

Exit Interview with Frank Moore, Congressional Liaison

Interviewer: Dr. Thomas Soapes

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Transcriber: Winnie Hoover

Soapes: Just for a background could you tell me where you were born and your formal education?

Moore: I was born in Dahlonga, Georgia, a small town in northeast Georgia up in the mountains and I went to elementary school there through the seventh or eighth grade, I have forgotten which. Then I went to Darlington School for Boys in Rome, Georgia. I graduated then went to North Georgia College, military college in my home town for my freshman year of college, then I completed my undergraduate work at the University of Georgia, a major in finance, a B.A. degree. I then went into the international guard and came out, took a sales job and eventually got into regional planning and economic development. Went back to the University of Missouri for some - Jefferson City, for some additional work

Soapes: In Columbia?

Moore: Columbia.

Soapes: That's my alma mater.

Moore: Is it? Columbia – then I went to work for next state senator named Jimmy Carter in southwest Georgia.

Soapes: How did you come into contact with him?

Moore: The – he was the founder and chairman of the board of a regional planning commission. I was doing work in the similar organization of about fourteen counties up in upper corner of Georgia. I was the number two man in the commission. Uh- Mr. Carter was on the search committee to look for an executive director of their agency and someone at the University of Georgia told him about me and they called and asked to interview me. I did interview along with a lot of other people and was fortunate enough to get the job. Went to work there and I believe interviewed in October of '66, just after he had lost – come in third in a ten person primary for the governor's race in '66 and I went to work down there in November or December of '66 and I've been working for him in one way or the other since that time.

Soapes: What role then did you play in his run for the governorship – his successful run?

Moore: I was the spear carrier. I went up – I took vacation and went up and did some organizational work in the ninth congressional district which was my home district and worked

some in the third congressional district in the county I lived in then, did some driving for him at night - the at minimal.

Soapes: You maintained

Moore: raised a little money.

Soapes: You maintained your relationship with the regional planning commission?

Moore: Oh yeah.

Soapes: What were your duties with the planning commission?

Moore: I was executive director. I reported to a Board. Mostly I super – recruited - I started to say “supervised”. The hardest job was recruiting professional staff in deep southwest Georgia - selling planning and zoning which was about as hard as selling integration in those years.

Soapes: You did a good job.

Moore: Got a lot of basic planning done, qualified for some federal grants, started some industrial parks, got them funded, got a lot of new jobs in the area, did a lot of transportation planning, housing planning, health planning. In the – not only plans but we got the plans implemented, key to the planning, turned out beautiful plans to sit on the shelf.

Soapes: Did that work bring you into contact with federal government people?

Moore: Yeah, I uh – the towns that were in the area were small – I think there were twenty-one or twenty-two cities. The largest one was Americus, Georgia which had about forty-five thousand. The next one was Cordele, maybe thirty thousand. Aside from those, they maybe had one person who kind of did state and federal stuff. Cordele had nobody - the others had no staff - they'd have a clerk who sort of did the water and the sewer and this type stuff so we essentially provided the staff for them to bring grants that they applied for, and practiced grantsmanship for the cities and the counties within that jurisdiction putting together various federal programs. I came to Washington a good bit - about once a month, traveled to regional offices, acting as an agent for the cities and counties with the Feds.

Soapes: Then when he is elected governor you joined his administration?

Moore: Not for the first – I didn't want to move to Atlanta. He had it worked out. He had me on the list to become State Parks director. He had to in order to secure the support for the Speaker , Speaker then - Smith, he had to agree to give one of the Speaker's buddies - Bagby - the State Parks job which they did for I guess an interim period until they reorganized it so I ran a state authority – a five state authority which is the way that Georgia like most southern states that had terrible inflation during reconstruction passed – had a strict constitutional provision and

