Interview with Tim Kraft, Appointment Secretary for the President

Interviewer: Marie Allen, Presidential Papers Staff

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Transcriber: Lyn Kirkland

Allen: Because of the short time we have today I’m going to skip the campaign of 1976 questions and just focus on the first term of the Carter Administration.

Kraft: OK

Allen: It’s my understanding that you have really had two jobs since you’ve been here; First, Appointment Secretary and then the political role that you’ve had in the last year and a half. Let me ask you first about the Appointment Secretary role. When did that first come up and what do you see as the most crucial elements of that job?

Kraft: Let’s see. It came up, I believe, on January 3 when I had a breakfast meeting with Hamilton Jordan and Brandon Butler. I can’t remember who else was there. Do you want me to go into those kinds of details?

Allen: Yes, yes.

Kraft: I had just gotten back from a Puerto Rican holiday.

Allen: I hope you stayed at El Mora[?]. I stayed at El Condante[?].

Kraft: I don’t remember where I stayed. I think I stayed at somebody’s condominium. Anyway, we had a breakfast meeting at L’Enfant Plaza and Hamilton said that I was being considered for Appointment Secretary and that I should fly to Plains that afternoon to talk to Governor Carter and get back as soon as possible. I believe that was on a Monday. I’m not exactly sure. So, I flew to Atlanta, transferred to somebody’s small plane and flew to Plains. It was rainy, cold, overcast and I went to the residence and spent about twenty minutes with Governor Carter—President-Elect Carter. It was the first time I had seen him since election night, I think. We talked about it for a while. He said it would be very demanding. I thought it would be a challenging, interesting job and I looked forward to doing it and hoped it would work out. We more or less agreed on the spot, then I just went right back to Washington—got in about midnight. I think I caught the ten o’clock Delta out of Atlanta. Tuesday I went back to the Transition Office and I was thinking about all the things we were working on there. I had a little staff that came up from the campaign. I thought I would continue there for at least another two weeks working on jobs for other people and you know who was going to work where, and that sort of thing. Hamilton said “You better get back down to Plains because you’ve got to get re-acquainted, start getting into it, and start, you know, running his schedule and helping out where you can.” I said, “Like at the end of the week?” And he said, “No, tomorrow afternoon.” So,
Wednesday after the Monday I returned to Georgia, got a room in the Best Western in Americus, and I began to learn a little about the Signal Corp, the Secret Service, that sort of thing, and I began to work on scheduling. We had, as I recall, a couple of trips to Washington before we came up for the inauguration. One was a sort of foreign policy forum of some sort that we held in the Smithsonian with members of Congress. It was almost a day long exercise, staying at the Blair House. There may have been one other trip, but I can’t recall. But the time went very quickly in Plains and Americus. I would go over to the house about once a day and either deliver messages that were important enough or pick up papers or get some directives from the President-Elect. I began to assemble a staff. One of the first people I called was Tim Smith, an attorney at a firm here in Washington. He had worked in the campaign. He was state campaign manager in Virginia, and I had known him since 1972. I would say he was one of the most competent and brightest people that I knew—a good organizer. Very smart and he liked his job with the law firm but I talked him into being Deputy Appointment Secretary. Actually, while he was thinking about it I asked him to sort of debrief people in the White House and get the lay of the land and find out what the appointments and advance and scheduling responsibilities were and to suggest an office plan and procedure that I could use. I noticed he was getting hooked on the job. He talked to Greg Schneiders who had done a little of that research himself. Greg had talked to previous appointment secretaries going back to Ken O’Donnell who worked for President Kennedy. So, Greg had some of that information. He also had some of the information that a writer from the Brookings Institution had done on the Presidency. I’m trying to think of the guy’s name. I’m drawing a blank.

