to-day alert posture, could also satisfy the rest of the demand when placed on generated alert. Thus, US objectives in Europe and Asia resulted in no significant additional demands for strategic weapons. This result is currently being tested in greater detail.

-- Damage Limiting. Fulfillment of the objective of limiting damage to the US should deterrence fail was addressed by a range of possible R&D programs and deployments. The capabilities directly applicable to damage limiting range from a modest civil defense program, to the deployment of ABM systems, to the acquisition of offensive counterforce capabilities. Limitation of damage via passive defensive programs, i.e., civil defense and industrial hardening, provides an approach which is controversial and would involve uncertain costs and effectiveness. The civil defense approach requires sufficient warning time (about one week) for implementing protection measures. Passive ABM defense programs which do not rely on such warning

* Today, the US covers targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and China using day-to-day alert planning factors.
times, and so hedge against surprise attacks, are costly and would likely be politically unacceptable in the US unless the nature of US-Soviet relations changed.

-- Political Sufficiency. The keystone in US strategic policy is deterrence. In addition, the US and its allies need to be free from any intimidation which could occur as a result of perceptions of an eroding strategic balance. This requires the perception by ourselves, our allies, and the Soviets of an undiminished US ability and willingness to counter Soviet actions against US interests. A necessary element of this is a retaliatory capability that we perceive as adequate. But is this politically sufficient?

There is general agreement that US strategic forces should be postured to provide freedom from intimidation, but what is at issue is whether major asymmetries in US-Soviet force levels, or perceived offensive and defensive capabilities, have political utility (e.g., for intimidation) and, if so, how should the US deal with such major asymmetries.

Current US declaratory policy states that the US maintains at least rough equivalence with the Soviet Union in aggregate force measures. Alternatives to this policy go from an active declaratory policy de-emphasizing the significance of static measures or programmatic imbalances favoring the Soviets to an acquisition policy seeking clear superiority in strategic power. Even if a policy of rough equivalence were continued, a collateral force issue still arises: should the US simply respond to Soviet programs in kind, or take initiatives (e.g., development and/or deployment of improved cruise missile technology) to offset major asymmetries and place the Soviet Union in a responsive position? A case of particular interest involves hard target capabilities. A significant hard target asymmetry favoring the Soviets might lead to a perception on their part that they possess an important edge in warfighting capability and thus to a perceived imbalance.

The study utilizes several alternative sufficiency criteria, including both indices that are static (i.e., indices of strategic power prior to a nuclear exchange) and dynamic (i.e., measures of strategic power after a one-sided exchange). The resulting forces are affected in various ways by the application of sufficiency criteria. In most cases, especially those involving DYAD forces and substrategies with relatively low military requirements, the impact of sufficiency criteria was to add substantially to the size of the total force. The impact was considerably less for balanced TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces, particularly as military requirements increased.

-- Strategic Reserve Forces. Current US employment policy directs that survivable strategic forces be taken from forces generated by other requirements and be held back for trans and post attack protection. An alternative approach would be to buy additional forces with the desired characteristics and maintain them as the strategic reserve force.
The SRF is a hedge against wartime uncertainties—previously unknown Soviet threats, unexpected failures in US forces—as well as a force to cope with post-war contingencies (e.g., attempted intimidation by other powers after a US-USSR exchange). Knowledge by the National Command Authority, that a survivable, capable SRF if available could, in some circumstances of less than massive attack, provide additional decision time thereby aiding in the control of escalation.

The most important characteristics of an SRF would be survivability, responsiveness to political control, flexibility for operating in varying environments, versatility made possible by availability of a range of yield and accuracy in both aircraft and missiles, and the availability of both MIRV and non-MIRV systems.

**Alternative Substrategies**

Four substrategies were defined for strategic forces. Substrategy 1 would meet the least demanding set of criteria; substrategy 4 the most demanding. Not surprisingly, the four substrategies are similarly ranked in terms of the pace and scope of modernization programs necessary to provide the forces for which they call.

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**Substrategy 1** would provide an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political and economic recovery resources. No early strategic force modernization is required. Force levels could be reduced by retirement of the older B-52D's, Tital II's and Polaris SSBN's. Defensive capabilities remain at current levels or are slightly reduced. The ability to respond flexibly is limited, and little countermilitary or damage limiting capabilities are provided. This substrategy assumes that domestic and foreign perceptions would not be seriously affected as a consequence of large disparities in US-Soviet force postures, even if no SALT agreement were reached which would constrain Soviet force modernization and growth to the US force levels associated with this posture. Consequently, there is no attention to forces for political sufficiency.

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**Substrategy 2** would provide a capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources; a more extensive flexible response capability; and the appearance of US-Soviet strategic balance essentially by maintaining force levels at SALT limits and some countermilitary capability (including retaining some of the current counter silo potential). Some strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., one or more of ALCM, B-1 and M-X). Defensive levels remain at current levels or are modestly increased. The most distinctive feature of this substrategy, which lies at roughly the low to middle side
of current US policy, is its decision not to pursue a highly effective hard-target-kill capability against Soviet silos and associated launch control facilities. Forces to maintain equivalence depend upon agreed SALT limits and Soviet deployments. Expected Soviet deployments within the Vladivostok limits would require additional new systems. Overall sufficiency requirements are to retain the US lead or equality in total warheads (RV's + bomber weapons) while maintaining forces at or near SALT limits.

-- Substrategy 3—which combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources with a full range of flexible response options—would enable the US to respond directly to the potential Soviet hard-target-kill threat with an efficient hard target capability of our own, while at the same time actively pursuing maintenance of some current areas of US advantage in the strategic balance. Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., M-X and/or D-5 for a time-urgent, efficient hard target capability, plus B-1 and/or ALCM). Defensive capabilities are maintained at about current levels with perhaps some modest increase. The most important strategic judgment associated with this alternative, which lies roughly at the high side of current policy, is that a matching US response to the Soviet hard target threat is important for deterrence and that the Soviets would not act as if it were an unacceptable threat to their strategic forces. Political sufficiency options are to retain a US lead or equality in static measures (RV's + bomber weapons, MIRV'd launchers, and hard target kill) or status plus dynamic measures (surviving RV's and bomber weapons, surviving missile throw-weight and bomber payload). Retention of current force balances alone could require substantial deployments of new systems, although requirements for equivalence depend upon Soviet deployments.

-- Substrategy 4—which combines an assured retaliation capability against Soviet political, economic, and military recovery resources, with a full range of flexible response options—would enable the US to respond directly to the potential Soviet hard-target-kill threat with an efficient hard target capability of our own. Early strategic force modernization is necessary to provide the required retaliatory capability (e.g., M-X and/or D-5 for a time urgent efficient hard target capability, plus B-1 and ALCM). Defensive capabilities would remain at current or substantially increased levels. This substrategy represents initiatives on our part to restore clear US superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces. Political sufficiency objectives are to maintain or acquire US superiority in all indices, both static and dynamic. Acquisition of associated forces would require substantial deployments of our new systems.
Alternative Forces

Alternative illustrative forces are summarized in Section F of Annex D. For each, numbers and types of delivery vehicles are given.

Variations in costs within substrategies will depend on whether it is required to maintain three relatively equal components of strategic offensive forces (ICBM's, SLBM's, and bombers), or if the diversity provided by maintaining two components of equal capability is considered sufficient. Variation in costs also will be strongly related to the scope and pace of modernization. The greatest variation in costs, however, will occur in relation to which criterion of political sufficiency is selected. In this study, the measure of sufficiency is based on a variety of publicly discussed indicators of both the quantity and quality of forces. Each of these indices can be faulted as being biased or misleading. We know that these indices can affect (and have affected) the perceptions of different audiences in different ways, but we do not know how these perceptions are formed or how consequential they are. Although they are only representative, the indices for offensive force appear to bound the problem sufficiently for this analysis. The decision to meet requirements for political sufficiency (if these indices or ones like them are used) can, in some instances, result in strategic nuclear forces significantly larger than those that analysis shows are needed to meet the target destruction goals established in this study. As noted earlier, such increased occur primarily in cases involving DYAD forces in substrategies having relatively low military requirements. The impact is considerably less pronounced for TRIAD and augmented DYAD forces, particularly as the military requirements increase. Nevertheless, differences in force requirements caused by the application of political sufficiency criteria justify the most careful and rigorous assessment of the relative importance of this objective of US strategic forces.

US Decleratory Policy, Military Strategy and Acquisition Policy

A continuing problem with US policy for strategic forces has been the degree of consistency and conscious coordination among the three major elements that constitute US strategic policy: our declaratory policy (what we say about our strategic force objectives, plans, and capabilities); our military strategy (actual plans for employing US strategic forces); and acquisition policy (the guidance for procuring strategic forces.

There exists today, for example, some discrepancy between US declaratory policy and US military strategy with regard to what we will do in the event of a massive Soviet nuclear attack. Our declaratory policy is that we do not target people per se; we target recovery resources. Yet there are large numbers of people living in close vicinity to many if not most of the Soviet "recovery resources" targeted. Consequently, US assertions that we do not target people simply are not credible to the Soviets (or Americans). More importantly, we do not tell the Soviets exactly what would be entailed in the destruction of the political (leadership), economic, and selected military resources critical to the recovery of their post-war power, influence, and economy.
At issue is how specific should US officials be in defining US strategic policy objectives? There are occasions when ambiguity in declaratory policy may make sense (e.g., as to exactly what the US response would be to a limited nuclear attack on the US), but is there any case for being less than fully explicit about the kind and extent of the destruction that the US plans and has the capability to produce in the Soviet Union in response to a massive attack on the US? Once we have determined these plans and capabilities, some argue that deterrence would be improved if the Soviets knew precisely what our targeting plans were and were told in painful clarity the total amount of death and destruction the US would have the capability to produce. Others argue that providing details of US targeting plans could trigger unwanted Soviet responses; e.g., accelerated defensive measures, industrial hardening, etc. They suggest it would be better to leave the Soviets with uncertainties, relying on the conservatism of Soviet planners to "worst case" their own estimates of our capabilities.

There also exists today an imperfect fit between US strategy and US acquisition policy as they relate to the objective of deterring a massive Soviet attack on the US. In response to Presidential guidance, our current military strategy is defined in terms of the kind of targets (recovery resources) to be destroyed and the level of destruction (70%) to be achieved. But the President did not, at that time, decide that this strategy could be used as guidance for acquisition policy. Indeed, the last Presidential policy on acquisition policy was NSDM 16 in 1969, which was concerned with a different military strategy (the requirement, inter alia, that the US would not incur more deaths and industrial damage than the USSR).

There is at present, then, no Presidential guidance on acquisition policy that matches our military strategy. As a result, the number and kind of US forces needed to execute this strategy are open to interpretation. This point is not without some consequence, since our present military strategy is aimed at a "moving target"; i.e., Soviet recovery resources are continually increasing in number and varying in kind.

Summary

To define what constitutes an adequate US military strategy and acquisition policy for strategic forces, the following specific questions need to be answered:

-- What kind and level of retaliatory capability is necessary for deterrence of Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression?

-- To what extent should the US acquire an efficient hard-target-kill capability and for what purposes?
-- To what extent should the US procure nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to US-Soviet force asymmetries?

-- Should the US acquire additional forces for an SRF; i.e., forces in excess of other requirements?
I. INTRODUCTION.

A. PURPOSE. In response to PRH/NSC-10, this paper defines a wide range of US Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) for the next eight to ten years. The military national forces (or in some cases a range of forces) that would provide a capability to carry out each AIMS over that time period have been estimated. As a baseline, the paper assesses current US capability to support national objectives in certain military contingencies. The AIMS have been evaluated in terms of their military, economic, political (both international and domestic) and arms control implications. Certain key issues have been defined, the answers to which are fundamental in determining the future direction of US military policy.

The range of alternative strategies described in this report has required that the scope of the analysis be broad rather than narrow. As a result, the AIMS are representative rather than definitive. They provide the analytical framework to assist understanding the issues and implications of alternative military strategies. The AIMS also provide a general framework for consideration of US military strategy. Although the decision need not be a choice of one of the AIMS, which are illustrative, the AIMS do allow for identification of the major elements of defense policy choices that can subsequently be explored to provide a basis for developing national military strategy.

As a first step, Presidential guidance is needed on the issues discussed in a series of key questions relating to the future direction of US military policy. Subsequently, consideration of detailed force posturing options within that policy guidance can follow through either the interagency process or the normal planning, programming and budget system decision process, as appropriate.

B. ASSUMPTIONS. Several important assumptions, common to all developed strategies, have been made regarding US policy or the international environment during the next decade. These assumptions project current trends into the future and obviously do not foretell radical or sudden changes, such as a shift in the strategic balance through major unforeseen technological breakthrough, or a shift of political viewpoint of a significant portion of the world's population. Should these assumptions not prove valid throughout the next eight to ten years, another reappraisal of US strategy would be required. The major assumptions are:

* These do not include the many assumptions which were made in the course of developing illustrative force postures, some of which differ from current plans.
-- The Soviet Union will continue to pose the primary threat to the physical security of the United States and to US interests worldwide. This assumption is the cornerstone of US global military strategy.

-- The United States will continue to view the security of Europe as a vital interest and will continue to participate actively in the defense of NATO, which is threatened by the Warsaw Pact. Without such a threat, US military strategy would be profoundly different. No matter what outcome may result from MBFR, there will still remain a threat and a need for NATO military forces; and the US, with its strategic nuclear capability, will play a leading role in NATO.

-- The United States will continue to regard aggression against Japan as a threat to vital interests. This assumption is one of the two major features (the other involves Sino-Soviet relationships) of US military strategy in the Pacific and East Asia.

-- The PRC and the Soviets will not effect a rapprochement sufficient to allow significant reduction in forces oriented towards each other. Should a rapprochement be effected, this would require a fresh review of security requirements.

-- So long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists, the US will not need to procure specific conventional forces to counter a PRC military threat. Should a Sino-Soviet rapprochement be effected, it is not clear to what extent PRC military effort might be channeled into directions counter to US interests. Any dramatic change in potential threats to US interests in the Pacific and East Asia would require a reappraisal of strategy.

-- In an interdependent environment, the US will continue to have major global interests. Access to raw materials and markets is vital to US interests in preserving both domestic and free world needs, and as such the US needs the capability, unilaterally in some cases and in conjunction with allies for others, to influence events beyond US borders—by use of military power where necessary.

C. MAJOR ISSUES. In order to assist the reader in reviewing the subsequent portions of this report, some of the major issues related to the future direction of US military policy are presented here. These will help lend perspective on the variances among the respective AIMS and allow the reader to focus on the key questions that need resolution before any informed evaluation of strategy or force posture can be made. Among the major questions are:
Question One. How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense? If deterrence fails, to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons?

Question Two. To what extent should the US, for political or military purposes, state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance?

Question Three. To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

Question Four. To what extent should the US plan to have military forces (or supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?

Question Five. What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

Question Six. What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture?

D. LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT. The PRM-10 Force Postures Study is a broad based study of national military strategy and defense policy for consideration at the highest levels of Government. It partakes of most but exhausts none of the many topics and areas of interest which enter into the formulation of national military strategy. This study attempts to present illustrative AIMS and force postures and to elicit Presidential guidance on key issues which bring out fundamental differences between the AIMS. It does that. There are, however, numerous other things which this study does not do and, for the most part, never intended to do. These include the following:

-- The PRM did not call for the Force Posture Review to formulate national objectives. In the absence of an agreed statement of those national objectives, it was necessary to structure the study to analyze implications of the different AIMS with respect to foreign policy, arms control, Soviet reactions, fiscal policy, and domestic considerations.

-- This study does not evaluate the Soviet threat. The best available national intelligence was used as the basis for force posture estimates, and Soviet and Pact capabilities and intentions were considered in the formulation and evaluation of AIMS. However, in some instances,
assumptions had to be made about the character of the Pact threat because agreed intelligence was not available. Soviet reactions to the AIMS were addressed specifically by the Intelligence Community. Absence of a specific section labeled "Threat" does not mean absence of consideration of a threat, but evaluation of threat was not an explicit part of the study. Also, no systematic analysis of a "responsive" Soviet threat--i.e., Soviet efforts to negate a specific US strategy--was attempted.

-- This is not a study of manpower and industrial mobilization preparedness. Our finding is that there is no concise documentation of this nature available and time precluded completion of such a study. Since no complete evaluation of military strategy is possible without a search into this area, the US needs to determine what preparedness policies should be established for both manpower and industrial resources to support a future military conflict.

-- This study does not directly address the theater nuclear forces. The appropriate structure of these forces within the guidance that follows this report needs to be investigated as a priority follow-on effort.

-- This study deliberately avoids programmatic issues. The idea is to obtain Presidential policy guidance to serve as a basis for subsequent determination of specific issues by other, more detailed studies and through the regular defense planning, programming, and budgeting system.

-- This study does not determine to what extent US readiness can hinge on centrally deployable forces, nor does it establish to what degree the US should rely on reserve forces. Both of these areas also need to be examined in a follow-on effort.

-- There are numerous other things this study did not address specifically: basing; strategic and critical materials stockpile; naval shipbuilding; nuclear weapon employment policy; chemical and biological issues; security assistance; and a technological net assessment. Some of these issues are addressed in the Net Assessment part of PRM-10; others are addressed separately.

-- Finally, the study is not the "last word" in strategic policy formulation. It is a concise presentation of an extremely complex subject designed to elicit broad policy guidance. As such, it should be considered as a point of departure rather than a point of arrival.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT. Section II (CURRENT CAPABILITIES) assesses the current (FY 1978) capability of the US to wage war in eight selected scenarios ranging from worldwide war with the Soviets to US involvement in lesser contingencies. These assessments help in establishing a baseline for evaluating strategy alternatives. This section is supported by Annex A which is comprised of the eight contingency assessments in their full form.
Section III (AIMS) has four major parts. The first describes the methodology used in deriving the AIMS and their substrategy elements. It is supported by Annex B, an earlier Memorandum for the President describing the substrategy elements in detail. The second summarizes the eight AIMS presented for final consideration— their content, forces, and costs. It is supported by Annex C which contains full descriptions, forces, costs, and implications of the alternative strategies and Annex D which contains a discussion of strategic forces and options. The third part lays out the major comparative dimensions of the AIMS. The fourth part assesses the various implications of the AIMS— Soviet reactions and foreign policy, arms control, fiscal, and domestic aspects— and describes possible non-military initiatives to help ease implementation.

Section IV (EVALUATION OF AIMS) evaluates the AIMS with respect to how each answers in a different fashion the six major issues posed in paragraph C, above.
II. CURRENT CAPABILITIES

A. PURPOSE AND CAUTIONS. This part of the PRM-10 analysis provides an assessment of the current (FY 1978) ability of the US to wage war in eight selected scenarios. These contingencies fall into two general categories: first, a worldwide war with the Soviet Union, including conflict in Central Europe, the NATO flanks, outside Europe (primarily the Far East), and strategic nuclear exchange; and second, selected lower level contingencies, including US-Soviet conflict in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, and US intervention in a Korean conflict not involving the USSR or PRC. These assessments provide an indication of how well the US and its Allies would do in these selected scenarios today. In effect, this paper provides a judgment as to the adequacy of the current US force posture. (The contingency assessments in their complete forms are contained in Annex A to this report.)

