DATE: Tuesday and Wednesday, July 30 and 31, 2002

SPEAKERS: Dr. Martin I. Elzy - Assistant Director, Jimmy Carter Library
Frank Moore, Assistant to President Jimmy Carter for Congressional Liaison

TOPIC: Oral History

DR. ELZY: This is Tuesday, July 30th, 2002. I'm Martin Elzy, Assistant Director of the Jimmy Carter Library. I'm interviewing Mr. Frank Moore, who was Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison throughout the Carter Administration. We're sitting in my office in the Jimmy Carter Library.

I would recommend that anyone using this interview should also consult the Frank Moore Exit Interview and the Frank Moore Miller Center Interview that are part of the holdings of the Carter Library. Those interviews were conducted more than twenty years ago, and it seemed appropriate to conduct today's interview, to allow Frank Moore to reflect on that White House experience after this passage of time.

I shall try not to ask questions that were adequately answered in those previous interviews.

Mr. Moore, have you recorded other oral histories or written any books or articles about which we should alert the researchers who use this interview?

FRANK MOORE: No, I have not. From time to time Jody Powell will send somebody to me who's doing a Master's thesis or something on one particular part of the transition, or the election, and I'm always, I hope, generous with my time. The most recent one was a guy from Americus who was doing a play about Jimmy Carter. He's at Georgia Southwestern.

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: And he spent two three-hour periods of time with me on this. It's been helpful in preparation for this.

DR. ELZY: Well, good. Well, please tell us briefly about where you were born, your family education and so forth.

FRANK MOORE: Yes. I was born in Gainesville, Georgia, but grew up in Dahlonega, Georgia, which is in Lumpkin County. My father was a Ford dealer and a hardware store owner. I was the youngest of four boys. I have a younger sister. I went to elementary school to Lumpkin County. I went to Darlington School For Boys in Rome, Georgia, graduated from there in 1954, I believe. Went one year to North Georgia College in Dahlonega and then transferred to
the University of Georgia. I finished in 1959. Later on, I went back to – after the White House, I went to the Advanced Management Program at Harvard. Harvard Business School runs a 13-week program.

And that's about the extent of my education itself [laughing]. A lot of it's self-taught.

**DR. ELZY:** Well, when you got out of the University of Georgia, how did you start your career, and where, when and how did you meet Jimmy Carter?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, I – I went to – I ran a test market for Captain Crunch cereal for the Quaker Oats Company in Knoxville. They did two – one in Buffalo, New York, one in Knoxville, because of the – TV was just coming in, and Saturday morning cartoons, and the cereal companies were trying to gauge the effect of sponsoring cartoons and how it affected the sales of a new cereal. And I ran that for the Quaker Oats Company.

But I'd come home at night and throw out the samples and stuff in the dumpster – I lived on James – in the James Agee Apartments [laughing] up behind the University of Tennessee. And I saw these children just waiting for me to come home, and they'd scramble and get the Aunt Jemima pancake mix, dog food, whatever Quaker Oat products I would toss out of my car.

And I spoke to my minister about it. I said, "You know, it's really--" -- President Johnson was running against Goldwater, Senator Goldwater, at that time. And Johnson came to Knoxville. And I saw him; I also saw Goldwater up in Kingsport, Tennessee, up in the Tri-City areas. But I said, "You know, this is just not right." And they started the War on Poverty. I decided I'd rather do something in that area than work for a cereal company.

So I came down to Gainesville, Georgia, which had a fourteen-county area, of extreme northeast Georgia, organization called The Area Planning and Development Commission, which are pretty unique to Georgia. They're a quasi-governmental agency set up by city ordinance and county resolution and they're funded mostly by the Economic Development Administration, part of the Department of Commerce.

And it was through these organizations that Head Start and Job Corps and those type programs were run. I ran Head Start in those fourteen counties, working for another man who was the head of it. Jimmy Carter was head of a similar organization in west central Georgia, which was eight counties. He was Chairman of the Executive Committee, as you would expect he would be, and they were interviewing for – they had a beginning Director and they wanted another Director, and somehow I was recommended. I went down and interviewed with him. And somehow got the job. Nancy and I spent the first night in Miss Lillian's [Carter] house, in Plains.

**DR. ELZY:** And what year was this? Approximately.

**FRANK MOORE:** She was in India. And Jimmy Carter had run for governor, lost; he was neither a state senator nor a governor. So this was probably '67.
DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: He was in between offices.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: Hugh Carter was the senator from that area at that time. But I'll never forget waking up and looking out, and those fields – I – my wife and I both were from North Georgia and we were used to seeing mountains when we'd wake, look out, on the horizon [laughing]. And I could see these fields going on forever. But it was a chance to run my own show. It was a raise. I think I went from $9,000 to $11,000 dollars a year.

But I had met Jimmy Carter previously when he was running for governor, for the first time. Senator Paul Broun from Athens, whom I respected, had brought him to Gainesville, Georgia, in the basement of a bank community room. And I went up and met him and was impressed with him. And later on, I went to work – he was not the chairman of the Commission but, as you could imagine, he was the dominant person on the Board. And he was already, I believe, laying plans to run for governor again.

One day Hamilton Jordan, whom I had not met – Jimmy Carter phoned me from the warehouse – I lived in Ellaville, Georgia, and the offices were in Ellaville, and I think they were eleven miles from Plains. We were in Schley County; he was in Sumter County. He said, "A guy named Hamilton Jordan wants to come by and see you, and will you be there?" And I said, "Sure."

Hamilton came in, introduced himself, and said he was going to work for Jimmy Carter, he was going to run for governor, and he wanted to know if I'd help. I said, "Of course." And probably taking a great risk, because it was – we had other Board members, had eight counties, and we did have to get money from the cities and the County Commissioners each year [laughing]. Fifteen cents per capita.

But Hamilton asked me to help in organizing the Ninth Congressional District, which I was from, in extreme northeast Georgia, and I had previously worked in Gainesville and [to] help in the Third. So I took vacation time off and went up and went around to see the County School Superintendents and the County Commissioners and the mayors and the bankers and people I had known in my previous job. And set up an organization, a semblance of one. I don't – I want to --

DR. ELZY: Was this really your first political work?

FRANK MOORE: Yes, it was. Except earlier Planning and Development Commission work is political work, because you're dealing with elected officials, but -- just a note here, and a caution, of truth in advertising – I did not have a big part to play at all in that gubernatorial election. I had another full-time job. I went to the meetings on Sundays --
DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: -- with all the people from around the state, and we made telephone calls and wrote letters and that type of thing, but I was certainly not in the inner circle at all and don't claim to have been.

DR. ELZY: During the campaign for the 1970 election.

FRANK MOORE: Yes. But he was elected. He asked – Hamilton asked me to come up and go to work in the State Capitol, on Reorganization. To do the County Commissioners and the mayors, which – I knew a lot of them in Georgia, having gone to the conventions and belonged to the various organizations, Georgia Planning Association, that type thing, been active in that – to generate support for the Reorganization bills.

DR. ELZY: And this was not an easy task, was it? Wasn't reorganization rather controversial?

FRANK MOORE: Very difficult. Very, very difficult. Lot of entrenched interests. And I guess about all I did was neutralize some of those people, but – a big fight in the State Senate and it passed by one or two votes.

Later on, Hamilton asked me to come to work for him, from that job. That was about a year job, maybe – maybe it was seven or eight months. And Lansing Lee, who worked for Hamilton, went back to law school, and I became Hamilton's deputy. And worked the Georgia legislature. Most of the hard work had been done by then; I was sort of – came after the battle, the tough battles.

And then I worked in – Governor Carter was National Campaign Chairman for the Democratic National Committee, which was sort of a nothing job prior to his taking it. Hamilton went up to be the Director of that and Hamilton was Executive Director [on Governor Carter’s staff], which is – incidentally, is a sworn position in Georgia. It's the Chief of Staff. But the Lieutenant Governor in Georgia – I don't know if you know this or not, Martin – is not part of the Executive branch. He's part of the Legislature.

DR. ELZY: Oh, I see.

FRANK MOORE: So when Hamilton went to Washington, I was elevated to his position for about the last twenty-two, twenty-three months of the Governor's term.

DR. ELZY: Chief of Staff?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah. Executive Secretary is the right term, but it's Chief of Staff. And it was sort of my job to stay there and look after things and run the sawmill because Hamilton and the Governor and Jody were out all the time in Iowa and New Hampshire and so forth. When Governor Carter announced, I became – I was National Finance Chairman for about the first thirteen months of the campaign.
DR. ELZY: Let me ask you about President Carter deciding to run for President. When did you first learn of it and what did you think about it?

FRANK MOORE: I learned about it at a meeting at the Mansion. And we were standing in a bedroom, a guest bedroom, and the Governor told me. And of course, I knew something was going on – I wasn't that dumb. But Hamilton had requisitioned a room in the basement of the capitol, and we [laughing] had put locks on it and he'd – my secretary was typing the memos that he was doing, so - it's a small office. And you notice the schedule and visitors coming through the - you know, coming out to the Mansion and national press and that type of thing. And — but what did I think of it? I thought it was wonderful, and I was for it. And here's why I did that.

In Georgia, regionally we're part of the Appalachian Regional Commission. Georgia is part of the Coastal Plains Regional Commission; two overlapping EDA [Economic Development Administration] projects. And I went to those meetings, both as staff – you usually had a staff planning meeting with other Chiefs of Staff for the governors and those two regions. And the Southern Governors Association, which Governor Carter was active in, really stretches from Maryland through Oklahoma, and includes Puerto Rico. So we – that, he had two meetings a year there. And the National Governors – and then the Democratic Governors.

So Governor Carter didn't particularly like going to those meetings. I'd end up going with him and stay after he left. So I had a chance to observe the other governors, maybe thirteen or fourteen other governors, and fifty other governors, in the National Governors Association. [Ronald] Reagan was Governor of California at that time.

But the people who were being written about were Dale Bumpers, Governor of Arkansas, and Reubin Askew, Governor of Florida. I knew both their staffs well. So the New South, the three governors, and they were the ones who were called on to be interviewed. And when the Governor's Assoc-- you know, came out of the closed-door meetings and the press pounced on them, and they were getting their pictures in the national magazines and so forth. And I said, "Well, I know all these guys, and Jimmy Carter would make a better President than they would."

And even at the National Governors meeting, and the Democratic Governors meetings, you would always have the other Presidential candidates come in. It was an obligatory stop for Ed Muskie or Birch Bayh or Scoop Jackson or Moe Udall or Ted Kennedy or - Hubert Humphrey – to come and speak to those groups.

And so I was always there, on the front row, and watching them. And usually went to a reception afterwards or before, or something in somebody's suite, and had a chance to size them up. And I said, you know, the guy I work for is at least as good as these people [laughing], and I think better in many cases.

So I had no - you know, I was enthusiastic about it. But I became National Finance Director again in a – because of these associations I had.
DR. ELZY: And as National Finance – what is the National Finance Director's role? Do you raise the money, figure out how to spend the money? Count the money?

FRANK MOORE: Raise it. And for a very specific purpose and in a very specific way. If you'll think back, this was just after Watergate. And the first National Campaign Finance Act was passed in the wake of Watergate. And people were struggling with these campaign laws. Maurice Stans was going to jail and John Mitchell was going to jail, and the Watergate trials were going on, and people were afraid if they put a bumper sticker on the car, they were going to jail. I mean, you know, they said, "If I write out a – Maurice Stans – I gave him a check, and he's going to jail. I'm afraid if I give you a check, I'm going to—".

But the public finance thing – the Presidential change is part of that law, of reform, and it – and PACS were just being set up. But it specified that you had to qualify for federal matching funds. You had to raise at least five thousand dollars in increments of two hundred and fifty dollars in twenty states to qualify.

So, well, what states do you start in? Of course, Georgia. And I went in and talked – we got Gary Hart's book, Right From The Start, and I met Gary and talked with him, and talked with other people who had been involved in Presidential campaigns and fundraising. And they said you have to raise about half the money in your home state.

And we had the traditional dinners – a big broadcast on – we got [Phil] Walden from Capricorn Records to furnish his artists, who were Razzie Bailey and Percy Sledge, and the Allman Brothers Band, the Marshall Tucker Band, and put on concerts for us, and raised money. And of course, that all counted. I mean, because you sell a $25 dollar ticket.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But we did all right in Florida and Georgia and South Carolina and [laughing] Alabama and – but then, you got down, you got about ten states, and you got about ten more to go. And literally, you found one person in New Mexico and Chip Carter would go out there and go with somebody that Hamilton had met at the Democratic National Committee and - they'd go door to door, soliciting ten or fifteen dollar contributions. The Governor of New Jersey – Brendan Byrne put on a fundraiser for us.

And the Governor of Delaware, who was the first governor to endorse Jimmy Carter for President, by the way, and it meant a lot. But he helped us raise some money. And we finally got to twenty states and got qualified, and then you got Secret Service protection when you reached a certain percentage in the national polls. I don't know what that was. It was a pretty low threshold – two or three percent.

DR. ELZY: I see.
FRANK MOORE: But that helped in this way, in the spending money part of it, because it was one way to generate – we usually flew in a Queen Air, or King Air – chartered airplanes, and they were 15-passenger airplanes, or 12-passenger or 8-passenger, but to put four Secret Service agents on an 8-passenger plane, and charge them first-class airfare --

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: You can essentially fly the candidate and the staff for free. And we'd charge news organizations, I believe – you'd have to ask Bob Lipshutz, because he was in charge of spending the money. But it was important to reach those two thresholds. To qualify for federal matching funds that gave you - gave you legitimacy -- a one-time Governor from Georgia, and then the Secret Service protection, but not just because they provided transportation on the ground, but also they provided revenue to the campaign.

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: But then Morris Dees came on as National Finance Chairman. I was glad to get out of that job, because it really wasn't – I really wasn't very good at it, but I just did what I had to do.

I called on the Governor’s friends – I raised the first five thousand dollars. I did a little budget, and we figured how many announcement letters we had to send out, and how much the stamps would cost, and how much the stationery would cost, and [laughing] I determined we needed five thousand dollars. I called Lamar Plunkett over in Bremen, Georgia, and he sent a thousand. I called Sam Way, Hawkinsville, and I've forgotten – so we – we got the five thousand. But you really had to understand the law.

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: What was allowed, because each person could only send twenty-five hundred, and so the wife had to give twenty-five hundred. It couldn't be on the same check; had to be a separate checking account, this type of thing. So everybody was scared to death of the new federal election law. So I spent a lot of time explaining that to people. I'm not a lawyer, so I don't know if I did it right or not. But we raised the money. And then I became a Deputy Campaign Chairman.

DR. ELZY: The Campaign Chairman was --?

FRANK MOORE: Hamilton Jordan. And I was Deputy for, and I was responsible for, the states – I believe beginning in Virginia - it's essentially the old Confederacy, Virginia through Texas and Oklahoma.

DR. ELZY: So there were two or three other Deputy Campaign Chairmen who had other states?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah. But of course the important states were New Hampshire and Iowa and Florida. And Phil Wise moved to Florida. I did some
early organizational work in Florida, and some fundraising. And Phil moved down there and took that to a different level. But the important primary in the states I was responsible for was North Carolina. And it was March the 24th, I believe. There were two weeks between Florida and North Carolina. But I spent most of my time in North Carolina and Texas. Lloyd Bentsen was running. He was on the ballot. He had the LBJ law, if you remember. The way you could run was --

DR. ELZY: Yes. He was running for Senate and President.

FRANK MOORE: And President. That was the Lloyd Bentsen law. But they had a very difficult – you were probably living in Texas at that time, but a very difficult qualification, where you had to go to each of the state senatorial districts and get a percentage of names on a petition, and file that with the Secretary of State, in order to get on the ballot, in that state senatorial district.

And I don't know how many – I think Texas had about the same number of state senatorial districts as they Congressmen; there were twenty-four or twenty-five. [George] Wallace got on about three. Most people didn't even make an effort. Of course Senator Bentsen was on all of them. And Governor Carter got on about twelve or fifteen. But I'll come back to that story later because it was important.

DR. ELZY: All right.

FRANK MOORE: At the Convention. But – well, let me go ahead and talk about it now. Just parenthetically. Of course, Senator Bentsen had all of the main people in Texas, the state senators, Barefoot Sanders, you know. One of his delegates, Oscar Mauzy was a delegate. You know, Herman Brown was – the Mayor of Dallas was a delegate.

And we had sort of nobodies. I mean, we had a fireman, or we had somebody here or there. Union guys. But by the time it got to the Texas primary, the – so these guys beat, you know, these name guys who really weren't going to go to the Convention, but we got – we got ninety delegates, and then we got a proportion of the other delegates. And we ended up with a hundred and ten delegates out of Texas.

