

Frank Church


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Thirty Cents



Frank Church

The
Chameleon
In
The
Senate

by Alan Stang

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Chip
Pisfig
in
Church
file

May 29, 1976

Mr. Hamilton Jordan
National Chairman
Carter for President Committee
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jordan:

I think the time has come to tell the truth about Senator Frank Church, and some of the problems we had with him, in years gone by, especially those of us who were formerly active in the Young Democratic Party of Minnesota.

I enclose some newspaper clippings about a famous "flap" those of us involved with civil rights had with the famous Senator. This is not meant to be vindictive, but I thought that the Governor would want to know who he is dealing with.

I have long been a supporter of Senator Humphrey, and long ago urged him to run for the Presidency, but when I got a flat "no go" in a letter to me last fall, I ran and won as a precinct delegate for Governor Carter in our Spring caucuses. Unfortunately there were not enough of us, under the proportional rules now in existence, to gain even one delegate on our national delegation.

If Governor Carter is our candidate, I hope that I may be of assistance to him in any way I can.

Incidentally, I am on good terms with both "Fritz" Mondale and Senator Humphrey, but have not been active in the party since being thrown out by the McCarthy "radicals" in 1968. Maybe its time I got active again.

With warmest personal respect,



Gene H. Rosenblum, Esq.

ghr/ar

Ford

Ronald Evans and Robert Novak

Ford's Campaign Strategy

Gerald Ford's selection of Army Secretary Howard H. (Bo) Callaway as his presidential campaign manager may prove a master stroke in Mr. Ford's pre-convention strategy: fence in former California Gov. Ronald Reagan and his conservative stalwarts so tightly that Reagan will abandon any hope of winning the nomination himself.

But beyond that, selection of the exuberant, rich and extrovertish Georgia conservative, who had been under active but secret consideration at least since May 27, reveals important details about Mr. Ford's developing political style and its healthy contrast to Richard M. Nixon's.

For example, the President himself has had a series of confidential talks with long-time Republican tacticians, such as Jack Mills, president of the Tobacco Institute who will be a part-time campaign aide, Ohio National Committeeman Ray C. Bliss and many more. He is looking to old friends from his days in the House, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Milsworth, a former congressman from Kansas, for major jobs in his campaign organization and is leaning toward Richard Cheney as White House liaison for the campaign.

As top aide to White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Cheney's designation as presidential go-between with campaign chief Callaway would give Mr. Ford automatic contact with all elements of the campaign. Such personal, detailed involvement was virtual heresy to Richard Nixon, who seldom deigned to talk politics with traditional politicians.

So tightly held was Callaway's se-

lection, revealed to Callaway himself only on June 13, that Republican leaders in Congress and the party's high command around the country, including Georgia state chairman Mark Mattingly, did not learn of it until the formal White House announcement last Wednesday.

Callaway's name was first quietly surfaced for White House consideration by wily presidential intimate Melvin R. Laird, now the highly-paid "Senior Counsellor" on Reader Digest magazine. Laird and Dean Burch, chairman of the Ford Campaign Advisory Committee, has culled the names of scores of prominent Republicans before settling on Callaway.

With Laird, Mr. Ford's first choice for 1976 campaign manager, out of the running because of his Reader's Digest job, Callaway's assets took on formidable proportions, with one obvious liability: his 1966 campaign for governor (lost by an eyelash), which one White House aide privately described as "racist."

But in the Republican southern heartland of Ronald Reagan, that criticism is no liability. Indeed, Mattingly told us that Callaway's selection would unquestionably help Mr. Ford in Georgia if a primary challenge from Reagan actually developed.

More important, Mississippi State Chairman Clarke Reed, the most active and vociferous critic of Mr. Ford as insufficiently conservative, says the President "couldn't have done any better," than Callaway for campaign chairman.

The "racist" charge against Callaway's 1966 gubernatorial campaign, moreover, is viewed in the White House as substantially outflanked by

Callaway's success in building an all-volunteer army with the highest black percentage—22 per cent—since World War II.

The underlying Ford strategy, in trying to convince Reagan and his conservative partisans that a race against the President would be futile, has the South as its focal point. Callaway, as a southern organizer for Barry Goldwater in the 1964 pre-convention period and southern regional director for Nixon in 1968, has outstanding credentials among southern Republican conservatives.

Thus, his selection as campaign manager gives Mr. Ford another lever in the South to go along with his nomination of Dr. F. David Mathews, president of the University of Alabama, to be Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

Although some anti-Ford conservatives describe this as "tossing the South a couple of bones," the bone-tossing is having an indisputable impact. That was clear last Saturday in Columbus, Ga., when Mr. Ford spent a highly fruitful hour behind closed doors with Georgia Republican leaders.

The President told the Georgians that "my philosophy is like yours," and the evidence he produced—his successful vetoes of anti-recession spending bills—drove his point home.

The danger in this pre-convention strategy is obvious: that the President will succeed in fencing in Reagan, thus winning the nomination battle hands down—but risking the election war when conservative Republicans will comprise a minor slice of the total vote.

Ford Campaign Unit Now Formal Entity

By Jules Witcover

Washington Post Staff Writer

In the increasingly popular game of getting into the presidential election swim one toe at a time rather than jumping in with both feet, President Ford yesterday authorized "the President Ford Committee" to raise and spend money to further his still-undeclared bid for a full four-year term next year.

Dean Burch, already appointed temporary chairman of the committee, personally registered the group at the Federal Election Commission, as required by the new campaign reform law. Burch said the President would make a formal announcement of candidacy soon, but this step certainly indicated his intentions clearly.

Burch submitted a letter from the President that said: "I hereby authorize the President Ford Committee to solicit and receive contributions and to incur expenses and to make expenditures to further my nomination for the office of President of the United States."

In an obvious reference to the Watergate scandal that grew out of the previous Republican President's re-election campaign in 1972, Burch said he was convinced that Mr. Ford "is committed to the most straight-up campaign that has ever been run by an incumbent President."

He said he thought the President would be nominated, but that former Gov. Ronald Reagan of California was "the most credible" of the potential

challengers. However, he said, "I'm inclined to think that the President's strength has grown in just the last few weeks, enough at least to lead any challenger to reconsider."

The registration is required of any political committee which expects to raise more than \$1,000 for a candidate. Burch said the statutory limit on contributions of \$1,000 from any individual to any one candidate and on expenditures assured that the 1976 election would be "an entirely new ball game."

The registration listed Burch as chairman, but the White House already has announced that Secretary of the Army Howard H. (Bo) Callaway will leave the Pentagon next month and take over from Burch.

Listed as treasurer and finance chairman of the committee is David Packard, former under secretary of defense. Other members of the organizing committee are Robert Douglass, a close associate of Vice President Rockefeller; former Nixon White House adviser Bryce Harlow; Richard L. Herman, former Republican national committeeman from Nebraska; former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; Leon W. Parma, an executive of Teledyne, Inc., of San Diego, and former Gov. William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania.

The registration listed the Riggs National Bank at Dupont Circle as the committee's depository, and said the campaign headquarters will be at 1200 18th St. NW, Suite 916.

L.A. Times 9/14/75

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CIA PROBE BOOSTS SEN. CHURCH

Continued from First Page

to give the coming hearings a big buildup. The effort failed.

Church coyly told reporters that the first day or two would deal with "a very important subject that has not yet come to light." But word began to leak out from Administration sources that he was referring to the CIA's retention of bacterial poisons, and Church was forced to provide details.

Subsequent hearings will deal with alleged abuses against U.S. citizens by the CIA, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other intelligence agencies. The committee's findings on the CIA's alleged involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be made public in a report.

Church is not known as a tough-skinned, hard-nosed investigator. On the contrary, during his 18 years in the Senate, he has been regarded by some as a bit soft, somewhat erudite and more eager for compromise than confrontation.

He is cautious and deliberate. When he speaks, he knows how his sentences will end. In briefing reporters after dozens of closed hearings by his CIA committee, Church has been precise in his remarks, yet reluctant to give sensitive details.

His patience has paid off in obtaining CIA records. Although the White House and CIA at first resisted giving Church the top-secret material he wanted, Church spent weeks working out a careful agreement for handling different files.

"We think we have it all," he said, referring to records that deal with the CIA's alleged involvement in foreign assassination plots. In an interview, he acknowledged that there were gaps in the written record but said that this was "not because anything was withheld but because the evidence simply doesn't exist in some cases."

No date has been set for release of the assassination report.

"It's like writing 'War and Peace,'" Church said, referring to the length of the report. "We have reviewed a vast number of documents, including National Security Council files, and have taken 8,000 pages of testimony from over 100 witnesses."

As to why the committee felt it necessary to disclose any CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church said:

"It's an aberration, really, from the traditional American practice in the world and our historic principles. It fell to us to do this job because the Rockefeller commission would not treat it." This was a reference to the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, a group headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

Church said the report would address such questions as how did it happen and who ordered it.

"Some of the conclusions we reach will have general application to the rest of the CIA investigation," he added. They will deal with the command and control of the CIA."

Church said in July that the panel had found no direct involvement by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy or former Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy in plotting foreign assassinations. Some Republi-



Sen. Frank Church

AP photo

Church to Be in Spotlight at CIA Open Hearings

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—When open Senate hearings on the Central Intelligence Agency start Tuesday, the public is likely to know a lot more about the man-looking liberal Democrat, Frank Church. Church, who was the nation's youngest senator when Idaho first elected him at age 32 in 1956, has enough work these days. He is being chairman of the Senate's investigation into whether intelligence-gathering agencies are chairman of a foreign relations subcommittee that is probing evidence of international bribery and payment of illegal U.S. campaign contributions by some major defense contractors and oil companies.

Church had begun quietly to organize a drive for the Democratic presidential nomination last January. His subsequent appointment to head the Senate's special committee on intelligence activities forced him to call off those plans—at least temporarily.

Some believe the CIA hearings and their wide television exposure will boost him to national prominence. If that should happen, he may rekindle his presidential campaign when the panel's work concludes by next spring.

The committee's seven-month investigation so far has been conducted in closed hearings. When he finally was ready to go public, Church tried

cans on the committee have evidence to clear these officials.

Lacking presidential direct control, behaving like a rogue elephant suggested at that time.

It was Church's early interest in questionable CIA activities in seeking—and obtaining—the committee. Senate Majority Leader appointed him to the job last July.

Following 1972 disclosures of government and the International Corp., Church—as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee—investigated an CIA in Chile. He did so as chairman of the subcommittee on multinational corporations, the investigating international payoff.

The subcommittee—acting on syndicated columnist Jack Anderson offered the CIA \$1 million to prevent Allende from gaining power in Chile. Church said the CIA had no role in that country.

"CIA turned down the money but we did the work," Church said. His first to obtain testimony from a CIA source on covert operations.

Church believes "a very pervasive corruption" in the United States. Among the symptoms is a "tempt for the law" by some large corporations and government agencies alike.

"Big corporations are showing contempt for the law with payoffs and bribery abroad and illegal contributions at home as though regard for the

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SEN. CHURCH'S ROLE IN CIA PROBE

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tries. It was the old Uncle Sucker business."

"I began to look more critically at military aid and other aid programs—how we often wound up arming both sides in a conflict and getting blamed by both," he said.

Church recalled the early 1960s, when the United States chiefly assisted the South Vietnamese with American advisers and limited aid.

"I went along with it, believing that we were assisting the Diem government to prevent the Communists from taking over," he said.

But Church said he became "increasingly cynical when we began sending in our own people in large numbers."

In February, 1965, he broke with the Johnson administration in a speech that called for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

A furious President Lyndon B. Johnson zeroed in on Church's remark that he (Church) agreed with columnist Walter Lippmann on Vietnam. Johnson told reporters he had advised Church: "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."

Church said that Mr. Johnson had never told him this, "but he probably wished that he had said it."

Continuing his opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Church was coauthor with former Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) in 1970 of the landmark legislation that came to be known as the Cooper-Church amendment. It prohibited the use of funds for introducing combat troops into Cambodia and Laos.

The first statutory limit of its type ever imposed by Congress, the Cooper-Church legislation was followed by additional restrictions on the President's war-making powers in 1971 and 1973.

Church's familiarity with foreign affairs has undoubtedly been an asset in his CIA investigation. Aside from investigating U.S. links to the murders of foreign leaders, his committee has sought documents and testimony about CIA covert operations abroad.

Activities abroad, however, are not likely to be disclosed in the public hearings. Church and other committee members have said they do not want to impair the effectiveness of the CIA but only to show where reforms and improvements are needed.

Whether Church decides to seek his party's nomination for President will largely depend on how well the committee does its work and how the public perceives its efforts.

"This investigation," Church says, "could be a minefield."

A 'WINDMILL THAT RUNS ON WATER'

Frank Church Hot Darkhorse

By LOUISE SWEENEY
Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, D. C.—There were nine or ten farmers gathered in a hot room in Shoshone County, Idaho, back in the summer of '56, listening to a young Democratic lawyer who was running like a deer for the United States Senate.

The lawyer, Frank Church, was talking and swigging great gulps of water as he unrolled a long campaign speech designed for a major rally.

Finally, one great big farmer at the back of the room said, "Yqung man, I want to tell you something. I'm gonna vote for you, but you're the only windmill I ever saw that ran entirely on water."

After the meeting someone asked Frank Church why he had given a whole speech to just a handful of people.

"Why unload the whole bale of hay, Frank?"

His answer: "Because I'm out to make converts—if I tell it to ten, they'll tell it to ten more."

That attitude, which at 32 made him one of the youngest men ever to win a Senate seat, may be an asset again during another important summer in Frank Church's life.

This is the summer when ten million people may tell it to another ten million as Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chairs televised hearings on the domestic role of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairmen of controversial TV hearings have a way of becoming famous, as Senators Estes Kefauver and Sam J. Ervin Jr.

proved, so before the next election Frank Church's name may be as familiar as John Wayne's.

But Senator Church is not now a candidate for the presidency, although his long-time campaign manager Carl Burke admits, "He was prepared to put his foot in the water last January (when he was asked to chair the intelligence committee) and then pulled out because he knew that maintaining a political posture when running a serious type of investigation would be a disaster."

When he is asked what the U.S. most needs in a president and whether he would be willing to give it, he answers:

"I think the country (he sighs) needs to have its confidence restored in political leadership. Any man who can do this, whoever he may be, that man we need for president."

Is he ruling himself out? "No, I'm not ruling one way or another. That's the bedrock requirement in the aftermath of Watergate and a whole decade of disillusionment."

Although he's not in the running now, the liberal weekly, "The Village Voice," profiled him as "the hottest liberal dark horse." He pushes the levers of power in several important Senate committees, appears almost often on camera to answer questions about CIA assassination charges or hearings on the scandals of multinational corporations.

Senator Church looks different off camera. On camera, answering volatile questions, he is formal, guarded, his eyes hooded,



FRANK CHURCH . . . Seeks Converts

almost scholarly, with a certain heaviness of manner and appearance which are deceptive. In person he is trim, ebullient, tall (six feet) with a tan face that grins easily, brown eyes, Indian black hair with some features of gray in it, and a warmth that the camera somehow doesn't catch.

The one constant, off camera or on, is the voice, a soft baritone that falls in measured cadences like lines from Tennyson, with no slang.

Frank Church's Capitol office, a long room decked with senatorial brown leather furniture and an oil portrait of one of his heroes, the legendary orator Sen. William Borah, "the Lion of Idaho," is hidden away at one end of a maze of marble corridors. One of the precautions he takes as chairman of the intelligence committee is to have it swept regularly for "bugs."

Railroader Builds Own Railroad

GREENPORT, N.Y. (AP)—Frank Fierstein is working on the road—his own road—when building a home for his wife and children, or regular changes the road. Fierstein's road is a narrow-gauge railroad that will connect his home to the town of Greenport. Fierstein, 42, is a former railroad worker who has spent the last several years building the railroad. He says the railroad will be a major asset to the town and will provide a link to the town's history. The railroad is expected to be completed by next year.

Brown Lambasts U.S. Bureaucracy

SACRAMENTO (UPI) — Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. charged Friday that the Ford administration is forcing California to encourage more people to join welfare programs without providing the money to finance them.

"So, here we are in a position of the state of California basically being run by those bureaucracies in Washington," he declared. "They force us into programs that we don't want to get into. If we don't, they threaten to cut off the money."

The governor told a news conference he complained to newly appointed Health, Education and Welfare Secretary F. David Mathews and would discuss the issue with President Ford next month in Sacramento, "if the President cares to listen."

Brown's criticism was similar to former Gov. Ronald Reagan's heavy attacks on the federal welfare bureaucracy and his jealous defense of states' rights.

"Everywhere we look in this federal government, we find they are forcing us to do things that we don't have the tax base to do and for which they are un-

willing to pay," Brown declared.

At his third formal meeting with reporters in the theater-like Capitol news conference room, the Democratic chief executive also discussed:

TAXES — He said he now could think of no circumstances under which he would sign a bill increasing the gasoline tax from seven to nine cents a gallon. "I'm very reluctant to see any new taxes and I'm doing everything I can to prevent that," he said.

SCHOOLS — He suggested California could come close to complying with the requirements of the Serrano education finance decision if over the next six to eight years the state pumped equalization aid into poor school districts and at the same time limited the spending of wealthier districts.

PRESIDENT — He insisted again he was not a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination next year, but said to "offer a Sherman-like statement is a little silly." Republican William T. Sherman said in 1885 that if he was nominated, he wouldn't accept and if elected, wouldn't serve.

Convention Kicked Off By Chavez

FRESNO (UPI) — United Farm Workers Union leader Cesar Chavez and between 500 and 600 delegates to the UFW's 2nd Constitutional Convention concentrated on getting the formalities out of the way during the opening session Friday so more important matters could be taken up today.

Chavez, looking trim and fit after completing all but the last leg of his 1,000-mile march through California to recruit new members and inform farm workers about the state's new Agricultural Labor Relations Act, welcomed the delegates in a brief address Friday morning to open the convention.

Chavez was greeted with a standing ovation that turned into a singing, slogan-shouting cheer.

After his brief talk, Chavez turned the convention over to other members of the union executive committee for the usual reports and seating of official delegations.

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S.F. Examiner 8/18/75

A sociologist's look at whites' flight to the suburbs

Knight News Service

WASHINGTON — Sociologist James Coleman, one of the nation's leading thinkers on school integration policy, is easing away from his recent contention that school desegregation has become a major reason for white flight from the cities.

Coleman is the University of Chicago scholar whose 1966 segregation research report became a rationale for many subsequent court-ordered integration programs.

Earlier this year, he drew criticism from colleagues and civil rights advocates when he said new research showed forced integration of single school districts to be self-defeating because it drove whites out.

But at a meeting of academicians in Washington Friday, Coleman presented a new draft report of his 68-city study, and it contained some significant new qualifiers. Among them:

- The effect of school desegregation on white exodus was substantial in some of the cities he studied, but it also was short-term. After the first year of a significant change in the racial mix of schools in a given district, the rate of white emigration usually went back to its previous level.

- Desegregation is "considerably less" a factor in white flight than other ongoing social and economic forces.

- There is no way to determine from Coleman's study what differences there are — if any — in the way white families react to reductions in school segregation that come by court order or deliberate policy, compared to those that come by such natural forces as changed residential patterns.

That last point is important because of the political use to which Coleman's findings and interpretations have been put since he began talking about them in April.

Anti-busing forces quickly seized on his remark that "court-induced school desegregation had served only to swell the white exodus from the big cities."

But academic colleagues have argued that he has no specific facts to back up his claim, since none of the cities he studied were under court orders during the 1968-73 period the research covered.

In seeming reaction to some of that criticism, Coleman would make no comments on court policy Friday, nor would he discuss his own ideas on what judicial and administrative approaches might relieve the problems he discussed.

In fact, some of his remarks suggested that he considered the issue of desegregation to be almost moot in the long run, at least in some northern cities whose school systems are fast becoming all-black.

As long as that trend continues, and as long as there are white suburban havens to move to, white populations in those cities will continue to decline, he said.

"The absolute proportion of blacks in center city schools and the differential between (the proportion of) blacks in the center city and the surrounding area have a strong effect on whites, quite apart from desegregation," Coleman said.

Gary Orfield, who is attached to the Brookings Institution, where the meeting occurred, said that an argument against court-ordered integration based on Coleman's figures was a weak one.

Orfield argued that a family that would move because of a more integrated school system probably is already on its way out of town anyway.

"A family that leaves Detroit next fall when the school integration plan is implemented," he said, "will also be aware of the city's income tax, its 1967 riot, the extremely high level of violent crime, the cut-backs in the police force, the city's black mayor, the massive housing abandonment in the city, the recent loss of more than a fifth of the city's job base, its severe current economic crisis and other factors."

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Nuclear Plant Initiative Still U

BY RON ROACH

SACRAMENTO (AP)—California's new Energy Commission won't take sides on the proposed Nuclear Safeguards Initiative, but individual commissioners say they won't duck the issue.

To date, it is 1-0 among commissioners in favor of the initiative.

The four other commissioners haven't taken public stands yet on what may be the most important socio-economic decision facing Californians.

They say Californians should lay emotions aside and take a cool, hard look at the facts in the initiative proposal on next June's presidential primary ballot.

The initiative would set standards for nuclear power plants which critics say are so tough they would prohibit any new plants and would phase out operation of existing multi-million-dollar plants.

Richard Maullin, chairman of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission said a commission stand would be powerful fuel for either side's campaign.

And, Maullin said, "Certainly a decision by voters to approve or reject will be taken as a signal for the rest of the nation."

Only commissioner Ronald Doctor takes a stand: "Strictly as an individual, I am in favor of the initiative."

Moretti is the in the

the election, I'll make my views known publicly."

Moretti said the implications pro and con must be set before the public which must try to make a decision based on logic rather than emotions, because there are emotions on both sides of the issue."

Al Pasternak said he was undecided.

Richard Tuttle said he wouldn't hesitate to speak out once he has totally analyzed all data.

But they all have feelings on the impact of passage or failure of the initiative.

Maullin said he hopes all the facts will be brought out by opponents and proponents and by hearings in October conducted by assemblyman Charles Warren, D-Los Angeles.

If they don't, "I might change my position and say something, which might affect the election," Maullin said.

Which way, Maullin didn't say.

"Being a political scientist by profession," said Maullin, former Rand Corp. researcher, "I know it won't be until next April when the broad public becomes aware of the battle. Right now there are special interest groups."

Doctor, a nuclear engineer, explained his position:

"I believe the initiative goes to the heart of some very serious problems that have arisen, problems of such magnitude and overwhelming importance.

wastes on future generations, as a burden to be borne without knowing how those generations can handle them?"

Doctor listed two major areas of concern:

SAFETY— To my way of thinking, at least from the evidence I've seen so far, there has been insufficient experimental work to provide assurances that are necessary. Perhaps there is

experimental work that I'm not aware of. If so, it should be brought to the attention of all."

WASTE—"How to dispose of or manage the longlived radioactive waste? It seems to be a basic philosophical problem Social and governmental institutions have never lasted as long as those wastes are going to be around."

Pasternak, a chemical engineer, said the prob-

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
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How a noncandidate can run for presidency

Church plays a 'waiting game'

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Sen. Frank Church is what might be called a "biding-his-time" candidate, making all the motions toward entering the race without actually getting in yet.

What the Senator's intentions are — he told a group of reporters over breakfast — is to jump into the race in late February or early March, after the first primaries are over in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Florida. Mr. Church considers these early contests "inconclusive."

After them he thinks that "most" of the candidates will have exhausted much of their funds and will have to either drop out or cut back on campaigning.

Already, he says, a Church campaign committee has half the contribution commitments in the 20 states that are necessary for qualifying a candidate for matching federal funds.

The Church "undeclared candidacy" status draws attention to an oddity in the bidding for the Democratic nomination: that beyond the large field of 11 declared candidates (Bayh, Wallace, Jackson, Bentsen, Harris, Byrd, Shapp, Sanford, Udall, Shriver, and Carter) several other noncandidates wait in the wings.

Foremost is Hubert Humphrey, who says he will not enter the primaries but is willing to be the draft choice of a brokered convention.

There are also other former presidential candidates — Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. They would take the nomination if it began to move in their direction.

Those who are playing this "noncandidate" game feel that all of the 31 primaries may turn out to be a waste of time — and that the convention will have to turn elsewhere.

Thus, they believe that their noncandidacies may well turn out to be the best strategy for capturing the nomination.

There are other Democratic "hopefuls," those who think that "lightening just might strike."

On that list — one top Democratic leader has said — "is just about every Democratic Senator and a lot of Democrats in the House, too."

One who would definitely take the nomination from a convention draft is Sen. Walter Mondale, of Minnesota who recently dropped his official candidacy because he said he didn't want the hardships of a campaign — including the



By R. Norman Matheny, staff photographer

Sen. Church — a 'biding-his-time' candidate

problem of raising sufficient funds to carry him through the many primaries.

Vance Hartke is interested in the nomination. So is William Proxmire. So is Adlai Stevenson. And there are many more.

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DAILY NEWS

NEW YORK'S PICTURE NEWSPAPER

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FEB 4 1975

By Jerry Greene

His Lips Say No, No but There's Yes, Yes in His Eyes

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Feb. 3—Under the customary form of analysis and interpretation as applied in the nation's capital, Sen. Frank Church's fuzzy denial of the fact in a televised interview means that he will definitely be a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

This has to be bad news for Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who intends to announce his own candidacy in a TV address Thursday, for the hulk of the Church support lies in the ultra-liberal wing of the party, a segment Jackson has been pursuing with surprising vigor in recent weeks.

Church, the still-youthful-at-50 Idaho Democrat and outspoken anti-Viet war

critic now starting his fourth term in the Senate, has been a sort of lay-back sleeper in the party's presidential sweepstakes. Hardly anybody knew he had the White House in mind before yesterday's rejection; speculation had focused on Jackson, on declared candidate Rep. Mo Udall (D-Ariz.); ex-Gov. Jimmy Car-



ter of Georgia; former Sen. Fred Harris (D-Okla.) and Sens. Lloyd Bentsen (Tex.), Robert Byrd (W. Va.) and Birch Bayh (Ind.), and 40 others.

Church was being interviewed on television because he is the newly named chairman of the Senate special committee that will be probing the CIA spy system, the FBI, and any and all other in-

fluence activities for the next six months. Somebody said there had been talk about a presidential candidacy.

"Let's scotch that right now," Church replied, before proceeding to un-scotch it. He admitted that some "people" had discussed the subject with him, then gone away to solicit support. The senator had told them he "would weigh the matter." But then came the appointment as CIA committee chairman; he notified the "people" that "there would be no further activity on my behalf, throughout the life of the investigation."

The operative words, of course, are "throughout the life of the investigation." That will be before the end of this year—and during the intervening months it is doubtful that any other senator or would-be candidate will have a crack at anything like as much television and press exposure.

Church has a hot property on his hands, a titillating issue filled with spies and secrets, all of the factors going

toward a fascinating probe, and he has assured "public hearings whenever we can." He has a very liberal Democratic majority on his committee and a couple of liberal Republicans, one of whom, Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), made at least one of those several White House enemies lists during the Nixon administration.

There isn't anything else around the Washington scene to compete with the Church committee for air time and headlines except the economy and taxes, neither of which is particularly photogenic or sexy.

So Church can lie doggo so far as presidential pretensions are concerned, while getting more national attention and recognition than all of the other candidates combined, and come out with a resounding report at year's end, just at the proper time for a presidential announcement. He can thus begin his drive when the competition has burned itself out a year too soon.

Column 1

Church aims at CIA plots, White House

Senator hopes hearings will enhance candidacy

By Harry Kelly

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—"The report will make some clear findings, of wrongdoings and failures of proper command and control, of inexcusable actions . . . in a whole series of assassinations and assassination attempts that extend through three administrations."

Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho) has lowered his voice. He leans closer, as if he is talking about something so bad he doesn't want to be overheard. Now and then voices break in from the other offices where they are worried about more mundane things, like press releases, making coffee, finding car keys, and solving constituents' problems.

Church is late to a meeting with the group from his Select Senate Intelligence Committee that is drawing up the final report on CIA involvement in assassination plots. He is late, so he sits in the straight-backed chair like a jockey waiting for the gate to open.

"HE HAS SO many balls in the air that I don't see how he does it," an aide says.

Still in the air is the weighty question: Can the intelligence hearings, with their press and TV coverage, turn Frank Church into a presidential candidate?

At 51, Church has a smooth, young, full face and sad, very serious, brown eyes. The eyes of the boy orator who grew up to face death and barely won. The eyes of a boy wonder elected to the Senate at 32 who sees the leaves beginning to fall.

Now he seems to be everywhere. Turn on the evening news, he is there. Pick up the paper, he is on page one.

CHURCH IS chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee holding hearings into questionable or illegal activities by the CIA, National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, and so on. He is chairman of the multinational subcommittee investigating bribery by United States corporations abroad. He is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which looked into the American role in the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai agreement.

And he would like to be President.

In the back offices there is no question among his aides that he will run. They are already talking about who will be his chief speechwriter. And he has brought in a newsman from Idaho and a public relations man to handle the press.

Church himself talks as if it isn't a sure thing, even though he admits people have been urging him to let them raise money and form a committee for him before it is too late.

He walks along the long, dim hall, a tall broadchested figure, talking about the campaign while hurrying to the subcommittee meeting and apologizing for having to hurry.

"I don't know where this thing [the intelligence investigation] will bring me out," he says. "I don't know what the shape of the party will be by then. Maybe it will be too late. But I'm not going to do anything, no matter what I decide, until after this."

TO CRITICS, Church has been using the intelligence hearings as a forum to gain exposure so he will be a household

Continued on page 4, col. 1

Church

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Column 1

Will probes carry Sen. Church to top?

Continued from page one

word by the time he enters the contest in January.

One Republican complains about the committee's failure to hold public hearings on the plot he feels would have revealed the role of John and Robert Kennedy in authorizing the CIA to plan the assassination of Fidel Castro.

Because of this "picking and choosing, instead of laying it all out," the committee has appeared to be concentrating on such quickie headline-grabbers as shellfish poisons, dart guns, and FBI break-ins, the Republican critic said.

SO FAR THE hearings have lacked the oomph—and thus the TV coverage—to turn Church into a Estes Kefauver or Sam Ervin. Public television began by covering the hearings live, but finally gave up.

More than one obscure but talented member of Congress has used televised hearings to make his name a household word. The most notable is Sen. Kefauver [D., Tenn.], who was propelled by a Senate racketeering investigation into contention for the 1952 and 1956 presidential nominations. The most recent is Sen. Howard Baker [R., Tenn.], relatively unknown nationally until he became ranking Republican on the Watergate Committee.

Despite the lack of television exposure so far, Church feels the investigation is the most important thing he has been involved in, topping the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on the Viet Nam war, which, he said, "gave legitimacy to the protests" against the war.

Although he has a reputation for integrity and honesty at a time when both are politically rare, he grinds on the nerves of some of his fellow Democrats, including liberals.

"CHURCH IS another small-state politician," a Democratic strategist says. "Another McGovern! Another Goldwater! Who needs it? Church couldn't figure out national politics if you gave him a roadmap."

"Church is a loner," another Demo-

crat complains, applying another standard of big-city politics and finding him wanting. "He smiles a lot, but I don't think I've ever heard him tell a joke. He takes himself too seriously. Just like McGovern does."

He has a reason for being serious. While at Stanford Law School, Church was diagnosed as having incurable cancer. Prognosis: death within six months. But he survived, cured, after X-rays that burned out the malignancy.

Ironically Church's first job in government service was in the intelligence field—as a young Army officer in World War II whose daily duties included producing an intelligence estimate of Japanese troop strength.

Now in his fourth six-year term, he has a Senate reputation as a pragmatic liberal, unusually articulate and ever ready to compromise.

BORN JULY 25, 1924, in Boise, Church is the son of conservative Republican parents whose opposition to Roosevelt's New Deal obviously did not influence him. Church was impressed more by the liberal views of Chase A. Clark, a Democratic governor of Idaho and U. S. District judge whose daughter, Bethine, Church married in 1947.

Now at this moment Church doesn't seem interested in talking about politics.

Behind the glasses the brown eyes sharpen only when he talks about the report on assassinations, about the CIA, and "the glimpses into this world of mystery."

"If the press thinks certain Presidents will be nailed to the wall on the basis of the evidence, well the press is going to be disappointed . . . When you read it there will be enough evidence there that you will be able to make up your own mind about what happened in these cases . . ."

But, he adds, his voice low and quiet, "you wouldn't as a juror make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that would indict a man or put a man in prison or hang him, because there are too many gaps and contradictions in the evidence."

Liberal Church Stumps West Waxing Conservative, Specific

By Paul G. Edwards
Washington Post Staff Writer

BOISE, Idaho, May 17—Frank Church concluded three days of campaigning throughout his Western home base today, presenting himself as the latest presidential hope for moderate-liberal Democrats while in fact reflecting moderate-conservative viewpoint on broad range of specific issues.

In three speeches and a dozen question-and-answer sessions with press and public, the Idaho senator:

- Called for a Supreme Court review of its busing decisions.
- Opposed federal gun controls in any form.
- Supported the renewal of clearcutting of national forest timber.
- Took a permissive attitude toward proliferation of nuclear power plants.
- Advocated the right of states rather than the federal government to decide fundamental domestic policy questions whenever possible.

Even in foreign policy, where opposition to the war in Vietnam helped restore his liberal image, Church's answers seemed simply to be the current embodiment of the well-established interventionist philosophy extended by such other heartland figures as Robert Taft, J. W. Fulbright and Mike Mansfield.

Church's moderate-conservative positions are well documented by his 20-year record in the Senate. But his effort to turn the Democratic primaries into an issues forum, and the unrelenting specificity of his answers, may disconcert some of those Democrats and the country who are the object of his appeals.

It is generally believed that in the Nebraska primary Church managed to outpace Jimmy Carter, the front-runner for the Democratic nomination, by rallying the liberal supporters of Hubert H. Humphrey, Morris K. Udall, Ed Bradley, M. Kennedy, Henry M. Jackson and Fred Harris.

Coming up again on this campaign trail, Church called for backers of a coalition of five to unite behind him. Never, he said, did he appear to flinch at a suggestion that might produce an answer hostile to the liberal wing of the party.

In a broad-brush way, his speeches waxed with the apparent contradictions of his beliefs by insisting that contra-

★ Delegate Totals ★ DEMOCRATS:

Carter	582
Jackson	201
Udall	192
Wallace	138
Stevenson	86
Humphrey	56
Church	16
Harris	15
Walker	2
McCormack	2
Bayh	1
Brown	1
Uncommitted	318
Total chosen to date	1,610
Needed to nominate	1,505

Democratic totals are based on completed delegate selection in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Florida, North and South Carolina, Canal Zone, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, N.Y., Arizona, Alaska, Virgin Islands, Penn., Wyoming, Louisiana, Illinois, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, N.M. and partial selection in Puerto Rico, Iowa, Texas, Kansas, Minnesota, Ala., D.C. and West Va.

REPUBLICANS:

Reagan	481
Ford	334
Uncommitted	374
Total chosen to date	1,189
Needed to nominate	1,130

GOP totals are based on completed delegate selection in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Florida, Puerto Rico, D.C., North and South Carolina, Wisc., Ind., N.Y., Guam, Miss., Maine, Ariz., Penn., Georgia, Ala., Neb., Wyo., West Virginia, Virgin Islands, Hawaii and Oklahoma and partial selection in Illinois, Minnesota, Texas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri and Virginia.

Coming up today: The Maryland primary with 53 Democratic delegates and 43 Republican delegates and the Michigan primary with 133 Democratic delegates and 84 Republican delegates.

—The Washington Post

dications are inescapable in a thoughtful approach to the country's problems.

"I am as conservative as Sam Ervin in my views on the constitutional rights of the individual," he said. "I am as progressive as Teddy Roosevelt in my view of the monopolistic powers of huge corporations. I am as liberal as Franklin Roosevelt in my belief that

the federal government should provide jobs and not welfare for the jobless. I am as common-sensical as the American people in my belief that America should not involve itself in futile foreign wars."

In Montana, Church sometimes substituted the name of Majority Leader Mansfield, the state's retiring senior senator, for "American people" when describing his common-sense foreign policy.

Church is striving for victories in his home state on May 25 and in Montana on June 1 impressive enough to sustain his late candidacy if he fails to win in Oregon, which also votes on May 25.

Church is counting on victories in the West to attract national press attention as he goes into the June 8 primaries in three states with big convention delegations: California, Ohio and New Jersey.

Despite the first wave of publicity generated by his Nebraska victory, his press following through the two states last weekend was meager: Only one television network, CBS, and two large newspapers, The Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post.

Although the sprawling mountain-and-plains states offer a colorful setting, Church's cerebral style sometimes seemed to have a bleaching effect.

At the annual Bucking Horse Auction in Miles City, Mont., on Saturday he shook some hands and then sat rather stiffly in the back of a pickup truck while a lusty crowd of thousands around him drank beer by the six-pack and bet on horse races between sales of rodeo broncs.

He doffed his coat, but in tie and wing-tip shoes, he looked positively Wilsonian in a setting that called for a Teddy Roosevelt. At the 1960 auction, Teddy Kennedy got national picture publicity by riding a bronco as he campaigned for his brother, the late President.

Church did much better at a packed campaign headquarters in Billings earlier Saturday. For almost 30 minutes he was peppered with questions by Montanans on everything from wheat sales abroad to federal aid for the arts.

The persistent inquiries seem to legitimize his assessment of the Nebraska campaign victory: "Proof that the people are hungry to talk about the issues."

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The Washington Post, Sept. 1, 1977

for. 2-5

Foreign Relations—After Fulbright

For more than four years, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, strongly opposed the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, especially as it related to Southeast Asia, but today few in Washington mourn the coming retirement of Fulbright more than the Secretary of State.

Since Dr. Kissinger took over the State Department last fall, he and the Democratic senator from Arkansas, who was defeated last month for re-nomination, have not only worked together harmoniously but have become good personal friends. It was made possible by U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the detente with Russia and China and the administration's effort to establish peace in the Mideast through a new deal with the Arab nations, all of which have long been favored by Fulbright.

It is no secret that in recent months the Secretary of State has privately as well as publicly consulted Fulbright on almost every administration move and, in the process, has kept the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a whole well informed on plans and operations. It has been a remarkable and constructive example of bipartisan foreign policy.

As an incidental result, Dr. Kissinger knows he can now count on getting a fair and sympathetic hearing when, at his request, Fulbright and the committee review for the second time the Secretary's role in the controversial White House wiretapping case.

If there is a silver lining to Fulbright's defeat, and the consequent loss of perhaps the most experienced and best-informed chairman in our time, it is the legacy of bipartisan independence he will leave behind, and, along with it, a renewed sense of committee responsibility and self-respect.

After a long period of being little more than a rubber stamp for the



White House, the committee in recent years has been standing up to both Democratic and Republican Presidents (notably Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon), and, in the process, inspiring the Senate to reassert its constitutional role in the making of foreign policy.

Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.), who will become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in January, is no Fulbright. His tendency is to get along with whatever administration is in power, as exemplified by his support of the Vietnamese war. He will be surrounded, however, by determined colleagues. Sparkman says he doesn't believe in a "controlled committee."

Moreover, as he adds, "You can't control it anyway—there are a lot of strong individuals on it."

The committee does include some of the most prominent senators of both parties. On the Democratic side there are two former presidential nominees (Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and George McGovern of South Dakota)

and a former vice-presidential nominee (Edmund Muskie of Maine). Just behind Sparkman in seniority is Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, and behind him is the young and forceful Frank Church of Idaho.

Church seems destined to be chairman in the not-too-distance future, for both Sparkman and Mansfield are in their 70s and probably won't run again. The other Democrats are all seasoned, influential senators: Stuart Symington of Missouri, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Gale McGee of Wyoming.

The Republicans (all moderates or liberals) are headed by the venerable George Alken of Vermont, one of the most respected men in the Senate. The others in order of seniority are the independent Clifford Case of New Jersey, Jacob Javits of New York (called the most "intelligent" member of the Senate), Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, James Pearson of Kansas, presidential hopeful Charles Percy of Illinois and Assistant Minority Leader Robert Griffin of Michigan.

Critics of the committee have recently argued that, as one wrote, it "has lost power to the relatively obscure, but more united, active and aggressive House Foreign Affairs Committee." The assessment is wide of the mark. The reason the House group is "relatively obscure" is that it deserves to be. It does not compare in caliber or performance with the Senate committee.

Where the House panel has been united chiefly in merely doing the bidding of the White House, the Senate committee has been united, often unanimously or near unanimously, in the boldest kind of independent action, such as successfully sponsoring the War Powers Act, which is designed to stop Presidents from plunging into wars without consulting Congress.

Under Fulbright and former Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, the committee repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Lyndon Johnson used to legalize the Vietnamese war. It led the fight to force U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia. It cracked down on military aid to military dictatorships. It encouraged the rapprochement with China and Russia.

In addition, it has put so-called executive agreements as well as formal treaties under sharp scrutiny. And, among other things, the creation of two new subcommittees headed by Sens. Church and Symington has extended the committee's influence over U.S. foreign bases and the rapid spread of powerful multinational corporations all over the world.

Walter Lippman once said that the removal of Fulbright from public life would be "a national calamity." When he leaves next year, however, the loss will be cushioned by the fact that he leaves a committee that is likely to carry on for some time in his unpartisan, independent tradition.

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Washington Post
September 6, 1974

for

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Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Frank Church: Spokesman for Detente

One of the things which most dismays us partisans of virtue and progress in international affairs is the way our natural political spokesmen tend to fritter away their opportunities to make a public case for the cause. The quality of debate and, to an extent, the quality of policy suffer accordingly.

This is particularly so on the eve of the retirement of Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), who, at his peak, brilliantly championed a liberal and humane international policy. No Hill figure with a potential for similar stature and appeal is in sight. That means that congressional foreign policy debate will continue to be dominated by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), a hardliner who makes his case very well.

Now, some would say this doesn't matter: that the national security debate now under way is already over; that no one is listening; that the "good guys" have lost.

But this is almost surely wrong. It is an insult to the democratic process and a misreading of the political arithmetic to conclude that there is no further practical point to discussing the great security issues of the day. That is precisely why a powerful softline voice is so vital, someone who will convert to public coin the expertise of the detente-minded specialists in the fair and effective way in which Scoop Jackson uses the stuff of the experts who lean the other way.

This brings one, with some chagrin, to Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who has a liberal outlook and is otherwise politically presentable, who has a good deal of seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee, and who in effect offered himself as Fulbright's successor

in a Senate floor speech delivered last Aug. 19—while the rest of us were off on vacation.

"The Substance and Shadow of Detente" rang all the right bells, for the faithful, and with considerable eloquence and style. Church reaffirmed his conviction that "we must think of national security in broader than military terms" and pleaded for "a breakthrough to reason and sanity."