This assessment focuses primarily on the warfighting capabilities of US military forces. The ability of military forces, together with other instruments of national policy, to deter conflict at all levels or, failing that, to prevent uncontrolled escalation is treated only in the context that potential warfighting capabilities have inherent deterrent value. Deterrence is dependent upon not only the ability of individual components of US military forces to prevail in a given contingency, but also upon the interaction of all these forces. Thus, the outcome of a conventional conflict in Europe depends upon the deterrent value of our theater and strategic nuclear forces as well as the warfighting capabilities of US general purpose forces -- and those of our Allies.

The forward deployment of US forces for peacetime presence and crisis response is a major element of both their deterrent value and their political utility. US deployed forces have historically been used to signal political commitment, promote regional stability, support Allies, influence potential adversaries, and, when required, respond rapidly to developing crises. Conflict deterrence and crisis response demand credible warfighting capabilities across a broad range of scenarios if US forces are to be successful in this role.

The following assessments of the outcomes in various conventional scenarios are made on the basis of "static" indicators. The term "static," in the context of the general purpose force contingencies, means that we have looked at the ability of contending sides to build up and sustain key types of forces in an area of contention over time, based on certain logical assumptions, but that we have not attempted "dynamically" to game the conflict between the opposing forces after they are in place. Thus, the assessments do not examine in detail the attrition of opposing forces after the outbreak of hostilities. Ground, tactical air and naval (including amphibious) force buildsups have been examined and judged as to their combined adequacy using various criteria. In the case of strategic nuclear exchanges between the US and the USSR, dynamic analyses are presented.

These judgments of force capability are dependent, to some degree, upon detailed scenario assumptions. In order to appreciate fully the contingency assessment, it is necessary to refer to Annex A.
B. US-USSR WORLDWIDE CONFLICT

Central Europe

US general purpose forces planning places primary emphasis on the defense of Western Europe in view of the strong US political, military, economic and social ties to this area. The confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces is focused in Central Europe where the two alliances have concentrated large standing armies kept at a high state of readiness.

In FY 1978, the Pact has a larger overall fighting force than NATO and would be able to take the initiative at the outbreak of a war. NATO, however, also has effective forces and a defensive mission for which it should need comparatively fewer forces. The major imbalances from NATO's perspective are the Pact's potential for quickly building up its combat forces in East Europe and NATO's low inventory of combat consumables (WHM). On the other hand, NATO forces can mobilize rapidly once the political decision is taken and offer considerable risks to the Warsaw Pact planner, including of course, the prospect of nuclear escalation as a hedge against unexpected conventional failure. The assessment concludes that the chance of NATO stopping an attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time. It is also considered unlikely that the Warsaw Pact could achieve its full objectives of defeating NATO Central European forces and reaching the French border and North Sea coast. This uncertainty, together with the risk of nuclear escalation, is judged to act as a deterrent to precipitate Soviet action in Central Europe in FY 1978.

The Pact's large, modern ground forces in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR pose the major threat to NATO. A Pact headstart in mobilizing ground forces could lead to a significant Pact advantage at the time NATO commenced mobilization. However, once NATO orders full mobilization, only about 2-4 days are needed to bring sufficient forces forward to reduce the ADE (Armored Division Equivalents, a measure for aggregating static combat potential) ratio of total Pact versus NATO forces to roughly 2:1. Establishment of logistics and other support would of course take much longer. Even with a theater-wide 2:1 force advantage, higher local ADE ratios -- on the order of 3:1 or greater at the point of main attack or along axes of attack -- would be needed by an attacker in order to achieve a probable successful initial breakthrough. In this regard, there is a distinct tactical advantage accruing to the Warsaw Pact due to their ability to mass combat power on major attack routes of their choosing while employing economy of force elsewhere. The ratio includes all Warsaw Pact units even

* For purposes of this section, Warsaw Pact mobilization times of 14 and 30 days were assumed. Short-warning attack scenarios (less than 7 days NATO mobilization), which are of growing interest, were considered but not analyzed in detail in the contingency assessment.
though some would likely be employed as combat attrition replacements. In contrast, NATO uses an individual rather than unit replacement concept.

NATO must rely on its tactical air forces to help blunt the Pact armored spearheads early in a war. NATO aircraft are generally more capable than those of the Warsaw Pact, even though they may be numerically fewer for the first few weeks of mobilization.

NATO maintains major maritime forces primarily in order to ensure that military and economic resupply cargoes can be moved to Europe to sustain NATO combat capability and preclude the Pact from considering that it has an option of "outlast"ing NATO. NATO's maritime forces in FY 1978 should be able to ensure that essential resupply and reinforcement could be provided to sustain NATO combat forces, even though initial merchant ship losses could be serious. NATO maintains prepositioned stocks of equipment and resupply items in Europe partly to prevent possible initial shipping losses from being decisive in constraining the ground forces buildup.

NATO currently has critically low inventories of war reserve material -- munitions, attrition replacements for vehicles, spare parts, and other items. The US five-year defense program provides for achievement of 90-days of stocks by 1982 with a goal of 180-day stockpiles. The other NATO countries have only about 30-days of stocks (based on differing consumption rates) and do not currently plan to buy more. The low WRM inventories would be the most significant factor limiting overall NATO and US force sustainability in FY 1978, since all the member nations currently fall well short of the DOD 180-day goal for ground force support. Additionally, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the sustainability of Warsaw Pact forces.

A considerable amount of the concern felt for NATO military capabilities reflects certain judgments made concerning the starting circumstances of the war -- the length of mobilization time and the degree to which NATO mobilization might lag that of the Pact. Part of the problem reflects the difficulty of identifying what the Pact views as adequate mobilization time and how they would balance additional build up time against reduced mobilization time for NATO in launching an attack. A second important factor concerns NATO's judgment of its own likely response time to a Pact buildup. Some of the NATO fear for its military security rests on judgments that NATO would be unwilling to make the political decisions necessary to match a Pact buildup as soon as it is recognized as such.

Other important planning considerations exist. For example, NATO's conventional force posture must be complemented by nuclear forces designed to deter nuclear attacks. NATO nuclear forces are generally considered adequate for deterrence of any immediate Pact escalation to this level of warfare. Chemical warfare must also be deterred. The Pact currently has superior CW capability thereby creating an undesirable element of risk in this part of NATO's deterrent.
NATO Flanks

This contingency examines conflict on NATO's northern and southern flanks concurrent with the previously discussed Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe.

If NATO can stabilize a defensive line in the Central Region, the flanks could probably be defended, though not without some loss of territory. However, the conflict on the North Flank could impact upon North Atlantic SLOC protection efforts and, therefore, the reinforcement and resupply of the Center. The establishment of a full NATO air and ASW barrier in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap would probably result in significant attrition over time of Soviet forces attempting to operate in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, Allied support for operations in Norway would continue to face a significant threat from Soviet naval forces in northern waters. Operations on the South Flank would not likely influence the conflict in the Central Region unless one side gained a quick string of victories permitting redeployment of some forces to the Center. This is considered an unlikely probability. The naval campaign on the southern flank would depend initially on the ability of the Allied forces to absorb the initial Soviet attack, but is judged eventually to result in Allied control of the Mediterranean.

In this contingency, imbalances exist for both sides. NATO faces a Pact superiority in tactical aircraft of approximately 2:1 on the southern flank. The USSR has an additional advantage in interior lines of communication which would permit rapid shifting of materiel to either flank. The Pact would have problems with the uncertainty of US commitment of the Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF), which could be employed on either flank, and with restrictions in the deployment of Soviet naval forces from the Black, Baltic, and Barents Seas. NATO would have problems with the uncertainties of Pact deployment of naval forces into the Atlantic and Mediterranean before hostilities begin. In Greece and Turkey, much of the combat consumables would be exhausted after about two-three weeks of intensive combat. However, SLOCs to both countries would be open after two-four weeks of combat in the Mediterranean. There are major uncertainties in how the course of conflict in the Central Region would affect allocation of combat forces to the flanks, and in how well both sides could sustain ground and air force operations. NATO has an overall advantage in tactical air forces on the northern flank, total major naval combatants available in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the flexibility of MAF employment.

Non-European Operations

This contingency examines the worldwide implications of a NATO-WP conventional war concurrent with the previously studied intense conflict in Central Europe and on NATO's flanks. It concentrates on the ability of the US and its Pacific Allies (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) to prevail.
against Soviet forces in the Far East after planned redeployments of US air and naval forces to the European theater upon NATO mobilization. It assumes that conflict does not break out between North and South Korea. The ability of NATO to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil is not considered on the assumption that, in the event of oil SLOC interdiction, NATO would depend upon existing POL stockpiles until forces could be freed from other theaters to counter this additional threat.

While the war in Central Europe is, of course, the conflict of greatest importance, the outcome of the worldwide conflict influences foreign support (resources and bases) necessary for US prosecution of the war, the stance adopted by the PRC, and negotiations to terminate hostilities. The overall ability of US and Allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe is uncertain. US advantages are based primarily upon control of critical maritime choke points, access to bases in Japan (including the Ryukyus) and South Korea, and the ability to threaten the territory of the USSR itself through naval and air attack. These advantages are offset by the difficulty of establishing effective anti-air and anti-submarine barriers in the face of intense Soviet opposition. Although essential military shipping to Japan could probably be maintained, the possibility exists that the USSR could cut the economic and resupply LOC's to Japan, endangering Japan's continued support of US military operations. This would make the US task in the Pacific considerably more difficult.

There is always a possibility that the PRC, North Korea, Vietnam, or other nations might take aggressive actions during or in the aftermath of a conventional war between the US and the USSR. Both sides, however, have multiple deterrents to such actions, ranging from threats (on the low end) to using nuclear weapons (on the high end). It would appear that these measures are adequate in FY 1978 to discourage any such peripheral activities.

The major problems for the US are the need to disengage forces under the current "swing" strategy (which requires redeployment of significant US naval and some air forces from the Pacific to the European/Atlantic theater upon mobilization), the limited Japanese defense capabilities, and the strong Soviet forces available in the Far East. Soviet problems include the need to maintain substantial forces opposite the PRC, the difficulty of sustaining extended naval operations in the Pacific and the vulnerability of isolated areas to US air and naval attack. Major uncertainties for both sides are the nature and impact of Soviet measures to deny Persian Gulf oil to the West, Soviet naval deployments prior to hostilities, Japanese strength and determination, and the actions of third parties during the conflict, primarily the PRC, but including North Korea and Vietnam.

**US-USSR Nuclear Conflict**

The results of a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union are that both nations would suffer very high levels of damage and neither could conceivably be described as a "winner." Further,
there is no decisive advantage to either side in terms of residual resources. Today, this is true regardless of who strikes first, or whether the attack is a surprise or occurs after a period of warning. With some slight variations, it is true regardless of the targeting policy adopted by either side. In the three cases examined in the analysis, the US suffers at least 140 million fatalities, and the Soviet Union suffers at least 113 million fatalities. Both the US and the USSR would incur over 70% destruction to economic recovery resources.

The results of several limited nuclear attacks on individual force components of both sides reveal the following outcomes:

-- Whichever side initiates a limited nuclear attack against the ICBM forces of the other side will not find itself better off in terms of the residual number of ICBMs, ICBM RVs, and throwweight.

-- In SLBM attacks on bomber bases, the US would not lose a significant number of its bombers on alert.

The limited nuclear attacks have been executed in isolation with the objective of maximizing damage on the particular delivery systems involved without regard for other targeting requirements. An attack on any single force component would result in the alerting of the remaining two force components; thus the results of the one-to-one exchanges should not be aggregated since they may not be achievable in combination. In fact, the targeting in an all-out exchange might well differ significantly from that in these limited attack scenarios.

C. OTHER CONTINGENCIES

Middle East

The contingency scenario used for the evaluation postulates a conflict in the Middle East between...

The scenario investigated here is considered illustrative and not a probable course of events. Given the opportunity to mobilize fully, the...
This contingency examines the ability of the US and Soviet Union to introduce and sustain moderate levels of combat forces in sub-Saharan Africa and to prevail in a limited conflict there. It examines a notional scenario involving US assistance to Zaire in combating an Angolan attack which is supported by Soviet and Cuban forces. Neither the US nor the Soviets mobilize or employ air or ground forces deployed in Europe.

In the past, the Soviet Union has avoided direct military confrontation with US forces in non-contiguous regions, and would probably attempt to use "covert" assistance, shipments of military equipment, and surrogate forces to further their interests. It is considered unlikely that the USSR would attempt to match a US force buildup in sub-Saharan Africa if the US committed its forces first, and the possibility of escalation to direct conflict between Soviet and American units were present. The reverse may not be true for the US. Although the US has been cautious in those contingencies with significant escalatory potential, it has in the past risked direct confrontation with Soviet forces -- e.g., Cuba in 1962, Haiphong mining in 1972, and the worldwide alert during the 1973 Middle East War. The ability of the US to project forces over great distances and to establish and protect its reinforcement/resupply routes is well known and

* The following notional US combat forces were committed to this contingency: 3 carrier task groups, 1 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), 3 Army divisions and 12 Air Force fighter squadrons.
gives the US the flexibility to support its national policies essentially where it wishes. Thus, even if the Soviets were given a headstart in the buildup of military forces in Angola, the US would probably be able to match and surpass the Soviet efforts.*

If both superpowers were to commence deployment of combat forces to sub-Saharan Africa, either from a standing start or after a period of tension, the US would have a substantial advantage owing to: (1) its more direct, less encumbered LOCs; (2) more mobile, projection-ready forces backed by extensive strategic and tactical lift assets; (3) better expeditionary equipment and experience; and (4) amphibious assault capability. If conflict were to occur during or after the deployments, the US would likely prevail: we would be able to interdict Soviet sustaining air and sea LOCs, while at the same time protecting our own reinforcement/resupply lines.

Despite its overall advantages, the US would experience problems initially in maintaining POL stocks for its forces deployed by air and in rapidly clearing any Soviet mining effort in Zairian coastal waters. Soviet problems are much more extensive. Their ability to rapidly airlift forces is highly sensitive to overflight and landing rights, their projection forces (airborne and naval infantry) are not structured to "fight their way" into a hostile area, and they would be unable to either maintain their own sustaining LOCs or impose an effective blockade of US deployed forces.

Korea

This contingency examines a surprise North Korean attack on South Korea. The US provides initial air and naval support at D-day. In-place US ground forces initially take action only in self-defense but are fully committed by D+7. The USSR and PRC provide only logistic support to North Korea.

If the North Koreans were to achieve tactical surprise, it is possible that they could at least temporarily attain their most likely major objective—the capture of Seoul. However, the North Koreans would probably not be able to gain and sustain major breakthroughs or wear down the ROK in sustained combat. The ability of the US to project military power into Northeast Asia is the critical factor in this assessment. If the North Korean reserves could be prevented from arriving at the DMZ, the US/ROK

*The following notional US combat force "packages" were examined for possible commitment in this contingency: 1-2 carrier task groups, 1 Marine Amphibious Brigade (3/9 MAF), 1 Army division, and 2 Air Force fighter squadrons.


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<tr>
<th>NATO-UP IN EUROPE</th>
<th>NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO-UP WAR</th>
<th>EAST ASIA</th>
<th>PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS</th>
<th>US-USSR NOKELANDS NUCLEAR CONFLICT</th>
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<tr>
<td>COUNTEROFFENSIVE</td>
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<td>DIRECT DEFENSE</td>
<td>INITIATIVES</td>
<td>INCREASED PRESENCE</td>
<td>HEAVY INTERVENTION</td>
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<td>LIMIT LOSS</td>
<td>LIMITED ACTION</td>
<td>CURRENT PRESENCE</td>
<td>LIGHT INTERVENTION</td>
<td>RETAIN US FORCE ADVANTAGES</td>
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<td>ELASTIC TRIPWIRE</td>
<td>MINIMAL EFFORT</td>
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<td>LIMITED ACTION</td>
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<td>TRIPWIRE</td>
<td>MODIFIED WITHDRAWAL</td>
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To formulate composite AIMS, substrategies were combined in a style that took one from the first column, one from the second, and so forth. A process of elimination led to the eight AIMS analyzed in this report. Out of the 216 possible AIMS variations, these eight were chosen as the set best encompassing a broad range while addressing in different ways the major military issues facing the US.

C. CONTENT OF AIMS. The final eight AIMS and their component substrategies are shown in Table III-2, below. The dotted line represents a rough approximation of current US capability in the terms of the substrategy elements listed. The sustainability dimension—which refers to the nominal length of time the US or NATO is prepared to support a conventional conflict from stocks plus initial production—is not apparent from this table (see footnotes), but it is the key variable between AIMS F (providing for 30 days) and F Variant (providing for 90 days). Of the eight AIMS, F Variant calls for forces closest to the goals established in the present US Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS as summarized below. Detailed descriptions and implications of AIMS are in Annex C. Strategic nuclear forces and related issues are discussed in detail in Annex D.
defense could probably stall the initial North Korean attack north of Seoul. With the US contributions of land- and carrier-based tactical air assets and materiel support, it would appear that the US and ROK would prevail against North Korea in the longer term.*

The level of forces which could be brought to bear at the front on D-day would generally favor North Korea over the ROK in all categories. The North Koreans would have the additional benefits of the initiative, an unconventional warfare capability, pre-established LOCs with both the PRC and USSR, and peacetime deployments which are conducive to tactical surprise. The ROK has widely spread infantry forces with limited mobility and vulnerable stocks of war reserve materiel. Major uncertainties associated with this contingency are the actions of the USSR and PRC, and the efficiency and maintainability of Soviet and PRC LOCs into North Korea. ROK forces, supplemented by US assistance, have the lead in number of tactical aircraft and in overall payload capability after about one week of conflict. In addition, the US/ROK naval forces (practically all US) are generally superior. Other US/ROK advantages are the availability of Japan as a staging area, prepared defensive positions, stronger manpower reserves and economic/mobilization base, more capable all-weather aircraft, precision-guided munitions, the availability of the US Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), and a good capability for long-term sustainability. It should be emphasized that despite South Korea's ongoing progress in strengthening its forces, certain forms of US military support still are required for a successful defense effort. The ROK Army appears capable of self-defense without large-scale support from US ground combat forces. However, the ROK still requires US tactical air, air defense, naval, logistic, command and control, intelligence and communications support.

* The following notional US combat forces were committed to this contingency: 5 carrier task groups, 2 Marine Amphibious Forces, 1 Army division, and 24 Air Force fighter squadrons.
The planned ability to sustain combat in Europe—sustainability—for the NATO-Warsaw Pact substrategy of each AIMS is as shown below. Some AIMS were evaluated for more than one assumption as to the period of time for which a logistic sustaining capability was designed.

