This is an interview with Stuart Eizenstat on January 10, 1981 in the West Wing of the White House. The interviewer is Emily Soapes of the Presidential Papers Staff.

SOAPES: I'm not going to try to cover, in depth, the whole time that you've known Jimmy Carter. We can't do it in the amount of time we've got today, but I did want to ask you, because I've never seen it anywhere, how it was the two of you met? I know you worked with him on the '69 gubernatorial campaign.

EIZENSTAT: We met as a result of a recommendation from a friend of mine, Henry Bower, Jr., who is an attorney in Atlanta and who had met then former State Senator Carter somewhat earlier at a coffee or some function in the campaign and was very impressed with him. I had been away at law school at Harvard in 1966 when Mr. Carter ran for governor the first time, so I was really quite unaware of him--didn't know him very well. And it had been my original intention to work for former Governor [Care] Sanders in that election simply because I had known of him; didn't know him personally, and my initial inclination was to say--as the saying went later--"Jimmy who?" I literally had not heard of him, but my friend insisted and I went to see him and was extraordinarily impressed with him. I saw him in the old Healy building in Atlanta in a bare-bones office; a couple of chairs and a typewriter. And we met for about an hour and he asked me to work for him. [I] was not prepared at that time to make that commitment. He called me back, perhaps, a week or two later and asked if I'd made a decision. I said I had not. He said, well, he'd like to talk to me a second time, which he did. We met for, I guess, a similar period of time--an hour or so--at which point I agreed to work with him and served as his issues director for that gubernatorial campaign. What particularly impressed me about him at that time was that he was a person, that seemed to me, that could help bridge the historical gap between rural Georgia and urban Atlanta. Governors had traditionally run against Atlanta. It was clear that Jimmy Carter did not intend to do that and that he had a real sensitivity to urban problems. And that he was going to be a friend of the city. And I thought that quite unique from a person who came from such a small town--such a rural part of the state. That's how we met and then during that campaign I obviously saw him fairly frequently. After he won, I did not serve in his administration. I kept in touch with him from time to time but not too regularly because he had his official duties and I had my responsibilities as an associate at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer, and Murphy in Atlanta.

In 1973, Bob Strauss, who was then the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, appointed the Governor to be chairman of the 1974 Congressional Democratic campaign. And in that capacity, Mr. Carter called me up and said he'd like to talk to me. I went to see him in the governor's mansion. He said that he would like to do a series of issue papers under his name that would go out to Democratic Congressional candidates around the country, making suggestions of issues to raise, criticisms to make of the Nixon Administration, and positive suggestions. And I worked on that project for I'd say six to eight months. We put out a series of, I think, fairly high
quality issue papers and in the course of doing what turned out to be perhaps fifteen or so issue papers. I collected a small file cart box-full of names of people like Brzezinski and Henry Owen and people that later came into the administration who agreed to do papers for us. And I took those papers, refined them, and put them into the form that we wanted, but that's essentially how I got started. Toward the end of that process, a couple of weeks perhaps a month before the November of '74 congressional elections, I asked the Governor if he would have lunch with me, that I wanted to discuss something with him and he said that he would be glad to. He was pleased at how the project had turned out. I told him that I had an idea; which was that I thought he ought to run for President because I did not think that Senator Kennedy would run, I didn't think that the field would have any clear favorite because I thought the contacts he had made as chairman with the speeches and so forth that he'd done--issues papers--had given him, at least, a head start. It was worth a try. He laughed and invited me at that point to join people who had long since been planning that effort.

SOAPES: You didn't know that?

EIZENSTAT: I did not know that. And I did, at that point, join the effort. One of the first things I did while he was still governor is we sat down one afternoon in the governor's mansion--upstairs residence--and I told him that the best way to start was literally to go from A to Z and take every issue. And for him to give me his position on each one of those national issues, issues that were likely to come up during the Presidential campaign. And he did. And I would dictate that into a tape and then come back with the typed version and we would talk about it, try to refine it and that sort of formed the nucleus for the issues part of the campaign.

SOAPES: This was in '74?

EIZENSTAT: This was in 1974 before he left the governorship; it was toward the end of his tenure. And then I helped set up the issues part of the campaign, which was, at that point, very small. I was still practicing law full-time, and I didn't have full-time to devote to this, but I did devote a substantial amount of time, weekends and so forth--Putting together more fleshed-out issue papers, speeches, and so forth. [I] got a very good group of volunteers to help. Then my involvement got deeper and deeper through 1975 and in early 1976 I took a leave of absence from my law firm to work full-time on the campaign.