Merely to warm the hearts of the faithful, however, is too limited a goal for someone trying to affect the course of a public debate on a matter at once so delicate in its details and so prone to manipulation through symbols as national security. Two other considerations are relevant.

First, the legitimacy of the other guy's anxieties—the subject is, after all, *security* — must be acknowledged. Church here does not pass muster. He passes over lightly, for instance, the Soviet performance last fall in the Middle East war, as though by mentioning it he had discharged any obligation to measure it. The particular future-oriented developments in Soviet missileery which trouble his opponents in debate, he simply ignores.

Church suggests—in truth, insultingly—that his opponents are "those who actually *prefer* (his italics) the cold war and the ever-present threat of hot war." He dismisses Defense Secretary Schlesinger, his personal bete noir, as a "warhawk" who "professes great fear of an erosion of the nuclear balance."

As though this were not what much of the argument is about, he simply asserts that the Soviet Union has passed

from being a "revolutionary" state to a "traditional" state with "conventional ambitions and conventional inhibitions." This judgment, he states wrongly, is one "to which our Soviet experts now generally accede." Secondly, Church's homework is not up to speed. Too many times, on the points on which he is presumably most anxious to sway serious people who haven't yet made up their minds, he yields to easy phrases and skips over the tough issues.

He presents breathlessly as a new insight, one "lost to view in the arcane wranglings of the military intellectuals," the utterly well known and uncontested fact that currently the United States has more warheads than does the Soviet Union. The worry is over the future balance.

He actually seems to believe that the virtual invulnerability of subs to an adversary's first strike is "another simple salient fact passed over by the Pentagon." But what other strategic reason is there for "the Pentagon" to put missiles to sea?

At one point he works himself into the impossible corner of stating that land-based missiles are without political value. There is more.

In tone and content, I think, Frank Church falls short of the stands which supporters of the international values he believes in have every right to expect from someone so politically well placed as he. There is a way to make a reputation as a fearless fighter among liberals and there is a way to go beyond that to carry those others whose support is vital to the success of his own enterprise.

2-3-20

George F. Will

An Apostle of Non-Interventionism

A portrait of the late Sen. William E. Borah hangs over the mantle in Sen. Frank Church's Capitol Hill office. The relationship between these two men (they never met) is the closest thing to apostolic succession in American politics.

Borah, an Idaho Republican senator from 1907 until his death in 1940, was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the late '20s. He never went abroad: "One might become merely confused by firsthand information." He was called an isolationist.

Church, an Idaho Democrat, will be chairman of Foreign Relations someday soon. He, too, is called an isolationist but dissents, obliquely, by insisting that Borah was just a non-interventionist.

Borah voted for war in 1917, but was the trumpet of the "irreconcilables" against the League of Nations and World Court, and also opposed repeal of the neutrality acts in the late thirties. He was addicted to the legalisms by which Americans, and especially American legislators, apply to foreign affairs the nation's evangelic faith in litigation.

He was ardently for the Kellogg-Briand pact which, you may remember, outlawed war.

He dissented hard and often against the use of Marines to promote the interests of fruit companies and other businesses in places like Nicaragua. Such were the excesses of the imperial presidencies of Calvin Coolidge and others.

Today Church wants the U.S. "off the mainland of Asia," which means, most importantly, out of Thailand and Korea. He says that if we try to "hang on" in Thailand, that will be proof that we have not learned the lesson of Vietnam, and that Secretary of State Kissinger should depart.

He believes that it was a mistake for U.S. forces to cross the 38th parallel in Korea, and that U.S. forces should have been withdrawn from Korea after the armistice. Today, he says, Korea is irrelevant to our vital interests.

Leaving Thailand would involve acknowledging (as Church sees it) that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is a nullity. Leaving Korea would involve acting on the provisions for nullifying our treaty with that nation.



By Harry Natchezan—The Washington Post

"Sen. Frank Church has a doctrine that is suited to the temper of the times."

There is a surface plausibility to this much of Church's argument: The U.S. should not have troops in places where the American public will not countenance the use of American troops. Today Thailand and Korea may be such places.

Church may represent the public mood today, as Borah certainly did in 1920. And Church, at 50, is a rising star. Elected to the Senate in 1956 when he was a cherubic 32-year-old, today only 15 senators (10 Democrats) have more seniority, and their average age is 70.

A senator who wants to specialize in foreign affairs should represent a state like Idaho: population 713,000 (42d), four cities over 25,000 and none over 100,000, population density 8.5 per square mile (45th). His constituents want water and reclamation projects; they don't want gun controls or interference with their methods of disciplining coyotes. His constituents do not require him to spend every waking moment wringing grants from the government.

As ranking Democrat (behind chairman Henry Jackson) on the Interior Committee, Church can look after the interests of his state, two-thirds of which is owned by the federal govern-

ment. On Foreign Relations, Church ranks behind only Chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala.), 75, and Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), 72.

In four elections to the Senate, Church has averaged 58 per cent of the vote. Re-elected last year, he now has, as Borah had, a safe seat. That can be, as it was for Borah in his later years, an invitation to a frivolous, merely rhetorical, career.

This danger is especially acute for a senator on Foreign Relations, which under William Fulbright (D-Ark.) became the Senate's most publicized and most ineffectual committee.

The committee has lacked a doctrine and an energetic man to promote it. Church, the apostle, has a doctrine that is suited to the temper of the times and the capabilities of his institution.

Committees and legislatures can only control foreign policy by reducing it to elementary impulses expressed in simple declarations—yes, we declare war; no, we will not fund bombing after Aug. 15; the troops must be out by June 30.

Non-interventionism is a doctrine of withdrawal and abstinence. It can be declared, simply. It may not fit the needs of the nation, but it fits the capabilities of Congress.

Christian Science
12-10

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Church discounts importance of New Hampshire primary

By the Associated Press

Boise, Idaho

Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho, predicted recently that no Democratic candidate will come out of the New Hampshire primary as the front-runner for the party's presidential nomination.

Mr. Church told a Boise news conference he believed the Massachusetts Democratic primary race will be more significant this year.

CHURCH

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WILLIAM S. ORiol, STAFF DIRECTOR
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JOHN GUY MILLER, MEMORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

February 10, 1976

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your recent letter requesting my views on several subjects because of the fact that I have been mentioned as a Democratic Presidential Candidate.


I am sorry that I cannot give you a personal response to your letter. The large volume of correspondence I have received, combined with my limited campaign staff, does not make that possible.

Enclosed is a brochure published by the Church for President Committee which addresses itself to my positions on many of the issues which face our country today. I hope that this information will be helpful to you.

As my campaign progresses additional material will be printed addressing itself to issues in more detail than this brief summary can hope to do. Please feel free to write me later if you would like additional material.


With thanks for your interest.

Sincerely,



Frank Church

Enclosure
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FRANK CHURCH
a biographical sketch

**Frank Church is no longer ahead
of his time. His time is now.**

There comes a moment in the career of such a man when his leadership is so well honed by years of broad experience that he is ready.

Now is that moment for Frank Church.

The gifted 32-year-old who brought his bright promise to the Senate nearly 20 years ago has arrived. Today, he is a respected senior senator. Today, he is a central figure in the national government with a command of almost any issue that could confront a President.

In this, the era of the accidental President, Democrats must do better. They must offer the nation a candidate who is prepared for the Presidency.

Frank Church is prepared.

FRANK CHURCH . . . is prepared for the Presidency

Aging Frank Church is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging. In that role he has mobilized the compassionate nature of America around the reversal of social insecurity for the aged. His knowledge of senior problems is encyclopedic. His list of legislative achievements is long. It was, for instance, the Church Committee on Aging which inserted a cost-of-living escalator clause into the Social Security statute, making it the law that payments to the aged must keep pace with inflation.



Multinational Corporations As Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, he has conducted the only in-depth Congressional investigation of the big oil companies and other huge American corporations operating overseas. In the process, he has acquired a comprehensive knowledge of oil policy. Frank Church is the leading advocate of a series of initiatives to break up the Arab oil cartel. And Frank Church would create additional jobs by eliminating the special tax breaks which cause American corporations to invest their capital abroad rather than in the United States.

Environment Frank Church is the ranking member of the Senate Interior Committee. Americans anxious to save the last remnants of our environment from the rude hand of overdevelopment know Frank Church as a founding father of the modern conservation movement. He was floor manager of the Wilderness Act. He authored the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Since long before it was safe or popular, Frank Church has stood up to the powerful interests who would plunder nature's legacy to future generations.



Agriculture Frank Church is a farm-state senator. No one can be elected four times from a state like Idaho without knowing farm issues backward and forward.

Education Frank Church has an exemplary record of helping upgrade education which can be succinctly stated: education has no better friend in the Senate. Ask any teacher familiar with his career.

Labor Frank Church is, by any yardstick, a friend of labor. He has persistently supported increases in the minimum wage and other measures designed to benefit working people. He has enjoyed strong labor support, while maintaining his right to disagree. Even when he has differed with the unions, they have respected him for his integrity and independence.

Human Rights Frank Church has been in the thick of the fight, throughout his career, to win a full measure of liberty and opportunity for all citizens. He made his convictions plain from the outset. In 1957, upon arriving in the Senate, he played a major role in enacting the first civil rights bill. Similarly, he has always strongly favored equality for women. Civil liberties would be alive and thriving with Frank Church in the White House.

Intelligence Community During the past year, the two great causes of Frank Church's career — civil liberties and curbing foreign policy excesses — came together in the single most precarious and exacting assignment of his years in the Senate. Frank Church was made Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee charged with investigating and cleansing the Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, the CIA and a host of other secret and powerful government agencies. The reforms now underway are the proof of how well Frank Church handled his assignment.



Public Candor Frank Church has built another public record—a life of personal honesty and public candor. He has supported virtually every legislative proposal for political disclosure. Moreover, if he had his way, the law would require every candidate for Congress, including incumbents, to disclose their personal income and assets. Since 1964, Frank Church has voluntarily published a complete accounting of his personal finances.



Vietnam Frank Church is a ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was one of the earliest foreign policy experts in the land to warn that foreign obsession would lead to domestic neglect. He first spoke out against the Vietnam War in 1964 at a time when everyone assumed his courage would cost him the next election. But, he won the election and persisted in his opposition to that misbegotten war. He co-authored the Cooper-Church Amendment, which prevented American ground forces from returning to Cambodia or entering Laos. And he co-authored the Case-Church Amendment, which finally forced an end to the bombing of Cambodia.

Middle East As a specialist in foreign affairs, he has been among the most persistent—and effective—advocates for Americans of all creeds who insist on the right of Israel to exist as a free and independent nation.

Energy Frank Church is Chairman of the new Senate Subcommittee on Energy Research and Water Resources. It was Frank Church who forced an increase last year in Administration requests for development of non-nuclear energy alternatives. It is Frank Church who says America's appetite for energy must be curbed to cope with the twin threats of dwindling resources and dependence on foreign sources of oil.





FRANK CHURCH a look at the man

And what do the people of Idaho—the people who have known him all his life—think of Frank Church?

They have elected him four times by landslide margins.

Frank Church is a native of Idaho, born July 25, 1924, in Boise, where his mother still lives. His pioneer grandfather settled in Idaho City—the center of a gold rush—shortly after the Civil War.

While still in high school, Church won a national oratorical contest, and met the girl he would one day marry—Bethine Clark. Bethine's father, Chase A. Clark, was governor of Idaho, so she shared Frank Church's fascination with public service. They were married June 21, 1947. They have two sons, Chase, born September 20, 1957, a University of Idaho freshman, and Forrest, born September 23, 1948. Forrest is now a minister in Boston. His wife, Amy, is Dean of Students at Harvard Divinity School.

Bethine and Frank Church are widely recognized as one of the most happily married couples in Washington. Bethine is as much a student of politics and government as her husband.

"If candidates for First Lady were placed on the ballot," he says, "she would strengthen the ticket."

The Churches were married after the Senator returned from World War II. He had enlisted, at the age of 18, as a private, and was commissioned a lieutenant on his 20th birthday. As a military intelligence officer in the China-Burma-India Theater, he was awarded the bronze star. He is a member of the Infantry Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia.


Church left the Army in 1945 to enter Stanford University, where he received his undergraduate degree. He excelled in debating and was graduated Phi Beta Kappa. Upon completing his law studies at Stanford, Church returned to Boise to begin practice. Four years later, in 1956, at the age of 32, he became one of the youngest persons ever elected to the U.S. Senate.

He was re-elected in 1962, 1968 and 1974. Today, at the age of 51, he is one of the most respected figures in the national government.

The long years of seasoning that prepare a natural leader for the Presidency are over.

Frank Church is ready.

A copy of our report is filed with the Federal Election Commission and is available for purchase from the Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C. Paid for by the Church for President Committee, Carl P. Burke, Chairman, William Landau, Treasurer. P.O. Box 2092, Washington, D.C. 20018.



February, 1976





Parade Magazine

Cover Article

Features Church



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No. 141

Senate

SENATOR CHURCH

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on September 21—last Sunday—Parade magazine carried a cover story on our colleague, Senator FRANK CHURCH. This article was given nationwide circulation.

I found the article an accurate portrait of a man who can only be described as a leader, and I commend it to any of my colleagues who missed it.

To that end, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

Sen. Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, would like to be elected President of the United States next year. So, too, would a dozen other Democrats, declared and undeclared.

At 51, however, Church seems more qualified than most. He is honest, intelligent, semi-charismatic, personable, but most important, experienced.

A boy wonder of sorts, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958, at age 32, the youngest Senator in the 85th Congress and then the fifth youngest in the history of the Senate.

Frank Church is into his fourth term, the first Democratic Senator from Idaho to be so honored, and he ranks 13th in seniority, which means he has power, prestige and precedence.

Soon he will become a nationwide TV celebrity as chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Intermittently the committee, with its revelations of questionable and illegal behavior by the CIA and FBI, has made headlines and prime time. But open TV hearings à la Watergate are scheduled to get underway any day now if they haven't already. And possibly TV will do for Frank Church what it did for Sen. Sam Ervin of North Carolina. It will boom him into a household name, a political celebrity, a widely known personality.

UNAPPRECIATED EXPOSURE

In an overcrowded field of Democratic Presidential candidates, the TV exposure, which under ordinary circumstances he would never be able to afford, will undoubtedly set Church aside from the pack. It may very well launch the "Church-for-President" campaign.

"I've thought about the Presidency," Church frankly admits. "Which one of us in the Senate has not? But I'm now engaged in an investigation that I can't mix with Presidential politics. So I've deferred any serious consideration of running for the Presidency until that investigation is completed."

When will Church and his committee finish running the members of the intelligence community through their filter?

"November may bring us to the close of public hearings," he estimates. "And possibly by February we will complete the re-

ports and recommendations."

"And by then," adds his wife, Bethine, "it may be too late."

The tall, boyish-looking, full-cheeked Senator nods his black-haired head. "It depends on a lot of variables," he explains. "I think by February we might have a baker's dozen of announced Presidential candidates. If none of them has developed sufficient momentum to separate themselves from the pack, it might still be possible for a late-comer like myself to enter the race.

"Much depends on financing," he points out. "A late entrant would be handicapped in getting together the necessary funds in a very short time. Clearly he couldn't enter the first primary [New Hampshire in February]. He'd have to organize a campaign and collect money for the later primaries."

Church suggests that if he decides to run, "I would have to select a few of the later primaries in the East and the West, which would be fairly representative so that if I did well in those, I could then come to the convention, albeit with many fewer votes, but with a case to be made that I entered representative primaries late in the campaign and demonstrated a strong national potential."

POLITICAL FAMILY

Senator Church's wife is one of the most politically knowledgeable of all Congressional wives. Her father, the late Federal Judge Chase A. Clark, was Governor of Idaho; her uncle was also a governor; her cousin, the late Worth Clark, served as a U.S. Senator. Says Mrs. Church: "Frank is not thinking about the Presidency, he is concentrating on the intelligence investigation and his other committee hearings. Ever since his bout with cancer, he's become pretty much of a fatalist. When he was 24 the doctors gave him about six months to live."

Frank Forrester Church was born in Boise, Idaho, on July 25th, 1924, into the conservative Republican family of Frank and Laura Church, who owned a sporting goods store.

When young Church was in Boise High School he won first prize in the American Legion's National Americanism Oratorical Contest. It won him a \$4000 scholarship to any college of his choice.

In 1942 he chose Stanford University at Palo Alto, Cal., then after one term quit at 18 to enlist as a private in the U.S. Army. He was sent as an officer candidate to Ft. Benning and later shipped overseas to the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater as a military intelligence officer. After the war Church returned to Stanford where he made Phi Beta Kappa, earned his B.A., then married Jean Bethine Clark, and decided to enter Harvard Law School.

MEDICAL BARRIER

At Harvard he came down with excruciating back pains. "At first," says his wife, "we thought it was the climate or that Frank was studying too hard. The pain kept getting worse, and the doctors couldn't diagnose it. We decided to go back to Stanford where it was warmer, and Frank could study at Stanford Law."

But life in Palo Alto did nothing to relieve the back pain. Finally the doctors found the cause: cancer of the testicles and abdomen. They operated and discovered that the cancer had spread to the lymph nodes. They pronounced it incurable, predicting death within six months.

"They were wrong," Church says happily. "There was a Dr. Wood in San Francisco. At that time he was one of the leading authorities in cancer at the Stanford Medical School. When he looked at the pathology report, the biopsy analysis, he said that what I had was a very rare type of cancer, frequently confused with incurable malignancy, but that in fact it was a type of cancer which was highly responsive to X-ray treatment."

DR. WOOD'S TREATMENT

"Dr. Wood insisted that I be given the full course of X-ray treatment, and in the end that saved my life."

Says Mrs. Church: "It was truly a miracle. There he was 6 feet tall and down to a little more than 80 pounds. The X-rays burned into him, turning him increasingly nauseous. It was almost unbearable. I read to him aloud during the treatments trying to divert his mind, trying to beat the nausea, trying for him to hold on. He did, yes, he did, and he beat it."

Trim, athletic, in good health, Church says, "Whenever I go out to Walter Reed or the National Institutes of Health for my yearly physical, they tell me I'm lucky to be alive. I tell them I'm lucky to have had Bethine. It was her determination which pulled me through."

Like most men who have cheated death, Frank Church believes passionately in the newness of life. "Right now," he declares, "what I want most is to do a creditable job in this present intelligence investigation that I'm heading, because I think that's perhaps the most important service I can render in my whole career in the Senate."

CIA MURDER PLOTS

Of all the sins and crimes the CIA has been accused of, Church says, "The most shocking is that the agency was involved in murder plots and murder attempts directed against foreign governments with which we were not at war. These particular attempts were directed against small countries whose leaders could never have been a real threat to the United States."

"I think that when the committee makes its report, it will be clear that in these cases there was no possible justification, no urgent national interest that had to be protected."

"We must make certain in the future that assassination never again becomes an instrument of American foreign policy."

Church believes that it was a suggested instrument during four administrations—Eisenhower's, Kennedy's, Johnson's, and Nixon's—and that "there is evidence which tends to show that the CIA may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage."

"I am not in favor of abolishing the agency," he states, "but it needs to be restructured. The laws governing the agency

need to be more strictly drawn. The control of the agency needs to be tightened. One thing that is clear from the present investigation is that in each of the administrations, from Kennedy's through Nixon's, there has been such loosening of control over the agency that it's always been possible for the agency itself to construe its authority more broadly than those concerned have intended.

"I think that in the future we will have to be more careful that the President, through his policy makers, has stricter control over the agency. Also it may be possible

to establish a joint committee along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as long as we make certain that the committee is fully empowered to deal with intelligence agencies.

"By that I mean it must have the authority to determine the money they should have. It must have full authority to know at all times what is happening, to know the full scope of covert actions. It must be advised in advance or concurrently of decisions that are made in this field so that the committee can make sure that the agency is living within the law."

Church is unsure whether the CIA should or should not partake in covert operations. "As regards covert activities," he says, "I think the agency is probably most proud of the support it gave to the constituting of democratic governments in Western Europe in the period following World War II. Now that kind of covert activity at least conforms to our traditional values. I'm not speaking of the methods that are used. I'm speaking of the objectives. The worst example of covert CIA activity that I can think of was our intervention in Chile where we undertook to depose a government that had been lawfully elected by the Chileans."

"What we've come to call covert operations has relatively little to do with collecting intelligence. They are clandestine efforts to maneuver things, to control events abroad."

"If we were to put the CIA back exclusively in the business of operating an intelligence agency and confine it to gathering the information we need for our own defense and to conduct an informed foreign policy, we would find, and the agency itself would today admit, that 95 per cent or 98 per cent of the information that is gathered comes from either overt sources or through the technical facilities that are available to the agency. The old cloak-and-dagger work which is connected romantically with the espionage methods of the past accounts for precious little."

According to the Senator, the intelligence agencies obtain the least amount of information from undercover agents in Communist countries.

A REAL JOB TO DO

"I have no objections whatever," he maintains, "to the utilization of whatever means there are at our disposal to collect essential information about foreign governments and their intentions and capabilities. That's intelligence work. I think most of it will come from our technical capabilities, but even if clandestine operations are necessary, I have no objection to them if they are confined to that purpose. But when it comes to manipulating events abroad through covert actions,

then the first thing you must realize is that it's not intelligence. That is a method of concealed interference in the affairs of others in order to manipulate them."

Church also heads the subcommittee investigating multinational corporations such as International Telephone and Telegraph (which offered the CIA a million dollars to interfere in Chile), Exxon, Northrop, and Lockheed which for years have regularly been bribing government officials overseas. "What you have got," he explains, "is the American intelligence community and the American big-business community taking part in the internal affairs of foreign countries. We would not tolerate it if it were done to us. That's the double standard we live with all the time."

FULFILLING A MENACE

What Church hopes to do in the weeks to come in his open televised hearings is "to demonstrate the dangers that are implicit in the spreading use of illegal methods of surveillance, improper mail openings, and various other ways of spying on the American people."

"I suppose," he offers, "that George Orwell would have called it Big Brother government in this country. The sad truth is that the methods first adopted by law enforcement and intelligence agencies like the FBI and CIA have spread to other departments of the government. And if this isn't exposed and checked, then it could continue to grow into the beginnings of a police state in this country."

"I want to dramatize the dangers so that there will be sufficient public support for the changes in the law that must come to prevent this from spreading further."

"George Williams, one of the much beloved professors of theology at Harvard Divinity School, said to me one time something that I have always remembered, 'Choose your enemy very carefully, for you will grow to be more like him.' After World War II the Soviet Union became our perceived enemy and we undertook to contest with the Russians everything in the world."

OUR OWN WORST ENEMY

"To justify emulating their methods we said we had to treat fire with fire. And in the process, of course, we've become more like them. In a free society that can go only so far. We become our own worst enemy if we bring down a free society in the very name of defending it."

The Senator, having been a schoolboy orator, is, of course, a loquacious man. He has been accused of being overserious, a Boy Scout, too sincere, self-righteous, and a goody-goody who's intoxicated with the sound of his own voice.

When Church became one of the first Senators to oppose the Vietnamese war, an angry Lyndon Johnson began referring to him as Frank "Sunday School" Church. Later, apostolic John Birchers in Idaho called him a "Commie-Symp," tried by petition to remove him from office by charging treason.

Convinced that the President did not have the right to order American troops into combat in Vietnam without Congressional consent, sure in his mind that the American involvement in Vietnam was a tragic mistake, Church refused to be swayed then by well-

meaning friends who told him he was committing political suicide. In the end he was proved right.

Although he is pragmatic and willing to compromise—"I've always had the pragmatic view that you ought to legislate, and to legislate you have to remain in the realm of the possible"—Church is recognized by most of his colleagues as a man of integrity.

"Frankly," says one veteran Senator, "I'm not interested in what sort of image Church projects. Some members around here think he'd be better off if he stopped playing Mr. Clean or Mr. Nice Guy or Mr. Orator. I'm not interested in that. What interests me is the kind of work a Senator puts out. Church does good work. He does his homework. He works hard and long. I don't care about his style. I care about his substance. He's got plenty of that. One day he'll wind up succeeding John Sparkman as head of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I predict he'll do as good a job as Bill Fulbright did."

Says another Senator: "Personally I like Church. He's pleasant, intelligent, hard not to like, but if you ask him what time it is, you face the very real danger of getting an answer on the history of watchmaking."

A NEWSMAN'S VIEW

A journalist who's covered Church for years claims the Idaho Senator is "suspect because he never denounces anyone as a 'stupid son-of-a-bitch,' he doesn't tell off-color stories, he drinks hardly at all, and has a political braintruster in his wife the likes of which few other Senators have. Bethine Church is the ideal campaigner. Whether he goes, she goes, a politically supportive spark plug."

Frank Church is aware of his Boy Scout image and laughs at it. "They keep calling me an Eagle Scout," he says. "The truth is that I never got beyond Boy Scout Second Class."

"They also keep calling him the American Legion orator who uses words pompously," says his wife. "But he's not one bit pompous. I think Frank likes words. I think he's a Jeffersonian-type man. All the time he was in China during the war he wrote letters to me and they began, 'Darling Bethine' and ended with 'Love, Frosty.' In between they contained wonderful accounts of what was actually happening in China at that time. Frank is not pompous, he has the best sense of humor and laughs at himself more than anyone I've ever known."

"Just because he comes through as being very careful and serious on these intelligence hearings doesn't mean he's that way about himself at all."

Church is serious about matters of principle. And he believes that the people's right to privacy and freedom has been violated on occasion by the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the Post Office, the Secret Service and other government agencies.

"I'm pretty relaxed about most things," he concedes. "But when it comes to the growing insidious danger to freedom in this country, when it comes to Big Brother government prying into every facet of our lives—I'm not relaxed about that. I'm alarmed."

If in that process, the public becomes grateful to Frank Church and catapults him into the top echelon of contenders for the Democratic Presidential nomination—that would not be half-bad. Ford versus Church would provide the nation with a very real ideological choice.

What they're saying about



FRANK CHURCH



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 94th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 121

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1975

No. 95

Senate

SENATOR CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED CAREER

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, last Sunday, the Washington Post Potomac magazine and the Washington Star both featured stories about the career of the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH).

Myra MacPherson, the author of the Potomac article, and Norman Kempster, who wrote the Star piece, have both pointed out what all of us who serve with Senator Church know full well. I have known Frank Church for 20 years and greatly admire him and hold him in the highest personal esteem. He approaches his tasks with meticulous and firm resolve. He is conscientious and independent. And, I might add, he would make an excellent President.

I commend these articles to the attention of my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that the Potomac cover story and the Washington Star feature

article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star, June 15, 1975]

THE POLITICAL SPOTLIGHT SWINGS TOWARD
FRANK CHURCH

(By Norman Kempster)

"Senator Church and I are good friends," Henry A. Kissinger said, oozing mock good will. "He calls me 'Henry' and I call him 'Cooper'."

The line, delivered as after dinner repartee at one of those black tie events that simulate bipartisan fun, was intended to be the ultimate put-down: After almost two decades in the Senate, Frank Church was little more than second billing on the Cooper-Church amendment that restricted U.S. military activity in Indochina.

There is some truth to that. Although he has been at the center of legislative battles on emotional issues ranging from social security to Vietnam to giant oil companies, Church has not become a household word. A recent Gallup poll showed that only about one out of four Americans had ever heard of him.

"Frank's always had that problem of the American Legion orator. It hurts him in his political efforts. Some feel he enjoys words more than the critical thought. I think the charge is unfair—but that perception is the one thing that keeps him one cut below greatness."

Another handicap is that Church has been around a long time without ever moving solidly into center stage. He is a mystery to some. He was airily dismissed by one Hill observer who said, "Oh, he's been hungry for the Vice Presidency or the Presidency for years and just never got it off the ground." Still, it is the Year of the Question Mark for Democratic presidential candidates and almost anyone can be—and is—running. Church recently joked after five Democrats had announced their candidacy, "they are all tied (pause)—for fifth place."

In a time of disgust with politicians, in a time when people are frightened about the economy and their own future, could a public used to sabre-rattling Presidents rally behind a Oentisman Candidate? Could another Mr. Nice Guy be offered up by the Democrats so soon after 1972's Mr. Nice Guy debacle? Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.) who helped manage George McGovern's defeat, thought a minute. "Have the people had it with a 'good guy'? First, this town is not 'people.' If you mean around the country, the answer is no. The trouble is, good guys seldom get a chance to be known in the country because they seldom get a chance to emerge out of this sink hole. Church is not a member of a clique. He's decent and independent. He does not stab people in the back. He's not scrambling up other people's backs."

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) says, "If Church had the driving desire of those other guys he would have been out there more. I think it's good he isn't so all, consumed with wanting the prestige." It may be an endorsement Church would like to keep in a closet, but 1972's loser is in his corner. "I'd be comfortable with Frank as President," says Senator George McGovern. With a laugh, he adds, "I'd sleep better at night. I think Church is better than any of these guys in the running now. I think he's got a better chance than Udall, Harris, Sanford, Carter, Bentsen; maybe not Jackson."

"But I'm afraid there is some truth that he may suffer from the too-nice-a-guy image. I went through that period of being 'just too nice,' 'too timid,' 'not a dynamic leader.' But there have been great Presidents who were quiet, restrained people. Who? Well, Thomas Jefferson for one. I think Frank Church is capable of writing things as eloquent as Jefferson or Lincoln. He's very effective on everything he's ever done."

But Jefferson was, after all, pre-TV. Today, the candidate who stirs great loves and hates gets that all-important media exposure. Even a former staffer feels, "I don't think Church is charismatic enough to be a very good candidate, but I think he'd be a helluva good President." But those who have seen mild-mannered Church change in front of an audience and bring them to their feet, feel the laugh may be on those who indulge in the conventional Washington sneer.

Students cheer noisily when he calls balling out companies with public money, "socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor." To be sure, his razzie-dazzlers are largely to Jewish groups predisposed to cheer Church these days; they give him standing ovations in Miami, New York, Chicago as he shouts his objections to our administration's "appeasement" policy in Saudi Arabia: "Indeed the only signal that comes through loud and clear is 'give them what they want—American law and American custom be damned.'" Church explains he is "blitzed" with invitations from pro-Israeli groups who need to be "reassured with respect to American foreign policy," but cynics see this as a conscious attempt to siphon off Scoop Jackson's wealthy Jewish "constituency."

The Presidential talk continues nonetheless. Carl Burke, a Boise lawyer and friend since the eighth grade, quit his firm to manage Church's campaign, had corralled wealthy backers in California and New York and several national committeemen before Church halted Burke because of the CIA committee work. But Burke still has his track shoes on. And Frank Mankiewicz, an advisor to Robert Kennedy and George McGovern, sounds like he's looking for another leader—and a job. Mankiewicz urged Church to run. "If he gets all the way in, I feel he'll draw off most of the support for other liberals. He co-authored every important 'restriction' on American policy in Indochina. The reason we're not still fighting and slaughtering over there is mainly because of Church." Who knows, Mankiewicz might even be able to help Church with his good guy problem. He once kidded McGovern that the way to change his Clark Kent image was to "get rumor spread that someone at a cocktail party made a remark you didn't like, and you gave him a quick karate chop that broke his arm."

Frank Church is where he wanted to be ever since he was 14 and first dreamed of becoming a senator. And, for the first time, in a post-Vietnam foreign policy reassignment, Church, the top-ranking dove, is in a position to be an influential spokesman for

change. Even if he cannot harness today's sentiments enough to get his presidential flyer off the ground, Church can be a force in Congress to apply pressure against the administration's adherence to what Church calls our "fatally flawed foreign policy." If he stays in the Senate, Church will be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee soon, and, if strong enough, could become more a policymaker and less a critic. Church laughs at suddenly being on the popular side and wryly ponders where have all the old hawks gone. "There was a time when the sky was dark with them and the doves didn't dare come out."

A looser from the West, Church admits that he has never fit in Washington. "I've been here 18 years and have no feeling of belonging in this city. I feel homesick in this town." But there seems to be no deep hunger to belong. He often uses the phrase, "I am relaxed." He is relaxed about the Presidency, relaxed about his current heavy work load, relaxed at a party.

Reporters used to the quick and snappy answers, ask Church questions at their own peril. He insists on giving the whole answer, with all the circumlocutions. Ask him for his vision of America's future foreign policy, for example, and Church first takes you back, if not to the Stone Age, then, at least to the beginnings of our "falling" Asian policy. "Any policy would have to be set at rectifying our mistakes. We saw the Vietnamese as pawns on a great global chess board, being pushed by prime movers as part of an international Communist conspiracy. The Vietnamese saw it as an indigenous war, a continuing struggle for national independence." Any future U.S. help in Asia "should be given at arms length," just as Russia and China helped the North Vietnamese. Troops should be cleared out of Thailand and, less quickly, Korea.

"This is an absolute necessity if we are not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam. There is no reason, no purpose for U.S. air bases in that part of the world, except to serve as a springboard for another Asian war."

Church does not label himself an isolationist or non-interventionist, as some are quick to call him, but rather an opposer of indiscriminate, interventionism. He is always "amazed" when asked how he can be a dove on Asia and a hawk on Israel.

"There is so little comparison! In Indochina, we huddled into a civil war among the people of a region of no strategic importance to the United States. The leaders we supported lacked the capacity to enlist the support of their people. Contrast this debacle with the Israeli experience—a democracy that has asked for the means to defend itself against outside forces—and has never called on American troops to fight for it. That's the biggest contrast. It is inconceivable to abandon Israel. If the Russian-equipped Syrian and Egyptian armies should ever overrun Israel, the Soviet Union would be placed in a position of preeminent influence in this strategic part of the world—obviously this would be a severe setback to the United States and such principal allies as Western Europe and Japan who depend so totally on the Middle East for fuel supplies."

Church is among those who see our future threat as an economic one. "I think that the impact of OPEC (Oil Producing Exporting Countries) cartels is far more damaging than anything we have witnessed in Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos."

The Middle East oil situation is murky, complex and fraught with violently divisive political points of view. Church says the exorbitant oil prices are bringing "tremendous inflationary consequences" and the dependency of Europe on Mideast oil has "undermined our whole Western alliance." On the other hand, Gerald Parke, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, feels this is more rhetoric than reality. "We have to face the fact the price of oil was too long." Church counters, "How can anyone say I am overemphasizing the problem when oil prices alone are equivalent to a \$50 billion added tax on the American economy alone? If prices are determined by a free market, alright, but we don't have a free market." Church feels present American policy only gives us increased prices and favors a tougher holding back policy with such countries as Saudi Arabia and Iran. "They've come to believe they can bring any action against us, raise prices, and still get everything they want. Well, many favors can be withheld. They need our technology and weapon systems every bit as much as we need their oil." Administration spokesmen feel such actions would be "precipitous," Church says all he wants is a policy of "reciprocity."

The argument that Arab countries provide only about 11 per cent of our total supply from oil producing countries is of little import to Church's assertive position. Saudi Arabia, sixth among our suppliers, is along with Iran in a vital "pivotal role," he says. "It doesn't matter how much oil we get from Saudi Arabia—these two countries are the architects of OPEC and without their leadership OPEC would begin to crack."

As the "boy senator," Church was described as having a "dazzling" smile. Today, the face is feebler, the hair, which still falls on the forehead, is beginning to grey, he wears glasses to read. But the smile still dazzles and the look is still earnest.

He laughs at the nicknames and criticism of the Exile Scout style. He's heard them all before. Including the latest; that he took the chairmanship of the committee on intelligence operations to get national exposure—televized hearings begin in a few weeks. "I think this committee is so very important; I sought it, but I've never seen it as any other than a political mine field." While liberals write warning letters that the committee "better not be a whitewash," there are just as many others who remember when the CIA and FBI were, as Church says, "enshrined by TV programs and all kinds of p.r." Church plans to strip away the "national security" excuse and says "our major purpose will be to alert the American people to the ever present danger of 'big brother government' prying into every facet of their lives. This is a more insidious danger to freedom than anything. We're examining the CIA, FBI, military intelligence, IRS, Post Office, Secret Service." After months of interviews and studying secret files, Church is "shocked" at the extent of such government surveillance.

One day recently, Church propelled out of his office—a place so debugged as a security measure that even CIA director William E. Colby felt his secret conversations there were safe—into a Washington bright with sunlight, not a fitting background for a day's worth of talk on modern day plague and pestilence. Professor W.K.H. Panofsky testified in a Dr. Strangelove voice before the subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He warned that slow-down, if not a reversal of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. strategic arms race, was vital in order to halt our "race to oblivion." Back in 1960, when Church was championing Kennedy, he once turned to poetry to criticize what he called President Eisenhower's "refusal to consider the missile gap" between Russia and the United States: "Now we lay us down to sleep/with Ike's smug team the watch to keep/If we die before we wake/Well the bed was soft—and we slept too late."

But the excesses of 15 years ago are not the perceptions of today. Church, who has voted for all disarmament legislation, gloomily preaches, "I wonder, Dr. Panofsky, if we are not really kidding ourselves as to whether these (past) agreements were meaningful at all?"

Church catches the end of an Interior committee meeting then hurries to the Israeli embassy in his decade-old yellow Mustang, driven by an aide. At a "Happy Birthday for Israel" reception Church smiles on George Meany, talks fishing with the British ambassador, kibitzes with a member of the Knesset, clasps Arthur Goldberg, who says, "I just want to say there is no one better qualified than Frank Church for president." People eagerly praise Church for his Arab boycott stand. Church says many times that he released a list of 1,500 American businesses and organizations boycotted by Saudi Arabia for their links with Israel, "so we could fight back and put a stop to it."

The talk is, again, of war. Saigon is about to fall and Church is asked about Ford's view that the rest of the world would see us as having "bugged out" of Vietnam. "What's the matter with us to be so on the defensive? It is the inevitable end of a mistaken policy," he says with a tinge of impatience. "Americans are too sophisticated to buy that view. They see it all on TV; they see soldiers pushing aside old women and children to get on planes." Abba Eban jokes about Ford, "most politicians gloat over their failures, he gloats over his successes." Church laughs and looks as if he might be flinging away that line as he slides out, shaking hands, acting the candidate.

In his Capitol hideaway office, Church sits on the floor and eats a club sandwich from a coffee table as advisors brief him on a closed CIA session with Clark Clifford. After three hours with Clifford, Church reveals no nuggets to disappointed reporters. A quick change to black tie in the Senate gym and Church is mingling at the White House photographers' banquet. A drum-rolling presentation of colors quiets the chatter. Church, "that Com-symp" to his John Birch enemies, is the only one at his table who places hand over heart. At dinner's end, Church ducks into a New York Times party for one quick drink. But it is clear he wants to leave; a few minutes later he is on his way home.

Frank and Bethine Church are consistently termed one of political Washington's most happy couples—even by those who work with them, often the most cynical examinees of the public "happy couple" mask worn by unhappy political teams. An interview with them sounds dangerously like a parody of those Modern Screen stories about Hollywood's rare phenomenon, the long-standing happily wed duo. "I find it so hard to talk about our marriage except positively," Bethine says with a giggle. "It comes off a little like those sunsets they paint on calendars." She sees the job as a joint career but laughs at the phrase. "When I say 'this is my career' it always comes out wrong. It just sounds so lanky. I feel like 'Mrs. Goody Two Shoes' for the next six hours when I say something like that."

That all could change soon, Frank Church is shuttling between the chairmanships of two high-visibility committees—the special panel investigating the CIA and a Foreign Relations subcommittee probing into overseas bribery by such American corporations as Northrop Aviation.

The failure of the commission headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to complete its investigation of alleged CIA involvement in political murders in foreign countries put a new spotlight on Church and his select intelligence committee.

White House officials who had hoped the Rockefeller investigation would preempt, or at least blunt, any sort of investigation by Congress found themselves obliged to tell reporters they are confident that the Church committee will fill in the blanks left by the Rockefeller commission.

Church is going about his investigation with a seriousness that is almost oppressive. His committee has been the most leak-proof in memory and he talks with furrowed brow and half-closed eyes about his determination to "avoid jumping to judgment on a matter of this gravity".

Some members of a House committee which is preparing for its own CIA probe have complained privately that Church is just too solicitous of the sensitivities of the agency. They say they are afraid that the committee may be too willing to give the CIA the benefit of the doubt.

On the other hand, sources close to the Senate committee express concern that the House investigation may turn into a circus.

Whatever the current outlook, the CIA inquiry could be the issue that converts Church into a national celebrity. And with the Democratic presidential picture still a jumble of personalities and ambitions, some liberals are beginning to talk of Church as a possible nominee.

"If (Sen. Edward M. Kennedy really means he won't run, Church very well could be the guy," remarked an aide to a liberal Democratic senator.

Church has done nothing publicly to encourage such speculation. But one source who knows him well said that although he once had no presidential ambitions, he now wants to run.

Church answers questions about his presidential chances while insisting that he is not now a candidate.

"I have deferred any serious consideration of running for president until this CIA investigation is completed," Church said as he toyed with his gold wire-rimmed glasses. "The two just can't be mixed. I can't mix this investigation in presidential politics so I am going to concentrate on the investigation.

"When it is completed it will be time enough to make a new assessment," he said. Well, just maybe it will be time enough.

Church said he hopes to complete the CIA investigation by the end of this year. In the past, the beginning of an election year often was plenty early enough for a candidate to enter the presidential lists. But with the new campaign finance law, most politicians believe that a candidate must begin to raise money this year if he hopes to make a credible race next year.

Tom Dine, who served as Church's staff aide on foreign affairs and is now a fellow at the Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard, said Church has concentrated on legislative matters for most of his 18 years in the Senate rather than making a name for himself in national politics.

"I think he sees himself as a national legislator," Dine said. "I don't think he sees himself as a national political leader."

Seated in an arm chair in an office decorated with a print of a painting from Pablo Picasso's "blue period" and with photographs of himself and some of his political icons like John F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson, Church agreed that he tries to limit himself to a few important issues.

"I've thought about the way to be effective in the Senate," he said. "I do believe that it takes a degree of specialization."

But while some lawmakers may specialize in the esoteric, Church has concentrated on some of the "gut" issues of the past few years:

He was a vigorous critic of the Vietnam war. After years of talking against U.S. involvement, Church sponsored with Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., the Cooper-Church amendments which first prohibited U.S. troops from being sent to Laos and Thailand and later imposed additional restrictions on the President's discretion in fighting the war.

As chairman of a subcommittee on the problems of the aging, Church battled with former President Richard M. Nixon over increases in Social Security benefits. Church wanted a bigger boost than Nixon was willing to accept. The White House accused Church of playing politics. Church accused Nixon of failing to care for the elderly.

Church's subcommittee on multinational corporations conducted a sometimes sensational series of hearings into the activities of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. in Chile. His committee established a link between ITT and the CIA in efforts to destabilize the government of left-

ist President Salvador Allende.