So Tim was up here doing this as we were winding up in Americus and Plains. He put together a pretty good plan. The advance and scheduling operation were a little disjointed under Ford; although, the way that they prepared the schedule for the President we felt was a good process, both in terms of getting him a little lead time on what his schedule was and getting him to check off on his schedule, so that they had his approval for every single day. That was the two week grid in which they submitted to him an outline schedule for two weeks and he approved it day by day along with alterations. We thought that was worth continuing. I think where we improved on the operation was that we really centralized the scheduling power in the Appointments Secretary. Under President Ford, Dick Cheney, the Chief of Staff, would look at the schedule. There was a guy named Terry O’Donnell, who was sort of a personal aide, would help administer the schedule, and then there was another guy who was the scheduler, whose name I can’t recall, and somebody else worked on the two week grid. Then there was a guy named Ray Cavanaugh [?] who was head of the advance and scheduling in the Advance Office. There were just a lot of separate pieces and we kind of pulled them together under the Appointments Secretary, as well as the duties of the personal aide. The civilian aide that is responsible for the President, who is with the President all times to take phone calls and written messages for memos that are submitted for the President when he is at Camp David, or vacationing, or on the road. But Susan Kraus, all written material goes through her. But if Susan didn’t happen to be at Camp David or even on the road, the written material would go through the personal aide. Just
as sort of an interpretive note, it seemed to us that in the opening weeks of the administration, a lot of the duties of the West Wing were sort of in flux. Nobody knew quite who was doing what. I think that the expansionist and imperialistic tendencies of Tim Smith and Tim Kraft did a lot to pull together the whole use of the President’s time apparatus—the Appointments and Scheduling Office, both in Washington and on the road, more so than had been done certainly in the previous administration. I think it has worked out best all around.

The opening days, the opening weeks and months, we saw kind of a shaking down, I think, and improvement of the schedule. We learned many things like not allowing for meetings that go past schedule, not allowing sufficient time for paper work, preparation for a scheduled thing—in other words we booked him too heavily in the early weeks. As hard as he worked, it was still too much. I started keeping a six week time analysis of his appointments and schedules that Susan, Ray Allen, and Ellen Jones helped put together. Their work was invaluable in helping track just who he saw when and for what period of time. They compiled what was in effect a seventy hour work week of actual paper work and meetings, not even counting the work he did in some cases up at Camp David. [Inaudible] worked closely together and I think that within a period of two to three months we began to loosen up a little to allow him a little more time for paper work and preparation. It seemed like our early battles were with people that seemed to impose most on the President’s time and with the least notice were the Congressional Liaison Office under Frank Moore, which was understandable to a great extent. Frank can’t anticipate every congressman’s whim or the needs of the Senate. Their schedule and a lot of their add-on meetings which we just kind of had to allow for.

The most comprehensive and intolerable was the intrusions of the National Security Council on the President’s time. Just a mind boggling array of visits and presentation of credentials and state dinners and working lunches and drop-bys and one hour sessions and this, that, and the other. I got into a few heated exchanges with Brzezinski on giving us more lead time and showing a little more consideration for the President’s overall schedule and allowing other needs that had to be accommodated other than those of the National Security Council. Nothing really happened. You know there wasn’t a personality problem or acrimony there. It was just one very aggressive person vying for the President’s time and somebody else trying to protect him. I forgot to mention that we started at the outset—we had a budget for the President’s time and we tried to allocate a fifty-five hour working week: x number of hours for the White House staff, x number of hours for the cabinet, x number of hours for members of Congress, paperwork, foreign visitors, et cetera. At the outset we would try to see if what we had planned over a two week period fell within that allotted amount of time. Well, it did for the most part. The overlays were usually in the areas of Congress or foreign policy. We seemed to put less attention to the budget as the year went on.

Allen: You just started to mention the time allotted for the budget.
Kraft: It was almost a seventy hour week. As you could see it was kind of [Inaudible. The oral history audio becomes intermittently inaudible at minute 15:28 until 23:30]

…I reacted very, very strongly in the spring when a New York Times writer Dan Huton [?] wrote an article about—it was irrelevant and erroneous and allocated quotes and every other damn thing. It was a terrible article! And I wrote a long, detailed letter in rebuttal of that article, and I had the support of most of the senior staff—the senior executive staff—in knocking down any quotes attributed to senior staff. The Times did nothing with the letter. And the writer was perturbed that anybody should have criticized his article. I guess that’s an example of the concern we had about his having an open and accessible schedule. He saw a lot of people in a seventy hour week and was available to a lot of people.

