QUESTION: This is Kay Hamner on March the 14th, 2003, at the Terry Sanford Institute at Duke University, in Durham, North Carolina. We are conducting an oral interview with Dr. Ellen Mickiewicz. Would you state your name and if you don't mind spelling it for the transcriber?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Okay. My name is Ellen Mickiewicz, M-I-C-K-I-E-W-I-C-Z. I'm James R. Shepley Professor [of Public Policy Studies] at the Terry Sanford Institute, and Director of the DeWitt Wallace Center for Communications and Journalism.

QUESTION: All right. Well, we've been conducting this oral history project for the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, to fill in some of the gaps and to add to some of the historical record there. As everyone knows, President Carter's post-Presidency has been somewhat different from that of his predecessors.

The Jimmy Carter Library is going to put considerable effort into documenting his post-Presidency for the record as well. He [President Carter] particularly asked that you be interviewed, because he considered the program that you brought to The Carter Center to be one of the most important in its formative days.

But let me start back and ask when you first met Jimmy Carter and when you first became aware that he might be doing something with his post-Presidency other than just having an archival institution?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I came to Emory [University] as a result of the national search for the Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. I began my Emory career in the fall of 1980. President Carter came back to Georgia soon thereafter, and when it was clear that the President was to be coming back, President Laney – I suppose in conversation with President Carter - had the notion early on that we ought to build toward a process by which Emory and President Carter and his ideals and goals for the future might do something together of mutual benefit.

As Dean of the Graduate School, and the only social scientist in the administration – well, I suppose even if I hadn't been a social scientist, it would
have been the same – I was part of these discussions early on. And they began very early.

One piece of it, for example, was President Laney's invitation to Hamilton Jordan to come to Emory to be a kind of adjunct member of the political science department, which is my own department. And to give seminars – I worked with Hamilton on those. And so I met the President when he came back to Georgia. Emory and President Carter initiated a process that would eventually emerge as The Carter Center.

**QUESTION:** So was the first major meeting about that the meeting on Sapelo Island?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** No. The major – well, yes, in terms of major, yes. But not in terms of first. Major in the sense that that was the all-star meeting. But before that – and I believe this was when I first met President Carter – Hamilton Jordan and I and Dean [James] Waits, and I think Ken Stein, drove to Plains, where we met President and Mrs. [Rosalynn] Carter – I believe Chip Carter was in the room at least some of the time.

And we discussed at that point, in a very preliminary way, our various interests. Again, not focusing on procedures, but just discussing matters of mutual interest so that we would begin this process together.

**QUESTION:** Do you think it was understood by the people talking with President Carter at those very early stages just what he intended to do in terms of activism. I know I've heard different things about how the institute, as it was called, I think, at the time, was envisioned for the future.

And for a former President to attempt to remain as active as President Carter has been, was something somewhat new; could invite criticism, as an attempt to intrude himself into foreign policy, and so forth and so on – which certainly came later, when he was doing these things. But do you think that all of you understood that he truly intended to be that active on the world stage?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** That's a very good question. I don't think, at these very early times, that there was articulated discussion – any kind of precise discussion – about a kind of second State Department or foreign policy initiatives. But one thing was clear – to me, certainly, and to most people – was that this was a very young, very energetic, person who was extremely driven by his principles and his intellect, and understanding, and experience.

I do recall that there was a model of The Carter Center in the [Emory] library – one of those things under a plastic dome, and people were standing around it. And I remember – and you probably heard other people mention this – President Carter mentioning that, 'I hope to do – I can do more with The Carter
Center than I could as President.' And at first I thought that was an exceptionally polite and very nice thing to say to people. Very soon afterwards - the next instant, I thought - this is significant and this is serious. President Carter means this, and this is going to be very exciting.

I personally never had concerns about that, because in the work that we did, we always coordinated with the administration – in fact, that was a lot of work, going back and forth and apprising everybody of everything. And when we began this, there was another party with another agenda: the [Ronald] Reagan administration.

**QUESTION:** I know that in the last ten or fifteen years, I've heard more and more about the role of NGOs [non-government organizations] in the world, and what they can accomplish. But in those early days, which is more than twenty years ago now, that these discussions that you're talking about were taking place – was President Carter thinking in terms of what an institution he could create, could accomplish? Or in terms of what he personally could accomplish using that as a vehicle?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Oh, I don't know that it's ever possible to disentangle those two, or even if it's productive. I think that, in our conversations, he certainly valued the connection with Emory, since that would provide a long-standing continuous connection to the future, an institutionalized connection.

So I think he understood from the very beginning, that for whatever he chose to do, whatever the form was, the organization had to be part of one that had deep roots and would be long-lasting.

Now, I think there are NGOs and NGOs. I think clearly, with President Carter's eagerness to effect his goals, in consultation with those around him, by means of continuing the prerogatives essentially he had as President – that is, the vast connections and respect, and the ability to cut through red tape – no one is going to say, 'No'; no one is going to say, 'You can't speak to him.'

So clearly, he brought to this himself, because he was a former President, and he knew – and he did that self-consciously – the ability to make this NGO operate instantly at a much higher level. I know of no institutions that can do that. I mean, I doubt very much that even the great foundations, with their billions in endowments, can do that. But I don't think one can separate President Carter on his own versus President Carter in an institution.

**QUESTION:** I think - I'm going to just interject this – that became a little bit more of a problem for some of the people trying to, I think, establish The Carter Center as an institution later, as time went on. Because trying to develop an institution that attracted people who had reputations in their own right, and ideas, and agendas, that would create an institution that could survive President Carter, while simultaneously trying to provide him with the advisors and staff for his
activities, created a certain tension.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Oh, that was there from the beginning. I mean, that did not come later. We had – I remember we had a discussion on President Laney's porch about those issues. Yes, clearly, if one talks about what happens, as President Carter put it, when the Carters were no longer active – that becomes a problem.

When it's a question of raising money for an endowment, that becomes a problem, because people want to know what they're giving to. The endowment means future; what does the future mean? How institutionalized will it be? Will it be institutionalized via Emory? Will it be institutionalized on its own, with a looser connection to Emory?

No, all these questions came up right from the beginning. And the committee that I chaired – the way Emory prepared for this was to form a committee, that I chaired as Dean of the Graduate School (the report of which is extremely interesting).