But [laughing] -- you know, Tony Williams has just been denied nomination for the second term as mayor [in Washington, DC] because his petitions were ruled invalid. So I was out in Austin, and I got a call from Mark White, later governor of Texas – he was Secretary of State for Governor Briscoe. And Mark said, "Could you come by and see me?" I said – [I didn't know him] - I said, "Yeah." And he said, "Frank," he said, "I've got here these petitions that were filed for Jimmy Carter to see where he gets on the ballot." And said, "A lot of 'em look like they were done in a bar over here on Sixth Street." Had beer stains on them and the same handwriting and they were alphabetical [laughing].

And I said, "So?" He said, "You know, as Secretary of State, I can either approve these or not approve." And I said, "So what's the deal?" He said, "Well, Governor Briscoe feels like Jimmy Carter is probably going to be elected
President, and he'd like somebody he can talk to there on energy issues." He said, he doesn't want to – he knows Edwin Edwards wants to be the energy czar – he's told everybody that, as Governor of Louisiana at the time. But Briscoe feels like he knows more about energy than Edwards because he owns a lot of it and he's – and agricultural issues.

So I went in and met the Governor and talked to him, and I knew his Chief of Staff, of course, and his other people, and I essentially, without any authority or anybody's part but mine [laughing], without talking to anybody, said, "You know, you'll always have a friend in the White House, you can call me directly and I'll talk to you."

So anyway, we got on the ballot, and later on, at the Convention, those – those delegates were very important to us.

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: But going back --

DR. ELZY: Sounds like you did a good job in Texas.

FRANK MOORE: I don't know. I don't – I made some long-lasting friendships out there, which – we had to make – we also made some enemies, because what happened, when you had to choose who the delegates were, then Bentsen and Briscoe – we had a lot of at large, and we had to give to these – these [laughing] distinguished friends, so the Governor and Senator, and some of our people who had gotten out front and run for us didn't get to go to the Convention unless they went as an alternate, and a lot of people probably have never forgotten that. But you just had to do what you had to do.

DR. ELZY: Right, right.

FRANK MOORE: As I'm sure there are a lot of people out there that don't remember Frank Moore very fondly.

DR. ELZY: But how did North Carolina go?

FRANK MOORE: Well, North Carolina, thanks to the good work in – we were running against George Wallace there. And as you know, North Carolina is made up of very small farms, tobacco, about fifty acres on the average farm, and eastern North Carolina is very conservative, white Democrats. Most of the black vote was in Durham and in Raleigh.

But we were really running against two people there. We were running against Ronald Reagan, for this reason. Reagan had discovered the Panama Canal as an issue against Gerald Ford in New Hampshire. And it was beginning to resonate. And he came to North Carolina, I think – I think Jesse Helms probably supported Reagan over Gerald Ford. And he had a television program. And I don't know what the registration was in North Carolina, what -- for the primary, but whatever it was, we – a lot of people who otherwise would have voted for Jimmy Carter or George Wallace crossed over and voted in the Republican
primary for Ronald Reagan.

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: But we won it, won it pretty big. I've forgotten what the percentages were, maybe 36 percent. Wallace got 24 percent.

DR. ELZY: A very important victory then.

FRANK MOORE: He fired all of his campaign staff. He had Billy Grammar -- a country music star going around and so forth, so he scaled back the next day. From the campaign. But it was interesting, that night – we had a ballroom rented. And had a band. And the Ford people had another ballroom in another big hotel. The Reagan people had a very small room in the same hotel we were in. Nobody expected them to win. They won the North Carolina primary.

And pretty soon, about nine or ten o'clock, this flood of people were coming into our party with Gerald Ford stickers on them. They had obviously been to the other party and saw that Ford – and they were coming looking for the Reagan party. But our ballrooms were adjacent. So essentially what happened, the two parties were combined at a cash bar. We ran the cash bar.

We made a good bit of profit off of it for the state party of North Carolina [laughing]. Or the Jimmy Carter – whatever it was - I mean, a good bit of money was twelve, fifteen hundred dollars for us.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But it was interesting to see how [laughing] – how quickly the Ford people switched sides to Reagan. There was the Panama Canal. That was my – the reason I mention it – that was my first exposure to what a volatile, volatile issue the Panama Canal was.

DR. ELZY: Right, right.

FRANK MOORE: During the primary season. But we had the – I learned a good bit about organization and we had the Communication Workers of America, the telephone operators, making the calls for us. And we had the NEA, National Education Association, talking.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And I learned – they had Washington people come down and work with us, and so that stood me in good stead later, when I went on back. They got promoted, along with me, so we [laughing] had good contacts from the national organizations. We had – North Carolina was not a big labor state, and they had some UAW [United Auto Workers]. Mostly it was teachers and communication workers. Bell South, I suppose, was the telephone company. And some independent phone companies up in the mountains.

But I also met a number of the Congressmen there, who later – they were
candidates at that time. They came on to Washington with us. I knew their staffs. And I'd worked in – I'd worked for them before. I forgot this – during the Governor's office, Hamilton asked Jody and myself and other people in the Governor's office to take our vacation and holidays and so forth and work in Congressional campaigns around the country. We worked in about thirty.

DR. ELZY: Really?

FRANK MOORE: And put on some campaign schools. In Kentucky and in South Carolina and in Texas and so forth. So I met a lot of people who later came on to Washington. Martin Frost, Bill Hefner and so forth. But it was important, and I had also run a campaign school in North Carolina, two years prior to this.

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: And five people had come – three of them got elected, so we had all those lists. They gave us their lists, so – we had a pretty good core group of people working for us in North Carolina.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But we didn't know – we didn't know we were going. North Carolina was sort of a fallback. We didn't know we would beat Wallace in Florida, and the national press sure didn't. But after beating him in Florida and North Carolina, it was pretty easy. I mean, I think – I think we took the candidate and we didn't even – we just brought him in there for a few times.

DR. ELZY: I see. I don't want to rush you through the primaries –

FRANK MOORE: Well, I didn't have a big role in the primaries.

DR. ELZY: I do want to ask you about the Convention. And then also, working into that as well, the selection of Walter Mondale as Vice Presidential candidate, if you had any recollections or memories of that experience.

FRANK MOORE: Well, the Convention's – of course, the parts of it I was responsible for – and I don't know how it was organized – I was a floor leader or something. But certainly those states where I had good friends and knew the governor – Mississippi, Kentucky, Texas, Alabama and Georgia – states I had been responsible for – essentially the old Confederacy – and I also had some other states, like Hawaii - for some reason [laughing], I don't know why.

But my – my part in the Vice Presidential selection is very narrow and very small, and it consisted of this. Since I was already at – after the convention, and after the nomination, I moved to Washington and opened a little office. Sort of a liaison – as you remember, we ran the campaign out of Atlanta.

DR. ELZY: Yes.
FRANK MOORE: Went over in Dupont Circle and, as I said, I knew people on the Georgia delegation and some of the others on the DNC staff. And when it came time to – I was designated to escort people to Plains, for the interviews.

DR. ELZY: Oh, really?

FRANK MOORE: For some reason. And I'd either escort them from Washington or from Atlanta and meet them here, so – and not only the people who were being – like John Glenn and --

DR. ELZY: Adlai Stevenson?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, I took Adlai down, and I took [Peter] Rodino down. I took – yeah, I'd fly down with them in a little plane, we'd go do – sit through the interview, and --

DR. ELZY: That must have been interesting.

FRANK MOORE: Well, it served me in good stead later because I got to know them --

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: -- you know, pretty well. But also brought down Russell Long and Jack Brooks and people like that, and Bennett Johnston, who we knew we would be going before the committees with what we wanted to do. And --

DR. ELZY: So you were assuming victory at that point.

FRANK MOORE: We were assuming victory about forty points ahead. And we were sort of running the Vice Presidential sweepstakes. There was a whole ritual to it. They'd come out and they'd ask what did Amy think and who'd you like best and this type thing. But certainly I had no – I had no part in selecting Mondale. Jimmy Carter did that. It was his – and it was a wise choice. I was using Herman Talmadge's office in the capitol – he loaned me an office in the Senate – and Norm Mineta loaned me his conference room in the House – because those of us – because we all worked out of them, on the respective sides. I shared the conference room with Norm with another young guy who was Leon Panetta, who had won his primary and had no – had no general election opposition. So he and I shared [laughing] --

DR. ELZY: Is that right?

FRANK MOORE: [Laughing] Norm's conference room. He was up there getting a head start, because he – he was assured of victory in November. But Talmadge was very nice, and very courteous, and courtly, and would take me to introduce me to various Senators that he thought would be important to us later on, and give me his private opinion of them. On the way – he always escorted you to the office, and into the office, and introduced you to the Senator, and then he left.
DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: But he told me, he said, "If you took a secret ballot and asked a hundred Senators to write down the hundred smartest Senators, that two people would be at the top. It would be Russell Long and Abe Ribicoff. I later told that story to Senator Long and Senator Ribicoff, and they both told me without any hesitation that he was wrong, that it would be Herman Talmadge who would be [laughing] one of the two top spots. But Ribicoff always had a great staff.

I said to Senator Ribicoff, "Well, Senator Talmadge says you have the best staff in the Senate." He said, "I do." He wasn't very modest about it. And he said, "I'll tell you how I get the staff. And I've always had this policy since I was Governor of Connecticut and I was Secretary of HEW." He said, "Anytime I interview people, I try to hire someone who's smarter than I am. And I've never succeeded." [Laughing]. So I remember that. I said, "Well, I'm going to remember that when I hire my own staff, and I'm sure I'll never fail," [laughing]. I always hired somebody who's smarter than I was. And it worked out – it worked out very well for me.

But Talmadge and [Russell] Long and [John] Stennis and [James] Eastland and – all the Southerners told me, they said, "Frank" – this is on the selection, said, "I know Governor Carter had to get a liberal, and if he had to get a liberal, and he's got to have one to win, he got the best one there was."

DR. ELZY: Well, good.

FRANK MOORE: That's what they all said. In one word, and that's exactly a quote from Herman Talmadge. But others said similar.

DR. ELZY: It sounds like, too, the Southern Senators were pleased to have a Southern Presidential candidate in Jimmy Carter.

FRANK MOORE: They were. I think there was a certain amount of pride. I didn't realize how deeply it ran. I spent a lot of time with Senator Stennis – he was Chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He was ranking on Appropriations, and he had, of course, Armed Services Committee appropriations – and after [John] McClellan died, I think he had both – both posts – both Appropriations and Senate Armed Services for a while, which was – shows you the esteem in which he was held.

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: But Senator Stennis told me a story. About how he got to the Senate, and it was in a special election, or it was 1947 or sometime along in there, maybe earlier. But he had been in the House, and he ran for the Senate and won. But he had been a practicing attorney in Mississippi, and he was raised by his grandfather. And he told me something I'd probably known and forgotten, that Mississippi was occupied longer than any other Southern state, by federal troops.
That's what he said, I don't know if that's true. He felt it was. And his grandfather remembered the humiliation and told Stennis about it regularly, of having to go down to the courthouse and see the flag raised and see the troops riding through the town and sleeping in the courthouse and supervising the elections and being billeted in the schools and so forth, like an occupying army – which, it wasn't like an occupying army, they were [laughing] an occupying army.

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: So Senator Stennis would say, "I wish my grandfather who raised me" – it might have been a great-uncle – anyway, it was an – it was not his mother and daddy – "I wish the person who raised me could see this now. A man from Georgia being President of the United States." And of course being several generations younger, I never realized how deeply some of those old guys felt about that from the South.

DR. ELZY: Right, right. We skipped over, actually --

FRANK MOORE: We later used that in the Panama Canal, used that – about an occupied territory, with Senator Stennis with a – "how would you like it if a canal went through the middle of Mississippi?" [END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]

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TAPE 1, SIDE B

FRANK MOORE: He didn't vote for the Panama Canal, but he didn't have to. It passed with sixty-seven votes, one part with sixty-eight. But he told me, "I'll be there if you need me."

DR. ELZY: Ah, I see.

FRANK MOORE: So I don't ever – I will never know if it had been effective or not, but I like to think it was.

DR. ELZY: You like to think you had one more vote.

FRANK MOORE: [Laughing] Yeah.

DR. ELZY: That's interesting. What about the campaign after the Convention, in '76? Running against Gerald Ford? What was your role in that campaign and how did you think it went? I know immediately after the Convention, Jimmy Carter had a big lead and it dwindled.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah. Well, it's hard to remember. It all just went together so fast – the primaries, and we didn't have a break between. And people say to me, "Gee, I bet the four years in the White House was real busy." I say, [laughing] "Well, actually it was six years, because I had two years of the campaign and we never had a break." We went straight into it. But my role – during that time I lived in Washington. My family lived in Atlanta.
But I stayed in a little apartment up there, shared it with some other people. And it was to try to coordinate the Congressional campaigns and the Senatorial campaigns.

For instance, we were just talking about Senator Stennis. I asked Senator Stennis to call a meeting of the Mississippi delegation. Which he did, in his office, and served lunch. So they were all Democrats – Senator Eastland came, Jamie Whitten was very important. We had – I can't remember all – oh, of course Sonny [Montgomery] from Yazoo City was number two on Armed Services in the House at the time. So a lot of important members.

So essentially, we didn't have any money, we didn't have any budget for Mississippi, you know, probably a couple thousand bucks. So what I tried to do was piggyback the Carter campaign on the campaign of those people who were running --

**DR. ELZY:** I see.

**FRANK MOORE:** -- there, and, and coordinated with the Governor and that was – we did the same thing in Pennsylvania and Illinois and California to – we didn't have nearly enough money for California, but we — but Norm Mineta helped us with some of the younger members of the California delegation.

And we'd have these delegation meetings and essentially make a pitch to them, and some of them would help us and some wouldn't, and they'd all — they'd all say they were; some would — some would actually do it. And so we'd sort of piggy-back to them. We'd try to get joint bumper stickers printed. So they'd pay for the bumper stickers, but they had Carter's name on it, you know [laughing]. But it was a lot easier [laughing] when we had a forty point lead.

**DR. ELZY:** Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** Of course, when the lead started dwindling, I was the recipient of all the griping about it, and all the fights of what you haven't done, what you need to do, and what you should do, in our state. And people would come to Washington and meet when – I'd get called up to a lunch and lectured, and you have to do it this way and that way, and you guys don't know what you are doing, and you stupid Georgians and so forth [laughing]. Without saying that; they were patronizing.

**DR. ELZY:** They wanted long coattails and as the election drew nearer, they were becoming more worried.

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, yeah, they – actually, you know, the *Washington Post* wrote a story - a long, long story, about how Jimmy Carter frittered away the election. To be published the day after. I guess every major newspaper did.

**DR. ELZY:** So they prepared a story in case the election turned out with Gerald Ford winning.

**FRANK MOORE:** Yeah. And the reason I know that, is they – part of it involved
me. That the people were stupid to run it out of Atlanta, not Washington, D.C.; we didn't pay attention to the right people up there, didn't ever come to Georgetown and go to the right parties, and they sent this unsophisticated guy named Frank Moore up there, as his liaison, and – laid a lot of the burden at my feet for losing. Which [laughing], thank goodness, we didn't.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But, uh -- I would do stuff like -- now, I was up there – but, you know, Mississippi started getting tight. And I went down and lived in the Governor's Mansion for three, four days and worked with the Governor, worked on voter turnout and that kind of stuff. And, you know, thank God I did. I mean, I don't think I had anything to do with it, but certainly the Governor got out and worked hard for us, and we carried Mississippi, and that was one of the states that put us over. It did put us over, that night, and Hawaii later came in, but --

DR. ELZY: I should point out, at some point, I think, you have made several self-deprecating remarks in this interview, but from what I hear from other Carter Administration people, they hold you in high regard, and think you did good work.

FRANK MOORE: Oh, they flatter me, but I don't – I don't pretend - you know, there's an opera, and there are a lot of people out singing the lead roles, and then there's spear carriers in the background. I was one of the spear carriers [laughing].

DR. ELZY: Well --

FRANK MOORE: [Laughing] I was on the stage, but I wasn't a principal.

DR. ELZY: So President Carter wins the election. The situation changes. Now, everyone knows he's going to become President. What became your role? When were you offered your White House job? Were you offered – was there some talk about other jobs, or was there just the one?

FRANK MOORE: No, it was never – there was never even talk of that job. It was interesting – I never --

DR. ELZY: It was the job you wanted, too?

FRANK MOORE: I would take – I didn't care. Whatever job the Governor wanted me to have. I continued to function in this role of escorting people to Plains [laughing], except it switched from Vice Presidential candidates to Cabinet officials, and --

DR. ELZY: Potential Cabinet --

FRANK MOORE: Potential Cabinet people. I took Bob Bergland down; I took Charles Duncan down. I was the person who – and some of them occurred at the Governor's mansion, and Governor Busbee was nice enough to let Governor Carter use the Mansion, even after November.
DR. ELZY: Now, on Cabinet appointments --

FRANK MOORE: I was just reminded of that lately because somebody came and interviewed me about how judges were done, and I said, "Well, you got to talk to Griffin Bell about that." And they said, "Well, we have, and he said that you were involved." And I said, [laughing] "I'm not involved."