to prohibit the state from going into debt so the states can devise these various ways to go into debt without really going into debt. One of the ways was for the - to create authorities - authorities issued bonds - state (?) and other bonding houses and interpreted that the state is liable for that debt and is a way of issuing bonds so I worked for one of the state authorities for about the first eighteen months of the administration and stayed in close contact. Then I - he started doing reorganization of the cities and counties - the relationship between the state and the cities and the counties and I came to work for Jim McIntyre who was then - he was the head of this reorganization effort. He was actually deputy Revenue Commissioner. I had known Jim when he was the general counsel for the Georgia Municipal Association when he was on the staff at the Georgia Institute of Government at the university so I went to work for him - uh being liaison between the organization team and county commissioners and mayors and so forth. Pretty soon I'd keep - people would - Hamilton was executive secretary - Hamilton Jordan - somebody would come to see him and he would send them over to see me. I was in another building - I wasn't in the Capitol building - and I was doing little jobs for the governor in addition to this other stuff and pretty soon they said "why don't you just move your desk over here in the governor's office while you're on this other project" and the transition was gradual but rapid and pretty soon I was working for the governor on McIntyre's salary - paying me. We completed that study, drafted twenty eight pieces of legislation to perfect the reorganization. The general assembly - my contract ran out - see I guess it was the federal grant I was working on really - the contract ran out in about January or something and I was - then I said well I am going on and get another job. They said "Why don't you stay and help lobby through this legislation?" This will only take - the General Assembly is only in for thirty or forty-five days and so I did. Of course Jim McIntyre did all of the work on the legislation - he got it all passed. I don't think I worked on a single bill but I worked on a lot of other legislation for the governor and was doing a lot of things at that time. In the spring Hamilton left to come to DNC and for some reason the Governor chose me to succeed Hamilton as his Executive Secretary. I've forgotten - I think it was in April - so I was Executive Secretary to the Governor for about the last twenty-two months of his administration which is uh - Executive Secretary in Georgia - a sworn position - is the number two position in the executive department. It is the Lieutenant Governor's part of the legislature. Traditionally it has been a stepping ground for people who wanted to run for state run office. Alumni list is you know Herman Talmadge, Ellis Arnold, most of the governors, a lot of public service commissioners, commissioners of agriculture, labor and so forth. Governor Carter didn't want any of us involved in politics for our own so he of course didn't put his manager in the office maintaining liaison with the Cabinet - so-called Cabinet department heads, legislature, handling the emergency fund - uh good training. I helped plan the run for the presidency. We decided on the announcement date, decided we had to raise a little money so I resigned. I guess the inauguration for the new governor was in January. By the way we weren't involved in the governor's race and the runoff until - there was a runoff between Busby and Lester Maddox - two weeks between that time - and the Governor asked me to help Busby all I could. I stayed on the phone constantly. I called, called 100 people in one

day, machinery, motivating them, galvanizing the work for Busby. Then Busby offered me a job, to stay on but I resigned early and the beginning Executive Secretary, Joe Mitchell, my assistant relieved me so I could raise money for the presidential campaign. I raised money to get stamps to put on the announcements to send out the announcement letters. It was a fun time – Hamilton, myself, Jody, Peter Bourne was working, coming down from Washington, working, Steve Chandler, Betty Rainwater that was about it. We moved into – we operated out of the back of Bob Lipshultz’ office, he then later moved out to a bigger office and we got some unfinished office space in the back of his building. Uh I carried two hats in the ‘76 campaign – one, the national finance director for about the first twelve or thirteen months and concurrent with that national deputy campaign director for the southeast I believe. Is the title. I raised money and I organized the south primaries concurrently – mostly raised money. Our big fear was Wallace in the south – we had to beat him to prove credible. We started off as an announcement – I think it was on December 12th – then the governor completed his duties and I think he made the first trip about a week after he went out of office and down through the South and I went the first leg of the trip - went as far as Jackson, Mississippi - he made about three stops. Then Jody picked up, went on to Houston and California. I stayed behind to raise money. In the first four or five trips I would go on one and then Jody would go on one. I found that I couldn’t handle the press nor could I raise money traveling with the candidate. You need to be either before him or after him, so from thereon Jody did all the traveling and I traveled either behind him or in front of him. Usually in front of him I stood up in advance and behind him to get the money afterwards.

Soapes: So you were both the advance man and the...

Moore: Yeah. I continued to do that until we wanted Iowa. I didn’t ever go outside the South. I went up to Pittsburg a couple of times to do some delegate signup. You had to file in some of these states very, very early to get people to file as delegates for you a long time before the primary. I did a little traveling outside the South, Maryland, Virginia, Colorado, Texas. I traveled constantly. In December I put on the first fundraising dinner. Phillip Austin was the Chairman, I was doing the work with some other people. The largest fundraiser that had ever been had in the South was for the southern voting rights conference I believe it might have been the SSLC – anyway Andy Young got Kennedy to come down to speak- Teddy Kennedy – it was a dinner honoring Andy Young. It was \$50.00 a ticket. People in Atlanta thought that was outrageous. We put on one for \$100.00 a ticket, said it would never go. We got the Regency ballroom in the Hyatt-Regency, negotiated them down on the meal and so forth, a lot of volunteers selling tickets, and actually oversold – it seats a thousand people. We had about twelve hundred tickets sold. I didn’t know what I was going to do. A tornado came through Atlanta that day, March 24th, destroyed the north side of Atlanta, a lot of the homes, roads so I had people calling me all day long saying “Gee I can’t come, my house is flooded, please explain to the Governor why I can’t come.” I had to get those tables back – it was still full. We netted about forty-five thousand dollars off that. We thought it was a great big sum of money at that time. It was. North Georgia politics you know was about - actually we netted more than