The same subcommittee investigated the big international oil companies, enabling Church to charge of Jan. 14, 1974—in the midst of the Arab oil boycott and against the background of lines of angry motorists at filling stations—that U.S. energy policy had been shaped for 20 years by a secret agreement with the oil firms.

Church first registered his opposition to Vietnam policy in 1963 when he objected to continued aid to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. His opposition was sporadic for a time. He voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 but shortly after that he became a firm and full-time foe of U.S. involvement in Indochina.

His opposition won him the scorn of President Lyndon B. Johnson and some politicians predicted that it would cost him his Senate seat from staunchly "hawk" Idaho.

Perhaps fortunately for Church, he did not face reelection until 1968 when doubts about the war were much stronger than they had been two or four years earlier. But even in 1968, Church's position on the war was not shared by a majority of his constituents.

Church's campaign literature stresses his era for such a conservative state. But he has been re-elected three times since he won the seat in 1956 in his first bid for statewide office.

So far, at least, Church has avoided the pitfall that led to the defeat of such Senate figures as J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and Thomas W. Kuchel of California—he has not forgotten to keep in touch with the folks back home. Aides say telephone calls from Idaho are answered before calls from the White House.

Church's campaign literature stresses his ties to Idaho. The 50-year-old Senator is described in his official biography as "a native Idahoan from plowshare stock."

He was married in 1947 to Bethine Clark, daughter of the late Chase Clark, a former governor of the state.

The marriage is described by friends as an "excellent partnership, personal and political." One Church aide, referring to Mrs. Church's taste for politics, called her "Idaho's third senator."

Mrs. Church says she vowed as a girl to stay away from politicians because of the erratic home life that is often an occupational hazard. But she came to realize that nothing interests her quite as much as government and politics.

"You dread the year before a campaign, but it's like the old prize fighter, when you hear the bell, you come out," she said.

Mrs. Church said she and her husband have made special efforts to maintain a normal family life in spite of the pressures of politics.

Church ducked out early from the CIA committee's questioning of former CIA Director Richard Helms Friday to attend graduation ceremonies for his younger son, Chase, at Mt. Whitman high school in Bethesda. An aide said Church considered the graduation to be a "command performance."

The Churches also have another son, Forrest, 26.

Mrs. Church refers often to the senator's "sense of humor." But to an outsider, the public Frank Church comes across as a man who is serious to a fault, often sounding like the college debater he was at Stanford University.

One of Church's proudest boasts about the way the CIA investigation has gone so far has been the way the committee has avoided news "leaks."

"It was confidently predicted at the time this committee was created that it would be a sieve through which state secrets would pour," Church recalled. "It hasn't happened. The leaks that have occurred have come from sources other than the Senate committee."

The committee's secrecy rules even bar some members of the staff from access to some information.

An aide to one of the Republican members of the panel remarked, "They know who had access to what information. There was even talk of censuring someone on the (Senate) floor if anything leaked."

Despite the efforts to prevent leaks, Church promised that all of the committee's findings ultimately will be made public.

"The committee feels that those facts should not be divulged piecemeal," he said.

[From the Washington Post, June 13, 1976]
RUSHES SLOWLY FOR PANACEA
(By Myra MacPherson)

Twenty-seven years ago, when Senator Frank Church was at Harvard Law School, he began to suffer from terrible lower back pains. His wife Bethine thought he was simply studying too hard and urged him to slow down, but the pain persisted through a bitter cold winter. So the Churches returned to Stanford University, where Church had graduated Phi Beta Kappa. But the change to a new law school and a new climate made little difference to Church who couldn't fight a pain for which doctors could find no reason.

Then they found Frank Church had cancer. Radical surgery was recommended and doctors operated for hours, removing the affected area as well as glands in the groin and abdomen and lymph nodes all the way up to the kidney. "They decided they had cut all

they could," Bethine recalls. "They were just going to close him up. They said it was all over; that he couldn't make it," she says, absent-mindedly knocking on a wood end table. "But they had missed the report. It was re-read by a man who looked like God—the cancer was very receptive to x-ray."

The cure was almost worse than the initial pain. "The x-rays just burned him up—it took him to the edge of death," his wife says. For several weeks he suffered the daily agony of nausea following x-ray treatments. Church, six feet, was down to a barely surviving 80 pounds. During the treatments, Bethine recalls, "I'd start to read aloud and just read madly to distract him. Sometimes if I was very histrionic I could get him over the hump of nausea." She remembers reading and re-reading "The Turn of the Screw," Church remembers Mr. Roberts. Now round-faced and jowly, Church on TV looks heavier than his 178 pounds; in person he is slim and athletic. "I never would have made it without Bethine," Church says. "She was just so determined I would get well."

That illness forever shaped Church's attitude on life. "I had previously tended to be more cautious—but having so close a brush with death at 23, I felt afterwards that life itself is such a chancey proposition that the only way to live it is by taking great chances. I watched my maiden aunt, Eva, whom I loved dearly, carefully putting money aside, waiting for the day when she could retire on her very modest income—and then she died three months before retirement. All her plans, those books she had on traveling, all those things she ever wanted to do—all snuffed out overnight."

Church acquired the outlook that taking a chance and trying was more important than winning or losing. After graduating from Stanford law school and practicing in Boise, Idaho, for a few years, Church, a man never before elected to any office, decided to run for the U.S. Senate. He became the boy wonder, the youngest senator in 1956 at the age of 32. Now, 18 years later he is running for the Presidency. He has called off his camp followers and money seekers while he chairs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, but he has left the door open to resume that quest in the fall. It is, needless to say, a very chancy proposition. But, while a "Church-for-President" question elicits little wild enthusiasm on the Hill, memories of George McGovern's '72 primaries, keep people from laughing. Church is an anomaly: The first Idaho Democratic senator ever to win even a second term, he is now in his fourth term.

And the times may be conspiring to vault to the forefront the Churchian view of a cautious America: a country with a diminished sense of Yankee soldiers-Yankee dollars omnipotence.

Hill handicappers, rating the pluses and minuses of Church, usually start with the good news. He is bright, one of the brightest in the Senate. At 50, he is, incredibly, an elder statesman who has worked with five administrations and is in the top ranking position of power on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At an age when many men are just beginning their senatorial career, Church ranks 16th in seniority and the average age of those 15 senators senior to him is 70.

His voting record is steady; one of the first doves on the Vietnam war, one of the first to champion civil rights. He stuck his neck out on controversial conservationist legislation and supported such causes as aid to the aging before it became popular. He exposed questionable international dealings of multinational corporations and he is now investigating high-and low-level government spying.

His minuses bell down mainly to the fact that he is from a small state, sometimes how much depth is really there behind the brightness and to matter of style, or the lack of it. At 16, Church won an American Legion national oratory contest and some detractors say he's been suffering from it ever since. Talking to Church in the shower would be no different than talking to him on the Senate floor, they suspect. He comes off decent and smart but a bit too studied, self-righteous, prissy even, and sincere. Sincerity—the earnest, obvious, serious variety—is something you can't have too little of in Washington, where draw-room cynicism is prized, and so Frank Church used to be called Frank "Sunday School." Today, with his elevated status, he gets called Frank "Cathedral." Friends pray for an occasional unclerical expletive or a stutter. One colleague once joked, "Sometimes he seems like a cross between an Eagle Scout and an old maid." A top Senate liberal Democrat who has observed Church for 12 years admires his work but says, "He's a self-important, pretentious ass; he postures like a little peacock—and loves the sound of his own voice."

Staff and friends wish Church's private humor would emerge more often and have taken to writing quips for him. When he recently attended a meeting of Gray Panthers (senior citizens) he noted that their motto is "Out of the rocking chairs and into action." At an aide's suggestion, Church joked, "That might not be a bad motto for Congress." The Gray Panthers laughed and the press wrote it up.

A close friend and liberal senator said,

Church says Bethine is the greatest influence on his life. "Ebe's aware of all the pressures. Probably one reason we have a happy marriage is that she understands all of politics." Ebe says, "If someone were going to Timbuktu tomorrow I'd say, 'I've just got to get my toothbrush and the children. I'm a seat-of-the-pants type person.' Church sees this as an important plus. "I think the majority of wives are very much oriented toward the nest. Politics is an insecure profession. The people who choose it are driven to it—that's not true of their wives."

The Frank and Bethine team is so bonded that one reporter recalled a disconcertingly synchronized performance. "I had this chilling feeling that I was watching two actors, although I like them both." Church describes their technique as "Bethine usually introduces me and then we answer questions. After she circulates and I circulate through the crowd."

One former aide said, "Occasionally we had to tell Bethine there are only two senators from Idaho—and she isn't one of them." When an aide recently discouraged a reporter from following Church around for a day, Bethine was quietly put out. Promptly the next morning the aide called the reporter back and hastily set up a day with Frank Church.

For years, a macho political joke went that Church was run by two women—Bethine and Verda Barnes, his long-time a.a. Church was one of the few senators who ever appointed a woman to that position and Miss Barnes, like all of his staff, past and present, praises him. "I have never known him to say a petty thing and he has the best disposition of any person I have ever known."

When Church first ran for office, Bethine drove the car for him and, to counter his shyness about meeting people, would actually push him out the door. His low-budget campaigns rely on as much exposure as possible and by the end of a campaign, the callus in the wedge between his finger and thumb on his shaking hand is hard and brown. Once, Bethine whispered that Church was pressing his thumb too hard when he shook hands with the elderly. He forgot to heed her and "all of a sudden I felt this pressure on my thumb," he recalls. "I looked down and there was Bethine calmly lifting my thumb up in the middle of a handshake!"

"Best friends" in high school, Frank and Bethine carried on a correspondence courtship when he was in World War II and married when he returned to Boise. Church served in the Burma-China-India theater as an intelligence officer. The biggest problem on the Burma road was not always the Japanese but Chinese robbers who swooped down on American troops. But the time Church felt his life in real danger was, strangely, the evening of the Japanese surrender. When his plane landed in Nanking the Americans faced row upon row of crack Japanese units in perfect formation. Church thought for an instant, "this is absolute insanity. Who says they're going to give up to us?" But the emperor's word had come through and all was peaceful.

In Idaho, Bethine is well known in her own right as a member of a strong political family. Her father was a U.S. District judge and a former governor. Next to his wife, Church credits his liberal father-in-law with having the strongest political influence on his life; Church's own father was more of a counter force. A "staunch Republican" and owner of a sporting goods store, Church's father never forgave himself for voting for Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. In self-defense, Church went to the library to get an unbiased view of Democrats—and wound up in their corner.

When Church came to the Senate it was widely rumored that he was a millionaire, thanks to having married into mining millions. Bethine laughs and says, "I wish it were true. When we were first married, one mine was paying some dividends. But dad was the kind who believed you can't take it with you so he spent it. He also grub-staked every misbegotten mine in the West. When he died we got a drawerful of IOUs." When Church first came to Washington there were many breathlessly cute newspaper articles about how he looked even younger than his 32 years. He had to wear brown suits to distinguish himself from the pages, who wore blue. One day a woman came up to two young men standing by an elevator in the Capitol. "I understand that one of you boy pages gets mistaken for Senator Frank Church." One of the "boys" answered, "Yes ma'am." He was Church.

Although old hands snickered at his uncontrolled joy at being a senator, Church moved ahead fast. He astounded Jimmy Hoffa, appearing before the labor racketeering investigating committee, when he scolded, "We don't need you, Mr. Hoffa, to come up here and moralize on what's right and wrong."

But the first time he presided over a session of the Foreign Relations Committee, Church leaned back in the chairman's high-backed swivel chair, trying to look confident, and toppled over on his head. Righting himself and the chair, he calmly observed, "The junior senator from Idaho is not accustomed to presiding over this lofty committee."

Church's big moment came in 1960 when he was the keynote speaker at the Demo-

cratic convention. He was 35. He studied and studied his speech. When no one was looking, he practiced at the podium. He got national publicity before the speech. It turned out to be a sag waver that included such lines as "only an awakened and rededicated America can raise a standard around which the great fraternity of the free can rally." Many conventioners went to sleep. A long-time friend recalls, "That was a marvelous opportunity to break into the national scene, and, frankly, he blew it with superficial oratory. You don't get a chance to blow too many chances. Maybe he's got another with this CIA business." Today, Church rolls his eyes and shakes his head about that speech. With a laugh he says disarmingly "All I can say in my defense is—I didn't know any better."

On the Senate floor it was another story, as Church grew to be effective. In 1962, although facing a stiff re-election fight, Church sponsored the pro-conservationist wilderness bill. Much of his re-election opposition was coming from business interests opposing the bill. "How does Frank manipulate?" asks McGovern. "He really doesn't. On the wilderness bill, for example, he was an extraordinarily able floor manager. He did it by shaming people into standing for the future of this country—despite all the special interest claims."

McGovern and Church tied for third place—after Morse and Gruening—in their dove stance; Church's first anti-administration policy speech came in January, 1964. He teamed up with McGovern on the Senate floor in early 1965, incurring Lyndon Johnson's wrath as well as that of hawkish Idaho voters. In 1967, John Birch backed opponents, who muttered that the "pinks" and "punks" got him elected, tried to recall Church for treason. The kooky plan, labelled illegal, backfired and got Church more support than before.

In 1968, Church's opponent hammered away at his civil rights, antipoverty and other domestic legislation, his dove stance and support of the nuclear test ban treaty. His 1974 opponent did the same and was aided by John Birch pamphlets that smeared Church. More than 55% of the votes went to Church. That sounds close for some states but for Idaho, one staffer said, "any Democratic victory over 51% is considered a landslide." Church won the first time with 59%, 55% in 1968 and a whopping 61% in 1974. Church wins by going deliberately parochial back home, stressing his ability to best represent Idaho's interests. In a gun-toting state, where practically everyone is a hunter, he avoids one suicidal position—he vociferously fights gun registration legislation.

Church's multi-national subcommittee findings were considered important net pluses in detailing such areas as the involvement of global corporations with foreign policy and developing the CIA link in Chile. But Church has been criticized as writing a report less assertive and aggressive than his more flashy hearings; some on the Hill wonder if Church is in it for the publicity rather than for affecting legislation and policy.

For example, a Church-Hart bill for a federal government agency to act as the sole purchasing agent for all United States oil imports has been knocked as unsophisticated, unworkable and impossible by some in the administration and, expectably, the oil industry. The proposal is designed to weaken the power of OPEC. The government would purchase oil under a secret bidding system and would then resell to private companies. John Lichtblau, executive director of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation—an independent consulting firm working with both industry and government agencies—argues, "What is to prevent OPEC from turning the tables and submitting a collective bid above the prevailing world market price? Our only options would then be to accept the bid or do without OPEC oil. They know we can't accept the second choice." Church says "I don't think that view is realistic at all. There is no indication they would respond this way. That would be like imposing a new embargo and that would put an end to all the largesse they're now getting. There's just too much to lose on their part." He added cautiously, "This bill touched a raw nerve—oil companies don't want any interference in their marriage with OPEC. Well, they don't have to worry. I've only got 15 senators willing to put their names on it for fear of offending oil companies. I hardly think it will go anywhere."

Church bristles at any inference that his hearings produced "puff" attempts at legislation. "After the ITT hearings we passed a bill to make it a crime for a company to offer money to the CIA." (It is now pending in the House.) A "major legislative achievement" was a bill to phase out government insurance of private business investments abroad "after the subcommittee looked into OFIC (Overseas Private Investment Corp.) and found it was being subsidized by the taxpayers."

And Jerome Levenson, chief counsel for the subcommittee argues, "Church knew they weren't going to do a damn thing on Helms or Kissinger, but he pushed it. The rest of the committee just wanted it all to go away.

He was the only guy who pressed on. All that about Helms' meeting with ITT's Genseen, none of that would have come out if we hadn't pressed Helms and crew. The State Department and everyone was urging him to stop and he just blasted them all to get where we did. The net plus is we exposed an issue things that had previously been sacrosanct." In a few weeks the subcommittee will have another go at some 10 to 12 companies, planning, as Business Week magazine says, "a long, hot summer for U.S. companies that have accepted bribery as an ordinary—and necessary—cost of doing business abroad."

Bethine's father gave her some advice on how to run a political life. "He told me, 'Now look, your mother traveled with me. You'll just have to go with Frank. Otherwise, you'll never know what makes him happy or sad or tired.' That helped. I'm such a worrier that had I thought I was not doing the best by Chase and Forrest, I'd just have been a wreck. As it is, I worried enough about all of them."

In earlier days, the Churches allowed politics to encroach on their private time: weekend embassy dinners, Idaho wheat growers' receptions, staff phone calls at night. "The kids didn't complain, but pretty soon we were spending less and less time together," recalls Church. They realized that politics were interfering and creating a distance between Frank and their younger son, Chase, now 18. (Forrest, the older, is married and has just been ordained as a reverend following graduation from Harvard Divinity School.) Chase was tuning out of his school work. The Churches "worked things around to consider his needs." They got a cabin in nearby Emmetsburg and, when possible, retreat there. The boys rode Hondas, and Church taught them how to shoot. But, mostly, says Bethine, it is where they can be together as a family—"before it gets to the point that you forget what that's like."

The trips to the cabin are less frequent these days. Church once expressed doubt about the rigors of a presidential campaign and that he was "reasonably frightened" by the experience of his friend McGovern. "You see the tremendous time and effort there's probably a tremendous ego trip involved in such a race—but it puts your marriage under the severest possible strain. When Ed (Juskie) decided not to run with McGovern, it was because Jane really hadn't enough." (Church himself was available in '72 but the only person who asked him was Jimmy the Greek, who gave him favorable odds as a running mate.) Church continued, "I think for people to want the presidency so badly that they will pursue it for years in the hustings, requires not only elephant glands, but also a terrible inner need for what they consider ultimate recognition in politics."

Today, that tune is somewhat changed. Church says, "Bethine and the boys have always been very political; they'd feel at home with it." One reason Church has changed his mind is, quite simply that he was asked. "This is the first time since 1966 that people have asked me to run. That time I was facing a tough Senate fight and couldn't consider it."

Church thinks the charisma factor side-tracks important issues and Bethine disgustedly feels the personality parade contributes to "Potomac myopia. You lose track of what people are thinking. I think the public relations thing has gone too far. I don't know how it gets undone, but I think people would have more confidence in us politicians if we could stop the treadmill. It isn't just terrible for a politician's personal life, it is terrible for our government. Eventually you're doing more p.r. than work."

Asked why he would want to be President, Church says "That office still remains the great one; there is a tremendous opportunity that comes to no one else, to change things for the better." But Church says he wouldn't mind staying in the Senate, either. He may well have to. Given the complexities of this year's campaign, particularly the new restrictions on financing, Church will have to do a lot of "p.r." to make up for his side-tracked campaign. He shrugs and says that's the chance he'll have to take.


Bethine marvels that "Frank relaxes faster than anyone I've ever met." With a broad smile Church says "In fact I can relax a lot faster than I can rev up."

Statements like that will cause Church's camp followers to lose more than a little sleep. But Church—a man who thought at the age of 23 that he had no future—can afford to be a little philosophical at the age of 50.

"I am," Church says, "just awfully relaxed about what the future will bring."

Frank Church

"Unequaled Accomplishments For The Elderly"



"As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, Senator Frank Church has been the leading voice in Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans."

--The National Council of Senior Citizens



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 94th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 121

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975

No. 158

Senate

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT ON BEHALF OF OLDER AMERICANS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, the Senate Committee on Aging was created in 1961 to be a focal point and advocate in the Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans.

Today the Committee on Aging has 23 members—making it the second largest committee in the Senate just after the Appropriations Committee.

The Committee on Aging is superbly served by its chairman, Senator FRANK CHURCH.

As the former chairman and now the ranking majority member of the committee, I have been impressed by his

leadership, his fundamental grasp of the issues, his innate decency, and his legislative skills.

He became chairman of the committee in 1971. During that time, he has been in the forefront in advancing legislation on behalf of older Americans, including:

Enactment of the 20-percent social security increase in 1972, the largest dollar raise by far in the history of the program.

Establishment of a cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to make social security benefits inflation-proof for the elderly.

Enactment of a two-step, 11-percent social security raise in 1974.

Approval of amendments to strengthen the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act.

Recently the National Council of Senior Citizens compiled a listing of some of Senator CHURCH's major legislative achievements for the elderly.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this summary, entitled "Senator Frank Church: A Distinguished Record of Achievement"—be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT

As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, Senator Frank Church has been the leading voice in Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans. He has consistently been in the forefront on everyday issues of direct concern to the elderly. And, his legislative accomplishments in the field of aging have been unequalled by any other Member of Congress. Among his major achievements—either as the sponsor or cosponsor of legislation:

Enactment of a 20-percent Social Security increase in 1972, which enabled more than 1 million Americans to escape from poverty.

Creation of a new cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to protect Social Security beneficiaries from the harsh impact of inflation.

Increased Social Security benefits in 1973 for more than 3 million aged widows, who represent one of the most economically disadvantaged groups in our society.

Extension of Medicare coverage to 1.7 million disabled Social Security beneficiaries under age 65.

Establishment of a national hot meals program for persons 60 and over in conveniently located centers. Nearly 240,000 older Americans now receive meals under the Title VII nutrition program for the elderly.

Enactment of a new national senior citizens corps to build upon the enormously successful Mainstream pilot projects, such as Senior Aides. Nearly 13,700 low-income persons 55 or older participate in this jobs program.

Passage of the Older Americans Comprehensive Services Amendments of 1973 to (a) provide new and improved community services for elderly persons; (b) strengthen the Administration on Aging; (c) establish model programs to come to grips with the practical problems and challenges of aged and aging Americans, including services for the handicapped, preretirement counseling, and continuing education; and (d) creation of a transportation program to help the immobile elderly.

Enactment of a two-step, 11-percent Social Security increase in 1974. Senator Church personally led the fight for the interim 7 percent Social Security hike by winning the support of 57 cosponsors in the Senate.

Allowing States greater flexibility in providing social services for former and potential aged public assistance recipients.

Exempting the value of maintenance and support furnished by private, nonprofit retirement homes in determining eligibility for Supplemental Security Income benefits. Thus, the subsidized portion of a recipient's maintenance in a nonprofit home for the aged will no longer be considered as unearned income and will not reduce or eliminate the individual's SSI payments.

Blocking the Administration's proposed 5 percent ceiling for the 1975 Social Security cost-of-living adjustment—thus allowing older Americans to receive the full 8 percent increase as authorized by law.

Creation of a nationwide community education program to provide recreational, educational, and a variety of other community services for the young and old alike.

Establishment of a model program to make home health services more readily available to provide alternatives to unnecessary and more costly forms of institutionalization.

On other fronts, Senator Church is also working for the enactment of additional important legislation, including:

Establishment of an independent, non-political Social Security Administration outside the Department of HEW; prohibition of the mailing of political announcements with Social Security checks; and the separation of the Social Security trust funds from the unified budget.

Coverage of essential out-of-hospital prescription drugs under Medicare.

Protecting older Americans from higher hospital costs by freezing the Medicare hospital deductible at the 1975 level.

Extension and expansion of the Older Americans Act to enable more elderly persons to continue to live independently in their own homes.

An older Americans Home Repair and Winterization Act.

Extension and expansion of the Older American Community Service Employment Act to provide new job opportunities for elderly persons.

Extension of the cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to persons receiving Social Security benefits.

Authorization of two Social Security cost-of-living adjustments a year during periods of accelerated inflation.

UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C. 20510



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IDAHO

AMERICANS . . . And The Law



An address by Senator Frank Church on the growing lawlessness in the United States.

"That sense of community -- of the duty each citizen owed to his fellow citizens -- seems to be evaporating.

A social cannibalism is emerging in its place. We are beginning to feed on each other. We are taking rather than giving.

Selfishness is displacing scruples about the common good."

-- Senator Frank Church



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Vol. 121

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1975

No. 156

Senate

AMERICANS AND THE LAW

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has drawn our attention in a recent speech to a growing lawlessness abroad in the land. As he points out, this is not simply the conventional lawlessness of garden-variety criminals, but worse, the growing lawlessness of those who traditionally set the lawful example. Some of our most prominent corporate and governmental leaders have strayed from the ethical habits of this Nation in recent years. And perhaps worst of all, some of our law enforcement agencies have not been true to the law.

Mr. President, this is a speech that

spotlights a growing weakness at the top of our society, which fosters a general disrespect for the law at every level. It is worth wider attention, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from this remarkable address.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT FROM A SPEECH BY SENATOR CHURCH

Of late, the seems to have lost much of its traditional respect, and not just because of the growth in conventional crimes. Ordinary criminals have never respected the law. We seem to have come to the disquieting point

today where citizens who are normally law abiding have taken to bending the law and even to breaking it.

That sense of community—of the duty each citizen owed to his fellow citizens—seems to be evaporating. A social cannibalism is emerging in its place. We are beginning to feed on each other. We are taking rather than giving. Selfishness is displacing scruples about the common good.

This feeds a spreading anarchy which takes on different forms. It reaches into the workshops of our land.

In frustration over the exorbitant price of bread, the longshoremen refuse to load wheat sold to Russia. Their refusal has nothing to do with wages or working conditions. But rather with their opposition to the sale. The law is disregarded. By refusing to load the grain, the union displaces the government and usurps for itself the right to determine trade policies.

Lacking a law which requires binding arbitration, a New York teachers union defies a court order against a strike, rather than taking an appeal to a higher court. What do those teachers now tell the children who find given laws personally inconvenient.

And this audience remembers well that the police in San Francisco recently staged an illegal strike and ignored court orders, while packing pistols on the picket line. If the police can defy public order, then the army is next. No society can long endure strikes against the public health or safety.

We must insist that the government provide mechanisms for settling grievances of public employees, and public employees must—in turn—work through legal channels to accomplish their economic goals. Otherwise essential public services will collapse. And the very fabric of our society will start to unravel.

But, lest there be any thought that public employees are alone in flaunting the law, we have only to look to the boardrooms of our largest corporations. For the past two years, as a matter of fact, I have been peering into those boardrooms, as part of the inquiry being conducted by my Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. This is what we have found:

ITT secretly offering the CIA a million dollars to prevent Allende, lawfully elected by the people of Chile, from becoming President. Like the longshoremen refusing to load wheat, this giant corporation sought to usurp for itself the right to determine the course of American foreign policy.

Exxon parceling out 27 million dollars in illegal political contributions in Italy in return for economic favors from the government.

Gulf Oil doling out four million dollars in illegal corporate contributions in Korea.

Northrop paying an agent 450 thousand dollars for the purpose of bribing Saudi Arabian generals.

United Fruit slipping the President of Honduras 1.2 million dollars to lower the export tax on bananas.

Lockheed admitting illegal payments to government officials in countries around the globe . . . in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and in the Far East, amounting in the aggregate to many millions of dollars.

All of this wrong-doing is acknowledged by straight-faced executives who say they had to break the law in order to get the business. The excuse, after all, is written plainly in the adage, "When in Rome. . ."

But the excuse is hollow. The bad habits of Rome were brought home to America.

The roster of companies that made illegal corporate contributions to the Nixon campaign in 1972 include many of the companies which have turned to bribery abroad. If we condone bribery of foreign officials we will sow the seeds of corruption in our own land.

Perhaps the most depressing aspect of this corporate lawlessness is that it is authorized at the highest executive levels. These corrupt practices are not aberrations engineered by underlings. They are company policy. Contempt for the law has come to preside in the boardrooms of some of the largest companies. Unless we support the moral and honest among our business leaders we are in danger of sinking into a quagmire of corporate lawlessness.

My work on the foreign relations committee has revealed another very disturbing area of the executive branch's disregard for the law:

The Export Administration Act of 1969 declares it to be the "policy of the United States to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries." It also requires that the Department of Commerce be notified of any requests for compliance with such boycotts.

Yet, the Department of Commerce distributes, through the American business community, a notice from the Government of Iraq, detailing intentions to buy 3,550 prefabricated buildings. The bid specifications disseminated by the Department included a requirement that would force any U.S. firm bidding on the project to support an economic boycott of Israel, a direct violation of official government policy.

And at whose request was the Commerce Department distributing these Iraqi bid specifications?

None other than our own State Department!

In justification of this outrageous breach of law, the Secretary of Commerce urges that a refusal to distribute such specifications would deny U.S. firms "prompt access to business opportunities in the Arab markets . . ."

On September 19, the Secretary of Defense informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Defense Department plans to sell one and a half billion dollars of military planning, design and construction work to Saudi Arabia under the foreign military sales act.

Hearings I chaired have revealed United States Government compliance with Saudi discriminatory boycott and visa regulations on such construction projects in the past.

Yesterday Senator Clifford Case and I informed Secretary Schlesinger by letter that we would fight this billion and a half sale unless we receive assurances of complete adherence to the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in all aspects of the sale and construction.

What is missing in the Administration's position on the boycott and visa restrictions is a decent respect for the basic principles on which the republic was founded. Our principles—not theirs!

The situation we now face is not without historical precedent. On December 17, 1911, President Taft abrogated a lucrative trade agreement with Czarist Russia which was shortly to go into effect because the latter refused visas to American Jews. In May 1885, the United States was informed by the Austrian government that Mr. Anthony Reley would be unacceptable as envoy extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna, "The position of a foreign envoy wedded to

a Jewess by civil marriage would be untenable and even impossible in Vienna."

Then Secretary of State Bayard replied in these terms:

"It is not within the power of the President nor of the Congress, nor of any judicial tribunal in the United States, to take or even hear testimony, or in any mode to inquire into or decide upon the religious belief of any official, and the proposition to allow this to be done by any foreign government is necessarily and a fortiori inadmissible.

"To suffer an infraction of this essential principle would lead to a disfranchisement of our citizens because of their religious belief, and thus impair or destroy the most important end which our constitution of Government was intended to secure."

Would that we had today a President and Secretary of Commerce equally sensitive to the "most important end which our constitution of Government was intended to secure."

But it is not only members of the corporate leadership which seek to evade the law. Government leaders as well invent specious rationalizations to evade the clear intent of the Congress.

I would like to think that the high fever point of our national affliction of disregarding the law came a year ago, with the resignation of Richard Nixon, when proof of his unlawful conduct finally forced him out of office, a step ahead of impeachment. The lesson of that painful ordeal is that, if we are to restore respect for the law to a position of primacy in our society, we will have to begin at the top.

Within the Federal Government, the place to start is with the keepers of the law—those agencies charged with law enforcement and secret intelligence activities. If they won't respect the law, who will?

The investigation of these agencies—the FBI and the CIA—by the Senate Committee I chair came about as a result of widespread charges of unlawful conduct and wrongdoing. We know now that the CIA has toyed with murder abroad—in league with the Mafia, no less! The FBI has admitted to a whole series of infractions, unrelated to law enforcement, but directed instead toward the harassment of law-abiding citizens.

Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote:

"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizens. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."

Happily, such wisdom is not the sole province of learned jurists. A few days ago, a chicken farmer up in Pennsylvania approached me to ask if it were true that the CIA had worked with the Mafia. When I told him, "Yes," it was true, he looked down at the ground, pushed at the dirt with his foot, and said:

"Senator, how will I ever teach my kids to grow up honest, when the government, itself, goes partners with the underworld?"

It is with such matters that the Senate Intelligence Committee must deal. The scope of our inquiry ranges far beyond attempted assassinations abroad. Indeed, the whole sordid subject of murder plots formed no part of the Committee's original mission. It was dropped in our laps when the Rockefeller Commission ducked it, and President Ford passed it on to us to deal with. Since then,

the Committee has taken over eight thousand pages of testimony, interrogated nearly a hundred witnesses, examined a vast array of documents, and compiled a record on the assassination issue alone that compares in size to the entire investigation of the Senate Watergate Committee.

All of this work has been conducted in executive sessions, behind closed doors. But the Committee intends to publish soon a full and detailed report of its findings. Doubtlessly, public hearings on such a subject, telecast to every corner of the globe, would have played to an unprecedented audience. The political box office, however, would have been far exceeded by the political damage that such a proceeding would inflict upon the United States. Hence the Committee chose

closed hearings, to be followed by a full disclosure in the form of a printed report.

Now, as the Committee goes into open hearings, we will focus on unlawful conduct by the CIA and the FBI . . . as directed against law-abiding American citizens. To what degree have these agencies, established to spy on foreign governments and fend off foreign spies, turned their techniques inward to spy on the American people instead?

That is a vital question, not only for what it tells us about our government today, but for what it portends for the future.

I don't know whether Big Brother Government waits for us, as we enter the third century of our Republic. Big Brother may still be the fictional figment of an Orwellian imagination, but the electronic hardware to sustain his rule exists in the American Government today. It has already been invented. It has been built. And it is in use.

In the need to know what foreign governments—some of them potential enemies—are doing, our own government has projected an awesome technology that enables us, not only to spy from the sky, but also to monitor the messages that course through the air. We have in place and functioning the capability to eavesdrop on messages between ships at sea, between planes in the air, and military units in the field. We possess an amazing capacity to intercept messages of every kind, whether governmental or commercial, military or civilian, public or private, wherever they are transmitted through the atmosphere.

The issue is how to keep that capacity outward-reaching in the service of our legitimate national security needs. For if it were ever turned around, no American would have any privacy left, such is the government's potential for monitoring any telephone conversation, any telegram, any unguarded conversation. There would, in short, be no place left to hide.

If an American President ever aspired to dictatorship, the existing technology of the Federal intelligence agencies could place in his hands the means to impose near absolute surveillance. The most careful efforts to combine together in resistance, no matter how discreetly undertaken, would be within the reach of the tyrant to know. Such is the sweep of this technology.

That is why the Senate authorized this investigation, why I accepted its Chairmanship, and why this has been the most disturbing assignment of my career. It is now more apparent than ever to me that the agencies which control this technology must always operate strictly within the law, and under the close and continuing supervision of the Legislative, as well as the Executive Branch of our government.

I know first-hand the wartime worth of

intelligence-gathering, because I served with the Military Intelligence as a young Army officer in World War II. Now, as a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am fully aware of the great value of good intelligence in times of peace. Without it, an informed foreign policy could not be conducted; without it, nuclear arms controls could not be policed; without it, the United States would be left groping in a dangerous world.

But the maintenance of such agencies poses a dilemma for a free society. They must function in the most delicate of all realms: mandated to maintain security without impairing freedom. If they engage in wrongdoing, it is not a casual matter that can be safely swept under the rug. If the charges raised in the press, which gave rise to the investigation, should prove largely true, then it is urgent that we learn in time. If they prove largely false, then the investigation will serve to redeem the reputation of prestigious agencies which find their honor in upholding the law.

But even if the lawkeepers commence again to set a sound example for upholding the law, we must pull ourselves together as a people and reestablish a general respect for the law at every level. We must begin to assert a self-discipline which recognizes that everybody can't have everything at the expense of everyone else.

If we fail to restore a proper regard for the common good within the framework of the law, then creeping anarchy will gradually replace the rule of law altogether. In its wake will surely come the repressive measures that a frightened people will then find preferable. There can be no successful preservation of

liberty outside the law.

The foremost example of lawful conduct must come from the top. But a proper regard for the law must be regenerated throughout—in the treatment of one citizen by another, in the self-discipline exercised by our great unions and in the lofty centers of corporate power.

Indeed, there is some hope on that score. Certain unions in financially-beleaguered New York City have agreed to wage freezes during the current fiscal emergency. Police and firemen in other cities, recognizing their duty to protect life and property, have urged the adjudication of their grievances in lieu of striking. And many American corporations have sacrificed business at home and abroad, rather than adopt dishonest methods.

But much sturdier political leadership is needed if a decent regard for the general welfare is to be regained. It will not come from the politicians who practice and encourage a double-standard, who reject lawbreaking from one quarter with a mailed fist, while accepting it from another with a welcoming hand. These politicians offer us no solutions, because they are part of the problem.

Adlai Stevenson, as civilized a man as ever sought the Presidency, tried to tell us: "As citizens of this democracy," he said, "you are the rulers and the ruled, the law-givers and the law-abiding—the beginning and the end."

I know Adlai Stevenson would agree that, if we don't regain our respect for the law and for each other, then our generation will be, in this our 200th year, not merely the end of a great beginning, but the beginning of the end.

IDAHO'S LONELY FRANK CHURCH

A day in the Washington swirl of a senator who has arrived

—OR—

A Church without a State

By staff writer Jay Sheldy and photographer Barry Kuyh

WASHINGTON — Although he won't admit it, Frank Church must be a lonely man.

Viewed by much of his Idaho constituency as a composite of celebrity, maverick lawyer, liberal intellectual and Washington stuffed shirt, people hesitate to approach him as if in an unceremonious awe of the status of Idaho's senior senator, the man who daily rubs shoulders with presidents, politicians and power brokers.

It would seem he must be at home in this Seat Of Government, steeped in familiarity and accepted by the mighty. That is not so. He is indeed a powerful, sought-after senator. And he has become the darling of an Eastern Establishment that recently discovered the "boy wonder" from Boise. But it is a one-sided love affair.

The Eastern Establishment and its omnipresent arrogance often disguise him. He does not have a driving desire for prestige and power. He is in Idaho country, to be sure. But neither is he welcome in the corporate boardrooms of Big Business. And he is not so stuffy that he can't tell you with delight about the time, as a young senator, he was trying to look confident at a Foreign Relations Committee meeting by leaning back in his chair and topped over backwards on his head, or perform marvelous imitations of Henry Kissinger, or drive a boat up 1987 Main Street in the Capitol every day.

The cruel of fame that has attached itself to Frank Church in the last two years has been a long time in the making. But each passing shot on the 6 o'clock news seems to detach him further from his western roots. While there will never be abandonment, further removal seems inevitable. Church is fighting it, but it is already there. As his talents further submerge him in national and international affairs, he has become more distant. Yet he resists acceptance into the Eastern set. He withdraws with his family to the Washington suburbs or a Pennsylvania country cabin. At times he appears to be a senator without a state.

Frank Church must vividly ponder the good old days when he was just that boyish-looking senator from Idaho. But a man who has given the last 19 years of his life to the United States Senate knows that nameless senators from Idaho cannot make the wheels of government turn, cannot command critical clout with the other 99 senators, and cannot move up.

Church's lonely distance was summarized well in this reporter's some weeks ago by a Nebraska farmer: "Frank Church is a senator from the

West who reminds me of a senator from the East." The observer was not derogatory, just intriguing.

Prior to his sudden prominence as chairman of the Senate select committee on intelligence activity, the Eastern Establishment, major news and media mainlines paid him little attention. Outside of Idaho, Frank Church was hardly a household word. That has all changed now. He is frequently mentioned in a Democratic presidential possibility — although Church himself is careful to avoid any appearance of reaching while regaining the intelligence committee — and is quickly becoming one of the hottest political properties in Washington. He now is an ever-ready invitation list.

His turn in the spotlight has not come unearned. Church has patiently paid his dues and done his homework in running to 1976 in Senate elections. He accepted underdog roles without underwriting. But he was alone in arriving because he refused to join the club. He could never totally be counted upon to go along, not with presidents nor with fellow senators. He was one of the first to publicly back President Johnson's Vietnam policies, for example, long before the dove stance became fashionable.

His first big break, prior to the intelligence committee chairmanship, was chosen to chair two other important committees. He has handled those assignments responsibly and responsibly. One is the subcommittee on aging. With it came a bipartisan elderly constituency that most politicians would give their shaking hands for. The other, the first to give him widespread media attention, is the continuing investigation into unethical and illegal dealings of multi-national corporations.

But the attention being generated by his committee probe into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency is second only to that given former Sen. Sam Ervin's historic Watergate Committee. Unlike the Bible-quoting Ervin from North Carolina, Church has thus far earned straight high marks for the manner in which he is conducting his potentially explosive probe. Every revelation is an automatic front-page headline, a three-minute segment on network news. Easy to exploit.

His detractors say the former debate champion is in love with the sound of his own voice. It would be kinder to the truth, however, to say Frank Church is in love with the English language. At worst, he has a propensity for pontification. Church speaks in precise sentences, liberally laced with headline grabbing naturalism. One can almost hear the paragraph meditations during a speech. Key words are emphasized;

punctuation is emphasized. Frank Church lives his life one day at a time. Turnovers don't trust for much because in 1968 there almost was no tomorrow. At age 23, the Stanford law student discovered he had what doctors diagnosed as terminal cancer. As a last resort, a doctor decided to try X-ray treatments. The cure took him to the edge of death. He was down to 80 pounds. But finally, his wife was determined he would get well. He did and immediately established a new life principle:

"Life itself is such a chancey proposition that the only way to live it is by taking great chances."

Thus it was that in 1966 he threw aside the beginnings of a successful law practice and took his chances at a spot for the United States Senate, the most powerful deliberative body in the world. His motivation was, grandly, the great Republican stalwart of liberalism, William E. Borah, the Senate lion from Idaho. A school of history, Church was fascinated and inspired by his ancestor here. And he continues to emulate Borah in many ways.

At age 22 Frank Church became one of the youngest senators in history and gained the nickname "boy wonder" fourteen years later the boy wonder is taking a chance on the presidency.

The Church staff has been at work a good two hours when the senator steps into the press-room office that the senator has been busy during that time. There was a 7:30 a.m. breakfast meeting with a wealthy New Yorker followed by an 8:30 media and member alliance, one-of-a-kind. Both meetings were private both at downtown Washington hotels. The two individuals are pushing him to run for the presidency and are willing to make a sizable campaign contribution if he but says the magic words. He says so here after the CIA hearings are wrapped up. By 9:30 Church is scanning his schedule for the day — which actually began 15 minutes ago with a legislative mark-up session in the Interior Committee. An announcement of promising intelligence matters will carry him to skip the Interior Committee today.

A nuclear ex-Cuba is racing to a secretary in an outer office about how his rights have been trampled. Staff members politely but firmly send the ex-Cuba to the gloomy hall of the Old Senate Office Building toward the office of a senator whose state's proximity to Cuba is a hot topic than Idaho's.

Because of publicity Church has received through the CIA investigation, more hints are showing

up. Most are telephone calls, however. Shortly before the Cuban incident, a woman from Denver called the senator's office, demanding to talk to him. She told Press Secretary Bill Hall, who sidetracked the call, that the CIA kidnapped her and forced her to undergo a hysterectomy. Furthermore, the agency was tapping her phone.

"Are they tapping it now?" asked Hall. The woman said yes.

Muttering the most authoritative voice he could, Hall boomed into the phone receiver: "Gentlemen, this is the press secretary to the chairman of the Senate committee investigating intelligence activities. You are ordered to stop harassing this woman at once."

Retrieved, the woman terminated the conversation.


Since Church is privy to sensitive intelligence data during the investigation, his office has been "secured" by a CIA security team. The agency "seeps" the entire office for bugs. The going joke among the Sped State staff was that the spooks turned up three potato bugs. The CIA boys didn't laugh at the gag. The CIA apparently has a rule against eating. The senator's phone has been connected to a special CIA "mask" which when activated jams any wiretaps on the line or bugs in nearby walls.