One of the few times that he was strongly critical of our scheduling of him was, I think, in the spring of ’77 he called Fran Bordy [?] and I in and said “Look at this day!” And it was pretty bad. We just had one thing after another and had given him no time to prepare for, I think, it was a budget session he had with OMB [Office of Management and Budget] that afternoon. He wanted to be thoroughly prepared as he went into the session. The session was not to brief him cold it was for him to be able to react to and interact with the OMB staff and in the discussion of whether…I think I said that before it’s just one of those things you learn as you go along that you have to evaluate the kind of meeting it’s going to be and anticipate the preparation time that the President might need and assume he’s going to do it all between 5:30 and 7 in the morning. Which is when he does a lot of things.

Allen: What was your way of relaying information with Fran Bordy and the other folks in the scheduling process?

Kraft: I was the appointments secretary. Tim was my deputy and Fran was the scheduling director. The way it worked out—I oversaw the two-week grid and made changes, deletions or additions, and I approved everything as it related to the President’s schedule in the White House and on trips. Tim became more involved in domestic and foreign trips, and was trip director for the first overseas trip, which was to England in May. Fran became more or less—most of her time was devoted to the two week grid and preparation of the in-house.

It didn’t always work out that way. As the year went on and as we went into 1978 and there were more domestic trips, we would kind of alternate who was trip director. Tim Smith might be—or Phil Wise subsequently—Tim left in August of ’77. The deputy, who was Phil after Tim, might become trip director for one domestic trip, and Fran might be trip director for another. We also alternated going up to Camp David. As attractive as Camp David is, it’s kind of monastic in some instances. Tim would go up sometimes; Fran would go up sometimes; and I would go up sometimes.

As I said, Tim Smith wanted to use his legal background more than he was doing as Deputy Appointments Secretary, so he moved to the Justice Department in August of ’77. I was sad to
see him go. I mean he’s the best deputy anybody could have, but he felt like we had kind of mastered the routine and things were running smoothly. He didn’t want to be in over his head. At that time, Phil Wise was just coming back from Europe, wandering around. I went after him and recruited him to be Deputy Appointments Secretary and he accepted. He was very good, very impressive. We began to have a lot of trips, an overseas trip that took us to Warsaw, to Saudi Arabia, to Egypt, to Paris, to Brussels. We had to work on in the Fall of ’77 and execute just after Christmas and over the New Year’s in ’78.

As we went into ’78—I might as well move into the evolution of this other job…

**Allen:** Right.

**Kraft:** I think we begin to see in February and March that there did need to be a few changes in the White House, in the Senior Staff, with greater attention to political constituencies. At the outset, Hamilton’s office had been the repository of everything political and personnel and just general crisis management. If there was a coal strike, Hamilton was in it up to his ears. If there was a treaty that had to be ratified—Hamilton was working in the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations. And, as a result, all the dozens of calls that come in everyday from political figures, Democratic Party leaders were not being really handled or responded to and that built up a certain degree of ill will. It was just too much for one person’s office. Hamilton said at one point that having myself and Phil in the appointments and scheduling operation was overkill, one of us could do it. He needed one or the other of us to spin off and help with some political chores. So he proposed, I believe in March, that a new position on the senior staff be created for myself, and that I should take over the political liaison functions as well as oversee the personnel office, which would free him up to do his daily responsibilities. I looked forward to it in one way and I, you know, sort of regretted leaving the appointments job in another way. I thought I always had a fairly easy-going relationship with the President. Usually me being the straight man—of course I’d set myself up and did get zinged accordingly. But we had a friendly, sort of humorous relationship and I enjoyed that. I enjoyed the travel. I knew that when you take yourself out of that immediate sever of travel and access things change.