that. We netted about sixty thousand dollars. That's money we used then to finance the travel to Iowa and New Hampshire, Florida and we had successive ones. Morris Deeds came with us about the next December and I was never so glad to see anybody in my life. I think the people in the campaign thought it would be a letdown for me or – that they were going to take me off and make Morris national finance director – somehow it would harm my ego. (Both laugh) I was never so glad to turn over something. He had been doing a little direct mail – he took it over and did a good job raising money. I then concentrated on the primaries in the South, traveling around, setting up and still got the same people. I'm proud of that. The same people who were with us who I'd met, identified, set up, remained with us through the general, all through the years, through the primaries this year. Of course we expanded, we got the traditional people with the core group still there.

Soapes: When you were doing fundraising in the very earliest days what were the types of people who were the most responsive to you?

Moore: The same types of people who were most responsive for anything - the solid, good folks who want good government and who believe – see the hardest thing to sell was credibility then. We weren't even in the polls – I mean everybody thought Sergeant Shriver was going to be the next president, or Birch Bayh or Maurice Udall or the former governor of Pennsylvania, or Milton Shapp was running, Sam Yorty was running All these people had tremendous publicity. There would be spreads in – Jimmy Carter would never be mentioned. So the toughest thing was credibility. The toughest thing early was just saying you were running for president. We used all kinds of euphoniums like the national scene or going national or getting involved in Washington politics. It was tough just to choke it out and say “actually running for president.” You know the headline in the Atlanta Constitution the day we announced was “Jimmy Who was running for what”

Soapes: Reg Murphy?

Moore: Yeah Reg Murphy. But the guy Lawrence Spivak gave the president some good advice. We met him at the Governor's Conference up in Seattle – he moderated it. One of his last shows Carter just ate up the other governors like he always did in a public appearance. Spivak rode back – we gave him a ride back to the hotel from King's studios and he said the president – the governor told him he was going to run for president. I don't know if he told him then or in later conversation – they exchanged correspondence.

We were going to announce – Peter Bourne thought we ought to announce in Washington, hire a limousine and have a big deal. Spivak said “Don't get in that cesspool up there.” That was his quote, “Don't get in that cesspool said what you've got is clean and young and not from Washington – accentuate the Washington announcement. He finally came up and compromised. He made a speech to the National Press Club – so the Washington press could be included and then made the actual announcement in Atlanta. We worked hard on that, we crammed the hall

but we used different tactics to raise money. We went to – a lot of people thought Carter was really running for Vice-President or Secretary of Agriculture or something like that. They just wanted to give money on the front end to make sure they were in. A lot of people believed that he could be elected President because we believed it. We didn't believe that you couldn't raise money because you have to – people could see the insincerity of it – you have to believe it. A lot of people we raised money from never met Jimmy Carter until later – they just believed in the people raising money. We did it – you know somebody – we got Christmas card lists from people, if they had an aunt or uncle someplace or people who had alumni lists, various schools, anybody that had gone to school with him. I know more damn navy captains, admirals, cause I'd track them down and find them that he'd been in the naval academy with and they gave a little reception.

Soapes: Is this a lot of hard leg work and ...

Moore: Oh tough tough leg work and you know we'd get in – if we got a check for a hundred dollars - big check. You know most of them were twenty-five, you know fifty. We got one for five hundred or a thousand dollars that was really something. (?) It was great hand them out and the money we got in that day was rushed to the bank and that was rushed to charter the airplane or pay the salaries and so forth. We worked like hell to get him on Meet the Press or something and we used that to mail letters, and call “did you see him, did you see him” you know – every little. Finally we started appearing in the polls. Of course Iowa was a breakthrough and then New Hampshire and they said “Yeah but can he win in the south where George Wallace is so strong” and of course the Florida primary – I forgot – I never thought I'd forget the date. Was it March 6th or March 4th ...

Soapes: It was early March.