SOAPES: In what period '74 to '76 until you did take the leave of absence, you thought this was an achievable goal, did you--?

EIZENSTAT: I thought it was a possible goal; I thought it was an unlikely goal and I, frankly, thought the best he could hope for was to run well enough to get a vice-presidential tap.

SOAPES: Or maybe run in '76 and then get the nomination in '8?
EIZENSTAT: Possibly. But I thought it was going to be very difficult. Even though I had suggested to do it, I thought it was an outside chance, one worth taking but not anything more than an outside chance.

SOAPES: In setting up the issues staff in the ’76 campaign, how did you go about that? You’ve now gotten up to the point where you came on full-time?

EIZENSTAT: Well, first of all, up to the time I came full-time we really were relying on young kids who had taken a semester out from college or who were in between college and law school, very bright, very able. And Steve Stark was the formal head of the issues section. He’s since graduated from law school and is a law clerk now. [He] will be practicing law shortly. He got together four or five young kids who were really good, very talented. Oliver Miller is one who comes to mind and was part of that group. It was quite obvious that once the President began to actually run in primaries that that whole structure was too thin to support a full-scale Presidential campaign. And Al Stern, who is a professor from Wayne State University, took a leave of absence—I had known him from the ’68 Humphrey campaign—came down and helped add some status and stature to the office and some good ideas as well. [He] was very bright and very able. And then I began to cultivate people from around the country who were substantive experts in their field; get ideas from them, get papers from them. And later in the campaign we developed actual task forces. [We] had a foreign policy task force that Richard Gardner from Columbia, who is the Ambassador to Italy, chaired. We had an economic task force that Larry Klein from the University of Pennsylvania, who has since gotten a Nobel Prize, that chaired and so forth.

SOAPES: Success bred success; was it easier to get these big names as Mr. Carter started winning primaries?

EIZENSTAT: Yes. In fact, I remember and so does Henry Owen—we chuckle about it every time we think about it—how in 1975 I came up with Mr. Carter for what was then his first briefing at Brookings, which I had helped write. And Henry was the person who arranged Brookings end. [It] was a working lunch. He got together people like Ed Freed, Fred Burkston, and others to give us a briefing. And Henry says afterward that one of the participants asked what this person was, you know, running for. [He] couldn't believe that he was running for President. Not because he wasn't intelligent and didn't seem on the ball but just because nobody had ever heard of him. But that certainly stands out. I remember very well that first Brookings briefing.

SOAPES: Then during the campaign, all right—

EIZENSTAT: The real explosion on the issues staff occurred after, or I should say really just before, the nomination. It was obvious that he was going to get the nomination. I came up to Washington and Milton Gortzman, who was a former aide to Senator Kennedy, who's since become a very close friend of mine, chairs the President's commission of social security and who was a Washington lawyer; arranged for me a series of interviews with people who were willing to come down to Atlanta and
serve on the issues staff. And I recruited, I suppose, twelve to fifteen people, mostly from the hill. And most of whom, by the way, afterward came into the government. In fact, I think almost all of them [did] in one capacity or another. And they were substantive experts in their field. They worked with these task forces. And people like Jerry Jasinowski, who then became Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Kitty Schirmer who came onto my staff. Of course, Al Stern, David Rubenstein, Bob Ginsberg, Doug Robinson, Sam Bleacher who went to NOAA, Oliver Miller; in any event people I'm sure that you are aware of. They formed the nucleus for our issues staff.

SOAPES: When they were in Atlanta were you traveling with Mr. Carter?

EIZENSTAT: No. I stayed in Atlanta with the issues staff, and I only started traveling the last several weeks of campaign, and which I did full-time at that point because most of the papers and issues were out at that point. And I spent full-time on the plane with him.

SOAPES: And during the transition your position was--?

EIZENSTAT: I was director of policy planning for the transition.

SOAPES: How was it that you came to select DPS [Domestic Policy Staff] as what you wanted to do as opposed to numerous other jobs at the White House?