But this other job needed doing, and I plunged into that, beginning with a series of breakfast briefings in the mess for all the Democratic state chairmen around the country. We’d bring them in ten at a time, and we did this five weeks in succession, asking each one to bring whoever they wanted to bring. It could be their finance director, or vice- chair, or their wife, or their sweetheart, or whatever. Actually, they brought their finance chairs and their vice-chairs, and on a couple of occasions their wives. That kind of got us back into contact with the Party. I began to get involved with the personnel work, which was far more time-consuming than I’d ever imagined. I began tinkering around with some of the personnel in the personnel office and looking for ways to improve that operation.
Then you get into the summer of ’78 and the Congressional, the off-year elections, in which we had an interest in terms of trying to get the President, the Vice-President, the First Lady and members of the Cabinet to campaign for people who wanted our help: for gubernatorial candidates who wanted our help and for those members in the House and Senate who Frank Moore particularly wanted us to help. We sort of set up a little campaign committee within the White House that would consider all of these factors and the President’s time and set up a comprehensive agenda for the summer and fall of 1978, which I think we did pretty well. We made over eleven hundred appearances, on behalf of the entire administration on behalf of our friends in the House and the Senate, on behalf of certain gubernatorial candidates.

Allen: Who was involved in the planning other than yourself?

Kraft: Frank Moore, Congressional Liaison, out his office Bob Russell was kind of the day to day person who would keep on top of it. Phil and Fran from appointments and scheduling. Scott Burnette who worked in the speaker’s bureau out of appointments and scheduling and as such would try to keep track of what the Cabinet, what our staff people were doing. Tom Donilon and Lana Fragburg [?] also [inaudible].

Allen: And the final decisions in most cases were made by yourself and…?

Kraft: They really were sort of consensus decisions. Frank might say, “Well we really have to help this particular House member.” Then, I might point out it was a good time to go there because the Governor was going to have a fundraiser that evening, so you could do something in the afternoon and then the evening. Then we just put it all together and tried to find the State, or the City, or the locale, or the event that afforded the maximum use of the President’s time. Particularly if it was the President, make sure that whenever you got him out it benefited as many people as possible. Then you’d also work with the First Lady’s Staff and the Vice President’s staff. They’re sometimes filling in for events that you might want to send the President to but he simple couldn’t make it. He had a conflict somewhere else or he couldn’t leave Washington, so we tried to get them to go to those places. As I said I think it was a pretty coordinated effort in that respect.

That took us through the, in the late summer of ’78, I hired Arnie Miller to be director of the Personnel Office. Quickly, arbitrarily with really no consultation, I reached out and hired him and it was a good decision.

Allen: He’s now on his honeymoon, isn’t he?

Kraft: That’s right. Guy’s got to make a mistake sometime or other. As a personnel director—retract that, erase, everybody should be married once or twice—he’s born for the job. He was the perfect candidate. He’s aggressive. He can assess and evaluate the best use of a person for a particular position. He’s savvy to the political nuances, on the composition of say a regulatory commission who can balance who, where do they need help that sort of thing. He’s brassy
enough to argue with cabinet secretaries and assistant secretaries in trying to sell them on somebody that should be in a key position and they may not agree with that. Or to reject somebody that they propose that he thinks is not adequate for the job. The previous personnel director had a superb intellect and was one of the best writers on the complex. And he had done a good job but lacked that sort of aggressiveness in trying to carry out the most appropriate or advantageous personnel placements in the administration on behalf of the President. Arnie’s very good at that and continues to be good. I am glad he is here.

Allen: And your role shifted once you had him in place?

Kraft: Well, I had to make fewer of the calls that I had to make previously, in trying to depose something or get something done. Arnie and I would confer everyday at five o’clock. He would tell me, ya know “Now, this is going to be tough. This is what’s going to happen: we are going to get into this fight.” We would assess the risks against the gains. He knew that I was behind him all of the way if we agreed on something [inaudible]. I thought we worked well together. That was the…

Allen: I think it was the fall of ‘78

Kraft: Arnie gradually began to develop the expertise and the pull that he has with the other members of the White House staff so that by the winter of ’79 he was considered to be a highly respected recruitment in that area. He worked well with Frank Moore’s staff. He got big marks there.