Moore: March 4th. After that we were kinda on our way. I did North Carolina and Wallace was suppose to be big there we were up there about six weeks. We knocked him dead, he called his people together after the primary and turned loose his plane, his van, he had about ninety people working and we cut it down to fifteen. He was out of it after that – after North Carolina.

Soapes: In a general election what role did you play?

Moore: I came up – the southern primaries ended I believe on May 25th was Arkansas, Kentucky and Tennessee, the last three, so immediately after that I came on to Washington and opened little beachhead offices, started going around and seeing members of Congress and went to see Tip O'Neill who was going to be the next Speaker you know and not necessarily as congressional liaison as to what legislation was going to pass when he was elected but to get these people involved in campaigns back in the states in general. So we had delegation meetings and so forth. But we - what would happened, since I had established these relationships when you would go to Texas the people couldn't be able whoever was running Texas so they would start calling me – they called the national office – they called Frank so I

ended up actually traveling out of Washington a circle where I would go to Kentucky, Texas back to Louisiana, Arkansas, Louisiana, Virginia. I didn't do Alabama, Georgia or Florida. Those were sort of problem states and so I was doing congressional liaison, had one secretary, a volunteer secretary, plus but working in the general with people I had worked with, working with the state coordinators and so forth. They had some kind of executive committee or something that met you know once or twice in the Atlanta area on Sunday night and scheduling and I was always at those meetings. Whenever the meetings came up I was whenever they were or wherever they were, I was there mostly doing the hand holding that was necessary in the South with governors and mayors and finance people since I had been with the Tea party I had gotten to know all these people. It plagued me when we finally were elected because we didn't set up a mechanism to have those people have anybody to talk with. The person who ran Texas didn't – you know went to work in the department of interior and had no political input. Not only was I getting three to four hundred telephone calls a day from Congress, I was getting three to four hundred a day from people out in the states who had nobody else to call. Bad mistake our not setting up some kind of desk, mechanism, regional desk, like we later learned to do.

Soapes: So then your job then in the general election sort of flowed naturally into what you came to do in the White House?

Moore: Yeah, I was a fireman.

Soapes: And a congressional contact.

Moore: And a congressional contact, too yes. I dealt with the congressional joint offices, the – let's do a bumper sticker together and we don't have much advertising money but you've got plenty – you have an opponent and we advertised and then include us can and I have your campaign workers to put your , you know, this type thing.

Soapes: At the start of the administration there were some comments in the press that Carter's relationship with the Georgia Legislature had not been good and that they were and that he was planning to have his congressional relations be on the same model.

Moore: Yeah. I don't know where that came from. Well the Washington press called in and talked to the person who succeeded the Speaker, the great Speaker George L. Smith, and the current speaker, Murphy, who was a – and then in to Lester Maddox who were enemies of Carter – blood sworn enemies and of course they - and Julian Bond who of course we've never gotten along with. Called Julian Bond well we've got a white and a black and you know. And they called Marge Thurman who was state party chairman and who has never been a friend of ours either so you get bad – we got bad reports. But it's true. He wasn't very popular with the Georgia legislature - never tried to be - wasn't running a popularity contest. He was ramming through the former legislation that hadn't been done in a hundred years. They didn't want to vote on that. Forced it, squeezed and we got the legislation passed. Did more in Georgia just in legal reform, more in conservation, more in financial management, more in education –

secondary, elementary, secondary – than any four governors had done prior to that. It was tough, tough you know legislation to get through. He was kinda pulling the state along into the twentieth century that still had some people, some nineteenth century people serving.

Soapes: What you're saying sounds very much like what I've seen in front of the interviews that a number of administration people have done here at the end of this administration of "We forced the Congress to tackle a number of ...

Moore: See people confuse – uh confuse relations of the legislature or Congress with the record. You can have a good relation and never pass any controversial legislation. I had everybody on the "hill" loving me when I would take them to the Kennedy Center and drive them up and down the Potomac on a boat, but never introduced any – you know never pushed for any tough legislation. Every time – any time a tough vote comes up it's pretty evenly divided or it wouldn't be a tough vote. And that person that's voting has got to think "I'm going to make half the people in my district mad." And if it's the Carter administration that's pushing that, pushing that, pushing that – you know – Why in hell is Carter making me vote on this stuff, you know. You've got sour feelings. So I don't worry about that. There are a lot of the other comments in the press after the first election too. There was a girl named Mary – named Russell – of the Washington Post that wrote a story that ran the day after the election that said that Carter's congressional relations was the reason he dropped twenty points in the polls and he barely got elected because he had done such a poor job with Congress. It's true. It went on to cite how I'd done such a poor job. I hadn't returned phone calls, you couldn't find anything about legislation - you know I didn't tell anybody - I was worried about getting elected, I wasn't worried about kissing some freshman congressman's ass you know after we got here.