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<th>AIMS</th>
<th>Sustainability in Europe</th>
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<tr>
<td>E, F, G</td>
<td>Nominally 30 days</td>
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<td>F Variant, H</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days, 180 days, and Indefinite (D-Day to the day production can meet consumption demands or D-P)</td>
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<td>J, M</td>
<td>Indefinite (D-P)</td>
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2/ AIMS F Variant lies closest to programmed US capabilities. The major exception is that the strategic nuclear capability of this AIMS is slightly greater than that currently on hand.
The planned at Europe--sustained strategy of Some AIMS were assumption as a logistic sus

AIMS

E, F, C
F Variant, H

J, M

AIMS F Variant capabilities. the structural slightly greater
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<th>AIMS</th>
<th>Sustainability in Europe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E, F, G</td>
<td>Nominally 30 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>F Variant, H</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days, 180 days, and Indefinite (D-Day to the day production can meet consumption demands or D-P)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J, M</td>
<td>Indefinite (D-P)</td>
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</table>

AIMS F Variant lies closest to programmed US capabilities. The major exception is that the strategic nuclear capability of this AIMS is slightly greater than that currently on hand.
AIMS E - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. As in AIMS E, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS E, the current programmed military deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F Variant - This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. This strategy is identical to AIMS F except that in a European war, sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces, with a requisite increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe beyond the first month of conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F. AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies.
AIMS G - This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS G - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Sovierts worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I - This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an
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indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated.) In addition, the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS H, essentially the current programed military deployments in East Asia--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS J - This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only--the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources--and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets' favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments--less land forces in Korea--would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS M - This AIMS is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indices--forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and a major intervention capability in other regions.
D. FORCES TO SUPPORT AIM S.

General Purpose Forces. The major general purpose forces which are designed to support these strategies are presented in Tables III-3 and III-4 below.*

The ranges of conventional force estimates in the tables show:

- Substantial differences of forces within AIM S.
- Large increases in some forces but not in others between AIM S.
- Overall increases in forces between AIM S.

In sizing forces, general purpose force levels increase from AIM S E to AIM S M because of the progression of increasingly demanding substrategies. The force levels within each AIM S vary because of uncertainties about the threat or because of different judgments about what level of forces and programs are necessary to support the strategy.

The size and sustainability of the Warsaw Pact threat to the Center Region in Europe were major factors in developing ground force requirements for each of the AIM S. The number of forces that the Pact could be expected to commit to the Center Region increases with the duration of the conventional conflict.** In short duration conflicts (i.e., nominally 30 days), 86-92 Warsaw Pact divisions are assumed to be available. This 86-92 division threat is that against which the forces in AIM S E, F, and G were sized. For longer duration conflicts, about 130 Warsaw Pact divisions are assumed to be available. The additional 40 or so Soviet divisions were assumed to be available from the central reserve and those allocated to the flanks. Many of the divisions of this larger force would be used as attrition replacements for a smaller aggregate of forces on line. The precise number of divisions which could be sustained on line during a protracted conventional conflict is an uncertainty; at present there is insufficient data and analysis to indicate the long term sustained combat

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* The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs that they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies. Specifically, the estimate for Pact sustainability, which was used to derive the lower bounds for US land forces, has a high degree of uncertainty. The substantive issue of non-US NATO sustainability beyond 30 days is avoided by assuming full NATO sustainability. In addition, naval forces should be structured to provide a balanced, flexible force capable of dealing with all aspects of naval warfare.

** NIE 11-14 and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning were source documents for the threat data. Soviet force generation capability beyond 130 divisions has not been addressed.
| TABLE III-3 |
|FORCE POSTURE RANGES|

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>E(x)</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>FT-78 PROGRAM</th>
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<td>374-454</td>
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1/ Estimates for these AIMS assume comparable sustainability of both NATO and Pact forces throughout extended conflict for the high end of the range. If it is assumed that destroyed Pact equipment is not replaceable after the initial 15-30 days, and it is assumed that NATO is fully capable of replacing its equipment, estimates of US units needed would be more on the order of those indicated by the low end of the range.

2/ An additional reason for the range difference is due to a large uncertainty in the number of divisions the Soviets would deploy to oppose an invasion of Pact territory.

3/ The high end of the range provides eight carriers with associated escort and support units to attack Soviet surface combatants and merchant/fishing vessels in the Norwegian and Mediterranean Sea and to provide air defenses for land based ASM aircraft. The low end of the range assigns the mission of sinking Soviet surface ships and merchant/fishing vessels on the flanks to the allies and flanks air defense to the allies and/or the USAF. Also, emphasis is placed on the use of land-based aircraft vics carrier for some naval missions in all AIMS. Forces are provided to augment allied ASM efforts on the flanks. In addition, the low end of the range provides no convey for a short European war, and assumes a greater participation by allied naval forces.

4/ CVT is a medium size multipurpose carrier capable of operating carrier aircraft now in the inventory and V/STOL aircraft in the 1980's and 1990's.
TABLE III-
FORCE RANGES

AIMS

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FIV</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>M</th>
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capability of the Warsaw Pact.* The high side estimate for sizing
force requirements for AIMS F(V), H, I, and J are based on the conservative
assumption that the Soviets could sustain 130 divisions with munitions,
spares and equipment in Central Europe for the duration of the conflict.
At the lower bound of these AIMS, the assumption is made that the Pact can
replace its equipment for only about 30 days. In AIMS H, the low end is
sized for the assumed 130 division threat and the high end for a rough
estimate of those additional forces -- approximately 50 divisions -- the Pact
could create after their own mobilization and before a NATO offsetting
attack could be mounted.

In all AIMS, forces are based on the assumption that NATO mobilization
would lag that of the Pact by about four days. It was assumed that the
Pact could (and might) attack at NATO M-Day (mobilization day) or any
time thereafter. No specific assumptions were made as to warning times
or pre-mobilization activities by either side.**

The major increase in Army divisions between AIMS E, F, F(V), G, and
AIMS H, I, J, M results from the requirement in the latter AIMS to re-
store the pre-war borders or to open a second front in a relatively short
period of time -- three to six months. (Forces required to carry out
offensive missions exceed those needed for defensive missions.) As a
consequence, all the forces needed must exist in peacetime, though many
can be reserve units. Fewer forces would have to be maintained in
peacetime if the strategy called for a protracted defensive period during
which the forces needed for the counteroffensive would be created. On
the other hand, such a strategy would require manpower and industrial
base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to
generate new forces on a timely basis. Insufficient information is avail-
able about (1) Warsaw Pact capabilities under total mobilization, and (2)
the cost to the US of maintaining, in peacetime, the capability to create
forces on various schedules, in wartime, to permit such a strategy to
be included in this study.

The range of Marine forces in all AIMS reflects differing mixes of
Army and Marine forces for intervention purposes. In addition, the larger
ranges in AIMS E, F, and H reflect differences in judgment as to the need
for amphibious forces for deployment to specific locations as a part of
the worldwide naval campaign in a NATO/Pact conflict.

* Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough
supplies for 30 days combat, prescribes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply
for a theater, and calls for national reserves of war materiel. If
ammunition and POL storage capacity are used as an index, the Pact could
have available 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months ammunition,
including that stored in the western USSR. Great uncertainty attaches
to such estimates of Pact sustainability, however, as they assume
optimal stockage levels.

** Mobilization day as used in the context of this study refers to the day
on which the requisite political decisions have been made and the buildup
of NATO or Warsaw Pact combat forces is initiated.
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There was general agreement on the methodology used to determine tactical air force requirements (e.g., tactical fighter wings—TFW) and the force levels generated. The spread of forces shown within the individual AIMS is due to a consensus that a range of forces would better represent the uncertainties of the analysis than would a point estimate. Therefore, a +5% to -10% spread was applied to the force levels developed for tactical fighter wings.

Naval forces in all AIMS were sized against a relatively constant Soviet naval threat over time. The range of naval forces is wide in most AIMS, and reflects radically different views on the use of carrier task forces in wartime. In all but AIMS H, the lower force level reflects emphasis on the use of land-based aircraft, vice carriers, for certain missions—specifically, anti-submarine warfare and sea lane protection. The higher force level reflects carrier task force support for these operations, as well as support of amphibious operations on the flanks.

For AIMS E, F, and G, naval force ranges (including USMC) reflect a different approach to the employment of naval forces, coupled with differences in assessed allied air and naval capabilities, and differing views of the effectiveness of land-based aircraft versus carrier task groups. The lower end of the range in these AIMS assumes that the Allies can provide a considerable force to attack deployed Soviet ships on the flanks, that the US Navy's role is limited to supporting the ASW effort, and that amphibious operations will not be required on the NATO flanks. The lower end of the range also assumes that Soviet surface ships will remain in the Norwegian Sea within land-based air cover, that US and Allied Interceptors can form an Atlantic air defense barrier, and that Allied land-based air will be available in the Mediterranean. Further influencing the lower estimate is the fact that no convoys are planned. The high end of the range plans for a limited number of convoys and assumes that the Soviets will deploy naval units into open oceans. It plans for more US forces to destroy the Soviet surface fleet with less capability attributed to allies. Navy forces are provided in the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas for flexibility against Soviet initiatives on the flanks.

AIMS H, I, and J require use of convoys, and naval force ranges continue to reflect a different approach to the employment of naval forces, coupled with differences in assessed allied air and naval capabilities, differing views of the effectiveness of land-based aircraft versus carrier task groups, and differing views of the amount of seaborne support necessary to support the land battle on the flanks. The low end of the range assumes that the SLOCs in the Atlantic can be kept open by maritime patrol (VP) aircraft and submarines with the help of two carrier task forces; convoys would be protected by VP aircraft, surface combatants and submarines; and land-based air with air-to-surface missiles rather than carrier aircraft would be used to attack Soviet surface forces. In essence, sea denial and sea control would be performed by VP aircraft and submarines. The high end of the range assumes that the Soviets will contest the airspace in the GIUK gap and the Méditerranée and thus not permit heavy...
reliance on land-based aircraft. This assumption dictates a greater requirement for carrier task forces which would provide a force capable of more flexible response. The high end of the range also provides carrier air support for Marine Amphibious Forces assault-landed on the flanks and for allied land operations.

It should be noted that naval forces of fewer than 13 carriers plus associated escorts could not support simultaneous peacetime deployments of four US carrier task forces (two in the Mediterranean and two in the Pacific).

Strategic Forces

Four strategic force substrategies have been defined in the paper and are linked with specific AIMS. Substrategy 1 is the least ambitious and is associated with the least demanding set of criteria for assessment; substrategy 4 is the most ambitious and has the most demanding criteria.* The four substrategies vary in terms of the pace and scope of strategic force programs necessary to provide the forces for which they call. Variation in costs within substrategies results from the scope and pace of modernization. The greatest variation in costs, however, occurs as a function of choice of military and political sufficiency criteria. The decision to meet political sufficiency, in some instances, results in strategic nuclear forces significantly larger than those required to meet target destruction goals as specified in this paper.

Strategic defensive forces and the considerations affecting damage limitation are discussed in Annex D. The decision on defensive capabilities must assess the military advantages to the US of significantly increasing defensive forces and the political advantages from more closely "matching" other Soviet programs such as civil defense, as well as the possibility that stability might be undermined if increases in defensive capability (particularly missile defense), coupled with counterforce capability, appeared to the Soviets to threaten their retaliatory capability. Additional major hurdles would arise from the need to get public and Congressional and Soviet support for modification to the ABM Treaty and for funding extensive CONUS air and ballistic missile defense, and passive defense for population and industry.

Six separate alternatives for national defenses are provided in Annex D. They involve programs for civil defense, air defense, ballistic missile defense, space defense, and strategic ASW defense against SSBNs. Options range from attack warning and technology only (with about 35% US population survival) through improved active CONUS air defense and passive measures to protect population and industry to a "high side" alternative which provides for an active defense of CONUS beyond the current ABM treaty (with about 75% US population survival). Additional details are given at Attachment 12 of Annex D, Strategic Forces.

* See pages IV-30 and IV-31 for more complete descriptions of these substrategies.
Tables III-5 and III-6 display the illustrative offensive strategic forces* for all AIMS in bar chart form. The units of measure are strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) and warheads (RVs + bomber weapons) on Tables III-5 and Table III-6, respectively. The graphs are arrayed from low to high options (AIMS J to AIMS H), and the total bars are broken out below to indicate the relative numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers and the relative number of warheads. A fundamental assumption in sizing the forces for military sufficiency was that the "legs" of the strategic TRIAD or DYAD would have equal damage-inflicting capabilities; this assumption often led to forces which were not attainable before the 1990's. Details on attainability are given at the Force Tables in Annex D.

The forces depicted by the graphs include consideration of requirements for the USSR, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries, the PRC, and a Strategic Reserve Force (SRF).** Force sizing was further based on the assumption that damage level goals in the USSR must be achieved with both US and Soviet strategic forces in a day-to-day alert situation, while forces for the NSWP and PRC were based upon generated alert conditions. Except in the AIMS J case, political sufficiency requirements (based upon either static, or static plus dynamic indices) exceeded to various degrees those generated by the desired military sufficiency damage levels.

Each case, which is represented by one or two bars on the Tables, is a separate option; i.e., either a TRIAD or DYAD variation. Short definitions of the specific analytical cases are found in Table III-5. AIMS J and H are the most straightforward, and only one total bar is shown for each. AIMS J (Case I) assumes no strategic forces are required for political sufficiency, and AIMS H (Case II) opts for clear strategic

* The JCS representative notes that the planning factors used in developing forces to test the notional strategic substrategies fail to take into account significant current nuclear tasking requirements. The current nuclear tasking criteria which are ignored are the requirement to achieve 90 percent damage against Soviet military recovery resources and the requirement to allocate some alert weapons against the nuclear threat and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact and PRC. Additionally, the modeling used to generate forces does not recognize real world considerations such as: MIRV footprint constraints, target base growth (no growth or hardening of industrial sites was considered), cross-targeting or timing considerations, operational bomber loadings, availability of strategic nuclear material, and sensitivities of the planning factors to uncertainties in the Soviet threat. Given these factors, the JCS representative believes the force postures and costs that are displayed are not appropriate for use in discussion of notional strategic forces.

** Strategic Reserve Force--Strategic nuclear forces designated to be held for trans and post attack protection and coercion. Additionally, such forces provide a hedge against wartime uncertainties such as unanticipated threats and unexpected shortcomings in US forces.
superiority. The cases depicted for AIMS J and M are structured as balanced TRIAD forces, although other cases (DYADS and augmented DYADS)* are provided in the Strategic Forces Annex. In the case of AIMS M, nearly all force mixes exceed the current force levels recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP, Volume II) and at least one nuclear delivery system in each mix associated with AIMS M is not attainable by FY1980.

The remaining AIMS fall into two groups—E, G, and H are associated with Strategic Substrategy 2,*** and AIMS F, F Variant, and I are associated with Strategic Substrategy 3. The six total bars displayed for each of these AIMS groups represent three kinds of force options, any one of which is applicable to the three AIMS listed above the bars. The pairs of bars for a particular case represent the use of different criteria in sizing forces for political sufficiency. In the case of the AIMS E, G, H grouping, the smaller bar of each pair represents a US lead or at least equality in total warheads (RVs + bomber weapons), while maintaining forces at SALT limits assumed to be 1800 SNDOs with a sublimit of 1100 MIRV'd SNDOs. The larger bar in each pair represents a US lead or at least equality in the same measures while maintaining higher SALT limits of 2400 SNDOs and 1320 MIRV'd SNDOs.

In the bar graphs for AIMS F, F Variant and I, the smaller bar of each pair of total bars has political sufficiency forces designed to retain a US lead or equality in certain static measures (RVs + bomber weapons, MIRV'd launchers, and missile hard target kill) and the larger bar of each pair represents forces designed to provide political sufficiency via equality in certain dynamic measures (surviving RVs + bomber weapons, surviving missile throw-weight + bomber payload) as well as the static measures.

The SNDO chart shows ICBM forces as the largest component of each total bar. This results from applying the "equal damage" criterion (which would provide a cross-targeting capability)*** to the forces. Differing pre-launch survivability, loadings, yields, and accuracies result in varying degrees of force effectiveness. For example, since

* Augmented DYAD—A force mix in which a "pure" DYAD composed of two delivery systems has been complemented by additional forces, e.g., ICBM/SLBM forces augmented by a limited number of B-52s.

** In two of the four force alternatives for substrategy 2, a mobile ICBM (H-X) was required to satisfy the balanced damage criteria. Since a tenet of this substrategy is not to develop an efficient hard target capability, some regard these two alternatives as inconsistent with the substrategy.

*** Cross-targeting—The process in which high priority targets are programmed for attack by more than one type of delivery system or delivery vehicle to provide a high assurance of attaining desired damage levels.
the pre-launch survivability factor assumed for ICBMs in the FY 86 timeframe was somewhat lower than that used for SLBMs (and since the SLBMs are assumed to begin to draw closer to the ICBM in reliability and accuracy by then), it takes more ICBMs than SLBMs to inflict equal damage on a given class of targets. In addition, bomber loads (B-52s with cruise missiles and B-1s with bombs and SRAMs) were considerably larger than ICBM and SLBM loads—thus, fewer bombers were needed to satisfy the equal damage criterion.

Except for Case 10, all force options shown were within the 2400 SNDV/1320 MIRV'd launcher limits. In Case 10 (an augmented DYAD composed primarily of modernized ICBMs and SLBMs), the pursuit of equality in dynamic measures caused the 2400 SNDV level to be exceeded—and creates a strategic force somewhat larger than the one shown for AIMS M (a balanced TRIAD, Case 11)—where superiority is the goal. Not apparent on this chart is the variation in quality of the forces.* The forces shown for AIMS M (Case 11) are largely modernized across the board; i.e., M-X, D-5, and B-1. These forces are the basis for associating this AIMS with strategic superiority even though it has no more SNDVs than several other cases.

Table III-6 displays similar bar graphs in terms of warheads. There is a one-to-one match to the cases shown on Table III-5. Relative sizes of the ICBM, SLBM, and bomber-associated segments reflect different loadings, damage-inflicting capabilities, and other factors discussed above. On both tables, the FY 78 and FY 82 FYDP forces are displayed as a benchmark for comparison, bearing in mind that not all the AIMS forces displayed are attainable by FY 86.

* Substrategy descriptions on pages IV-30 to IV-31 provide information on the systems required for modernization.
TABLE III-5

ILLUSTRATIVE AIMS STRATEGIC FORCES: STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

-ASCERT-

TOTAL SNDVs

BOMBERS

SLBM's

ICBM's

NOTE: Forces represented hereon are preliminary estimates and are subject to revision.

* Some force elements exceed JSOP Volume II FY 79-86 but are attainable by FY 80.

** Some force elements exceed JSOP Volume II FY 79-86 and are not attainable by FY 80.

*** SNDV's, which include bombers and ballistic missiles (ICBM's and SLBM's). All figures are TAI (Total Active Inventory). Other forces could have been shown (e.g., non-augmented DYAD's—see Strategic Force Annex, Attachment v).

**FYDP (Five Year Defense Plan) is the 22 February 1977 version.
### Table 111-6

**ILLUSTRATIVE AIMs STRATEGIC FORces STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

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**TOTAL RVs AND BMBR. WEAPONS**

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**NOTE:** Weapons represented herein are preliminary estimates and are subject to revision.