DR. ELZY: Well, you mentioned the Cabinet members. I had not thought of this before, but did President Carter meet with two or three potential people for each Cabinet post before he made a decision? Or did he just meet the person that everyone agreed, and he felt he should appoint, and then decide to do it or not?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I don't know. I mean, in some cases it probably was a short list of two people or something. In others, it was sort of a – like, in a - from the economic area – he'd have a – a day-long meeting where you'd invite people who were the wise men ostensibly, but, and -- you know – [A.W.] Clausen with Bank of America – he could have been Secretary of the Treasury; he could have been Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; he could have been, you know, three or four different things. And I think the same thing was going on in foreign policy, where --

DR. ELZY: So he might bring in a group of wise men, ostensibly to give him advice, but he's also sizing them up.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, and he's received memos from them, and – and everybody's got their favorite, and they're pushing this person for Secretary of State, and this person for National Security Adviser and this person for Secretary of Defense, and this person for Undersecretary of this and so forth, so – I think there was – and again, I was not involved in this. I'm simply an observer. And I'm not saying that's how it happened, but I think - you know, knowing the Governor as I did, I could see that he was, you know, making decisions about these people. And I guess you might say, you know, one person could play shortstop or they could play second base.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And another person could play shortstop but really wouldn't be a good second baseman, so you put that person at shortstop and you put the other one at – at second base.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And so, I think that type of thing was going on as people were going in and out of Plains.

DR. ELZY: So when in that two-month period did President Carter – did President Carter offer you the job of head of Congressional Liaison?

FRANK MOORE: He – he did not. He did, eventually. But the Cabinet – we were meeting – we were at Saint Simon’s at Musgrove Plantation. And the
Cabinet had mostly been selected. And some of them – many of them had been announced. I think the big four had been announced -- State, Defense, Treasury, Justice.

For instance, that's an example of how that process went on, I think. You know, Griffin Bell was in charge of the judicial related issues. Griffin Bell wrote the questionnaire that you would use with a Cabinet person. If you answered all those - you know, questions with, "Is there anything in your life that were it to become public, might be embarrassing?" and so on and so on and so on. "Would you be willing to submit a financial statement, both your wife's and yours," and so on and so forth.

Well, you know what, a lot of people come, there's a match in the interview, and they get that thing, and they'd say, "It's quite an honor, I appreciate it, it was nice to be considered, but I really want to see my son grow up," or, "My bank needs me," or whatever.

Judge Bell was doing the judicial issues, and devising a method to do merit selection of judges. And I think when it came down to who's going to be Attorney General, President Carter hadn't really known him, worked with him that closely, he'd been Kirbo's law partner, but he was so impressed, he said, "You know, why don't we do Griffin Bell as Attorney General?" It's like Warren Christopher doing the Cabinet selection for Clinton in Little Rock and in the end, he gets to be Secretary of State because he's better than all the people he's recommending.

**DR. ELZY:** That's right. Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** And that's what happened to Judge Bell. I mean, he's recommended this person, this person, this person, the strengths, the weaknesses, and that, and pretty soon, you say, "Well, gee, the best guy is a person who's not even being considered. He's running the process."

**DR. ELZY:** I see.

**FRANK MOORE:** I think a lot of that went on. I don't know that that's the way it happened, but I think it did.

**DR. ELZY:** Right. Right. And then you were offered the job of -- ?

**FRANK MOORE:** We were down at Musgrove Plantation; we had done – I know Bergland was there. Others were there. I don't know if the whole Cabinet had been selected. But, at the end of one of the meetings, Governor Carter came up - you know, we were just standing in the yard, saying goodbye to people, and he said, "By the way, I'd like for you to be, uh – work on my - come to Washington with me and work on my staff as head of Congressional Relations." And I said, "Well, I'd be thrilled to do it. And I'll do that or anything else you want me to do."
I'd never talked about any other job, and never had any promises of having that job, and – and really no expectations of having it. I mean, I could have stayed right here in Georgia and gotten other work.

**DR. ELZY:** Well, after he said that to you, did you go to work on that job? Did that become your --

**FRANK MOORE:** Yeah.

**DR. ELZY:** -- primary role, then, to deal with a recently-elected Congress?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, my first job was confirmations of the Cabinet. Yeah. But - but Senate primarily. And that, my primary job right away was to – and we had some – we had some controversial – if you remember, Ted Sorensen was first nominated CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].

**DR. ELZY:** Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** And it was my job to call around to the Senators, certainly going by the Chairman and the ranking, and on the respective Committees and the leadership and bouncing names off of people. And so I was in the midst of doing that. And then Stansfield Turner, we had to – we did that one, after Sorensen withdrew.

Griffin Bell essentially ran his own – we weren't involved in that, but he had – there was controversy about his belonging to a private club in Atlanta. And so forth. He got twenty-six votes against him, I think. He probably could tell you every one of them. I know I would be able to. There was – even with Bert Lance, before Ribicoff and [Charles] Percy – uh, Ribicoff was Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I guess that was – that was the right - that was the Committee for OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. And he had to agree to sell the stock in the bank he was president of, and so forth. So that's – that's what really happened later. The bank stock dropped in value and he asked for an extension, and they asked for another hearing on it.

But then we had Dan Tate come to work, as Senate Liaison, and did a wonderful job with all those confirmation – and Bob Thomson – the confirmation hearings. And sometimes the deputies were - you know, the – the top person – a lot of the old-time Senators, you know – for instance, Talmadge would say, "He's the President, he can have whatever he wants, I don't care. I'll vote for whoever you send up here, but when you get to Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for cotton, then I want to be consulted on who that is going to be, and I want to see the list, and I want to give you my opinion of those people, whether I think they know what they're talking about."

**DR. ELZY:** Right, right.

**FRANK MOORE:** So he didn't care who the Secretary of Agriculture was, but he cared about one specific program.

**DR. ELZY:** Right, right. I see.
FRANK MOORE: And that was true of a lot of people. [George] McGovern. [Robert] Dole on wheat. All of the guys on wheat. Frank Church on sugar beets.

DR. ELZY: I see. I see.

FRANK MOORE: Long in particular on sugar. And people always associate Louisiana with oil and gas, but sugar is so important to them, and rice is so important to Louisiana and Texas. And Arkansas. So who's gonna be the guy for rice in Agriculture? That's what we want to know. And of course they had a lot of visits with these nominees.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: They weren't — weren't televised, but that's what was important to them.

DR. ELZY: That's right. Before I ask you more about your role as Congressional Liaison, I did want to ask, during the Administration, did you advise the President on topics other than Congressional relations? Or advise him on appointments? Things of that nature?

FRANK MOORE: Yes. Uh [pause] — he would ask me. I don't think I ever did — I was trying to think — did I ever do it unsolicited? And probably the answer is no. But if it involved Georgia or one of the states that I was active in or knew people in, knew the governors in — if somebody — if a governor came to see me — and Jack Watson was intergovernmental affairs, and governors should have come [to him], but sometimes they'd come and see Jack, and they'd stop by my office. And of course, I'd had a prior relationship with them. And I'd write a memo to him about Governor so-and-so came by to see me and he's concerned about this or that. If it was Georgia, and particularly involving someone that he'd been in the legislature with or a judicial appointment or political appointment like U.S. Attorney. Where the Senate had — two Senators had — if they were of the same party, had to agree to it. I was involved in those.

I was involved to some degree in the judicial issue, the political part of it. Judge Bell delegated that to a person on his staff who really got the short list together. And then Bob Lipshutz, myself and — and Griffin Bell would get together, and kind of go through the list. And I'd sometimes — Griffin Bell would always go see Eastland — go up there with the list. I would go see the relevant Senators, and if it was a judgeship that covered multiple states, I'd have to see certain Senators and talk about it.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And that was how I was involved, and report back.

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: And we had some fights, for the black judges in Alabama.
And those were fought in the press, and we changed the procedure. Judge Bell did this, and it was a good change. But what would happen is, somebody would be mentioned as a judge, and they'd get on the short – the ABA [American Bar Association] would say this person’s qualified, and the Senators would say he’s okay.

And then you'd run – their name would get out, and usually ruin their law practice, because they'd have to start recusing themselves from cases. And their law practice would deteriorate, and things would get held up. And then, you know, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] would start going around town, asking people about them. And then, you'd find out – and this happened more than once – that some of these people had trouble with the IRS [Internal Revenue Service]. And bad trouble. And you really couldn't go forward to the Senate with them.

So, suddenly they were not under consideration. And people – and it was not fair to the individual, because – so everybody wondered, "Well, why?" You know, the FBI was in town, asking about them – and it's really an IRS problem.

So Judge Bell suggested, and -- that from now on, that he call – you know, and we worked it out with the Secretary of the Treasury. And I didn't know why, and I don't think Lipshutz did. But Griffin Bell would call over to the head of the IRS, or the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and say, "Martin Elzy is being considered for a judicial appointment. Is there any reason why, are there any pending cases or issues with him?" You would never, you know, ask them outright.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And he'd say, "Well, Martin really is – we were just getting ready to take an action against him. And it probably wouldn't be a good idea to send him formally to the Senate. It would embarrass him and it would embarrass the President." So we flipped that. And it worked a lot better. Not "we." But Judge Bell did.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But it caused some problems.

DR. ELZY: Let me ask a question --

FRANK MOORE: But it was certainly just the political part of it I was involved in. Not the qualifications for judge or anything.

DR. ELZY: Let me ask just a question about work as head of Congressional Liaison. What was a typical day like? How often did you meet or talk on the phone with President Carter? Did you spend time on the Hill? Were you always in your office? How did it work?

FRANK MOORE: Well, we started out in some confusion, not enough people in February and so forth. And about March we finally got organized and we realized that people were going up to the Hill from Stu Eizenstat's office, and from Bert
Lance's office, and then people were going from the agencies and the President's schedule really wasn't coordinated, nor major policy announcements.

So Bob Thomson – Hamilton and I – we had a Senior Staff meeting -- and -- and it was agreed that we would have a Deputy meeting every morning at, I think, 7:30. And Bob Thomson of my staff ran it. And Jim McIntyre's Deputy and Hamilton's Deputy and the scheduling people came, and somebody from the First Lady's office – the whole White House complex – and somebody from National Security came. Madeleine Albright [laughing] attended those meetings for Brzezinski. She also worked jointly for me. Did you know that?

DR. ELZY: No.

FRANK MOORE: She reported to me and National Security. I paid half of her salary and – and NSC paid half of her salary. But she came – she was Chief of Staff to Muskie -- when she came.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But she did NSC – well, other people did the NSC stuff, too. But those – that was a very, very important meeting. Because it started out on Monday, and say, this is what's going to happen this week, this is what's going to happen next week. Phil Wise would – or Tim Kraft would do the political – would do the schedule – this is where the President's going, this what he's going to do, and so Bob would say, "Well, he's going to Ohio to make a speech. We've got a Congressman, we've got two Congressmen, who are really undecided votes on a bill coming up next week, and can we get two seats on Air Force One?" "Well, sure." "Well, can we invite them?" "Yeah, you can invite them to go with the President."

So then the political office and the scheduling office would all be – and – somebody in Stu Eizenstat's office might say, "Well, you know, we're negotiating with that Congressman on some policies. Okay if I put somebody else on the airplane that could talk with them about?" So that began to work well.

And then that meeting was followed by a Senior Staff meeting. And I don't remember the time. They always were so early. But this Deputy meeting would go about an hour. We would – Bob would prepare a memo for me, Jody Hamilton, Stu and probably Jack Watson. And items would come up to the Senior Staff meeting. And actually Bob, I think, would come to the Senior Staff meeting, give a report. Oftentimes he'd just stay there and say, "This is what happened." He's very organized, very detailed. And also very neutral.

DR. ELZY: This was Bob --?

FRANK MOORE: Thomson.

DR. ELZY: Thomson.

FRANK MOORE: Um-hmm. He had -- he had an Army – he had been in the
Army and he was very crisp. And we would -- from that, we would essentially pass out assignments to – "I'll call the Department of so-and-so – I'll either call Secretary Califano or I'll call his Deputy, or I'll call the congressional affairs person, if you'll call so-and-so, and you'll call so-and-so." And we'd get the Administration coordinated. Jody would call the Press Secretary over there and say, "I'm going mention this at my briefing, or would you rather the Secretary say it?" Or whatever. And they'd always prefer it come from the White House [laughing]. Well, sometimes they wouldn't. Sometimes it's good news for the Secretary.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: So we got the thing – starting with that Deputy's meeting. Every morning. Public liaison was there, Anne Wexler's people. And it was important — and then we had interworking – Les Francis ran interworking groups. And these -- that's what we called them – they could be called anything – but essentially it was people, primarily from Domestic Policy, OMB, and my staff. And we – suppose we had a bill we wanted - just to take one, Department of Education. And OMB certainly had a – a lot to say about that.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And certainly Congressional Relations did. Because we had a lot of committees, things were being taken away from, and we were creating another committee on the Hill, and jurisdiction overlaps, and so forth. And then certainly Public Liaison did, because – NEA [National Education Association], you know, what are they going to think about it, or the Teachers Federation, or the schools, State School Superintendents, the Governors, and so forth?

So we'd have these deputy level working groups. And usually they were chaired by somebody from my staff. Sometimes they were chaired by somebody from Stu's staff. People like Bert Carp or somebody we worked closely with. Sometimes by an OMB staff, we'd just sort of decide who had the lead on it. But we would work out these issues, and usually that resulted in a memo to the President, signed jointly by me, McIntyre, and Eizenstat, the three of us.

So it saved the President a lot of time, hopefully it did. Instead of trying to read three different memos, we combined it into one memo, and send it to him, and it was usually a decision memo. Agree, disagree, disapprove. And of course he would ask for additional information on this and that. And sometimes it would be a minority report. Sometimes two of us would agree and the third would disagree.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: But it was already in one paper. And we sort of had an agreement among us that we wouldn't try to lobby on the side; that we'd just let the President decide, and whatever he decided, that's what we'd do.

And, uh -- I can't think of any specific issues, but there were lots of them, I mean, there were probably, you know, two or three or four or five a week, but that was a
process that came up.

So my day then began with a meeting with the President. And I was scheduled either before or after the National Security Adviser - I've forgotten which, but we often passed each other [laughing] in the door. And sometimes I'd meet with him alone; sometimes the Vice President would be in the meeting. Or I'd ask that the Vice President be in the meeting. Sometimes I would take different members of my staff in, one person who would talk about one particular issue; I'd take the person who was doing education or energy or taxes or whatever, to brief him and talk about it.

And that accomplished a number of things. One, it let the President get to know that person, so when he said – I said, you know, "Bill Cable said this is what happens," and so he'd get to know Cable. But it also gave Bill Cable credibility on the Hill. He could go up to the Hill and say, "I just met with the President," and they'd say, "You met with him?" He'd say, "Yeah, I met with him, I went in with Frank Moore, and we sat, and the President said, you know, he said to tell you hello, I was coming up to see you, and by the way, a picture was made, and he autographed it," you know. So that established credibility for members of the staff.

And within the White House complex, it enhanced the credibility of my staff in dealing with other people. If someone was in seeing the President, not one on one, but three on one or two on one – and they were never going to get in there, because their boss wasn't going to take them in – so it made my job much easier, because it enabled my staff to get things done without my having to do them.

DR. ELZY: Right. How long were these meetings with the President typically? Since they were every day, it would seem --

FRANK MOORE: They were pretty quick. They were usually fifteen minutes. And sometimes I'd yield back my time or I'd just say, "I don't have anything today," and – and he'd go back to work on paperwork. Or sometimes Phil would come and say, "Are you going to use all your time today?" And sometimes I'd say no, and Phil would say, "I'm going to run over today. It's going to take twenty minutes to get through this." And he'd have to take some away from Brzezinski or somebody else. And we'd trade off like that. Sometimes I'd use five minutes; sometimes I'd use twenty minutes.

DR. ELZY: What were you doing in these meetings? Were you preparing the President for his meetings that day with Congressmen, perhaps? Or presenting issues to him, asking him what position you should take on a piece of legislation that was being considered?

FRANK MOORE: All of that. What I would do – and he would have had the memos, the weekly – the legislative report. Sometimes he'd make a note, you know, "see me."

DR. ELZY: Maybe we should mention the weekly legislative report, explain what it is.
FRANK MOORE: Okay. This was done, I believe, on Fridays. And the weekly legislative report was both a report on what had happened that week and what was expected to happen next week in the schedule from subcommittees to full committees to floor votes and what the amendments were going to be. And what actions were being taken. And sometimes a request for the President's time to make calls or to meet with people – essentially - something that might be a schedule request: 'We think it would be good if you met with – next week is going to be about ripe to bring these two guys down.' And he'd say, "Okay."

Well, that was then my authorization to go to the scheduling secretary, you know, the President's note [laughing]. Otherwise, they'd say, "No, you can't get those people in." Or, it might be – it might be a decision – these other groups would come down and say, you know, "We're down to the yes or no," you know.

