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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 22, 1978

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC - 38

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities
 and Arms Control ~~X~~

To develop US views for consultations with our NATO Allies, the President has directed the Special Coordination Committee to conduct a study of the political and military aspects of:

- Possible increased long-range theater nuclear force capabilities in Europe for strategic strikes on the Soviet Union.
- Possible inclusion in future arms control negotiations of long-range theater nuclear systems.

This examination will provide a basis for SCC review and guidance for US participation in the NPG High Level Group on theater nuclear force modernization and for US consultations with our NATO Allies on the desirability and possible content and form of arms control negotiations involving theater nuclear systems in Europe. The analysis should be a single integrated study, prepared by an interagency working group chaired by the NSC staff.

It should focus on identifying and assessing the major political and military issues bearing on long-range theater nuclear capability in Europe and arms control, and should include:

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declassify on: OADR

Classified/Released on 11/12/91
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by: [redacted], National Security Council

(F88-274)

-- What is the nature of the NATO long-range theater nuclear problem in terms of the impact of Soviet theater nuclear developments on NATO objectives for deterrence and defense (including target coverage), on NATO nuclear doctrine, force posture, and planning and targeting arrangements, and on Allied political attitudes? (The study should delineate current Allied nuclear objectives and arrangements and give some historical perspective on past issues of nuclear strategy and sharing, e.g., MLF.)

-- What would be the military and political objectives of adding significantly to European-based long-range theater nuclear capability for strikes against the Soviet Union? How would different force characteristics affect these objectives (e.g., types of systems -- cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, aircraft; range; targeting; cost and relation to conventional force improvement program; Allied participation; relation to national deterrent forces; nuclear/ conventional cruise missile trade-off?)

-- What would be the effect of significant increases in NATO long-range strike capability on deterrence and defense, coupling of the US strategic deterrent to Europe, and US strategic doctrine for limited and flexible options?

-- How might such increases affect relations between US and Allies and among Allies?

-- What might be Soviet military and political responses to such increases and what would be the implications for NATO military and political objectives?

-- What would be the benefits and risks of arms control negotiations on long-range theater nuclear systems (i.e., in terms of the deterrence and defense and Allied and Soviet considerations sketched above) as an alternative to or in conjunction with the addition of long-range theater nuclear forces.

-- How might such arms control negotiations be structured (e.g., objectives, systems to be covered, geographic scope, types of limitations, nationalities of forces included, negotiating forums, participation in negotiations and/or consultation machinery, verification)?

-- What is the relationship between theater nuclear modernization and arms control, on the one hand, and US post-SALT II strategic arms control objectives and US and Allied MBFR objectives, on the other?

Illustrative force posture and arms control options should be delineated to illuminate the issues and implications rather than to present a range for selection of definitive US positions. This should include analysis of how various security and Allied concerns might be met without either significant increases in Europe based long-range capability or arms control negotiations.

Based on the above analysis, the study should identify key issues we would wish to discuss with the Allies concerning force posture issues and the general guidelines for the conduct of, and consultations on, arms control issues. The study should, in this process, also identify the key issues which need high-level discussion and decision in the US Government prior to the initiation of consultations.

The overall study, with an executive summary, should be submitted for SCC consideration by July 28.



Zbigniew Brzezinski