EIZENSTAT: Because my interest in politics going back well before the time I came up here with Andrew Young and Maynard Jackson with Carter when he ran for governor as well as President was issues, policy, rather than other aspects of political campaigns. And so the natural thing to do is to go into a policy job. And this was the most natural policy job since it was domestic policy rather than foreign policy that I was most interested in.

SOAPES: You've gotten good reviews as a talent scout. Obviously, many of the people you worked with--campaign, select, and DPS, how did you select the areas and the people? Did you and the President sit down and figure out which areas you needed--?

EIZENSTAT: Well, first of all, we already had a number of those areas with competent people that I had obtained over the summer of '76 for my issues staff. And so it was natural for some of those to stay with me; others went into other departments. But, essentially what I did is I talked to my predecessor, Jim Cannon, who is a splendid person and very helpful. I'd looked at his organizational chart to see what issues and areas the domestic council under him covered. And then we looked at our own situation. Now, the President put us under a restriction of having 3 percent fewer people than Ford did, so I had to cut the number down, but we essentially tried to cover all the substantive areas that the Ford people covered, and they were the natural areas--human resources, natural resources, and so forth.
SOAPES: And none were added after the beginning were they? I'm not aware of--

EIZENSTAT: The only change really was that as a result of a reorganization in 1977, the Office of Drug Abuse Policy which was a separate office was abolished and parts of the staff were dispersed to the agencies. A small core was kept on the White House staff and they were on my payroll. Now when Peter Bourne was here, it was really a technical thing. I did not have directional control over them; -Peter did. They were run as his staff and not mine. When Peter left and Lee Dogaloff was named to take over for him, then we integrated that staff into ours. They would come to all our regular meetings. The paper flow was through me then, from them.

SOAPES: You mentioned you met with your predecessor, Jim Cannon. In what ways did you want Domestic Policy Staff to be different from his or Joe Califano's or the Nixon Domestic Policy Staff?

EIZENSTAT: Well, I had worked here when Califano was here. I was a junior White House aide at that point, but I had never-the-less been here. Califano had an extremely small staff, five people, that had substantially expanded after he left, by Nixon and Ford. As I indicated, ours was cut back. But then again since Joe had left, the budget had more than doubled. In fact, it had gone up from, I think Joe was here when there was a first 1 billion budget. It was already about 4 billion or so when we came. And many new agencies and functions have been added. In terms of how I wanted it to differ, Jim Cannon, by his own admission, said that the Ford domestic staff really was a reactive staff in a sense that President Ford did not send a lot of legislative proposals up. He saw it as his role to fight off legislation being passed by the Democratic Congress which he spent a lot of time vetoing. And not coming up with so many of his own proposals. It was obvious to me that we were going to be in a much more active posture and we had a Democratic Congress, so we had the same party in control of the legislative branch as controlled the executive branch. That would make for the possibility of passing more of our legislation as was the case with President Ford. So that was the major change in direction in attitude.

In terms of organizational structure it was not terribly dissimilar, but we decided not to use the domestic staff which subsequently came through the first reorganization of Domestic Policy Staff. We decided not to use the staff or the council as it had initially been tried unsuccessfully, I think really by President Nixon, which was to actually have formal meetings of the council. The members of the domestic council were all the domestic cabinet officers. And that would be just duplicating a cabinet meeting. It would be too unruly. You'd have people in jurisdictions different than the issue on the agenda trying to have some input into that particular agenda item. So what we did is used it as a coordinative staff, and there was a piece in either the National Journal and [4mCongressional Quarterly, I guess, in '78 or early '79 which indicated that in the way we had organized the staff it really was serving the function that the original Ash council had envisioned when the domestic council was first created.

SOAPES: Coordination rather than implementation of policy?
EIZENSTAT: Rather than even implementation or rather than development of policy per se. Now obviously when you coordinate you have some input into shape policy. But we saw ourselves not as implementors trying to run the departments as Mr. Haldeman or rather Mr. Erlichman had tried to do. Nor did we see ourselves per se as policy makers telling the agencies this was to be the policy, and, you know, you do the rest. Anytime you work on policy there's obviously a close relationship between coordinating and developing. There were times when I would call the secretary and say that the President promised this particular thing in a campaign or he told me that he would like this particular thing staffed out. But the initial policy development was really done in the departments. We coordinated it. Rather than in fact do it ourselves, which I think is the way it ought to be. We don't have the staff capacity, the computer capability, of the historical knowledge that the bureaucracies of different departments can bring to a problem.