And essentially, what we worked out was a tripartite division of activities for The Carter Center. That is, those in which President Carter would be leading and would follow his agenda; those in which he had an interest, and would participate but not necessarily lead; and those that were of interest to groups of fellows, academics, practitioners, that would be consistent with the broad goals of The Carter Center, but would be able to function essentially on their own.

And, I think what happened over time was (I know it was sort of articulated a lot by development) that division into three was really collapsed into one. That is, the activities were to be those in which the Carters had a serious interest and definite role.

Now, partly this was because there was a tendency to become very diffuse. This was not a well-endowed institution, still isn't, probably - I'm not privy to that. It's better than it was, certainly, but before the endowment drive, it wasn't. There was a tendency to go off in all directions, and this is an institution that was trying to create an identity.

But in part – and I maintain this was always the case, and concerned me very much as Dean of the Graduate School – there was, and I believe still is, a tremendous mismatch between some of The Carter Center's activities and the kind of back-up at Emory.

That is, in the areas of health and public health, especially with the creation of the Public Health School, there's a strong ally, or strong additional force, at the university to work with The Carter Center and to provide institutionalization in that direction. In the social sciences, much less The Atlanta Project, there was never that strength at Emory. And Emory and The Carter Center did not build together in the direction that could productively create that institutionalized partner.
And so the main feature, then, was the task force idea, which brings people in to decide on a policy, and then they disperse. It's very ad hoc: usefully ad hoc, in that people don't get stuck in an agenda. But it's still very ad hoc. So – I know this is a long response to your question.

**QUESTION:** No, this is wonderful; you're moving in exactly – addressing some of the issues that we wanted to get into. Let me back up to something you said just a moment ago. And then I want to get back to this. That President Carter had said he could do more with this institution than he could as President. Do you know what he meant by that? Do you have an idea exactly what he meant by that?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** I can't say what he meant. I can describe the ideas I got from that. First of all, I think, he was freer of the constraints of the Presidency. 'Must not talk to the PLO,' 'Must not have relations with those for whom foreign policy had dictated no relations in the past, or unrecognized countries.'

Freed of all of these diplomatic and official constraints, as a private citizen, but with the aura, of course, of a former President, not only could he step in those forbidden waters, but he could do it with great effectiveness. And that's what it seemed to me to mean.

**QUESTION:** In order for that to be effective, would he have to not have the full cooperation of whatever the current administration in Washington was? In other words, whatever doors he opened, and however far he could move ahead, in relationships between the U.S. and someone else, or what was going on in those areas – it would come to nothing if the administration didn't embrace that – make that become official in some way. At least, that's how I was thinking about things. Or did he see that would be useful regardless?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, I think there are two ways to answer that question. One is that many of his concerns, where this kind of activity would be employed, were precisely those concerns which – I think not only he felt, but I think many, with general agreement, felt – were not really major pieces of an administration's agenda. They were either too difficult, too remote – many in Africa, for example.

There would be no particular objection - and I think it was cleared pretty easily – to work in those areas where a political administration might think, 'It's a lose-lose situation. It's very difficult and you can't fix it, and it's low on the radar.' In these instances, it seems to me, it's very useful for an administration to remain free of the downsides, and the upside they can take some credit for, in at least not refusing President Carter's initiative.
In other cases, however, there are the cases where we don't have diplomatic relations precisely because there is a relationship of enmity and a security threat. And in those cases, I think it may have been harder for him to argue with any given administration, but as far as I know, he was not denied by administrations in his attempts to go into those areas. And without formal contacts, obviously, it's very difficult to defuse these hot spots.

**QUESTION:** In the kind of situations you were talking about, in terms of – well, Africa, where the current administration, would usually, as you put it so well, not have it high on their radar – or often, internal wars, internal civil wars, that type of thing, or human rights violations that President Carter could involve himself and, through personal diplomacy, perhaps bring about changes. So where it would become necessary, for the current administration to endorse what he was doing, I suppose would be later.

Just to give a high profile example, Korea – in which whatever he managed to negotiate there, it didn't – if the United States didn't accept it, then it wasn't going to happen – that's the difference in the kind of situations you were talking about.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** I would call that a high security issue where there aren't sufficient contacts. Haiti is another one, although – you know, it wasn't high security, but there were no official contacts. Bosnia, obviously, was another one. I think in these cases he certainly had to have the permission, or the agreement, of the current administration, but in Korea, of course, in Ambassador James Laney, he had a very powerful ally.

**QUESTION:** When you came to Emory, you came there and you were Dean of the Graduate School. But your background and your field of interest were Soviet relations and international media. Was this new for Emory, this type of program?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** There was a political science department, so political science wasn't particularly new, as there were people who were interested in Russia and the Soviet Union. I think what was new – I think my own interest, inspired by and accelerated by proximity to President Carter - was moving research findings into real policy. There wasn't very much of that – yes, in the health field, but I don't think there was very much of that in general - outside The Carter Center, that is, within the university.

**QUESTION:** President Carter's interest in what you were doing was very real and immediate. Was part of that stemming from the fact that, from the beginning, he was bothered by what the Reagan Administration was doing relative to what he had begun to establish with the Soviet Union. Would you say
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: We didn't start up with a small – a bounded or defined research issue. What we started with was growing concerns about world security and international arms control. And clearly, outside the United States, there was one major force that was driving this, and that was the Soviet Union.

We both were on that track: he, from his frustration with the Reagan Administration; I because I thought we could do something new and something different. One of the things I was always very concerned about in dealing with the Soviets, was that the same old people were brought to the United States for the same old conferences, retreads, in a way. They were well known; they were mouthpieces.

He and I determined very early on that if we were going to do something, there had to be somebody substantively interesting, somebody who was important in the decision-making process and not a megaphone – or at least not just a megaphone. And if the Soviet government didn't want to do it that way, well, it wasn't acceptable to us. This approach was absolutely terrific, because that's not how most of these well-intentionted events took place. I remember the Deputy Chief of Mission came down from Washington, when we were planning the Arms Control International Security --

QUESTION: Deputy Chief of Mission --?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Of the Soviet embassy. Came down as we were beginning our thinking about what would turn out to be two small consultations and one very large one. We met first in the top of the library --

QUESTION: And this is the library on the Emory campus, not the Carter Library?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes, it was the first home of what would be The Carter Center.

QUESTION: And this would have been 1982, 1983?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, let me see. There were two small consultations in 1984 and the big one in 1985, so it must have been early 1984.