And sometimes it'd involve an appointment – somebody a Senator wanted back home, and you know, the Senator is not going to call this hearing until he gets an answer on this, and we think this guy's pretty sorry, but he's going to be one of five, he's not going to make much difference anyway, and let's go ahead and do it. And some-- he'd say "Okay," and somebody else wouldn't want it done, but – uh – but it was – I would make a – so I'd have a short list, just bullets. Sometimes typed, sometimes handwritten, sometimes on a three by five card, and then give him a copy; I'd take a copy. And we'd just go down it, one, two, three, four five, check it off, and then sometimes he'd have something to add. And sometimes it'd be some stuff I'd want to tell him I didn't want to put in a memo.

DR. ELZY: I was going to ask – those pieces of paper you just mentioned. Do they still exist?

FRANK MOORE: No.

DR. ELZY: -- in the Congressional Liaison files or – they weren't considered something you'd keep?

FRANK MOORE: No. I tossed mine, and I assume he tossed his.

DR. ELZY: I see. All right.

FRANK MOORE: Sometime, I mean, as soon as I went out the door – well, sometimes I'd make notes on it. But, no, they don't exist. I'd be surprised if they existed. I hope they don't exist.

But and then, I'd have a meeting with my staff. And this would occur around 10:30 or 11:00, people'd be anxious and jumping at the bit to get going, you know – and committee has got a hearing and so forth. But sometimes somebody'd say, "Well, you can just go on and go," you know. And, "Well, here's what happened at the Senior Staff meeting; here's what happened at the meeting with the President," and we'd make assignments and do-do-do, you know. And everybody would take off.

And I'd usually go to the Hill for a lunch or a meeting – I'd usually have four or –
I'd get back to the office about three or four o'clock in the afternoon, sit down and return calls. I'd get maybe two hundred calls a day. Had twenty-five to the sheet — I'd prioritize them — and I'd try to return a hundred of them that day, but it had twenty-five to the sheet on each call sheet. I'd have four sheets, and my secretary would have to prioritize them. I'd look at them and highlight the ones I had to do, "Here's from a Senator or a member, staff person, you know." And sometimes they'd be from some of these people I met in the primaries, and — and they didn't get callbacks, which hurt us in '80. Because that wasn't my job anymore. I should have — I should have had somebody calling those people back.

But then about four-thirty or five o'clock, I would return calls until six-thirty or seven. And then I would usually go to three what's called DB's, drop by's, receptions. Usually Tuesday, Wednesdays, Thursdays, when they were held. Sometimes four or five a night. Some of them you'd have to sit down and eat, you know, one course. If a Senator was having a big group of people in from the home state, you know, he'd have a representative from the White House to demonstrate his importance. And then I'd go home and start it over again.

But the weekly legislative report was a lot of things. It was a compilation of — we would say, State is handling this, or Treasury is handling this; in other words, it was a prioritization. And you don't need to get involved, and I'm not getting involved. There's different levels. Or, State is — or Treasury is handling this, but they need some help, but I'm going to help them, and here's what we're doing. Or Treasury is doing this, but they need some help, and I've asked the Vice President to help, and he's agreed.

Or, Treasury is handling this thing, and it's really in trouble, and it's coming up next Tuesday -- the showdown's coming -- and we've done all we can do and here are four people we are asking you to call. And here's an attached briefing paper on all of them. And of course, he never said no. He always agreed. He always wanted to do more than was necessary, or always more than we wanted him to do, or --

DR. ELZY: Well, it's interesting --

FRANK MOORE: "He" being the President.

DR. ELZY: That was one criticism one hears of President Carter is that he didn't know the Senators and Congressmen very well when he went to Washington, and that he wasn't a glad-hander. But from your point of view, he was cooperative, and eager to lobby Congress.

FRANK MOORE: Not only that, but he was very, very good at it. He was as — he is as good, one on one, as anybody I've ever seen. He's very good in small groups. He's good in groups of three or four or five. He's very, very good. We had meetings over in the East Room — we'd bring down groups of members on some big issue, and we'd talk to them about it — and he was very effective. And we could measure effectiveness very precisely, because we were keeping vote counts, and the next day we'd go see those people; we'd see them at night - I mean, my staff would meet them in the hall, we'd walk them to the cars, and
they'd change. You know, from undecided to for. Or change from against to undecided. So – he moved a lot of votes, a lot of times, on a lot of issues.

On the Greek-Turkish arms embargo; people forget that, how unpopular it was. I mean, how many Congressmen have a best friend who's a Turk who runs a restaurant and is Chairman of his Finance Committee and was godfather to his two children? I mean, every Congressman's got a Greek in their district. They'd come to him and say, "I've never asked you for anything, but don't do this, I'm asking you personally, don't vote for this," It's a very difficult vote.

DR. ELZY: Right. But President Carter did work with Congress.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah. I mean, I think the people who wrote that were the Washington press corps, or people who covered the Hill. Oh, I'm sure some of that's true; he certainly wasn't a Lyndon Johnson, and he wasn't a Jack Kennedy, who'd been – been a U.S. Senator. And he wasn't a Gerry Ford, who they all knew, called Gerry.

But he was very effective, and it's not just hearsay, because you know, I'd see votes change.

DR. ELZY: He was the first Governor to become President for a while. Now it's become much more traditional.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah.

DR. ELZY: Perhaps we should stop at this point. [END OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]

TAPE 2, SIDE A

DR. ELZY: We were discussing your schedule, and it sounds quite daunting. Busy from dawn till midnight, it sounds like. But you also just told me you're about to celebrate your fortieth wedding anniversary; you must have – so you were married and had a family during that time you were in Washington. What was family life like for someone in a position like yours? Was it difficult to --?

FRANK MOORE: It was difficult and not just for me but for everybody. We had young children, and it was difficult for a number of reasons. Number one, it was difficult financially, because we hadn't made any money in the governor's office or in the campaign, and housing prices were so much greater. And just housing took a lot of your disposable income. Our salary – we first went there, I think was forty-eight thousand.

There was a quadrennial review. I think William Simon was head of the Commission, who worked for President Ford and appointed him, so Bert Lance asked me to meet with Bill Simon, and Bert – before they submitted the report, made it public. Because it – obviously, raised Congressional salaries.

And it did it in two steps. I think it went to $52,000 and then to $55,000 and finally to $59,000 over a four-year period. And I didn't have any problem with it,
because I knew Congress wouldn't have any problem with it [laughing] and I wanted it myself.

But we stayed – just so – the Senior Staff got paid essentially what the Congress did, you know. Level I, Level II, Level III, and Cabinet, and Vice President, President, Cabinet, Vice President and so forth. But we didn't get the full raise that Congress gets. We stayed a like bit under it. We, the Senior Staff. But it was very welcome.

And Bill Simon talked to me about it. He said, "You know, you're going to find out," and he said, "It hurt me." He said, "I was a Cabinet officer, I got $66,000 a year." He said, "You can't live in this town on $66,000 a year." And he said, "I'm pretty frugal, and I had some money when I came here, and I spent it all."

Now, looking back on it, and seeing – talking with my children and going through these things - you know, I didn't go to soccer games or school plays or things that all fathers regret not having done because there was something more important happening.

DR. ELZY: Did you have weekends off, or just Sundays or --?

FRANK MOORE: Well, a lot of times we had meetings on Sunday, and we usually worked Saturday mornings in the White House. Now, President Carter was very, very generous to me and some others, and let us use Camp David to – let me and Hamilton and Jody, and I had four kids, so I used Camp David, I think, more than – more than others. And again, it's a selfish reason, because of the communications network – I could not feel guilty; my children could be up there bowling or watching a movie, and I'd be working on the phone, calling members of Congress [laughing] at home on the weekend. And we often did that.

DR. ELZY: Certainly one benefit of this for children, even though you're busy, would be their exposure to all of this history that they're involved in. Were they old enough at that time to --

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, I think so.

DR. ELZY: -- enjoy and understand it?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, I think they all were. And as I said, Mrs. Carter and President Carter were very generous in invitations to White House events and social events and Camp David and flying on Air Force One and all those things, and those perks certainly - I'm sure the children were disappointed their father didn't come to the school play, but then none of their -- none of their schoolmates got to spend a weekend at Camp David, either.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: And we went up there a lot during August – Congress was out.

DR. ELZY: I was going to ask you if being in Congressional Liaison might have
been a little bit of an advantage in the White House jobs because sometimes Congress leaves town. Or were you working just as hard when they were gone?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, Jody -- Nan Powell, and my wife Nancy Moore, and Jody Powell and Frank Moore, have often had this discussion. And Jody always says that I had the hardest job because I had to deal with Congress. And I always said he had the hardest job because he had to deal with the press. And it’s – it's - I believe it. But Nan always says, "No, Jody had the hardest job because Congress left and the press never did."

**DR. ELZY:** Yes.

**FRANK MOORE:** And she's probably right. The press was there all the time. But you never got away from it. If they [Congress] were out, you were receiving calls; the staff – usually, what happened, you said -- well, you put off doing things until Congress goes out working with – not only our staff but Senate and House staff, the leadership staff – would say, once the boss is gone, then we can get something done.

**DR. ELZY:** I see. The staff stays and continues --

**FRANK MOORE:** The staff stays and continues – so you're really just as busy. And of course, in the mid-term elections – we set up a program under Les Francis' direction, where we gathered all the grants in, from all the – and Congressional relations handled that. And we always had five seats on Air Force One; we always had ten seats at each state dinner, and we were doing trips here and there, and Vice President was always very helpful in this.

We decided very early that the last two years of President Carter's term was going to largely depend on what the Congress looked like, and we ought to try to – so we started, you know, in the odd year, setting up an organization within Congressional Relations to help members get elected, re-elected. And elected, if it was an open seat. And to feel like we had something to do with it. And to owe us something for having gotten that done – either a campaign appearance, or a grant or whatever. So, we coordinated all that. And the schedules of the Cabinet officers and what we called the surrogates, which would include Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Mondale and other people.

But, so you were really busy. I mean, the only time you really got – because invariably you'd think you were going to have an easy week and a flood would occur or a tornado, and you’d have Senators screaming, you know, "You've got to do something about this tornado," or this flood, or this or that. And so you'd take off and do it.

**DR. ELZY:** I've heard or read --

**FRANK MOORE:** And when you did take off, you were so bone, dead tired, that you ended up sleeping.

**DR. ELZY:** Right. Did you feel that you needed to get things done in the first year of a Congress, the year immediately after the election, because the second
year was going to be devoted to reelection activities? I'm not speaking just of President Carter, but also Congressmen and Senators.

FRANK MOORE: Well, yeah – the Congress has got a certain rhythm to it.

DR. ELZY: All right. Could you discuss that?

FRANK MORE: Yeah. A new Congress comes in. And let me -- let me take this chance to talk a little bit about something you mentioned earlier, that there was criticism of President Carter, that he didn't know how to glad-hand, and hadn't been a member of Congress, and he was a new guy coming to town, had these new people coming from Georgia. Well, let me tell you what happened in 1976.

First of all, the year before that, and the House had had the Watergate babies – eighty-four of them. Two years later, he had another seventy-two. A hundred and fifty new Democrats. Didn't come up through the party ranks; didn't - hadn't gone through all that discipline. Didn't owe anything to anybody. They felt independent; they felt an affinity with Jimmy Carter. The Speaker of the House was brand new. It was Tip O'Neill.

Rayburn had been Speaker; McCormick had been Speaker, and Carl Albert had been Speaker. Tip O'Neill was new. Jim Wright was Majority Leader. He had been elected Majority Leader by one vote over Phil Burton, after a bruising, bruising, three-way fight, first. And then winning by one vote.

So the leadership – and then they had appointed their own leaders. [John] Brademas, others, who were brand new in their jobs. And not real sure of themselves and their jobs. With the Speaker looking out at 150 Democratic freshmen and sophomores who were fighting to overturn the seniority system. And demanding to elect their own Chairman, and doing it, and deposing the Chairman of the Ag Committee, and putting Tom Foley in, and opposing other Chairmen.

And you're supposed to be leading this group, and you look out and see all these people [laughing] are overthrowing people you've served with for thirty years [laughing]. You see them, you know, pushed off to the side; you become a little concerned about your own fate.

That's the House. I could talk a lot more about the House, and about a lot of insecurities that are over there, and how they were manifested toward somebody else who was new in town. A guy from Georgia.

But you go to the Senate. And a new Majority Leader, Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia. Also in a contested race. He'd been working on it and working on it, ever since he beat Teddy Kennedy for Whip. Other people – Teddy Kennedy wanted to be Majority Leader. Others wanted to be Majority Leader. They weren't. Bob Byrd was. So he didn't have a unified Senate. He was brand new in his job.

So it wasn't just the Executive branch that was new. The whole – the Senate, at that time, was supposed to be -- under our Constitution -- be the stable body, and
the body that's deliberative, that takes the votes from the House of the People and tones it down and so forth -- had, uh -- forty-five of the hundred Senators had been there six years or less. The next two years, it changed even more. Seniority changed very rapidly. Somebody who'd been ranked No. 89th was suddenly 22 in ranking of seniority. So a lot of changes were going on, you know.

So it wasn't just the Executive branch. A lot of turmoil. Still had the -- the War Powers Act had taken power away from the Executive and given it to the Legislative. The last two Presidents had essentially governed by veto. The Nixon Congressional Relations people and the Ford Congressional Relations people told me they didn't even try to get a majority in the House. The only thing they worked for was to sustain a veto -- enough to keep a veto from being overridden. So they never worked with a majority.

They would let the Congress pass the bill they wanted; they'd never go up against -- working against it; they let the President veto it, and then go up and work with the Republicans only [laughing] in the House or the Senate.

So we suddenly had a whole new job, working with Democrats who had not been worked with in eight years. They'd been adversarial; they'd wake up every morning saying, "How can we get Nixon or get Ford?" -- all of the Vietnam War residual feelings were there. And suddenly you had a Democratic President where you hadn't had one in how many years, Martin?

DR. ELZY: Since Lyndon Johnson left office in '69.

FRANK MOORE: In '69, so this was '76. And they weren't used to working with a Democratic President. They were used to working against whoever the President was, every day. So it was a hard transition for a lot of people. And a difficult transition, to say, "Now, wait a minute, that's the Executive branch, they're supposed to be our enemies. And they want us to work with them?"

And then it flipped the other way, so we said, "Well, it is a Democratic President, and we do have, for the first time since Lyndon Johnson, very high expectations which could not be met in terms of patronage jobs. Fred Malek, as you know, working as OMB for Nixon, essentially took a lot of patronage jobs – thousands of them – and federalized them. To lock in Republicans.

So the people that said, "Well, you know, I couldn't get one of these jobs for my friend or my brother-in-law or my supporters when Nixon or Ford was President; now we've got a Democratic President, so here's a list of people I'm sending to the White House, and I want them appointed."

Well, they weren't there. There were six Presidential appointees in Chicago, six. You think if you're Mayor [Richard] Daley and you know the President and you helped to get him elected and so forth, that he -- that he's going to believe that? That's a guy who's got six thousand patronage jobs just in the Cook County Park System alone. And you say, "We've only six people we can appoint."

DR. ELZY: Right.
FRANK MOORE: They don't understand it. And they resented it. So we didn't have a lot to work with in terms of giving out jobs. And I'm -- I suppose I've talked too long on that, but I'm a little defensive about it.

DR. ELZY: That's fine. That's fine. You were talking about the rhythm of Congress, that it --

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, that's what got me off on it. A new Congress comes in. Okay, who's going to propose what, what's the President going to send up? And we were of course involved in that and talked about it and so forth. We [laughing] sent up a lot more than they thought we were going to do. They said, "What is your priority, what is your top--?" We say, "We've got fifteen things for you." "Well, now, what is the priority of those fifteen thing?" "They're all priority." But [laughing] -- you heard all those stories and they're all true. It's not an exaggeration.

FRANK MOORE: So we worked with the Speaker's staff and Senator Byrd's staff to really try to prioritize things, and set up -- of course, the first thing is to get the Cabinet confirmed in the Senate. In the House, everything starts with the Ways & Means Committee, or the Appropriations Committee, and you've got two years to get it done.

But -- I learned a lot. And one of the things we did for President Carter, and I hope it's here in the files. We prepared a calendar every year of legislative days. And it showed you how little time you really had to get things done. Have you ever seen that?

DR. ELZY: I don't believe I have. I hope we have it.

FRANK MOORE: Hope you have it too, because it's informative. But you say, well, it's January, the Congress is coming back in. Well, they never came back in until after the Super Bowl, which used to be — because the Speaker wanted to go to the Super Bowl, and some of his guys — his friends wanted to go to the Super Bowl. So they'd come back Tuesday after the Super Bowl on Sunday. And that was usually about the 17th or 18th. Now it's later.

But if you take -- and I'll just talk about this in general terms -- the major breaks -- which, you come back after the Super Bowl, then you go out for President's holidays, which are middle of February. Then you come back and you take a -- you actually got a pretty long work period there up until Easter. Then you take an Easter break. And you come back, not for long, until you take a Memorial Day break. And by the way, the President's Day's breaks are pretty long, because every -- because the Republicans want to do Lincoln Day speeches and all the Democrats have Jefferson, Jackson speeches -- so that's really a ten-day break.