Soapes: Want to talk a little about how did you organize the office then once you got here then after January 20th?

Moore: Naturally we did it in the House and the Senate – we did it by states, by regions in the House. We didn't have enough people. We only had thirteen people total in the whole office. The President had the idea that we had all these people out in the agencies working and they could do the congressional liaison and I would be the supervisor of those. It didn't work because people want to talk to the people who talk to the President, not people in the agencies. And we had a rocky going until about April or May. Kirbo came up and went around and talked to people and Strauss talked to some people and somebody else and they all came back – Bert Lance – and they came back to the President with one recommendation that nothing is wrong with Frank – nothing is wrong with what he is doing – just doesn't have enough people. So we hired some additional people and things really smoothed out and ran well. Since then we have been saddled with, you know, with a bad reputation.

Soapes: It's the first impression...

Moore: It's the first impression that stuck in the press. You go back and get any press report and they say that Frank Moore doesn't return telephone calls. Starts off with that. You can call – I've had reporters come and interview me and I say "Don't interview me – I say you take a congressional director. You go up there and call anybody, you call thirty people at random and ask them what kind of job I'm doing and they'll call back and they say well you know surprisingly he's doing a good job. So I say "So you going to write it?" and they say "No my editor doesn't want it." Now if I – so the press I got was bad press and then I never got any good press after that. That's the only thing people remember – so what – we got a good record – we got a good record.

Soapes: The staff system – the senior staff system for this White House began without the chief of staff - the spokes of the wheel system they talked about – the major staff people fumbling into the President. Did you feel that that was an effective system?

Moore: Well it was effective for me but I was unique – that I never had to go – I never went through a Chief of Staff when we had one anyway. I always dealt directly with the President – still do and I could subjugate myself to the Chief of Staff if I wanted too and I told the President –probably in retrospect it was probably a mistake because the operation of other things. We had the first Camp David meeting. I told the President that the big things got done well and the little that we did if we all decided to do on the senior staff, we organized the tasks and we did them well – Panama Canal treaties, and whatever we did we did it well and did a hell of a job on it. And the little things got done well but the middle things fell through the crack and that was what was killing us. It hurt me in congressional relations because of this little - it wasn't congressional relations weren't making mistakes in the staff office but other people in the White House would make horrible blunders about congressional relations because it didn't filter through and go through a central area but we got the blame for it - naturally.

Soapes: Could you give me an example ...

Moore: Floor announcements, you know they would give them to a governor without thinking, you know somebody was chairman of this committee or they would on scheduling they would say no you know or photographs - the President traveling – forget to notify a Senator or Congressman that he was going into his district. The advance team would tell them – some committee chairman who would announce it and that committee chairman didn't vote on our bills. That committee chairman was chairman of the so and so county democratic committee, wasn't chairman of the Senate Finance Committee or the Senate Armed Services Committee or the Senate Budget Committee or the House Appropriations Committee – didn't vote up here and it took a hell of a long time to get that all worked out. We did the grants, we did all the notifications you know - the procedure. We did an awful lot of stuff. We sent so much legislation up in a hurry.

Soapes: Was that a mistake?

Moore: In retrospect yes well I don't know. You know you shoot for the moon, you hit the top of the trees, you hit the top of the tree, you hit the stump. We shot for the moon maybe and hit the stars. I don't know – it's uh. We got a lot of legislation passed but it sure unloaded the circuits up there. Maybe we should have introduced that – what we did was all priority so we got no credit for what we got passed. What we got - we passed eighty-five percent and get blamed for losing fifteen percent. Press would say GA lost this, this and this. Had we said we're gonna pass – if we'd said the ball – the score in the ballgame you know ought to be – when this things over it ought to be six to three, and then if we – the score was five to three, they would say Carter triumphs, but what we did, we'd say the score is going to be a hundred to nothing – or ten to nothing really. If we had said we are going to pass these four pieces of legislation and worked on those pieces of legislation, passed them – we would have had one hundred percent success no matter what happened to the other six but we – really we had thirty up there - we really had thirty pieces up there and we passed twenty-six of them you know. But the big four didn't pass – we were failures. So I am not sure it was a mistake sending them all up, I think it was a mistake in the way we presented it. We should have said “These are our priorities – this is what we hope to do – concentrate on that.” Everybody would have known. It just got to be a matter of scheduling – whose bill coming up next. When it got to the committee what do you concentrate – what does the President really want you know. I deal with him four things but I can't - I'm not going to be with him on ten. Yeah – they are all priorities.