QUESTION: At that time, who was the top person in the Soviet Union, so
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Konstantin Chernenko. The big change was marked in 1985 by the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in March.

QUESTION: And was this someone President Carter had any sort of communications with while he was President?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: No, they appeared not to have known each other. And we made it very clear to this man – I remember, Chernenko had just been named, actually -- we made it very clear that if we were going to do something, it would have to be with individuals of much higher rank and stature, and with real capacity to contribute to the policy discussions that were coming up.

And indeed, when the consultation took place in April of 1985, there was a remarkable trio. There was a General, Konstantin Mikhailov – there was the longstanding and very powerful Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, from Washington, and there was Yvgeny Velikhov [phonetic], who was the chief science advisor, the science policy power, in the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Why do you think that they responded so positively, and agreed to participate in something with President Carter? Why did they feel that was going to benefit them in some way? Why would they even agree to that?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, first of all, all three consultations were co-directed by President Carter and President [Gerald] Ford. But – and I can't be sure – except that I think it was certainly related – I think Gorbachev had an enormous role in this - I mean, a decisive role. I think it was deliberate on his part.

And the reason I think so, is that not only did these high officials come, but at our meeting the Soviet delegation floated a plan that would have been the solution to a major arms control disagreement – namely, the construction of a particular kind of radar in the Soviet Union that American arms control experts believed was a clear violation of the treaty.

And there, in the Medical School auditorium where this took place, they came up with a proposal that the radar could be inspected and – they opened the door. This was the first time that had ever happened. Gorbachev clearly had not only a desire to make certain changes, improve relations with the West, but also to create some real policy steps forward.

QUESTION: But given that the people – Gorbachev and others – had to
be aware of the fact that there was not any sort of positive relationship between President Carter and the Reagan administration, why would they feel that floating a policy initiative like that at a conference, even though President Ford was also there – at that conference, was something that would ultimately wind its way up to the powers that be in Washington.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, the Reagan administration did cooperate. We had Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. We had Ted Stevens, Republican Senator from Alaska.

QUESTION: Why did they do that? The Reagan administration had been ignoring President Carter whenever they could do so. Was it after the people in the Soviet Union agreed to come that the Reagan administration decided they’d better get involved?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: No, not at all. They were involved from the very beginning. Or to put it differently – we were looking – we were designing this – President Carter and I – from the very beginning, to cover all the arguments. It makes no sense to simply preach to the choir, and to have a conference of like-minded folks. I mentioned there were two smaller consultations the year before – one at The Carter Center at Emory, and one at President Ford’s Center in Ann Arbor [Michigan]. On both of those occasions, we had leading Republican thinkers. We had Hal Sonnenfeld – we had Richard Burt. Richard Burt, at the time, was the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs. We always included them. And it was always, I think, really mutually beneficial.

From the very beginning, this consultation was something that was going to look at all the areas, and all the arguments. Henry Kissinger came to the consultation. As did other Republicans. That participation and the scale of the consultation, and the fact that President Ford was there, made it certain that it was bipartisan from the very beginning.

QUESTION: What happened with the initiatives that the Soviets floated at that conference?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: President Carter wrote an op ed that was published in The New York Times shortly after, in which he referred to it, I believe. And they did eventually settle that radar, among a number of other issues related to verification.

The verification also had a vast international scope; we had a number of other countries, key actors in the security area, represented there. I think it became something that was really on an extraordinary scale.
We were going to have the two days of the full plenary conference in the Medical School Auditorium. (We also had working groups for some three or four days before the plenary.) But we had very little space in the Medical School Auditorium, although it was a very nice setting.

And if one imagines all the press that wanted to be there, the seats were shrinking by the minute. And what I thought would be an interesting idea would be to see if Ted Turner would put it on television and essentially provide a feed. Not only would get the message out to the larger public, it would also solve some practical problems.

And I wrote a proposal to Ted Turner, whom I hadn't met before then, and I was invited to a meeting of Mr. Turner and a table of his vice-presidents. I went to CNN [Cable News Network], and he was extremely impressed with the proposal. He said that, "We have to do something," and he was tremendously concerned about the nuclear threat and U.S.-Soviet relations. He decided on the spot that they would cover the whole thing live. This would mean they would lose commercials – at least a million dollars in commercials at that time.

He assigned his best correspondent to it, Ralph Beglighter, and covered the whole thing. And then CNN made a two-hour version of it – originally it was eleven hours – a two-hour version, and then a one-hour one called "Avoiding Nuclear War." They then sent it all over the world.

**QUESTION:** That's interesting – so having this televised in no way constrained the participants? They in no way hedged their bets, so to speak, because they knew this was being televised? I would have thought a consultation like that might have produced freer speaking if there had been more privacy, but quite obviously, that wasn't the case.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, first of all, I should say that it was most unobtrusive, in terms of just the technical aspects of taping it – it was extremely professionally well-done. So no one was sitting there with blinding lights and feeling on the hot seat.

**QUESTION:** So it wasn't live, it was being --

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** It was live.

**QUESTION:** It was live.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** But you know, I have sat through operas being filmed live, and you don't even notice it, with contemporary technology. But that's
not the most important part. I don't know of a single savvy political type who, if there is an audience of even five people, does not realize that he or she is on the record. I think they are on the record, of course.

But they also realize that in the context of conflicting opinions, they had better be pretty good at getting theirs out. So, no, I don't think that a real professional in the presence of anybody else considers anything to be confidential.

**QUESTION:** One of the things I have heard people say to me informally is that President Carter had become quite adept at using the media to get the messages out that he wanted. And of course, some of the times this drove the administration crazy – the current administration in Washington. But do you think this was the beginning of President Carter really grasping the potential for modern media to assist him in what he was out to do?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, I think it might have done so, for several reasons. One is that when he came back from Washington, from an experience with media, particularly television, that had been, to put it mildly, negative – the screaming Sam Donaldson -- that kind of coverage and the sensationalism for a thinker like President Carter was extremely negative.

[Sound of knocking on door; break in recording.]

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ [continuing]:** President Carter's own experience with the media was far from positive. He had a very low opinion of them. One reason for a change was the factor of time. Over the years the distance from the experience with the media, obviously, grew longer and longer. Second, I think the way the press covered issues of the consultation was a very hopeful sign for him.