Some Idaho constituents from Preston wander into the office. They are tourists in Washington. They are ushered into the senator's presence for a brief visit. Administrative Assistant Mike Weatherall adroitly shortcuts his boss' secretary with: "Senator, you remember us—back from Preston?" Of course, the senator remembers so-and-so and the conversation moves to the constituents' concerns about gun controls. Church is adamantly against the controls and assures Mr. so-and-so he is speaking up on the matter.

Weatherall goes for a camera so the folks can have a memento of the occasion. The two kids flank the senator and the flash catches embarrassed grins. With instructions to his staff to see to any Senate or White House tour passes the family might desire, Church walks down to the door of his inner office.

No sooner does the door shut than a call comes in from Bill Miller, chief of staff on the CIA committee. It concerns sensitive material about a "comp" with Daniel Ellsberg material relating to the CIA. A flap of the switch activates the "mask."

Next on the appointment list is Abigail McCarthy, ex-wife of the former Democratic presidential candidate, Sen. Eugene McCarthy. She is now writing a great column for the



New York Times Feature Syndicate. He isn't long into the interview before it becomes apparent that glib and glib reporters do not hard-biting political reporters make. Nevertheless, the interview struggles along and Church is patient.

It is obvious what is on her polite mind. The first reporter to break the silver-tongued questions of Frank Church's formal announcement of presidential intentions would reduce a normal front-page space and prime air time. With the standard refrain — no discussion until the hearings are terminated — Church quietly pops that bubble.

However, the opportunity to discuss what he feels is a leadership gap in the nation is not overlooked. This Church feels well.

McCarthy presses him on his civil rights philosophy, a subject dear to her former husband. Coming from a state where a civil rights incident is more than likely over whether girls can wear pantsuits to some eastern Idaho school, Church, with charming ease, moves the discussion topic to foreign policy, something with which a member of the Foreign Relations Committee feels at home.

"This country is groping for a new foreign policy. The man who articulates such a policy can step into this leadership gap." But, so cautious, choosing his words carefully, "foreign policy isn't the only thing it is not the last that wags the dog. We must take care of our freedoms at home."

The interview moves on smoothly to the Central Intelligence Agency. Church is critical of past CIA indiscretions. Although he recognizes the need for an intelligence-gathering agency, he sees potential dangers in allowing a president to set CIA policy without input from Congress.

"If secret intervention into a foreign nation is appropriate for a good cause, what will stop a president from doing things we don't approve of?" Stumped, Abigail shakes her head as the tape recorder reads her lap takes down every word for later transcription. "We have used three CIA (intervention) methods," continues Church, "and we often to promote justice than democratic government."

Becoming a trifle bored with the subject, the columnist moves the interview along by asking what Church thinks of the women's movement. Slack, but he handles it without a stutter.

"I see it as an outgrowth of our striving to live up to our professed principles. But the extreme fringe of the women's lib movement have very little appeal to me as they do to most people."

Talk returns to the presidency, but in a general way. "We need to revert to a simpler lifestyle for the president. Enough of the imperial presidency, escalation, severity, traps, new inventions, pomp and circumstance. The president ought to be able to take a day off in the back porch of the White House to read the newspaper, a constituent of Mariposa County has been a great opponent of his office."

He is wrapping up and the location grabbing photos begin flashing toward

Abigail's microphone. Church throws out the lines of "economic Jewels" and "comic relief" as he leans back in his chair and waves his hands to punctuate key points.

Church reaches a philosophical and vocal crescendo and the chair creaks down on all four legs. Dear Abigail nervously falls off the sofa. But she recovers quickly and the interview is ended. Gallantly, she is ushered to the door by the arm.

There will be no coffee break this morning. Private Secretary Tommie Ward tells the senator that Congressman John Murphy's office called to ask if he would meet with six Korean nationalists for an informal discussion on Wednesday. Before he can answer, Tommie says she declined the invitation because of the senator's committee assignments. So Murphy's office inquired about Thursday. She declined for some other reason. Murphy got the picture. Church nods and sits down at his desk to scan the current issue of Newsweek with a cover story about his committee.

No time, however, as Sen. John Tower of Texas, the ranking Republican on the CIA committee, returns an earlier call from Church.

It seems that over the weekend the Chicago Tribune broke a story, floated by a member of the House Intelligence Committee, that the CIA had discussed several years ago a plan to assassinate the late French President Charles de Gaulle. It didn't take long for a hysterical French press to pick it up and a Washington-based reporter for the French news agency Agence France-Press, had called Church for confirmation.

By prior committee agreement, no news releases from the Senate Committee were to be issued without joint approval from both majority and minority members. Since the Texas senator was unimpeachable, Church explained to Tower, the chairman met ahead and issued a release to squelch the erroneous report. As if it so happened, a CIA agent from Africa had made the assassination suggestion, but the agency disapproved of it immediately.

"I thought you would approve, John. Thank you, John. Goodbye." Weatherall pops in to show his boss the morning headlines from the Idaho Statesman and Lewiston Morning Tribune that have just arrived by telecopy. Weatherall hands him a statement for approval that was requested by National Enquirer. Everyone wants a piece of the action these days.

Committee chief of staff Bill Miller calls again to say that the investigators want to take a secret deposition late this morning from an intelligence witness and Church is ordered for the hearing in it will be based on the senator's prior offer to let just the Senate floor but every senator has one of those small, private lounge work areas. When he is assured one of those is available, he is assured one of those is available.

The witness is a former State Department lawyer by the name of Louis, who was involved with the CIA's extensive Phoenix program in



Frank Church is a senator from the West who reminds me of a senator from the East.

(Continued on next page)

Clockwise, Church is shown talking with Sens. Scott, Tower and Mansfield; in secret session of the CIA investigating committee in the Atomic Energy Committee Room at the end of the guarded corridor; meeting with Daniel Schorr and other reporters at a "stakeout" after the hearing; and relaxing briefly at the end of the day.



The making of a Church...

(Continued from page 5A)

Vermont. Shortly after the deposition-taking begins, Church leaves to join wife Bethine in the Senate dining room. They have asked John and Alice Maloney of Lewiston to join them for lunch in the most exclusive restaurant in the nation.

Church orders a chicken salad sandwich and loaf tea. He delights in relating historical tidbits about the elegantly furnished room. Lunch takes an hour and Church excuses himself to dash off to a hastily called meeting with Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Sen. Tower in Scott's office.

He is not sure why they want to see him as he moves through halls clogged with gipping tourists. Audible stage whispers of "That's Frank Church," accompany Idaho's senior senator as he strides past the lines of citizens. Another sign that you've arrived.

Scott's office is a miniature museum of Chinese art. The meeting lasts 20 minutes. Last to arrive, Church is the first to leave. He is obviously quite pleased.

"Remembering just occurred that has never happened to me before," he says to his reporter/photographer shadows as he makes his way back to the Old Senate Office Building via the subway train. All three of them, he says, gave him a bipartisan vote of confidence for the answer to which the intelligence committee was being run. It really meant something to him.

Back at the office there is just time to scan a batch of late letters-of-fiducium before receiving a constituent from Lebanon who says he has a big problem. The curtain are typical.

Does the senator want to see Ed Blitzer, who says he is "your old friend" (everybody is the senator's old friend these days), who has just returned from a State Department visit in Venezuela?

The Foreign Relations Committee staff wants to know if the senator will

be a delegate to the British-American Parliamentary conference in Bermuda, wives included.

The Ambassador of Tunisia wants to come to and see the senator.

A request for a keynote speech to the Kentucky Young Democrats Convention.

He opens the memo on the desk, substitutes a deep sigh for a smugly catnap and with renewed enthusiasm turns to greet the salacious lawyer. Church has his side on interior matters. Fred Hutchinson, join the meeting. The contractor complains that he is being harassed by the Forest Service. Details are recited book, chapter and verse. Church listens sympathetically.

Weatherall breaks in to announce that a U.S. News & World Report editor is in the outer office awaiting a scheduled interview that was to have begun 10 minutes ago. The logger intervenes and is ushered into Hutchinson's office to continue his story.

The U.S. News guy is no Dear Abby. His first question — which came off more like a demand — is for Church's specific political philosophy.

"I'm a moderate politically," smiles Church.

The reporter gets that where-have-I-board-dash-before look on his face and Church corrects: "Actually, they think I'm a firming liberal by Idaho standards. But I'm not. I'm a revisionist in foreign policy. We have been excessively interventionist in recent years. For too long we have been the world's policeman, banker and judge. It's time to revise those roles. I'm not an isolationist. But we should refrain from intervening elsewhere in the world unless the vital interests of the United States are directly at stake."

This interview takes little time in getting around to the Question. The standard answer:

"There's no way for me to know where this investigation will bring me out. It would be wrong and foolish for

me to declare myself a candidate at this time." He will decide after the intelligence committee finishes its work, perhaps by February. Yes, he admits, the White House job is attractive.

The U.S. News reporter and Albert McCarly, leave their respective interviews even.

It's now 3:30 and off to the intelligence committee meeting which has been in an on-again, off-again situation all day. This particular session is closed to the public. Normally, the press is informed of all meetings — open and closed — so that it can establish a "backlog" near the hearing room. When participants leave, they are asked for a comment. Today somebody forgot to formally tell the press that the meeting was on after all. The reporters will be in a bit of a mood.

Elaborate security precautions are taken for closed hearings. They are held in the Atomic Energy Committee room in the attic of the Capitol. Just getting there is like sneaking out of a James Bond flick.

One enters a small, unmarked elevator in the basement of the Capitol. The elevator rises non-stop (there are no doors on the other floors) to the attic. The door on the back side of the lift opens into a small one-room studio by two secretaries. A sterile-looking, block-long hall leads to the committee room. The hall is blocked by armed security men.

With an escort, Church disappears into the hearing room at the end of the corridor. Other committee members arrive — Sens. Barry Goldwater, Philip Hart, Tower — as does the press, which has heard of the hearing through the grapevine. The wait begins.

Some eyebrows are raised when Church allows Lewiston Morning Tribune photographer Barry Laugh to be escorted to the committee room to take some preliminary pictures. When the national photographers learn he is

from out of town and not likely to scoop them, feathers smooth over.

Today the committee is taking testimony from two CIA agents. Major revelations are not expected, but the press corps isn't taking any chances and packs the small reception room that was built to accommodate about a quarter of their number. They nap, play cards, read. The network biggies are there engaging in small talk — CBS' Daniel Schorr, ABC's David S. Soudacher, NBC's Ford Rowan. And the heaves from the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Star, wire services, radio and public television mingle.

They are upset that no announcement of the meeting was given. Press Secretary Bill Hall calms them down, saying it was a last-second change necessitated by CIA Director Colby's unexpected decision to testify on the next day. The testimony of the two agents had to be completed before Colby took the stand.

The press grumbles, but Church has been open with them in the past so they let it go this time.

Ninety minutes after disappearing down the ominous corridor, Church, flanked by the committee's chief counsel, Frederick (Fritz) A. O. Schwartz III, grandson of the late New York say baron, steps up to the waiting battery of microphones. Church apologizes for the non-announcement of the meeting.

Okay, okay, fine, but what about the agent's testimony? The reporters press for details.

Church deftly gives them enough for the evening newscast and morning editions, but sensitive details remain protected. The "stakeout" folds up its tent after about 15 minutes of probing.

Again back to the office goes Church. This time it's a meeting with Colby to be followed by a session with Chief White House Counsel Philip Buchen. Colby closes himself with Church for about 20 minutes. His bodyguard, a hairless Cyclops, stations himself outside the door.

Colby exchanges brief pleasantries with Buchen as they pass each other in the waiting room. Then Buchen takes his turn with the chairman. He explains why President Ford is reluctant to hand over sensitive intelligence material to the committee. The White House has this thing about leaks. Church assures him the White House documents will be safe. The meeting adjourns with a victory for Congress.

The day's last mention are read as Francis ambassador invites Bethine and Frank to dinner Friday. A Rabbi Hertzberg is leaving shortly for a round-the-world trip and wants to talk to the senator before he leaves.

Letters to be signed.

Since there is no official function to attend that evening, it seems the day is nearing an end for Frank Church (unless a few hours of pressing bills, 8 o'clock reports, newspapers and magazines at home tonight, it's a downhill from here on out. Except for a pressand interview and photo session with the Tribune team.

Church's prop his feet up on the desk. It is the first relaxation of the day. There is a new pinching of eyes, long yawns stretching. The questioning begins.

In the senate shortly at some of the revelations that have come out of his committee's investigations into the CIA.

"Sometimes I wonder if I have become a shockproof because of Watergate. It is the public that I worry



about. Their shock platier has been overloaded in recent years. But, yes, there will be some tumults to come out of the hearings."

What if the committee's investigations were to turn up evidence, for instance, that the CIA was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy? Should anything that transpired be told to the world?

"If we discovered something as crucial as you described, it would have to be explained publicly. If we find, as we may, that the FBI and CIA were involved in selling the Warren Commission everything they should have, it will publicly come out."

But can the CIA be trusted to tell your committee the truth?

"They are seasoned practitioners in the art of deception, so CIA personnel will have to be questioned closely. But it will be more a matter of evasive answers jumping to their lips."

In the CIA's so-called "dirty tricks" division (Clamdestine Services), which appears to be at the heart of the agency's problems, all that necessary?

"Dirty tricks are a part of the romance of espionage. And the harvest thing to give up in the romance. What risk and danger spying has yielded has been very limited. Around 90 percent of the intelligence information on Russia has been collected through technical or overt means. It is very difficult to get information through covert means because of the nature of a Communist society. Agents soon are discovered because of constant surveillance of the population."

How have the CIA's activities, such as its assassination plots, hurt this nation?

"Our activities overseas really betray how we have betrayed our own principles. We have mimicked the ways of the Communists. We must be careful when we choose as an enemy because he will grow more like him."

Some say Frank Church is too liberal for Idaho and not liberal enough for Washington. Is that so?

"I've never left Washington, D.C. and my home Idaho is my home. And my views are not that far apart from the people there. I am a new breed of liberalist developing referred to in the state administration of Leo Jerry Brown of California. It is liberalism that is alive in the minds of the people but which is absent in our political and limited government. It is a long overdue. We have turned the corner. No longer are we just interested in huge buildings and more bureaucracy."

What will all this mean to a presidential candidate?

"The most important single duty is to restore public confidence in leadership.

If President Ford can manage that, he will win in 1976 and be entitled to the election. If not, then the Democratic candidate must be able to project this kind of image. His record must be such to reflect confidence in basic honesty."

Would being chairman of a committee investigating the intelligence activities of this nation offer a potential presidential candidate the chance to reflect the confidence of which you speak?

"If the investigation were to furnish public confidence in my personal integrity, fairness and courage, I should think my work on the committee would be an important plus."

You say you won't make any decision to seek the Democratic nomination until the committee turns in its report. But surely you've given considerable thought to running and have a positive attitude about it.

"You can't devote a life to politics and not find the most excited office of all: all yours."

If you decide to run for the presidency, what would be the key issues on which you would campaign?

"The issues are clear. We need a new foreign policy if people believe, as I do, that we've overcommitted ourselves in furnishing solutions through payoffs to foreign governments. We need a new secretary of State. Secondly, we need to restore confidence in government. The people are dangerously disenchanted. They are ready to write it off. I'm afraid the conditions are right for the plucking by a demagogue."

You have been mentioned as a candidate for secretary of State in a future Democratic administration. Supposing a Democrat is elected in 1976, would you accept the post if it were offered?

"It depends on who is president. Under the right conditions, I would accept it."

It is nearly 8 p.m. and the senator is growing tired. It's been a 13-hour day. The questioning will continue tomorrow. Church packs up his brief case with light reading and prepares to leave. Most of the staff has already gone.

On his way to the door, he stops for a second at a portrait of William F. Bush, a predecessor in his office and of the press whom everybody has given Frank Church much inspiration and of occasional advice.

A last inquiry: If the laws were alive today, what do you suppose he would say to Frank Church in light of his career activities and intentions?

"Church is taken aback by the hypothesis of a man in his office and of him. Surely there's a great laugh." "Well, I would hope he would say, 'Hang in there, Frank.'"



CHURCH

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SWAMPLAND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

**— report of the chairman
of the senate intelligence
committee**

What if there's nothing left for her?

The need to provide for one's children is one of the most deeply felt emotions of mankind. When we look at our children we can't help wondering if there will be enough of the world's scarce resources left for them when they grow up—enough oil to provide heat, as well as fertilizer for food, enough energy to produce clothing and means of transport. Or will they be left desolate in a world we have depleted of all the fundamental resources?

Our diminishing resources are being spent at an incredible rate, and it is hard to imagine any incentive that would cause politicians who are elected today to make politically difficult decisions whose payoff will come tomorrow.

Present political programs make no allowance for the fact that, at current consumption rates, the world's supply of non-renewable resources will be gone in a century or less. What is needed is a group which can speak out on these questions, can find solutions for the technological problems involved, and can command worldwide respect and the ear of governments.

There is such a group in existence: Pugwash.

Pugwash is a movement which began in 1957 when a small group of scientists from East and West broke through the wall of suspicion that separated their nations. Basing their rapport on the objective language of science and their professional respect for one another, they formed "Pugwash," named after

the small town in Nova Scotia where their first meeting was held. These world-famous scientists, many of them Nobel prize winners, have been meeting regularly since that year to solve the problems of nuclear war, weapons proliferation, over-population and hunger. They have worked with the objective tool of scientific knowledge and communicated their findings and accords to their governments. Their calm and lucid proceedings have been reported back to

governments and have been responsible for significant breakthroughs in areas where governments have found it traditionally difficult to act.

Pugwash is giving serious consideration to the issues that revolve around the depletion of our diminishing resources. If you care about this issue, if providing for our children is a matter of deep concern to you, you can make a real and important contribution by helping Pugwash.

Because Pugwash itself is in danger. Dependent as it is on private donations, its financial base has always been insecure. Now it faces disaster. Inflation and the drying up of grants have taken their toll and this situation cannot continue. Pugwash may be the best hope we have. Pugwash needs your support now—now when its work is most urgent.

You can help by becoming a *Friend of Pugwash*. As a *Friend* you will be kept up to date on Pugwash meetings and publications. Your contribution, of course, will be fully tax-deductible.

A \$100 donation enrolls you as a *Friend of Pugwash*. Students and those unable to contribute \$100 can enroll as associate members for \$30. Please don't delay. Fill out the coupon or send your check with the information required.



Please enroll me as a *Friend of Pugwash* and send me summaries of its major meetings. I enclose \$100 as my 1975-76 contribution.

Please enroll me as an associate member of *Friends of Pugwash* and send me digests of its important meetings. I enclose \$

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COVERT ACTION:

swampland of American foreign policy

The Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee finds in the excesses of the CIA the symptoms of an illusion of American omnipotence which has entrapped and enthralled the nation's presidents

Frank Church

Two hundred years ago, at the founding of this nation, Thomas Paine observed that "Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world." I still believe America remains the best place on Earth, but it has long since ceased to be "remote from all the wrangling world."

On the contrary, even our internal economy now depends on events far beyond our shores. The energy crisis, which exposed our vulnerable

dependence upon foreign oil, made the point vividly.


It is also tragic but true that our own people can no longer be made safe from savage destruction hurled down upon them from the most hidden and remote regions on Earth. Soviet submarines silently traverse the ocean floors carrying transcontinental missiles with the capacity to strike at our heartland. The nuclear arms race threatens to continue its deadly spiral toward Armageddon.

In this dangerous setting, it is im-

perative for the United States to maintain a strong and effective intelligence service. On this proposition we can ill-afford to be of two minds.

Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, which was formed on January 27, 1975, to examine the intelligence activities, both domestic and foreign, of the CIA, FBI, IRS, and the U.S. Postal Service as well as other government agencies. The Committee will be dismissed on February 29, 1976.





We have no choice other than to gather, analyze, and assess—to the best of our abilities—vital information on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries, present or potential.

Without an adequate intelligence-gathering apparatus, we would be unable to gauge with confidence our defense requirements; unable to conduct an informed foreign policy; unable to control, through satellite surveillance, a runaway nuclear arms race. “The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators,” wrote Gibbon. Those nations without a skillful intelligence service must navigate beneath a clouded sky.

With this truth in mind, the United States established, by the National Security Act of 1947, a Central Intelligence Agency to collect and evaluate intelligence, and provide for its proper dissemination within the government. The CIA was to be a clearing house for other U.S. intelligence agencies, including those of the State Department and the various military services. It was to be an independent, civilian intelligence agency whose duty it was, in the words of Allen Dulles, CIA Director from 1953-1961:

To weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudic-

es of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty.

“The Central Intelligence Agency,” concluded Dulles, “should have nothing to do with policy.” In this way, neither the President nor the Congress would be left with any of the frequently self-interested intelligence assessments afforded by the Pentagon and the State Department, to rely upon.

In its efforts to get at the hard facts, the CIA has performed unevenly. It has had its successes and its failures. The CIA has detected the important new Soviet weapons systems early on; but it has often over-estimated the growth of the Russian ICBM forces. The CIA has successfully monitored Soviet adherence to arms control agreements, and given us the confidence to take steps toward further limitations; but it has been unable to predict the imminence of several international conflicts, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a word, though it deserves passing marks for its intelligence work, the CIA has certainly not been infallible.

While one may debate the quality of the agency’s performance, there has never been any question about the propriety and necessity of its involvement in the process of gathering and evaluating foreign intelli-

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, charged with investigating the intelligence agencies of the United States government. It came into being early in 1975 and will submit its final report later this month.

gence. Nor have serious questions been raised about the means used to acquire such information, whether from overt sources, technical devices, or by clandestine methods.

What has become controversial is quite unrelated to intelligence, but has to do instead with the so-called covert operations of the CIA, those secret efforts to manipulate events within foreign countries in ways presumed to serve the interests of the United States. Nowhere are such activities vouchsafed in the statutory language which created the Agency in 1947. “No indication was given in the statute that the CIA would become a vehicle for foreign political action or clandestine political warfare,” notes Harry Howe Ransom, a scholar who has written widely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence in modern society. Ransom concludes that “probably no other organization of the federal government has taken such liberties in interpreting its legally assigned functions as has the CIA.”

The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very much

open to question. Certainly the legislative history of the 1947 Act fails to indicate that Congress anticipated the CIA would ever engage in covert political warfare abroad.

The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a rationalization for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague and seemingly innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for CIA intervention around the world.

Malignant Plots

Moreover, these interventions into the political affairs of foreign countries soon came to overshadow the Agency's original purpose of gathering and evaluating information. Just consider how far afield we strayed. For example:

- We deposed the government of Guatemala when its leftist leanings displeased us;

- We attempted to ignite a civil war against Sukarno in Indonesia;

- We intervened to restore the Shah to his throne in Iran, after Mossadegh broke the monopoly grip of British Petroleum over Iranian oil;

- We attempted to launch a counter-revolution in Cuba through the abortive landing of an army of exiles at the Bay of Pigs;

- We even conducted a secret war in Laos, paying Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries to do our fighting there.

All these engagements were initiated without the knowledge or consent of Congress. No country was too small, no foreign leader too trifling, to escape our attention.

- We sent a deadly toxin to the Congo with the purpose of injecting Lumumba with a fatal disease;

- We armed local dissidents in the Dominican Republic, knowing their purpose to be the assassination of Trujillo;

- We participated in a military coup overturning the very government we were pledged to defend in South Vietnam; and when Premier

Diem resisted, he and his brother were murdered by the very generals to whom we gave money and support;

- We attempted for years to assassinate Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The various plots spanned three Administrations, and involved an extended collaboration between the CIA and the Mafia.

Whatever led the United States to such extremes? Assassination is nothing less than an act of war, and our targets were leaders of small, weak countries that could not possibly threaten the United States. Only once did Castro become an accessory to a threat, by permitting the Soviets to install missiles on Cuban soil within range of the United States. And this was the one time when the CIA called off all attempts against his life.

The roots of these malignant plots grew out of the obsessions of the Cold War. When the CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic Services of World War II, Stalin replaced Hitler as the Devil Incarnate. Wartime methods were routinely adopted for peacetime use.

In those myopic years, the world was seen as up for grabs between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Castro's Cuba raised the specter of a Soviet outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Soviets and their allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Soviet penetration there was viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in emerging Africa. There was a great concern that a communist takeover in Indochina would have a "domino effect" throughout Asia. Even the lawful election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was still seen by some as the equivalent of Castro's conquest of Cuba.

In the words of a former Secretary of State, "A desperate struggle [was] going on in the back alleys of world politics." Every upheaval, wherever it occurred, was likened to a pawn on a global chessboard, to be moved this way or that, by the two principal players. This led the CIA to plunge into a full range of covert activities designed to counteract the competitive efforts of the Soviet KGB.

Thus, the United States came to adopt the methods and accept the value system of the "enemy." In the secret world of covert action, we

NATIONAL ANATHEMA

O! C.I.A. can you see
By the Chile dawn light
How profoundly you failed
In your late great scheming
When your Helmsman struck shoals
And your vessel sprang leaks
As the venture was botched
Past all hope of redeeming?

Though the plot was insane,
It was Kissingermane
To a high cosmic plane . . .
And could happen again.

O! C.I.A. let no new-fangled planner now push
For a sham Angola role while we beat about the Bush.

—Felicia Lamport

threw off all restraints. Not content merely to discreetly subsidize foreign political parties, labor unions, and newspapers, the Central Intelligence Agency soon began to directly manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending many millions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricks, ranging from bribery and false propaganda to schemes to "alter the health" of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes.

In his handwritten notes for this meeting, Nixon indicated that he was "not concerned" with the risks involved. As CIA Director Helms recalled in testimony before the Senate Committee, "The President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't care how." To Helms, the order had been all-inclusive. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office," he recalled, "it was that day." Thus, the Presi-

report to Dr. Kissinger, our Ambassador wrote that:

Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile.

The ultimate outcome, as you know, of these and other efforts to destroy the Allende government was a bloodbath which included the death of Allende and the installation, in his place, of a repressive military dictatorship.

Why Chile? What can possibly explain or justify such an intrusion upon the right of the Chilean people to self-determination? The country itself was no threat to us. It has been aptly characterized as a "dagger pointed straight at the heart of Antarctica."

Was it to protect American-owned big business? We now know that I.T.T. offered the CIA a million dollars to prevent the ratification of Allende's election by the Chilean Congress. Quite properly, this offer was rejected. But the CIA then spent much more on its own, in an effort to accomplish the same general objective.

Yet, if our purpose was to save the properties of large U.S. corporations, that cause had already been lost. The nationalization of the mines was decided well before Allende's election; and the question of compensation was tempered by insurance against confiscatory losses issued to the companies by the U.S. government itself.

No, the only plausible explanation for our intervention in Chile is the persistence of the myth that communism is a single, hydra-headed serpent, and that it remains our duty to cut off each ugly head, wherever and however it may appear.

Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Soviets do it, we must do it, too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis.

Before Chile, we insisted that

The blame lies in the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manipulation of their affairs; it formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our Presidents: the illusion of American omnipotence.

No where is this imitation of KGB tactics better demonstrated than in the directives sent to CIA agents in the Congo in 1960. Instructions to kill the African leader Lumumba were sent via diplomatic pouch, along with rubber gloves, a mask, syringe, and a lethal biological material. The poison was to be injected into some substance that Lumumba would ingest, whether food or toothpaste. Before this plan was implemented, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. Nevertheless, our actions had fulfilled the prophesy of George Williams, an eminent theologian at the Harvard Divinity School, who once warned, "Be cautious when you choose your enemy, for you will grow more like him."

Allende 'Unacceptable'

The imperial view from the White House reached its arrogant summits during the Administration of Richard Nixon. On September 15, 1970, following the election of Allende to be President of Chile, Richard Nixon summoned Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms, and John Mitchell to the White House. The topic was Chile. Allende, Nixon stated, was unacceptable to the President of the United States.

dent of the United States had given orders to the CIA to prevent the popularly-elected President of Chile from entering office.

To bar Allende from the Presidency, a military coup was organized, with the CIA playing a direct role in the planning. One of the major obstacles to the success of the mission was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted that Chile's constitution be upheld. As a result of his stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans. Unable to get General Schneider to resign, conspirators in Chile decided to kidnap him. Machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to a group of kidnapers on October 22, 1970. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded on his way to work in an attempted kidnap, apparently by a group affiliated with the one provided weapons by the CIA.

The plot to kidnap General Schneider was but one of many efforts to subvert the Allende regime. The United States sought also to bring the Chilean economy under Allende to its knees. In a situation

communism had never been freely chosen by any people, but forced upon them against their will. The communists countered that they resorted to revolution because the United States would never permit the establishment of a communist regime by peaceful means.

In Chile, President Nixon confirmed the communist thesis. Like Caesar peering into the colonies from distant Rome, Nixon said the choice of government by the Chileans was unacceptable to the President of the United States.

The attitude in the White House seemed to be: If—in the wake of Vietnam—I can no longer send the Marines, then I will send in the CIA.

What Have We Gained?

But what have we gained by our policy of consummate intervention, compared to what we have lost?

- A "friendly" Iran and Indonesia, members of the OPEC cartel, which imposes extortionate prices on the Western World for indispensable oil?

- A hostile Laos that preferred the indigenous forces of communism to control imposed by Westerners, which smacked of the hated colonialism against which they had fought so long to overthrow?

- A fascist Chile, with thousands of political prisoners languishing in their jails, mocking the professed ideals of the United States throughout the hemisphere?

If we have gained little, what then have we lost? I suggest we have lost—or grievously impaired—the good name and reputation of the United States from which we once drew a unique capacity to exercise matchless moral leadership. Where once we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were welcome, now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once friendly foreign people, the United States is today regarded with grave suspicion and distrust.

What else can account for the startling decline in American prestige? Certainly not the collapse of our military strength, for our firepower has grown immensely since the end of World War II.

I must lay the blame, in large



measure, to the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manipulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our Presidents: the illusion of American omnipotence.

Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue that all U.S. covert operations must be banned in the future. I can conceive of a dire emergency when timely clandestine action on our part might avert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.

I can also conceive of circumstances, such as those existing in Portugal today, where our discreet help to democratic political parties might avert a forcible take-over by a communist minority, heavily subsidized by the Soviets. In Portugal, such a bitterly-unwanted, Marxist regime is being resisted courageously by a people who earlier voted 84 percent against it.

But these are covert operations consistent either with the imperative of national survival or with our traditional belief in free government. If our hand were exposed helping a foreign people in their struggle to be free, we could scorn the cynical doctrine of "plausible denial," and say openly, "Yes, we were there—and proud of it."

Senator Frank Church (right) and Dr. Edward Schantz, professor of chemistry at the University of Wisconsin, one of many witnesses who appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Dr. Schantz, who first developed shellfish toxin for the United States Army, testified that the poison could be put to good use in the medical community.

We were there in Western Europe, helping to restore democratic governments in the aftermath of World War II. It was only after our faith gave way to fear that we began to act as a self-appointed sentinel of the status quo.

Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention—bribery, blackmail, abduction, assassination—were put to the service of reactionary and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or withstand the volcanic forces of change.

And the United States, as a result, became ever more identified with the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new.

The remedy is clear. American foreign policy, whether openly or secretly pursued, must be made to conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world. □

An aerial photograph showing a U.S. destroyer, the USS Dahlgren, in the foreground, trailing a Soviet missile-laden freighter in the background. The ships are moving across the ocean, leaving a wake. The freighter is a large, multi-decked vessel with several masts and antennas. The destroyer is a smaller, more modern-looking ship with a prominent superstructure. The text "The week" is overlaid on the right side of the image.

The week

U.S. destroyer Dahlgren tails a missile-laden Soviet freighter, home-bound from Cuba, at the height of the crisis in 1962.

Church: domestic I

NEW YORK TIMES.

SUNDAY, JUNE 15, 1975

The Nation / Continued

Frank Church Is Moving Center Stage

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON

WASHINGTON—Take it from Senator Frank Church of Idaho, chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in general and spy murder plots in particular, that "If the answers are there, we will find them."

"It's clear, isn't it, to the country that the most delicate and inflammatory issue of all has been bucked over to the Senate committee," Mr. Church was saying last week after President Ford and the Rockefeller Commission wrapped up their inquiry into the Central Intelligence Agency and handed the dark mystery of foreign-policy-by-assassination to the Congress.

"Someone has to deal with it," he said, toying with a small cigar in his calm, cozy study just off the Senate floor. "I don't exactly welcome it, but it's fallen to the committee, and once we've satisfied ourselves we have all the facts, we'll have to figure out the timing and the method for making the appropriate disclosure."

"In our kind of society," he said, "there's no way this kind of issue can be brushed under the rug, but I hope we can make the disclosure, I hope we can relate the acts in a manner that will least injure the country."

In framing the committee's mission, Frank Forrester Church Jr. helps to frame a picture of himself—a serious, cautious man, acutely conscious of form, and mainly absorbed now in the question of how to tell a gruesome story in language that is politically acceptable not only to more conservative colleagues on the Senate committee but to the nation at large.

Though he offers no details, Mr. Church has clearly known the worst of the assassination story for some time now and never hesitated to cast it in the gravest moral terms. When Vice President Rockefeller declared two weeks ago that the C.I.A.'s transgressions were "not major," Senator Church responded that his committee had hard evidence of assassination planning. "I don't regard murder plots as a major matter," he said. "Ours is not a wicked country and we cannot abide a wicked Government."

"You know, they're trying to compare it now with the idea of doing away with Hitler in the late thirties," he went on the other day. "But we were dealing here with little countries who couldn't possibly menace the United States, whose leaders were simply inconvenient—nuisances! If we're going to lay claim to being a civilized country we must make certain in the future that no agency of our Government can be licensed to murder. The President of the United States cannot become a glorified godfather."


Yet righteous rhetoric and powerful punchlines are second nature to Frank Church. He won the American Legion's oratorical contest at age 16. He made his national debut with a bombastic keynote address at the Democratic convention of 1960: "The hinge of history swings on the United States," he said then. "The maintenance of peace, the preservation of freedom, the fate of the world, all ultimately depend upon American principle, American prestige and American power." Even to friends he has long seemed to be in love with the sound of his own voice.

And so the question about Frank Church is hardly whether he will be able to draw a stirring speech from his examination of the Central Intelligence Agency but whether he can shape a majority of the committee and rally a constituency outside Idaho behind the kind of indignation he feels. On past performance it is not an easy question to guess at.

He has always been viewed as a model "loner" in Senate politics. A conscientious and independent student of policy, a wide reader and effective writer, he repented of his cold war certitude not long after that keynote speech and became an early dissenter on Vietnam, at considerable peril back

II

Frank Church is moving Center Stage
New York Times Sunday, June 15, 1975



Brian Alpert/Keystone

home. He has seemed at the same time a soloist, a somewhat vain and distant man even with his fellow Senators, an orator whose eloquence sometimes has more performance value than persuasion in it.

Into his fourth six-year term and still only 50, it may be partly chance that Frank Church has long been overshadowed on his major committees by more senior Democrats such as former Senator J. William Fulbright on foreign relations and by Senator Henry M. Jackson in interior.

But he has also lacked their stubborn legislative skill, their taste for aggressive staffs and their love of the game. For sound provincial political reasons, he long refused to pay any assistant more than the Governor of Idaho's salary, which was \$12,500. He has admitted to feeling "lonesome" in political Washington.

Senator Church's chairmanship, on the other hand, of the frisky young Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-

tions has been cited as the most promising current version of the old Kefauver phenomenon—the Presidential launching of small-state Senators through hot-news television hearings which, though it didn't quite work for Estes Kefauver in the fifties, has never lost its allure.

The multinational inquiry cut its teeth two years ago on the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation's political machinations in Chile, including the \$1-million offer to the C.I.A. to help thwart the late Dr. Salvador Allende's presidential ambitions. The subcommittee has delivered blockbusters on a steady schedule ever since, from the examination of the international oil cartel and the limitation on American credit for the development of natural gas in the Soviet Union to the most recent revelations of corporate bribes for political favors abroad.

But the hard-charging, publicity-wise staff of the multinational subcommittee plays by looser rules than Senator Church has set down on the Central Intelligence Agency investigation. The political and institutional stakes are bigger in the project, and certainly the Republican members of the committee, led by Senators John Tower of Texas and Barry Goldwater of Arizona, are a more aggressive presence than their colleagues on the multinational panel.

"He'll try to settle for half a loaf on the C.I.A.," says a Senate staff man who has watched Mr. Church closely for 10 years. "He's persuadable. In that academic, abstract way he has, he'll come out looking to the future, trying maybe to amend the statute. I'm just not confident that he'll stand up in a committee showdown when the right-wingers get rough. Where is his support going to come from?"

"Whatever the consequences," says Senator Church, "this investigation must be thorough and it must be honest."

A long-shot Presidential candidacy may well be at stake here. Senator Church broke up an exploratory finance committee when he took the intelligence committee assignment, but the glint is still in his eye and supporters are still interested, from super-rich contributors in Malibu, California to Mary Perot Nichols of *The Village Voice* in Manhattan, who calls Frank Church "the hottest liberal dark horse" for the 1976 campaign.

At a minimum, and it is not small minimum, Washington and the world are probably watching the next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That chairmanship is an older and closer ambition than the Presidency, and it is now only one seat and four years away if Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama retires, as expected, at the end of his term.

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argument the public will vote for the party that at least appears to have decided something. In defeat, even Labour Party loyalists will have to accept that Mr. Wilson has been discredited as a leader, and to whom then will they have to turn? At the moment none of them would dream of admitting it—but the

one figure who can hope to emerge unscathed from the whole bruising process is none other than the man they are now desperately trying to make the scapegoat for all the party's troubles. If Mr. Roy Jenkins is wise he will not despair. Instead, like Brex Rabbit, he will simply lie low.

Anthony Howard

Farewell to Foreign Aid

Why I Voted No

by Frank Church

When revolution comes—as it likely will in many of the still “stable” countries of the third world—it will bear no resemblance to the kind of benign, gradual “takeoff” into self-sustaining growth envisioned by American aid officials and private investors. The notion that a stable, nonrevolutionary social structure is the essential condition of economic development is a self-serving rationalization. It enables American policymakers to believe that the interests of the United States, as they conceive them, are identical with the social and economic interests of the poor countries. “Stability,” they insist, is not only essential for the exclusion of Communism and the preservation of American influence; it is also in the best interests of the developing countries themselves, because—so the argument runs—revolution means violence, disruption, inefficient management, and the loss of investment capital as well. In this way, we rationalize our support for regimes whose very existence is the principal barrier in their countries to real economic development and social justice.

The conditions essential for development are not so much economic and technological as they are psychological and political. No infusion of capital and know-how from without can galvanize a society in which the rewards of development are grabbed up by a small privileged caste while the majority of people are left hopeless, debilitated and demoralized. As the Brazilian bishop Dom Antonio Batista Fragoso put it, “We do not need paternalistic redemption. We need conditions so that those who are now abandoned may free themselves from their own underdevelopment with their own united force . . . the poor have no hope in those who still have economic power. And the poor are those who struggle for justice. If those who fight for

justice are called subversive, then subversion is their hope.”

In countries long under the domination of corrupt oligarchies nothing less than a radical redistribution of political power may be the essential precondition for economic development. If the bulk of the people are to make the concerted effort and accept the enormous sacrifices required for lifting a society out of chronic poverty, they have got to have some belief in the integrity of their leaders, in the commitment of those leaders to social justice, and in the equality of sacrifice required of the people. Reactionary regimes have neither the ability nor the interest to foster such a conception of social justice. They value aid from the United States as a means of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power. The lip service paid to reform is a crumb for their benefactors; helps to make the Americans feel good and it costs them nothing. In fact, American economic aid is commonly used to promote industrialization programs which generate a high level of consumption for the privileged, with little, if any, “trickle-down” benefit for the dispossessed. At the same time, American military assistance, and such para-military programs as the training and equipping of a country's police force, help such regimes as those of Brazil, Greece and Pakistan to suppress reformist movements. In this way American aid is being used not to promote development but for the quite opposite purpose of supporting

FRANK CHURCH, United States Senator from Idaho, is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. This article is based on a major floor speech, largely unreported, delivered before the Senate voted 41 to 27 to reject the foreign aid authorization bill.

the rule of corrupt and stagnant—but vociferously anti-Communist—dictatorships.

Even if we should succeed in purging our minds of the anti-Communist obsession which has driven us into league with military dictatorships and oppressive oligarchies all over the globe, it would still be all but impossible for us to promote radical reform in the countries of the third world. Even indeed if we were a revolutionary society ourselves and were committed to a revolutionary conception of development—as most assuredly we are not—there is still very little we could do to foster social revolution in alien societies. The catalyst of radical change in any society must be an indigenous nationalism giving rise to a sense of community, commitment and shared sacrifice.

I do not suggest that the United States prefers or admires the dictatorial regimes it subsidizes, but only that there is little we can do with our aid to change them, all the more since these regimes can blackmail us so easily with the threat of Communism if they should fail. The Kennedy Administration did make an effort to encourage democratic and progressive policies in countries to which it extended aid, especially in Latin America, but that effort was a failure and the reasons for that failure are instructive. We failed because we had neither the ability to impose reform from outside nor the will to pursue it from within. The one was simply impossible; the other went against the priority of our own interests as we conceived them. However much we may have wanted reform and development, we wanted "stability," anti-Communism and a favorable climate for investment more. The experience of twenty years of aid shows that we can neither bring about fundamental reform in tradition-encrusted societies nor prevent revolution in those countries where the tide of change runs deep and strong; all we can really do is to service the *status quo* in countries where it is not strongly challenged anyhow.

There is abundant evidence that our foreign aid program is much less philanthropic than we have cared to portray. Indeed, the figures suggest that it is patently self-serving. Former AID Director William Gaud discloses that, as a result of tied loans "ninety-three percent of AID funds are spent directly in the United States. . . . Just last year some 4000 American firms in fifty states received \$1.3 billion in AID funds for products supplied as part of the foreign aid program." Similarly, George D. Woods, former President of the World Bank, has observed that "bilateral programs of assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-income countries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales, toward practical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions thought to be strategic."

The oft-asserted lament that our foreign aid program lacks a constituency in the United States is just another of those myths we hold dear. Actually, our

bilateral aid program is, in effect, the soft-loan window of the Export-Import Bank; it is the source from which foreign governments borrow money on easy terms with which to buy goods and services from within the United States. As such, it enjoys a lively constituency which exerts steady pressure on the government to keep the program going.

In addition to financing American exports, our foreign aid, both economic and military, has encouraged relationships of sustained dependency on the United States. In many underdeveloped countries, repressive governments draw reassurance from the arms we furnish and the military training we supply. As the source of money and weapons for their armies and police forces, the US government acquires a certain leverage over these regimes, while they last. Enticed by attractive credit terms, by growing familiarity with American equipment, reliance on American replacement parts, by bargain prices on obsolete equipment, training programs for their soldiers and police, and the sales promotion techniques of our military advisory missions, these governments soon enough learn to "think American."