SOAPES: Nor would it make for very good relations with the departments.

EIZENSTAT: It certainly wouldn't. I think one thing that we frankly did accomplish is established good working relationships with the departments. I have seen almost no complaints in four years about the way we operated. I think we acted fairly in the brokering issues and mediating disputes between agencies and where necessary to bring something to the President, writing fair and objective decision memoranda that the agencies would see before they went in for the President's decision. So, part of that coordinative function was to ultimately present decisions to the President, present them in a coherent way, present them in an orderly way, give him all the facts and figures and statistics and political pluses and minuses and economic and budgetary impacts. They would be all in one piece of paper.

SOAPES: [This is] something I wanted to ask you about. You probably also read Elizabeth Drew's pieces that were in the New Yorker right after the election and early December. The last one that appeared was a very long one and one of the things that she said was that she felt that, and it was unusual you know she doesn't go in for analysis she more or less goes straight for reporting, said that one of the problems the President had in this campaign was that he failed to enunciate his vision, I'm not giving her correct words, for the next four years. And one of the reasons that he didn't do that was that he really didn't have a vision in '76 for what he was going to do for those four years and the people were tired of this, etc. And yet the Domestic Policy Staff has been a very, very visible group. You've given many interviews; you obviously have close access to the President. But there is that perception out there. She gave wording to that. What effect has this had on your work, if any at all?

EIZENSTAT: Well, I think the campaign people made a decision with which I certainly wouldn't agree, but, you know, it's 20/20 hindsight I suppose, but I did agree at the time, which was to really talk more about Mr. Reagan's liabilities than our record and what we were going to do in the next four years. I urged a series of these radio speeches on Sunday to try to break out of this mold so that we were talking about some positive things. The President had a new economic revitalization program he had announced
which needed to be emphasized and re-emphasized. There were health care issues and so forth that could have been done, but there just didn't seem to be a particular interest in doing so. I don't know; I think in part it was also the whole Iranian thing, because the President didn't campaign actively during the primary season. I think it just threw everything out of kilter. The normal focus wasn't there. But I think in the '76 campaign there was a good deal of talk about the future, of government aid, for government organization, spending, the need for health insurance, and so forth. I mean, if anything, the criticism was that there were too many things promised for the future rather than none at all.

SOAPES: We can't cover today, for one thing I know you've got an appointment in less than an hour, anything like the number of issues that you've dealt with. But I did want to ask you, now your press club speech that came back in December, if the excerpts that showed up in the paper were correct, I contrasted that to the memo that was published that you had written to the President that set in motion, I guess, the Camp David Summit in July of '79. In that memo you had said that not even double-digit inflation had caused our ship to take on water as the energy/gas-shortage of that spring/summer had. And if I read your speech correctly you now see inflation as having been the greatest problem?

EIZENSTAT: Well, they were one-in-the-same, you see, because what happened was that the time that those big energy price increases started to come, which was in the spring of 1979; they had not yet, at that point, aggravated the inflation, but it was clear they were going to. It was just a question of time. That impact began to be felt toward the end of 1979 and the beginning of '80, when we got into the double-digit inflation figures largely because of those price increases. But energy and inflation are just inextricably mixed because until we reduce our dependence on ever more expensive foreign oil, until we avoid the kind of price increases that we had in '73, '74, and then again in '79, I don't think we'll have those this year in '81 was bad but we had the possibility of some very very high increases. The heating oil prices are going right up through the roof again. Until we reduce that dependence on foreign oil and become more independent, then we're going to have grave difficulty in controlling our inflationary problem because those outside forces that are imposed by crude oil prices from abroad lap over into the rest of the economy. After all, crude oil is the basic commodity for our whole economy. It's what we use for our cars, refined as gasoline and motor oil. It's what we use in many sections of the country to heat our homes. It's what we use under our industrial boilers for the generation of power. It's used by some power plants for the generation of electricity so that it's used as a raw material for plastics and many synthetics. It's the most basic commodity you can get. When you have those sorts of price increases they're going to have a direct impact. So they're really one-in-the-same. Now again that was written also at a time when you had gas lines and that was a transient phenomenon, but it was a symbol of a deeper problem in terms of our energy dependence.