And third, and maybe even most important, it put him and Ted Turner in closer proximity. Ted, in turn, was a great fan. We worked even more closely with him when we formed our own NGO, the Commission on Radio and Television Policy.

And in fact, CNN, as you know, developed a kind of close link, and could work especially well with President Carter. So yes, I think President Carter became quite conscious of the fact of the importance of the media, getting his message out, without having that overhang of those really trying White House years.

**QUESTION:** During that consultation, had you ever witnessed President Carter at work, so to speak, before then? So what did you observe? I've often heard that the very force of his personality can cause things to happen in meetings like that, which can be extraordinary. Can you comment on that – on his actual participation – how he interacted?
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: In these consultations? Yes, well, he can be very blunt.

QUESTION: Yes.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: And I think it's a – how shall I say – it's a diplomatic use of being blunt.

QUESTION: I know that, too.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I think he knows exactly what he's doing, and why he's doing it. It cuts through a lot of bureautrease which neither he nor I can stand, certainly. He would make interjections during the consultation that would move things just right along and put questions to people with no frills. But he has a way of doing it, I think, which is also apparently impersonal. So it's blunt, but it doesn't seem to be tied to any emotion of dislike or personal emotion. It's very effective, extremely effective. I've seen it time and again, when we've met in our many meetings of the Commission on Radio and Television Policy.

I remember one case of that, when we were talking about the issuing of broadcast licenses in the states in transition after the fall of the Soviet Union. The question under discussion was how long the term of a license should be. He turned to the Americans who were sitting there and said something to the effect of, "Do you think you should have yours for life?" And you know, ABC, CBS, NBC – of course they think they should have theirs for life. But -- it was a stunning moment.

I think his style is very respectful. It's very balanced. He always indicates that no one has a monopoly on doing the right thing or being always right, that there are flaws in all systems. He gives the impression of, and is, I think, the fairest person I know. And everybody with whom I've spoken, who participated in meetings of this sort with him, believe that to be true. He's fair, and he's patient. And he's also strategically blunt. And I think that's a wonderful combination.

QUESTION: I know that on occasion, when President Carter has spoken with me about something, and the way in which he looks at you so directly that can almost be disconcerting at times, but also you're fully aware that he's giving you one hundred percent of his attention while you're speaking. Would you say that he is adept at picking up on body language or other signals among the people that he is speaking with to react to, or respond to? The actual reason I'm asking this question is because I think Mrs. Carter is quite good at that. And I wondered if this was one of those things that sometimes she contributed to, and
you noticed that. Or if he himself is just quite good at seeing that there is
something going on with this speaker, beyond the words that are coming from his
mouth.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I think, in general, that Mrs. Carter’s observations
and her kindness, and her sense of needing to reward people and thank them
are a vital component. I get so swept up in the policy issues, too. I never saw
anybody really uncomfortable. Except, of course, in cases where they should be
uncomfortable.

I mean, I think they should be uncomfortable if they're trying to stonewall
or something of that sort. Yes, he will hammer. I guess I'm not that concerned
about their discomfort, because I think it was an important undertaking – a lot of
effort was put into it, and people should be as forthcoming as you can get them
to be.

QUESTION: So this was the first major consultation involving this
particular area.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: There were three, as I said.

QUESTION: Two smaller ones and a larger one, involving this particular
area that he wanted to work with. So was it that he first saw you and your
program, not in terms of radio and television policy on a global scale, but first
saw you as the expert that could help him with Soviet relations.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes, and I didn't have a program, either. That is, I
was Dean of the Graduate School, and doing my research, and –

QUESTION: What was your research into at that time?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: It was involved with questions of the relationship
between media, particularly television, and change in the Soviet Union. At that
time, the Soviet Union’s media coverage was centrally coordinated, so that how
they covered the Afghanistan War, for example, was a major issue of security.

So I had my own research program, but I didn't have a program in the
sense that it had a separate name and a separate staff. And yes, it was salient
because it brought Russia into focus.

QUESTION: Now, Gorbachev came into power in 1985.
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes, in March.

QUESTION: And this major consultation was taking place in 1985.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: In April.

QUESTION: In April.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I think.

QUESTION: So, but in the smaller consultations that had taken place prior to that, you were still -- you feel like you still saw the imprint of Gorbachev's influence emerging?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: It's hard to say. Chernenko, who was the last leader before Gorbachev, was a man who, when he took office, seemed to me to be on his death bed. Just looking at him. And as a matter of fact, I remember -- and you must remember -- that, before him, was also the very short reign of Yuri Andropov, who was in the hospital most of the time on dialysis.

And I remember when the second-in-command at the Soviet embassy did come down -- I remember sitting with him on the back steps of the administration building, and saying to him, "So, this new man" -- Chernenko -- "does he seem a little weak to you?" He said, "Oh, no, he's gone through all the tests, and this time we have someone who's very healthy." And he was to die soon thereafter. Chernenko really could do not much of anything.

I don't know -- I can't say whether his stamp was on it, but I do know that the Soviet embassy was very forthcoming. In fact, at the Ann Arbor small consultation, a very interesting official of the Soviet embassy asked to come, and did come, just to learn about and observe it. There was considerable attention to it.

QUESTION: Was there communication between President Carter and Chernenko directly?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Not to my knowledge.
QUESTION: Was there between him and Gobachev? Soon after – fairly early after Gorbachev –

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I don't know. I do know that President Carter did communicate with Gorbachev not too long thereafter, as we had plans moving toward the creation of the Commission and Gorbachev's approval was very important.

QUESTION: I remember, in looking through Douglas Brinkley's book on The Unfinished Presidency, that he wrote that President Carter was quick to realize that Gorbachev talking about glasnost and perestroika was genuine, and what it meant. Mr. Brinkley also said that you were the first one to point this out to President Carter, and that you had made that assessment very accurately, very early on, which you were probably one of the few who did. So can you tell us a little bit about your discussions with President Carter about Gorbachev and glasnost?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes. Well, we were receiving Soviet television from an offshoot of the satellite. That is, it wasn't beamed to us, but we could just catch it. And Soviet television not aimed at international audiences, but at Moscow.

And one has to understand that the Soviets had been absolutely, incredibly, controlling about television. Not so much newspapers, because newspapers had smaller circulations, and intellectuals read them. I don't mean there wasn't mass readership of some things – there was – but on the whole, the Gorbachev policy was: Well, let the intellectuals have their newspapers, but television you've got to be really careful of, because that goes out to 250 million people all at once, and that's pretty scary.