No less than military aid, our economic assistance creates and perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for example, that aid shipments be carried only in American ships and that purchases be made only in the United States. Because of these and other requirements, the Peterson Report estimates that United States aid costs recipients about 15 percent more than world market prices.

Surplus food shipments under PL 480, on its face the most philanthropic of aid programs, in fact have served to unload costly surpluses "at virtually no economic cost to the United States," according to economist Michael Hudson, a former balance-of-payments analyst for the Chase-Manhattan Bank. At the same time, Hudson points out, the PL 480 program has put the aid-receiving countries in debt to us to the extent of some \$22 billion, "thereby tying them to the purse-strings of the State Department and the United States Treasury for nearly twenty years to come."

Dependency on the United States grows steadily too with the mounting burden of servicing past debts. The Peterson Report acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on a "short leash." As grace periods end on loans falling due in the 1970's and poor countries find themselves paying out ever greater amounts to finance past debts, new loans will be effectively neutralized and the poor countries will be threatened with economic paralysis. The upshot may well someday be a general default on debt payments to the United States reminiscent of the defaults on war debts which complicated and disrupted our relations with European countries in the 30's and helped to drive us deeper into isolationism.

Nowhere have we seen more clearly the ineffec-

tiveness of aid as a deterrent to revolutionary pressures and as an instrument for the reconstruction of traditional societies than in Latin America. The Alliance for Progress represents the high water mark of our innocence in supposing that we could liberate traditional societies from their centuries' long legacy of tyranny and stagnation with a little bit of seed capital and some stirring rhetoric. It is true that the *per capita* income of Latin American countries has risen during the years of the Alliance for Progress, but it has risen in so unbalanced and inequitable a way that the gains have gone almost entirely to the 20 percent of the population who live within the modern economy. The benefits accruing to the lower 80 percent have not even kept up with population growth, so that they have become both relatively and absolutely poorer. Progress, though visible, is illusory. Shining modern cities have arisen and the Alliance for Progress has brought roads, transistor radios and Coca Cola to the Latin American countryside, but their social impact is negative and disruptive. Labor-saving devices make life more comfortable for the affluent few but they do not add to *per capita* output and they add to unemployment where there were labor surpluses to begin with. Indeed the effect of this distorted and inequitable development, which widens the gap between rich and poor, is demoralizing to the poor and therefore detrimental to genuine development.

The distortions of public aid to Latin America are heightened by the impact of private investment. Although United States direct investment in Latin America grew from \$8 billion to \$15 billion during the 1960's and continues to grow at the rate of \$1 billion a year, according to Gary MacEoin, United States companies withdraw \$2 in dividends, royalties and other payments for every new dollar they invest. United States private companies exercise a "double negative impact": at the same time that they decapitalize Latin America by the withdrawal of profits, they plow back a part of their profits to gain increasing control of the mineral assets, industry and production of Latin American countries. Under this devastating North American onslaught, resentment of the United States has grown apace and increasing numbers of Latin Americans have become convinced that they are the victims of a virulent new imperialism. As one Chilean political scientist commented on the experience of the 1960s, "If that is what one decade of development does for us, spare us from another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother us in debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets."

In both Latin America and the rest of the third world the conviction is taking increasing hold that the poverty of the poor countries is not the result of imperfections in the old "models" of development but rather the *inevitable* result of the policies and prac-

tices of the rich countries. In his recent book, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, Gunnar Myrdal describes how the reforms promised in the Alliance for Progress were "rapidly emasculated by interaction between the holders of power in Latin America, including the American corporations working there, and the United States Government and Congress." The resulting economic and social relationship, not only between the United States and Latin America but generally between the rich and poor countries of the world, may not be one of deliberate, malicious exploitation, but we can hardly deny the name given to it by the Brazilian economist Helio Jaguaribe. It is, he says, "an objectively imperialist system."

I can no longer cast my vote to prolong the bilateral aid program, (estimated cost: approximately \$4 billion over the next five years) as it is now administered. I could understand—though perhaps not condone—a foreign aid program that is essentially self-serving. We live, after all, in a selfish world. But the present program is designed primarily to serve private business interests at the expense of the American people. In far too many countries, as in the case of Brazil, we poured in our aid money for one overriding purpose, the stabilization of the economy in order to furnish American capital with a "favorable climate for investment." The search for foreign investment opportunities by the largest American corporations is relentless and irrepressible, as the biggest profits are to be found abroad, where the tax burden can frequently be reduced or averted. Moreover, the risk of loss due to political instability, riot, revolution or expropriation, has been largely lifted from the investor and shifted to the US Government. OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, backed by the Federal Government, readily insures American companies against risks abroad for which no comparable insurance is available at home. The multimillion dollar losses incurred by American copper companies, resulting from the nationalization of their holdings by Allende's Marxist regime in Chile, are likely to be borne—not by the companies that eagerly invested there—but by the American taxpayer. Our foreign aid program has become a spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad! Small wonder that the crumbling ghettos in our cities along with our declining rural communities, have to beg and scrounge for new capital!

The major preoccupation of the present foreign aid program is the massive disbursement of munitions which we either give away or make available at bargain basement prices. We ply half a hundred foreign governments with our weaponry. Most of the world has become a dumping ground for ships, tanks and planes, which we label as excess to our needs. Easy credit is available at interest rates well below the cost

of money to the US Government. The Military Assistance Program has become a preposterous scandal. It should be drastically curtailed, not enlarged.

As for our long-term bilateral loans made in the name of promoting economic development, it is long past time that this function were passed over entirely to the World Bank, the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral lending agencies, which were set up for this purpose. I am prepared, now and in the future, to support substantial US contributions to these agencies. In this manner, we could set a worthy example of international responsibility and beckon other rich nations to share the load with us.

I would confine our bilateral aid in the future to technical assistance grants, administered, where feasible, by the Peace Corps. It was through technical assistance - the successor to Harry Truman's original Point 4 - that the "green revolution" was achieved in Asia and the hand of famine stayed. This aspect of our foreign aid, involving outright grants, not loans, has constituted the worthiest part of the program. On account of it - and in hopes that the objectionable parts would be whittled down and ultimately displaced - I have tarried too long as a supporter and indulged in too much wishful thinking. Events of the past few weeks on Capitol Hill have finally dispelled my illusions. Instead of cutting back on the foreign aid package, Congress is about to enlarge on it. We are in the process of doing the same with the gigantic military budget, approving more money for the Pentagon this year than we spent at the height of our involvement in Vietnam. Incredible, but true!

The acquiescence of Congress to these money demands of the Nixon administration makes it clear that we have no disposition, despite all the pious talk, of changing our spending habits. The "new priorities" promised the American people won't be realized, as long as we refuse to cut our huge foreign and military spending. The long-neglected problems of crime, drugs, poverty and pollution, which afflict so many of our people here at home, will continue to fester and grow. I would advocate, as an alternative to the palliative of aid, that we lend positive support to developing countries by entering into commercial arrangements that redress the terms of trade which are now rigged against them.

As with so many of the difficult questions that divide and agitate our society, the answer to the dilemma of aid lies not abroad, not in the slums of Calcutta or in the rural backlands of Brazil, but within ourselves. Essentially, the question is whether we are prepared to recognize the limits of our own capacity - the moral and political as well as the technical and economic limits - and allow nature to take what may well be an uncongenial course in many countries of the third world. The question, to put it another way, is

whether we can recognize that there are some things we simply cannot do - such as restructuring another country through our own efforts - and other things that we cannot permanently prevent - such as social revolution, where and when its time has come.

The dilemma of aid is not fundamentally different from the dilemma of Vietnam. It is a problem of power - our own power, the uses to which we wish to put it, and the moral and intellectual limitations which have resulted in such wide discrepancies between our intentions and our accomplishments. The dominant political attitude of the '60s was one of extravagant self-confidence. We were filled up and infatuated with the "simple fact" - to quote Professor Walt Rostow - "that we are the greatest power in the world - if we behave like it." Now, in the wake of sobering tragedy, a new outlook begins to take shape, and one may hope that it will affect our thinking in matters ranging far beyond Vietnam. Having concentrated for a decade and more on the growth and uses of power, we may now perhaps be willing to cultivate other national attributes - such as prudence and common sense. If so, we may be prepared to come to terms with such conditions of our time as the following: that our social engineering, as applied to the poor countries of the world, has shown itself to be irrelevant and disruptive; that the threat of Communism in the third world is exaggerated and, in any case, beyond the lasting reach of our aid programs; that for many countries radical revolution is the only real hope for development and the single most helpful thing we can do is to leave them alone.

Contrary to the development "models" worked out in the '60s by our Agency for International Development, it now appears that thoroughgoing social revolution is the necessary prerequisite for the development of much of the third world. There is nothing the United States can or should do to promote revolution - to do so indeed would violate the United Nations Charter and sound traditional standards of diplomacy. What we can and should do is to stop promoting counterrevolution.

Several years ago Alan Moorehead wrote a book called *The Fatal Impact* in which he recounted the disastrous and largely unintended effects upon the Tahitians and Australian aborigines of the diseases, alcohol, firearms, laws and concepts of morality brought to the South Pacific by the early European explorers and colonists. Reflecting on his own voyages to Polynesia, Captain Cook himself wrote that "It would have been better for these people never to have known us." It would represent a noteworthy advance in the standards of international relations if the United States, profiting from its own experience as well as that of others, could lift its well-intentioned but no less fatal impact from the face of the third world, so that in time it may appear that it was not so bad after all for them to have known us.

A BIG CHANCE FOR CHURCH

The chairman of the Senate committee probing U.S. intelligence operations thinks the United States has been trying to carve out too large a role in the world.

"Our foreign policy has been excessively interventionist," says Senator Frank Church. "We have undertaken to be the world's policeman, banker and judge, and the time has come to redress the balance."

Such sentiments from the fourth-term Idaho Democrat are nothing new. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he was a leader in the Senate fight against U.S. military involvement in Indo-China.

Increasing attention. However, the views of Frank Church are getting increasing attention nowadays. And many are wondering whether telecasts of his hearings will make him a serious contender for the presidential nomination in 1976.

Some think the youthful looking, 50-year-old legislator may become a television hit at a time Democrats are casting about for a fresh personality as a national candidate.

Today, however, Senator Church is not widely known across the U.S.

He was born July 25, 1924, in Boise, the son of a sporting-goods-store owner. Although reared as a Republican, he became a Democrat as a teen-ager after visiting the library to bone up on the New Deal.

After Army service in World War II, Mr. Church married Bethine Clark, daughter of Chase Clark, then Democratic Governor of Idaho. They have two sons, 26 and 18.

After graduation from Stanford University Law School, he practiced law in Boise. In 1956, when only 32, he was elected to the U.S. Senate.

Although Idaho is considered a conservative State, Mr. Church has taken a liberal stance on most issues but easily won re-election three times. He is the only Democratic Senator ever re-elected in Idaho.

Mr. Church reveres the late Republican Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, an apostle of isolationism in the 1930s. But he eschews the "isolationist" label for himself. He says U.S. involvement abroad should be limited to areas "where the vital interests of the United States are clearly at stake."



Senator Frank Church (Dem.), Idaho

In the Senate, Mr. Church has made his mark as a leading member of the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee. Under the seniority system, he is only a few years away from becoming chairman.

Pride in his style. Since winning an American Legion oratory contest at age 16, he has prided himself on his speaking style. This love of oratory has sometimes opened him to the charge of being pretentious—inclined to revel in the limelight. But friends say his basic instinct in any political fight is to seek accommodation rather than confrontation.

They point out that while the House intelligence probe is in shambles, Mr. Church has won praise from both parties for his careful stewardship of the Senate inquiry.

Mr. Church asked for the intelligence assignment, and when he got it, he halted the work of a group that was exploring the possibility of his presidential candidacy.

He says he will not think about the presidential question again until the intelligence inquiry is over. To those who see the investigation as a potential Church launching pad, the Idaho Senator replies that it could just as easily turn into a "kamikaze" suicide flight if the inquiry erupts into bitter controversy.

Does the idea of being President appeal to Frank Church? He told *U.S. News & World Report*: "I don't think you can devote your life to politics as I have and not find the most exalted office of all alluring. But I've always thought a man could render significant service in the Senate, too. So I'm not losing any sleep over it."

the road to greater security through some regional measure of controlled and inspected disarmament, thereby opening a way to a stage-by-stage advance toward the fusion of the two German States. If in the coming negotiations were to fail on these wider issues we would then have to reconcile ourselves to the final partition of Germany.

The problem of Berlin, on the other hand, has a special element of urgency of its own, since Soviet Russia has insisted on unilateral changes in default of a Four Power agreement. The fact is that while Soviet Russia can veto German reunification in freedom, the Western Powers can veto Russia's unilateral action on Berlin. What we should do and should do is to endeavor to negotiate a settlement for the City and ensure that it does not lose the authority of the West Berlin Administration which links with the Federal Republic. This new status can only find acceptance by East and West, but also by the West Berliners, whose lives and liberties are most directly concerned.

LIPPMANN's suggestion of "a city within a city" and "a city within a foreign state" is both imaginative and realistic. West Berlin's rights and the rights of the West Berliners would be confirmed in a new Charter or Statute in which encircled West Berlin would be guaranteed a secure and ordered future by the presence of Western Powers acting under international auspices. This proposal has a great deal to commend it; the new Statute should not supplant but derive from and maintain the existing rights and responsibilities which the Four Big Powers hold from the unconditional surrender of defeated Hitler Germany. United Nations participation would give genuine international significance and authority to new arrangements for West Berlin's secured future. There would also be practical advantages in having United Nations observers to keep a close eye on the operation of free land and air access to West Berlin. The United Nations can, in my judgment, play an effective peace role in any new plan for the future of the "city within a city."

It is also, I believe, a case for considering whether existing restrictions on West Berlin's Parliamentary rights should not be removed. West Berliners should be represented in the German Federal Parliament only as observers; if memory serves me aright, the three Western Powers have accepted this limitation in order to safeguard their own rights and responsibilities in Berlin. I have not visited West Berlin for some years and have, therefore, a recent opportunity of discovering the views of the Berlin authorities on this point but it seems to me that this discriminatory restriction—which has operated for nearly 10 years—should be reviewed and re-examined by the Western Foreign Ministers now that they are in the future of West Berlin under consideration. I can see no valid reason why the political links between

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FRANK CHURCH, Junior US Senator from Idaho (D), is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. A lawyer and a former Military Intelligence officer, he has also been active on behalf of the Crusade for Freedom.

MAX BELOFF, who teaches at Nuffield College, Oxford, has written *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, and *The Great Powers*.

THEODOR ESCHENBURG has been on the Political Science faculty of the University of Tübingen since 1949, also serving in various positions in local government. Since 1953 he has been co-editor of *Vierteljahres Hefte für Zeitgeschichte*, an historical quarterly.

KARL JASPERS has been a Professor of Philosophy for almost 40 years, the last 11 at the University of Basle, Switzerland. His books in English include *Existentialism and Humanism*, *Man in the Modern Age* and *The Origin and Goal of History*.

West Berlin and Federal Germany should be inferior to those between East Berlin and East Germany.

To my mind the minimum result of the coming negotiations should be to take the heat out of the Berlin problem and remove the anxieties and tensions which have bedeviled the daily life of the West Berliners and threatened the peace of Europe for a decade.

LORD HENDERSON

London

By FRANK CHURCH *The Russian Motives*

THE WORLD TODAY seems to be so continuously teetering on the brink of disaster that our nerves sometimes threaten to usurp our judgment. The prospect of nuclear war is so appalling that we are dismayed at the lack of progress toward genuine peace. When approaching the conference table, we tend to set our sights higher than logic would justify.

This, I think, is a lesson implicit in Mr. Lippmann's analysis of the Berlin crisis.

He writes: "We shall be better off and we shall feel better about it all if we grasp the realities and do not evade them."

As Mr. Lippmann clearly points out, the existence of two German states is a fact. Neither we nor the Soviet Union are willing to permit the loss of either half to the other. This conflict of immovable interest is therefore a powerful force operating at the moment against

any major settlement in the heart of Europe.

The reality that emerges from this analysis, as I see it, is the likelihood that no forthcoming Foreign Ministers' or Summit conference will effect much change in Middle Europe.

If this is so, the worst mistake we could make would be to approach the negotiations with any notion of acquiescing to the implications contained in Mr. Khrushchev's November ultimatum.

Any retreat, including a reduction of Allied troops in Berlin to token size, might open the Pandora's box of fear that we are unable and unwilling to hold the line against determined Russian pressure to break it.

Of course there are concessions that Russia could make that would justify a withdrawal on our part. I would applaud concessions on both sides, provided they are genuinely reciprocal. But I see nothing in the present situation, or in the Russian attitude, to indicate that they will agree to concessions commensurate with the ones they are demanding of us. For what were Russia's motivations in handing down its ultimatum?

It has been suggested that Russia instigated the Berlin crisis to consolidate her hold on restive East Germany and the other satellite countries. But it is hard to see why, in the first place, this was necessary, or secondly, why it was worth the risk of a major war. For here, time and the status quo would seem to be on Russia's side.

More than three million East Germans have fled the puppet state since the end of World War II. These refugees were undoubtedly the most vehement opponents of the Communist regime. Presumably those who remain are more able to adjust themselves to the life there. And give the customary Communist methods of indoctrination and education, the younger generations, as they replace the old, will grow to know less and less about the free way of life.

THE argument that Russia is really motivated by a fear of West German rearmament does not seem very convincing either. Is it plausible to say that the Soviet Union, with its 175 active divisions, feels seriously threatened by eight or nine West German divisions?

It would seem more likely that Russia's motivations go farther. Doubtlessly the Kremlin hopes to loosen West Germany from NATO. Perhaps it even hopes to panic the West and unravel the NATO alliance itself.

Given such objectives, and having been summoned to the conference table by a Russian ultimatum, it is difficult to visualize how we can find a way to join the Soviets in any acceptable plan for a general settlement in Middle Europe.

So Mr. Lippmann's approach is a realistic one. Without raising vain hopes, he has suggested a formula for Berlin that might serve the interests of both East and West, and thus prove a negotiable subject. It is based on a recognition that Berlin is going to remain an enclave

in East Germany for some time to come, and that we are going to have to deal with Berlin apart from the question of a German settlement.

Perhaps there are some other attendant subjects suitable for negotiation at this time. The possibility of establishing a demilitarized corridor of some kind along the East-West German boundary line certainly ought to be explored.

When all is said and done, however, our range of opportunity in the coming negotiations is going to be narrow. Western Europe must be defended against further Russian encroachment, and West Germany is indispensable to that defense. We must not acquiesce in any new arrangement respecting Berlin that will weaken or undermine the strength and stability of the Western alliance.

FRANK CHURCH

Washington, D. C.

A "Free-wheeling" Germany

MR. LIPPMANN'S articles on "The Two Germanies and Berlin" have a great advantage over so many discussions of the subject in that they do not seek to avoid saying things which are bound to offend against some current assumptions as to how things are and what people really want. They have been given even greater topicality by the likelihood that a new German Chancellor, whatever the measure of Dr. Adenauer's surviving influence, will not be able to avoid some radical rethinking of the position, quite apart from the intensity of the pressure about the Berlin question that the Russians may contrive in the course of the summer. My own views as to a desirable solution where Berlin is concerned are not far removed from Mr. Lippmann's. But in order to see what chances it offers Western policy-makers, it is necessary to look more closely at some of the points that Mr. Lippmann makes. I would suggest that the following at least require further examination on the part of those in a position to undertake it:

1. While it is true to say that fear of a reunited Germany is widespread in both halves of Europe, it is generally realized among the more rational students of international politics that this ought not to be because of what a reunited Germany could do on its own; Germany is and can only be a power of the second rank by the standards of the second half of the 20th Century. What causes worry is the possibility of diplomatic adventures or even military adventures in which such a Germany might engage; and that there might be a danger here is confirmed by the outraged feelings expressed by the Germans when it is suggested (as recently by General de Gaulle) that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognized as a permanent frontier. For Germans, Germany is divided into three parts not two; and what we call East

JUNE 13, 1967
NATIONAL REVIEW

Recall Senator Church?

WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.

One can understand the impatience of the voters of Idaho to do better for themselves than Senator Frank Church. He is the gentleman best forgotten for his dreadful keynote address at the Democratic convention of 1960. Now his views on Vietnam are not those of the Administration or of the leaders of the Democratic Party, or, it appears, of the citizens of Idaho—who now desire to replace Senator Church by recourse to the populist extreme of recall. My own hope is a) that the recall movement will fail; b) that if it doesn't, that the courts will knock it out; and c) that Senator Church will be conventionally defeated at the polls in the fall of 1968 when he is due to run for re-election.



Buckley

Although the recall movement is being backed primarily by conservatives, it is a most un-conservative thing that they are doing. It is especially strange that some of the people who have associated themselves with the movement adopt as their principal political slogan the motto "This is a republic, not a democracy. Let's keep it that way." One of the more important differences between a republic and a democracy is rule by representatives of the people rather than rule directly by the people them-

selves. If the latter were truly desirable, we could have running democracy without any difficulty at all by simply plugging in Dr. Gallup to a big IBM machine and turning on the dial. Do you prefer Johnson or Nixon? If the answer on Monday is Nixon 51, Johnson 49, we could simply flash the helicopter to jettison Lyndon, and pop up to New York to fetch Nixon, who then would be President until. . . Do you prefer Nixon or Romney? Tuesday, when Romney comes in.

And so for all the senators, and for all the congressmen, until someone stopped to ask the question: why have any elected officials at all? Why not just constantly submit questions about everything to the voters, and let them decide directly?

Why Not Wait?

The attitude of the gentlemen from Idaho who desire to recall Senator Church reminds one of the unfortunate citizens of Massachusetts who tried to suggest to John Quincy Adams in the 1830s that his business as congressman was to register exactly their views on public matters. To which the ex-President replied that for such a job clerks were available, that his notion of representative government was not that of someone sent to Washington to transcribe the fluctuations in popular opinion back home, but that of a man in whose capacities the voters have confidence, which confidence they may renew or

not at regular intervals.

Those regular intervals are of course specified by the Constitution, and it is unlikely even if the voters of Idaho proceeded to recall Senator Church, that the Senate would comply with the recall. Hinds' *Precedents of the House of Representatives*, a reliable an exegete of the Constitution as any, reminds us that "a State may not add to the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution for members of the Senate and House of Representatives." And gives two examples: "Asserting this principle, the House in 1807 seated a member whose election was contested on the ground that he had not been twelve months a resident of the district from which elected as required by State law. No attempt was made to ascertain whether these requirements were met because the State law was deemed to be unconstitutional. Both the House and Senate have seated members elected during their term of office as state judges, despite the provision of State constitutions purporting to bar the election of judges to any other office under the State or the United States during such term."

No doubt Idaho would argue that to recall a senator is not the same as "adding to the qualifications" prescribed by the Constitution. And no doubt the Senate would reply that that is in effect what is being done to Senator Church: adding the qualification that he shall voice views harmonious with those of the majority. The latter is surely the more reasonable construction.

Why not wait? Nineteen sixty-eight is not so far away, and in the meantime Senator Church is not going to change our foreign policy. He is not, by his eccentric views, threatening the republic nearly so much as the new populists of Idaho.

region offers the little countries of Indochina their best hope for remaining independent. They would, of necessity, establish friendly ties with China, staying scrupulously neutral and unaligned, but they need not become the vassal states that a spreading war, drawing Chinese armies in, would surely make them. This even applies to North Vietnam, where nationalist feeling against China is deep, and where Ho Chi Minh does not yet take his orders from Peking. Clearly, if we seek to restrict Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia, a settlement in Vietnam is essential.

Those who urge the contrary course—a Korean-type war in Indochina—often argue that South Vietnam has become the testing ground of a new and vicious form of Communist aggression, the guerrilla war. They contend that the Viet Cong rebels, though perhaps not the pawns of Peking, are at least the agents of Hanoi; that indirect aggression by infiltration is being practiced by the North against the South; and that we Americans must see to it that the guerrillas are driven out, or such wars of subversion will spread.

I grant this seems a compelling argument, but it won't stand up under close analysis. Communist guerrilla wars didn't begin in Vietnam and won't end there, regardless of the outcome of this particular struggle. American muscle, sufficiently used, may hold the 17th parallel against infiltrators from the North, but our bayonets will not stop—they could even spread—Communist agitation within other Asian countries. A government may be checked by force, but not an idea. There is no way to fence off an ideology.

Indeed, Communist-inspired guerrilla wars have always jumped over boundary lines. They have erupted in scattered, far-flung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions

the popular view.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (QUARTERLY)

OCTOBER 1966

U. S. POLICY AND THE "NEW EUROPE"

By Frank Church

PRESIDENT Johnson said recently of Europe: "The Europe of today is a new Europe. In place of uncertainty, there is confidence; in place of decay, progress; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of war, peace." Confidence, progress, partnership and peace—what better testimonial could there be to the health and vitality, both political and economic, of Europe today; and what better promise for Europe's future?

During the summer, in a month of hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee examined "the Europe of today." Our discussions ranged over the entire continent, literally from the Atlantic to the Urals, and beyond. For a diagnosis of the Atlantic Alliance means considering not only de Gaulle's aims, but the prospects for German reunification, Britain's association with the Common Market, nuclear arms control, greater European cohesion, East-West détente, the impact of Viet Nam, and much more. These problems are connected to each other in a seamless web that joins the United States with Europe, linking us together in the future as inextricably as in the past.

When the Committee's hearings began, it was announced that their purpose was educational. In preparation for them, I visited Europe in May for interviews with governmental leaders, including Wilson, Erhard and de Gaulle, along with prominent spokesmen of the opposition parties and other knowledgeable political observers. I have now had a chance to test my tentative conclusions against what the Committee has been told by a number of distinguished American experts on Europe.

The fact that there is in Europe today confidence, progress, partnership and peace is due, in no small part, to farsighted policy decisions we have taken since the end of the war. But we may stand in danger of being so dazzled by past successes that we could easily stumble into future failures. For Europe is now rumbling, not with discontent, but with a new spirit of independence, in both East and West. We seem to hear the sound, but we may not understand its meaning. To me it is the murmur of widespread European assent to the proposition: "Resolved, that the postwar period has ended."

Testifying before the Committee on July 13, Under Secretary

State George Ball said: "The NATO Crisis [not the period] . . . is over." Such a statement assumes that the principal problem facing NATO is France's refusal to continue her participation in SHAPE, or to permit NATO bases to remain on French soil, and that because the other allies have decided to maintain a relocated military headquarters for the Alliance in Belgium, the crisis has ended.

But the questions General de Gaulle has raised have a much deeper significance. For he is the symbol of the growing desire of European countries to exert more control over their own destinies—the longing for a larger measure of national independence. To the extent that he has appealed successfully to these sentiments, General de Gaulle is not isolated, either in France or in Europe. And, perhaps more importantly, by leading the assault upon the old barriers of the cold war, which all Western Europeans want removed, he appears to many, if not to most, Europeans to be moving with the current of history, while the suspicion grows that we are anchored to the past. Europeans recognize that de Gaulle's perspectives exceed his power, but they also believe that we are so preoccupied elsewhere, particularly in Viet Nam, and so tied to cold-war concepts, that we fail to take advantage of the openings our power presents. As one astute European observer remarked, "France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective."

Perhaps our resistance to the mood of Europe is most clearly reflected in our relations with de Gaulle's government. We seem to have a peculiar ability to get under each other's skin, to use one another as a foil. McGeorge Bundy described the present foreign policy of France as "disappointing in its manners, costly in its pride, wasteful in its lost opportunities, irrelevant in much of its dramatics and enduring in its fundamentals." Though an intriguing epigram, Bundy's assessment must be weighed on the scales of recent French history. When the General returned to power, France was on the verge of civil war. The Fifth Republic may be hard to live with, but who would prefer the France before de Gaulle, with its revolving-door governments? The previous régime was marked by feeble central power, a faltering economy, poor national morale, mutinous armies and a chronic inability to extricate France from costly and questionable colonial involvements. France today is prosperous and stable, shorn of her outdated imperial burdens, aglow with the rekindled pride of her

design.

How has de Gaulle achieved all this for France? Perhaps, as Professor Henry Kissinger suggested, it was because the General saw the need to teach his country and Europe generally "attitudes of independence and self-reliance," in the belief that "before a nation or an area can mean something to others it has to mean something to itself." Above all, we should remember that, however disconcerting we find de Gaulle's policies, or imperious his style, he has proved time and again, most recently in Moscow, that he is a man of the West.

Yet, despite de Gaulle's basic loyalties, the present occupants of the seventh floor of our State Department will not forgive him for throwing roadblocks in the path of a united Western Europe. Secretary Ball, in his appearance before the Committee, referred repeatedly to the "compelling logic" of a unified Western Europe, to be built, presumably, in the general image of the United States. His testimony, in line with many previous Departmental statements, was replete with warnings that the alternative to unity is a return to the "corrosive nationalist rivalries" of prewar Europe, as though there were no middle ground.

Actually, there is scant basis to fear that Western Europe—knit together by a flourishing common market—is in any danger of unraveling, and even less reason to apprehend a reversion to the pattern of militant nationalism which plagued the period before the wars. The "either-or" argument is unreal, a rhetorical duel between two straw men. When pressed, Secretary Ball himself conceded that Western Europe was not likely to revert to the old habits of a discredited past. Summing up, he sought a more plausible case, declaring that "the central issue before the American government and the American people . . . is what kind of Europe and what kind of Atlantic world we want."

My talks in Europe, and the comments of witnesses during the hearings, brought home to me the fact that it is not the kind of Europe *we* want that any longer governs. The question is really what kind of resurgent Europe the Europeans themselves will build. We can encourage them to move in certain directions, largely because they have looked to us for leadership. But we should avoid pressing them too hard to adopt our favorite schemes for solving their problems. Looking back over the statements of leading State Department officials, one is struck by the fact

that they seem to hold out for Europe no alternative between our form of unity and chaos, no awareness that European sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent a practical possibility. In brief, I believe it isn't wise to keep insisting that Western Europe should grow to resemble the United States of America.

At best, it is a dubious policy to keep prodding our NATO partners for their reluctance to make new offerings at the altar of European union. For we cannot forecast with any certainty that our Grand Design for Europe, even if it were to happen, would necessarily prove a blessing to the world.

What real assurance is there that world peace would be promoted by the emergence of another gargantuan state, comparable in size and strength to the United States or the Soviet Union, and equally capable of waging global war? Is it not just possible that a looser association of European countries, which rejects subordination to a single executive authority, might turn out to be the safer arrangement? After all, Bismarck's *Reich* welded together, under one Emperor, the separate principalities which had composed the German *Bund* in a union which proved a curse to peace. Yet the *Bund* itself was once touted for having been "impregnable in defense and incapable of aggression."

Can we really be so confident that a united Western Europe would always remain our faithful partner? We are dismayed by de Gaulle because he dissents from our view about how European defense, European political life and European relations with the rest of the world should be conducted. Why should we believe that a great European Union would not prove even more assertive, contrary and—dare I use the term?—disobedient than de Gaulle's France? Perhaps, as Professor Kissinger suggested, there are advantages to be found in preserving pluralism in Europe.

In any case, the fact remains that in Europe today there is a desire for diversity. Therefore, the task for us is to cast our policy so that it encompasses both the quest for cohesion and this desire for diversity. To accommodate these two aims concurrently, we should avoid taking rigid ideological positions. We must not insist that Europe evolve in any way which does not correspond to the real feelings of Europeans. Surely the United States does not hold the only patent on a Grand Design.

The same insistence on the solution we want—and that we think Europeans should want—has been applied to the nuclear sharing problem. Thousands of pages have been written on this subject. I can add nothing new to the debate. It does seem to me, however, on the basis of the accumulated evidence, that we have handled this problem with a rather heavy hand. The Committee, to be sure, was told that the United States had not been doctrinaire on the subject of a multilateral nuclear force, that we had been “very, very careful not to try to bring pressure” on our allies to accept the Multilateral Force (M.L.F.), and that the charge that there has been pressure is “nonsense.”

Our diplomats may believe that they avoided bringing heavy pressure to bear on behalf of the M.L.F. proposal, but this is not the frank opinion of most European officials directly involved and of most disinterested experts on both sides of the Atlantic. If we are so unaware of the resentment our tactics produced our antennae are in need of major repair.

Likewise, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the United States has nearly isolated itself in insisting upon retaining the so-called European clause in our draft proposal for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This clause would leave the door open for the creation of an independent European nuclear deterrent, although the necessary precondition for such a force is a degree of political unity which Secretary Ball himself has described as “far exceeding that foreseen in the near future by even the most optimistic proponents of European federalism.”

The official argument, rooted once again in our Grand Design for Europe, is that we are unwilling to foreclose the possibility that some future European Union might organize a nuclear deterrent force in which the Germans could participate. Besides, we want to preserve our option for a “hardware” solution to the nuclear-sharing problem within the Western Alliance. We say that the clause, which one knowledgeable observer has described as though written with a “ball-point corkscrew,” would not lead to proliferation because it permits no increase in the total number of “nuclear entities” in the world. I wonder what our attitude toward such an option would be if mainland China announced its intention to form an M.L.F. with Albania, Mali and North

Viet Nam, or the Soviet Union an M.L.F. with Poland and Cuba.

In any event, the State Department insists that the European clause is "not the real obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement." The Committee was told that German access to nuclear weapons, under an M.L.F. or a similar "hardware"-sharing scheme, would not even prove a serious obstacle to German reunification, which "will come about when conditions are ripe for it." Most Europeans would disagree.

Our refusal to drop the European clause seems to indicate that we have decided it is more important to bind West Germany more tightly to a truncated NATO than to improve relations with the Soviet Union. I think our priority is wrong. As far as I can determine, the other European nations at Geneva, including our allies, feel that we are mortgaging the present for the sake of a highly problematical future. In other words, most Europeans—I will mention West Germany in a moment—who would participate in a separate European deterrent and whose interests this hypothetical, if not visionary, force would presumably serve, are not pressing us to retain the European clause. Why, then, should *we* insist on keeping an option for *them* which they do not demand, or at least do not think is important enough to jeopardize closer relations with the Soviet Union? Is this in our interest—or in theirs?

In discussing the ultimate goal of our policy in Europe, Mr. Bundy said: "Settlement is the name of the game." If we are going to play the game, we must remember that the ball is labeled "relations with the Soviet Union." If we are not going to play, we will discover that the game will go on without us, and we shall soon become spectators in Europe rather than participants. However much we may doubt the Russians, most Europeans are persuaded that the danger of a Soviet attack has receded, and that, as a result of developments in the Communist world—particularly the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the necessity for Russia to turn about and face the challenge of a hostile China—the time has arrived for a diplomatic assault upon the unwelcome barriers which split the Continent. For the partition of Europe at the Elbe is regarded by Europeans on both sides as transitory and unnatural.

The United States should lead its allies in their reach eastward across the Elbe, for we alone can deal, on equal terms, with the

will press on, believing, as more Europeans do every day, that in Europe, at least, the cold war is over. It would be tragic for all concerned—except the Soviets—if by standing so far behind our Western European allies we forced them to turn their backs on us in order to seek reconciliation with Eastern Europe, as they are bound to do.

To lead the new search for a European settlement, we need not join in the European consensus that the Russian threat has faded away. We can parley without discarding the Western Alliance, to which even France proclaims her continuing fidelity. NATO still exists as a fort for the West, should the Soviet Union turn militant again.

On the diplomatic front, the best place for a breakthrough remains Geneva, where we may have come within reach of a non-proliferation treaty. Negotiations should not be permitted to break down on the issue of retaining the European clause. It is reunification, not nuclear sharing, which concerns the Germans most. Europeans, including many Germans, hold generally to the belief that reunification can come about only after much better relations have been established between the two halves of Europe. Maintaining the option for increased German access to nuclear weapons can only add to the fears and suspicions; closing the option, on the other hand, would tend to lessen tensions. As Mr. Bundy pointed out, so would a clear public statement by the West German government accepting the Oder-Neisse line. I have the impression, and several witnesses before the Committee did too, that German public opinion is coming around to a realization of the need to strengthen the East Europeans' confidence in Germany. I would think that we should encourage the Germans to do so. I do not see why we, alone among the Western powers, seem unwilling to accept the thesis that reunification will follow relaxation. I do not see why we, again alone, continue to assert an almost mystical belief that eventually, for inexplicable reasons, conditions will somehow materialize making German reunification possible. By holding to this view, by insisting on a European clause as a prerequisite for a non-proliferation treaty, we are running the risk of not only falling between two stools but of knocking both over. For the prospect of an integrated European nuclear deterrent is most likely to prove a mirage. An empty hope can only disillusion the West Germans, causing them—more in sorrow than in anger—to pull away from NATO's close embrace.

Vital Speeches of the Day

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Latin America

TOWARD A NEW POLICY

By **FRANK CHURCH**, *United States Senator from Idaho, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs*

Delivered in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., April 10, 1970

HOPE, FRANCIS BACON once commented, makes a good breakfast, but it is a lean supper. As Latin America enters the 70's, her governments tremble beneath the bruising tensions that separate hope from fulfillment.

"Here is a subcontinent," historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., observes, "where one-eighth more people than the population of the United States subsist on less than one-eighth of our gross national product, where 5 per cent of the people receive a third of the income and 70 per cent live in abject poverty, and where in country after country the political and social structures are organized to keep things that way . . ."

As Germán Arciniegas of Colombia pointed out in a famous observation, there are two Latin Americas: the visible and the invisible. "Visible Latin America is the Latin America of Presidents, generals, embassies, newspapers, business houses, universities, cathedrals, *estancias* and *haciendas*. But in the shadows lies 'mute, repressed' Latin America, a 'vast reservoir of revolution . . . Nobody knows what these . . . silent men and women think, feel, dream, or await in the depths of their being.' In recent years, invisible Latin America has begun to stir. Workers and *campesinos* want three meals a day and a modicum of human recognition and dignity. Indians want to enter the national life of their countries. Intellectuals and students want social justice. Engineers and soldiers want modernization. Whatever the particular goal, the inherited condition of life is becoming every day more insupportable for more people."

Much of Latin America entered the 20th Century with a way of life inherited from 16th Century Spain and Portugal. This is a way of life which in many respects is incompatible with a modern, industrialized society. Latin countries are plunging headlong into the 21st Century with precious little time to make a transition that took generations in the United States and centuries in Western Europe.

Yet the imperative is clear. In countries whose per capita income presently ranges from \$80 to \$800 a year, only the fastest economic growth conceivable can possibly produce enough food, shelter, clothing and employment to match the spiralling requirements of the swelling population. This multitude, which now numbers 276 million souls, is growing at the rate of 3 per cent a year, faster than any other population in the world; yet production, on a net per capita basis, is increasing at only half that rate. Inflation is endemic; foreign exchange is in short supply; export trade opportunities are restricted by barriers interposed by the already rich, developed nations; and overall economic growth is falling chronically short of satisfactory levels. The Sixties did not bring the much-heralded "Decade of Development" to Latin America. The euphoric expectation of bountiful blessings generated by the Alliance for Progress has receded, and widespread disillusionment has set in.

Still, economists know what is required within Latin America to move it into an era of adequate, self-sustaining economic growth. There is general consensus on the necessity for far-reaching agrarian and fiscal reform, for increasing internal savings and enlarging internal markets, for regional economic integration, and for more favorable trading arrangements with the developed countries. Most of all, there is the need to bring into the national economic life the large numbers of Latin Americans, amounting in some countries to the greater part of the whole population, who are now, for all practical purposes, subsisting outside a money economy.

Obviously, if such profound internal changes can be accomplished at all, they can be brought about only by the Latin Americans themselves. The impetus must come from within. Success or failure may be marginally influenced, but it cannot be bestowed from without—neither by the United States nor any other foreign power.

It is also evident that the means adopted, the economic

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systems devised, the political forms chosen, will likewise have to be homegrown. Neither the leisurely evolution of modern capitalism, as it matured in northern Europe and the United States, nor the differing brands of Marxism, as practiced in Russia or China, offer models for Latin America that are really relevant to its cultural inheritance or its pressing needs. Even Cuban-style communism has found a meager market in other Latin lands. Che Guevara's romantic excursion to spread Castroism to the mountains of Bolivia ended in fiasco and death. For Latin America, steeped in the Christian tradition and prizing the individual highly, communism has little appeal. Indeed, those in the forefront of the struggle for radical, even revolutionary, reform in Latin America today are more likely to be found wearing Roman collars than carrying red banners.

So, as we peer into the 70's, we must anticipate turmoil and upheaval throughout Latin America, a decade of instability, insurrection and irreversible change. Each country will stake out and cultivate its own political and economic terrain. The spirit of nationalism will grow more fervent, and movement along the political spectrum will be generally toward the left. Inflammable sensitivities will run high.

As for the United States, we would be well advised to practice an unaccustomed deference. The more gently we press our hemispheric neighbors, the greater our influence is likely to be. This will not be easy, for self-restraint is the hardest of all lessons for a great power to learn. Too tempting and seductive is the illusion of omnipotence. Every great power would prefer to believe—and ascribe to itself—the verity of the tribute once paid by Prince Metternich to imperial France: "When Paris sneezes, Europe catches cold."

In casting our own weight about the Western Hemisphere, the United States has shown typically little self-restraint. Between 1898 and 1924, we directly intervened no less than 31 times in the internal affairs of our smaller neighbors. And we have yet to kick the habit, as our abortive Bay-of-Pigs invasion bears witness, not to speak of our military occupation of the Dominican Republic, as recently as 1965.

In addition to its direct interventions, the United States has deeply penetrated the economy of Latin America with an immense outlay of private investment. By the end of 1968, American business interests had nearly \$13 billion invested in Latin countries and the Caribbean, nearly three-fourths of which was concentrated in minerals, petroleum and manufacturing industries. The extent and growth of these holdings have inevitably—and not surprisingly—given rise to cries of "Yankee Imperialism."

A recent study by the Council for Latin America, a United States business group, reports that in 1966, the total sales by all U. S. affiliates in Latin America amounted to 13.7 per cent of the aggregate gross domestic product of all the countries of the region. If foreign-owned companies played the same proportionate role in the United States, their annual sales would exceed \$130-billion!

Latin Americans have also begun to deny what was long taken as an article of faith—namely, that foreign investment promotes economic development. Hear Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes of Chile: "We can assert that Latin America is contributing to finance the development of the United States and other affluent nations. Private investments have meant, and mean today for Latin America, that the amounts that leave our continent are many times higher than those that are invested in it. Our potential capital is diminishing while the profits of invested capital grow and multiply at an enormous rate, not in our countries but abroad."