SOAPES: You said in that memo that the task was to make OPEC the enemy. What could have made OPEC the enemy?
EIZENSTAT: Well that was really a sort of metaphorical way of saying that people had to view this thing in a crisis atmosphere, that there really was an energy crisis. And that if we could arouse people's attention, the fact that we could not be dependent on the supply of oil from countries some of whom, not all, but some of whom are not this country's friend and who were trying to get everything they could get out of it. If that was a sort of simplistic way to arouse people's attention, then we ought to do it. We ought to find some mechanism to stir people up about this issue. Now there are other instances, Saudi Arabia being a perfect example which has been a good friend of this administration's and of this country's, it's kept its production higher in its own economic and national interest, it's done so to keep some stability in the world markets, and Lord knows where we would be if we didn't have that. There are other countries like Libya, Iraq, and others, who have not been as modern and as sensible; so the point was finding some way to rouse people's attention and focus it, and that became a focal point for our 1979 energy program for the creation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, for the solar program that we put into place. I think it did help rouse people's attention, but it's a terrible price to pay to have a 125 percent increase in oil prices. I think it's worth saying also that anyone who has really studied that 125 percent increase would have to say there's as much due to the consuming countries as it was to OPEC, because the consuming countries went into the oil market in a wild scramble to try to make up the shortage resulting from the revolution in Iran.

SOAPES: Was that memo leaked or was it intentionally published?

EIZENSTAT: No. It was leaked by someone I'm not familiar with.

SOAPES: Okay. I really wondered when I went back and looked at the things why it hit print.

EIZENSTAT: I don't know.

SOAPES: Did you encourage then, you know, that the energy speech was cancelled there around the fourth of July?

EIZENSTAT: I was certainly not behind cancelling the energy speech. I was quite surprised, to say the least, at its cancellation. I thought it was a mistake to cancel it and was just as surprised as the next person when I found out that it had been. We were working on it very hard.

SOAPES: Then you were not encouraging the meetings at Camp David that went on in the next two weeks?

EIZENSTAT: Absolutely not. Nor the speech which followed it, the so-called "malaise" speech.

SOAPES: Yes. And I was curious as to how that came about.
EIZENSTAT: Now once they had decided to do that speech, and I saw the structure of it, I was less than happy with it, to say the least. It seemed to me that since he was going to give an energy speech to begin with and it had been cancelled that we ought to try somehow to tie energy into this theme that Pat Caddell and some other's were suggesting that the President use. And the way that I suggested it--I drafted the energy section of that speech, largely up at Camp David--was that if there was this inertia or malaise in America, if that was the premise of the speech, then the way to eliminate it was to find a common mission, a common goal that might be in a common enterprise. And that energy security independence was that issue. That was the marriage of the two parts of that speech.

SOAPES: Then is your perception that the cabinet shake-up, the malaisespeech--the whole set of developments of that particular few weeks? What is your perception of what that accomplished for the President--?

EIZENSTAT: Well the speech, much to my surprise, was initially quite well received. But whatever positives came out of that were more than overcome by the negatives which resulted from the way in which the cabinet shake-up was accomplished, and which again, at least in a couple of instances--I was concerned about the episode, but I made a particular point of--and the President was good enough to mention it to those cabinet officers that I urged him to keep Secretary Blumenthal and Secretary Califano.

SOAPES: I was not here at the time, but I'm told that there was a great sense of crisis hanging all over the complex last summer.

EIZENSTAT: Well, there are crises and crises--I mean there was a certain electricity and it was a difficult period; that's for sure.

SOAPES: Go back to the other side of that record as you pointed out, inflation--looking back on the four years, what could you say that [you] might have done differently?