I'll tell you a very quick anecdote. In December of 1979, Soviet television was going to run a "Sherlock Holmes" series. All of a sudden they got a decree from the Kremlin that they couldn't show it. And the reason they couldn't show it, it turned out, was that in the beginning, Sherlock Holmes meets Dr. Watson because Watson has been sent home, because he was injured in the war in Afghanistan. And they were about to invade Afghanistan.

So you can't believe how careful they were, about things that were on television.

QUESTION: So in monitoring what was actually being shown on Soviet television, and broadcast on the radio, you could begin to analyze something about what was going on in the Soviet --?
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, yes, but then radio I did not really listen to. But what I mean to say is, when you take a medium that is so closely watched – every minute is so closely watched – when something changes there, then you know that this is extraordinary. And further, that the audience, which is 85 or 90 percent of which is dependent on television for most of its information, and where television is in 99 percent of the – 97 percent of the households --

QUESTION: I was going to ask you about that.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes, everybody has one.

QUESTION: In the Soviet Union, that's surprising. Okay.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, it's a way of getting the message out.

QUESTION: Well, that was one of the questions I was going to ask you, because of course, in my generation we were brought up to believe that everybody in the Soviet Union lived very poor and didn't have access to all of these things. But they did. So that television was a very important part of everyday life.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Yes, and when you say 'standard of living' – if a television set is a critical instrument to carry a message from the government, it's not a matter of luxury. They were subsidizing television to a huge extent. So everybody had it. Even in places where ten people lived in a small, rural – large room, essentially, in Kazakhstan – they were all watching television.

So everybody had it, everybody watched. And everybody knew what the operational mode was. So that when there were changes in that, they should not be underestimated. Because these were – even depending on what kind of changes – these could be construed as a profound change. Again, I'm not saying that reality was pushed by it. But I'm saying that the decision to make certain changes in a way that went directly to the population, that had certain expectations over many, many years, should be taken very seriously.

QUESTION: So was it through analysis of Soviet television that you began to realize that Gorbachev's commitment to glasnost was real?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I knew that there were really things happening, and that when you start on this very large scale strategy, and in fact, he did it to leapfrog these very recalcitrant bureaucracies, it's both risky and meaningful. And
among the things I showed President Carter was a program that astonished me, that showed that the Soviet Union was adhering to human rights prescriptions of the Helsinki Accords. And it showed --

**QUESTION:** I'm sorry --?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** The Helsinki Accords. And that, to my astonishment, they showed -- perfectly seriously and respectfully – services taking place at a synagogue, a mosque, and a Russian Orthodox Church. Now, this is in a country that had excoriated Jews and severely limited Jewish worship. And certainly the same with Muslims; less so with Orthodox. But to see the kind of – the images were so extraordinarily respectful and legitimizing that - I mean, it was absolutely astonishing. And several things that happened.

**QUESTION:** So Gorbachev was using Soviet television in a way to introduce the whole concept of glasnost to the population?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Yes, yes. It was a television strategy. And in his memoirs and when I was talking to him later for my book, he said that very soon after he came to power, he had a meeting in Leningrad and was talking about his ideas, and somebody filmed it and - you know, but it was within the party organization, gave him the video to take back. And Raisa, his wife, saw it back in Moscow, and said, "Boy, you're terrific! You've got to do this! You've got use television." Yes, that's exactly what he was doing.

And again, you have to understand that matters of this sort, for that audience, which was well trained to analyze their own system, was simply extraordinary.

So I talked to President Carter a lot about that; I showed him these clips. And I remember at the time, that he said it was real. It's not cosmetic when 250 billion people are getting shaken up by this. It can't be cosmetic. And I remember when I went to conferences, I remember a man from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] who is very prominent today saying – just castigating me for taking this seriously. So it was certainly not easy.

**QUESTION:** So while you and President Carter saw what was going on, the administration in Washington at that time didn't see the same thing.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Not quite as early. And again, it's not the kind of thing you can bring to Congress and say, "Let's re-do our military budget on the strength of it."
QUESTION: Your whole program or activity of analyzing Soviet television – when did you actually start doing that?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, I had been actually working on media and media audiences – I had already published, I think – I had already published two books. Or one and a half - I mean, perhaps one was in preparation, I don't recall. So I had a lot of experience.

I had also gotten to know, because of the research, what certain people were doing on television. I got to know them when I went to Moscow and asked to meet those people and colleagues. And these were not necessarily – these were not the people necessarily at the top. They would later be at the top.

And whereas most of the people who did a lot of work in the Soviet Union were, quite understandably, dealing with people in charge of the institutes – say, the Institute of the USA in America and others – I just didn't think that's where change was coming from. And I was more interested in these avenues of change, and sort of seeking these people out and trying to understand. And it turned out, for the work of the Commission, to be extremely fortuitous. Because these were networks of people who did, in fact, rise to decision-making positions.

QUESTION: After this major consultation that took place in April, 1985, what was the next significant activity that took place within your program in The Carter Center, and that President Carter undertook that you were involved in, relative to the Soviet Union?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I'm trying to think. I don't know when we began working on the Commission on Radio and Television Policy. Because it took a long time.

SIDE 2

QUESTION: This is Side Two of the tape of the interview with Ellen Mickiewicz at Duke University on March 14, 2003. Can we continue?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: The task of this was really herculean. Knowing what I know now about how much work it was, I just wonder how we did it. One thing – one whole element was the American side. Another whole element was, what would the Soviet side be? I mean, this is after having worked through what the subject matter would be. Why? Not another bilateral organization, and so on.
The [John and Mary R.] Markle Foundation, which had supported my scholarly work for a number of years, was just absolutely fantastic. Because what they did – and very few foundations really do – is they are very interested in helping you develop your ideas. And so I remember going up there, and talking to people, and they'd bring people in to talk more to me, and help with understanding.

And these are vast issues of helping with thinking about the best people on the American side. It was an extraordinarily helpful and strong support. And they eventually gave us an exceptionally large grant to get this off the ground. They really believed in it.

And at the same time, just in terms of logistics, I began working with Charles Firestone, who was Director of the Aspen Institute's Communications and Society Program. And I had been in one of their conferences, so I had experience with him. And that whole organization essentially became the site for all the working groups which preceded the Commission.