In the fall of ’78 I began with my under deputies, Joel McCleary, what we called an agency review process. It was signed off on by the President. The idea was for Joel to consult with me and Don Magan [?] to conduct interviews with cabinet secretaries and their assistant and under secretaries to assess the performances of those presidential appointments—those about 2,000 presidential appointments. A lot of them were, of course, across departments and agencies. At the outset, in ’76 and ’77, the President allowed cabinet officers to make most of those appointments themselves. There was no constitutional panel [inaudible] or personnel director or even the President for that matter. I mean he had to pass on them. He took their appointments at their word. Well by and large they made a lot of good appointments, but in that many positions and with that much responsibility there were a few inferior appointments as well.

The agency review process was sort of a taking stock of who performed well, who was inadequate after a year and a half in office. And again it was not done in a clandestine way or in kangaroo court. In every instance we talked with the cabinet secretary themselves. We talked with the person’s colleagues, we talked with the person themselves. We talked with the Office of Management and Budget, Jack Watson’s office, Stu Eizenstat’s Domestic Policy Office, and amassed quite an amount of background and material on the different assistants and under deputy secretaries and how they related to each other and what kind of job they were doing.
Allen: How far did you extend—assistant and deputy secretaries only?

Kraft: And undersecretaries, the presidential appointment rank. In some instances we’d recommend changes to the President. More often than not, we’d have to work it out with the appropriate secretary. In many cases the secretaries were responsive and cooperative. They felt like we were being straight forward with them and the [inaudible] of the White House did too. And we had the President’s backing, and some changes were made. We did it all with a degree of confidentiality and discretion that protected people. Rather than impugn somebody’s competence, or integrity, or ruin their careers, some people just left. The only averse leak we had the entire process was with some Department of Labor personnel who were convinced to leave the Department of Labor—but that’s neither here nor there. That process was ongoing from fall of ’78 through spring of ’79. I think Joel McClary did a magnificent job on it.

My other deputy secretary, Rick Menandes [?], was helpful in a number of ways. One of his major accomplishments was the conducting of town hall meetings in the fall of 1978, during Hispanic heritage week. He marshaled about thirty administration appointees—Hispanics, and sent them out to specific town hall programs in over thirty communities in which there was tremendous response. They didn’t have to build a crowd literally thousands of people would attend these town hall meetings, and they’d ask questions, and would criticize, and make points. All these were transcribed and this was key. All the tapes came back and they were transcribed. Rick bundled up the material by subject matter and sent them to the appropriate agencies for their response to these criticisms and these questions. It took a better part of a year, of course, to get the agencies to respond and to send back some sort of answer or progress report. We had these printed up in a booklet, and we had a follow up meeting of the briefers and many of the attendees at the town hall meetings just last month in the White House. They had an opportunity to criticize and to make suggestions or comments on the whole process to the cabinet secretaries. Patricia Harris, somebody came from Charleston, Vincent Luddy [?] and then the President attended the afternoon session. So in terms of keeping the doors open and having an affirmative outreach program for the Hispanic community, Rick has done a tremendous job.

Allen: How did you select which places were going to have the town hall meetings?

Kraft: He did it. Primarily with cities with large Hispanic populations, you know, the obvious choices: San Antonio, Denver, Los Angeles—mostly Southwestern. I’m pretty sure they had meetings in New York, Chicago, and Miami as well.

Allen: Before you totally leave the agency review process, was the Cabinet check up over the summer this year a natural outgrowth of your findings and results of this agency review process?