And I'll back up just a little bit and say -- so you take a week -- so suppose your Congress comes back the week of so-and-so -- the last week of February. Well, they travel -- Monday's off. Tuesday is a travel day. The house has a pro forma
session on Tuesday morning, and read the *Journal* and so forth – and make – so you really don't do any legislation until Wednesday.

Work Wednesday, work Wednesday night. Carry over what you have to until Thursday. Thursday afternoon, people on the West Coast have got campaign commitments and trips on Thursday and Friday. And we used to – I used to know within a minute, when the planes left for the West Coast from Dulles. Couldn't fly out of National at that time. And they were four o'clock planes and five o'clock planes.

So if you had – you couldn't have a vote beyond three o'clock, because you had twenty-two Democrats in California who had to leave at three in order to make the four o'clock flight to Dulles in order to get back to California. So, I mean, just take – hypothetical legislative calendar. So you take – this is supposed to be a full week of Congress. You've really got Tuesday – you get the Rules – you get some Committee meetings on Tuesday – nothing on Monday. Committee meetings on Tuesday, Rules vote. So you get Wednesday, bills on the Floor. Wednesday night, Thursday bills on the Floor. But you gotta get 'em done by three o'clock.

**DR. ELZY:** So about a two- or three-day work week.

**FRANK MOORE:** And then, so Friday is a travel day, but really you start traveling on Thursday to get off on Friday. And a lot of people drove on Thursday nights – the guys from Pennsylvania and Ohio and so – we had a Committee Chairman who drove to New Jersey every weekend. Every weekend, he drove back to New Jersey. His wife drove him.

But so -- then you start the next week. And Monday is a travel day. But Monday a travel day spills over into Tuesday. I mean, most – most guys, if they're running for reelection, if they're – they'd have – they'd schedule campaign events all day on Monday and then come in Monday night or Tuesday morning. The guys from California would fly the redeye – fly all night and get in on Tuesday morning. All the West Coast, but mostly from California.

Some people are here from North Dakota, and it's just very, very difficult to get back and forth. Because you've got to fly to Chicago, you've gotta change planes, you've gotta fly another place, you go to Pierre, then you've got to change - you've got to fly to South Dakota [laughing], then you catch your plane to North Dakota.

So you really had to take those into consideration, the schedule – the travel schedule of people when you were trying to get a Committee vote, or get a Subcommittee vote, or get meetings together.

So I'll finish this up real quickly. But if you take the legislative calendar, and you really kind of did a review of it, about Easter, or if you did one for the Fourth of July break, and you took a look from when you – at October, really, Columbus Day, and up until Thanksgiving, you'd come out where there's only twenty-one days or something like that. No more than thirty days to get stuff – actual work days – to get stuff done.
So then you start backing that up. To get the bill written, to get it – to have the consultations on it, to meet with the different interest groups, then to have – and really – when I say there's a rhythm, it seems like there's a very slow rhythm, but it's really frantic underneath the surface.

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: Trying to make that thing work; those legislative days, where really something – where people can vote on a bill.

DR. ELZY: Right, right.

FRANK MOORE: And then you get to the end of it, and it's legislative ping-pong. Where the House takes the Senate Bill, Senate takes the House Bill, and bouncing back and forth in the conference committees and all that, in those days – those times were always just frantic -- at the end.

Of course, Senator Long always waited until the end to do his tax bill, and he had a saying. He said, "In chaos and confusion there is opportunity." So he thrived on that. When everybody else is running around in chaos and – he could sit on the Senate Floor and manipulate it like he wanted to. Which is what he wanted – what he'd done with the tax – with the -- and he paid no attention to the House tax bill. He just did his own bill, and then they'd – he'd go to conference and get what he wanted.

DR. ELZY: I was going to ask you if your role, and the Office of Congressional Liaison role – I would think would be quite a bit different for a bill that originates from the White House, as against one that originates with Congress.

FRANK MOORE: Yes. Or, there's another classification – one that originates in a department or agency. Of course, the agencies handle their own authorization and appropriation. And that's a principle. I mean, if I'm – if a person is Congressional Relations for HUD [Housing and Urban Development], you're working for the Secretary of HUD, your main job is to make sure you get the money for HUD. And that's -- that's a year-round job. Now, there might be several special programs that the Secretary wants. But you don't – the White House is not involved in that.

DR. ELZY: I see.

FRANK MOORE: And if they've got – if there's a special program about this or that, no matter what department it's in HEW's [Health, Education and Welfare] Children's Immunization or it's this or that, you know – then the – that department handles that. But if it's a White House – if it's the President's bill – and I was the President's lobby – lobbyist. Principal lobbyist. And I tried not – I tried not to lobby for them – a lot of people asked me to lobby for them.

DR. ELZY: For a department, for --

FRANK MOORE: Yeah.
DR. ELZY: -- a budget.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, well, yeah. And sometimes I would and most of the time I wouldn't. Usually, if they were in trouble, they couldn't do it without us, we'd jump in and do it. But. You try to delegate all that out.

By the way, there's one other thing we had. President Carter had, you know, the idea of Cabinet government. So we had a meeting of all the Congressional Relations people in the Roosevelt Room. I think it was usually on Fridays. And I don't know if it was weekly or biweekly. We'd have the Assistant Secretary for Legislation in. And this way we'd try to coordinate -- we'd sort of pass out assignments and do some cross-fertilization if -- if for instance, you are Treasury, and you work principally the Ways & Means Committee.

Well, that's an exclusive Committee, so that's not a good example. But suppose you're a guy for the HUD, and you work the Authorization Committee for HUD, but we've got a cross-cutting issue and you have a very good relationship with this member. And we need that member to vote on the Greek-Turkish [laughing] arms embargo.

So you would go and say to them, "The President has asked me to come and see you and talk to you about this vote." And then they'd report back to my staff, and we'd take it and work it on down, and so forth. So we assigned -- we made assignments to the other people in the Administration. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't. Defense was always a problem, always difficult getting them to --

DR. ELZY: Help on other --

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, help on other stuff.

DR. ELZY: Other agencies. I was going to ask how you plotted strategy to get legislation passed. Would that differ with each bill? Or did you have certain Congressmen and Senators you could always rely on?

FRANK MOORE: We had -- we actually had some we could always rely on. Senators and Congressmen, and it was a core group. But you better not take them for granted, I mean, you'd end up -- not just assume. You always had to ask them and talk to them about it. And you -- they gave good advice. But strategy was always different.

I talked about something we did that had not been done before, to my knowledge. We developed a computer program, and we took a similar vote that had occurred in the last Congress, or with people there. Or sometimes we'd do a test vote. We'd throw -- throw an amendment out and see what people voted on it, get somebody to introduce one.

DR. ELZY: Really.

FRANK MOORE: And see how people would vote, and then we'd break it down,
you know, hard No's, hard Yes's, and Undecided. We couldn't lobby four hundred and thirty-five people, or five hundred and thirty-five. And so we'd try to get down to the thirty or forty people we needed to work.

And we'd break it down into freshmen, sophomores, Western, Midwestern, Southern, Northern, Democrats, liberal, Republican – Democrats, Republicans – and then finally people who had won their district by less than five percent, then you assumed they were in jeopardy, either in the primary or the general.

But if they, you know, had no opposition, then you really didn't have any constituent problem in general, so -- you really had to - you know, and Congressmen represent their district, or - and their own interests, first, and then the party, and then the President.

So you had to determine where those interests lay. And work it like that. I mean, some people would – Senator Goldwater would often give us votes. And people would ask how you got them, and I'd say, "Well, I just ask him." And they'd say, "Well, why would he vote with you?" And I'd say, "Well, if it didn't involve the Indians, and it didn't involve Arizona, and it didn't involve the Defense – the Air Force and the Department of Defense, he didn't care."

**DR. ELZY:** Yes.

**FRANK MOORE:** He'd vote for you.

**DR. ELZY:** Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** So if, you know, I notice you've asked me and I've said No, no, no, I'm going to tell you yes this time, because I don't care. It doesn't affect Arizona; it doesn't affect the Indians – he was a great – and it doesn't affect the Department of Defense.

**DR. ELZY:** Right. I was going to ask – there's a belief in the public, I think, that there's probably a lot of vote-swapping and deal-making. Is that true, or not? And are there any unwritten rules to that practice?

**FRANK MOORE:** You mean, on the part of the Administration?

**DR. ELZY:** Yes – with --

**FRANK MOORE:** Or within the Congress.

**DR. ELZY:** -- with – with Congress. You know, I'll give this Congressman a dam if he'll vote for us on this issue. I once read another – and I think it may have been [Larry] O'Brien – who was quoted as saying, "We never made specific deals. Because once you do that, you've set your price."

**FRANK MOORE:** That's true. Well, you -- you've set yourself up for blackmail.

**DR. ELZY:** Right.
FRANK MOORE: Yeah, we never did that. I mean, generally, you tried to have good relations with – you never directly connected things. And the only time I ever did that – and when your votes got close – and Phil Burton from California taught me the trick. And he called them walking dead men.

And the walking dead men were people who had decided they weren't going to run again, or had gotten beat in the primary, or were – or even gotten beaten in the general, and then had a session, you know, after that. But mainly it was people who had retired, and so they would make that announcement – say, in May or June, you know – to give time, if there's an early primary, like the June primary in California, a guy would say, "I'm not—" – or in Texas, which had a relatively early primary as far as – I guess Texas has a pretty late primary, though, doesn't it?

DR. ELZY: I don't remember.

FRANK MOORE: If it's in April or May. But, you know, a Congressman's going to retire, and he wants to make sure that the party has a chance to pick somebody, so he says in March, "I'm not going to run." So from March until the next November, he is classified as a walking dead man.

Which means that he doesn't owe anything to anybody, to the leadership, to his constituents – mainly, the only thing he owes is to his friends, his long-time friends there. And oftentimes – and so what I would do is, I would get a list of the walking dead men. And I'd check and see how long they'd been in Congress, and how long they'd been in the State Legislature or what – essentially what their retirement situation was.

And oftentimes, just one more year or two of federal employment can make a tremendous difference in your retirement pension as a member of Congress. Suppose they've been redistricted or they had a divorce or – something like that. They - you know, or they knew some guy was just going to beat them – they'd just say, "I'm not going to --."

So there are a lot of jobs out there, FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] jobs. They don't really pay that much, but they qualify - you've got your high salary for the Congress, and you only need it for a year, or a year or two. Or it could be a job in one of the – Agriculture has a lot of jobs. A lot of jobs. And so the Secretary of Agriculture can appoint someone for a year who's been a member of Congress to help him on a certain program.

So I was never adverse to talking to walking dead men about what their plans were after they left Congress, and how many years of retirement they had. And I never did really, just say – but they'd be – they'd be pretty direct with you. They'd say, "Look, I need one more year, I need eighteen more months – if you could help me do this, you let me know what I could do to help you."

And so you'd see some votes that were uncharacteristic of their previous career, in that last session [laughing] – and the thing is, you know, if something was close – we often passed things 214 to 216 or 212 to 215, or 208 to 212 – and you didn't have – know where those last four or five votes were coming from, until the
votes, oftentimes, started, you know.

So if you could pick up twenty votes, or if you had a pool of twenty people, you could get four or five votes out of that pool – that was a lot of difference.

**DR. ELZY:** I was going to ask you about vote-counting. That's another kind of legend of Congress. Did you always know, before there was a vote, how it was going to turn out? Or were you successful in your effort to know how Congressmen and Senators were going to vote?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, it depended on the Congressman and Senator. I mean, some of them wouldn't always tell you the truth; some of them would never tell you the truth. Some of them were dependable and some were undependable.

And depending on what the leadership – if you were working with the leadership, you know - and we vetoed the defense bill, and the House tried to override it, and biggest – one of the biggest fights we had, and we were working against Tip O'Neill and mainly working against Jim Wright. And all the Committee Chairmen, and all the Appropriations people, and we prevented the override but – you know, if the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee is talking to a member, and you're talking with the member, guess who's going to win, I mean --

**DR. ELZY:** Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** He can do a lot more for them than you can.

**DR. ELZY:** That's right.

**FRANK MOORE:** So – and somebody might be undecided, and a lot of people would just wait and see which way it was going, or they'd wait to see how somebody else voted. Or they'd wait and see how hard the leadership was working them. Or, you know – different people were considered experts on certain issues. And they'd take their cue from that person.

Sonny Montgomery on defense - I mean, so many Democrats followed Sonny Montgomery. Joe Wagner on the Ways and Means Committee on tax stuff – he had about five or six people who would follow him. Certainly members of the Rules Committee had a lot of people who would follow them.

It depended – it depends on who the floor manager of the bill was. And how persuasive the floor manager was. And we would oftentimes work with the floor manager, providing arguments for them, and papers, and – and leadership would say, "Well, you know, you told us you had this guy, and he just told me five minutes ago he switched." And, I'd say, "That can't be true." He said, "Well, he just told me that he had a guy from home call him, he just couldn't say no to him, and so you better go check on him."

And so we'd go check on him, and he'd say, "Well, yeah, I have switched. And I'm sorry, I told you, but I gotta change my mind." And you'd say, "Well, what does the guy from home want?" And he'd say, "Well, let's work out something." And then sometimes – sometimes the person - you know, if it's going to be real
close, just being absent is worth a lot. Particularly if they were going to vote against you and they aren't there. It counts as a vote.

And we'd time – we'd time votes like that. I mean, not we, but the leadership would – making sure you had your people back, or -- and the Senate was very careful. They – if a Senator said don't – asked the leadership not to hold the vote until I get back, they wouldn't do it.

**DR. ELZY:** Right. Let me ask a question about – what was your office's relationship with Mrs. Carter and her office? And did she contact legislators on behalf of legislation?

**FRANK MOORE:** She never did that directly. She – on mental health, there were some people she worked with. And she worked with the wives. She did, on her specific issues. But she was very helpful at White House social functions and Senate Wives Club and – and, uh --

**DR. ELZY:** Did you keep her briefed on what the issues were and who was leaning what way?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, I think she stayed briefed, you know. When you briefed the President, I mean, she – but if she asked for a briefing, she got one, or we'd write a paper for her. But oftentimes we'd get requests from members for her to come and dedicate, oh, a library, or to do something, or - you know, be at some function. So we'd brief her on that and she understood exactly how it worked. And was very, very helpful.

**DR. ELZY:** Well, good.

**FRANK MOORE:** I don't think we ever did ask her, nor should we ever have asked her, to call anybody directly and ask them for a vote. But – she was very – very, very helpful. Mrs. Carter did testify before congressional committees concerning mental health. She also did lobby state legislators, particularly in Illinois, for the Equal Rights Amendment.

**DR. ELZY:** Did you have the impression that she talked to President Carter about the issues?

**FRANK MOORE:** Oh, yeah. Yeah. She knew what was going on. In detail.

**DR. ELZY:** Well, this might be a good point to break. And we'll continue tomorrow.

**FRANK MOORE:** Okay.

**TAPE 2, SIDE B**

**DR. ELZY:** It is now Wednesday morning, July 31st, again, at the Carter Library. I wonder, Mr. Moore, if you have comments that you'd like to share with us on some major legislative efforts during the Carter Administration. One that certainly is well-known, the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties.
FRANK MOORE: Yeah. That was a hard fight, and we – President Carter said when we started – we'd -- in fact, I was on one of the rare vacations. I was at Longboat Key in Florida, and I received a call from him, and he said, "I just talked to Sol Linowitz and they're about to wrap up this treaty negotiation in -- in Panama," and he said, "It's going to move pretty quick, and we need to start calling people."

DR. ELZY: Do you remember what month and year that was?

FRANK MOORE: Well, it had to be in the summer.

DR. ELZY: Summer?

FRANK MOORE: Yep. Because [I was there] with my family, visiting my sister and brother-in-law, who lived there. But – so I cut it short, and got on back, and we got on the – we, you know – started calling the relevant Senators and made up a list. And – he – started calling them in. And we went to see Howard Baker and Baker wanted to see all of the negotiating documents and everything that was done on it.

And we set up – and when I say we, certainly it didn't ever – the Panama Canal Treaties never would have been passed, if it had just been Congressional Relations working on it or just the White – the whole White House, the whole Administration, had to work on it. Landon Butler and Hamilton and Anne Wexler can tell you a lot more about the public liaison part of it. I'll tell you what we specifically did at my office.

DR. ELZY: Fine. Good.

FRANK MOORE: One of the things we did was go to the Senate and ask the Senators to give us a list of the forty or fifty most important people in their state, to be invited to the White House. And that's without the Senator making any comment, any – any - you know, 'yes, I'm for it, or I'm against it, or I've got a – my mind needs to be changed,' but —— and then we invited those states. And it usually would include a newspaper publisher and this person's best – the opinion leaders in the state. And I think that's really what did it. But in addition to that, my staff and I made – I made four trips to Panama, taking Senators down.