I do want to make a remark, though, about the earlier arms control and international security consultations. I'd be very remiss if I didn't note the partnership with Roman Kolkowitz. Roman Kolkowitz was a professor of political science at UCLA, and his work was in international security and arms control; he was co-author with me of two books, including one which is the edited transcript of the consultation.

Let me just mention about that. We had transcripts of the whole eleven hours. And I edited them. And then we sent them back to each participant to vet and to approve.

**QUESTION:** Are those transcripts in your papers in Atlanta?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Should be. I don't have them.

**QUESTION:** I had been trying to track those down. I talked with Rita [McGrath], and apparently --

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** She doesn't have them.

**QUESTION:** No, she doesn't have them. She says she thinks they're in the political science department at Emory. That they were not at The Carter Center. I know we didn't have it.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, that would have been when I was Dean of the
Graduate School, so they should be in the Dean's – I left behind, in the Dean's office – because I left the Deanship at the end of 1985.

**QUESTION:** Would those records be considered Emory University's records? Or your records?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** They're not my records - I mean, I considered them Emory's. I only took what was – just personal kinds of things for me. But I left all the stuff there.

**QUESTION:** So if what we wanted to do was to get as many records as possible concerning these early years, within one place, within one archives, I should appeal to Emory to make those a part of the Jimmy Carter Library or Museum.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Absolutely.

**QUESTION:** I'll follow up on that right away.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** And this book here is a boiled-down version of that whole consultation. And it gives all of the participants and President Carter's, President Ford's, and the other contributions.

**QUESTION:** Okay. I did not have that. And I really do want to get to those papers, so I'll follow up on that as soon as I get back, and see if I can get Jay Hakes to make an official request of the Jimmy Carter Library to get those.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** I really wanted to make sure you understood that Roman was a full partner. Because he was on the West Coast, I worked with President Carter pretty exclusively, although I think he did on a couple of occasions when he was at Emory. But we really worked on designing conceptually together.

Okay, so back to the Commission. So we had the Markle Foundation and the Aspen Institute's great support. But what really had to happen was to try – the Soviets had never done anything like this, and as you can imagine, being very wary of anything to do with media, as most people are.

**QUESTION:** Well, this is why I was so surprised when you said that everyone was okay with CNN in televising those consultations. Because it did
seem to me to be somewhat different than what I had expected about the way I would have thought the Soviets wanted to control what got out from them.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, they wanted to control it for their own population. They didn't particularly want — they were under no illusion that you could control beyond the borders.

**QUESTION:** Well, in other words, television signals from outside the borders of the Soviet Union couldn't be picked up? Or they blocked it?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** They could be picked up in some of the border countries. Estonia could pick up Finnish television. East Germany, except in the Dresden area, picked up Western television. But especially with analog television, using the spectrum — you can't do it. You can't beam into the country. And so, again, I don't mean to say that people were just so stupid and didn't understand anything that was going on. They had many very crafty ways of figuring out what's going on in the world. They're a pretty smart public. But no — the vast majority of television signals were entirely within the Soviet Union.

So — it would be quite another thing to have this broadest at home. That's another matter.

**QUESTION:** Let me get back to this major consultation, then. You said then things moved on — things happened fairly rapidly in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power. And that began to change how you were designing the activities of your program. So can you talk about that?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, then it started moving toward a real program. That is, a program with some staff, and of course, with greater interest in the foundations.

And there was also at this time — this was in 1989 — this didn't directly relate to the commission, but I was, in my own work, together with colleagues in the United States and in the Soviet Union — we did the first Soviet-American national survey in the Soviet Union. It had never happened before. And we got funding for it — not through the Carter Center, but I mean funding that I went out and got. And it was extraordinary. It was also the first time ever that raw data actually could be brought out.

Now, I don't want to bore you and the tape too much going into the history of this, but polling — surveys — had been banned when Stalin came to power. Because that gives too much weight to what people think and what people expect, and what do they know? So some people were executed, even, who did that. But it was shut down completely.
And it started coming up again. And in Gorbachev's time, they realized that in the very least, you need polls to figure out your work force, where people are going to settle, alcoholism, marriage – all kinds of things you just – and then the media started doing some polling about whether they were even read or not.

So the next big thing that I undertook was this massive survey. And I even went into the field with people in four different republics. And it was fantastic. And again, showed that television was more important.

**QUESTION:** What was the subject of the survey? I mean, what subjects did you cover?

_ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:_ The survey was about media issues, about political issues, like how tolerant people might be, and issues of what rights they think people ought to have – feelings of security, media habits – so there was a lot. And it was very, very exciting.

**QUESTION:** And so this was jointly conducted by you – the program in the United States and —

_ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:_ And the person who was leading the charge to bring back serious surveys, whose name is Boris Grushin, G-R-U-S-H-I-N. And with two other colleagues in the United States, in different universities. So that was really big.

**QUESTION:** So did the Soviet government make use of the survey?

_ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:_ I don't think they really did.

**QUESTION:** And all of these records are also at Emory?

_ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:_ No.

**QUESTION:** These are your records. Okay. That's not directly involved with The Carter Center?

_ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:_ No.
QUESTION: I'm just interested myself, but I understand about that.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: So, in any case, what we were moving inexorably toward was, in fact, this commission. And it was very, very difficult, because what it did take was President Carter's talking to Gorbachev. And he did this – oh, I forget what year he did it. I don't remember how he did this.

But what we did was, we chose for the first agenda item, elections – coverage of elections. But the purpose behind it was that he was certainly convinced, as was I, that here's this huge country that is beginning to look at television sort of in and of itself – how to make these loosening, liberalizing changes. But not having thought about it, because they had no tradition of that. And the United States had lots of different views on what we should be doing.

And so why not have them benefit from the experiences that some leading people here have, and why not let us benefit by having all our experiences and our convictions questioned. Because when you have to give advice, that's the time you really become honest with yourself.

And that's exactly what happened at the first meeting. Which was absolutely astonishing, because they brought up political advertising – whether they should have it?

QUESTION: Who brought that up?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: The Soviet side.

QUESTION: And this was a meeting at The Carter Center?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: This was a meeting at The Carter Center, the first meeting of the Commission. And the Americans, who included – well, I won't give you the roster, because you know who they are, but all different stripes of attitudes toward television and different positions.

To a man, they said, "No, don't do it!" Or, "Don't do public television our way. Make it much more important." All these people in one voice were - I mean, and I must say, the Soviets were astonished. Because they met this wall of saying, "Don't do it our way." [Laughing.] And I think that also helped the credibility enormously.