Kraft: I don’t if it was a natural outgrowth. I think in the process of that review, I kept Hamilton closely apprised of what we were doing. Just in terms of my political responsibilities, I would keep him apprised on the number of areas where either support of the President or the President’s programs or some individuals and departments where that support was found wanting. If he, I
can’t say that our process was a part of that. [inaudible] Hamilton and the President and the members of the White House staff had been dealing with [inaudible] for almost two years. There were several hands and several voices that helped shape some of those recommendations that resulted in some of the changes. It wasn’t done in a vacuum. It wasn’t done without consideration. It was done expeditiously and the replacements were superb. The whole process was handled very well with the one exception of that last resignation, [inaudible] which we should have anticipated. It caught the country and the world for that matter by surprise and created in a short time span a great uncertainty. That’s really hurt us. I think the changes that he made, doing the whole thing within 48 hours and coming up with such stellar replacements and shifts. It was a masterful realignment, but the uncertainties and the confusion created by the mass resignations—or the resignations offered in mass but not accepted—was counter productive.

Allen: How [inaudible] were the replacements?

[Knock on the door interrupts the interview]

Allen: We’ve been following a chronological approach and we kind of haven’t got time to carry it down to the wire, now, with your going, but let me just ask you a couple of general questions. One, how did your role as a person who was looking out for political affairs in the White House tie in with the DNC [Democratic National Chairman]? How did the two of you interact with local and state politics?

Kraft: Well, the Democratic National Chairman was John White, who was with the Department of Agriculture before that. I was considered for Democratic National Chairman. I remember in October/November of 1977 when Ken Curtis made clear his desire to leave. Hamilton and the President were looking around for a likely candidate to propose to the Democratic National Committee to succeed Ken. I was one of the likely candidates and Chuck Lynette [?] was one of the others…there were a couple of others. I did my best convince them that that was not my hat and that I wouldn’t be what a Democratic National Chairman should be, which is a national spokesman, or spokesperson, for the party. And much more of a high visibility profile than I usually like to be. We cast about and finally settled on John White, and I’m glad we did.

John White and I would meet every Wednesday afternoon for lunch. We would go over whatever was happening in the party. In the winter and spring session of 19…70…that’s right in the winter, spring, and summer of ’78, I believe it was, we had, the party had to meet in its entirety, the entire DNC had to meet and pass upon the recommendations of the Wynegred Commission [?]. The Wynegred Commission being a commission mandated by the 1976 convention to make certain changes to the delegate selection process—improvements. And the Commission put together its suggestions. First, they had to be accepted and voted upon by the Executive Committee of the DNC and then the DNC in its entirety. So, we spent a great deal of time worrying about the vote and some of the potential altercations and differences, etc., etc.
Within the White House, I had an invaluable ally in Rick Hutchinson, Staff Secretary responsible for the paper flow, who had been the chief delegate selection guy for the campaign in ‘75 and ‘76. Rick knows the rules inside-out. He even likes ‘em! You know they interest him. [inaudible] It’s good to have somebody like that who’s concerned with these things. He can tell us what to say and what to do, which is just about what he did. He said “Now we’ve got to fight for this one. We really don’t care about that one. You’ve got to call someone…” and so on and so forth. He was very helpful in that respect. To the extent that you want to see the Democratic Party be supportive of the President, you have the concern with the image of the party and the fact that it’s not torn apart or fighting endlessly over rules, you want to have things go smoothly. That was why I would be concerned about it and would keep in close touch with John. Rick Hutchinson, John and I and others would work closely with Morty Leningrad [?] and other allies on the Democratic National Convention to see that the party had that professional, concerned, can-do approach.

We also had, at the end of 1978, the winter convention, which for any incumbent administration is a pain at worst and a mixed blessing at best. What happens is that your own party, and the Democratic Party is a large, open, tumultuous, out-spoken conglomeration of different constituency groups, individuals—much more so than Republican Party, which is more of an elitist, closely-controlled country club sort of outfit. You have your own party, your huge family, get together at the end of two years of the Democratic President’s incumbency and assess and grade and either praise or bitch about the first two years in a [inaudible] and an open public forum. If you had your druthers, you just as soon wouldn’t have the party. It’s a family reunion you could put off for four years when it’s time to re-nominate the President.

Allen: It’s like being tarred and feathered if it wasn’t for the honor of it. You just as soon pass it up.