- ICBM and SLBM re-ENTRY vehicles (RV's) and bomber weapons. All figures are converted to individual nuclear weapons. NHII carries 3 warheads: H-X, 10; C-1 SLBM, 9; C-4, 8; and D-5, 8. B-52B's, G, B-52G's, 10; B-52H's 12 (when penetrating), or 20 (when standing off) (except FY 78 when ALCM's are assumed not available and load is 8, in FY 82 ALCM's are assumed available and all B-52H's are assumed to penetrate); B-1 loading is assumed to be 21. All other delivery systems carry one weapon each.
- Some of the higher warhead figures may not be attainable by FY 86 due to Oralloy or Plutonium resource limitations.

**FYDP** (Five Year Defense Plan) is the 22 February 1977 version. FYDP SLBM's are assumed to include a full complement of SLBM's.
E. COST OF AIMS. The range of total costs estimated for each strategy is shown in bar chart form on Tables III-7, III-8, and III-9.

The cautions expressed regarding the illustrative force estimates to support AIMS apply equally to the costs of AIMS. It is emphasized that these are cost estimates for long term attainment of notional forces, and given the fiscal constraints and programming procedures of year-to-year force development, the actual costs of achieving the AIMS forces could change.

Table III-7 depicts estimated costs in billions of dollars for the five year period FY 79-83. A comparison of this table with Table III-4 (Force Ranges) shows that in general the differences in costs between AIMS and ranges of costs within AIMS are driven by differences in force ranges. Not estimated but potentially important is the range of costs that would result from alternative methods and rates of reaching the ultimate force structures. The limit loss strategies for Europe (AIMS E, F, F(V), and G) each have a cost range that includes the FYDP. The size of the range is dominated by the range of estimates of naval forces for these strategies. The range narrows in AIMS H, I, J, and M reflecting fewer differences in force sizing methodology for the longer war strategies. The high ends of the ranges for AIMS H and I are less than AIMS G due to a lower requirement for air forces when major initiatives against the USSR outside of Europe are not planned.

The outlay costs for FY 81 on Table III-8 show similar range patterns to Table III-7 and are consistent with the above comments.

Table III-9 shows the range of annual costs estimated to be needed to maintain indefinitely a given force posture once the AIMS is achieved. The fiscal year that the force is attained is also shown in parentheses for each end of the ranges. This table is the best single indicator of the relative long term costs implications of each AIMS. For the high end of the ranges, the year is dictated by naval forces for AIMS E, D, F(V), and G, and Army forces for AIMS H, I, J, and M. Strategic forces are not attained until FY 89 for the low end of the ranges in AIMS E thru I, and naval and air forces dictate the year in AIMS J and H, respectively. The length of time necessary to reach force postures to achieve the more ambitious strategies is dominated by the programming assumption that present industrial base capabilities would be used. With the current tank production capability for example, the time required for a major expansion in Army forces is quite lengthy. Alternatively, if a faster near term expansion was desired, near term costs would be considerably higher than shown in Table III-7.
F. COMPARISON OVERVIEW. There are three approaches useful to comparing the AIMS. In paragraph G, below, AIMS are compared by content and capability. In paragraph H, the implications of the AIMS in terms of Soviet reactions, foreign policy, arms control, fiscal and domestic considerations are analyzed. In paragraph I, non-military initiatives that might be necessary to ease implementation are described.

G. COMPARISON OF AIMS: DIMENSIONS. The major dimensions of the AIMS that bear highlighting are:

-- Deterrence and the nuclear dimension.
-- The NATO-Warsaw Pact dimension.
-- The non-European dimension.
The NATO/Warsaw Pact Dimension

In the event of a US-USSR worldwide war, the NATO/Warsaw Pact dimension of conflict would be critical. Although the threat has been discussed, other major differences among the European aspects of the AIMS require highlighting: specifically, tasks, sustainability, and deployment posture.

Tasks. The tasks to be performed by the US, in conjunction with its Allies, vary among AIMS. AIMS E, F, F Variant, and G, with a sub-strategy of "Limit Loss" in Europe, have the least demanding task, that of holding a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line but not counterattacking to regain lost territory. This would involve the loss of between a quarter and a third of the West German territory east of the Rhine River. AIMS H, I, and J, embodying the sub-strategy of "Direct Defense," have a more demanding task, that of absorbing a determined Pact conventional attack, counterattacking and restoring the pre-war borders. AIMS M, with an "Offsetting Attacks" substrategy, seeks to offset Pact aggression in Central Europe by initiating an attack against less heavily defended Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage for recovering territory lost in the Central Region or elsewhere. Naval forces in all AIMS are tasked with interdicting and attacking deployed Soviet naval forces and merchant vessels and of protecting required shipping. In AIMS H, I, J, and M, they have the task of more active US naval operations on the flanks.

Sustainability. For force sizing purposes, the AIMS were created with specific assumptions as regards how long a conventional conflict in Europe would last. AIMS E, F, and G were evaluated for 30 days sustainability, AIMS F Variant, H, and I for 90 days. AIMS I was also evaluated for 180 days; and AIMS I, J, and M for an indefinite sustaining capability (D to P).* The "short" (nominally 30 days) and "intermediate" (nominally 90 days) lengths of sustainability do not imply that any war would end on the 31st or 91st day. They do imply that major decisions would have to be made sooner.

---

* D to P sustaining capability means that sufficient stocks are provided in peacetime to sustain forces in combat until production can be increased after the start of the war to match wartime consumption rates—stocks are available from D-Day to P-Day.
made fairly early (perhaps after only a week or after several weeks respectively) on the best course of action to adopt: whether to disengage, whether to pursue separate diplomatic initiatives, whether to rely on conventional outcomes (probably unfavorable since little conventional capability would exist after 30 days in "short war" strategies) of battle, whether to resort to nuclear weapons, or some combination of these. These dilemmas are evaluated in Section IV, but what is clear is that those AIMS which are based on only 30 days of sustainability (AIMS E, F, and G) rely more heavily on deterrence than on confident capability to win (or draw) a conventional war.

**TABLE III-10**

**European Dimensions of AIMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIMS</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>86-92 Div</td>
<td>Hold at Weser-Lech</td>
<td>Nominally 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>86-92 Div</td>
<td>Hold at Weser-Lech</td>
<td>Nominally 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>86-92 Div</td>
<td>Hold at Weser-Lech</td>
<td>Nominally 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Variant</td>
<td>About 130 Div</td>
<td>Hold at Weser-Lech</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>About 130 Div</td>
<td>Restore pre-war borders</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>About 130 Div</td>
<td>Restore pre-war borders</td>
<td>Nominally 90 days,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>180 days, and indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>About 130 Div</td>
<td>Restore pre-war borders</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>About 130 Div plus reinfor</td>
<td>Offset Central Region with flank attack on Pact</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deployment and Reinforcement Posture.** Another major issue, not differentiated among the separate AIMS but covered in the range of deployment and reinforcement postures in Europe for all eight AIMS, deals with the number of forward deployed forces in Europe in peacetime and the effectiveness of prepositioned equipment in accomplishing NATO reinforcement. As noted earlier, in all AIMS, forces were based on the assumption that NATO mobilization would lag that of the Pact by about four days and that the Pact might attack as early as NATO M-Day. Therefore, all force sizing analyses were based on the assumption that the security needs of NATO would require that NATO forces be postured to fight at NATO M-Day. The critical time for NATO would be during the first week after M-Day, during which time the European NATO nations would be mobilizing and deploying their forces, while the major combat reinforcements from the US would just be beginning to arrive.
In the case of Army forces, two different force postures, common to all AIMS, were derived to meet the Warsaw Pact threat. The higher forward deployment posture derives from the contention that if D-Day = NATO M-Day, higher in place forces must be planned. This posture calls for nine US divisions to be forward deployed and ten brigade/regiment unit sets of equipment (POMCUS) to be prepositioned, an increase of four sets over the stockage level in Europe today and at least equal to that programmed for FY 1982. This higher forward deployment posture reduces the risk immediately after NATO mobilization, but accepts more risk in the period from about NATO H-7 to H-30, while airlift catches up with prepositioning. The lower forward deployment (and higher POMCUS) posture derives from three contentions: (1) that major increases in forward deployments in Europe are not politically feasible; (2) that such increases could be destabilizing; and (3) that prepositioned combat elements could be on line within about five days of those forward deployed (whether or not this could be accomplished remains questionable). This lower posture calls for considerably increased POMCUS with no increase in US peacetime deployed forces. It retains five divisions in Europe, about the same as currently, and provides 30 brigade/regiment sets of prepositioned equipment, five times the current stockage and at least double the stockage programmed for FY 1982. This posture accepts a greater degree of risk in the first few days following NATO mobilization.

Airlift requirements for wide-bodied aircraft would be some two to three times greater to support the first posture than the second. This is caused by having to move about three more divisions by air to Europe in the first posture to meet the total requirement, considering current POMCUS stocks.

Non-European Dimension

Three further salient features about the content of the AIMS should be highlighted. One has to do with East Asian peacetime deployments. A second concerns levels of effort for non-European operations, both for peacekeeping/local wars and in a major US-USSR war. The third addresses the degree to which forces for intervention are additive or inclusive.

East Asia. The forces generated in the various AIMS were developed primarily for use against the Soviet Union in wartime. Then a portion of those forces were forward deployed in the Western Pacific as the "peacetime presence" forces in East Asia for each AIMS.

In any AIMS, the US will remain a major military power in the Western Pacific with visible forces present in peacetime. The AIMS are thus differentiated in East Asia primarily on the degree of planned US involvement in a full range of political and military regional security affairs. Most US forces will be based off shore rather than on the continent itself and would be less likely to become automatically engaged in regional conflict. The fact that in AIMS E and H the US intention is to avoid involvement in regional conflict notwithstanding, no regional
power could be certain, no matter which AIMS might be selected, that the US would not choose to involve itself with strong air and naval forces and not insignificant Marine ground forces.

Non-European levels of effort. The eight AIMS illustrate three general approaches to providing for conventional capabilities for non-European operations. Each of these can be described in terms of levels of effort, and each embodies roughly parallel capabilities for: (1) initiatives against the Soviet Union in a worldwide war, and (2) peacekeeping activities and intervention in potential local wars. These three levels of effort are graphically displayed in Table III-2, page III-3.

AIMS E and H place relative worldwide emphasis on the European component of strategy (with AIMS E relying more heavily on nuclear deterrence and AIMS H providing increased conventional capability). Both recognize the global interests and responsibilities of the US but provide only a moderate conventional capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event a major war erupts. The strategies plan a quite limited military capability to intervene unless draw downs are made on forces dedicated to Europe.

AIMS F, F Variant and I require a higher worldwide level of conventional capability than AIMS E and H. The capability for initiatives against the Soviet Union remains the same—limited—as in AIMS E and H. To limit Soviet influence in the Third World as well as promote and protect US global interests, the US would plan a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS G and J generally allow an even greater capability for action outside of Europe in the event of war, but this capability affects the rationale for the two strategies differently. AIMS G places reliance on deterrence in Europe and enhances this deterrence by providing a war-fighting capability outside Europe to ensure that the Soviets understand that any aggression on their part will place all their forces and territory at risk. Conversely, AIMS J raises the nuclear threshold in Europe by emphasizing conventional defense there and complements this by providing significant capability outside of Europe. The Third World is seen to have such importance that the US requires significant capabilities for unilateral intervention, to the extent of risking a military confrontation with the Soviets if necessary.

AIMS M calls for such a significant military capability in conventional (and nuclear) forces that US non-European interests can be secured with little dependence on Allied assistance and in the face of Soviet opposition.
Intervention forces. The capability for peacekeeping and involvement in potential local wars exists in each AIMS. In some cases the forces required for such intervention are expressly provided for—they are additive, not inclusive. In other cases they are not. For example, AIMS E and H call for only limited military action in potential local wars, so no additional forces are provided for this purpose. Any required forces would be drawn from forces dedicated to other purposes, such as reinforcing Europe. All other AIMS include specific forces for intervention in local wars and peacekeeping activities. AIMS F, F Variant and I specify "light intervention," corresponding to about current capabilities, while AIMS G, J and M specify "heavy intervention."

H. COMPARISON OF AIMS: IMPLICATIONS. Summaries of the implications of the AIMS presented here are: Soviet reactions, foreign policy, arms control, fiscal, and domestic. More detailed consideration of the implications is in Annex E.

Soviet Reactions

As a general proposition, unless the changes in US programs threatened to severely disadvantage the Soviet position, it is judged that the Soviet Union would not be inclined to react rapidly, in terms of changes in their own military programs, to alterations in US strategy or force posture. This judgment derives from Soviet persistence in viewing the world in adversarial terms; from their dependence on military power in international relations; from the bureaucratic, technological, and economic momentum of their military production sector, which even the Soviet leadership has a questionable ability to change; and because the Soviets tend toward extremely cautious calculations of their military requirements. Finally, the extremely cautious Soviet approach to structuring and sizing their military forces makes it difficult to ascertain what the Soviets would consider their ultimate force requirements vis-a-vis any given US forces. This, in combination with the Soviet desire to maintain an advantageous military posture, makes it unlikely that the Soviets would reciprocate to unilateral reductions in US strategic (AIMS J) or conventional (AIMS E and perhaps AIMS F) force postures.

What would probably cause them most alarm would be significant increases in US strategic capability (AIMS H), large increases in the standing NATO forces (AIMS H, I, J and M), or in more formal US ties with China (AIMS M).

Thus, AIMS H would represent the most threatening posture to the Soviets since it entails positive initiatives in all three categories. They would probably initiate a worldwide propaganda campaign to inhibit the US buildup and would almost certainly attempt to curtail it by pursuing arms control agreements. A massive internal campaign probably would be initiated to condition the Soviet and East European populations to further sacrifices to increase Pact military capability.
Most worrisome to the Soviets would be the buildup of a US strategic damage limiting capability (both offensive and defensive) which would allow the US to wage, survive, and win a nuclear war, such as is the case in AIMS M. In the near term, they would probably increase deployments of existing and planned systems to threaten the US or its allies (more land mobile ICBMs; more forward deployed SS-X-20’s and Backfires; more SSBN’s on patrol, bombers on alert, and SSBN’s with cruise missiles; enhanced air defense; and perhaps ABM). In the longer term, increases would be likely in R&D, civil defense, and strategic military programs in general.

A buildup in NATO standing forces, theater nuclear and/or conventional forces (AIMS H, I, J and M), could also cause great concern. More forward deployed US divisions might be viewed as more threatening than merely enhanced reinforcement capability, but any increase in FRG capability would be particularly alarming. All of these would tend to deny the Soviets their strategy of winning a European war quickly and on NATO’s territory. The rate at which the NATO buildup was manifested would be important in determining the Soviet response, since, as in any reaction to changed US or NATO strategies, Moscow would not want to reorient its planning in such a way as to reorder its current economic and manpower priorities.

Any US overtures toward China (AIMS M), particularly direct political or military cooperation, would be a major security concern for the Soviets. They might seek better relations with the US through new arms control agreements, and they might well build up their own Far Eastern forces—naval and air units—and air units and ICBMs.

Soviet operations in the Third World have been developed in response to their own perceived requirements, are of long duration, and are largely unaffected by changes in US capabilities. In the face of a US buildup, they would probably increase their military aid, work closely with Cuban forces and other surrogates, employ their naval and air forces in ways to promote their interests and inhibit US capabilities, and orchestrate their propaganda in the Third World to undermine US ties and to have these countries pressure the US to stop its programs. The Soviets might perceive the improvement in US intervention capabilities (AIMS G, J, and M) as a means of rapidly reinforcing NATO’s forward deployed forces.

**Foreign Policy Implications**

The strategy and forces developed by the US to meet existing and potential military threats and political challenges profoundly affect the US role in the world and others’ perceptions regarding that role. US military postures are seen by others to reflect US political priorities. Stated military intentions and the deployment of US forces powerfully influence the way other nations—friends, neutrals and potential adversaries—decide how best to provide for their own security interests and ambitions and what their political orientation should be. The behavior of other nations, in turn, affects such US national interests as freedom of action in domestic, economic, and foreign policy. The implications of the AIMS can be grouped into the following aspects as they affect Europe, East Asia, the Third World, and arms transfers.
SECRET

Europe and Allied Reactions. The reaction of NATO Allies to a chosen US military strategy would depend on several factors:

-- Consistency with accepted NATO strategy,

-- Degree of additional defense burden implied for them,

-- US willingness to link conventional defense to theater and strategic nuclear systems, and

-- Perceived adequacy of US strategic forces.

Adoption of AIMS E, F, or G, all of which include a substrategy of "Limit Loss" for Europe, would probably cause adverse European political reaction if such AIMS were interpreted as departing from the current NATO MC-14/3 strategy. While the US military forces in Europe would not be reduced, and US capability would be planned to approximate the current military capabilities of NATO Allies, the Allies—and especially the FRG—would be shaken if the US stated a willingness to accept territorial loss in the event of war. Moreover, a reduction in US reserve forces earmarked for NATO reinforcement would raise questions about the depth and durability of our commitment to European security. Finally, the "flank" allies—Turkey, Greece, and Norway—might see in AIMS E, F, and G a reduced US commitment to their territorial integrity and might see advantages in nonetrality.

AIMS E might cause particular problems in that reduced presence in East Asia might be seen as enabling the Soviets to concentrate more attention and resources on Europe. AIMS G, with an apparent increase in US emphasis on contingencies outside of Europe, might amplify the image of reduced US commitment to Europe; however, the US might be able to convince the Allies that Soviet power could be deflected from Europe in this fashion. As long as the US strategic posture is preserved or enhanced, the Allies would not find the US strategic posture a source of serious worry.

The effects of such European concerns are hard to predict. If sufficient domestic support could be mustered, the Europeans might begin to prepare independently for their own security as a hedge against eventual American disengagement. If the reduced US war goals and sustaining capability provoked anxiety in Germany, pressures could mount to enlarge the Bundeswehr—and possibly to kindle West German interest in nuclear weapons. If, however, European governments found it politically impossible to increase their own defense preparations, they might, over time, find it only prudent to be more accommodating toward the USSR. In either case, of course, NATO itself and US-European relations generally would suffer. At a minimum, the somewhat reduced US force and operational goals would undermine the US ability to encourage greater Allied defense efforts, diminish somewhat the US leadership position, and possibly weaken the vitality and cohesion of the Alliance.
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These reactions could be significantly softened—at least for AIMS F and G—if the US were to avoid any statements to the effect that a loss of NATO territory would be acceptable. Some erosion of Allied confidence would, however, still be likely in light of the reduced US reinforcement capability of these AIMS but could be offset in part by emphasizing efforts to increase the US capability to reinforce Europe during the early stages of a NATO mobilization.

Because there would be no major changes in US programs, AIMS F Variant should have little impact on the Alliance, US-European relations, and the US leadership position, provided the US refrained from any public indication that NATO would accept territorial loss in the event of Soviet aggression. Allied resistance could be expected, however, to funding fully the sustaining resources required for this strategy.