DR. ELZY: Oh, really?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah. And I don't know – myself – I don't know how many others were made. But usually – and some Senators went more than once. But we certainly – we took Democratic ones down. Senator Baker had made – did three trips going down. And Senator Byrd would tell us who to take from the Democrats.

We had DC-9's, we'd leave Andrews. We would – it's not that long a flight. We'd spend a day going – touring the canal, had a – we'd meet with [Omar] Torrijos – we'd meet with [Manuel] Noriega, who was head of security at that time – go to the barracks. We’d meet with the Archbishop. We would meet with the Canal
Zone employees. We’d meet with the American retirees. We’d meet with American Chamber of Commerce. And we'd meet with the Panamanian business community. And then we’d – and then we'd get in a helicopter – we'd spend the night.

Get in the helicopter – sometimes we'd come back that night – get in the helicopter, and fly down the Canal, all the way down the Canal, from one end of Panama to the other. We'd usually stop at San Blas Islands or something and come on back. So we had a pretty good schedule. And that truly --

**DR. ELZY:** You often hear of Congressional junkets. But these sound like real working trips, where you really had an agenda in mind. You were trying to shift votes on this issue.

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, there was no junket about this. It was hard work from before take-off, because you were briefing the staff, and briefing the Senator, and working with the Panamanians, and - it was very hard work. In fact, I never went on a junket. My staff never went on – we always went on working – uh - I mean, I'm sure they'd be characterized as that, but usually you work pretty hard at these things.

Certainly we did. Maybe the Congressmen might feel like they were on a junket, but we had an agenda. We always had a list of things to talk to them about if we knew who was going on a trip – and it wasn't just Panama Canal. I mean, if John Chafee and I are going to spend ten hours together flying down and flying back, I'm going to take that opportunity to talk to him about some of the environmental legislation. Because you can't talk about the Canal all the time.

But we – we did that. And of course, we did the vote counts and we - you know, the State Department was very involved; we had a whole team. Congressional relations was a part of the team.

**DR. ELZY:** Excuse me a moment – were the Panamanians very helpful in this process?

**FRANK MOORE:** Yes.

**DR. ELZY:** When you went down there, for example?

**FRANK MOORE:** Oh, yes.

**DR. ELZY:** Understood what was – the American political scene and --

**FRANK MOORE:** Yeah, they had appointed an Ambassador who was essentially a businessman, whose job was to help, named – named Gabriel Lewis. And Gabriel was a very good politician, and he was in direct contact with Noriega and the Cabinet. Yeah, they were very helpful.

It was - the – the latest thing – NAFTA and the way the Mexican government moved to town, and appointed – took people from the business community and sent them up here on a one-year assignment to get NAFTA passed and hired the
right lobbyists and so forth.

But - we couldn't have done it without the Republicans, without the Republican establishment supporting it. President Ford supported it – former – we had people from the – actually people were hired as consultants, from - former State Department officials from the Republican administrations.

I might mention this, too; it deserves some credit. Paul Sarbanes has been in the news a lot lately on the banking reform – regulatory reform. We couldn't really have done it without Paul Sarbanes on the Floor of the Senate. We were being attacked – Laxalt and Jesse Helms and that crowd kept throwing up, you know, drugs, and this and that.

And – and Sarbanes, who is a very smart man, Rhodes scholar – took it upon himself, he and Frank Church, to organize the debates and just counteract those things. And we were briefing them, and the State Department was briefing them, but he really – and then it was televised, as you – well, broadcast, it wasn't televised. But I think Sarbanes' calm, reasoned, thoughtful arguments, broadcast to the American people, had a lot to do with the other Senators – what they were hearing from back home and -- and on the Floor, and reading his speeches.

But as you know, it was passed by one vote. One treaty did and the other one by two. And I think we had one to spare on both of them, but you'll never know.

DR. ELZY:  What about the creation of the Department of Energy? I think you have mentioned to me that you knew Secretary [James] Schlesinger pretty well.

FRANK MOORE:  Yeah. My office was where, you know, Larry O'Brien's had been. And it's a funny story – Larry O'Brien told me this in that period – I went and met with former C.L. [Congressional Liaison] people. Henry Hall Wilson, we mentioned, and Larry said that President Kennedy was on the reviewing stand in front of the White House, and just before he [laughing] - you know, he started to leave the reviewing stand, people started running over to the White House and grabbing offices.

And of course, they all wanted to be as close as they could be to the Oval Office. And they were fighting, and dragging tables and chairs. And he [O'Brien] said, he went – he saw these steps, he went upstairs, and there's these beautiful offices upstairs that nobody wanted. And they were available. So he took them.

And since that time, they've been the Congressional Relations Office. Then the White House counsel moved in. He had plenty of room – he had his whole staff up there. They went back sort of in the attic and threw boxes and created offices. The White House counsel's office is up there, and then there's another office.

And when Jim Schlesinger came to work, to work on creating the Department of Energy, his office was in that suite, and we – and our receptionists and secretaries shared a common area. He came to work very early; I came to work very early. He left late; I left late. So we had a – a lot of time to get to know each
other. And he – he did a – he was close to Scoop Jackson, and Scoop Jackson opposed it. So he did most of that work there. He did – the Speaker created a special Committee with Lud Ashley as Chairman. Jim did most of the direct lobbying with those people. We – our – my staff did a lot of the other lobbying. And we – we were involved with Lud, not much with Scoop.

But it – it reminds me of this Homeland Security Act now. You take the organizational table and lay it out for the Department of Energy, and it had a lot of Assistant Secretaries in it, probably too many. I'm surprised President Carter approved it, but it was pretty top-heavy in Administration and still is.

**DR. ELZY:** Did this face opposition from departments that were losing offices to the new Department of Energy?

**FRANK MOORE:** Of course, but the greatest opposition came from the people on the Hill who had jurisdiction over those -- departments.

**DR. ELZY:** I see.

**FRANK MOORE:** They really couldn't openly oppose it, but – it made sense then; it makes sense now, to put them together. But I mean, I remember Reagan in '80 saying that – and it – it was in New Hampshire, I think, wasn't it, and saying that the Department of Energy is a – we're going to get rid of it when I'm elected, Department of Energy and the Department of Education; this hasn't produced one kilowatt of electricity and it hasn't produced one [laughing] barrel of oil since it was created.

And then I remember he appointed the dentist from South Carolina to come up and be Secretary of Energy. And he said he was going to get rid of it. He got up there and he found that sixty percent of the budget was nuclear weapons [laughing]. And it was a surprise to him [laughing].

**DR. ELZY:** Yes, yes. It's a big department. Wide-ranging responsibilities. Now, you had worked with President Carter in government reorganization in Georgia.

**FRANK MOORE:** Yes.

**DR. ELZY:** And then in Washington President Carter had the same goal.

**FRANK MOORE:** Yes.

**DR. ELZY:** Did you try to apply some of the same lessons you'd learned in Georgia? Do you think that worked out well?

**FRANK MOORE:** Of course. And there's always - you know, there's always a – Tip O'Neill would say, like "You're in the big leagues now, this is not bush league, and this is not the Georgia legislature," and things like that. So you have to be careful in making those comparisons.

But the fact is, there are a lot more similarities between a state legislature and a Congress than there are dissimilarities. State legislatures have some very, very
smart people in them; many of them would be leaders in Congress if they wanted to go there, but they choose to stay and live in their home state and run a business and – and provide leadership.

But of course we learned the lessons about building support among the different constituent groups. And explaining it carefully and saying no one’s going to lose a job on it, and it's going to be more efficient. And particularly explaining it to the press, and to the American public. And all those – all those lessons were transferred.

**DR. ELZY:** I see. I see. Are there – we talked about reorganization. Another important aspect of President Carter's program was deregulation of transportation, energy prices.


**DR. ELZY:** Looking back on that, do you have any interesting observations or views on the success of it?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, I – I think I – President Carter and, and - and the people who worked for him, and me as an extension, should – should have a lot of pride in doing all – in doing all that, and having the vision to tackle it and pass it and – and see the benefits that have accrued to the American public and the consumers because of it.

**DR. ELZY:** In that case, you were working – some of the opposition was from the Democratic Party, wasn’t it? When you started deregulating.

**FRANK MOORE:** Of course. Labor unions and -- these things have built up over the years and – well, for instance, on trucking deregulation. It's very hard to – as you know, the public service commissions and the states, they issue a license and you have essentially a franchise to run a truck between here and there, and there's no competition for it. You don't make a lot of money, but you make some money, and you're guaranteed you're going to make some money because the rates are set. And if you've been – if your father did that before you, and you're doing it, and your sons are going to take over that business, you say, "I think I like it the way it is."

So we probably made some mistakes in some of that. It – I think the overall effect, if you look at it, is it – it increased – it lowered freight costs and enabled businesses, small businesses, to, uh, move up and down the interstates.

You can just look at Atlanta on [interstate highways] 75 and 20 and 85 -- because they can be easily supplied by trucks, you didn't have to have a railroad, but the flip side of it is that a small town that's not on the interstate, like Plains, that used to have regular truck service, doesn't have it anymore. Because that route's not subsidized as it was when it was regulated.

So I think you – you ended up having strips of development across the country and sort of – it's sort of the same thing – a lot of small towns lost air – airline service and have never gotten it back. Because it was subsidized by the larger
DR. ELZY: Now, mentioning these complicated issues --

FRANK MOORE: But – but they've got cheaper airfare – a lot of people flying who never could have flown before --

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: Because of the airline deregulation.

DR. ELZY: Right. Mentioning this range of complicated issues, it seems to me your office had a very difficult task in comprehending all these issues, and at the same time comprehending all the Congressmen and Senators' personal interests and weaving that together to get the legislation you wanted.

FRANK MOORE: Well, that's true, but – the -- most Congressmen – you'd have one page. You have no more than five bullets. They don't have a long attention span, they don't have – if it's not their area. Now, if they are the expert in it on their Committee, or Subcommittee, certainly, you spend months and months going into details. But when it comes time to – to lobby the Congressman in whose field – who wouldn't have an expertise in this field, it's usually - you know, the rule is, just have it all on one page.

And of course, getting to that, you work it down, you work it down, and you define – you try to define the argument, and try to rebut what you already know; you already assume the questions, and have the answer ready. But it is – it is interesting work, because you're doing – it's not the same issue over and over and over again. It's four or five different ones every day.

DR. ELZY: I would think so. I would think so. What about the Alaska Lands Act? That was sort of a different approach, I believe, at the end of the Administration.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, I think that's one of – I think that's a legacy of the Carter Administration that will go on, that's just as great as what Teddy Roosevelt did. And you go to Alaska, as I've done, and you have people who – who say Jimmy Carter's a hero and he always will be. And then others who say, you know, he took a lot of land out of production for mining and drilling and so forth.

But I think that it's – I tell the story, [Senator] Ted Stevens, of course, is from Alaska. And we'd really gotten down to - we're negotiating over details, and what parts – small, small parts of Alaska, were going to be set aside. And as you know, there's several different classifications – national monument, national wilderness, national this – but which would be in which category.

Ted Stevens' Chief of Staff, a guy named Jack Ferguson, who called me and said, "Could Senator Stevens see the President?" And I said, "Well, we've got a very narrow window. He's leaving --" going to Japan, or something – "but I can get you in. Where are you?" He said, "We're in Alaska." I said, "Well."
Anyway, so Senator Stevens flew all night to get to this meeting, came into the Oval Office, and started talking to – and I was in the meeting, and Jack Ferguson was too, and the President. And I think probably Cecil Andrus was there; I'm sure he was – Secretary of Interior.

But [laughing] – the Senator mentioned one obscure area in – in Alaska, and President Carter said, "Well, let's check that," and he took the maps and – and folded them out, and he got down on his hands and knees on the floor of the Oval Office and said, "No, I don't think you're right. You see this little watershed here actually doesn't go into that one, it comes over here."

And Jack told us later that they were in the car going back to Capital Hill [laughing] and – and Senator Stevens said, "He knows more about Alaska than I do! I've been campaigning all over it and representing it for twenty-five years!"

But I think that's an example of his attention to detail. He didn't leave it to the Secretary of the Interior. And he's been criticized for that. But he knew what he wanted. And he educated himself. And he – he got it.

DR. ELZY: That's right.

FRANK MOORE: A great disappointment - we've talked about our successes – a great disappointment to me is Hospital Cost Containment. Because I think, had we passed that, and had we passed a national health care - and we certainly could have – we would have a different country now. And we wouldn't be fighting these same issues and – we learned a lot about how not to do things by lobbying the health – the Hospital Cost Containment issue on members in Washington while they were being lobbied back home on the weekends by the hospital administrators and the board members. And we lost votes every time they went. And we finally just had to call the vote, because it – to see if we could squeeze it by, and we didn't.

DR. ELZY: So that brings up the issue of the tactic of appealing over the heads of Congressmen and Senators to their constituents.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah.

DR. ELZY: Which you did on --

FRANK MOORE: Panama Canal.

DR. ELZY: Panama. But you say on Hospital Cost Containment you failed to do that. That's interesting.

FRANK MOORE: Failed to do it, and it's two different – and we should have done it earlier. We – we learned – of course, the – the members don't like it. But we're not in a popularity contest. I figured my office was not in – people said, well, you know, "Frank Moore wasn't popular on the Hill." Well, I wasn't running a popularity contest. My job was to pass legislation for the President, which we did. Highest percentage since Lyndon Johnson. So if I wanted to be popular, we wouldn't have passed it, and everybody would have been happy.
DR. ELZY: And so offending a Senator by appealing to his constituents on one issue – it didn't bother you a lot, but that might hurt you on the next issue with him.

FRANK MOORE: It – it increased – people gain respect by doing it. Once they know you can do it - they don't want you to do it – but the fact that you can do it gives you some respect.

DR. ELZY: So rather than holding a grudge, their respect for you is increased, because they see you do have that power.

FRANK MOORE: I think so. I think so.

DR. ELZY: Why don't we pause here? If that's all right with you. We're at sort of a stopping point. [End of Tape 2, Side B]

TAPE 3, SIDE A

DR. ELZY: Could you tell us a little bit about the relationship of the White House, your office, with Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the House?

FRANK MOORE: Sure. Actually, about – I think you have to look at that in three parts, to understand the complexity of it, and it was a complex relationship. One was, who Tip O'Neill was and the way he got there before Jimmy Carter was President, and how he become Speaker. One, what he did as Speaker while Jimmy Carter was President, and then after 1980, when he was the top elected Democrat in the country, what he did.

DR. ELZY: All right.

FRANK MOORE: So it was really in three parts. Because a lot of the impression for the relationship between Tip O'Neill and the Carter White House actually didn't come from the four years, but came after the four years. When Ronald Reagan was President and the Republicans had taken over the Senate and so forth, and he was still – he was still – he was the only elected – he was the highest ranking Democrat.

Tip O'Neill was a wonderful man, great storyteller. What he was is what he was; he didn't – there's nothing – he loved his family, he loved his church; loved Boston and his district. And was a – a wonderful Congressman. He got on the leadership track because of, as everyone knows, Hale Boggs going down in a plane in Alaska, and became Majority Leader, and then – and then Speaker, when Carl Albert left. But people forget that Tip O'Neill was a new – just as Jimmy Carter was a new President, Tip O'Neill was a new Speaker. And his number two person was Jim Wright, as a Majority Leader, and he was a brand new, just been elected by one vote, after a bitterly contested Democratic caucus.
So it wasn't a unified House. You had a hundred and forty or a hundred and fifty new Democrats, young people who didn't owe anything to the party or didn't feel like they owed anything to the Speaker, who got elected in the wake of Watergate in '74 and '76, who had their own agenda.

So he – he wasn't a guy who felt safe and secure in his leadership role, which was new to him, and to Jim Wright and to John Brademas. And of course, the first Democratic President since Lyndon Johnson.

And the Senate has to – has to be remembered – also had new leadership, both Democratic and Republican leadership. And that's an important part of dealing – of the Speaker's job, is dealing with the counterparts in the Senate. He had a new Committee Chairmen; there was a lot of turnover. New Subcommittee Chairmen. And a guy down at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue with an enormous agenda, and chomping at the bit to get it passed.

So let me talk about our relationship with Tip O'Neill, the White House and my offices. He was very, very helpful, every way that could be, every courtesy, and there's two different levels of that. One was, you know, perceived personal slights, which you would talk about in the press. But the other is what he actually did as the leader of the Democrats in the House, and he did everything he could to help us, he and his staff, on the Energy bill.

He set up the Special Committee, so it wouldn't have to go through, sequentially, all these other Committees on it. He helped – let us help pick the people to go on it. Lud Ashley chaired it. Never would have gotten through the House without that Special Committee, and he had the power and the prestige to do it.

He was very helpful in scheduling votes when we needed to get them scheduled, through his control of the Rules Committee. He was very, very helpful, all the reorganization bills; there were twenty-four or twenty-five different ones, in working with the Judiciary Committee and Government Affairs Committee and so forth. All the – none of the big things would have passed without Tip O'Neill. He was for Hospital Cost Containment – one of the only persons in the leadership who was.