And it was just an extraordinary experience. It was really quite amazing that they got together – and they came from all over – the head of Khazakistan television was there, and the Baltics and - I mean, it was just absolutely amazing.
And then the next year – okay, so that was just before – that was in 1991, in the fall. And the Soviet Union disappeared at the end of that year. So the next year, all of a sudden, you're dealing with fifteen countries. And that, of course, logistically was extremely difficult. And there are some absolutely wonderful touches to that.

We went to Moscow, had some meetings. And then we took a plane to Kazakhstan. And President Carter was invited up to the cabin. And he didn't come back. So we had achieved our cruising altitude and he came back, and he said, they let him – I don't know, is it "drive" the airplane? They let him – they let him fly the airplane. This is with, like, you know, 250 people aboard or something. And they let him fly the airplane. He says, "Oh, it was easy. It was like the old submarines. It was old fashioned."

**QUESTION:** Oh, my goodness.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** So there he was, flying our airplane. But that was – and that was about ethnic conflict. And we met in the room in which the Soviet Union was dissolved, in that very room. And there – and I still don’t know how to go on from here - I'm not sure what's in the public records and what kinds of things interest you, so let me ask you.

**QUESTION:** All right. Well, let me go back a little bit, then, to this back up – now we've covered from the first thoughts about The Carter Center through to about 1991. So let's go back and go into that period a little bit more, from a different angle. As you were watching The Carter Center develop, and emerge – let's talk a little about that – as the institution.

I know I've talked with Dr. Laney, and will be talking with him again. And he had set forthrightly that the relationship had not, perhaps, or had definitely not evolved in the way that he had first envisioned it. In the sense that perhaps there were not – he had hoped that there would be a place where peoples from other countries could come and learn democratic principles and take back to their country, be involved in the programs, and become sort of the seed that got planted back in their country. And it never – that just never really worked out quite that way.

So probably there are a lot of different ways in which The Carter Center and the academic institution like Emory University could work together, or explore it. I was there myself during some of those discussions. And —

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** I'm sorry to interrupt you, but could you just explain to me about people from foreign countries. I mean, students or --?
**QUESTION:** I gather he didn't mean just students. When he was talking to me, he was talking about if there were scholars, if there were people in government, if there were people in civil society that could spend time at The Carter Center and take what they learned back and put into practice in their countries – that he thought the impact of The Carter Center could be magnified around the world. But that was not the way in which The Carter Center's activities evolved.

And he said, quite frankly, that probably in terms of scholarship for Emory, there hadn't been the payoff that might have been envisioned at first. Not there wasn't a great deal Emory has gained out of the association, but that has not been the particular way in which that benefit has manifested itself.

I personally agree with that. So in those early days, was there more of an attempt to find a role for the academic community at The Carter Center?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** There were endless discussions about it. At every Fellows meeting it seems, one way or another. And we had Fellows meetings in those days, and most of the Fellows were academics. So there was a bigger – to the extent that the Fellows were important, to the extent that the Fellows were academics, mainly – there was a better chance to do it then.

There was a lot of lip service paid to it. And I don't mean lip service in the sense that it wasn't honestly intended. But it seemed to me to be ill-suited to the structures.

And here I come back, again – when I was on that – for example, when I chaired that committee, about what should The Carter Center be, in terms of Emory – this was the university committee – before The Carter Center was named or created – one of the things I said, knowing that when you have Centers, that they tend to have some kind of centrifugal pull. Because they're doing things; they doing different things. At the very least, you have to have real transportation connections. Especially one that's not on campus.

So one of our recommendations – and I was extremely strong on this – was to have regular bus service, regular back and forth, so that anybody could hop on the bus. And this was never done. I do think distance and different missions pull Centers apart. You see it all over the United States.

**QUESTION:** I got involved in some of the negotiations with the administration at Emory, trying to establish some sort of transportation link between the two. And The Carter Center, as you know, didn't have funds to set up a bus system there, and Emory already had the vehicles and so forth. But they resisted. And it was the university that resisted creating that link. And we didn't have the funds to do it from our side.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** I know. And what I tried to do was to say, "Look,
you've got medical buses – buses that go back and forth from all these places. If you took them two blocks out of their way or something" – just something truly trivial. And that was vetoed because the schedule is already in place or something. I think you have to plan.

And let me mention that I had done a study of all comparable Centers in the country before we did this. Before, that is, we had our meeting. And that should be somewhere there, too.

So that's one thing. But the second thing was about funding. Each Carter Center project had to be self-sufficient financially. Which means essentially - anything I did, I went out and got the money. Now, they routed through Emory, or routed through The Carter Center, but I went out and got it.

And everything that you do, as you know, in a grant proposal, you're going to spend. I mean, it's earmarked. So, for example, could I have had an Emory faculty member join me, take a course off, travel with me, work together – of course not. You know, I had no funding for that, The Carter Center had no funding for that. The faculty member had no funding for that. So that kind of intimate collaboration could not have taken place. Just because of funding.

The second thing is, as I said before, this was absolutely critical – our Emory counterparts were extremely few.

And third, everybody has his own schedule. Junior people have to get tenure. They could hardly take out time – and this was a problem with The Atlanta Project, too – they can't take out time on the precious way to tenure, which is really hard to get.

QUESTION: This is what I was going to ask you. The activities of The Carter Center, participation in those - didn't necessarily lend itself to the kind of research and publication that would help someone achieve tenure. I mean, it was something they would be doing outside that track?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Not necessarily. If Emory had had something to do with policy, public policy - there are a lot of people in this institute, say, who we all have our PhD's either in political science or economics, some in history. And there's a lot that you can do of a research nature that will tell you a lot about the choices to make, the impact of choices, and so on. That could have been, I think, extremely useful. But there was nothing of that sort at Emory, at all. And still isn't.

QUESTION: I know that in talking with Steve Hochman and Dr. Laney and others, that one of the reasons President Carter chose to associate with Emory, rather than one of the state-supported schools or universities in Georgia, was the feeling that he would have more freedom, would not be as constrained, as he might be if he were involved in an institution publicly supported.
Yet in listening to both – Steve has made some of the same comments you have about this – that Emory did not have the faculty working in that direction. Would the University of Georgia, with the Dean Rusk Center and so forth have perhaps been better able to have provided that?