Should the US start implementing the full conventional force requirements of "Direct Defense" in AIMS H, I, and J, the Europeans might become concerned on three counts. First, they, too, would be expected to expand their defense expenditures beyond what their political and economic systems may likely be willing to support. Second, the Soviets might be provoked by the NATO buildup, leading to possible increase in East-West tensions and military confrontations. Third, the Europeans could fear that the increased US emphasis on conventional forces might raise the nuclear threshold too high and lead to a possible US nuclear decoupling. The West Germans, in particular, would find this latter aspect most worrisome.

Such concerns might be aggravated in AIMS H by the danger that reduced presence in East Asia might enable the Soviets to respond more easily to the increased US military emphasis on Europe. With respect to AIMS J, European fears about US nuclear decoupling and reduced escalatory credibility would be sharpened by the lowered US strategic nuclear posture of "assured retaliation only."

The adverse effects of AIMS H and I might be substantially reduced if it were made clear that the strategy represented a goal toward which force improvements should be aimed, rather than a fiat for massive new defense efforts, and did not include a reduction in the US theater nuclear posture.

AIMS H might disrupt US-European and Intra-European politics in three respects. First, many members of NATO would resist making the expenditures to complement the US buildup, even though the Allied force buildup required would be considerably less than that for AIMS H, I, or J. Second, intra-Alliance friction would inevitably arise over which members were to serve as staging areas for offsetting offensive action (from the flanks). Finally, some Allies might object to what might appear as a transformation of NATO from a purely defensive alliance to one with certain offensive qualities.
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East Asia and Chinese Attitudes. Stability in East Asia depends on a complex balance among the political and military powers in the region. AIMS E and H, by furthering US withdrawals from the region (after the Vietnam and Korea pullbacks), could undermine that stability.

AIMS F, F Variant, G, I, and J, which maintain the current US peacetime presence in East Asia, should provide some reassurance to the countries in the region following the withdrawal of US ground forces in Korea, particularly with the general increase in conventional capabilities outside of NATO entailed by AIMS G and J. AIMS J's diminished strategic nuclear capabilities, however, may cause some anxieties and could contribute to pressures to acquire independent nuclear forces.

AIMS H calls for increased US presence in the region. As such, it is likely to undermine efforts to get the Japanese to assume a modestly greater share of the regional defense burden. Although Korea and Taiwan might be reassured, it could concern the PRC about US aspirations for regional hegemony and intentions to normalize relations. If the Soviet Union or, less likely, the Chinese viewed the US buildup as provocative, it could conceivably challenge stability in the area as they attempted to respond or preempt.

The Third World. In all AIMS, the US would have a major capability for intervention in the third world inherent in its forces even if not bought specifically for that purpose. The extent of this capability would depend upon US willingness to use forces otherwise intended for NATO. Thus the perceptions of the developing countries of US military strategy would depend, in the first instance, on US use of military force in such contingencies, but, in the absence of such occasions, on US statements.

AIMS E, and especially AIMS H, which have reduced capabilities and forces for intervention outside Europe could cause concern among third world countries, if the impression were given that the US was not interested in the security conditions of the developing world. This could result in increasing accommodation toward the Soviets or pressures for self-sufficient security measures. Regional stability might suffer if these pressures produced increased military programs, particularly nuclear weapons programs. At the same time, these AIMS might reduce third-world anxieties about potential US intervention in their internal affairs while increasing the potential for Soviet probes.

AIMS F, F Variant and especially I, provide capabilities that should reassure most developing countries that prefer to see the US discourage Soviet troublemaking. The limited US military capability to engage in land combat could, however, be perceived as a signal that the US would not plan to counter the Soviets if they chose to become deeply involved. The US would still have the potential for major intervention by drawing down on
European dedicated forces. At the same time, the retention of "light intervention" capabilities in these AIMS would signal a US willingness to threaten or use some military force to protect national interests.

AIMS G, J, and M provide considerable conventional capabilities for use in Third World contingencies. The developing countries may view this as a mixed blessing -- the benefits of US willingness and ability to counter any Soviet adventures and regional stability could be offset by concerns of US activism and the purposes of the extensive capabilities that these AIMS signal. Additionally, there may be fear that these AIMS would provoke an undesirable Soviet response, thus potentially converting local disputes into superpower confrontations.

Arms Transfers. The Administration's arms transfer policy guidelines seek to achieve restraint in the volume and technological sophistication of US arms sales and grants. Tension between the arms transfer policy and a military strategy is most likely to arise in those cases in which the military strategy shifts US defense responsibilities to local forces that cannot meet the challenge with indigenous resources.

Except in extraordinary circumstances, the NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are exempted from the arms transfer guidelines. Korea is also being treated as a special situation. In general, then, the greatest impact will be felt in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.

In AIMS E and H, US drawdowns and pullbacks are likely to generate increased requests for more, and more advanced US systems. The US, in an effort to cushion the effects of a shift to the policy implied by E or H, could be strongly motivated to be responsive to such requests. To do so, however, would vitiate the arms transfer policy.

In AIMS F, F Variant, and I, the US plans to maintain important conventional capabilities for possible use outside of Europe. No vacuum would be created that increased arms transfers would be required to fill.

In AIMS G, J, and especially M, the buildup in US conventional capabilities should curb requests for arms and would permit more restrictive application of the arms transfer guidelines while preserving adequate total force capabilities.

Arms Control Implications

These largely follow from the foreign policy implications and estimated Soviet reactions described above. None of the strategies would violate arms control agreements now in effect covering strategic offensive forces. However, some strategic force posture alternatives described could require adjustment to conform with limits specified in the Interim Agreement, if this agreement were still in effect after October 1977. Deployment of an ABM defense adequate to protect the complete US ICBM force and/or CONUS
(AIMS H) would be prohibited under the ABM Treaty, and would require major revision or US withdrawal.

Any significant or precipitous departure from the current US military strategy is bound to have an impact on the course of ongoing arms control efforts. Strategies requiring a visible and rapid increase in the size of US and Allied forces (e.g., AIMS H, I, J, and M), particularly in Europe, would disturb the MBFR negotiating environment. While an increase in some Soviet forces confronting NATO would be a likely consequence, the pursuit of such strategies might promote greater Soviet efforts to negotiate arms control constraints. However, Soviet suspicions of US motives might make it more difficult to conclude meaningful arms control agreements, either SALT or MBFR.

The pursuit of a strategy which resulted in significant unilateral reductions in US forces (such as AIMS E or H), would reduce adversaries' incentives for negotiating arms control agreements. In some regions, particularly in Europe and perhaps in the Far East, such unilateral reductions could destabilize force balances and increase national motivations to acquire weapons at a faster pace. In some countries, incentives for nuclear weapons acquisition would probably rise. Even the most resourceful US arms transfer and non-proliferation policies might not be able to counter totally such a trend since US ability to take the initiative to influence multilateral arms control efforts would likely decrease along with decreased US presence. AIMS with significantly increased peacekeeping or intervention capabilities without any increase in strategic nuclear capabilities (G and J) could encourage greater global stability and foster initiatives such as the nuclear free zones and conventional force limits. However, anti-US regional powers might view the expanded US capability as being threatening and seek increased arms transfer support from the Soviets or the PRC.

With respect to strategic forces, major nuclear force modernization requirements (inherent in AIMS F, F Variant, I, and particularly in H) would be somewhat constrained by qualitative limits such as proposed in the US "Comprehensive Proposal" of March 1977, (i.e., freeze on new types of ICBM and limits on ICBM/SLBM testing). Strategies which called for maintaining current levels of theater nuclear forces in Europe (possible under all AIMS) might inhibit negotiation of substantial reductions in the SALT aggregate because of Soviet concern over theater systems which could strike the Soviet homeland. Although some opportunity for negotiation of reductions in the SALT aggregate or MIRV limit would be present under all strategies, unilateral US strategic force reductions (as in AIMS J) might not provide Incentive for the Soviets to negotiate equivalent reductions.

In summary, the impact of any significant change in US strategy on arms control prospects would depend not only on the political and security dynamics of the various regions of the globe, but also on how the US executed the change (see Non-Military Initiatives below), and on how well the US integrated its arms control policies into its global strategy for national security.
Fiscal and Economic Implications

The President has emphasized his intention to submit a balanced budget for 1981. With an actual deficit of $66.5 billion in 1976 and projected deficits of $48 billion in 1977, and $62 billion in 1978, efforts to achieve this balanced budget objective will generate substantial pressure for outlay restraints over the next several years.

Anticipated economic performance significantly affects the fiscal picture. The underlying economic projections for 1977-1982 used in this exercise assume an average real growth rate of 5.1% between calendar years 1977 and 1981, tapering off to 4.3% between 1981 and 1982. Inflation, as measured by the GNP deflator, remains at an average annual rate of 6% in CY 1978, slowing to 4% in CY 1982. The unemployment rate is projected to drop from an average of 6.3% in CY 1978 to an average of 4.5% in CY 1982.

Under these assumptions, a 5-year fiscal projection of outlays was prepared using base levels of current programs, adjusted for Congressional budget actions and allowing for future increases or decreases mandated by current law. The projection includes the effects of the President's energy program and social security tax proposals on receipts and outlays. Administration commitments to basic tax reform and national health insurance are not reflected in the baseline projections, however, and are treated as budget options because specific proposals are still under development. The baseline projection is shown in the following table.

Defense outlay projections beyond 1978 are those included in the January 1977 budget submission to the Congress. These estimates are about $5 billion per year below the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), but they do include real growth in all years.

The baseline projection of outlays for 1978-82 is shown in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Base Outlays:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Budget Deficit/Surplus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DoD-Military and MAP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nondefense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>277.2</td>
<td>-66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>311.3</td>
<td>-48.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>110.6</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>458.3</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>145.0</td>
<td>536.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>676.5</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline Budget Projections (in billions of dollars)
Within the currently projected surplus in 1981, the Administration has three broad fiscal strategy choices for arriving at a 1981 balance:

**Tax Policy Options**

The Administration's tax reform package is still being formulated. One preliminary set of proposals would involve a $30 billion loss of 1981 receipts due to changes in personal and corporate income tax structure and rates. Alternative provisions or tax rates could increase or decrease the amount of loss of future receipts; for present purposes, however, the "$30 billion" case is used. The revenue loss from a tax reform package of this magnitude follows:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Reform Revenue Reductions</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
<td>-28.4</td>
<td>-30.3</td>
<td>-28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nondefense Outlays**

Reductions in ongoing programs and possible new initiatives can both be considered. Possible reductions have been grouped into three areas:

--- Benefit programs for individuals such as tighter limits on cost growth in medical programs, increase medicare cost sharing, eliminate the security minimum benefit and reduce GI bill benefits.

--- Grants to State and local governments including reductions in EPA construction grants, highway funding community development block grants, social service grants and general revenue sharing.

--- Other general government by reducing nondefense employment, phasing out postal subsidies and more austere water resource programs. The outlay impact of these actions is shown in the following table:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefits for</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other General Government</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Outlay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reductions</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>-20.1</td>
<td>-23.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Four groups of possible nondefense initiatives are considered:
national health insurance, a welfare reform program more costly than the
baseline projection (both very rough order-of-magnitude figures, but by
far the largest potential budget claims on the nondefense side); a doubling
of US development aid; and a set of "other general government" initiatives.
Threats from undesired Congressional actions are not included. The outlay
magnitudes involved are shown in the following table:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Health Insurance</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Reform</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubling of US Foreign Aid</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other General Government Initiatives</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Outlay Increases</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense Outlays

In assessing the fiscal impact of the various Defense strategies, a
distinction must be made between the 1981 effect and the long-term impact
of Federal spending levels. Large increases in Defense programs in a peacetime
environment require several years to reach maximum rate. Thus, the
long-term impact of AIMS H, I, J, and M is much greater than the 1981
outlay level. AIMS H and I outlays would reach an annual increase of
$50 billion while AIMS M would be close to $100 billion.

For purposes of assessing the fiscal implications of the various
strategies, the low and high force postures may be roughly grouped into
four categories:

-- The low force structure option under AIMS E, which would put 1981
outlays $16 billion below the "baseline" projection.

-- The low option under AIMS F, with 1981 outlays $8 billion under
the baseline.

-- The low options under AIMS F(v) and G, both $4 billion above the
baseline.

-- All 12 other options, all of which are approximately $25-35 billion
above the baseline.

The categories covering the low force structure options under AIMS F,
F(v), and G can be considered for analytical purposes as not significantly
different from the baseline projection. Thus, the matrix below shows only the two extremes (AIMS E low Option and the average of the 12 high options) and the base.

The Tradeoffs

The baseline projections indicate that a $20 billion budget margin is available in 1981. Assuming the base level for defense and nondefense programs, it is not possible to adopt the complete tax reform package, all of the nondefense initiatives, or any of the higher force structures or the lower force structures under AIMS H, I, J, or M. If a cut in non-defense outlays base is chosen, the savings combined with the $20 billion available margin in 1981 will permit adoption of one of the higher defense levels. Similarly, adopting the low force structure under AIMS E will permit either tax reform or all of the nondefense initiatives. Reducing both defense and nondefense outlays below the current base would yield sufficient resources for the complete tax reform package and permit selected program initiatives.

In short, the 1981 margin is not sufficient to fund either the major defense or nondefense initiatives or the tax reform package. None of these choices can be fully satisfied without a reduction in the base level of another area or a tax increase.
## TABLE III-15

### 1981 BUDGET OPTIONS

(In Billions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Toward Larger Surplus</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Movement Toward Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receipts</strong></td>
<td>606.9</td>
<td>-30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain existing tax structure except for energy proposals and proposed increases in social security taxes, primarily on employers; extra revenues applied to reduce debt or support program growth.</td>
<td>Tentative Treasury costing of tax reform package ($30.3B).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outlays</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondefense:</td>
<td>-20.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate $10.5B in individual benefits, $6.7B in grants, and $2.9B in other government.</td>
<td>Keep all programs at current levels, except where mandated by law to increase them.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense:</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt the low force structure option under AIMS E.</td>
<td>Assumes continued real growth in non-pay purchases and constant manpower level. Corresponds roughly to low force structure options under AIMS F(v) and G.</td>
<td>Adopt any of the high force structure options or low force structure options under AIMS H, I, J, or M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base Budget Margin</strong></td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space program and ERDA basic research -- new initiatives</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher funding level, sewage treatment plant construction grants</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources projects</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium enrichment (revenues)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal highway construction</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad subsidies</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet engine noise reduction assistance</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education assistance</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIH and other health agencies -- funding level</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans benefits</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore oil -- non-bonus bidding</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Illustrative Initiatives | 1,119 | 4,465 | 6,660 | 8,024 | 8,510 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More stringent means-testing for food stamps and child nutrition eligibility</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tighter limits on price increases under Medicare and Medicaid (further 5% reduction in 1981 price level)</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constrain program levels for education programs</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaseout GI bill benefits</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit veterans non-service-connected medical care and consolidate hospitals</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate social security minimum benefit (net of increase in means-tested SSI program)</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Medicare cost-sharing (i.e., raise deductible amounts)</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Benefits for Individuals</strong></td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants to State and local governments:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce EPA construction grants funding to $2 billion a year</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce highway funding</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce funding level for community development block grants</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaseout social services grants</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Grants to State and local governments</strong></td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other general government:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Federal nondefense employment by 4% by 1981</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phaseout postal subsidies</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce water resources and power programs further</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Other General Government</strong></td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, Illustrative Nondefense Reductions</strong></td>
<td>293.5</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>-20.1</td>
<td>-23.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Domestic Implications

Any change from the status quo is likely to generate public and Congressional controversy, though that controversy might be minimized through careful education of the public and Congress of the reasons for the change. Although stated national military strategy could be a source of some contention, most of the debate will surround changes in defense postures and in the resources allocated to defense.

Certain reactions are predictable and probably unavoidable: in general, anti-military elements will applaud decreases in defense spending and oppose increases; pro-military forces will act in the opposite fashion. The reactions will depend on the magnitude of the change and the projected effects of the change on other programs that they support. Other adverse reactions will catalyze around specific issues: the draft, reserve forces, interservice rivalries, and base openings or closings.

AIMS E, F, and perhaps G, entailing reductions in reserve forces, especially the Army Reserve, would provoke the reserve lobby, although increases in active forces could counterbalance the concern. AIMS H, I, J, and M, entailing significant increases in military forces, would raise an outcry over increased defense spending and the need for a peacetime draft. AIMS H, with its massive military requirements, is likely to find little domestic support in the absence of a Soviet threat of much greater magnitude than now perceived.

The debate over strategic content might be somewhat less lively than that over domestic resources, but still cause controversy. This would be particularly true for those AIMS that make significant changes in US strategic nuclear posture -- AIMS J in foregoing US nuclear equivalence to the USSR, and AIMS M in achieving clear nuclear superiority. The second major feature to draw criticism would be the emphasis (made apparent in Congressional testimony) on the large intervention forces called for in AIMS G, J, and M. Procurement for that capability might provoke widespread charges of "getting ready for another Vietnam."

Although not investigated in detail in this study, an industrial base sufficient to provide for greatly increased forces or to provide the logistic sustainability for conventional conflict in Europe for periods of 180 days or longer is not currently planned and could represent a serious constraint on the reasonable and timely attainability of the assets needed to pursue this strategy.

I. COMPARISONS OF AIMS: NON-MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES.

Since military force changes are among the most visible indicators of changes in national policy, perceptions of force changes by domestic and foreign publics are key determinants to the success or failure of any new
policy. Changes to US military strategy need to be carefully coordinated with complementary initiatives using diplomacy, negotiation, and economic incentives to:

- Alleviate certain undesirable foreign policy consequences of a particular defense strategy;

- Lower the potential military risks associated with a defense strategy that might be seen as desirable for its cost or force posture features.

- Cover gaps that may exist between defense strategy and capabilities by offering non-military measures designed to improve allied support and assist in deterring adversaries.

- Ensure that national strategy and force posture is not seen by others as being more threatening than is intended.

- Enable elements of an initially selected defense strategy to be modified if non-military steps set in motion resulted in changes in the political or military environment.

The following briefly discusses non-military initiatives that might be warranted by either reductions or increases in current US defense strategy or military capabilities. A more detailed discussion is at Annex C.

Reductions. If the US were to reduce its military capabilities either overall or selectively (as in AIMS E, F, G, H, J), non-military initiatives are available which emphasize the advantages and significance of diplomatic and economic power in dealing with adversaries, Allies, and Third World countries.

The US might pursue arms control initiatives more vigorously to obtain reductions in threats and opposing force levels, thereby minimizing the risks of unilateral US reductions.

With respect to the Soviet Union, the US might undertake a broad program of economic assistance to the USSR in trade, credits, food, and technology, directed toward lowering political tensions and reducing the risk of war.

With our NATO Allies, the US might pursue further specific economic measures responsive to West European needs in order to demonstrate concern and commitment to their security and well-being. Efforts to assure the FRG that US commitment is clear would be particularly important, and a special relationship with Bonn on security, diplomatic, and economic issues might be sought.