Minister Valdés is supported by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America which estimates the flow of private investment to Latin America in the period 1960-1966

at \$2.8-billion while the repatriation of profits and income amounted to \$8.3-billion. This means that over this period foreign investment caused a net loss of \$785-million a year in Latin America's balance of payments.

Working with later data on a somewhat different basis, the Council for Latin America makes the very opposite claim, putting the net positive contribution of U. S. investment to Latin America's balance of payments, during the 1965-1968 period, at \$8.5-billion a year.

Wherever the truth may lie, it is clear that the influence of United States business in Latin America is enormous, and that its impact produces political as well as economic repercussions. Whether or not the Latin Americans are right in their analysis of the adverse effect of private foreign investment on their balance of payments, the important political point is that they *think* they are right about it.

The U. S. presence in Latin America is pervasive, culturally as well as economically. Latins listen to American music, go to see American movies, read American books and magazines, drive American cars, drink Coca-Cola, and shop at Sears. The ubiquitous American tourist is to be seen on every hand, worrying aloud about the water and food and complaining about the difficulty of making himself understood in English.

The Latin reaction to all of this is somewhat ambivalent. Latins like the products of U. S. culture and U. S. business, but at the same time they feel a bit overwhelmed and fearful that Yankees may indeed be taking over their countries. One of the causes of internal resistance to proposals for a Latin American Common Market is the fear that U. S. companies would be able, through their sheer size, to benefit from it to the disadvantage of local entrepreneurs.

Given this situation, it has to be expected that regardless of the policies we adopt, however enlightened and beneficial they may be, the United States will long remain a national target in Latin America for criticism, misgiving, suspicion and distrust.

The picture is not all that bleak, however. Millions of people in Latin America think well of the people of the United States. Certain of our leaders have been greatly admired—Franklin Roosevelt for his "Good Neighbor" policy, and John F. Kennedy for the way he bespoke the heartfelt aspirations of the dispossessed. No one can fault the sincerity of President Kennedy when he launched the Alliance for Progress in March of 1961, inviting the American Republics to join in a "vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the people for homes, work and land, health and schools." Since then, the United States has funneled in more than \$10-billion in various forms of aid.

Given the magnitude of our effort during the 60's, we are left to wonder why it produced such disappointing results. We thought we were seeding the resurgence of democratic governments; instead, we have seen a relentless slide toward militarism. We thought we could remodel Latin societies, but the reforms we prescribed have largely eluded us. We thought our generosity would meet with gratitude; but we have seen antagonism toward us grow as our involvement in their problems has deepened. We pledged ourselves to goals which lay beyond our capacity to confer, objectives that could never be the gift of any program of external aid; by promising more than we could deliver, we have made ourselves a pausable scapegoat for pent-up furies and frustrations for which we bear little or no responsibility.

Worse still, the kind of aid we have extended, has tended to aggravate, rather than mitigate, these difficulties. Bilateral in character, administered on a government-to-government basis, our foreign aid program is embroiled in the internal politics of

both the donor and recipient countries. The program's very nature makes this unavoidable, but the consequences are contributing to a steady deterioration in relations.

First, let us consider what has happened to the foreign aid program, due to the pressure of domestic politics within the United States. What commenced (back in the days of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe) as principally a grant-in-aid undertaking, has been transformed by the outcry against "foreign giveaways" into what is now primarily a loan program. Furthermore, in terms of accomplishing our foreign policy objectives, hindsight indicates we have gone about foreign aid backwards. The Marshall Plan should have been administered mainly on a loan instead of a grant basis, and the ready return of our investment would have done much to solve our balance-of-payments problems in the 1960's. In Latin America, the formula should have been reversed, with the emphasis on grants instead of loans.

Now the accumulation of these loans, and others as well, by Latin American governments, is creating serious debt service problems. "Heavy borrowings by some Western Hemisphere countries to support development," notes the Rockefeller Report, "have reached the point where annual repayments of interest and amortization absorb a large share of foreign exchange earnings. Within five years, a number of other nations in the Western Hemisphere could face the same situation. Many of the countries are, in effect, having to make new loans to get the foreign exchange to pay interest and amortization on old loans, and at higher interest rates.

"This debt service problem is a major concern. If countries get into a position where interest and amortization payments on foreign loans require a disproportionately large share of available foreign exchange, then the general pace of development will be slowed by the inability to maintain imports of the capital equipment needed to support economic growth."

Of course, in fairness it should be pointed out that our foreign aid program is not the sole contributor, by any means, to this mounting debt service problem. From 1962 through 1969, the Export-Import Bank lent \$1.7 billion to Latin America at commercial interest rates and generally shorter maturities than AID loans. Various European governments and banks (as well as U. S. banks) have made substantial loans, frequently at rates of 6 to 8 per cent and for maturities of no more than 3 to 5 years. It is clear that both we and the Europeans are going to have to review our lending policies and explore ways for stretching out repayment schedules. Joint action between the lending nations, the international lending institutions, and debtor nations is necessary. I agree with the Peterson Task Force suggestion to put this strategy "into effect now to prevent an emergency—not to deal with one after it has arisen."

Not only did the pressures of domestic politics change our aid to loans, but concern over our chronically adverse balance-of-payments led the Congress to insist upon "tying" these loans to the purchase of goods and services in the United States. Thus our "aid"—so-called—became an ill-disguised subsidy for American exports. While it undeniably constitutes an addition to Latin American economic resources, it can only be used for purchases in the United States, or, under the new Presidential directive, within the Hemisphere, where prices are often above European or Japanese levels. Moreover, still another politically-motivated restriction requires that half of the goods financed by the United States must be transported in American bottoms. It has been estimated that this provision alone reduces the effectiveness of each \$100.00 of U. S. loan assistance by as much as \$20.00, furnishing another irritant to developing countries.

But the worse political consequence of all has been the

inability of Congress to resist temptation to use the aid program as both carrot and stick to reward or punish recipient governments, depending on how we may regard their behavior. Since 1961, the punitive sections of the Foreign Assistance Act have increased from 4 to 21.

Most notorious of these punitive provisions is the Hickenlooper Amendment. Although it has proved useless as a deterrent to the confiscation of American-owned businesses abroad, this amendment will remain on the books. Few Congressmen would relish explaining to their constituents why they voted to repeal a provision which prohibits giving further aid to a foreign government which has expropriated an American-owned business and failed to pay adequate compensation.

Yet, the Hickenlooper Amendment is only the most prominent of a whole series of penalties written into our Foreign Assistance Act. There are, for instance, the amendments designed to enforce the American view of fishing rights. On occasion, U. S. fishing boats have been seized by Ecuador or Peru for fishing in what we regard as the high seas, but what they regard as territorial waters. If a fine is imposed, our law provides that military sales and assistance must be suspended; it also provides that the amount of the fine must be subtracted from the economic aid we are furnishing the guilty government.

This provision, I must confess, was solemnly adopted as an appropriate punishment to put an end to any further meddling with American boats. But, alas, it has not worked that way. We "tie" so many strings to our "aid" that some governments have preferred to take their money in fines!

The trouble with attaching such penalties to the aid program is that, although they might give us some emotional satisfaction, they do not stop the behavior against which they are aimed. What is worse, they provoke a series of diplomatic showdowns that corrode, weaken and eventually destroy good relations.

Peru is a textbook case. The deterioration of our relations with Peru began in 1964, when the State Department, on its own initiative, started to drag its heels on extending aid to Peru as a tactic to force the government to settle the International Petroleum Company (IPC) case. The tactic was not successful and resulted in some bitterness on the part of the Peruvian government, then headed by Fernando Belaunde Terry, a man who otherwise qualified as a true Alliance for Progress President.

This bitterness was increased when we refused to sell the Peruvians F-5 aircraft. But then, when they decided to buy Mirage aircraft from France, the State Department reversed itself and offered F-5's. At this point, Congress decreed that foreign aid should be withheld from countries buying sophisticated weapons abroad. The net result is that Peru now has Mirages, a plane aptly named for the contribution it makes to Peruvian security.

Finally, a military government more radical than the reformist Belaunde came to power and promptly expropriated IPC. The new Peruvian government has not only failed to pay compensation, but has actually presented IPC with a bill of \$694-million for its alleged past transgressions. And through all of this, there has been the continuing wrangle over fishing boats.

This sketchy review is necessarily oversimplified. The story of U. S.-Peruvian relations in the last five years contains ample mistakes on both sides. The point is that each successive stage in the deterioration has been provoked, in one way or another, by some aspect of the United States aid program. Indeed, more than one U. S. Ambassador to Latin America has said privately that his difficulties stemmed directly from our aid program. One can scarcely imagine a more damning indictment.

Let us now consider the political impact of a bilateral, government-to-government aid program upon the recipient countries. They are naturally interested in putting the money into places of immediate advantage, where the political pay-off is greatest. Heavy emphasis falls on program, rather than project, loans, whereby lump sum transfers of dollar credits augment a given government's foreign exchange reserves. This is an indirect method of lending budgetary support. The reserves, of course, are available to be purchased with local tools in Cincinnati or perfume in Paris. Since it was never a part of the rationale of a program loan that its proceeds should be used to finance the purchase of French perfume, AID early limited the purposes for which program loans could be used. But money is fungible, and restrictions applied solely to the loan do not insure that the borrowing government will not use its other resources for the purchase of frivolous luxury items, while relying on the United States to finance necessities. Little if any net economic gain would be made in these circumstances.

It became necessary, therefore, to make program loans contingent on agreement by the borrowing government to regulate its imports generally in such a way as to insure that its total foreign exchange reserves were used with optimum efficiency from our point of view.

Further, the question arose as to what to do with the local currency generated by the program loan. In the absence of agreements to the contrary, this currency can be used in ways that would undermine, neutralize, or offset the intended purpose of the loan. So, to insure that these local currency proceeds are used in ways that meet with our approval, AID made agreement on this point a condition of program lending. As in the case of foreign exchange reserves, it followed, of course, that this agreement had to encompass the government's fiscal and monetary policies across the board.

All of this inevitably involves the United States in the most intimate areas of another country's sovereignty, its tax policies and its monetary system. Program loans are disbursed in installments, usually quarterly, and each disbursement is preceded by the most detailed review of our AID mission of the recipient country's economic performance for the prior quarter. Why has the government's tax program not been enacted? The central bank is letting the local money supply increase too fast. Recent wage settlements have been inflationary. The currency is over-valued. A program review typically raises these and a hundred other similar questions and complaints. This is done with the best of motives, but at an exorbitant political price.

Our aid technicians must sit as advisers and overseers at the highest levels in the finance ministries of various Latin American governments. Inescapably, this places us in a patronizing position which is demeaning to our hosts. The large colony of our AID administrators, meanwhile, living in conspicuous luxury in every Latin capital, cannot help but feed popular resentment against the United States. If a militant nationalism directed against the *gringos* is now on the rise, it is quite possible that our own policies, largely connected with AID, have given it the spur.

One is left to wonder how so cumbersome and self-defeating an AID program has lasted so long. Again, I suggest, the answer can be found by examining the politics involved on Capitol Hill. The analysis, I assure you, is a fascinating one.

Year after year, in order to get the needed votes in Congress, a package of contradictory arguments is assembled. The package contains something for everyone, with the result that the life of the AID program has been prolonged by a hybrid coalition of both liberal and conservative members. Let us explore how this artful strategy has worked with respect to the two main categories of AID, military and economic assistance.

(1) *Military Assistance.* Conservative members of Congress have been wooed to support this kind of aid on the ground that bolstering indigenous armies and police forces furnishes us with a shield against the spread of communism in the hemisphere. Furthermore, it is argued, strengthened military power within Latin America is to be welcomed as a force for internal stability favorably disposed toward local American interests. For the most part, these arguments are accepted as articles of faith, even though events discredit them. In Cuba, it was demonstrated that once a regime has lost minimum essential support, no army will save it. Castro didn't walk over Batista's army; he walked through it. In Peru and Bolivia, on the other hand, where the government's army seized the governments, the new military regimes galvanized public support behind them not by favoring, but by grabbing, local American interests. Each confiscated a major American-owned business, the Gulf Oil Corporation in Bolivia, the IPC in Peru.

Liberals in Congress have been lured to support military assistance by quite different, though equally flimsy, arguments. They have been told that our subsidy brings us into close association with the military hierarchy, thus enabling us to exert a tempering influence on the politically ambitious generals, while assuring ourselves of their friendship in case they do take over. Again, argument and fact are mismatched. The 1960's were marked by an unprecedented shift toward military dictatorship in Latin America. Hardly more than half a dozen popularly-chosen democratic governments remain alive south of our borders. Tempering influence indeed!

Furthermore, once a military junta has installed itself behind its American-furnished tanks, guns and planes, there is no assurance that the United States will be benignly regarded. In fact, the new "Nasserist" regimes of Peru and Bolivia, among all governments of South America, are the most aggressively hostile toward us.

Meanwhile, the military missions we have installed in no less than 17 Latin capitals, add to the debilitating image of the United States as a militaristic nation. Even the Rockefeller Report, which gave its blessing to military assistance, looks with disfavor upon "our permanent military missions in residence," since they "too often have constituted too large and too visible a United States presence."

That puts it mildly. Listen to the testimony of Ralph Dungan, our former Ambassador to Chile, given before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs: "I believe there is no shaking the prevailing Latin conception of the United States as a society dominated to a very large measure by 'the Pentagon.' This perception is widely shared across the political spectrum." Dr. Dungan went on to say that "perhaps no single action which the United States has taken in recent years including the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco was so significant in confirming the view of Latin America of the United States as a nation willing and ready to use its vast military power unilaterally . . . as the unfortunate invasion of the Dominican Republic." Other friendly hemisphere observers have noted we will never know whether the Alliance was a success or failure because the program stopped the minute U. S. Marines landed in Santo Domingo in the Spring of 1965.

So much, then, for our misguided military policies in Latin America, and the contrived and contradictory arguments with which they are perpetuated. Let us now turn to the other side of the American AID program, economic assistance.

(2) *Economic Assistance.* Here again, Congressional support has been secured on the basis of false and conflicting doctrines. Conservative votes have been solicited upon the theory that economic assistance is good for business, that it can shore up the *status quo* in Latin America and thus prove an

effective deterrent to revolution. It is argued that our input of dollars will promote stability and thwart the anti-capitalists. Oddly enough, this proposition is widely believed, even though Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere which has gone communist, enjoyed a relatively high per capita income along with a highly concentrated investment of American capital.

Liberals in Congress, on the other hand, have accepted the need for economic assistance on the weakness of the opposite argument, namely, that far from preserving the *status quo*, our financial aid is meant to promote necessary economic and social change. But, as our experience with the Alliance for Progress bears out, external aid does not produce internal change. Because the money has been channeled through existing governments, it has mainly been spent for the benefit of the governing elites. It has perhaps helped, in some instances, to modernize Latin economies, but not to restructure them. In short, the liberals have also been taken in!

The conclusion I must reach is that our AID program, as administered in Latin America, has proved to be—on balance—a net loss. As our meddling has increased, resentment has grown. It lies at the root of an alarming deterioration in inter-American relations—deterioration which has led to the assassination of one of our Ambassadors, the kidnapping of another plus a labor attache; the riotous receptions given Governor Rockefeller as President Nixon's personal emissary, indeed, the refusal of some countries even to receive him; and most recently, the unruly student demonstrations following the arrival of our Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs on an orientation visit to Bolivia.

This does not mean that we should throw up our hands in despair, or turn our backs on the hemisphere. What is necessary is that we first get off the backs of our neighbors! We must learn to hold ourselves at arms length; we must come to terms with the inevitable, letting changes take place without insisting upon managing or manipulating them. We must begin to show some self-restraint.

Here, then, are some guidelines I would favor for a new U. S. policy toward Latin America in the 70's:

(1) First of all, we should begin to adopt trade regulations that give the developing countries in Latin America a better break. We should listen closely to the growing, unified Latin complaint on this score, and give the most serious consideration to their urgent appeals for preferential treatment. The political hurdles to such a course are high; the strongest Presidential leadership will be necessary; but for too long we have avoided biting this particular bullet with the palliative of the AID program.

The great independence hero of Cuba, Jose Marti, once warned his countrymen that "a people economically enslaved but politically free will end by losing all freedom, but a people economically free can go on to win its political freedom." To achieve the latter, which Latin Americans believe they are now fighting for, Latin products must not be squeezed from the world's markets.

(2) Next, we must start to observe, as well as praise, the principle of non-intervention. It was San Martin, one of Latin America's legendary figures, who said that *we are as we act*. If we are to act in accordance with the principle of non-intervention, we must not only accept Latin governments as they come, but we must also refrain from the unilateral use of our military power in any situation short of one involving a direct threat to the security of the United States. Such was the case in our show-down with the Soviet Union when the Russians tried, in the Fall of 1962, to obtain a nuclear foothold in Cuba. But let there be no more military interventions, 1965 style, in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere.

(3) We should bring home our military missions, end our

grant-in-aid and training programs, and sever the intimate connections we have sought to form with the Latin military establishments. After all, the recent war between El Salvador and Honduras we made possible, in large part, by our gift of arms and training eagerly extended to both sides. This is a shabby business for us to mix in.

(4) We should commence the liquidation of our bilateral government-to-government economic AID program, as the recent Peterson Task Force Report recommends, effecting at the same time a corresponding shift of economic assistance to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other multi-lateral institutions. Such a transfer could be cushioned by phasing out our bilateral program in the following manner:

(a) The United States naturally should fulfill those loan commitments already in the pipeline, but the money should be "untied" so that the recipients may put it to the most efficient use. This can be done by Presidential action, which has thus far been limited to the freeing of only those markets within the hemisphere.

(b) The State Department should open negotiations for the rescheduling of debt repayment in those instances where the burden unduly restricts necessary economic growth. This, too, lies within the authority of the President, and accords with the recommendations of both the Rockefeller Report and the Peterson Report. We should seek, also, to involve European creditors in this process. I would oppose stretching out debts to the United States so that debts to other creditors can be paid on time.

(c) Financial assistance from the United States for public housing projects, schools, hospitals, family planning programs, and other social work should, in the future, be funneled through the newly-established Inter-American Social Development Institute. If this institute is administered properly, it will emphasize the use of matching grants instead of loans, and it will deal not directly with Latin governments but with private groups, trade unions, rural cooperatives and charitable foundations.

The Social Development Institute should be staffed with personnel ready to try a wide variety of new experiments, willing to refrain from sending another horde of North American directors into Latin countries, and who will share with Latin Americans the real experience of innovating and initiating new programs. In short, if the Social Development Institute is to succeed, it must be divorced entirely from the old ways of AID.

(d) As for technical assistance, the remaining part of AID, it somehow remains as much overrated in the United States as it stands discredited in Latin America. The program's present weakness was perhaps best summed up in an excellent study by a Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on the American AID program in Chile. Speaking for the Subcommittee, former Senator Gruening concluded that our technicians were "too far advanced technically . . . for what is required in underdeveloped countries. They are also too ignorant of local conditions and customs and serve periods too short to make a significant impact." This criticism is endemic to our technical assistance program throughout Latin America.

The limiting factor on the amount of technical assistance we have extended has never been money; it has always been people. The technician not only has to be professionally qualified; he should also know the language and the culture. He should be accomplished at human relations as well as in his technical specialty. There just are not many people like this to export abroad, and it is better not to send technicians at all than to send the wrong kind.

Yet there remains a need to transfer technology as well as capital to Latin America. This can best be done through expanding the exchange-of-persons program to enable more Latin Americans to study in the United States, and through selective grants to a few outstanding Latin American universities. The role of shirt-sleeve diplomat, the concept which underlay the original Point Four program, can best be played by Peace Corps Volunteers.

(5) Another promising agency has been created by last year's Foreign Assistance Act, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, more commonly known as OPIC. Its purpose is to encourage, through a liberalized program of investment guarantees, a larger flow of American private capital into developing countries. In Latin America, OPIC could play a useful role, if it encourages the right kind of investment, directing it away from the sensitive resource areas, and pointing it toward joint ventures in which Latin Americans will share largely in both ownership and management. Here, again, everything depends on the way OPIC is administered.

The use of joint ventures deserves emphasis. I am well aware that joint ventures are distasteful to many—not all—American companies. But, in the long run, this may be the only way U. S. business interests can survive in Latin America.

Before concluding, let me just add one warning here. Private foreign investment is not economic cooperation and assistance; it is business, and most Latin leaders are willing to treat it in a business-like manner. What Latin Americans are telling us is, "if the U. S. wants its investors to prosper in the region, then it is incumbent on the U. S. to make sure that

investors are 'development-oriented.'"

Whether the public or private sectors are involved, it is essential for the United States to lower its profile in Latin America. Our national interests can best be served, not by helping Latin America less, but by loosening our embrace. We should keep a decent distance away from their internal affairs, from their military apparatus and their revolving-door governments. This would be best for us and best for them.

It would also disengage the United States from its unseemly courtship of governments which are living contradictions to our traditional values as a nation. When we pour our money into budgetary support for a notoriously authoritarian government, when we supply it with riot guns, tear gas and mace, intelligent young Americans who still want to believe in our professed ideals, begin to ask elemental questions.

"If we are not *against* such dictatorships," they ask, "then what is it we are *for* that really matters?"

In the final analysis, each country must live by the ideals it prizes most highly. That is the basis upon which governments turn to their people for loyalty and support. A crisis of spirit arises when our foreign policy comes unhinged from the historic values we hold dear as a people, and when the role of the United States in the world becomes inexplicable to its own young citizens. This is happening to us. Its occurrence is of more fundamental importance than any question of economic theory, investment policy or diplomatic tactics.

Devising the right role for the United States in its own hemisphere and the world at large, a role consistent with the admirable ideals of its origins, would go far toward restoring our country to the unique position it once held in the community of man.

Crime

SOME CALL IT DISSENT

By BILL CHAPPELL, *United States Congressman from Florida*

Delivered before the Kewanis and Rotary Clubs of Ocala, Florida, March 30, 1970

ON DECEMBER 6, 1967, San Francisco State College erupted into a state of chaos. Rioting students and off-campus militants broke into buildings, smashed property, and beat students and newsmen. Some called it dissent. In Washington, several weeks ago, four thugs ran out from a darkened building, surrounded an elderly lady, robbed her of the fifty cents she had on her person, and bludgeoned her into unconsciousness. Some excused their behavior as dissent.

On April 4, 1969, shots rang out in Memphis, Tennessee, and Martin Luther King was dead from the unlawful use of an assassin's gun. Minutes later, thousands of people marched into the streets of Washington and for five days they burned and looted like invaders from another land. Fire after fire lighted the night. One . . . then another . . . a total of 711 were reported. 645 buildings were damaged or completely destroyed, while people wandered at will into the broken store fronts and walked away, weighed down with their plunder. Over one thousand people were injured, eleven were killed and property damage cost \$24,000,000. Some excused the assassin's act and the mob's behavior as dissent.

A few months ago, the Black Panthers in San Francisco handed out coloring books to little Negro children. The book portrayed blacks shooting and knifing policemen, with the caption: "The only good pig is a dead pig." Should such action

be excused as lawful dissent?

In Los Angeles, drug addicts Charles Manson and his cohorts are awaiting trial for the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate. Last week, Manson threw a copy of the United States Constitution into the waste basket in defiance of law and order. His supporters called it dissent.

What do *you* call it when a man robs another, when he steals, when he burns a building, when he threatens another with a gun, when he murders, when he teaches others to burn and to kill? I call it crime.

Crime . . . and the paralyzing fear of crime . . . has exploded into one of the most serious threats to America today. And if we are going to correct this problem, then we must understand a few of the reasons behind the rising crime rate.

Many in this country have come to regard the Supreme Court with such reverence that it can do no wrong—even when it hands down irresponsible decisions that cripple the police in their efforts to prevent crime, detect criminals and prosecute them. Its rulings on mob marches, riots, pornography and subversive activity are all contributing to the crime wave.

One of the great deterrents to crime is realistic penalty. A criminal law without an enforced realistic penalty is no law at all. Yet, the courts have encouraged criminal irresponsibility by handing out light and unrealistic sentences.

HARPER'S NOVEMBER 1963

The Atlantic Future: Europe's Choice

by Senator Frank Church

Frank Church, the guest in the Easy Chair this month, has been U.S. Senator from Idaho since 1957 and is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was keynoter of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, and a Military Intelligence officer in World War II.

If the partial test-ban treaty is the first crack in the glacier we call the Cold War, it should serve to remind us of how massive and prolonged a thaw is yet required before the danger of nuclear disaster finally melts away. In the years immediately ahead, the treaty in no sense diminishes the importance of our defensive alliances, chief among which is NATO.

Yet NATO is now drifting into a deepening crisis that our European allies seem either unwilling or unable to counteract. Everyone agrees, on both sides of the Atlantic, as to the fact that a crisis exists. Paradoxically, it is the very success of NATO in accomplishing its original objectives which has led to the present impasse.

NATO was originally established to prevent Western Europe, the heartland of our common civilization, from falling under Russian rule. For over fourteen years, NATO's shield has included large numbers of American troops, whose presence in Europe has been proof of the American commitment to invoke her nuclear power, as NATO's sword, in the event of a communist attack. American arms of both conventional and nuclear character were required to make NATO work, that is, to keep the Russians at bay while the countries of Western Europe, battered

and broken in the aftermath of the war, were regaining their health and strength.

I do not believe that either the American people or the Senate of the United States, which ratified the treaty establishing NATO, regarded our entry as an arrangement for stationing American forces permanently in Europe. Firemen are welcomed into a household threatened by fire, but they are not expected to remain inside indefinitely as residents. So it ought not to be surprising—in view of the remarkable recovery in Western Europe which has since occurred—that some Europeans should begin to ask, "How much longer are the Americans to stay?" or that some Americans should begin to inquire, "How much longer will we be welcome?"

We have come to the end of the era for which NATO was created. The circumstances have changed. We must remold the alliance to fit present conditions, or the crisis within it will grow. NATO cannot remain static and stay relevant; it must be transformed or abandoned; it will adapt to the new era as a useful instrument to serve the objectives we hold in common with our allies, or it will come apart from the stress of mounting internal pressures. So we must clearly identify those changes in circumstances which have rendered NATO, as originally conceived, obsolete.

To begin with, there has been a change in the relative strength, and hence in the credibility, of the American nuclear deterrent. This change has taken place in three phases. In the first phase, only the United States possessed massive strike ca-

pability with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union could oppose us with conventional land power alone. The deterrent was believable, and therefore effective, so long as the Soviets in fact understood that it would be used to prevent, or to punish, unacceptably, a march by them on the West. In the second phase, the Soviets possessed weapons of mass destruction. But the ones which could reach and damage the American continent were few in number, and vulnerable to neutralization by the enormous, superior and diversified nuclear weapons system which we had then developed. While the risks to the United States had been greatly increased, there was room to negotiate that we could, if necessary, tolerate Soviet power without suffering mortal damage in return. In the third and present phase, the assumption can no longer be made. Each nuclear giant possesses weapons sufficient in number, in diversification, in concealment, or in invulnerability, to ensure that it could withstand a first strike by its adversary and thereafter inflict near-total destruction upon him.

The consequence of this third phase is that Europeans must ask themselves—for the first time—if it is really believable that the American nation would suffer immolation for their defense. And the question is not whether we, the Americans, believe that we would do this, but whether the Europeans believe we would do it. For it is evident that a deterrent has failed if it has to be used, and it follows from this that it is only the Russian belief about the conditions under which

would be used—not our belief or that of our allies, or even the objective fact itself—which is ultimately determinative.

I know of no way to remove, absolutely, the doubts which some Europeans have raised about the answer to this question. The cornerstone of American policy has been, and remains, that the defense of the West is indivisible. Our President has recently reaffirmed, in Germany, that our forces will remain so long as they are wanted and needed; that we will put our cities to the hazard in defense of theirs. He spoke with absolute sincerity and conviction, and with the support of the American people. Still, the proposition itself is without precedent in human history. It cannot be tested or proved in advance. While it may be convincing to the Soviets, it evidently is no longer convincing to all Europeans, for, if it were, there would clearly be no need for France to pursue the effort now in progress to create, at great difficulty and expense, a separate national nuclear capability.

This brings me to the second fundamental change in circumstances which accounts for the crisis in NATO. It is that Europe now has, for the first time, the capacity to create for itself an alternative to reliance upon American power. I make a distinction here between nuclear capability of modest dimensions, useful chiefly as a means of augmenting the prestige or bargaining power of its possessor—perhaps having the potential of invoking, under some conditions, the use of American power—and a genuine nuclear deterrent, capable of massive or controlled response in a variety of strategic situations. It is the latter which free Europe now has: the population, the economic base, the technological resources, and the developing political institutions to create and command, if it chooses. In most of these categories, Western Europe now surpasses the Soviet Union itself. If Europe determines that the effort is necessary or desirable, it can in due course equip itself to match the Soviet Union, bomb for bomb, rocket for rocket. It would then, of course, be free from dependence upon a nuclear de-

terrent provided and controlled by the United States.

The present drift in free Europe points toward the eventual development of separate national nuclear systems, even though this course represents the most unstable, costly, and inefficient method for achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. Perhaps this is inevitable, as long as Western Europe remains a loose association of wholly sovereign states. The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the sovereign power to command them, for they represent in today's world the instruments of life or death—for the country which has them, for its adversaries, and quite probably for its allies.

What I have thus far said carries the implication that there is an inherent incompatibility in this new state of affairs between sovereignty, if that sovereignty involves possession and control of nuclear weapons, and alliance. I think this is the case, and that this single concept summarizes and explains the reasons for the crisis in NATO.

The continued expansion in Europe of nuclear capability under national control will expose the United States to intolerable risks, so long as our troops are there, and so long as we are committed to regard any attack upon our European allies as an attack upon ourselves. In these circumstances, every additional national finger upon the nuclear trigger means one more country other than the United States with power to decide what Americans will die for. While the risks involved in sharing this fateful power with a single independent European state, or with a suitable command structure representing all of Western Europe, might be acceptable, it is too much to ask that we share it with every European country stocking a nuclear arsenal of its own, each with its own sense of destiny and order of priorities.

In short, the present drift toward proliferation in the control of nuclear weapons, unless it is checked, will eventually force the United States to withdraw from Europe. Time is running out on the NATO alliance. The 1960s will tell the tale.


What then of the future? How are we to reconcile the conflicting

positions on control of nuclear weapons which now plague the alliance? I think we must begin by recognizing that no device or technical arrangement designed to gloss over the differences, without really changing anything, will suffice. As strongly as de Gaulle feels that France must have its own deterrent, we feel just as strongly that we must retain control over the risks to which we are exposed—so long as American forces are committed in Europe and we supply the nuclear means for meeting or preventing an attack against it. It is possible to share a master plan for programing and targeting, but the core decisions about the use of American nuclear weapons must be made by Americans.

I think there are, however, alternative solutions to the problem. The first is for Europe—not France or Germany or even Great Britain, but Western Europe—to undertake a unified effort to arm itself with a genuine nuclear-deterrent capability. To do this would require an integrated program, not merely because of the expense, but chiefly because it would be necessary to create a unified command structure with the sovereign power to invoke the use of its nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me that it would be in the interest of the United States to encourage and assist Europeans to make this effort. We could then withdraw our forces from the Continent in an orderly fashion, leaving Europe with its own defense, and both Europe and America could thus minimize the risks inherent in the proliferation of separate national defenses.

This course need not involve, as might be first supposed, a return to isolationism on the part of the United States. On the contrary, the creation of a European entity capable of assembling and commanding a unified European nuclear deterrent could contribute to a stronger partnership spanning the Atlantic, for the defense and development of our common civilization. I say it could contribute, because partnership is illusory if one partner is in a position to dominate the others. Just as there can be no authentic European entity under the hegemony of France, so there can be no equal partnership

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THE EASY CHAIR

across the Atlantic until Europe has achieved cohesion to match and balance the unified power of the United States.

In addition to this advantage, there would be others incidental to Europe's assuming full responsibility for its own defense. The American adverse balance-of-payments problem would then lend itself to ready solution. It is entirely possible, also, that the vexing problems resulting from the artificial division of Europe between East and West, which do not seem amenable to negotiations between Washington and the Kremlin, could be approached from new perspectives by Europeans negotiating with Europeans.

If the problem of attaining a sovereign, integrated European Nuclear Defense Command proves to be insuperable, and this further step toward a more perfect union among the countries of Western Europe is not taken, there is the other alternative: Let Europe forgo nuclear armament and continue, so long as the Cold War makes it necessary, to rely upon the United States to furnish the nuclear deterrent against a Soviet attack upon the Continent.

From our national point of view, this alternative is to be preferred; but I think that if we Americans are to be Europe's nuclear sentinels, stationed there for indefinite duty, then we have a right to ask our allies for fairer arrangements.

Let it be understood that we are there as invited guests, not as intruders; that our presence in Europe is no longer a rescue mission, extended by the strong to the weak, but simply a division of responsibility, as between rich equals, for mutual advantage. If we furnish our nuclear deterrent for the defense of Europe, as well as our physical presence to make this deterrent convincing to the Soviets, then Europe must make fair exchange, including at least two elements:

(1) No further diffusion of nuclear arms, for this will involve intolerable risks, both to us and to Europe itself. If we are to have the responsibility for holding at bay the weapons of mass destruction which might otherwise be used to smash or blackmail our NATO allies, we must ask that they rely on us to honor that

trust in our common interest, come what may.

(2) Equitable financial and economic arrangements to assist us in solving our adverse balance-of-payments problem. In this connection, it is notable that our military disbursements abroad contribute five times as much to the drain on our dollar resources as do all of our foreign-aid programs. There is no good reason why the force levels of American troops quartered in Europe should not be reduced, and the difference made up by an added commitment of European troops to the NATO Command. It is essential, too, that European trade barriers against American agricultural and industrial products be reduced or removed as speedily as possible. Finally, we have a right to ask that Europe assume an increased share of the cost of aiding the underdeveloped countries of the world in those needy regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where the struggle with communism is yet to be won.

There are heavy burdens and responsibilities, for Europeans as well as for Americans, whichever alternative is chosen. And the choice, after all, is Europe's. Either course would seem acceptable to the United States. What is not acceptable is a continuation of present trends which point toward the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance, leaving a vacuum of policy and power, with diminished security for all.

These thoughts were largely the substance of an address I delivered this June at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Bavaria, before a gathering of lay leaders representing various professional, business, and labor groups. The conference was attended by numerous German political leaders, including Chancellor Adenauer and Berlin Mayor Brandt.

Although I spoke only my personal views at Tutzing, the reaction to my speech caused me to feel that the United States ought to acknowledge openly that Europeans have their choices to make.

If nuclear parity for Western Europe becomes their chosen course, then it can be realized only through the creation of a genuine European deterrent. This would be a great step toward European union, even if it

No Such Thing as a "Mere Woman!"

by
Julian P. Van Winkle
President

Old Fitzgerald
Distillery

Louisville, Kentucky
Established 1849



Lo and behold, Johnny's report card listed him as the Number 2 student in his High School class.

"Congratulations, Son!" said his father. "But why not Number 1?"

"W-e-l-l," Johnny stammered. "There was *this girl* . . ."

"You mean you let a *mere girl* get ahead of you?" the father asked.

"You see, Dad," the boy explained, "girls aren't as *mere* as they were in your day!"

Likewise, to us Kentucky distillers in search of valued customers, today's grown-up girls are not as mere as once they were. In fact, American women, in their role as chief guardian of the household purse string, now account for upwards of thirty percent of all beverage purchases.

And across the land the cocktail hour is happily shared, as a pleasant respite from the cares of the day, by *both* man and wife.

At such times of wholesome renewal, our OLD FITZGERALD has special appeal.

For ours is a bourbon with a pleasing richness of flavor best appreciated in leisurely sips. Whiskey so carefully nurtured is no more to be gulped than the expertly prepared dinner soon to be served.

As our not-so-mere customers rightly appreciate, this twilight hour is a time for sharpening, not dulling, the human spirit. And in providing heightened pleasure in fewer but better drinks, OLD FITZGERALD encourages healthful moderation, at the same time fostering a pleasant day's-end "togetherness" for both the man-and-lady of the house.

If you are one who looks to the cocktail hour as a time of rest and restoration, we invite you to join an inner circle of moderate men and women who find in fewer but better "OLD FITZGERALDS" a well-deserved reward for the rigors of the day.

Kentucky Straight Bourbon
Always Bottled-in-Bond
Mellow 100 Proof

THE EASY CHAIR

had to be undertaken initially without de Gaulle. An empty chair could always be left for France to occupy eventually.

We must never forget that the most critical test of a deterrent is its credibility. A substantial nuclear retaliatory force, able to survive and strike back lethally at an aggressor—commanded by Europeans—is the most believable deterrent that can be posed against any future threat to attack Europe. Its existence would minimize the risk that the Soviets might someday mistake our intention or our will to defend Europe as our own homeland, and thus reduce the chance of war.

Further, the establishment of such a force in Europe would enable us to restore normalcy to our relationship with the Continent. History has a way of abhorring anomalies. It is as unnatural for American troops and weapons to be stationed indefinitely on European soil, as it would be for French, British, or German soldiers to be permanently billeted here in the United States.

Finally, the deliberate substitution of a European nuclear force would permit the orderly withdrawal of American power from Western Europe, under conditions of our own choosing, without impairment of Europe's security or our own.

I must report, however, that German reaction seemed heavily to favor the second of the alternatives I suggested—a confining reliance on the United States nuclear deterrent. If other European opinion bears out the apparent German belief that Europe is not yet prepared to form a single nuclear command, it seems all the more important to me to confront the Europeans with the fact that they do have such an alternative within their reach and that this choice is theirs.

Our failure to do just this is helping to widen the gulf between the developing attitudes in Washington and the capitals of Western Europe. As James Reston recently observed in his column in the *New York Times*:

The leaders in London and Bonn increasingly talk as if they were spectators rather than participants in the conflict between the giant nations.

Britons see nothing odd in the fact that America should conscript its men to defend Europe while Britain has not only abandoned conscription but is hoping to bring its army back from Germany.

The widely held assumption in West Europe is that Europe can be both protectionist and prosperous, self-sufficient economically and dependent on the United States militarily, and that Washington will go on putting 11 per cent of its gross national product into defense and foreign aid while some of the allies are doing less than half as much proportionately.

How this attitude of mind developed in Europe is clear enough. In the early postwar years of poverty and reconstruction, Western Europe not only came to rely on the United States but gradually accepted the idea that power in the modern world had become proportional to mass, and therefore that only gross material size (population, area, and raw materials) could be effective in world politics. There is now less evidence of poverty and unemployment anywhere in Western Europe than in many parts of the United States but this attitude persists and, what is more disturbing, seems to be growing.

Once the Europeans realize that we are not imposing our presence upon them for purposes of our own defense, and that their continued reliance upon our nuclear power is the result of their own decision, then they will see the justice in assuming an increased burden in conventional arms, as their share of the common effort, and in helping us to solve some of our financial problems which are directly related to the cost of our presence in Europe.

Moreover, for Europeans to make this choice consciously will reduce the appeal of de Gaulle's resistance to American leadership on the Continent, and render more acceptable our insistence that other European nations must forgo separate nuclear armaments of their own.

After I had spoken at Tutzing, one of the Germans in the audience said to me, "Senator, you have made a hard speech, but an honest one. To us, this is the best evidence of real friendship."

Another said, "As I see it, you have told us we will have to pay more. I think you are right."

LOOK - JAN. 26 1965

CONSPIRACY USA

The Radical Right's totalitarian methods in the campaign, and since, seriously threaten American freedom, reports Senator Church: The mutual confidence essential to free government is slowly being cut away by propaganda. Step by step, decent citizens come to tolerate attacks upon the loyalty of loyal men.

BY FRANK CHURCH UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM IDAHO

"What's AN EXTREMIST?"

"Why, that's a guy who keeps his socks up by walking on his hands!"

So went some of the banter in the recent campaign. If it had all been so flippant, we could give the country high marks for ready humor. American soldiers, after all, grew robust around the cracker barrel on many a gibe and belly laugh.

But the real menace of extremism cannot be laughed away. It is, unfortunately, a fever that has not been overcome by the election results. From what I saw in the campaign, and what has happened since, I know we have cause for serious concern about the future of freedom in America.

To understand why, we might begin with the frog story that keeps popping up in Right-Wing literature: Put a frog in cold water and heat the water very slowly. Before the frog catches on, he's cooked. This story is used to illustrate the radical's thesis that, with each Government program, we creep along the road to communism—until suddenly we're there before we know it.

A friend of mine in Idaho tried the slow-boil experiment the other day on one of our frogs. You guessed it! The frog jumped out of the pan. How-

ever, Idaho frogs may be smarter than most. I checked with U. S. Department of Agriculture scientists, and I learned that, in a properly controlled experiment, an ordinary frog's internal system will fail to sound the alarm in time to save him.

The same can happen to our internal political system—through the slowly boiling outrages of extremism. We have already become accustomed to a level of political absurdity that would have seemed, a few years ago, quite impossible.

A distressed schoolteacher writes to warn me that "our defenses are being destroyed and we are rapidly becoming sitting ducks for our enemies." If the Communists are successful in seizing control of the country, she continues, "we will go down together. You, as well as all leaders, will be liquidated. . . . None will be spared unless they are members of the Communist organization."

How do you answer such a letter? Its implication—that this sturdy country of ours is about to be taken over—is preposterous. Yet this honest, deeply disturbed woman is being trapped into the belief that treason seethes around her.

Hardened adherents to the conspiracy theory of the Radical Right send a different kind of letter.

filled with insult and invective, often neatly typed on fine letterheads, though occasionally scribbled on scraps of paper and smudged with handprints in red ink to signify their suspicion that I, along with most other public officials, am either an unwitting tool or a conscious agent in a sinister plot to betray the country.

These people cannot be shrugged off as a "crackpot" fringe; their numbers alone compel us to be concerned, and they spread the virus like Typhoid Marys. In many places, they dominate the letters-to-the-editor columns of the local newspapers. Here is a sample from the Sunday *Statesman* in my home city of Boise, Idaho: "The 'Social Studies' program [in the high schools] was initiated 30 years ago by American education intelligentsia after the Soviet plan, for the acknowledged purpose of promoting the 'collectivist society' in America."

Another letter brings the startling news that "the present administration is working hard to undermine our whole defense system and make it much easier for the Communist party to make more gains overseas and even in our own country."

These are angry people, but they suffer more from folly than from hatred. "Folly is a more

continued

Rightists slashed tires, daubed a swastika

dangerous enemy to the good than malice," Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the theologian, discovered in 1942. "Malice always contains the seeds of its own destruction, for it always makes men uncomfortable." This Nazi-hunted pastor wrote these words before foolish men caught him and hanged him.

The treachery theme, in assorted versions, inspires a virulent fanaticism that many Americans have not yet learned to deal with. Most of us recognize, and dismiss, the extremists on the racial front, both white and black, who openly flaunt their bigotry. Such inciters may draw a following for a while, but the great bulk of our people, in their abiding decency, will not be taken in.