That's just a question that just now occurred to me?

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: I don't know.

QUESTION: I do know, getting back with – of what I have watched with President Carter, you worked with him very effectively. Bob Pastor worked with him very effectively. There have been others that have been quite adept at seeing where he could make a difference and in designing programs and activities that would allow his strengths to come forward and do something.

But I know – and I saw that with you, and with Bob Pastor – you came with a unique background; Bob had both the political experience as well as being a fine scholar. And when I think about it, there were not many others on the Emory University faculty roles that knew how to make use of him as a resource, or how to design a program that would make use of this resource of a former President.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: He did not want to be made use of – that is, one can imagine that he could provide a tremendous amount of information, say, to someone doing a dissertation on Germany or the two Germanies or something like that. But not as a resource, but rather as an actor.

QUESTION: Exactly. So you don't usually find an academic community experienced on how to design a program, an activist program, that would ---

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, one could, though. I mean, I think one could. I mean, again --

QUESTION: You did. And Bob did.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: But I go back to this report, before The Carter Center. The recommendation of our report was actually to create an Emory Center that would be a backstop, a help for, an ally, with The Carter Center. The Emory Center, if I recall correctly – first of all, it would have all kinds of data sources.

Secondly, it would bring the social sciences together so that instead of the
sort of weak individual departments, you'd have a critical mass. You'd pool methods, so you'd get a whole lot more methods. And you'd have a lively interchange that would create some – well, as I say, some critical mass instead of dealing with each of the varying fields – social sciences separately. And the administration said, "No, we have our Center. It'll be The Carter Center."

And I said, "Well, it's precisely because we have The Carter Center that we need this center." But that seemed redundant. It's not redundant. It would have – I think that's exactly what would have created what you're talking about – the ability for the two to really move together.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that President Carter saw that, the way you saw that?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Which is that?

**QUESTION:** What could be the benefit – was he as interested in furthering scholarship as he was in furthering the action program that he saw himself undertaking?

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** No. No. If you put it that way, no. He's referred to – when he was Governor, he'd appoint a committee to do research, and quote, 'Research meant months and months and months and no conclusion.' But that doesn't have to be research. I mean, if that's his experience – yes, it depends on how you interpret it. I think had there been this kind of ferment and excitement and you know – instant capability not only for getting data sources but for interpreting them correctly, you know, with good methods – that would have been a very different….

**QUESTION:** I can just see - I mean, I can't fathom why that wasn't --

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Money. At least. Many there were other reasons too. But it just – it got such short shrift - I mean . . . [laughing].

**QUESTION:** I know that, just as an anecdote for myself, when I first came there and started working on the administrative side at The Carter Center, that Emory didn't even have insurance policies that took care of international activities. I mean, they had – the university just had no experience administratively with working with a center that was international.

**ELLEN MICKIEWICZ:** Well, I started the international administrative
capacity at Emory. I appointed somebody precisely to, first of all, take an inventory of exactly what kinds of exchanges we had; who was designated to deal with international activities. I don't mean study abroad – that had always been there – but up in the Dean's office, I create this position, which then later morphed into the position that Marion [Creekmore] held.

But let me just say from the Emory president's side, or what I imagine it to be. Taking a chance on The Carter Center was a very, very risky operation.

QUESTION: Yes, I'm aware of this.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: It involved, in the beginning, who knew how much money and for how long? It was – it's a largely conservative, I think, Board of Trustees, but that certainly does not include my favorite people, the Hardmans [John and Laura]. And I don't even know if Laura was on the Board?

QUESTION: She was on the Board a bit at that time.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Was she? But it was very hard to move the Board in this never before seen direction. With how open-ended a financial obligation. So it was extremely risky and bold for President Laney to have had that vision at all.

QUESTION: It was indeed.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: And so – and he was out there, you know, just sort of --

QUESTION: But Jim Laney came to Emory with a background beyond that of academia, as well, which sometimes you don't find in a university president, when their entire careers have been within that community. But having -- even though it was through the church, he had been in South Korea for a long period of time, and he had a global perspective that you might not find.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Oh, yes. Plus he was a man of -- no matter what he did, he was a man of vision and action. And I think he's absolutely brilliant.

QUESTION: I do, too.
ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: When we used to interview tenure people – candidates for tenure – when I was Dean. No matter what the field, he would sort of instantly hit just the main point. Or just the weak point. I mean, he was just absolutely amazing. He was just . . .

So I'm not sure that Emory was in a position – I don't know – to undertake the rest of what I thought maybe ideally should be done. I really don't know.

QUESTION: I know that the - I've watched that whole relationship evolve to the point that now Emory's role is that of being a part of the Board of Trustees that helps oversee the financial aspect of The Carter Center. The university as such – maybe some individuals – but as such does not get involved in designing programs or determining that kind of policy for The Carter Center. So the role is somewhat less than it was when you were there. I might say somewhat less – considerably less in that respect.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Well, the administration, I think, was not ideally suited to follow President Laney.

QUESTION: Well, perhaps we can stop this now, and let me take this, and listen to this. Here's the process. Our transcriber transcribes this, and we send it to you. You make whatever changes, additions, corrections, that you choose to make. Accompanying the transcript will be a deed of gift so that when the transcript is as you wish it to be, you can give it to the Carter Library.

You can make whatever restrictions that you want to, within reason; I mean, if you wish to say that any portion of your remarks you wanted to be not available to the public for a period of time or anything like that – we hope not, because we'd like to have this available to researchers right away. Usually what happens with me is, after I've gone through it, I start making all kinds of notes of things that have been brought out that I want to follow up on and expand on. And ask for time later on. So if we could do that.

ELLEN MICKIEWICZ: Okay, sure, I'd be delighted. The only thing – I remember when you mentioned that you wanted to come, "And I said, "Oh, yeah, let's do it the end of May," or something. I just want to warn you that I've got, coming up, the most incredible time I think, ever. I have to give five different talks, and one of them is in Vienna. I'm having seventeen Russians come – etc. So this is a – in other words, this is just a way of saying, I'll try to get to it. But this is really the mother of all crunches.

QUESTION: I understand. And to be honest, I don't think the transcript is turned around real rapidly, either, so you won't be getting it like next week, anyway. But I'll be listening back to it. And I may just make a phone call – I may
hear something that I want to just make a quick question for some clarification on, that can be added in there.

Let me stop this at the moment.

[End of interview]