The US might undertake a major effort to strengthen US-Japanese diplomatic ties both under a strategy of overall reductions (AIMS E) and under a strategy where the US builds up its capabilities in Europe while
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reducing military capabilities in Asia (AIHS-M), but the utility of such initiatives is uncertain.

In the Third World, the US might pursue more vigorously with the Soviet Union a Middle East settlement and stress the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Increases. In the event of major overall military buildups by the US (AIHS-M), associated non-military initiatives would be based upon the assumption that this would be accompanied by an increase in US-Soviet tensions, a major arms race, a tightening of the NATO alliance directed towards countering the Eastern bloc, and an unstable Third-World situation. Non-military instruments within this framework might be designed as consistent measures to punish adversaries, reward Allies, and woo neutrals.

Regarding the Soviet Union, the US might pursue a tough economic policy.

In the European area, the US might reemphasize the importance of NATO's integrity and offer large-scale economic assistance to Western Europe to help ensure that the Europeans develop both the will and the resources to do their part in the requisite conventional buildup.

In Asia, the US might similarly increase economic ties and intensify political relationships with both Japan and Korea in order to improve their positions vis-a-vis the USSR and China and convince them that nuclear proliferation is both unwise and unnecessary.

In other regions, the US might seek to limit Soviet influence and enhance the US image.

In the event of selective US military buildups, on the other hand, the purpose and character of such non-military initiatives could be correspondingly modulated in terms of intensity and modified in terms of basic thrust.

Toward the Soviet Union, the US might cast its policy in terms of rectifying an imbalance in Europe, and couple these assurances with a more cooperative economic posture.

With respect to Western European Allies, the US might attempt to provide somewhat more cooperative economic policies and more consistent political commitments to help ensure NATO-wide improvements in force postures and to keep the FRG from moving alone to upgrade its conventional capabilities in proportion to the US.

In Asia, the US might enhance economic cooperation and political consultations with Japan and Korea to reduce the fears of these countries that the US might indirectly be lessening commitments to them in favor of Europe.
Another approach, not necessarily in contradiction to the above considerations, might be needed to complement increases in military capabilities. We may want to ensure that a more robust military posture does not appear too menacing -- to neutrals and even to adversaries -- lest it damage US political leadership potential, provoke the USSR and others, and generally increase international tension to our own detriment. An open economic policy, continued creative diplomacy and moral leadership, and restraint in our rhetoric about the advantages of our military power could contribute to this effect.

For example, improvements in intervention capabilities alone (AIMS G) would require some Third World non-military initiatives to help demonstrate that, despite the greater intervention capability of the US, its posture would be defensive and its objectives would remain peace, development, and independence in regions such as Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
IV. EVALUATION OF AIMS.

A. INTRODUCTION. This section raises six key questions* for Presidential consideration. Each of these questions is discussed in the context of the AIMS described in the previous section. The intent is to illuminate the various aspects of each question, rather than provide a single "right" answer.

Because the questions are interrelated, they should be addressed completely before final judgments are rendered on any of them. The questions do not lend themselves to a simple "yes" or "no" answer. They are intended to elicit broad general guidance which will have the effect of creating an overall integrated military strategy for the United States.

* The JCS representative believes that evaluation of the AIMS requires consideration of additional questions. Such questions include the determination of peacetime preparedness policies for both manpower and industrial resources to support future military conflicts; possible US responses, in conjunction with its Allies, to increases in Warsaw Pact capabilities; determination of what levels of combat sustainability are required for US and Allied forces; the extent to which US readiness can hinge on centrally deployable forces; and the degree to which the US should rely on reserve forces.
B. QUESTION ONE.

Question. How should the US deal with the threat of Soviet aggression? In particular, what should be the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces for deterrence and defense? If deterrence fails, to what extent should the US rely on the early use of nuclear weapons?

Discussion. The major threat to US interests and security is posed by Soviet power worldwide. A US national military strategy must address the need to deter a US-USSR war and the ability to wage war in such a way as to terminate conflict on conditions acceptable to the US. Europe, because it is where the US and USSR have substantial interests and confront each other militarily, is the area of principal military concern. Thus, while any US strategy to deal with the threat of Soviet aggression must be worldwide in scope, it is appropriate to focus the military elements of the US national strategy on Europe.

For illustrative purposes, it is analytically useful to group the AIMS described in Section III into three broad categories.

AIMS E, F, G

In AIMS E, F, G (Group One), deterrence is based on both conventional and nuclear forces which are designed to make the costs of military aggression outweigh potential gains.

NATO conventional forces to resist a Soviet attack are planned to deny the Soviets the prospects of a quick, inexpensive, low risk victory. They are not planned to deny the Soviets territorial gain. While Warsaw Pact sustainability and short term mobilization capabilities may exceed NATO's, in conventional conflict with NATO destruction of a significant element of Soviet military power would occur. The conventional forces, through their ability to engage in high intensity combat, would also increase the credibility of a US/NATO nuclear response. While the Soviets might hope that the mutual hostage effect of the US-USSR strategic systems would make an American use of nuclear weapons in Europe unlikely, they could not be certain. Moreover, Soviet planners would have to consider British and French nuclear systems. Finally, deterrence is enhanced by the fact that the Soviets must consider their relationship with the Chinese and divide their finite military resources between widely separated military regions.

Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility both requires the Soviets to allocate their military resources between Europe and Asia and limits the Soviet ability to directly threaten US interests in Asia. This Sino-Soviet hostility permits greater relative American concentration on Europe.

Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine calls for each front to maintain enough supplies for 30 days combat, prescribes strategy of 2 to 3 months supply for a theater, and calls for national reserves of war materiel. If ammunition and POL storage capacity are used as an index, the Pact could have available 2 to 3 months of POL and more than two months ammunition, including that stored in the western USSR. Great uncertainty attaches to such estimates of Pact sustainability, however, as they assume optimal storage levels.
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If, in spite of the considerations outlined above, conflict should occur, this group of strategies does not provide, at a high level of confidence, the capability to defeat a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack. Whether the Soviet objective of a victory within several weeks could be achieved is uncertain. The Soviets may be able to sustain combat for longer than the 30 days for which these AIMS provide.* If the Soviets can persist in their attack, a US/NATO conventional defeat in Central Europe is likely.** In that event the US could be forced to:

- Negotiate an end of the conflict.
- Resort to first use of nuclear weapons.
- Fall back from Central Europe and continue the war conventionally elsewhere.

The probability of NATO obtaining a satisfactory negotiated settlement to European hostilities is slim, since the Soviets would be winning militarily.

If NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, rather than terminating hostilities, provoked a Soviet nuclear response, the consequences are not clear, but it is doubtful that US/NATO would thereby obtain a military advantage and be able to reverse the losing situation. If war escalated to strategic nuclear exchange, major destruction would result without any foreseeable US advantage.

Finally, the US would find it exceedingly difficult to continue the war by conventional means, since its forces would have been sized and sustained only for the initial battle in Central Europe and not for a protracted worldwide conventional struggle.

AIMS H, I, J

In AIMS H, I, and J (Group Two), deterrence rests on the US/Allied capability to repel a Soviet conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. The objective of NATO forces is to deter a Soviet attack through a clear conventional capability to defeat it rather than to make a conventional "victory" too costly for the Soviets.

* The OMB representative believes that because of the large uncertainty in Pact sustaining capability, it cannot be confidently predicted that the Pact could conduct an offensive operation longer than NATO could sustain a less militarily demanding defense. The uncertain reliability of non-Soviet Pact forces (which contribute over one third of the total Pact forces) contributes to this judgment. The OMB representative also believes that AIMS E, F, and G significantly upgrade NATO early combat capabilities.

** If NATO forces succeeded in containing a Soviet attack and establishing a stable defensive line, the eventual outcome is not clear.
If conflict should occur, the US would have planned the capability to defeat a Soviet attack without resort to nuclear weapons. In Central Europe these strategies are designed to allow the US/NATO to move back to the original borders after first blunting and stopping the Soviet/Pact attack. Having achieved their war objectives, the US/NATO could then initiate negotiations for conflict termination. Although the Soviets would not have achieved their war objectives, they might choose to limit their own losses and terminate the conflict. If not, the US/NATO would still have conventional and nuclear forces which could be used to threaten the Soviets. If a period of prolonged stalemate ensued, the superior economic power of the US, NATO, and Japan, could be brought to bear. At worst, a nuclear conflict might develop.

**AIMS M**

In Group Three strategies (AIMS M), deterrence rests on the threat of offsetting a Soviet attack in Central Europe with a capability to seize other territory, supported by superior US strategic forces. The threatened response to Soviet aggression in Europe is not confined to that theater; rather, Soviet aggression would be countered by US military initiatives against the Soviet Union itself. Should conflict occur, the probability of Soviet success is remote. Unlike the options available in Group Two, AIMS M provides sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to obtain a military advantage over the Soviet Union. US/NATO, possibly in cooperation with China, could either threaten or actually use these capabilities to force a termination of hostilities.

**Policy Tensions**

The basic policy tension is that, on the one hand, Group One strategies, which can be supported within current defense expenditures and are consistent with the capabilities of our NATO Allies, promote deterrence; but if conflict occurs, probably would not provide satisfactory options for conflict termination. On the other hand, Group Two strategies, which offer more satisfactory options for conflict termination and lessen the probability of nuclear war, would require large increases in US and Allied defense spending and may provoke adverse Soviet and Allied reactions.

Affordability of military forces depends on the perceptions of the US/NATO as to the urgency of the situation. If it were perceived that a major Soviet/Pact conventional attack were intended, great expenditures for defense would be acceptable to the NATO governments. At present, such a perception does not exist. It is not that the US and its Allies cannot afford greatly increased defense expenditures but rather that the perceptions of the Soviet threat do not justify radical increases. Furthermore, while the US and NATO possess the necessary resources, there is intense domestic competition for these resources in non-defense sectors.
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The Allies desire an American commitment to a restoration of the status quo ante but, unlike the US, show little inclination to provide conventional forces to accomplish such a goal. (The NATO Allies currently provide no more than 30 days of ammunition and supplies.) For them, deterrence appears assured by US military involvement in European security affairs and the potential escalation of any conventional conflict to strategic nuclear war. Given such views, dramatic increases in conventional forces and sustainability, such as in Groups Two and Three, would probably be viewed as either inconsistent with the Soviet threat or undermining deterrence.

However, if Group One AIMS were interpreted as reducing the US commitment to Europe, this would probably provoke serious Allied concern, especially in the FRG. Significantly increased German perceptions of vulnerability can only jeopardize the US ability to influence FRG defense policies, including German nuclear decisions. Moreover, the flank allies, perceiving a reduction in US support for the defense of their territorial integrity, may seek security assurance outside of NATO. Groups Two and Three strategies avoid these difficulties through the US commitment to restoration of the status quo ante. However, US/NATO movement to acquire and deploy forces capable of first absorbing and then defeating a Soviet attack might provoke a similar Soviet counter-buildup. Thus, while Group Two and Three strategies might provide the basis for stable deterrence if the capabilities described in the strategies existed, movement from current capabilities towards the increased force levels might actually be destabilizing.

Elements of a Solution

A number of ways exist to try to reconcile the policy tensions posed by the different AIMS. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the US currently pursues portions of a number of them. In seeking resolution:

-- The US could have as its declared strategy a restoration of the status quo but acquire forces for a more modest strategy. A public NATO commitment to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante would ease anxieties in the FRG even without full US or Allied funding for the necessary forces. US reassurance of European allies concerning US nuclear reliability forces the Soviets to consider the consequences both of a failure to achieve their objective in a timely fashion and NATO nuclear response to a conventional attack. (See Question Two.)

-- The US could acquire conventional forces to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities outside the European theater. AIMS G, for example, provides forces specifically to undertake non-European initiatives against the USSR. Because this AIMS also plans for heavy intervention in local wars, additional forces could be available for initiatives. (These same forces, if employed in Europe, could provide a limited enhancement of the conventional capability NATO possesses in Group One's strategies.) (See Question Three.)
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-- The US could, individually or in cooperation with NATO, expand the conventional sustainability of Group One forces to delay or avoid reaching a nuclear decision point. AIMS F(v), for example, provides the US/NATO with 90 days of sustainability. This would not permit restoration of the status quo ante; but, if also attained by the Allies, it might avert a conventional defeat. Increased US sustainability above that provided by the Allies may be useful as an example for them and to provide the US additional non-nuclear options should conflict occur.

-- The US could enhance its nuclear capabilities to increase the deterrent value of the various groups of strategies. AIMS F, F(v) and I include strategic forces which maintain US advantages in certain indices. AIMS M seeks clear superiority in strategic forces. (See Question Six.)

-- The US could undertake political, economic, and arms control initiatives to promote Soviet-American cooperation and thereby decrease the likelihood that war would break out in Europe. Or the US could undertake foreign policy initiatives which seek to undermine the reliability of the military contribution of the Eastern European countries to Warsaw Pact strength. For example, the US/NATO might adopt a public TNF targeting practice which excludes either non-Soviet Pact forces not participating in attack on NATO; all East European targets except Soviet military formations, installations and logistic support; or both.

-- The US could actively seek closer security links with the PRC to force the Soviets to devote additional resources against China. Such a US China policy might include military sales, intelligence sharing, or other Sino-American security ties.

-- The US, in conjunction with its NATO Allies, could plan to maintain in peacetime the forces and sustaining capability needed to stabilize a defense line in Europe and plan to create in wartime the additional forces needed to counterattack to restore the original borders. This would require manpower and industrial base mobilization plans and capabilities sufficiently responsive to generate new forces on a timely basis. At present we do not have such capabilities; neither our manpower mobilization capability nor our Industrial base have been planned on this basis. To estimate the cost of such a capability would require study of (1) Warsaw Pact capability to sustain its existing forces in protracted combat while simultaneously creating new forces and (2) the cost to the US and NATO of maintaining in peacetime the capability to create forces on various schedules. Insufficient work has been done on such total mobilization planning in recent years to permit even gross estimates, of the costs involved.
C. QUESTION TWO.

Question. To what extent should the US, for political or military purposes, state objectives or fund programs for security in Europe which are inconsistent with the interpretation or implementation of NATO strategy by other members of the Alliance?

Discussion. NATO's official strategy, expressed in MC-14/3*, calls for preserving peace and providing for the security of the NATO area by maintaining a credible deterrent effected by forces which would cause the Warsaw Pact to conclude that, if they were to launch an attack, the chances of a favorable outcome would be too small to be acceptable, and fatal risks could be involved. Should aggression occur, NATO's objective would be to preserve or restore the integrity of the NATO area by employing such forces as might be necessary within the concept of forward defense. NATO's response to aggression could take the form of:

-- Direct defense—a response in kind to deny the attacker his objective;

-- Deliberate escalation—raising the scope and intensity of combat to raise the cost and risk, not solely to defeat the enemy, but also to weaken his will; or,

-- General nuclear response.

While direct defense would be NATO's first response to any aggression short of full nuclear attack, NATO should always be prepared to escalate; and the main deterrent to aggression is the threat of escalation. As a result, the strategy calls for conventional forces to be designed to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by presenting the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities at a scale that could involve grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.

Within the ambiguities of this statement, the US has been able to urge improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities and the Allies have been able to rely heavily on the nuclear deterrent. None of the AIGS considered in this study is completely consistent with a strict

* This paragraph paraphrases portions of MC-14/3 relevant to the issue at hand.
reading of the NATO strategy, although the force capabilities of all but AIMS M could be interpreted as adequate to execute the strategy. However, certain AIMS require a level of conventional capabilities which considerably exceed those presently planned by our NATO Allies, and it might be difficult to persuade the Allies to procure the capabilities needed without raising questions about strategy.

In AIMS E, F, or G, the US would, in essence, be adjusting its planning for conflict in the European theater to correspond more closely to that of the Allies. Consequently, there would be no need to challenge the current acquisition policy of our NATO Allies. The small decreases in total US forces that might result in AIMS E and F could, if desired, be explained as a way to obtain funds for increases in capability to reinforce Europe rapidly in the early days of a war. NATO's conventional capabilities would continue to be inadequate to implement the wartime objective of preserving or restoring territorial integrity against a large scale attack, and first use of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution. Many of the adverse political implications of adoption of these AIMS probably could be avoided if the US continued to publicly support MC-14/3, particularly with reference to forward defense and restoration of the status quo ante. The fact that the Warsaw Pact is aware of NATO's formal strategy may be an additional reason for the strategy to espouse goals and intentions other than those which would actually govern NATO force planning in AIMS E, F, or G.**

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* One divergence between formal NATO strategy and all the AIMS considered in this study is the concept of accepting, either temporarily or permanently, a significant loss of NATO territory. The amount of loss of NATO territory contemplated in all AIMS is likely to be viewed by the Allies as inconsistent with the concept of forward defense. Consequently, regardless of the AIMS proposed, there will be the question of whether to continue to subscribe to the concept of forward defense in our declaratory policy or whether to reconcile declaratory policy and capability. As we presently model land warfare, implementation of a defense at the West German border would require significant increases in NATO's peacetime deployed forces and in their day-to-day readiness posture. Such changes are unlikely to be politically acceptable given the current assessment of the likelihood of an attack. In addition they might appear threatening to the Pact and thus be counterproductive. Failure to address with our Allies the problem of reconciling strategy and capabilities makes war planning difficult. Yet it cannot be addressed without also raising the question of the circumstances under which the US would be willing to initiate nuclear warfare.

** The JCS representative believes that adoption of any of these AIMS contains the high risk of the loss of Western Europe or early initiation of a nuclear response, should deterrence fail.
On the other hand, implementation of AIMS H, I, or J, which call for the development of conventional forces adequate to restore lost NATO territory, would require major increases in Allied as well as US capabilities.* It is uncertain as to whether the Allies could be persuaded to make such increases (given current public perceptions of the threat) without opening up the issue of strategy. If a strategy debate should develop, it might be divisive and might guarantee that the US would not be able to persuade the Allies to make further force improvements.

AIMS F(v) falls between these two categories. The Allied forces required are not much larger than those currently planned, and the principal difficulty would be obtaining the necessary sustaining capability for the Allies. We might succeed in persuading the Allies to make the necessary improvements in their capabilities if we did not question NATO strategy but continued to urge improvements in the conventional leg of NATO's TRIAD in reaction to Pact activities. Mechanisms such as a common NATO war reserve stockpile have been suggested recently. If the Allies could not be persuaded to develop the needed capability, the US could consider planning to supply them in wartime from its own stocks, recognizing the problems associated with commonality. Congressional appropriations for a policy of stockpiling for the NATO Allies is, however, doubtful.

If neither of these solutions is achievable in the near term, the question arises as to the extent to which the US is willing to fund sustaining capability in excess of that of the Allies. Some greater capability might serve as an inducement to greater Allied effort and would be available for use in other, perhaps more likely, contingencies. In addition, no contingency considered in this study other than sustained conflict in Europe generates significant stockpile and industrial base requirements. If such a contingency is not to be planned for, it must be decided how much (or how little) sustaining capability is enough—a question somewhat analogous to the political sufficiency question for strategic forces.