The same common sense accounts for the decline of the Communist party in the U. S. Back in 1932, it ran candidates in 39 states and garnered a total of 102,991 votes. In those desperate Depression days, the Communists were at work in labor unions and on college campuses. But the reforms of the thirties, the resurgence of free enterprise and its spreading abundance, robbed the "class struggle" of its credibility. The unions cleaned shop, the Communist groups faded on campus, and the Communist party itself was outlawed by Congress.

In view of this collapse of the Radical Left as a political force within the United States, the precipitous rise of the Radical Right is all the more curious. Lacking a flesh-and-blood adversary with which to grapple, the Right has improvised one, conjuring up a phantom. It takes the vague form of conspiracy, which supposedly involves the top offices of the land. *The Time Has Come*, a Birch-distributed pamphlet, trumpeted in 1964, "Washington has been taken over! By which we mean that Communist influences are now in full working control of our Federal Government."

Here, in the Birch Society, is the taproot of the conspiracy doctrine. It was no slip of the tongue when the Society's Robert Welch charged Dwight D. Eisenhower with "knowingly accepting and abiding by Communist orders and consciously serving the Communist conspiracy for all of his adult life." Mr. Welch listed similar charges against Milton Eisenhower, Allen and John Foster Dulles, General of the Army George C. Marshall and Chief Justice Earl Warren.

The thesis, that our leaders are Red-tainted, has to be regularly updated by the Radical Right. The newest summation appears in *None Dare Call It Treason*. From February to election day, 1964, more than eight million copies went out—one for every six families. The book's potential effect is sobering to contemplate, for it could work its poison through our body politic for years to come like the slow, half-life chemistry of radiation. Bruce Felknor, director of the Fair Campaign Practices Committee, a nonpartisan group that studies smear tactics, says that the burden of *Treason* is to "make the Democratic party appear to be selling out to the Reds, and . . . to make liberal Republicans out as co-conspirators with the Democrats in advancing the cause of world communism."

I saw the marks of the conspiracy doctrine in some communities of my own state. For the first

Brown, Republican editor of the Blackfoot (Idaho) *News*, backed Harding. One morning, Brown found his car with a red swastika painted on the door, tires slashed and sugar in the gas tank. Later, a female voice on his phone said: "Last time, it was your car; next time, it will be your home."

In Wyoming, Sen. Gale McGee, an outspoken critic of the Radical Right, found youngsters in Laramie and Cheyenne on a house-to-house canvass distributing mimeographed leaflets. They were instructed to say: "This is an enemy agent. Here are the facts about Communist McGee." The Senator's wife Loraine had her husband's campaign cards grabbed from her hands, torn into pieces, thrown at her feet and then spat upon.

A state director of a charitable foundation, whom I know, came home one night to find "Reds" painted on the mailbox, "damn Socialists" daubed on the lawn table, the house lights and windows, which were beyond the reach of children, painted bright red. What made him an enemy? A picture of the President of the United States in his window.

Merchants of outrage

In the face of such vehemence, people voted heavily for the moderates. The landslide, some concluded, smothered the Radical Right.

I do not agree.

"In the past several months, the conservative message has received unprecedented exposure," says the Rev. Billy James Hargis, who directs what he calls the Christian Crusade and, like other leaders of the Radical-Right movement, styles himself a "conservative." Without doubt, this exposure is paying off, at least for the moment.

The Right Wing reports rapid growth. Since 1955, its organizations have been expanding at an average annual rate of 22 percent. The Birch Society, the strongest and most influential group, reports that the campaign months from August to October established all-time records in new-member recruitment. Thirty of the largest organizations raised their aggregate annual budgets from \$4,906,000 in 1958 to \$14,300,000 in 1963. Total spending by all Right-Wing outfits hit \$30 million in 1963, researchers estimate, half again more than both major parties spent in the Presidential campaign. The Birch Society will boost its 1965 budget by a whopping one third.

The propaganda network of the Radical Right forms a giant web. Its 20 largest publications boast a combined circulation in excess of a million. The Right also makes its pitch on the public air through 7,000 radio broadcasts every week. The case history of one spokesman measures the menace: The Rev. Carl McIntire was broadcasting in 1958 from a single radio station. He accused the National Council of Churches—Methodists, Presbyterians and 29 other denominations—of lining up "alongside Communist action" in the racial conflict. Today, the avalanche of contributions he solicits from gullible listeners underwrites daily broadcasts on 617 stations.

McIntire is only one of several Big Scare purveyors on radio-TV. Their conspiratorial in-

ika on an editor's car, taught kids to cry "enemy agent."

triotriots" into his secret army. In a post-election newsletter, DePugh exudes desperation: "The hopes of millions of Americans that the Communist tide could be stopped with ballots instead of bullets have turned to dust." A St. Petersburg, Fla. Birch Society chapter passed out a Minutemen newsletter's call to arms: "If you are EVER going to buy a gun, BUY IT NOW! . . . Form a secret Minutemen team. This is your best guarantee that someone will act promptly to help secure your freedom when the time comes that you unexpectedly turn up missing."

Wild-eyed? Fanatical? Indeed, but only an extreme symptom of the Right-Wing affliction, which, if it keeps on spreading, will infect millions more with the fever of fear.

What, then, is to be done about it? First of all, I think, we must undertake to reclaim the precious words of our own heritage. "Freedom," "Christian," "Americanism" are not nameplates to be exploited by charlatans. Nor, for that matter, is the time-honored term "conservative."

There is plenty of room in this country for the whole spectrum of opinion, from the most progressive to the most reactionary. The sweep of opinion is the essence of a free society. In the Senate, one quickly learns not only to tolerate, but to respect, the integrity of another man's point of view. The range of opinion within each party extends from a Wayne Morse to a Harry F. Byrd, from a Barry Goldwater to a Jacob Javits. But each senator recognizes the essential loyalty and good faith of his colleagues. All understand that free government rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and upon its ruin, tyranny is built.

Robert Welch, taking a radically different position, describes democracy as "merely a deceptive phrase, a weapon of demagoguery, and a perennial fraud," and admonishes his followers to understand that "the John Birch Society will operate under completely authoritative control at all levels." This is neither the language of the true conservative nor the method of freedom.

Scholars differ on why so many conscientious Americans are being caught up in the Radical Right. It is, clearly, a revolt against the established order by the discontented, motivated by a mixture of reasons: a quest for some higher purpose than is satisfied by the commercial standards of our times; a fear of the new relationships being generated by the burgeoning growth, urbanization and automation of the country; a resistance to the complexities of modern life, to the bigness of government, to the racial revolution, to a "cold war" that never ends, to the absence of quick and easy solutions; a frustration over the inability of the United States, in the nuclear age, to swiftly work its will upon the world. These are the conditions of life with which we must cope, but they stir many a rebel to go forth in search of a cause.

The rebel may find his cause when asked to join a study group where big things are "considered"—communism, the Constitution, the need for recapturing traditional values. Do the neighbors care about communism? They seem to care only about bowling, bridge and barbecues.

So a convert is made. He is taught that the Communists are corrupting the children by creating an allegiance to the United Nations, which is actually Communist-inspired (by Alger Hiss) and operated (by U Thant, along with some Red

generals and judges). Obviously, in order to save the children, the high-school textbooks must go.

Now, the institutions of the town itself are directly challenged. How will the teachers react, the parents in PTA, the ministers in their pulpits, the editors in their news columns? Will the sensible citizens fight back, or remain uninvolved? I can't really blame those who choose the easy way out, when so many men in high public office duck for cover. For too long, too many politicians have used our national repugnance to communism as a convenient crutch in their races. Little wonder that they now hesitate, though many see the need, to take issue with constituents who regard themselves as superpatriots, waving the compelling banner of "anti-communism."

The strawman specter

But the local and national community can no longer afford to hesitate. The Radical Right is not so much the enemy of communism as it is the enemy of freedom. It opposes the only programs that fight the real Communist threat—which festers on the miseries of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America—and focuses instead on a strawman specter at home. The resulting fear undermines public confidence in the very institutions of popular government, in the men of Congress, the Supreme Court and the Presidency itself. When mutual confidence is destroyed, then we shall have cause to fear the loss of freedom in America.

The time has come to affirm that this country of ours is not a Victorian Haunted House, its foundations eaten away by Red termites. This country is a great, free land, rich beyond dreaming, powerful beyond belief; a land still striving, in ever-larger measure, to reach the goals of equality and personal liberty to which we pledged our nation in the days of its infancy.

The world is not a big Red sea in which this country is being scuttled, but a vast arena of political upheaval in which the quest for freedom, ever stronger, has overthrown the colonial empires of the past. It isn't a tidy world, nor is it a secure one. But it is one for which the United States set the revolutionary example.

To put this world, and the nation, in a proper perspective for the American people—this is the urgent business of statesmanship today. The job cannot be done without first exposing the delusions of the fanatical Right. Its propaganda, its frequent resort to outright intimidation and coercion, represent nothing less than totalitarian methods. They must be repudiated by all responsible citizens, Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, who won't run at the first cry of "Comsymp!"

If our inner strength fails, we may end like the frog: cooked before we know it. Daniel Bell, scholar of mass movements, put the danger wisely:

"Barbarous acts are rarely committed out of the blue . . . Step by step, a society becomes accustomed to accept, with less and less moral outrage, and with greater and greater indifference to legitimacy, the successive blows. What is uniquely disturbing about the emergence of the Radical Right in the 1960's is the support it has been able to find among traditional community leaders who have themselves become conditioned, through an indiscriminate anti-communism, to judge as respectable a movement which, if successful, can only end the liberties they profess to cherish." END

Yet there remains a need to transfer technology as well as capital to Latin America. This can best be done through expanding the exchange-of-persons program to enable more Latin Americans to study in the United States, and through selective grants to a few outstanding Latin American universities. The role of shirt-sleeve diplomat, the concept which underlay the original Point Four program, can best be played by Peace Corps Volunteers.

(5) Another promising agency has been created by last year's Foreign Assistance Act, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, more commonly known as OPIC. Its purpose is to encourage, through a liberalized program of investment guarantees, a larger flow of American private capital into developing countries. In Latin America, OPIC could play a useful role, if it encourages the right kind of investment, directing it away from the sensitive resource areas, and pointing it toward joint ventures in which Latin Americans will share largely in both ownership and management. Here, again, everything depends on the way OPIC is administered.

The use of joint ventures deserves emphasis. I am well aware that joint ventures are distasteful to many—not all—American companies. But, in the long run, this may be the only way U. S. business interests can survive in Latin America.

Before concluding, let me just add one warning here. Private foreign investment is not economic cooperation and assistance; it is business, and most Latin leaders are willing to treat it in a business-like manner. What Latin Americans are telling us is, "if the U. S. wants its investors to prosper in the region, then it is incumbent on the U. S. to make sure that

investors are 'development-oriented.'"

Whether the public or private sectors are involved, it is essential for the United States to lower its profile in Latin America. Our national interests can best be served, not by helping Latin America less, but by loosening our embrace. We should keep a decent distance away from their internal affairs, from their military apparatus and their revolving-door governments. This would be best for us and best for them.

It would also disengage the United States from its unseemly courtship of governments which are living contradictions to our traditional values as a nation. When we pour our money into budgetary support for a notoriously authoritarian government, when we supply it with riot guns, tear gas and mace, intelligent young Americans who still want to believe in our professed ideals, begin to ask elemental questions.

"If we are not *against* such dictatorships," they ask, "then what is it we are *for* that really matters?"

In the final analysis, each country must live by the ideals it prizes most highly. That is the basis upon which governments turn to their people for loyalty and support. A crisis of spirit arises when our foreign policy comes unhinged from the historic values we hold dear as a people, and when the role of the United States in the world becomes inexplicable to its own young citizens. This is happening to us. Its occurrence is of more fundamental importance than any question of economic theory, investment policy or diplomatic tactics.

Devising the right role for the United States in its own hemisphere and the world at large, a role consistent with the admirable ideals of its origins, would go far toward restoring our country to the unique position it once held in the community of man.

Crime

SOME CALL IT DISSENT

By BILL CHAPPELL, *United States Congressman from Florida*

Delivered before the Kewanis and Rotary Clubs of Ocala, Florida, March 30, 1970

ON DECEMBER 6, 1967, San Francisco State College erupted into a state of chaos. Rioting students and off-campus militants broke into buildings, smashed property, and beat students and newsmen. Some called it dissent. In Washington, several weeks ago, four thugs ran out from a darkened building, surrounded an elderly lady, robbed her of the fifty cents she had on her person, and bludgeoned her into unconsciousness. Some excused their behavior as dissent.

On April 4, 1969, shots rang out in Memphis, Tennessee, and Martin Luther King was dead from the unlawful use of an assassin's gun. Minutes later, thousands of people marched into the streets of Washington and for five days they burned and looted like invaders from another land. Fire after fire lighted the night. One . . . then another . . . a total of 711 were reported. 645 buildings were damaged or completely destroyed, while people wandered at will into the broken store fronts and walked away, weighed down with their plunder. Over one thousand people were injured, eleven were killed and property damage cost \$24,000,000. Some excused the assassin's act and the mob's behavior as dissent.

A few months ago, the Black Panthers in San Francisco handed out coloring books to little Negro children. The book portrayed blacks shooting and knifing policemen, with the caption: "The only good pig is a dead pig." Should such action

be excused as lawful dissent?

In Los Angeles, drug addicts Charles Manson and his cohorts are awaiting trial for the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate. Last week, Manson threw a copy of the United States Constitution into the waste basket in defiance of law and order. His supporters called it dissent.

What do *you* call it when a man robs another, when he steals, when he burns a building, when he threatens another with a gun, when he murders, when he teaches others to burn and to kill? I call it crime.

Crime . . . and the paralyzing fear of crime . . . has exploded into one of the most serious threats to America today. And if we are going to correct this problem, then we must understand a few of the reasons behind the rising crime rate.

Many in this country have come to regard the Supreme Court with such reverence that it can do no wrong—even when it hands down irresponsible decisions that cripple the police in their efforts to prevent crime, detect criminals and prosecute them. Its rulings on mob marches, riots, pornography and subversive activity are all contributing to the crime wave.

One of the great deterrents to crime is realistic penalty. A criminal law without an enforced realistic penalty is no law at all. Yet, the courts have encouraged criminal irresponsibility by handing out light and unrealistic sentences.

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Farewell To Foreign Aid

A LIBERAL TAKES LEAVE

By FRANK CHURCH, *United States Senator from Idaho*

Delivered in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., October 29, 1971

WE STAND IN this year 1971 at the end of one decade of disillusion, with no good reason to believe that we are not now embarked upon another. Ten years ago, the leaders of the United States—and to a lesser degree the American people—were filled with zeal about their global goals. With supreme confidence both in our power and capacity to make wise and effective use of it, we proclaimed the dawning of a new era in which America would preserve world peace, stem communism and lead the impoverished masses of mankind through the magic point of "takeoff" into a "decade of development." To bring these glories to pass—so we allowed ourselves to believe—we had only to recognize the simple, central fact which Professor Walt Rostow assured us would bring victory in Vietnam and success in all our other foreign enterprises, "the simple fact that we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it."

Looking back on the sixties, no one can deny that we were indeed "the greatest power in the world" and that we surely did "behave like it"—if throwing our might and money around is the correct measure of "behaving like it." Nonetheless, we not only failed to accomplish what we set out to accomplish ten years ago; we have been thrown for losses across the board: in the name of preserving peace, we have waged an endless war; in the guise of serving as sentinel for the "free world," we have stood watch while free governments gave way to military dictatorship in country after country, from one end of our vast hegemony to the other. Today, confidence in American leadership abroad is as gravely shaken as is confidence in the American dollar. As for the "decade of development," ten years of American foreign aid spread far and wide, not only has failed to narrow the gap between rich nations and poor; the gap between the small, wealthy elites and the impoverished masses in most underdeveloped lands has also widened.

Against this backdrop of general failure, the Senate is being asked to authorize yet another year of foreign aid as usual. For fiscal year 1972, President Nixon has asked for a foreign aid authorization of more than \$3.5 billion compared with \$3.1 billion appropriated last year, and included \$500 million added on for Israel. Clearly, the Administration seeks not just to sustain, but to increase the level of spending.

The annual foreign aid authorization bill, however, is more than the visible tip of the iceberg. It constitutes about two-fifths of a total foreign aid program of over \$10 billion proposed for this fiscal year by the Executive Branch.

The magnitude of the foreign aid program can be grasped by projecting its costs over the period of the next five years. Calculating these costs on a conservative basis—estimating on a projection of existing, not hypothetical, spending levels, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee forecasts that foreign assistance for the five-year period, FY 1973-1977, will exceed \$50 billion! Less than half of the five year total will result from programs authorized by the regular foreign assistance and military credit sales program. Thirteen billion will be attributable to programs now funded through the Defense Appropriation bill, and the P.L. 94-142 program will account for an additional \$7 billion.

Staggering as these totals seem, it is probable that the actual costs will be short of the mark. In calculating the estimates, the committee staff used only the most reliable and restrictive of available guidelines. For example:

1. Regional and country economic aid estimates were based on the projection of the average of the programs for FY 1970, 1971, and the amount requested for FY 1972.
2. Regional and country military aid and credit sales estimates were based on the average of the programs for FY 1971 and that planned for FY 1972, except for

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case of countries such as Korea and Cambodia, where special circumstances apply, or in the cases of Africa and Latin America where higher ceilings are now being proposed.

3. An inflation factor of only 3.5 per cent was used to calculate projections for all programs except those for ship loans and excess defense articles, which were calculated at one-third of acquisition cost.
4. It was assumed that programs related to the Vietnam War will continue at the FY 1972 level on the theory that if the shooting war stops, there is likely to be a corresponding increase in economic aid for reconstruction purposes and the total U. S. assistance will not decline.
5. Contributions to international lending organizations were based on a continuation of present levels or scheduled contributions without accounting for the impact of inflation.
6. No costs were included for a possible residual military assistance advisory group in Vietnam.

The five-year projection probably falls short in still other ways. It is impossible to estimate with any precision the future size of certain programs, such as that for the distribution of excess defense articles. As the war in Vietnam continues to wind down, and our armed forces are restructured, the quantity of excess weapons and war materials is bound to increase way above the \$660 million planned for distribution outside Vietnam this year. The prodigious turnover of military equipment to the Vietnamese just doesn't show up on the books, nor does the value of American bases being transferred to them. Furthermore, the number of ships available for giving or lending to foreign countries is also likely to increase substantially as our navy's participation in the Vietnam war diminishes and its modernization program expands.

For all of these reasons, the staff projection of the cost of foreign aid to the United States for the next five years, which totals \$51,024,050,000, is probably too low. That, in itself, should give us pause. No Senator should vote to approve this year's authorization bill, without looking ahead. Perpetuating foreign aid through this annual ritual is a salami-slicing tactic. Only by studying the projections over the next five years, is it possible to appreciate what a tremendous outlay of this country's financial resources is actually entailed. Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that the committee staff charts, showing requested totals of foreign aid for FY 1972, and estimated levels for the next five years, appear at this point in the Record.

A perusal of these charts will reveal that foreign aid, in all its forms, is costing the United States approximately \$10 billion a year! This country simply cannot afford to sustain such an outlay out of habit, especially when in terms of its stated objectives—the containment of communism, the promotion of economic development, and the advancement of freedom—the program is on the whole a proven failure, whose continuation is warranted on these empirical grounds alone.

It seems important, however, if we are to learn something from the experience, to consider why our aid programs have failed to achieve their objectives and whether, indeed, these objectives were sound to begin with. The technicalities have been examined and reexamined; every few years a new commission conducts a new study resulting in a new report and a new reorganization—and nothing else. Never yet have we considered in full measure the possibility that the failure of aid is not technical and administrative but conceptual and political, and that it can only be understood as an aspect of the larger failure of American foreign policy over the last decade. If that is the case, as I have come to believe, it is futile to

the most efficient organization and the most competent management must fail if the program itself is rooted in obsolete conceptions of the national interest and if the objectives meant to be achieved are unsound or unattainable, or both.

On the basis of our experience over the last decade in dealing with the third world—unquestionably the "disaster area of our foreign policy"—John Kenneth Galbraith suggests four lessons that we should have learned:

First, it now seems clear that the "Marshall Plan syndrome"—the belief that American capital, energy and know-how could not fail to work economic wonders in any country on whom these blessings might be conferred—has turned out to be largely irrelevant and unworkable in the poor countries which lack Europe's pre-existing organizational, administrative and technical capacities.

Second, it is evident now, if it was not before, that in the poor rural societies of the third world the concepts of "communism" and capitalism are of little more than "terminological" significance. The fact that these countries are poor and rural has vastly greater meaning than the fact that such little enterprise as they have may be "socialist" or "free."

Third, in the course of discovering that the inner life and development of the third world lie beyond the reach of external control, we have also discovered that the futile effort to shape another country's development calls into being an enormous, intrusive civilian and military bureaucracy. Whereas colonial power was exercised directly, Professor Galbraith observes, through a simple line of command, our campaign to win the hearts and minds of foreign populations requires "a much more massive table of organization." Indeed, in the course of recent hearings on Brazil in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the fact came out that, relative to population, we have twice as many American officials administering our aid program in Brazil today as the British had in India governing that country before independence.

Finally, Professor Galbraith notes, we have seen how an overseas bureaucracy acquires a life and purpose of its own, only tenuously controlled by the Executive in Washington and effectively beyond the reach of Congress and the American people. Like any bureaucracy—especially a colonial service far removed from its home base—the American aid and military establishment abroad are motivated by one simple unshakable ambition: to survive and perpetuate their species.¹

Finally, I would suggest a fifth lesson to be drawn from the experience of the sixties: that, even with enormous power and the best of intentions, there are some things we cannot do, things which are beyond our moral and intellectual resources. If we learn nothing else from the experience of the sixties, it will profit us immeasurably to have learned that being richer and stronger than everybody else has not made us wiser. When it comes to wisdom, we are part of the pack; just knowing that will be wisdom enough.

It is astonishing in retrospect how little we questioned the seeming verities of the cold war during the fifties and sixties. Conservatives railed against "international communism" and prescribed military aid; liberals, believing themselves more sophisticated, spoke of the "Sino-Soviet bloc" and the greater usefulness of economic aid. Neither questioned the premises of the cold war or the purposes of aid. China and Russia alike were perceived as implacable enemies of the "free world;" if they differed, it was only on the most efficient means of "burying" us. Aid—both military and economic—was con-

ceived primarily as an instrument of containment, a weapon in the cold war, and if some Americans favored military assistance and other economic, that too was a matter of tactics, if not of how to "bury" the Communists, then at least of how to contain them.

Like most shibboleths, the trouble with containment is not that it was illusory in its original formulation but that it was subsequently elevated to the status of a universal truth, which it is not, and applied in areas where it had no bearing. Vietnam is the principal case in point: we supported the French, then supplanted them, and finally plunged into a war in which we are now still engaged because we had persuaded ourselves that Ho Chi Minh was the puppet of the Chinese, who in turn, at least until the mid-fifties, we regarded as puppets of the Soviet Union.

When the cold war philosophy developed, back in the late Forties and early Fifties, the Soviet Union had indeed represented a military threat to Western Europe. Extrapolating from that quite plausible threat, we came to suppose that we were confronted with a ruthless, coordinated global force to which we gave the name of "international communism." By the time of the Johnson Administration, the cold war outlook had been refined to take account of the Sino-Soviet split, so that Mr. Rusk raised the specter not of "international communism" but of a "world cut in two by Asian communism." Still this outlook was the direct descendant of the Acheson view of 1949 when the then Secretary of State proclaimed the Chinese Communists to be "a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism," led by men who "have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia. . . ."²

Foreign aid, which had worked so well in Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, was conceived thereafter as one of the arsenal of weapons to be employed in the grand, global strategy of containment. Military assistance, starting with the Truman Doctrine, was designed to bolster the armed forces of the arc of nations along the periphery of the "Sino-Soviet bloc;" it was soon extended to support shaky regimes beyond the periphery of the "bloc," in Asia and Latin America, against the danger of foreign sponsored subversion. Economic assistance, it was thought, would serve the same purpose by promoting development and prosperity, by robbing subversion of its appeal to the masses. Liberals and conservatives within the United States debated the proper mix of economic and military support; neither questioned their purpose nor underlying premise.

The premise, however, was open to question from the outset. As early as January 1945—so the Foreign Relations Committee was recently told by one of our leading China experts—Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai secretly informed President Roosevelt that they were willing to meet with him in Washington for exploratory talks as leaders of a Chinese political party.³ Soon thereafter—so reported an American Foreign Service Officer named John Stewart Service—Mao outlined a plan for postwar Chinese-American economic cooperation. "America," Mao told Service, "is not only the most suitable country to assist the economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America. . . ."⁴ Again, in 1946, Chou En-lai made it clear to President Truman's special Ambassador, General Marshall, that the Chinese Communists had no wish to be totally dependent on Stalin. "Of course we will lean to

one side," he said. "But how far we lean depends on you."⁵

It has also become apparent that the notion of "communism with its headquarters in Peking" has been more myth than reality. China had little or nothing to do with North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950, and entered the war reluctantly only to counter General MacArthur's reckless thrust to the border of Manchuria. China also had little to do with the Vietminh insurrection in Vietnam; indeed, the first Indochina war began three years before Chinese communists won their own civil war in China.

Just as China had no wish to rely exclusively on the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh had no wish to be a satellite of China. According to an article of last June 30 in the *Christian Science Monitor* drawn from previously unpublished Pentagon papers on the United States "ignored eight direct appeals for aid to North Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh in the five winter months following the end of World War II,"⁶ more astonishing, according to this account, "Ho also received several messages through secret channels even earlier, in August and September of 1945, proposing that Vietnam be accorded the 'same status as the Philippines'—an undetermined period of tutelage preliminary to independence."

If there is any truth in this version of events—and there is evidence of much truth in it is overwhelming—we are led to the conclusion that American foreign policy since World War II has been based in large part on a false premise, the myth of the Communist monolith. This is not to say that either of the great Communist powers has been benignly friendly but only that they have not been consistent in their hostility, which in part has been provoked by our own actions; they have seldom acted in concert; that both have influenced but neither has ever really dominated the Communist movements of Southeast Asia; and that both of the great Communist states and certain of the small ones—including North Vietnam—have on certain occasions been willing, even eager to come to terms with the United States.

For reasons ranging from our dismay with Stalin's Russia after World War II to the intimidating effects of the ensuing anti-Communist hysteria at home, American policy has clung tenaciously through the fifties and sixties to the myth of the Communist monolith. It was in that frozen frame of reference that our foreign aid programs were designed, with an unprecedented array of alliances and a massive buildup of American military power, as part of a grand strategy for the containment of "international communism." Well over half of our aid to the so-called "developing countries" has been military and paramilitary assistance. Foreign aid, economic as well as military, was sold to Communist as a national security measure. The "developing countries" were portrayed as cold war battlegrounds which would be vulnerable to communism if we did not sustain them. In undeveloped countries, John J. McCloy wrote in 1960, promises to be "the principal battleground in which the forces of freedom and communism compete—a battleground in which the final shape of society may finally be tested and determined."⁸

Even if the premise of a unified aggressive "international communism" had been sound, the strategy for countering it with foreign aid was not. Experience has shown that, although military assistance can be a potent factor in countering insurgency, it is by no means a reliable one, while American economic support has almost no influence whatever, whether a country "goes Communist," as Cuba and Chile have shown. This is not for lack of skill or technical know-how

² *United States Relations with China*, Department of State, August 1949.

³ Allen Whiting, on June 28, 1971.

⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945,*

Vol. VIII, The Far East, China, Washington, 1969, p. 274.

⁵ Whiting, *ibid.*

⁶ Quoted in Richard J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution* (1969), p. 27.

our part but because of the irrelevance of the instrument to the objective. The countries of Asia and Africa—I must here include Latin America—which have remained non-communist have done so not because the United States has succeeded in buying their allegiance or in launching them toward "takeoff" and self-sustaining economic growth, but because they have not wished to become Communist, regarding communism as an alien ideology, or because their populations have been too poor and illiterate to be interested in such sophistications as ideology or revolution.

Revealingly, the Russians have had no greater success in buying ideological converts with aid than we have had in trying to head them off. In one or two instances, small African countries have unceremoniously packed off their Russian aid technicians when their presence became too intrusive. Egypt, which has been the largest single recipient of Soviet foreign aid for the last fifteen years, has rigorously suppressed its internal Communists and repeatedly warned the Russians against meddling in internal Arab affairs. In July of this year, President Sadat responded to a Soviet appeal for Egyptian pressure against the crackdown on Communists in the Sudan, with an angry address before the Arab Socialist Union in which he declared that Egypt would never become Communist or recognize an Arab Communist government—although, President Sadat added, Egypt would remain friendly to the Soviet Union, even after a possible settlement with Israel.⁷ Occurrences such as this suggest the advisability of giving credit where it is due: when it comes to using aid for political purposes, the Russians have a greater talent for alienating people from communism than we do.

Nonetheless, our Administration persists in the delusion that it can buy influence with aid. So President Nixon seems to believe in his insistence on letting military and economic aid filter through to the government of West Pakistan, even though American arms may be used to carry out the savage oppression of the people of East Pakistan. When the House of Representatives voted in early August to suspend aid to the West Pakistani regime, except for relief assistance in East Pakistan and for East Pakistani refugees in India, President Nixon expressed his disapproval on the ground that an aid cutoff would jeopardize the Pakistani government's ability to create "stability" and would undermine our own ability to influence the course of events . . .⁸ In terms of the *realpolitik* which this Administration seems so fond, our continuation of aid "already in the pipeline" to Pakistan is supposed to buy influence with the ruling generals in Islamabad and help forestall the influence of Communist China. The cost of this influence—such as it may be—is the loss of our influence with India, which has now concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Worse still, as the *New York Times* put it in a recent editorial, our continuing support of the Pakistani government "has put the United States in the position of subsidizing, and thus seeming to condone, crimes against humanity unequalled since Hitler's time."⁹

While experience has shown that our aid programs have little if any relevance either to the deterrence of communism or the encouragement of democracy, they have been effective in certain instances in keeping unpopular regimes in power. They have certainly contributed to that end in the cases of the Greek colonels, the Pakistani generals and the Brazilian junta. All of these regimes are dictatorships, but they are anti-communist and therefore pass our eligibility test for membership in the "free world." A government may torture and terrorize its own population but—from the standpoint of

our policy makers—as long as it remains anti-communist, provides "stability," generally supports American foreign policy and is hospitable to American investment, it qualifies, for purposes of aid, as a "free country."

"Stability" is an antiseptic word; it reveals nothing about how individual people live and die. "Stability," as Richard Barnet points out, "is an *antidevelopment* goal in countries where the established institutions perpetuate poverty and the ruling elites show no serious commitment to change."¹⁰

As the Tsars of Russia and the Sultans of Turkey understood very well, there is no better defense against radical revolution, no greater assurance of "stability," than an ignorant and inert population. Traveling in Latin America several years ago, a Senate staff member noted repeatedly in his diary the gentleness, submissiveness and conservatism of the *campesinos* in one country after another. "Like the peasants of northeastern Brazil," he noted, "the Indians in the *barriadas* of Lima are not revolutionary; they are too humble and ignorant and are therefore subrevolutionary or prerevolutionary. That, however, is not necessarily going to be the case with their prodigal offspring, many of whom are getting a little schooling and a little view of the world beyond the sierra and the *barriada*. Some of them are going to get ideas and it only takes a few who are smart and tough to make a revolution."¹¹

When revolution comes—as it likely will in many of the still "stable" countries of the third world—it will bear no resemblance to the kind of benign, gradual "takeoff" into self-sustaining growth envisioned by American aid officials and private investors. The notion that a stable, non-revolutionary social structure is the essential condition of economic development is a self-serving rationalization. It enables American policy makers to believe that the interests of the United States, as they conceive them, are identical with the social and economic interests of the poor countries. "Stability," they insist, is not only essential for the exclusion of communism and the preservation of American influence; it is also in the best interests of the developing countries themselves, because—so the argument runs—revolution means violence, disruption, inefficient management, and the loss of investment capital as well. In this way, we rationalize our support for regimes whose very existence is the principal barrier in their countries to real economic development and social justice.

The conditions essential for development are not so much economic and technological as they are psychological and political. No infusion of capital and know-how from without can galvanize a society in which the rewards of development are grabbed up by a small privileged caste while the majority of people are left hopeless, debilitated and demoralized. As the Brazilian bishop Dom Antonio Batista Fragozo put it,

"We do not need paternalistic redemption. We need conditions so that those who are now abandoned may free themselves from their own underdevelopment with their own united force . . . the poor have no hope in those who still have economic power. And the poor are those who struggle for justice. If those who fight for justice are called subversive, then subversion is their hope."¹²

In countries long under the domination of corrupt oligarchies nothing less than a radical redistribution of political power may be the essential precondition for economic development. If the bulk of the people are to make the concerted effort and accept the enormous sacrifices required

¹⁰ Richard J. Barnet, "Can the United States Promote Foreign Development?" unpublished paper, p. 17.

¹¹ Seth Tillman, *Diary of a Trip and Visits to the Peace Corps in Latin America*, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 16, 1967, pp. 16, 24, 33.

¹² Quoted by Barnet, *ibid.*, p. 12.

New York Times, August 6, 1971.

Press Conference of August 4, 1971.

"Stability" in Pakistan," *New York Times*, August 6, 1971, p. 30.

for lifting a society out of chronic poverty, they have got to have some belief in the integrity of their leaders, in the commitment of those leaders to social justice, and in the equality of sacrifice required of the people. Reactionary regimes have neither the ability nor the interest to foster such a conception of social justice. They value aid from the United States as a means of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power. The lip service paid to reform is a crumb for their benefactors; it helps to make the Americans feel good and it costs them nothing. In fact, American economic aid is commonly used to promote industrialization programs which generate a high level of consumption for the privileged, with little, if any, "trickle-down" benefit for the dispossessed. At the same time, American military assistance, and such para-military programs as the training and equipping of a country's police force, help such regimes as those of Brazil, Greece and Pakistan to suppress reformist movements. In this way, American aid is being used, not to promote development but for the quite opposite purpose of supporting the rule of corrupt and stagnant—but vociferously anti-communist—dictatorships.

Even if we should succeed in purging our minds of the anti-communist obsession which has driven us into league with military dictatorships and oppressive oligarchies all over the globe, it would still be all but impossible for us to promote radical reform in the countries of the third world. Even indeed if we were a revolutionary society ourselves and were committed to a revolutionary conception of development—as most assuredly we are not—there is still very little we could do to foster social revolution in alien societies. The catalyst of radical change in any society must be an indigenous nationalism giving rise to a sense of community, commitment and shared sacrifice. Can anyone seriously believe, for example, that the United States, through massive infusions of aid, could ever have persuaded, inspired or cajoled the demoralized Chiang Kai-chek regime of the late forties into generating the kind of collective spirit which the Chinese communists have generated? Here is how James Reston describes it from Peking in August 1971:

"Whatever you think of their political system, they are consciously engaged these days in the common life of rebuilding the nation and even in reconstructing themselves. This country is engaged in one vast cooperative barn-raising. They work at it night and day with a pride and persistence that are astonishing . . ."¹³

I do not suggest that the United States prefers or admires the dictatorial regimes it subsidizes, but only that there is little we can do with our aid to change them, all the more since these regimes can blackmail us so easily with the threat of communism if they should fail. The Kennedy Administration did make an effort to encourage democratic and progressive policies in countries to which it extended aid, especially in Latin America, but that effort was a failure and the reasons for that failure are instructive. We failed because we had neither the ability to impose reform from outside nor the will to pursue it from within. The one was simply impossible; the other went against the priority of our own interests as we conceived them. However much we may have wanted reform and development, we wanted "stability," anti-communism and a favorable climate for investment more. The experience of twenty years of aid shows that we can neither bring about fundamental reform in tradition-encrusted societies nor prevent revolution in those countries where the tide of change runs deep and strong; all we can really do is to service the *status quo* in countries where it is not strongly challenged anyhow.

United States foreign aid certainly was unable to win support at the time of the recent two votes at the United Nations relating to the admission of the People's Republic of China.

As you recall, the first vote was an important procedural one, as a result of which member-states defeated the United States resolution declaring that expulsion of Nationalist China was an "important matter" and, consequently, required a two-thirds vote rather than a simple majority for passage. Fifteen nations voted against our resolution and 15 abstained.

The foreign assistance bill, now before us, contains authorizations totaling approximately \$1.5 billion in military and economic aid for 42 of the 74 member-states that either opposed our position or abstained on this key vote.

Correspondingly, the bill contains aggregate authorization of approximately \$2.4 billion for 55 member-states that either voted against our position, or abstained, on the second question that admitted the People's Republic to the United Nations and expelled Nationalist China.

If our long-term loans, made in the name of nourishing development abroad, serve neither to deter communism nor strengthen democratic government, and if they do so little to furnish the destitute with a broader measure of social justice wherever they may live, why do we persist in making them? To find the answer to that question, one must begin the search here at home, in the land of the lender.

There is abundant evidence that our foreign aid program is much less philanthropic than we have cared to portray. Indeed the figures suggest that it is patently self-serving. Former AID Director William Gaud discloses that, as a result of tied loans, "ninety-three per cent of AID funds are spent directly in the United States. . . . Just last year some 4,000 American firms in fifty states received \$1.3 billion in AID funds for products supplied as part of the foreign aid program." Similarly, George D. Woods, former President of the World Bank, has observed that "bilateral programs of assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-income countries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales, toward tactical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions thought to be strategic."¹⁴

The oft-asserted lament that our foreign aid program lacks a constituency in the United States is just another of those myths we hold dear. Actually, our bilateral aid program is, in effect, the soft-loan window of the Export-Import Bank; it is the source from which foreign governments borrow money on easy terms with which to buy goods and services from within the United States. As such, it enjoys a lively constituency which exerts steady pressure on the government to keep the program going.

In addition to financing American exports, our foreign aid, both economic and military, has encouraged relationships of sustained dependency on the United States. In many underdeveloped countries, repressive governments draw reassurance from the arms we furnish and the military training we supply. As the source of money and weapons for their armies and police forces, the U. S. government acquires a certain leverage over these regimes, while they last. Enticed by attractive credit terms, by growing familiarity with American equipment, reliance on American replacement parts, by bargain prices on obsolete equipment, training programs for their soldiers and police, and the sales promotion techniques of our military advisory missions, these governments soon enough learn to "think American."

No less than military aid, our economic assistance creates and perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for example, that aid shipments be carried only in American

¹³ "Letters from China, V," *New York Times*, August 18, 1971, p. 37.

¹⁴ Quoted by Barnett, *ibid.*, p. 7.

ships and that purchases be made only in the United States. Because of these and other requirements, the Peterson Report estimates that United States aid costs recipients about 15 percent more than world market prices.¹⁵

Surplus food shipments under PL 480, on its face the most philanthropic of aid programs, in fact have served to unload surplus surpluses, "at virtually no economic cost to the United States," according to economist Michael Hudson, a former balance-of-payments analyst for the Chase-Manhattan Bank. At the same time, Hudson points out, the PL 480 program has put the aid-receiving countries in debt to us to the extent of some \$22 billion, "thereby tying them to the purse strings of the State Department and the United States Treasury for nearly twenty years to come."¹⁶

Dependency on the United States grows steadily too with the mounting burden of servicing past debts. The Peterson Report acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on a "short leash."¹⁷ As grace periods end on loans falling due in the 1970's and poor countries find themselves paying out ever greater amounts to finance past debts, new loans will be effectively neutralized and the poor countries will be threatened with economic paralysis.

The upshot may well someday be a general default on debt payments to the United States reminiscent of the defaults on war debts which complicated and disrupted our relations with European countries in the thirties and helped to drive us deeper into the isolationism of that era.

Nowhere have we seen more clearly the ineffectiveness of aid as a deterrent to revolutionary pressures and as an instrument for the reconstruction of traditional societies than in Latin America. The Alliance for Progress represents the high water mark of our innocence in supposing that we could liberate traditional societies from their centuries' long legacy of tyranny and stagnation with a little bit of seed capital and some stirring rhetoric. It is the conclusion of one recent author on Latin America, who spent three months last year in search of "Latin American reality," that, despite the Alliance for Progress, "things are getting worse, not better, that each year more people are poorer, hungrier, less clothed, less sheltered than the year before, and that all the indices project a continuation of this negative trend for the foreseeable future. Life is barely tolerable for 80 per cent of Latin America's 275 million people, and it will be unspeakably worse for the 600 million projected for the year 2000."¹⁸

It is true that the *per capita* income of Latin American countries has risen during the years of the Alliance for Progress, but it has risen in so unbalanced and inequitable a way that the gains have gone almost entirely to the 20 per cent of the population who live within the modern economy. The benefits accruing to the lower 80 per cent have not even kept up with population growth, so that they have become both relatively and absolutely poorer. Progress, though visible, is illusory. Shining modern cities have arisen and the Alliance for Progress has brought roads, transistor radios and Coca Cola to the Latin American countryside, but their social impact is negative and disruptive. Labor-saving devices make life more comfortable for the affluent few but they do not add to *per capita* output and they add to unemployment where there were labor surpluses to begin with. Indeed the effect of this distorted and inequitable development, which widens the gap

between rich and poor, is deeply demoralizing to the poor and therefore detrimental to genuine development. As Erich Fromm and Michael Maccoby have shown in their study of a Mexican village, the impact of the "developed" ideology of "Consumerism" and waste on a traditional society is to destroy social cohesiveness, undermine personal psychological strength, and rob the people of joy in their lives.¹⁹

The distortions of public aid to Latin America are heightened by the impact of private investment. Although United States direct investment in Latin America grew from \$8 billion to \$15 billion during the 1960's and continues to grow at the rate of \$1 billion a year, according to Gary MacEoin, United States companies withdraw \$2 in dividends, royalties and other payments for every new dollar they invest. United States private companies exercise a "double negative impact": at the same time that they decapitalize Latin America by the withdrawal of profits, they plow back a part of their profits to gain increasing control of the mineral assets, industry and production of Latin American countries.²⁰

Under this devastating North American onslaught, resentment of the United States has grown apace and increasing numbers of Latin Americans have become convinced that they are the victims of a virulent new imperialism. As one Chilean political scientist commented on the experience of the 1960's, "If that is what one decade of development does for us, spare us from another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother use in debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets."²¹

In both Latin American and the rest of the third world the conviction is taking increasing hold that the poverty of the poor countries is not the result of imperfections in the old "models" of development but rather the *inevitable* result of the policies and practices of the rich countries. In his recent book, *The Challenge of World Poverty*, Gunnar Myrdal describes how the reforms promised in the Alliance for Progress were "rapidly emasculated by interaction between the holders of power in Latin America, including the American corporations working there, and the United States Government and Congress." The resulting economic and social relationship, not only between the United States and Latin America but generally between the rich and poor countries of the world, may not be one of deliberate, malicious exploitation, but we can hardly deny the name given to it by the Brazilian economist Helio Jaguaribe. It is, he says, "an objectively imperialist system."