Soapes: What's your evaluation of the help you received from the leadership?

Moore: It was good. It was particularly good in – it was good in both bodies. See what people don't remember is though and talk about Carter was new – their new President but they don't remember that Tip O'Neill was a new Speaker and Bob Byrd was a new Majority leader and Jim Wright was a new Majority leader and John Bradson (?) was a new Majority Whip and Alan Cranston was a new Whip and I remember being in the Speaker's office and you know they were trying to get organized themselves. They didn't know exactly – they had eighty freshmen from two years ago – the Watergate babies who were mean and tough and didn't owe a damn thing to the Speaker or Jimmy Carter or the Democratic Party. They got elected on their own – their own constituency and they were a wild group. Then we got another fifty or sixty who came in with us who were bright, young, aggressive folks who didn't know any that Tip O'Neill didn't help get elected and they had a big Majority leader – if you remember Jim Wright was elected by one vote – he and Burton and Bowen(?) so it took them a while to kind of get their hands on how they were going to -. We were going to meet with the freshmen down here and the Speaker said “don't meet with the freshmen I gotta – you've got to deal through me and we made a mistake. Later on he urged us to do it because he said I can't control them, maybe you can control them. We were dealt through the leadership to the committee chairman. As a result we strained – we had some people who felt a little disenchanted with us who had worked, particularly the southerners, who had worked with the young guys who had run with Jimmy Carter and got elected, then had to go deal through the Speaker. The Speaker was very very effective. God

bless him, we wouldn't have gotten a lot of stuff done if it hadn't been for him. These are the way things broke down was you know. The liberal Democrats and the Republicans – the Republicans on one side and the Republicans on the other – our job was to get the moderate Democrats to come along screaming and kicking which a lot of them did and we passed something by three votes or six votes or whatever. If it was a moderate something – a moderate piece of legislation – then you could lose sixty or seventy liberal Democrats and you had to pick up some Republicans. We made a mistake in not working more – because Tip is so partisan. We didn't have a good working relationship with the Republicans in the House. I didn't have a Republican – didn't have anybody to just work with the Republicans. Should have done that. We were going to do that the second term, hire a guy to work nothing but the Republicans. The Senate was a little better because they are more bipartisan anyway because they have to be – particularly in some of their committees. It took a year before I got a good relationship with Howard Baker and it was partly my fault – thought it was the fault of Senator Byrd – he wanted us only to deal with him. He didn't want us to have any breakfasts with the Republicans down here – he said “I'm the leader” but he was very, very good. He did more to help us in the Senate than anybody else up there. I can't think of any big thing that he was with us on that we lost and I can't think of anything with us – that he wasn't with us on any big thing that we won. So yeah you have to be ambivalent about the Senate because Senator Byrd did more to help us than any other Senator there but then if he didn't help, he did more to hurt us – not deliberately. He wouldn't say, “I'm going to be against you” - he would say “Well I'm going to sit this one out.” But those instances are rare. (

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Soapes: The uh -were there ... You talk about how you divided your time with your staff. Were you spending a great deal of your time on the Hill doing lobbying or did you rely on your staff to do...

Moore: Started out doing much more up there than I needed to. I'd get involved with LAs – with somebody in this and that and it was just because I knew that I wanted to be so much. I finally took it down to where I dealt mostly with the leadership, stayed here, went up there enough to make my face known and seen but everybody wants to deal with the top person. That's why Hamilton was the top person in the White House so he was – people up there weren't satisfied to deal with me. They really wanted to deal with the President. If they can't deal with the President, they want to deal with the next most powerful person in the White House who was identified as Hamilton. They couldn't identify with Hamilton then they did with me but they really said “but gee” ... It didn't matter if I performed or not. If they called me, I got it done for them. They'd want to say back home I talked to the President or Hamilton Jordan. In fact a lot of times they would say they had talked with the President when they talked with me which is fine. It's sort of an unwritten rule. The White House called - the President told me – it really was Frank Moore who told them but that's fine. Um – but there's a lot of lobbying that goes on in the White House - as much as the Hill almost from getting positions hammered out so I found

myself in a lot of meetings here. We reorganized about a year and a half ago and put Bob – Bob Thompson as my deputy and then he could handle all the internal stuff after that and I was free to do a lot more stuff up on the Hill. Some staff, you know, could do it all – some people without anybody. Usually it's a totem pole deal. Staff member talks to this congressman – keep narrowing it down, squeezing it down. When it gets down to thirty calls or ten calls have to be made then I'd call those and then you know if there was still some - and then the President would call, you know, so it's sort of a ratchet system – goes right up.