Summary

In summary, the US could implement AIMS E, F, or G without questioning formal NATO strategy, because the Allied capabilities required correspond roughly to those currently planned. Full implementation of AIMS F(v) or M would require Allied cooperation, but such cooperation might best be obtained by working within current NATO strategy. Implementation of AIMS H, I, or J requires Allied cooperation in making major increases in capabilities. There is doubt about whether such Allied cooperation could be obtained without raising the issue of strategy. Thus, choice of a strategy which requires a major increase in Allied capabilities would require a decision on whether to raise the issue of strategy within NATO.

* The JCS representative believes that a variant of AIMS I which relaxed the criteria for early restoration of pre-war borders and provided for D-day to P-day sustainability, vice 90 days, would not require the major increases in active NATO peacetime forces.
D. QUESTION THREE.

Question. To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?

Discussion. Recent strategic planning has necessarily focused on Europe, and there has been little analysis of the conduct of the non-European aspects of a worldwide war. However, the steadily growing ability of the USSR to employ military force worldwide makes it prudent for the US to assess the need to confront them on that basis and determine whether the US should provide more forces either to counter Soviet initiatives or to take its own initiatives.

A major purpose of operations outside Europe would be to promote US objectives in a European war. At a minimum, the US would undertake operations to insure that the war in Europe could be prosecuted effectively. Additional forces might permit the US to put off the decision to use theater nuclear forces or could provide hedges to reduce the risk inherent in any European strategy. If the NATO defense in Europe were unsuccessful or a stalemate were achieved, operations outside Europe might improve the US negotiating position.

The AIMS as presented all require "Limited Action" or "Initiatives" as the options for outside Europe operations. Essentially the two categories represent the limits of a range of defensive and offensive capabilities. AIMS E and F are basically deterrence strategies and provide a limited military capability to counter Soviet initiatives outside Europe.

AIMS H and I, which also have "Limited Action" as the outside Europe option, are less dependent on nuclear deterrence and provide a more formidable conventional warfighting capability for a longer period of time. In these two AIMS, "Limited Action" is designed to allow the US to focus on Europe but prevents the Soviets from concentrating on Europe by confronting them worldwide.

The other three AIMS, G, J, and M, have "Initiatives" as the outside Europe option. In the case of AIMS G, also basically a deterrence strategy, "Initiatives" raise the nuclear threshold and provide a hedge against failure in Europe.

In AIMS J and M, "Initiatives" and increased presence outside Europe coupled with a strong conventional defense in Europe provide the US with a credible conventional deterrence. Additionally, AIMS M provides a substantial capability to wage war and defeat the Soviets worldwide.
Representative forces envisioned for operations outside Europe are shown below.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces (Representative)</th>
<th>Limited Action**</th>
<th>Initiatives***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>2****</td>
<td>2 ****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Amphibious Forces</td>
<td>3/9</td>
<td>1 3/9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As earlier indicated, all of the AIMS contain some air and naval forces for operations outside Europe in the context of worldwide conflict. However, AIMS G, J and M, which have initiatives outside Europe, also have heavy intervention for potential local wars. Some of the forces perform a dual role and are not completely additive.

**US-Soviet Advantages/Disadvantages**

It is useful to note the relative advantages that each major power enjoys when considering options to pursue in a worldwide war. Essentially, the USSR has near term energy self-sufficiency, and the US and its Allies are increasingly dependent of foreign sources of energy. The USSR has either internal or short length SLOC's and LOC's to the potential area of conflict while the opposite is true for the US.

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* The JCS representative believes that, given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies.

** Limited Action forces were sized to accomplish the following tasks: protection of oil SLOC's; limited conventional attacks against Soviet facilities and deployed air and naval forces; extensive mining to deny Soviets free use of the seas; assistance to allies in maintaining Pacific SLOC; and assistance in the defense of South Korea with forward deployed forces.

*** Initiatives forces were sized to do the Limited Action tasks and, in addition: increased attacks on Soviet facilities, as well as air and naval forces, and attacks on Soviet fishing fleet. Marine forces are employed in support of naval campaigns.

**** Army force structure provides two divisions as part of the NATO requirement, which are planned only for employment in the Mid-East.
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On the other hand, the US has greater open access to the seas than do the Soviets. (Soviet limited access to the sea may be a disadvantage on the offensive but an advantage on the defensive, since the sea avenues of approach are also limited.) As opposed to the Soviets, the US is free from hostile neighbors and has relatively reliable allies; has greater industrial, economic, technological and agricultural strength; greater power projection capability; and does not need to withhold considerable military power to defend national borders or control internal situations.

Soviet Initiatives

The Soviet Union has a capability to take initiatives against US interests outside Europe. The problem for the US would be compounded if the Soviets undertook a variety of different initiatives simultaneously. Potential Soviet initiatives include:

-- Attack US nuclear capabilities (carrier, submarine, air forces and support bases) in the Pacific to limit damage from US attack.

-- Attack Japan's sea lanes of communication and air and naval bases in order to tie down US forces in the Pacific, as well as limit Japan's war supporting potential.

-- Support a North Korean attack on South Korea.

-- Threaten Persian Gulf oil by attacking oil SLOC's or conducting land/air attacks on these oil sources.


US Initiatives

The US has limited forces available, after European requirements are met, to do what current strategy calls for:

-- Defending SLOC's to Hawaii and Alaska.

-- Attacking deployed Soviet naval and air forces.

* Present planning also requires that some US forces deployed worldwide "swing" to reinforce the European war. The concept of "swinging" forces is more credible if a US-USSR war starts in Europe or if the swing is started as soon as Pact mobilization is detected. However, if conflict is initiated by crises in other areas and expands subsequently to a NATO-Pact war in Europe and worldwide US-USSR conflict, then considerable portions of the swing forces may already be engaged and not readily available to move to the North Atlantic/European theater. Also, in the case of a short war (less than 30 days), naval swing forces may not be able to reach the European theater in sufficient time to accomplish designated tasks. On the other hand, if the war is extended, then these forces become critical.
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-- Conducting limited attacks against Soviet facilities when beneficial to do so.

-- Assisting allies in defending Pacific and Indian Ocean SLOC's.

At issue is whether additional forces should be acquired to take initiatives against the Soviet Union to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities and to provide better defense against Soviet initiatives. The US could consider a number of different initiatives:

-- Attack Soviet air and naval facilities. Considerable advantage accrues to the power that can attack first in areas outside Europe, as the other must adopt a defensive posture, thereby immobilizing a large portion of his forces. The ability to deny the Soviets free use of the seas or the ability to conduct air attacks against US forces would be enhanced by destroying forces before they deploy. Preemptive strikes or actions such as mining passages prior to Pact D-day, however, might not be desirable politically. More forces will be required, and more US losses taken in attacks on Soviet bases after D-day, but it may be prudent to determine Soviet intentions before attacking.

-- Defend Persian Gulf oil SLOC's and oil fields. The continued flow of Persian Gulf and North African oil is crucial to the war capability of the NATO Alliance. Consequently neither the Soviets nor ourselves could ignore the importance of these resources, and US forces could be called on to counter Soviet attempts to interdict oil SLOC's or take over the oil fields themselves.

-- Deny seas to Soviet merchant and fishing fleet. Attacks on the Soviet merchant fleet would limit critical logistic support to the northeast Soviet provinces. The Soviets also rely heavily on food from the sea, and attacks on the fishing fleet would create problems in terms of a long war. The northeastern provinces are particularly vulnerable and denial of economic and military reinforcement by sea renders the maritime provinces susceptible to possible PRC initiatives.

-- Power projection into Soviet littorals. The principal goal would be a diversion of Soviet resources disproportionate to our own. Therefore, limited objective operations with the purpose of tying down Soviet defensive forces and possibly encouraging support from other powers would be more appropriate than a unilateral attempt to open a second front. In this regard, Petropavlovsk and the Kuriles are prospective objectives. In addition to actual combat operations, the mere threat of such operations and unconventional warfare operations can tie down Soviet defending forces.
-- Deep Interdiction of Soviet territory. If reinforcement and supply by sea of the maritime provinces has been disrupted, the only alternative transportation from the Soviet Union's western economic and industrial heartland is the Trans-Siberian railway which can be interdicted by the US or PRC. Attacks of this nature against Soviet territory would provide military, political, and psychological benefits. However, in this context, as in all major US-USSR conflicts, there is a corresponding risk to US territory.

Summary

The US currently has the capability to perform limited operations, both offensive and defensive, outside of Europe during a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. A greater capability could be retained by delaying the "swing" of PACOM forces to NATO with an attendant risk for the European war.

The USSR has the capability to conduct a range of initiatives against the US to which the US should be able to respond with those actions necessary to protect vital interests. There are increased initiatives that the US can consider based on the objectives desired and the relative costs/benefits derived.

The key issue is whether the US should plan for only those actions to protect vital interests or should the US plan for specific actions (which will require additive forces and incur increased costs) outside of Europe in an overall strategy for worldwide war against the Soviets.
E. QUESTION FOUR.

**Question.** To what extent should the US plan to have military forces (or supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war?

**Discussion.** The focus of previous questions has been on deterring or waging a major war with the Soviet Union. While consideration of this critical dimension remains central to US national security planning, other militarily significant events are more likely. International crises and local wars, variously affecting US interests, have punctuated the years since the last war between great powers. The probability is high that during the next decade similar conflicts will occur which, while not directly threatening the territory of any major power, may warrant the use of US military power.

Potential US actions in these circumstances range from crisis management or peacekeeping activities—where military presence provides a complement to diplomacy—to armed intervention in order to protect US interests. The utility of military action, as well as the degree of involvement which is appropriate, is a function of many variables. Physical proximity to the US is a dimension, as is the extent of US commitment, whether via formal treaty or perceived obligation. The significance of interests in some regions, such as the Middle East, may justify a degree of military involvement under any circumstances, while other areas may assume sufficient importance only in a great power context. Thus, an insurgency in Rhodesia might not warrant US military presence unless the USSR introduced forces there. This dimension, which could produce a direct confrontation between US and Soviet units, continues to gain importance as Russian involvement in the Third World grows and their capability to project military power beyond their borders increases.

**The Importance of Planning**

A de facto capability to deal with crises and local wars would exist even if forces were acquired only to deal with a major US-USSR war. However, in the absence of an independent decision establishing planning guidance for local wars, drawing on these sizable forces might not provide a satisfactory capability for crisis management or intervention. For example, to make sure that these major war forces were in Europe when needed, significant portions of the force and its equipment might be forward deployed with the remainder tied to strict, time-phased mobilization and deployment schedules. If it were subsequently decided to employ these forces in a crisis or local war, the capability to make initial, forcible entry, such as that possessed by airborne and amphibious forces, might be lacking. Appropriate basing and rights of passage might be unavailable. Additionally, the strategic lift available might be inappropriate to deploy these "European" forces and equipment in a timely manner. Their training
and equipment might be unsuitable for a non-European environment, and they might have inadequate logistic support to accomplish the local war mission. Such potential shortcomings might be consciously accepted as the result of a planning decision. They should not come as "surprises" based on the assumption that large forces acquired for one purpose are automatically employable for other missions.

**Planning Levels**

A planning decision on peacekeeping and local wars can be made by establishing a level of effort which forces and supplies in the structure must be capable of supporting. Implicit in this approach is the possibility of employing other available forces to support higher levels of effort should US interests warrant, but the capability to do so would not be programmed.

A set of representational levels of effort were defined in the study and are outlined below. They describe three points on the capability planning continuum and provide the components of global flexibility (strategic mobility, initial entry capability, environmental suitability and sustainability) in varying amounts. These levels and the resultant forces reflect approximately the three general groupings which emerged from the analysis of several local war force posturing scenarios, postulated in the 1985 timeframe. (Amounts of sustainability, though rather arbitrarily assigned, are consistent with the options described and provided a basis for costing.) The levels of effort for planning are:

**Limited Action** - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and limited naval and tactical air forces to support US interests anywhere in the world for 90 days. The commitment of US land combat forces would not be planned. (AIMS E and H incorporate this planning concept.)

**Light Intervention** - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and moderate naval and tactical air forces, but only limited land combat forces anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 180 days would be planned. (AIMS F, F(v), and I incorporate this planning concept.)

**Heavy Intervention** - The US would plan to have the capability to provide logistical support and considerable land, naval and air power anywhere in the world. Supplies to sustain US and host nation forces for 360 days would be planned. (AIMS G, J, and M incorporate this planning concept.)

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* Supplies would be planned to sustain both US and host nation forces. Currently, except for certain nations, the acquisition of such war reserve stocks for use by non-US forces is prohibited by law.
The chart below depicts representative forces associated with the three planning options.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces (representative)</th>
<th>Limited Action</th>
<th>Light Intervention</th>
<th>Heavy Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Amphibious Forces</td>
<td>0-1/9</td>
<td>1-3/9</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide-bodied Aircraft</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Forces versus Drawing Down

Once a planning level of effort has been specified, the forces and supplies required to support it need not increase the total structure. In many cases, the capability required may already be present in the forces provided for other purposes. Where there are deficiencies, e.g., in strategic lift or sustainability, the shortfall would constitute, at a minimum, the additive requirement to achieve that particular level of planned effort. Beyond this, it may be desirable to acquire further additive capability at additional cost to reduce the need to draw on other assets in order to cope with crises and local wars. Such decisions must span the considerable range of choice from completely inclusive forces for "limited action" to completely additive forces for "heavy intervention."

The balance struck between drawing down and acquiring additive capabilities depends on the significance attached to several inter-related factors. These include force redeployability, sequence of events, available sustainability, relative force sizes, source of forces, and the desirability of flexibility/hedging.

Force redeployability, or the ability of forces to disengage and redeploy rapidly, can best be appreciated by posing two conditionals. If the US does not want to draw down major war capabilities for crisis management and local wars:

-- Land combat forces and associated support must be additive, since they can only be disengaged and redeployed slowly, if at all.

* The JCS representative believes that, given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs, they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies.
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-- Some tactical air forces must be additive. While such units are easily redeployable, complete withdrawal would leave land forces without air support. In addition, attrition of aircraft in local wars must be considered.

-- Naval forces and strategic mobility forces need not be additive, since they can be disengaged and redeployed relatively quickly and easily.

-- Airborne and amphibious forces may or may not be additive depending on whether the US plans to commit such forces to sustained combat or use them for initial entry only.

If the US is willing to draw down:

-- The requirements for local wars may affect the mix of forces, e.g., numbers of heavy and light divisions.

-- Local war planning may influence the deployments of forces acquired primarily for other purposes. For example, the requirement to structure a single force for both local and major wars may lead to a different mix of POMCUS and airlift for Europe than would be optimum if Europe were the only contingency.

-- As noted above, local wars may still generate the largest requirements for certain types of forces, e.g., airborne and amphibious forces. The increment between local war and other requirements would have to be additive.

Differences in redeployability are the operative factor in considering the possible sequence of events between a local and a worldwide war with the USSR. If US Intervention in a local war occurred prior to the outbreak of a war with the USSR, some intervention forces would not be available rapidly for employment against the Soviets in Europe or elsewhere. If the intervention forces are additive, no adverse impact would occur in the US-USSR war. If the intervention forces are inclusive, there would be a reduction in US forces available for the US-USSR war. The effect might be to limit US capability in the critical early days of the major war.* On the other hand, if the US-USSR war started before the local war, the US would have already committed inclusive forces to the US-USSR conflict and presumably would not want to undertake an intervention. In this situation, any additive intervention forces would be available as a central reserve to be employed in Europe or elsewhere to influence the war outcome.

* This problem might be offset at least partially by mobilizing reserve forces in numbers corresponding to those active forces committed to a local war. In this way, readiness for the initial phases of a major war could be maintained, possibly providing sufficient time for local war forces to redeploy in the event of a major US-USSR war. There could, however, be significant political ramifications of such a reserve call-up.

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Another factor is the amount of available sustainability. In most cases, even though forces may exist elsewhere which can be drawn down to wage a local war, adequate logistic support will not be available. Major draw downs of stocks for a protracted local war may prove disastrous if a major war occurs. Thus, even if intervention forces are even partially inclusive, attention must be paid to the possibly additive sustainability needs, both for US and host nation forces.

The degree of risk associated with relying on inclusive intervention forces, if a major war follows a local war, is a function of relative force sizes and resultant margins for error. Thus drawing down on a limited reserve defense in Europe (AIMS E, F, F(v), and G) to completely satisfy the requirement for a heavy intervention would invite disaster. The diversion of forces from a European direct defense (AIMS H, I, J, and M), especially if the intervention forces were taken from CONUS reinforcements, (perhaps with compensating activation of reserve units), would not be as significant.

If the forces for initiatives against the Soviet Union in the event of a worldwide war are acquired (AIMS G, J, and M), a source of forces for certain aspects of crisis management and local wars has already been created. If these initiative forces are to be used for intervention, some delay in commencement of actions against the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable. It should also be noted that in several instances, a local war requiring significant US participation might already involve a direct confrontation with the USSR. In such situations, the question of relative leverage (who is tying down whom) must also be considered.

Ultimately, the degree of draw down which is acceptable represents an assessment of the probability and impact of military involvement in crises and local wars, with appropriate hedging against uncertainty. The desire for sufficient flexibility to provide the optimum response to any military contingency must be balanced against such constraints as political and fiscal feasibility. Any resultant risk of inadequate military response must be acceptable.

Summary

Planning for peacekeeping and local wars represents an Important dimension in developing a US military strategy. Establishment of a level of effort for planning is essential. Beyond this, it is necessary to decide to what extent the capability to support this level will be additive or drawn from forces planned for a major US-USSR war.

* It should be noted that the reverse is also true—the acquisition of additive intervention forces creates a source of some initiative forces. This potential for partial interchangability becomes particularly useful at "Heavy Intervention" levels.
F. QUESTION FIVE.

Question. What should be the US military strategy in East Asia? Should the US maintain the current military presence or include additional adjustments in US forces in Korea and the Philippines?

Discussion. In the years following the Korean War the US maintained strong sea and land based forces forward deployed in the Western Pacific to combat Sino-Soviet inspired and supported aggression against a weakened Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and throughout Southeast Asia. The situation today is quite different. As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated from alliance to military confrontation, a similarity of Sino-American security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets has evolved. The threat of a Taiwan invasion has moderated because of Chinese hostility toward the USSR, preoccupation with internal economic problems, and the advent of a less radical Chinese leadership. Japan has become the third largest economic and industrial power in the world. The Republic of Korea has developed its economic and military capabilities to the point where it is less reliant upon the US for its security needs.

As the circumstances in East Asia have changed, the primary US objective in that region has become a stabilization of the current, relatively favorable balance among the great powers as opposed to containment of a Sino-Soviet threat. Defense links with US Asian allies enhance the stability of this East Asian great power balance. The US strategy in the Pacific should, in addition to supporting US political interests, provide for military requirements such as protection of the approaches to the continental United States and LOCs to deployed US forces.

The impact of future changes in US military deployments in East Asia could vary markedly among the major powers. Japan is probably most sensitive to such changes. It currently perceives no immediate danger from either the PRC or the USSR, in part because of confidence in the US Security Pact. However, if this confidence were to be lessened, the Japanese response is uncertain.