Kraft: You just as soon walk. But you had too…the party—the midterm thing was mandated by Memphis and therefore you had to do it. It was in all of our interest to make Memphis go as smooth as possible. John White had Gordon Wynne from Texas kind of master mind the procedure and process at Memphis. And Gordon Wynne is a master at that sort of thing. He’s been through many conventions. He used to be a producer in the entertainment world. His conventions and large gatherings with a podium theater is his business and he’s very good at it. He put together a pretty good process in Memphis, which centered larger on hearings and forums and less on floor debates and votes. Floor debates and votes came on Sunday afternoon and there was plenty of excitement in that five hour time span for everybody with some fairly close and controversial positions. I think that what came out of Memphis was just about what we expected—a standoff in terms of fairly good press, fairly good exposure, and certainly no harm or damage done.

So those are the sort of things, getting back to your original question, that would preoccupy me and others on the White House staff in our relationship with the party. The party is constantly
looked upon as an extension of the political presidency. To the extent that the leading party figures and your national chairman and your national committee are supportive of the President you don’t really get much news, and to the extent that anybody is divisive or pops off in opposition to the President you’ve got a minus.

Next question, I’ve got to run…

**Allen:** Finally, your leading right into this and the President, of course, is automatically also head of the party, what do you see is the state of the Democratic Party right now and the role that the re-election committee is going to have to it?

**Kraft:** Again the Democratic Party is as I’ve described it: a not closely controlled…

**Allen:** Compared to ten years or twenty years ago, do you think there is a significant difference?

**Kraft:** Oh, yeah. A tremendous difference, there has been a tremendous difference since 1968. Anybody that writes a book about the major parties in the United States over the last twenty years, over the last 10 years really has to taken into account the extraordinary—and I’m not just saying this as a partisan. Any objective observer can see that the Democratic Party underwent extraordinary internal reforms to open up the party process.

I mean, you know, state chairmen and county chairs used to pick delegates to national conventions. If you were able to control or buy or influence or win over a few key state chairs or a few powerful county chairs and city machine leaders you had yourself a lot of votes. By opening up the process, by making the delegate selection process subject to notification, open meetings, strict rules, accountability and you know the legacy reform of the Winnebog Commission is equal division. The delegation to the 1980 convention has to be half male and half female.

You really took away the machinations and the control and the attended abuses that previous party chairs had at their disposal if they were inclined to use it. So you have the phenomenon in 1979 of this very open party looking at in some instances, some elements of the party looking at alternative candidates. They think the President’s, certainly the left wing of the Democratic party finds the President too conservative or too moderate in his approach. There is a very ambitious governor on the West coast who wants to be President when he grows up. He has all but declared his intentions of opposing the President for the nomination. So you have individuals and elements of the party that want an alternative to an incumbent President. By and large when you look at the pluses of the Carter administration, the substantial achievements in domestic policy and the extraordinary achievements in foreign policy and a world at peace, you would be hard put to see why a major political party would seek to replace its incumbent given the advantages of the incumbency. But, nobody ever gave all the elements of the Democratic party straight A’s for pragmatism. There is always going to ambition or a different ideological hue that will seek to replace a sitting President regardless of the risks involved.
Allen: Probably increasing the absence of solidarity…

End Tape 1

Kraft: You combine that with the absolutely wide open mechanisms available for getting delegates at the caucus level. There is another phenomenon that has influenced American politics in the last twenty years, more so than any other thing, bar none, more so than party reforms, more so than social attitudes, and I think that’s television. There is no doubt in my mind that the phenomenon of television has dramatically changed the whole approach to campaigns, the campaign schedules, what you do with the candidate, how you time the day, what you’re trying to say, where you campaign. It’s extraordinary. I could ramble on about that for hours. I hope that – and this is really irrelevant but I’ll say it anyway– I hope we keep the Electoral College system as opposed to the straight vote because that’s the only way that states that do not have large urban metropoli are ever going to see a presidential candidate. Literally large sections of the country would be written-off if we go to just a straight vote and TV campaigns. I think that’s not what we want. We will now (inaudible?)

Allen: Thank you so much. Good luck.