If he – if there was something that he disagreed with us on, he would say, "I'm just going to remain neutral. I'm not going to work for you; I'm not going to work against you, but I'm not going to do anything." Which was a wonderful, wonderful position for him to take, “the Speaker has no position on this.” And that was – those were very, very rare.

When we got into the doing the balanced budget toward the end, and we were getting into the shocks of the oil quadrupling and so forth, Tip was an old-fashioned liberal Democrat. He had speeches he could pull, he could make, on the spur of the moment, about the halt, the lame, and the blind, and we have to have public works, we have to build the buildings, we've got to build the bridges, we've got to build the roads, we've got to have jobs, jobs, jobs, jobs, jobs.

So he did not agree with what President Carter was doing there, or – but, he held his tongue about it. We had one serious fight on a defense bill, a veto, and – we
had a veto strategy. We started – we should have started very early, but there was so much of a psychological overhang from the way Nixon and Ford had had to govern by vetoing bills and then trying to sustain it, that we – first couple of years, we just said, President Carter said, he's going to sign a bill or – you know, he's going to sign it.

And didn't veto any until he vetoed it was for fiscal discipline, really, because they were – the one of the defense Appropriations bills – I don't know if it was an authori— — it was an Appropriations bill. And of course we fought; we had to fight the leadership on that and we – thank goodness, we sustained it in the House by going to a lot of the younger members, not any of the older ones. Had it – had it – had we not sustained it in the House, we wouldn't have had a chance in the Senate. Because Senator Byrd was already geared up to override it.

So it was a wonderful relationship. We have to give the Speaker credit for much of the legislation that was passed.

Now, you come to 1981; President Carter has lost. Reagan is in the White House; you got all new Reagan appointees, new agencies, the Boards, the Commissions. He's got one piece of legislation – Reagan – that's to pass the tax cut. Nothing else. The Senate's been taken over by the Republicans. Chris Matthews, a speechwriter who worked for Jody Powell, has gone to work for the Speaker, as his speech writer, and his job is to shape him as a national – Tip O'Neill never had a press secretary; I mean, didn't need one. He was his own press secretary. You know, he'd just – he'd just stand up at his desk and talk, take questions. But he is – the guy – here's the Speaker of the House; he has to oppose Reagan, and he has to oppose the Republican Senate.

And a lot of things were said then – you certainly don't want to blame the losses on the Democratic Congress, and the actions they took, so who do you blame? The guy who – from Plains who's left town.

So there's three different parts. And I think – I'd have to say over— I doubt that anybody – Johnson with Rayburn, I'm sure, was a – I'm sure was a relationship that will never be equaled. But certainly the relationship with Jimmy Carter and – and his staff, which I was a part of, and we – we, the Congressional Relations staff, had the most interface with him, of course.

We were up there every day; we did weekly legislative breakfasts in the White House and – when the Congress was in session, it was very useful. On Tuesday morning, always, the House and the Senate, Democrats, we would work out with the Speaker's staff, in advance, what was going to be on his list, what was going to be on Senator Byrd's list, when they came to meet with the President, and we were able to brief the President on what people were going to say and be prepared with an answer or non-answer or to send it to somebody else. And little – sometimes somebody would ask for a minute with the President after the breakfast, to speak of an appointment, or something like that. And we – we did all that.

And one of the things we did, too, and I don't know who in my staff thought of it, but they deserve a lot of credit – immediately after the breakfast, we would each
jump in – of course, the Congressional leaders had their own cars and drivers. Some of the – some of the more junior ones didn't. But we would either take them back in a White House car, or we would jump in the car and ride up with them. So you'd get an immediate debriefing –

DR. ELZY: Yes.

FRANK MOORE: – of what they thought about the breakfast, what had happened, and – and often – and, and, and we were often able to coordinate things between the House and the Senate in that way.

DR. ELZY: I get the impression that sometimes – some of the conflict with Senators may be that they're ambitious to become President. Tip O'Neill, I presume, or I've never heard, had that particular ambition, did he?

FRANK MOORE: No. He had – he had reached the pinnacle of his political life. During the '80 campaign, as Senator Kennedy was running against us, of course, both from Boston and he played – Tip O'Neill played a little coy. In fact, I think if you went to see and interviewed Ted Kennedy, he would say that he thought the Speaker favored Carter a little bit, and Carter would say the reverse. So he played it right down the middle.

But in the Senate, even from the '76 campaign – I mean, the only people that had run against us in the House were Moe Udall. And he – he was a good sport about it, you know. But in the Senate, you had Scoop Jackson, you had Birch Bayh, you had Lloyd Bentsen, you had Frank Church. And there were probably others who – certainly others who looked in the mirror every morning and thought they should be President. Well, you – you had Dale Bumpers, who had been a Governor of Arkansas, and kind of had a brief fling. Had a lot of people who thought they could do a better job of President.

And some of them – and many of them who had tried and been defeated. By Carter. So that did for – that did cause for some – but I'll tell you, the person who – Lloyd Bentsen, in our first meeting with him, said, "Look. I ran against Jimmy Carter. I lost. He won. He's the President. I'm the Senator. I understand that. Let's go to work." And I wish all of them had said that. But they didn't.

DR. ELZY: Yes. Shall we speak of any of the other personalities? Jim Wright?

FRANK MOORE: Jim Wright was another old style – almost a Populist. And he was passionate about some of his issues. But of course, he was also a public works guy. He had come up on that Committee and he was big, you know, with the transportation, the roads, and so forth. But he was in favor of spending a lot of money on public works. But when I say the Speaker – a lot of things we wouldn't have – he was very loyal to Tip, and sometimes Jim would step out of a fight, or sometimes Tip would ask Jim to lead the fight. And we – we wouldn't have – without Jim Wright, we wouldn't have won a lot of legislation. Most of the time we got crossed with him, it was Nicaragua. Stuff like that. But not on domestic politics – or issues – unless it was over spending.

And as with all those people – I mean, President Carter asked me one time, he
said, "You know, sometimes I think these people think it's just a game." And I said, "Well, yeah, the bulk of them do. But with the proper leadership, when something really, really big comes along, the Congress will usually do the right thing." And the Speaker would tell the story, he'd say, "You know, I have a summer place on Cape Cod." And he went there every weekend he could.

And he says, "Just a very slight wind will bend the marsh grass. It won't even be a ripple, but you can see it waving. And then the wind will change, and it'll wave back the other way." And he said, "Frank, that's the way the Congress is." And so there has to be – you have to go through those breezes when it blows one way, back – the Senate is a little more stable. But he says, "The leadership has to – we have to stay firm." And sometimes you have to let it blow. And blow way down. But it's resilient; it will pop back up. So it was a nice story, an illustration.

DR. ELZY: Right. Did you tend to get more cooperation, as the President's point of view, from Congress on foreign policy issues as opposed to domestic issues, because they perhaps felt less constraint from the constituents on how they should vote?

FRANK MOORE: Yes. I think that's generally true. I think that's generally true. Trade bills, you – you know, I can tell you, we have fifteen districts that have mushrooms in them. And we've got thirty-two districts that have something to do with shoes. And I can – you know, I used to know all of those. And where the – I'd know where the specialty machine screws are made in America. I used to know every district those were made in.

So when – constituencies – you can slice it and dice it a lot of different ways. But Bob Strauss was so resourceful and so brilliant in working out those things for the trade bills, that we were – it really never did come to a contest.

DR. ELZY: One last one I was thinking of was Howard Baker. One gets the impression from this distance in time and space that you may have been fortunate in him, as the leader of the opposition in the Senate, that he was willing to cooperate, if it seemed reasonable to him. Is this a fair characterization, or was he particularly politically minded?

FRANK MOORE: Well, we were certainly lucky that Senator Baker was the Republican leader. He's a wonderful man and a wonderful statesman. And, and – he did, many times, what he thought was right, and he damaged himself politically with his constituency. In fact, he was essentially denied – I've heard this story, I don't know that it's true, at the Republican convention in Kansas City, where they said he supported the Panama Canal – and essentially denied him the Vice-Presidential nomination – he's a very capable person. And of course, as you know, Everett Dirkson was his father-in-law. And his father had been a Congressman. He grew up being a public-minded person.

And supported open housing, you know, when he was a Republican Congressman from a conservative part of Tennessee. And he did – I don't – when you, when you say did he – he didn't just not work against us – he was a leader. We would never have passed the Panama Canal Treaty without Howard Baker. And his leadership. We would never have – some of the things on arms
control, some of the treaties we never would have done without – and he just thought it was the right thing to do, but he damaged himself politically every time he did it.

He did tell me on SALT II, he said, "I've done the right thing on this, I've done the right thing on that," he said, "and Salt II is probably the right thing, but I'm not sure I can do the right thing a third time," [laughing] "and continue to get reelected to the Senate." Of course, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and it was pulled down, but –

DR. ELZY: Right, right.

FRANK MOORE: He would study everything he could get, all the papers, take a look – he didn't want any surprises. And he had a wonderful staff. In fact, on the Panama Canal treaty, he hired additional staff to work on it, and set up sort of a separate staff operation.

DR. ELZY: We shouldn't leave Senator Byrd out of this review of top Congressional officials. What would you have to say about him?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I'll tell you something that Senator Byrd told me and – I think he wouldn't have minded it being repeated. He said that first, I'm a U.S. Senator from West Virginia, and I represent my people from West Virginia. Number two, I am the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate representing the Senate as an institution. And he said, third, I am the Democratic leader of the U.S. Senate, and we have a Democratic President. In other words, he was saying, "I'll support the President when and if I can after West Virginia and after the needs and desires of the Senate."

Now, he – he supported us – of course we couldn't have passed the Panama Canal or any of the treaties or – anything without his support and help. He's been there a long time; he's still there, providing leadership. He had particular issues he was interested in – coal and certainly other West Virginia industries. He – a very proud man, with every right to be proud. He was self-educated and he didn't ever want himself or his office or the Senate, as an institution, slighted in any way or even any perceived slight. So. He's very tender about statements coming out of the White House that refer to the Senate.

DR. ELZY: Were there issues, speaking of the Senate as an institution, where the executive branch and the legislative branch were just at odds because they have constitutionally different responsibilities. I'm thinking of, for example, executive privilege.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah.

DR. ELZY: Issues like that. Did you –?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, that certainly – that was always there and it was just – just – it's funny that the person who really owned that issue in the House was Elliott Levitas, a Congressman from Atlanta, and from the district where the Carter Center now sits.
DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: I think he represented this –

DR. ELZY: I believe so, yes.

FRANK MOORE: Certainly DeKalb County, up to the – so, yeah – you have to remember – I mean, the War Powers – the prerogatives of the President and Presidency had been whittled away at, all through the – all through the Nixon and the Ford – the War Powers Act was a big, big fight. All those things took away from the Presidency.

You'd say – well, to the Speaker – or you'd say – you'd say to Jim Wright, mostly – you know, "We don't need to spend two million dollars on this dam for a study and so-and-so," and the reply was, "Who knows better what is needed for the district than the Congressman who represents that district? Certainly they know better what the people in the district want than a bunch of people in the White House. A bunch of punk pencil pushers at OMB."

So I think that's an institutional thing that occurs, no matter who's President, no matter's who's a Congressman, who's a Senator. It's probably been going on since we were – been a – a country.

DR. ELZY: This is actually a good transition, then, to a series of questions I was going to ask you about some common criticisms, after twenty years, that we see in the literature about Jimmy Carter's relations with Congress. The one I was going to ask about was, were the water project vetoes a major obstacle to good relations with Congress?

FRANK MOORE: Absolutely. It was, and we paid the price for that. And it was the kind of thing, had we stuck to it – the President had struck them all and then the Speaker called up one afternoon and sort of offered some kind of an accommodation. And we looked – we kind of lost both ways on it. And some people felt like, well, he won't stand up – they won't stand up for what they believe; you can roll them if you work hard enough at it. And they interpreted that as a sign of weakness. So either not do it at all or do them and then never – and fight, fight, fight for it.

But even the people – I mean, Gary Hart will tell you, he fought for those two dams in Colorado; he said they were sorry, they never should have been there, we all knew it, but we saw it as a chance to get – gain some political leverage over the White House.

And – but it did create some bad feelings and we were long time getting over it, particularly the Public Works Committee and then the Appropriations Committee. And I'm not saying it wasn't the right thing to do. And maybe you – I guess what I'm saying is that we did it pretty early and there were some unintended consequences.

DR. ELZY: Yes. Yes. On another matter I was going to ask you about,
although I think you've referred to it earlier, but maybe just to spell it out a little more. It is said that Jimmy Carter failed to set priorities for Congress and also – or, actually, that he gave them too much work. And also that he dealt with issues that were too difficult – Panama Canal is often listed as one of those.

**FRANK MOORE:** Yeah, and reorganization – and things that hadn't been done in thirty or forty years that needed to be done. It was – as I said, you know, he was a very active President. He sent a lot of legislation up there, and we got complaints – 'You're overloading the circuits and we can't – you know – we can't cram all this in here, and which do you want done? You give me one, two or three,' and we'd say, "Well, we want one, two and three." And they'd say, "That's not the answer we wanted." So then they tend to start setting their priorities themselves. But – he did set priorities but it wasn't number one. It was one through five or one through fifteen.

**DR. ELZY:** It is said that the Carter White House didn't return phone calls from members of Congress. How did your office deal with Congressional mail and phone calls. What was the process that was followed?

**FRANK MOORE:** Well, I think – there were some articles very early on, right after – well, prior to the inauguration, once he — once President Carter was elected – again, nobody moved to — I was up there with some temporary help. And supposed – you're receiving all these phone calls, there's no way – you'd get 250 a day, you could return them.

But after the inauguration, we also got a lot of phone calls. President Carter would introduce me, he'd say, "Anything you want, call Frank. And here's his number." And we really didn't have enough staff and couldn't – couldn't get back to a lot of people. So I'd say it was a valid criticism for February and maybe March, and then we got straightened out. There's no way you – if you get twenty- – if you, if you take – if you get twenty-five phone calls, each phone call takes three or four minutes to return and oftentimes that generates another phone call. You call somebody back and then you have to do – so there's no way one person could do it. So we got that delegated on down.

But another – there's another reason for that. And Hamilton Jordan was de facto Chief of Staff. People wouldn't call the President – didn't think they could get through -- a Senator or Congressmen, but just say – here's the way it goes, this is the hierarchy.

A Senator would rather talk to the President, because he'd like to say, "I called the President and talked to him." Failing that, he'd rather talk to the top person, Chief of Staff, so they'd call Hamilton. I would be third in line.

Well, Hamilton and the President, and the President's secretaries, to protect me, and to make – keep me from being undercut and my staff, would refer – if a Senator called Hamilton, he'd say, "Frank, return this call. Senator so-and-so called me; I don't know what he wants. And you should be getting the call anyway. We need to condition – we need to set up this thing so that people from Congress call you."
And so you had some resentment on the part of the people making the calls \textit{[laughing]} that Hamilton didn't return calls. Well, Hamilton was doing it to protect me. Or the President was doing it to enhance my credibility within the White House. So I'm -- so I'm afraid some of criticism comes around because people were trying to help me.

\textbf{DR. ELZY}: Right. But your office was answering those calls.

\textbf{FRANK MOORE}: Oh, we had -- we had -- we had strict -- we kept logs; we tried to return every -- we never left there Friday night without a telephone call being returned from that week. And I know that sounds -- you'd think we'd do it that day, but we did -- we stayed -- we'd do them that night. But you'd get -- you know, you'd play telephone tag, maybe call a person back or something -- maybe it'd take two or three days.

But we went, we had a meeting in my office on Friday afternoons; we went through all of our call sheets and we -- “Have you done this, have you done that?” “I haven't talked to him but I've talked to his Chief of Staff; Chief of Staff says no need to call back, the thing's been fixed now, the crisis is past.” Or “Frank, he saw you at so-and-so's fundraiser and you took care of it, so there's no need to do this again.” Or, “Yeah, thanks. I know you tried to get back to me, but let's sit down and talk about two or three things after this.”

And -- yeah, we had very strict discipline on -- on -- but, if you went to look at, you know, \textit{The Washington Post} and pulled out a page it'd say “the Carter White House doesn't return phone calls.” Well, I think that's probably true for the first forty-five, sixty days, but for the rest of the four years, we did it. But -- but nobody wrote a story about that.

\textbf{DR. ELZY}: Right. I presume you had a big mail operation, too. I presume if a Congressman wrote a letter to the White House, to the President, it would come through your office.

\textbf{FRANK MOORE}: Yes. We had a Congressional mail operation, a lot of people working in it and -- and that -- you know, that was also prioritized. You could tell which was just a pro forma letter and which ones -- which ones the President needed to sign, which ones Susan needed to sign, which ones could be signed by the auto pen and which ones you could acknowledge receipt of.

\textbf{DR. ELZY}: Right.

\textbf{FRANK MOORE}: And you get pretty good at that. And of course, you farm them out -- we had a very -- we had a wonderful -- a wonderful woman heading that up named Ev Small who was Katherine Graham's personal assistant up until her death. And helped her write her book. Who has a PhD in English from University of Virginia. So when Ev -- when it was anything with a letter, I didn't have to check the grammar.