Soapes: When you needed information here in the White House who were your best sources?

Moore: David Rubenstein – best source. He knows – he knew everything that was going on. You smiled like you've heard that before. But you have people, you know, Treasury – you got one person at Treasury and one at State that you depend on and one at Commerce you depend on and so forth, but here you know if I had to find out one thing, I would pick up – had one call to make I would call David. Herky Harris OMB always knew what was going on in OMB. He could find out.

Soapes: What was the tenor of the relationship between senior staff? Was there a camaraderie, was there a sense of insularity? How was it?

Moore: Well I think its camaraderie, especially you know people who were in the campaign and came here. We were organized, you know. If you bring somebody in new it takes a little while for them to break in to the older group that has been there but certainly we finished up with a sense there, particularly senior staff, and special assistants to Louie Martin and all other special assistants. I think they felt as much a part of – and my staff got along with senior staff I think. You know Jodie or Jack or anybody just as soon talk to Dan Tate and me you know with a Senate matter or Cable or Bob Thompson worked with them just as well – take their advice and we were there, you know, deputies. Strengthening got stronger deputies here you know. It was – I don't know we used – we tried to find people in the campaign jobs. The place we suffered was – we had good people ahead of the White House Personnel office but they never had any good help. Arnie Duff was a hell of a guy but when you get below – you know – we should of put good tough people in there early and put the campaign people someplace else. Always a weak link as far as I was concerned. Not the people who headed it – things just fell through the cracks down in there.

Soapes: What would, if you had to rank on a scale, what were the two or three toughest issues you had to deal with?

Moore: Oh the domestic energy and foreign – foreign pieces of legislation – the Panama Canal treaty, the arms sales, mideast arms sales, Greek, Turkish arms embargo, would have to be one, two, three. Their Rhodesian chrome thing was hard but we had a constituency there – black American – to help us. Then we had the Greek, Turkish arms embargo – Turks don't have a constituency here. We worked (?) the Greeks. And in the arms sales, the Arabs don't have a

constituency. Jewish Americans have a great skill in lobbying Congress so those were tough for that reason - those reasons. Domestically energy just energy. There are a lot of other things but we did the work - on all the energy bills we worked so hard.

Soapes: And I – would you...

Moore: Still service reform was a tough damn thing to do. Shouldn't have been but it was. God was it tough.

Soapes: Why was it so tough? So surprise

Moore: Well inside the beltway you know which was where the opposition was and those committees had just been stacked for such a – people didn't do anything else except represent Federal employees. Once we got to the floor it wasn't tough you know but getting through the committees. The Department of Education was very hard to get passed. Again because of the built in resistance – losing some turf.

Soapes: Did you find that the President got enough information and a good enough variety of information?

Moore: Uh, I don't know if I'm particularly qualified to judge that. I think the information I gave him was on the political scene up on the Hill was very, very good and I think he would tell you the very same thing when you asked him. Um, we didn't make many mistakes on saying, "this is the situation, this is what has to be done, this is what will happen." The information particularly when you are moving fast tends to be - I think that in general, you know, after the second Camp David when we brought in Hedley Donovan, we brought in Al McDonald and Lloyd Cutler and if we had reached out earlier it would have been better off to get a wider - but those people, you know, the people – you get advice from a lot of certain people but the advice is not any better. Sometimes it is horrible. I've sat down there in the Cabinet room and heard – heard the heads of major corporations give the President advice which is horrible – absolutely wrong. I've already been in three meetings with automobile people and he told them early "you've got to start producing more fuel efficient cars" and they said "No Mr. President the American people want big cars. What you have got to do is slow down the Congress trying to shove this stuff down our throat. God knows where we would be on consumption of foreign oil if we hadn't mandated the fleet MPG requirements." But these are supposed to be the smartest people in the industry you know. They were wrong right up with everybody else, just kept on being wrong. Seen the airlines do it. They had the idea they told him we were going to go broke if they we had airline regulation. They make more damn money, you know. Uh so it is good to get that advice but it probably good not to take it. Makes people feel more a part of if they come in, you build a constituency out there - Ann Wexler was very good at doing that.