The Soviet Union is perhaps less sensitive to changes in US deployments. Although they are as concerned as the US about the security of the sea approaches to their homeland, they are particularly concerned about China.

Of the major powers, the PRC is perhaps least sensitive to changes in US force deployments in East Asia but has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to US global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR. Chinese security needs are dominated by their Soviet requirements. Inasmuch as the PRC does not appear, at this time, to constitute a threat to US interests, it would appear to be advantageous for the US to avoid a threatening posture relative to China.
In this political environment, the PRC can play an important role in a US worldwide strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. The nature of the Soviet security problem, which confronts them with powerful adversaries in both Europe and Asia, is an important American advantage. Perhaps paradoxically, US military policy and actions in Europe may have a more important effect on the Chinese ability or inclination to remain hostile to the USSR than US military presence in Asia. A strong US/NATO position in Europe forces the Soviets to allocate substantial forces to that theater. But increases in US air and naval forces in East Asia could prompt Soviet buildups in the Far East which China would not view as desirable. Substantial increases in US forces deployed to East Asia could result in a conflict of interest between the US and PRC at the expense of the mutual interest of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior.

US interests in East Asia are defined in terms of both great power and regional considerations. The exact causal relationship between the level of US peacetime military presence and degree to which US regional interests in East Asia are secured is not known. However, five basic reasons for peacetime forward deployments are to:

--- Accomplish initial wartime tasks against the Soviet Union
--- Protect US interests.
--- Promote regional stability.
--- Discourage nuclear proliferation.
--- Enhance US influence.

The presence of US military forces in East Asia demonstrates tangible US military power and provides a sense of security to our friends. The visible evidence, provided by US presence, and active US involvement in regional security affairs inhibits aggression, provocation and coercion by local or outside powers and discourages nuclear proliferation. While US influence is not measured solely by our military presence, it does contribute to our influence.

The visibility of involvement is greater in those AIMS with current or increased East Asian presence (AIMS F, F(v), G, I, J, M) than in those with a reduced presence (AIMS E and H). AIMS E and H concentrate on major wartime tasks accomplished from a reduced baseline (no Philippine or Korean bases), while accepting the resultant limitations. (Withdrawal from the Philippines would significantly reduce US capability to engage in combat operations throughout Southeast Asia and to project power into the Indian Ocean in support of US regional interests. Withdrawal from Korean bases would impose major obstacles to supporting combat operations in Korea.)
SECRET

The East Asia forces generated for all AIMS were developed primarily to satisfy wartime requirements against the Soviet Union and, secondarily, to provide air and naval combat support during Korean hostilities or other local wars for the appropriate AIMS (AIMS F, F(v), G, I, J, H). The minimum military mission requirements against the Soviet Union in East Asia are the same in Reduced and Current East Asian Presence substrategies. Increased forces for use against the Soviets as in AIMS G, F and H are the result of planned initiatives during hostilities. Forces were not generated to satisfy peacetime presence requirements in support of US political interests in East Asia over and above those needed to satisfy military requirements, except in the case of AIMS E and H in which the low range of carrier forces was based in part on maintaining a peacetime presence in Asia.

As can be seen in the table below, the forces provided in all AIMS insure that the US would retain significant anti-Soviet military capabilities in the Western Pacific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reduced Presence</th>
<th>Current Presence (Without wartime initiatives)</th>
<th>Current Presence (With wartime initiatives)</th>
<th>Increased Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E    F/F(v)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>G    J</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Div</td>
<td>0-1  1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1    1</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFW</td>
<td>3    4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3    5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF Ashore</td>
<td>1    1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1    1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTGs</td>
<td>1-2  2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2-3  2-3</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>2-4  4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4    4</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Sqdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What may be of considerably greater significance than the actual combat power of US forces deployed to the Western Pacific is East Asian perceptions of the nature and extent of US participation in regional security affairs that US force levels convey. In the altered East Asian political environment, the forces allocated to East Asia have declined steadily from the pre-Vietnam posture. Vietnam aside, the US has already withdrawn one division from Korea and announced plans to remove all remaining ground combat forces; the airborne brigade has been withdrawn from Okinawa;
deployed carrier task groups have been reduced from three to two; US forces have been removed from Thailand and significantly reduced in Japan; US military presence in Taiwan has been significantly reduced; the level of military assistance to East Asian nations has declined; and the US is publicly committed to consideration of proposals which would limit US military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Both US allies and potential adversaries are keenly aware of these trends and it may be difficult to persuade Asian nations of a continuing US involvement in regional security affairs. The exact point at which further reductions may harm US interests is not known. The question is whether further reductions in either US deployed forces or retrenchment in the US base line can be made without risk to US regional interests.

There are differing views whether reductions in US forces and/or retrenchment in the US base line (AIHS E and H) could be conducted in a manner which would continue to provide for major US security interests vis-a-vis the Soviets without upsetting regional stability or discouraging Chinese hostility towards the Soviets. Further, such reductions might encourage Japan to do more in its own defense and assume a greater regional military role. There is no question but that Japan could contribute a much greater share of its national effort to its own defense. This may be desirable and could, ultimately, permit further reductions in wartime requirements for US air and naval forces in East Asia.

The current situation is relatively favorable to the US. The US is moving towards an offshore military posture which avoids automatic involvement in regional hostilities but is capable of combat operations throughout East Asia; the Soviets are in check; China persists in its anti-Soviet attitude and military orientation while showing little inclination towards aggressive action against Taiwan; nuclear proliferation incentives in Japan, Korea and Taiwan are not pervasive; North Korea must take into account powerful US air and naval assets in any decision to attack the South; Japanese-American relations are close and cooperative; and ASEAN cooperation is both relatively high and hostile to DRV expansion.
pages IV-245 to IV-341
are denied in full. All are (s)
1. INTRODUCTION

Military strategies delineate the requirements of the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. Therefore, a complete evaluation of the AIMS requires assessment of their probability of achieving US national security objectives. Since these objectives are not defined in PRM-10, this assessment will use the National Security Objective statement in the Defense Guidance as the basis for evaluating the AIMS. This paragraph states:

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international environment in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the US ability to deter a war, to prevent coercion, to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflict on terms compatible with US national security interests.

(For greater explication of attendant security objectives and policies, refer to the Defense Guidance, November, 1976, pages 2-12.)

It must be noted that military strategies are not without inherent risk. At one level, there is the risk that the strategy itself may not completely fulfill national policy and objectives. At the other level, the force capabilities may not completely fulfill the strategy requirements. Traditionally, we have adopted military strategies that contained risk at both these levels.

Consideration of the probability of military success of each of the AIMS to achieve US national objectives requires an analysis of the complex interaction of many assumptions and variables. Some, such as deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies -- which rest in part on the perceptions of capabilities and the resolve to use them -- are less easily quantified and hence are more difficult to assess in finite terms.
Deterrence of aggression is a primary objective of US national security policy and is an aggregate of the stabilizing effect of both nuclear and conventional forces. Other objectives include withstanding an aggressor attack if deterrence fails, and terminating the conflict or terms favorable to maintaining a global environment in which US interests are protected. Thus, the probability of achieving US objectives, should deterrence fail, is an essential element in considering the acceptability of any specific military strategy. An assessment of these various factors as they relate to the PRM-10 AIMS is presented in tabular form in Inclosures A-E.

2. ASSESSMENT OF AIMS

a. GENERAL

The illustrative AIMS, displayed in the PRM-10 Report, fall into three categories -- one stressing nuclear deterrence, a second stressing conventional warfighting capability, and a third stressing both conventional and nuclear deterrent and warfighting capabilities.

AIMS E, F, F(V), and G, emphasize nuclear deterrence to achieve US national security objectives. If this deterrence fails, they provide a low probability of achieving those objectives in conventional and nuclear warfighting and subsequent conflict termination actions. AIMS G, however, does provide substantial conventional capabilities for conflict outside NATO.

AIMS H and J stress conventional warfighting capability rather than nuclear deterrence to achieve US objectives and have limited nuclear warfighting capabilities. Thus, they are likely to achieve US objectives in conventional conflicts. AIMS J, and to a lesser degree AIMS H, do not provide sufficient nuclear capability to confidently deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons nor to achieve US objectives in a strategic nuclear exchange.

AIMS I, I(V), and M provide high probabilities of achieving US national security objectives through

1/ I(V) is AIMS I with D to P sustainability and indefinite warfighting capability.

A-2
deterrence. Should deterrence fail, these strategies also provide warfighting capabilities which have relatively high probabilities of terminating a conflict on terms favorable to the US and its allies. Forces for AIMS H are not considered attainable within the timeframe of the study.

b. **DETERRENCE EMPHASIS:**

AIMS E, F, and G have a low probability of accomplishing the US objective of preventing Soviet domination of Western Europe if deterrence fails. Since deterrence costs to a large degree on perceptions, these AIMS do not provide a highly credible deterrent. Since the sustainability of US forces is limited to 30 days in these AIMS, decisions regarding conflict termination, (either in the form of deliberate nuclear escalation, negotiation, or withdrawal of US forces from Europe), must be made shortly after commencement of hostilities. These early decisions are necessary in order to provide time to execute the withdrawal, escalate to nuclear warfighting, or conclude negotiations within the 30 day sustainability limitation. Fighting will continue during this period and American forces must be sustained. Under these conditions, favorable conflict termination through negotiation or withdrawal from Europe is unlikely. AIMS F(V) has similar implications, but allows a longer period for decisions before conflict termination procedures must be initiated.

The Pact has considerably larger general purpose forces than NATO, as noted in the Contingency Net Assessment of the Report, and the Soviet leadership would probably not have initiated aggression unless it believed it could achieve its objectives. An early US/NATO offer to negotiate would probably be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Even if the attack were contained, it is unlikely the Soviets would settle for a postwar situation which would even approach US objectives in Europe, if they believed they could outlast the allies.

There is considerable uncertainty as to whether deliberate escalation to nuclear warfighting would be
likely to achieve US objectives. Some believe that
display of US resolve through initiation of theater
nuclear warfare and/or employment of limited or
regional nuclear options by strategic forces would
cause the Soviet leadership to withdraw and/or
negotiate. However, the Soviets' considerable
capability to conduct theater nuclear war and the
vulnerability of many NATO nuclear systems suggest
that the Soviets may well attempt to preempt NATO
first use, if possible, or respond in kind while
continuing their attack. The range/yield asymmetries
between NATO and Soviet nuclear capabilities and the
pressures on decision-makers raise the possibility of
continued escalation, which, side by side deterred
first before a strategic exchange is not clear. If
the US succeeded in limiting escalation in the
European theater, the damage throughout Europe would
be widespread, a result inconsistent with NATO
objectives. If an all-out nuclear exchange occurred,
the destruction in the US would be of such magnitude
that even though US strategic nuclear targeting
objectives were fully achieved with regard to the
Soviet Union, it would be a Pyrrhic victory. In this
context, AIMS E and G, with low strategic nuclear
capabilities, would probably not prevent continued
escalation and would make conflict termination through
controlled escalation a very risky course.

The option of withdrawing from Europe would not
achieve US objectives. A free Europe is a vital
American interest. USSR dominance of the West European
urban-industrial economic base would unfavorably alter
the world balance of power. US long term interests in
the Persian Gulf and Africa would also be seriously
affected by the loss of Europe. US strategic options
in such a situation would be extremely circumscribed:
acceptance of the dramatically altered balance of
power or the prospect of undertaking a major
conventional operation to regain Western Europe when
American industrial mobilization capability and access
to raw materials would be inferior to that available
to the USSR.

c. CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING EMPHASIS:

AIMS H and J, which couple strong conventional
capabilities with limited nuclear capabilities, have
a high probability of achieving US objectives in the
event of a conflict in Europe which remains limited to conventional arms. However, AIMS J, and to a lesser extent AIMS H, imply a reduced nuclear deterrence objective and permit worldwide perceptions of a strategic nuclear balance favorable to the USSR. The strategic force levels postulated in AIMS J, in conjunction with Soviet civil defense programs and warfighting capabilities, result in a condition which is inconsistent with US objectives of deterrence. The US, its friends and its allies could be subjected to Soviet nuclear coercion. In the event of nuclear conflict, US ability to control escalation would be limited, and the likelihood of nuclear conflict termination favorable to US objectives would be low.

d. CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING EMPHASIS:

AIMS I, II(V), and M provide balanced capabilities which have the highest chances of attaining US security across the spectrum of possible conflict and take into account the worldwide interests of the US. Forces for AIMS M are not reasonably attainable within the timeframe of this study. The study assumption that the direct defense of NATO includes the restoration of lost NATO territory within 90 days requires peacetime maintenance of large in-being forces necessary to achieve this objective.

The size of active forces is sensitive to the early restoration of the border requirement. AIMS II(V) reduces the requirement for US active army and air forces while relying more heavily on non-US/NATO forces to assist in stabilizing a defensive line as far forward as possible, preferably at the Weser-Lech. However, the naval forces required for AIMS II(V) would probably remain the same as those required for AIMS I. Provisions for a US D to P sustaining capability would enhance the NATO defense and achievement of US objectives outside Europe, while new forces are mobilized and positioned for the counter-offensive. Such a strategy would permit US/NATO to capitalize on its greatest advantage: its overall economic, industrial, and technological potential over the Pact. The D to P capability, in conjunction with adequate forces, provides more flexibility for the decision-maker. US conventional land force increases required to execute this strategy could be lessened by a modest increase in allied reserve forces. Additionally the
US would require increased readiness of its forces, especially those committed or earmarked for Europe. AIMS I(V) offers a possible means of achieving US security objectives within the bounds of reasonable attainability.

Detailed descriptions of the relative probability of military success of all the AIMS by sub-strategy are provided in Inclosures A-E.

5 Inclosures
A. NATO/WP in Europe
B. Outside NATO Area During NATO/PACT Conflict
C. East Asia
D. Peacekeeping Activities in Local Wars
E. US/USSR Nuclear Conflict
### MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO-EUROPE SUBSTRATEGIES IN PRM-10 AIMS

(Described in terms of relative probability of successful achievement of US national security objectives)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substrategy</th>
<th>Aggregate Deterrence (Nuclear and Conventional)</th>
<th>Warfighting If Deterrence Fails</th>
<th>NCA Options for Favorable Conflict Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limit Loss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-E</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-F</td>
<td>Moderate-Marginal</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-F&lt;sub&gt;V&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-G</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-H</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-I&lt;sub&gt;4&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-I&lt;sub&gt;V&lt;/sub&gt;&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High-Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-J&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offsetting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-M&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Probability of success descriptors - Very High, High, Moderate, Marginal, Low, Very Low.

<sup>1/</sup> Assumes US national security objectives in current Defense Guidance
<sup>2/</sup> Assumes decision for conflict termination must be made about D+7 to allow 23 days for conflict termination
<sup>3/</sup> Assumes decision for conflict termination must be made about D+60 to allow 30 days for conflict termination
<sup>4/</sup> I<sub>V</sub> is AIMS I with D to P sustainability, with indefinite warfighting capability
<sup>5/</sup> Comparative NATO-PACT mobilization capability requires further study.
Reasonable attainability of both GP and strategic forces associated with this AIMS is unlikely.
<sup>6/</sup> Aggregate deterrent would be very high only if USSR did not respond with corresponding force buildup
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTRATEGIES OUTSIDE NATO AREA
DURING NATO-PACT CONFLICT IN FRM-10 AIMS

(Described in terms of relative probability of successful achievement of US national security objectives.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substrategy</th>
<th>Aggregate Deterrence (Nuclear and Conventional)</th>
<th>Warfighting If Deterrence Fails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited Action $-E$</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-F, F_v$</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-I, I_v$</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives $-I, I_v$</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-G$</td>
<td>Moderate-Marginal</td>
<td>Moderate-Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-J$</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Probability of success descriptors - Very High, High, Moderate, Marginal, Low, Very

1/ Assumes US national security objectives in current Defense Guidance, pp 2, 7, 8, and 9
2/ All Army divisions are committed to or earmarked for NATO requirements
3/ Assumes all SLOCs protected by SACLANT/CINCLANT
4/ $I_v$ is AIMS I with D to P sustainability and with indefinite warfighting capability
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substrategy</th>
<th>Aggregate Deterrence (Nuclear and Conventional)</th>
<th>Warfighting If Deterrence Fails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-B</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Low-Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-H</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Presence</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-F,P</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-G</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-I,J</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-I,J_v</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-J</td>
<td>Low-Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-M</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High-Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Probability of success descriptors - Very High, High, Moderate, Marginal, Low, Very Low

1/ Assumes US national security objectives stated in current Defense Guidance, pp. 2 and 7
2/ Assumes withdrawal of US ground combat forces from ROK.
3/ I_v is AMS I with D to P sustainability and with indefinite warfighting capability
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTRATEGIES FOR PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND LOCAL WARS IN PRM-10

(Described in terms of relative probability of successful achievement of US national security objectives)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substrategy</th>
<th>Aggregate Deterrence (Nuclear and Conventional)</th>
<th>Warfighting If Deterrence Fails</th>
<th>NCA Options for Favorable Conflict Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( E )</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H )</td>
<td>Marginal-Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light Intervention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( F, F' )</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I, I' )</td>
<td>High-Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heavy Intervention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( G )</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High-Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( J )</td>
<td>Moderate-Marginal</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate-High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( M )</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Probability of success descriptors - Very High, High, Moderate, Marginal, Low, Very Low,

\(^1\) Assumes US national security objectives stated in current Defense Guidance, pp. 2, 4-5, 7-9.
\(^2\) Assumes no US ground combat forces

Enclosure D
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTRATEGIES FOR US-USSR NUCLEAR CONFLICT

(Described in terms of relative probability of successful achievement of US national security objectives)\(^1\)\(^/\)\(^2\)\(^/\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substrategy</th>
<th>Deterrence of Nuclear Attack</th>
<th>Deterrence of Conventional Conflict</th>
<th>NCA Options for Warfighting And Conflict Termination If Deterrence Fails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assured Retaliation Only (RC1, OC1, NC1, AC1, DC1, PS1)</td>
<td>J Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Overall Force Balance (RC2, OC2, NC2, AC2 DC2, PS2)</td>
<td>E Moderate</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Low Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain US Force Advantages (RC2, OC3, NC2, AC2, DC2, PS2)</td>
<td>F,F(^V) High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Superiority (RC2, OC4, NC3, AC3, DC2, PS4)</td>
<td>M Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High Very High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Probability of success descriptors - Very High, High, Moderate, Marginal, Low.

\(^1\)/ Assumes US national security objectives in current Defense Guidance, pp 2 and 11
\(^2\)/ Assumes no break of ABM Treaty
\(^3\)/ Reasonable attainability unlikely
\(^4\)/ Acceptable outcome includes ability to terminate conflict at less than total Nuclear War. The estimate could be considerably in error if the Soviets can successfully evacuate and shelter their population. Furthermore, these must remain subjective estimates until such time as a capability is attained to conduct Comparative Postwar Recovery Analyses (CPRA)\(^5\)
\(^5\)/ Maximize US postwar power and influence relative to the enemy after a massive exchange