EIZENSTAT: Two things--three things, I suppose. First, we should have sought wage and price control stand-by authority in 1977 as the President had suggested he would do in the '76 campaign and in his White paper on the economy. And he was persuaded by his economic advisors not to do that because they said it would be too anticipatory a wage/price behavior. Second, in not seeking wage/price control authority in 1979 and 198 when these huge energy price increases came. Not because you could stop those increases but because you could prevent those increases from lapping over into the rest of the economy until there was some chance to digest those. And the ground on which it was not sought at that time--which was a legitimate ground; it was a closed question--was that you didn't have the authority--to seek it would be a long bitter legislative battle during which time people would be raising prices/wages, to get under the base. I think third, in retrospect, the '78 tax cut should have been vetoed. I say in retrospect because nobody knew that you would have a 125 percent in oil increases at that time. Had you known that, you wouldn't have wanted to do that. But that would have led to the recession coming in 1979 rather than 198 in an election year. And it
would have dampened some of the inflationary expectations. Then, I think the way in which the fiscal '8 budget deficit got away from OMB and the administration as a whole. We were expecting a deficit half the size of the one that OMB told us in December or January we were going to have. And that had a very bad psychological impact on the farm market control; so that in turn led to the March episode. So those were a few things. But an awful lot of that is retrospective and at the time I'm not sure that any of those particular decisions like signing the tax bill seemed like bad decisions.

SOAPES: Are there decisions that you--?

EIZENSTAT: You also had very rapidly declining productivity during this whole period which our economists were not able to fully explain either--

SOAPES: --things [you] would have done differently. I'd like to get your evaluation of things that you were working on that you would cite as accomplishments of the Carter Administration.

EIZENSTAT: Yes. I think that the President's administration was full of accomplishments that were largely unreported or unrecognized by the public. In my area, the domestic area, for example, he saved the social security system from bankruptcy, with, I think, a very sensible and bold plan. He created the nation's first comprehensive urban policy to increase incentives for investment in urban areas by the private sector and to focus procurement in the location of federal buildings in urban areas.

He was responsible for as much innovative education legislation as any President since Lyndon Johnson and not only [the] creation of the new department, but in the middle-income student assistance program, in the new concentration grant program under title I for particularly impacted areas, one the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and with substantial increases in funding for education.

He was responsible for this nation's first comprehensive energy policy, and that is not simply rhetorical. He broke the Gordian Knot on pricing of crude oil and natural gas, leading to world prices which will increase incentives for production of both of those fossil fuels and will help with conservation. He put in the first series of comprehensive tax incentives for conservation, for insulation, for example. He developed a series of incentives for solar energy through tax credits and vastly-expanded research and development efforts. He put coal at the center of his energy policy, and coal vastly increased both in its export and its overall production. He put nuclear energy on a safer basis after the Three Mile Island by implementing the Khemeny Commission recommendations. And he developed the nation's first synthetic fuel effort which will be the most massive peacetime effort in American history. We'll be spending more to develop this resource with a new industry, the synthetic industry. We'll be spending more than we spent on the space program to send the man to the moon and the interstate highway program put together.

Important social legislation passed like the child abuse and child welfare legislation, and I think important farm legislation was passed. The farm bill of 1977 is a wonderfully innovative program which relies for the first time less on price support
programs and moves to a target price system, an income support system. And [he] created the first Farmer-Hill grain reserve. Farm exports increased dramatically and tremendously.

One of the things for which he will long be remembered is the pioneering work that the President did in deregulating major sectors of the economy, airlines, trucking, rail, banking, communications. No one would have thought that could have been done in a four-year period perhaps even an eight year period. It's the most substantial change in the relationship between business and government since the time of the New Deal. He also put in major reforms into the process by which regulations are developed when they are necessary; making cost-analysis requirements for the first time, requiring agencies to choose the least costly method, creating the regulatory council and the regulatory calender so that industry would have advanced notice of what regulations were going to be published and passage of the regulatory flexibility bill which provides lesser burdens on small business for regulation if they can't afford those burdens.

He also did a tremendous amount in the government reorganization area. [He] passed thirteen reorganization plans which helped streamline government below the levels it was when he came into office. And civil service reform will certainly go down as a truly revolutionary change in the way in which government employees are hired, fired, paid, and promoted and put in private sectors incentives for the first time. That's a darn impressive list and I think belies the currently held notion that there were very few things that were done.

I also think he did a tremendous amount in the area of youth employment, the Youth Act of 1977, the so-called Youth Employment Development Projects Act of '77 was a tremendous innovation and his employment and training programs were also very innovative and very expansive. We doubled the federal government's investment and employment training in the four years we were here and created a record number of jobs, well over eight million during our four year tenure.

SOAPES: So you think that President Carter's administration--the evaluation will rise in the future?

EIZENSTAT: I think that the President's evaluation will definitely rise in the future and that he accomplished an enormous amount.

SOAPES: Thank you for taking time off on a Saturday morning to talk about it. I appreciate it.