Soapes: Is Jimmy Carter a tough man to tell things he doesn't want to hear or to give bad news to?

Moore: He must be for some people because they always choose me to do it. It's not tough for me to do but (Soapes and Moore laugh) always when it gets down to who's going to tell him that then it ends up being me in a lot of things but used to always. He doesn't – he's very competitive. He doesn't like to compromise.

Soapes: Would you find it difficult to get him to negotiate on a piece of legislation?

Moore: Well no more difficult than getting him to negotiate on anything. Well some people in the administration wanted to compromise too quickly. I kinda like – I think the President is just about right on it. Hold out and hold out you know and don't ever give a hint to anybody that you might compromise. You're better off. You get more because some people just fold too quick.

Soapes: Were those kinds of decisions reserved really for him or did he delegate to you as congressional liaison?

Moore: Well it depends on how fast a piece was moving. Reserved generally for him. If I told him though – I said "look this thing's coming up tomorrow – I gotta have some – I need a little leeway to negotiate" he said "well go ahead and do it."

Soapes: But here are the essentials to keep.

Moore: Yeah and you know we always involved Stu and the department head necessary but we never say – well what you have to do is say "now I think we can do this, now you understand I am not speaking for the President – I have to check back with him." We will have to get together and sell him on it if we do this. And people on the Hill complained – said gee you never could find anything with those guys. You know – will the President go with this – will he not go but they look at it from one perspective and they don't realize the ramifications of a piece of legislation – what it does – the kinda review it has to go through. We can't give quick answers on some things.

Soapes: One personal question – working the senior staff of the White House has often been very difficult for people to maintain a life away from the office – family life. Did you find that difficult?

Moore: Well I found it difficult but not impossible. I did it. Try different things, you know, the President says everybody should go home and be with their family at dinner. I tried going home to dinner and then coming back to work and I tried leaving for work at seven o'clock and then going home to dinner. I have so much stuff to do every night – I was out five nights a week – sometimes six nights a week. I have been out fourteen nights right now. Last night was the first time I have been home. My wife generally goes with me so what we ended up doing – she'd fix supper for the kids and then she'd come meet me and we'd go back and the kids adjusted very well. . They're very mature but certainly trade off by – they suffer some by not being around their Daddy but they've been around the President and the Pope and the Vice-President

and a lot of Senators and Congressmen and got invited to a lot of things at the White House, you know, so the balancing ...

Soapes: A lot of plusses for them.

Moore: Plusses for them.

Soapes: Did you find the, the Washington social circuit a pleasant experience or not?

Moore: It's a necessary experience in my line of work. We were criticized earlier for not going out – by some of the Betty bills, some of the gossip columnists. They want every important decision to be in some off-the-wall embassy so they be eavesdropping, I guess. Uh, it gets to be, I mean its the people you are working with, it gets to be pleasant. You do a lot of, well I do a lot of business at receptions. Congress is out that day and you want to get started the next day. I get some, you know, almost every day – well not almost every day – that's an exaggeration, but many, many times you sit around, you know, just talking to the President and you say "I saw Senator so and so last night and he said this or somebody said well what's Senator so and so going to do and he says," well I happened to see him last night at an embassy party and I asked him and he said this." Well if he said that then that means if we get this guy then we've got it so you do a lot of business at them and it's necessary. Some people if they don't do it, you know Senator Stennis has never out in his life. Senator Talmadge never went out and they were pretty successful and there are a lot of people – I don't think Mike Mansfield ever went out to anything in all the time he was here. Speaker McCormick didn't go to a lot of social things – so it's possible to do business here without going to social events unless – but toward the end I wanted mine delegated to more and more of my staff. I had two levels to go to – I had to go to all the hill related functions and then since I automatically got invitations as a member of the senior staff to a lot of embassy functions and foreign visitor type functions so it was kind of a double load. It's uh you don't have to get – to have a divorce as you move to Washington – your family can be strengthened by it. I think mine was.

Soapes: One final question. Did you enjoy doing this job?

Moore: Oh yeah. You couldn't do it if you didn't enjoy it. There is no way you could go to utter depths of exhaustion both physically and mentally and still come back to work the next day and do it. I mean you just have to throw up your hand and say "I'm leaving" if you didn't enjoy because you couldn't sustain yourself.