\textbf{DR. ELZY}: Yes.

\textbf{FRANK MOORE}: \textit{[Laughing]} No -- and I wouldn't have been able to, anyway.
DR. ELZY: It is said that President Carter surrounded himself with young Georgians and needed in the White House some mature Washington veterans. And I particularly wanted to ask about that. Vice President Walter Mondale was a Washington veteran, so I was wondering what his role was in dealing with Congress.

FRANK MOORE: It was important; it was significant. He'd been on the Finance Committee; he'd been in the Senate for three terms, I guess – eighteen years. From Minnesota; he was a protégé of Hubert Humphrey. He was well-liked in the Senate by conservatives, the liberals, the Democrats, the Republicans, everyone. And a lot of people in the Senate felt like they could talk to Fritz when they couldn't talk to Jimmy Carter or couldn't talk to Frank Moore or Hamilton Jordan.

So he would go up and just have a lunch about every couple of weeks. No agenda or anything, just get some of the guys together. And had – served the lunch in the Vice President's room or – or go to the Senate dining room or whatever. And just a listening session. And it was very helpful for him to bring that back. Sometimes he made a – you know, he took assignments on specific votes and people he was very, very close to. The President relied on him.

Of course, he presided over the Senate. He damaged some relationships when he broke a tie vote or made a ruling from the Chair on the Energy Bill, which made some people mad, but he said – Well, you know – I mean, he did what needed to be done, but some people thought that it shouldn't have been done. But very, very helpful, and very supportive of me, and helpful of me and his – so was his staff. But let me go back to the first point.

DR. ELZY: Sure.

FRANK MOORE: On the Hill, particularly in the House, and, and, and – by the way, we – Dan Tate and Bob Thomson were two mature, well-respected Senate hands who worked for me. And they understood the Senate; they'd grown up in it and lived in it – and everybody understood them. Same way with the House people. When they were talking about, we're talking about me or other Georgians.

But Jim Wright, when somebody would complain to him about it, he'd say, "Look." He said, "The President has to have people around him he can trust." He said, "Had you—" said, "The Congressional Relations person can either be somebody on the Hill, from us, who's representing the Congress in the White House. Which we don't need. We can represent ourselves. Or you could have somebody in the White House who the President trusts representing him up here. And you've got that in Frank Moore."

DR. ELZY: Right.

FRANK MOORE: "And we're lucky we've got that, that is somebody the President trusts who represents him on the Hill, and not the Congress in the White House. Because we know what he's thinking, what – and so when
Frank—"you know, they grew to trust me and—"

**DR. ELZY:** Right.

**FRANK MOORE:** So Jim Wright was very helpful in making that little talk when everybody complained, and they said, "Well, I never thought about that."

**DR. ELZY:** Well, good.

**FRANK MOORE:** And I always considered that I did represent the President on the Hill and not the Hill in the White House. But what—a lot of the criticism—those people who said, "You need some senior Washingtonians working in the White House," were thinking of a very specific senior Washingtonian and it was usually themselves.

**DR. ELZY:** Someone needed a job.

**FRANK MOORE:** [Laughing] or wanted one, wanted a better one than the one they had.

**DR. ELZY:** Right. All right.

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**TAPE 3, SIDE B**

**DR. ELZY:** I believe you said you had read a story about Jacqueline Kennedy coming to the White House. And do you recall when she visited during the Carter Administration?

**FRANK MOORE:** Yeah, we had a lot of surprise, you know, visitors there. Not only the NFL—the Super Bowl champions, the NBA champions—you have a chance to meet—Muhammad Ali came by my office one day—I have a treasured picture of that. But one thing I got—about four o'clock in the afternoon, and usually about four o'clock was when the President would call me and ask me to stop by his office. We were talking about my day, and I never got to that part.

**DR. ELZY:** Oh, really?

**FRANK MOORE:** Sort of a—so we—the red phone would ring or Susan [Clough] would say, "The President wants to know if you can stop and step down to the study." And we'd go down and just talk about things, or if it was Friday and I went over to the—I took the Legislative Report, I'd take it over to the residence, and sometimes the President would say, "Come on in and sit down, and let's talk about things," or he'd have a visitor over there, it would be interesting to talk with.

But [laughing] one day I got a call, and I don't remember what year this is probably be '79, '78—from the First Lady's office, and said, "Mrs.—two Mrs. Kennedys are coming in, Mrs. Rose Kennedy and Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy, to view the portrait of President John Kennedy. And Mrs. Carter isn't here and can't get back." I don't know what the problem was—a plane delayed—"and wants to
know if you will meet them and give them a tour."

I said, "Of course," so I walked under the colonnade and to the diplomatic reception room, and – and Jacqueline Kennedy came, and Mrs. – of course, I recognized her and Mrs. Rose Kennedy, too, and we introduced ourselves – they had come separately; they did not come together. Separate cars, and from separate locations. And we went up and they looked at President John Kennedy’s portrait.

And I believe Rose – Mrs. Rose Kennedy had never seen it before, and Jacqueline Kennedy had not seen it hanging in the White House. Maybe she - I'm not sure about this; maybe she’d seen it in the artist's studio or whatever. But then they asked if it was okay for them to look at the Red Room or the – [laughing] and I said, "Of course, go anyplace you want."

I think Mrs. Carter had planned on having them for tea, and – so we, you know, we – fifteen minutes, maybe twenty minutes max, but – there were -- surprises like that come in the White House that you forget about and then remember twenty years later what a pleasant time it was. The visit of the Pope, and having a chance to meet the Pope, shake hands with him – most people don't get to do that. So in addition to all the hard work, there are a lot of perks that go with it.

DR. ELZY: Well, good. One thing we haven't mentioned, I guess, in your responsibilities, was I imagine that you sometimes accompanied visitors even from other countries to Congress, or to visit with Congressmen. I understand you took Deng Ziaoping to -- ?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I wouldn't say I took him. The – it was a – he paid a visit up to the Hill, and there was a – a luncheon with the Congressional leaders, the – and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committees. And I was a - I'm sure there was a State Department person – but I was the only person from the White House that was in there.

And I was invited - not by the Chinese – but by Speaker O'Neill and – because I think he hosted the meeting - to come. So it was interesting to see our leaders explaining our form of government to -- [laughing] to the Chinese.

DR. ELZY: Yes, yes.

FRANK MOORE: I'm sure he - I'm sure the guy knew very, very well what our form of government was [laughing], but – I don't think they did a joint session for him. Oftentimes they do a joint session.

And those were – those were hard to schedule. And oftentimes a visitor – it was – that fell on us to do that. Head of state comes, they want - you know, they want to meet around town, they want to meet with Defense, Treasury, State – they want to meet with the National Security Council, and they always want a meeting with the President, and they want a state dinner if they can get one.

And if they really can get one, they want to address a joint session of Congress, which really puts a burden on Congress, because of the – of the security. If it's
on a Monday, then they don't – they want to have it full, the chamber full, so they have to get all the pages and all the staff and everything to fill up the chamber, so it won't look empty. If it's on a Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday, then they can't have any legislation that day. Because they have to clear the chamber and sweep it for security reasons, and again, you have to fill it up.

So it got to the point, that people said, "Oh, we don't want to – please don't ask us to do any more joint sessions of Congress." I mean, State Department asked the White House, White House would ask us to go – and say -- you know, if somebody really, really important comes, of course we'll do it, but – not for the Prime Minister of Bongo Bongo, you know. So we put a – we quit asking. Because we didn't want – we didn't want to get a no.

**DR. ELZY:** One thing I haven't asked you about, and this reminds me of it – did you travel much during those four years on business? Did you – I know you mentioned going to Panama – did you make any other flying trips? And also, did you travel around the country?

**FRANK MOORE:** I didn't travel around the country much. I did some camp—— I did fundraisers for people -- you know, would be a speaker at someone's dinner or whatever, at J-J [Jefferson-Jackson] Dinners, and make short talks. My staff traveled a lot with Congress; I encouraged it.

We actually controlled – and this was something that – that other – that the Nixon people told me I should do, and I did – and other White Houses hadn't had it – we – the Congress can make a request for an airplane to the 89th Air Wing, which is Andrews Air Force Base, for Congressional travel. We had all those requests come through us, Congressional Relations, to get an airplane.

So we scheduled the Congressional trips – well, at least, the Air Force, of course, scheduled them, but there's more – more trips than there are airplanes, so you have to juggle them, and – and some airplanes have windows, some don't. Windows are preferred because it makes people, when they land, people judge the importance of the Congressional delegation because they know those planes; they've seen them coming and go through the years [laughing] – they even know the tail numbers on them.

So of course, the more senior people got -- LBJ's old Vice President plane was a favorite one that people used to use. And then Vice President used it – it had a great big seat in it and – but - my staff went on those trips and they're wonderful things. I mean, I can tell you, twenty years later, you remember – you really get to know a member and you get to know their wives and their family, going on those trips.

I didn't go on as many as they did. I went on one to China, with Senator Muskie, when - before he became Secretary of State, and we had five Senators and five members of the House.

Senator Baker took me on two trips. One was to Russia, in preparation for the SALT talks, and I went with Senator – five Republican Senators – Tower and Garn and Danforth – I can't think of the other one right now, and their wives and
my wife, Nancy. And I got to know Senator Baker very well and those other Senators.

You travel together ten or fifteen days and – he was always very courteous in that he would treat me, of course, as a member of the executive branch, so in terms of all the things that protocol requires, who sits on the right, where you line up in the motorcade, and so forth, Senator Baker always treated me as number two in the delegation, not one which I – I told him that I – it was a little embarrassing to me.

I went on another trip with Senator Baker to Mexico and Panama and Venezuela and Peru and Brazil and Argentina and Costa Rica and – they were wonderful. Hard-working, hard-working.

You got off, you met – you’d meet with the leadership; you meet with the opposition. First thing you do is go to the Embassy, you get a briefing from the political people. Get a briefing from the economic people; get an intelligence briefing from the – the intelligence officer. Those were usually restricted. Not just – not to the whole delegation.

Dinner at the Embassy, but a working dinner, because you were briefed on everyone who was coming, and you had some – an Ambassador might ask you to do certain things, you know, to help in his or her work.

Then you have a return dinner, and back on the airplane to another country. So – maybe at the end of a ten-day trip, you’d take a half-day and play tourist or something, but I never went on a trip where we went to the beach or nightclubs or anything.

**DR. ELZY:** Speaking of Congressmen on planes, did your office also help with Congressmen traveling with the President, as he went around the country?

**FRANK MOORE:** Yes, we had five seats on Air Force One that were ours to use. And of course, sometimes - I mean, it's just so obvious who those people have to be – if it's the senior person from that state, or the Committee Chairman – they want to go, they’re gonna go.

**DR. ELZY:** Now, were these always Democrats?

**FRANK MOORE:** No, not necessarily. Well, they're all Democrats - they're – I think there were some exceptions. What you don't do – you don't – if a Democrat – if they're not Democrats, they don't get off the front door with the President and get their picture made getting off of Air Force One with the President because it can be used --

**DR. ELZY:** I see. I see.

**FRANK MOORE:** There's a whole protocol of boarding and unboarding and de-boarding, I mean, lining up --

**DR. ELZY:** I gather Air Force One's pretty luxurious.
FRANK MOORE: Well, I've only - I've only been on the new one, one time. President Clinton brought us down here to the presentation of the Medal of Freedom. But it is luxurious. The old one is – was nice; it's a little better than first class. But again, you work all the time. You work – you get a phone, you get the list, and you work, you work it, you read papers, and you answer - I mean, you take a big bundle of mail, and you work, work, work, work, work. Return calls. And sleep.

DR. ELZY: What did you learn about American government during your four years as head of Congressional Liaison? Looking back on it now; if you were talking to a grandchild – what did you learn that might not be obvious to everyone else?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I think every cliché you hear about Congress is true. It has to be – it has to be true to be a cliché. But you don't want to watch hot dogs made and you don't want to watch tax laws made [laughing].

I think if you watched foreign policy committees work, you'd be very proud of our Congress. I think if you watched a lot of the social welfare being made, a lot of the public – most all of the public policy, the Congress will usually do the right thing. They may go a little too far one way, a little too far back, but it's – our system of government is pretty well self-correcting; our country is so strong, so powerful, our people so resilient, that they'll make the necessary adjustments [laughing] when they think it's time to do that – at the election box.

And it makes you proud to be an American and I just have to – I think we're about to close, and I'll just say this, that I was proud to work for Jimmy Carter, when he was Governor, when he was a candidate, when he was President, proud every minute. But I've never been more proud than I am now of what he's doing after the Presidency.

DR. ELZY: I was going to ask what your relationship has been with President and Mrs. Carter since leaving the White House?

FRANK MOORE: Well, they live in Georgia, I lived in Illinois – I live in Maryland and D.C., but we find times to get together, and communicate on holidays and Christmases and Thanksgivings. We'll call each other.

And I believe for the last seven years, President Carter has come up and spent time with Jody Powell and me on the farm together – he comes up and goes hunting with us. And he stays one year with Jody and one year with me. But we all eat together every meal.

Four years prior to that, we had a annual hunting trip, or five years, annual hunting trip out to Arkansas, with President Carter. Of course I always see him when he comes into town. And we have the kind of relationship that, if we haven't seen each other for six months to a year, after we've been together a couple of minutes, we're right back where we were. Twenty years ago. And I'm proud of that.
DR. ELZY: Why don't you tell us what you've been doing these last twenty years?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I've put to use the things I learned working for Jimmy Carter, about state government and organizing, by – by being Vice President of Government and Regulatory Affairs - and I also had Public Affairs reporting to me - for a national and later international company. And I stayed about fifteen years there.

And I've now retired and enjoy my grandchildren and visiting with old friends.

DR. ELZY: You live in Maryland – in close proximity to Jody Powell. I gather you two have long been friends and --

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, we own a farm together. And where we've each taken two acres of land and built our respective houses on it. We're about two hundred yards apart. We share the boat docks and we share the tractors and we share the shop and the duck blinds and everything else.

DR. ELZY: Did you work for other politicians before you worked for President Carter or after, or --?

FRANK MOORE: Only one time. When President Carter appointed David Gambrell to fill out Senator [Richard] Russell's term, he – I was asked to come and work in David Gambrell's campaign. Raising money. Which I did. For six months or whatever – however long a race. Maybe I came to work in July and the race was over in November. Actually, Sam Nunn beat him in the primary, didn't he?

DR. ELZY: I believe so.

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, so whenever the primary was. Maybe a six-month tour. So he lost to Sam Nunn in the primary.

DR. ELZY: I don't – let me ask you, if I may, about some – just thoughts I just had. What do you think about – from your experience with the Congressional legislative branch, and the executive branch – talk about having, say, a four-year term for Congress instead of two, or a six-year Presidential term and limiting the President to one term. Have you thought about those?

FRANK MOORE: Yeah, I have. You can't really get everything done in one term. I mean, you see – you see – Florida has – the Speaker is limited to one term, and it's sort of lined up; you know who's going to be the Speaker several years out, [it goes] Majority Leader and then the Speaker. And it works well. You get a lot done. Because you know you've got that one year to get it done.

I don't think it'll ever happen, because I don't think we can change the Constitution, but I've always been in favor of a six-year term. I think President Eisenhower talked about it. It's a tough job. One of the toughest things is running – is the election part of it. Running for reelection. And if you could – you could get elected once and devote all your time to the Presidency, you'd probably accomplish a lot.
I've always been in favor of national service. I feel like the Israelis do. That when you graduate from high school, you ought to spend two years in the Army or Job Corps or working in a hospital, or whatever, and I think there are a lot of government — I think then you'd learn about government responsibility; you could have a lot of those jobs in Washington, and in state legislatures. And then when you decide to go to college, you're more mature. It works well for other countries. But we never had a chance to introduce that legislation.

DR. ELZY: Right, right. I don't want to end without asking you to talk about maybe what you look back on as your greatest disappointment, but you've already mentioned Hospital Cost Containment. But also, what you look back with, on your work on Washington, with the most pride?

FRANK MOORE: Well, I think you'd — you'd say the same thing everybody would say. That it's the friendships you made, the people you worked with, what you learned from those folks, the chance to serve a President as great as Jimmy Carter.

A lot of legislation we're proud of, and that's going to be on the books a long time, and a lot of it has been built on, and some of it — some of it's been torn down. But it has to be the personal relationships you made.

DR. ELZY: Good.

FRANK MOORE: Martin, I want to thank you for having me in and giving me your time, and ask you or any of your staff to contact me if you want to — have a question about anything you run across in our files, or anything you think I might I have knowledge of.

DR. ELZY: All right, well, we certainly appreciate you volunteering to do this oral history interview. It's been a great pleasure, and we may think of some more questions in the future.

FRANK MOORE: Well, please call me.

DR. ELZY: All right. Thank you.

[END OF TAPE 3, SIDE B]