I can no longer cast my vote to prolong the bilateral aid program, as it is now administered. I could understand—though perhaps not condone—a foreign aid program that is essentially self-serving. We live, after all, in a selfish world. But the present program is designed primarily to serve private business interests at the expense of the American people. In far too many countries, as in the case of Brazil, we poured in our aid money for one overriding purpose, the stabilization of the economy in order to furnish American capital with a "favorable climate for investment." The search for foreign investment opportunities by the largest American corporations is relentless and irrepressible, as the biggest profits are to be found abroad, where the tax bite can frequently be reduced or averted. Moreover, the risk of loss due to political instability, riot, revolution or expropriation, has been largely lifted from the investor and shifted to the U. S. Government. OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, backed by the Federal Government, readily insures American companies against risks abroad for which no comparable

¹⁵ *United States Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach*, Washington, D. C., March 4, 1970, p. 32.

¹⁶ Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson, *The Myth of Aid*.

¹⁷ *United States Foreign Assistance in the 1970's*, p. 33.

¹⁸ Gary MacEoin, author of *Revolution Next Door: Latin America in the 1970's*, in "Latin America: Who Is to Blame?" *Commonweal*, June 25, 1971, p. 331.

¹⁹ *Social Character in a Mexican Village* (1970).

²⁰ MacEoin, "Latin America: Who Is to Blame?", p. 332.

²¹ Quoted by MacEoin, *Ibid.*, p. 334.

insurance is available at home. The multi-million dollar losses incurred by American copper companies, resulting from the nationalization of their holdings by Allende's Marxist regime in Chile, are likely to be born—not by the companies that eagerly invested there—but by the American taxpayer. Our foreign aid program has become a spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad! Small wonder that the crumbling ghettos in our cities, along with our declining rural communities, have to beg and scrounge for new capital!

As my service in the State amply demonstrates, I am not a foe of a genuine foreign aid program, having long since acknowledged that any country as advantaged as ours should do what it can to help other people improve their lot. But no longer will I endorse with my vote a foreign aid program which has been twisted into a parody and a farce.

The major preoccupation of the present foreign aid program is the massive disbursement of munitions which we either give away or make available at bargain basement prices. We ply half a hundred foreign governments with our weaponry. Most of the world has become a dumping ground for ships, tanks and planes, which we label as excess to our needs. Easy credit is available at interest rates well below the cost of money to the U. S. Government. The Military Assistance Program has become a preposterous scandal. It should be drastically curtailed, not enlarged.

As for our long-term bilateral loans made in the name of promoting economic development, it is long past time that this function were passed over entirely to the World Bank, the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral lending agencies, which were set up for this purpose. I am prepared, now and in the future, to support substantial U. S. contributions to these agencies. In this manner, we could set a worthy example of international responsibility and beckon other rich nations to share the load with us.

I would confine our bilateral aid in the future to technical assistance grants, administered, where feasible, by the Peace Corps. It was through technical assistance—the successor to Harry Truman's original Point 4—that the "green revolution" was achieved in Asia and the hand of famine stayed. This aspect of our foreign aid, involving outright grants, not loans, has constituted the worthiest part of the program. On account of it—and in hopes that the objectionable parts would be whittled down and ultimately displaced—I have tarried too long as a supporter and indulged in too much wishful thinking.

Events of the past few weeks on Capital Hill have finally dispelled my illusions. Instead of cutting back on the foreign aid package, Congress is about to enlarge on it. We are in the process of doing the same with the gigantic military budget, approving more money for the Pentagon this year than we spent at the height of our involvement in Vietnam. Incredible, but true!

The acquiescence of Congress to these money demands of the Nixon Administration make it clear that we have no disposition, despite all the pious talk, of changing our spending habits. The "new priorities" promised the American people won't be realized, as long as we refuse to cut our huge foreign and military spending. The long-neglected problems of crime, drugs, poverty and pollution, which afflict so many of our people here at home, will continue to fester and grow.

Shifting the necessary resources back to the solution of these problems doesn't mean we must chuck all foreign aid or turn our backs upon calamity elsewhere. We can still afford to make generous donations when disaster strikes in other lands.

Finally, I would advocate, as an alternative to the palliative of aid, that we lend positive support to developing countries by entering into commercial arrangements that redress the terms of trade which are now rigged against them.

As with so many of the difficult questions that divide and agitate our society, the answer to the dilemma of aid lies not abroad, not in the slums of Calcutta or in the rural backlands of Brazil, but within ourselves. Essentially, the question is whether we are prepared to recognize the limits of our own capacity—the moral and political as well as the technical and economic limits—and allow nature to take what may well be an uncongenial course in many countries of the third world. The question, to put it another way, is whether we can recognize that there are some things we simply cannot do—such as restructuring another country through our own efforts—and other things that we cannot permanently prevent—such as social revolution, where and when its time has come.

The dilemma of aid is not fundamentally different from the dilemma of Vietnam. It is a problem of power—our own power, the uses to which we wish to put it, and the moral and intellectual limitations which have resulted in such wide discrepancies between our intentions and our accomplishments. The dominant political attitude of the sixties was one of extravagant self-confidence. We were filled up and infatuated with the "simple fact"—again to quote Professor Rostow—"that we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it." Now, in the wake of sobering tragedy, a new outlook begins to take shape, and one may hope that it will affect our thinking in matters ranging far beyond Vietnam. As Gary MacEoin writes with reference to our excessive meddling in Latin America, "As with the pacification programs in Indochina, the more total the penetration, the more negative the result. Political scientists must, in the future, cite this experience as no less significant than that of the Vietnam war when they discuss the limits of power of the great."²²

Having concentrated for a decade and more on the growth and uses of power, we may now perhaps be willing to cultivate other national attributes—such as prudence and common sense. If so, we may be prepared to come to terms with such conditions of our time as the following: that our social engineering, as applied to the poor countries of the world, has shown itself to be irrelevant and disruptive; that the threat of communism in the third world is exaggerated and, in any case, beyond the lasting reach of our aid programs; that for many countries radical revolution is the only real hope for development and the single most helpful thing we can do is to leave them alone.

Contrary to the development "models" worked out in the sixties by our Agency for International Development, it now appears that thoroughgoing social revolution is the necessary prerequisite for the development of much of the third world. There is nothing the United States can or should do to promote revolution—to do so indeed would violate the United Nations Charter and sound traditional standards of diplomacy. What we can and should do is to stop promoting counterrevolution. Or, as Richard Barnet has succinctly put it, "As long as the United States views the successes of revolutionary governments as foreign policy defeats, we will continue to be an enemy of development."²³

Our aid policy is not only an aspect of our total foreign policy, it is also a reflection of the life and values of our society. As long as power and the application of power are our dominant preoccupations, as to a great extent they have been in the years since World War II, our impact upon the third

²² *Revolution Next Door*, p. 12.

²³ "Can the United States Promote Foreign Development?" p. 37.

world will be exploitative and damaging. But if, as a result of the sobering experience of Vietnam, we are disposed to revive more traditional American values, we may devise a constructive foreign aid program designed to really help the struggling poor of the world. After all, one of the most deeply rooted of all American political attitudes is the mistrust of power. Can a people who have found it wise and necessary to check and balance the powers of their own government as applied to themselves find it any less wise and necessary in their dealings with others?

Several years ago Alan Moorehead wrote a book called *The Fatal Impact* in which he recounted the disastrous and largely unintended effects upon the Tahitians and Australian

aborigines of the diseases, alcohol, firearms, laws and concepts of morality brought to the South Pacific by the early European explorers and colonists. Reflecting on his own voyages to Polynesia, Captain Cook himself later wrote that "It would have better for these people never to have known us."²⁴

It would represent a noteworthy advance in the standards of international relations if the United States, profiting from its own experience as well as that of others, could lift its well-intentioned but no less fatal impact from the face of the third world, so that in time it may appear that it was not so bad after all for them to have known us.

²⁴ Alan Moorehead, *The Fatal Impact* (1966), pp. 61, 80-81.

The Economic Game Plan

THOUGHTS FROM LABOR

By LEONARD WOODCOCK, *President, International Union, United Auto Workers*

Delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, October 4, 1971

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: On August 15th we were told that the economic mess in our nation needed strong medicine, and we agree that the nation does have an economic mess. In the last 2½ years unemployment has gone from 2.6 million in December, 1968 to over 5 million in the summer of 1971, and that's not counting the almost one million persons, mostly women, who drop out of the labor force because of the impossibility of finding jobs, and who are no longer recorded as unemployed, and the several million more who are underemployed.

Our unemployment has then gone statistically from 3.3 per cent to 6.1 per cent, and this in large measure due to a deliberately engineered recession, about which the country was told by the President in October of 1969 when Mr. Nixon said he had inherited an inflationary situation—and he had—and that the only way in which that could be cured was by creating an unfortunately sharp measure of unemployment which would rein in the inflation.

Well, half of that promise was kept. We got the sharp measure of unemployment but we did not get the reining in of inflation. The inflation which in 1968 had been mounting at an annual rate of 4.2 per cent, in 1970 was raging at an annual rate of 5.9 per cent, and in May through July of 1971 was moving at an annual rate of 5.2 per cent. And this with 27 per cent of our industrial capacity idle. And our Gross National Product in 1970 in uninflated dollars was down for the first time since 1958.

We are experiencing in this year our first adverse balance of trade since 1893. We indeed are in an economic mess and the nation was ready for strong medicine, as was shown by the polls—which we do not question. But what kind of medicine is it? The Wage-Price Freeze we say is unfair, inequitable and obviously cannot be continued on its voluntary basis because wages certainly will be frozen, since the employers control that mechanism, but prices certainly would not continue to be frozen because employers too unilaterally control that mechanism.

We say, what happens to the suspended payments during these 90 days? We have a Letter of Agreement, for example, with the McDonnell Douglas Corporation attached to the old contract, now expired, which says that on the 16th of September the workers in that company were entitled to the Cost of Living which had accumulated beyond the ceiling payments provided under the old contract. That money is 34¢ per hour. It became effective under the Letter of Agreement

terms on the 19th of July. That 34¢ from the 19th of July until the 15th of November for that company alone is over \$5 million. And we say it does nothing to fight inflation to take that \$5 million from the approximately 20,000 families who have it coming by virtue of contract and simply deposit it in the corporate treasury of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.

That is why we say that money coming due during this period is money owed and must be paid. After the 90 days the UAW has said, if our contracts are to be stopped in the operation of some of their terms, then as far as we are concerned those contracts are null and void. And when we so said, we were labeled as being irresponsible and that such a position was unthinkable. Well, I submit to you that if an individual sold a house in November, 1970 for \$30,000 and was receiving payments month by month based upon that contract for \$30,000, and was told one year later in November, 1971, that sale cannot be for more than \$25,000, that individual would certainly be free to say, "Well then, I will not sell." And we will not sell either under those terms and—and this needs to be thought about—if labor contracts can be torn up based upon the stroke of a pen, then obviously we can no longer in the future negotiate contracts for any longer than one year.

Now, some of the economists—including some of the economists on the Democratic side—say that we really should be grateful to the President because by his action he has taken us off the treadmill of mounting wage increases to keep pace with a mounting inflation. Well, we submit to you that we got off that treadmill one year ago. When we went into the automobile and the agricultural implement negotiations we were facing the prospect of bigger and bigger wage increases in the later years of long-term agreements, in anticipation of a future inflation. But unfortunately by virtue of getting those bigger and bigger increases, making certain that future inflation would come about.

And we told our leadership this was wrong. It was wrong in their interest and it was wrong in the nation's interest, and that we should negotiate for annual increases tied to the national productivity, provided that such increases were protected in their value by Cost of Living protection. This kind of contract worked very well for 20 years in the General Motors Corporation and just short of that in the rest of the industry.

The fact is that none of the three major inflations that we have had since World War II had their origin in labor cost

monumental wave, we must either utilize the energy generated by our escalating hopes, or risk further severe buffeting as their tremendous force washes over us.

It is to the great credit of our nation that such hopes exist at all. Without our unparalleled past progress, we would not dare hope for—much less expect—so much more.

Whether we realize our dreams—whether we fulfill the promise of America—is ultimately dependent on our compassion and generosity.

There is room—indeed, there is grave need—for all of us in this great effort. It has been true of democracies through the

ages that the effectiveness of government is directly proportionate to the degree of citizen interest and citizen participation.

Government can be relevant; it can be an effective device for meeting critical citizen needs; it can function as it should—as an extension of the people's will.

Whether it does or not is dependent on our willingness to demand relevancy, to demand efficiency, and to demand truthfulness—and to back up our demands with a commitment to make representative democracy function as it should.

Thank you.

The State Of The Aging

LEGISLATIVE RELIEF

By FRANK CHURCH, *United States Senator from Idaho*

Delivered in the U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C., February 7, 1972

MR. PRESIDENT, recently I told the White House Conference on Aging that our Nation seems to be falling behind, rather than advancing, in terms of achieving genuine security and well-being for older Americans.

Nevertheless, my message was not one of pessimism.

Instead, it was one of challenge.

That challenge, very briefly stated, is that the 1970's can be either a period of triumph or one of despair for older Americans.

We can seize this historic opportunity to translate the recommendations of the 1971 White House Conference on Aging into action—immediate and long-range.

Or we can fumble and fritter away our opportunity, with the result that the elderly will taste more disappointment and despair.

Quite bluntly, older Americans of today have already waited too long for too little.

They will not be willing—nor will their successors—to wait until the White House conference of 1981 for action to begin.

For these reasons, I have requested time to make the leadoff address today—the first in what might be called a state of the aging message to be delivered by members of the Committee on Aging and others.

Our purpose is to press home certain facts to the Congress and the administration about the issues now facing the elderly, the significance of the recently concluded White House Conference on Aging, the immediate and long-range opportunities for legislative action, and some thoughts about the future of aging Americans.

And my own personal goal is to help generate impetus for bipartisan congressional and administration efforts to make the 1970's a memorable decade of achievement.

To begin, I would like to make a few comments on comparative costs. What are we talking about when we ask for reforms that would help older Americans?

Well, we could abolish poverty among the elderly for what it costs to run the war in Southeast Asia for just 3 months.

We could broaden medicare coverage to include out-of-hospital prescription drugs for what we now spend for an aircraft carrier.

We could establish a comprehensive manpower program for older workers for the cost of one submarine.

Given such incongruities in our present spending patterns, it is easy to understand why the 1970's could become a decade of despair for older Americans.

They see a nation which boasts a gross national product of more than \$1 trillion, but in which nearly 5 million older Americans subsist below the poverty line.

They see a nation where the median family income is almost \$10,000, but in which nearly one-fourth of all aged couples have incomes below \$3,000.

They see a nation in which \$70 million is requested for military aid for Spain, but in which only \$30 million is appropriated for service programs to enable elderly Americans to live independently.

But they also see a nation where there is new reason for hope. Through the voices raised at the White House Conference on Aging, all of us have heard a stirring declaration for action.

And that call has already produced momentum on two key fronts.

Throughout 1971, the Congress struggled with a reluctant administration for more adequate funding for the Older Americans Act. And rightly so. A budget assigning the Administration on Aging approximately the same amount of money that was allocated to the Pentagon for publicity purposes was not worthy of a great nation.

We questioned the administration on these spending priorities. And finally, we won some limited victories, including a \$15 million increase in appropriations.

But it took a White House conference to turn around an administration that was first willing to settle for \$29.5 million for the Older Americans Act, about \$1.45 for each senior citizen. It took a White House conference to demonstrate that the elderly were deeply dissatisfied. And it took a White House conference to provide the necessary impetus to secure a \$100 million appropriation for the Older Americans Act, the highest in its history.

There is also no doubt in my mind that the conference helped to marshal support for establishing a national hot meals program. For nearly 2 years, the administration had opposed this measure. During the week of the conference, though, the Senate rejected this advice and approved the nutrition program for the Elderly Act, S. 1163, by a vote of 89 to 0. This measure, which was sponsored by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), is now before the House of

Representatives. And, I understand that the House is scheduled to take action today on this proposal.

And behind it all, there is a firm bipartisan attitude in Congress when it comes to issues affecting older Americans. No where is this better demonstrated than in the Committee on Aging, on which I serve as chairman. We may have 11 Democrats and nine Republicans on our committee. But in our treatment of the issues affecting the elderly, we try to conduct our business in a bipartisan manner.

What is now necessary is a joint effort by Congress and a willing administration to construct a sound and coherent program for the aging.

Before discussing what form this action program should take, an examination of the administration's "game plan" is essential. This is not done in a partisan vein because no administration to date—whether it be Democratic or Republican—has really come to grips with the predicament of the elderly.

Despite the crying need, the administration, until recently, exhibited a narrow, negative attitude. Not only did it fail to propose new programs of its own, but it resisted, opposed, and even blocked several congressional initiatives.

Until last week, the administration opposed the enactment of the Nutrition Program for the Elderly Act. Yet, 8 million older Americans have diets insufficient for good health. And the administration's own White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health strongly supported this type of legislation.

The administration has opposed legislation to create a midcareer development services program for older workers. But today, nearly 1.1 million persons 45 and older are unemployed. They account for less than 4 per cent of all enrollees in our Nation's work and training programs, although they represent 21 per cent of the total unemployment in the United States and 37 per cent of all joblessness for 27 weeks or longer.

The administration has argued against the establishment of a National Senior Service Corps, although 4 million older persons may want to participate in this program. And many pilot programs under Mainstream—such as Green Thumb and Senior Aides—have shown beyond any doubt that community service employment is good for the elderly as well as the localities being assisted.

The administration opposed establishment of a National Institute of Gerontology and an Aging Research Commission. Yet our Nation probably spends no more than 8 cents per person for biomedical aging research. And the low priority assigned to aging research continues to be one of the major problems in the field of gerontology.

The administration has presided over the continued decline of the Administration on Aging. Today, AOA is no longer the strong Federal focal point which Congress intended. Instead, it is a crippled agency with no real clout in the Federal bureaucracy.

To make matters worse, the administration now proposes sharp cutbacks in the scope of coverage under Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare protection has already eroded to the point that the elderly, as a group, are paying almost as much in out-of-pocket payments for health care as the year before this historic law went into effect.

But the fundamental weakness in the administration's game plan is the failure to develop a real income strategy to provide security in retirement. Its policy of adding a few dollars every 2 years of monthly social security checks is just not going to get the job done.

Cost-of-living adjustments will also provide little protection if the administration continues to insist that his escalator should be pegged to an inadequate base. All this will do is

perpetuate deprivation for persons who now receive low benefits.

We in the Congress have long supported automatic adjustments to protect the elderly from inflation. However, there is one crucial difference: The Congress wants to raise social security benefits to a more realistic level before employing this escalator mechanism. Only in this manner will older Americans have any meaningful protection from raising prices.

The retirement income crisis which now affects millions of older Americans is much too deep for the administration's shallow treatment. It cries out for much more far-reaching action on several key fronts. And it deserves no less than a national commitment to eliminate poverty for the elderly and to allow them to share in the economic abundance which they have worked most of their lives to create.

Yet the administration's income strategy has been pursued, to a large degree, in a half-hearted manner with no realistic goals.

In 1970, for example, the administration was first willing to settle for a 7-per cent increase in social security benefits. Later it upped the ante to 10 per cent when an avalanche of criticism forced reassessment. But the significant point is that neither of these proposals would even have kept pace with the rise in prices since the last social security increase.

Only because of bipartisan congressional insistence did the elderly win a 15-per cent raise. And then the administration threatened to veto this measure because of its "inflationary" impact. But fortunately the measure was tacked onto a tax proposal which the President could not veto.

Again last year, the Congress and the administration had another go-around on social security. This time high-level administration spokesmen urged the Congress not to rock the boat by approving a raise in excess of 5 per cent. Later the request was eased up to 6 per cent. But, once again, this increase would have been wiped out by the time the elderly received their first checks, and once again, a bipartisan Congress ignored the advice of the administration and approved a stopgap 10-per cent raise.

The net impact of this action is that social security recipients are now receiving about \$4 billion more in benefits than they would have received, if the administration had prevailed. Equally significant, we would now have thousands more on the poverty rolls if the Congress had accepted the Nixon recommendations.

Now I turn to the President's address to the delegates at the White House conference. In some respects, his remarks represented a step forward, particularly his proposal for increased funding for the Older Americans Act. However, his statement fell far short of prescribing what is really needed to come to grips with the basic problems confronting the elderly—relating to income, health, and housing. And once again, this was symptomatic of the administration's failure to establish realistic goals.

The President, for example, recommended that H.R. 1 be approved "without delay." At the outset, I wish to express my support for early action on H.R. 1. In terms of numbers of persons affected, this could quite possibly be the most significant domestic legislation considered during this session. But many important changes are still needed to improve this bill and to eliminate some of its undesirable provisions. And I, along with other members of the committee, will have more to say about that later.

If the Congress were to accept H.R. 1 without any modifications, the elderly find themselves on the same old economic treadmill. The 5-per cent increase in social security benefits would not become effective until this June. Even more significant, this raise may not be sufficient to keep the elderly

DO NOT REMOVE SOCIAL BUILDING

even in their desperate race with inflation. By June, the jump in the cost-of-living, since the 1971 social security increase, which became effective last January, may well be in excess of 5 per cent.

Additionally, the proposed \$1,560 income floor for a single aged person is nearly \$300 below the existing poverty line. By the time this in some standard becomes effective, it will fall substantially below the poverty index.

There are also very crucial omissions of fact in the President's address. He did not, for instance, inform the delegates that his administration made no request for a social security increase for 1972. The 5-per cent raise was principally the result of bipartisan efforts in the House of Representatives. Nor did he tell the delegates that his administration was first considering a \$65 income standard for its welfare reform proposal for the aged. With such a low threshold, this was tantamount to no welfare reform at all. Now that standard has been doubled, but once again largely because of bipartisan congressional efforts.

During the last 3 years, our employment rate has jumped from 3.4 to 6 per cent, adding nearly 2.5 million persons to the jobless rolls. Today more than 5.2 million individuals are looking for work. More than 1.1 million have been searching unsuccessfully for 15 weeks or more.

All age groups have felt the crunch of these economic policies—whether in the form of massive layoffs, shorter work weeks, smaller paychecks, rising prices, high interest rates, or just slow business. But older persons and their families have been especially hard hit.

Many have discovered that they have lost more than jobs. Thousands have also lost their pension coverage as well—even though they may have worked most of their lives for this little "nest egg."

And the elderly—perhaps more so than any other age group—have been especially hard-pressed by inflation. As prices go up, their limited purchasing power goes down.

Yet, despite my earlier skepticism about administration policies, I still find many hopeful signs for 1972 to be a year of decisive legislation victories for older Americans.

First, White House Conference Chairman Arthur Flemming has repeatedly emphasized the need for early action to implement the policy recommendations of the 3,400 conferees. Second, the President's White House Conference speech has provided a possible signal that the administration may look more favorably upon categorical programs for the elderly.

Third, issues related to aging now enjoy strong bipartisan support in Congress. This has been demonstrated time and time again. It may be revealed when Congress stands up and demands that social security benefits be raised to a much more realistic level. Or it may be demonstrated when bipartisan efforts turn an inadequate funding request for the Older Americans Act into a \$10.5 million victory for the elderly. Fourth, I believe that the Congress is ready, willing, and able to act on several major proposals during this session. Important momentum was generated during the week of the White House Conference, and I look for this impetus to continue during the months ahead.

Our Nation is now being challenged—as it never has been before—to develop and implement a national policy on aging. This will, of course, require a full fledged action campaign in several areas if the later years are to be a time for dignity and self respect.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of economic security. Today more than 4.7 million older individuals 65 and older fall below the poverty line, nearly 100,000 more than in 1968. And for the first time since poverty statistics have been tabulated, their impoverished number have increased, instead of decreased.

Today older Americans are more than twice as likely to be poor as younger Americans. One out of every four persons 65 and older—in contrast to 1 in 9 for younger individuals—lives in poverty. And the threshold, I might add, is a "rock bottom" standard. According to the Census Bureau, it is \$1,852 for a single person and \$2,328 for an aged couple.

Perhaps one of the most economically disadvantaged groups in our society now is the aged widow. Approximately 50 per cent live in poverty. And as they grow older, they seem to grow poorer.

Equally alarming is the high incidence of poverty among elderly minority groups. Their likelihood of being poor is nearly twice as great as for the white aged population, and four times as great as for our total population. Approximately 48 per cent are victims of poverty, compared with 23 per cent for elderly whites. Especially disadvantaged is the aged Negro woman who lives alone or with nonrelative. More than 88 per cent—or nearly nine out of every 10—are considered poor or marginally poor. And there is strong evidence to suggest that they suffer from greater extremes of impoverishment. More than 59 per cent, for instance, have annual incomes below \$1,500.

Another area of retrogression, in many respects, is in the field of health care. Today, less than 7 years after the passage of medicare, the threat of costly illness is still too real for too many older Americans.

Medicare now only covers about 43 per cent of their health care expenditures. And that coverage is being eroded further with proposed cutbacks and rising medical costs.

The sad truth is that serious illness strikes with much greater frequency and severity at a time in life when incomes are most limited. Persons 65 and older have health bills averaging almost \$800 a year, nearly six times that for youngsters and three times that for individuals in the 19 to 64 age category.

If our Nation is to assure true economic security in retirement, we must resolve the serious medical cost problems which pose an intolerable drain upon their limited incomes.

Our Nation has also made little progress in terms of maximizing employment and service opportunities for older persons. Many older workers are now being eased out of the work force. Only about 17 per cent of all persons in the 65-plus age category have jobs, usually part-time and in lower paying employment.

Many persons now in their 40's or 50's are also discovering that advancing age may become a problem long before traditional retirement. It may occur when age may make it difficult to locate new employment, although we now have a law prohibiting such discriminatory practices. In large part, this is rooted in other fundamental problems which work to the disadvantage of middle-aged and older persons:

Inflexibility in adjusting employment patterns during the later working years;

False stereotypes about the undesirability or feasibility of employing older workers; and

The lack of training opportunities to prepare older workers for new and gainful employment.

Little improvement has also been made in developing a comprehensive and coordinated system for the delivery of vitally needed social services. According to a recent report by the Gerontological Society, no community in the United States has developed a comprehensive network of services to meet the varied and changing needs of the aging. And that message should be of major concern for all Americans, because an effective social service system can enable the elderly to live independently, instead of being institutionalized at a much higher public cost.

An effective income strategy must be complemented by

social service delivery systems which are far superior to those that now exist. Adequate income will be of little consolation to aged persons who are unable to go to the doctor, the supermarket, or visit friends because suitable transportation is unavailable or inaccessible.

Much of this lack of progress or retrogression, in some respects, is reflected in the elderly's living environment. Less than one-quarter of a century ago, our Nation announced a goal for a decent home and suitable living environment for all Americans. But this objective is far beyond the means of too many older Americans. Nearly 6 million are estimated to live in dilapidated, deteriorating, or substandard housing.

Yet, our housing programs have lagged behind their demonstrated needs. Only about 350,000 units have been constructed for seniors under Federal programs during the past 10 years. This is only about the equivalent of the net gain in their population during any one year.

Large numbers of aged homeowners are also finding themselves in a "no-man's land" for housing. Rapidly rising property taxes and maintenance costs are driving them from their homes. And alternative quarters at prices they can afford are simply not available.

Complicating everything else is the fact that the elderly are among the chief victims of our Nation's most pressing problems: such as the decline in our cities, the migration from rural areas, the disintegration of our public transportation system, and the sheer wastefulness of a nation which overspends for military hardware while tightening its fiscal belt for human investment expenditures.

But even these problems can be solved if we insist on an appropriate national commitment and a soundly conceived strategy. And this session of Congress provides a splendid opportunity to launch a comprehensive action program to implement the goals of the White House Conference on Aging.

First and foremost, early action is needed to make H.R. 1 as strong as possible in terms of ending poverty for the elderly. Several features adopted by the administration—such as full social security benefits for widows, a liberalization of the retirement test, an age-62 computation point for men, and cost-of-living adjustments—provide a solid basis for genuine reform of our social security program.

However, essential finishing touches are necessary to perfect this measure. Heading the list, in my judgment, is the need for more substantial increases in social security benefits. And this raise should be retroactive to January 1, instead of taking effect in June.

The 5-per cent increase proposed in the House-passed bill, though welcome, is simply not enough.

For these reasons, I am urging—as I have previously in my omnibus social-security-welfare reform proposal—across-the-board increases in social security benefits which would average about 12 per cent. This raise would also be weighted to provide larger percentage increases for persons who now receive low social security payments. Under my proposal, persons with very low benefits would receive benefit increases averaging about 21 per cent.

My bill also would abolish old-age assistance and would replace it with a new income supplement program to be administered by the Social Security Administration. For persons who now receive social security benefits and old-age assistance—about 2 million older Americans—this would provide an efficient, single-step service. Another advantage is that the Social Security Office has the trust and respect of most aged persons; it does not have the same negative connotations associated with the local welfare office.

Particularly significant, my proposal would establish an income standard which would be sufficient for abolishing

poverty among all older Americans. In contrast, H.R. 1 fixes the income floor for single persons only at \$1,560 per year. This is certainly a step forward. But the income standard in H.R. 1 would still leave millions of elderly persons in poverty. For these reasons, I urge the Senate to raise the threshold in H.R. 1 to an amount which would wipe out poverty once and for all. Moreover, I recommend that there be cost-of-living adjustments to make this standard inflation-proof for low-income older Americans in the future.

Important as a realistic income strategy is, we must not overlook the need for further improvements in medicare through H.R. 1. For many older Americans, the single greatest threat to their economic security is the high cost of illness. Gaps still exist in medicare, causing a further drain upon their limited pocketbooks.

Two vital reforms, in my judgment, are needed: first, the elimination of the premium charge for doctor's insurance and second, coverage of out-of-hospital prescription drugs under medicare. These measures were strongly supported by the 1971 Social Security Advisory Council, as well as the delegates at the White House Conference on Aging. Now, I believe, is the time to extend this essential protection to the elderly.

Other changes are also necessary to improve the health care provisions in H.R. 1. Since other members of the committee will focus on these measures, I shall concentrate on two provisions, which may seriously cut back the availability of health care to the elderly:

The increase in the deductible for doctor's insurance from \$50 to \$60; and

The \$7.50 copayment charge for medicare patients for each day in the hospital from the 31st day to the 60th day.

The copayment charge, alone, could add \$225 to the hospital bill of an older American. Ironically, this provision is likely to fall most heavily upon the very person medicare is supposed to help the most—the individual who may be exposed to costly health care expenditures because of a prolonged period in the hospital.

These increased levies, I believe, should either be stricken or substantially reduced by the Senate.

Another area for early action during this session is the establishment of a strong Federal spokesman to represent the elderly in the highest councils of Government. Recent reorganization moves during the past 5 years have raised very serious questions about the capability of the Administration on Aging to serve as an effective advocate for older Americans. Today, AoA is a weak agency with very little authority. Its program responsibility has been reduced by two-thirds during the past 2 years.

In short, we need a new, strong, and coordinated apparatus to serve as a cornerstone for a cohesive and comprehensive Federal approach on aging.

Within a few days, I shall introduce legislation to implement this objective. Basically, the bill will be patterned after the recommendations of the committee's advisory council on the AoA or a successor. Their proposal—later adopted at the White House Conference on Aging—called for:

Establishment of an independent office on aging at the White House level to formulate policy and monitor programs on aging;

Creation of an advisory council to assist this office and to prepare an annual report on the progress made in resolving the problems of older Americans; and

Elevation of the AoA by placing it under the direction of an Assistant Secretary on Aging in HEW.

Enactment of this measure, I believe, can provide the operating governmental framework for developing coordinated policies on behalf of aging Americans. And early action on

this proposal becomes imperative, because June 30 is the deadline for extending the Older Americans Act.

Equally important, Congress should act promptly to enhance employment and service opportunities for aging Americans. With unemployment continuing to mount, mature workers are finding that they are among the first to be fired, but the last to be hired. Many now stand in need of a flexible manpower program which is responsive to their needs. Large numbers are jobless because their skills have been outdistanced by technology or because they are seeking the work of a bygone era.

For these reasons, I urge the administration to reassess its opposition to the Middle-Aged and Older Workers Employment Act. For thousands of unemployed or underemployed workers 45 and over, this measure could provide the training, counseling and other supportive services to enable them to move back onto the payrolls or to more productive work. It also authorizes placement and recruitment services in communities where there is a large scale joblessness because of a plant shutdown or other permanent reduction in the work force.

Another area meriting early attention is broadened service opportunities for older persons. Several mainstream pilot projects have amply demonstrated that there are thousands of older Americans who are ready and able to serve in their communities. We do not need any more proof that these programs will work. What is needed now is a genuine national commitment to build upon the solid achievements of these projects. And enactment of the Older American Community Service Employment Act, S. 555, can provide a basis for converting these projects into permanent, ongoing national programs.

Far-reaching action in the housing field is also essential if we are to assure a full and satisfying life for the elderly. We must begin at once to eliminate the conditions which force many older Americans to live in inferior and unsuitable homes simply because they cannot find or afford better housing. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing for the Elderly (Mr. Williams) will discuss in greater detail the committee's recommendations for improving housing programs for the aged; and my remarks will be brief.

Basically, I have two points to make. First, legislation should be considered during this Congress to make home repair services available for elderly homeowners who would otherwise have difficulty paying for these costs. Many urban and rural neighborhoods are deteriorating because essential home repairs must be delayed for several reasons—limited income, failing health, or the lack of necessary skills to perform the fix-up work. But these blighted neighborhoods can be renovated with the establishment of a national home repairs program, utilizing the skills of older persons to assist aged homeowners.

Second, the administration should, I believe, spell out more clearly its housing goals for older Americans. This should be done early to enable appropriate congressional units to act on administration proposals during this session. In this fashion, a comprehensive housing package—combining the best features of congressional and administration initiatives—could be developed.

Concluding my list of suggestions for early action is a proposal that legislation should be enacted early this year to authorize mini-White House Conferences on Aging every 2 years. These periodic conferences would permit more intensive review, one at a time, of specific issues raised at the 1971 conference—such as retirement income, health, housing, and others. Equally significant, this would establish a continuing mechanism for developing and implementing the policy recommendations of the 1971 conference. It would also

provide vital followup work to assure that the proposals outlined by the 3,400 delegates lead to concrete action instead of more words. This concept, I am pleased to say, has been enthusiastically endorsed in the report of the 1971 White House Conference. In the very near future, I shall introduce legislation to implement this proposal.

My earlier remarks have been directed essentially at action that can and should be taken now to meet immediate challenges. But the development and implementation of a national policy on aging would be incomplete without also establishing long-range goals and direction.

As chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, I believe that the committee can play an important role in focusing on crucial issues with far-reaching and long-term implications for the aged of today and tomorrow. For example, the allocation of work and income is still a major unresolved problem in our country today. Instead of the "all or nothing" principle—100 per cent full-time employment during the adult years and then complete inactivity during the retirement years—new work lifetime patterns must be considered.

Greater experimentation, for instance, with phased retirement, trial retirement, and sabbaticals will be essential, particularly if the trends toward shorter work-weeks and longer periods of leisure time continue.

The resolution of this crucial problem has a far-reaching impact for all age groups. This point cannot be understated, because more than seven out of every 10 children born today can expect to reach age 65. And they can expect to spend longer periods in retirement—perhaps a third of their entire lives.

But how will these retirees make use of their new free time? Will it lead to fulfillment and enjoyment, or just boredom and frustration? All age groups, now and in the future, have a very deep interest in these fundamental issues.

Another major question requiring immediate attention is the crushing burden of the property tax upon the aged homeowner. Many now find themselves financially paralyzed because their property taxes have doubled, or even tripled, during the past 10 years.

In 1970, property taxes hit an all-time high of \$37.5 billion, nearly 35 per cent higher than in 1967. This tax, moreover, frequently takes a much greater chunk out of an elderly homeowner's limited budget because it is regressive in the extreme. Renters also feel the pinch since landlords usually shift this burden to the tenant.

Several potentially helpful measures—such as the proposal sponsored by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Eagleton) to provide a credit for low- and moderate-income homeowners and renters who are 65 and older—have been introduced during this Congress, and can provide welcome relief. But in view of recent State supreme court decisions, other alternatives may have to be considered for the financing of our elementary and secondary schools. For these reasons, the Committee on Aging will focus on several issues of vital concern to aged property owners and tenants, such as:

If a substitute for the property tax is developed, what type of an impact will it have on the aged? Will it provide substantial relief for the elderly homeowner or tenant? Will it protect them from extraordinary burdens?

If the property tax is still retained, what would be the most effective method for providing relief for aged homeowners and tenants? Should it take the form of a Federal tax credit or rebate for individuals confronted with extraordinary burdens? Should Federal assistance be made available to States which provide such relief?

Or, should other alternatives be developed?

Additionally, the committee will work with senior citizen organizations, educators, and others in the development of an

effective system for the delivery of social and health services. The necessity for co-ordinarily social and health services is now widely talked about, but it is still rarely practiced. But the much-sought goal—to assist aged persons to live independently, instead of being institutionalized—will not really be resolved until that principle is widely applied.

Another key concern is to find ways to involve the elderly more in programs meant to serve them. They must have a role, a voice, and an input in the decision-making process. One possibility is that our national policy should encourage the development of what might be called "Community Councils of Older Americans." Elderly council members could work with governmental and private agencies to make programs more responsive to the special needs of the elderly.

Eventually, as in the case of the council of elders in Boston, these units could incorporate and become contracting agents for such programs.

Establishment of these community councils can also enable the elderly, more and more, to manage the programs which are now meant to serve them. There are many experts and professionals in the field of aging. But there is really no expert like the elderly person who has lived and experienced the very problems we are attempting to resolve.

Now 1972, it seems to me, can be a year in which we break away from false, fixed notions about aged and aging Americans. It can be a year in which we take advantage of the momentum of the White House Conference to make certain that its goals are implemented.

As we move toward these goals, we must also remember that the field of aging will be the big loser if the politics of expediency is practiced for narrow, partisan advantage. The elderly need the cooperation of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike.

The administration and Congress must also work together if we really intend to solve their problems, rather than debate them.

Today there are more than 20 million Americans who are 65 or older, about one out of every 10 Americans. The elderly's combined numbers are nearly equivalent to the total population in 20 of our States.

Equally important, each year 1.4 million Americans have their 65th birthday. And by the year 2000, approximately 45 million individuals will have become newcomers to this age group.

Today our Nation has a unique opportunity to make advancing age a time of fulfillment, instead of neglect and despair. Perhaps even more significant, there is already broad agreement on many crucial policy goals and the course of action our Nation should take now and in the future. In many respects, the report of the White House Conference is a ringing reaffirmation of recommendations advanced by the Committee on Aging and its advisory councils.

With this broad base for support, our Nation can begin to develop, for the first time in its history, a comprehensive workable national policy for the elderly American.

Pesticides And Public Opinion

GET READY FOR THE TURNAROUND

By H. L. STRAUBE, *Vice President and General Manager, Agricultural Chemical Division, Stauffer Chemical Company*

Delivered at a meeting of the Western Agricultural Chemicals Association, Portland, Oregon, January 12, 1972

THE THEME of our discussion today is "Marketing Chemicals in Today's Restrictive Atmosphere." In a sense, it sounds like it could be the latest episode on "Mission Impossible." It doesn't really sound like it can be done, but somehow, by the end of the program perhaps we will find that it can be done, that things are not as bad as they appear—and they very well may be getting better.

There are some who believe these restrictions have been thrust upon us by uncompromising Federal and State Governments. I do not think this is so. To me, this is simply a normal political reaction to what was obviously considered a problem.

If you examine our industry in the spectrum of American business, we're fairly new on the scene. Think about it. With few exceptions, virtually all the products we sell today were not even known 25 years ago. Ours is an infant industry built on a foundation of technology and scientific facts. Our products were conceived in research laboratories throughout the world, tested in the experiment stations of our government and leading universities, and their performance has been proven over and over again on our nation's farms.

The benefits have been tremendous. Americans enjoy the highest quality, the most abundant and the cheapest food available in the world today. Before pesticides, in the 1930's and 1940's, the American farmer produced enough to feed himself and 11 others. Today he feeds himself and 45 others. At the same time, today in the U. S. only five per cent of our

total work force is engaged in farming, attesting to the massive increase in productivity during the past 25 years.

To look at it another way: Annual losses of crops and livestock to pests in the United States are \$20 billion. If pesticides were withdrawn from U. S. agricultural production, total output of crops and livestock would be further reduced by 30 per cent. It is a fact that if pesticides were eliminated starvation in this country would be rampant and the price of farm products would likely increase by 50 to 75 per cent.

So much for statistics. With all of these herculean achievements, why, then, the hue and cry to ban pesticides? What has changed? Why are we constantly on the defensive, fighting for our existence and the right to market what we feel are highly beneficial products? Perhaps the answer to the can of worms our industry is being fed is in this recipe—take technology, stir in social concern, put it in a political pot, and let it stew and simmer.

Let me elaborate on this recipe by first asking you to think back. Over the past few years we have stood by in amazement watching dangerous developments occurring around us, listening but not hearing the outside world.

Yes, we talked about our accomplishments, but just as I stand here *now*, talking to you, we discussed these achievements *then* only among ourselves. Meanwhile, everyone else, even our own wives and children were listening to the righteous, the indignant, the advocates of various groups and crusades. Some of the statements were startling.



Impounding Congressional Policy

SEN. FRANK CHURCH

Senator Church (D., Idaho) has been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1959.

Washington

The executive branch's insatiable appetite for power is undermining the last bastion of Congressional strength, control of the purse strings. This development—that far too much power is concentrated in the modern presidency for the good health of constitutional government. Historically, the rapid growth of Presidential power is directly with the shaping experiences of the 20th century—two World Wars, the Great Depression and atracted cold war. Unfortunately, the Congress itself accelerated the trend by tamely yielding its power and responsibility. As a consequence, increasing executive authority has overshadowed the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution to the point where we must ask whether we are witnessing a permanent decline of constitutional government.

Most authority over foreign policy, including the war-making power that the Constitution vests in Congress, has already passed to the President. Now, on the domestic side, Congress is steadily losing its constitutional grip on the public purse. The disastrous impact of this development can be felt only when one realizes that appropriating money is the most important business assigned to Congress by the Constitution.

The appropriation power, however, lies today as much within the executive domain as within the Congressional. In part, this was inevitable. The increased complexity of governmental transactions, combined with a concomitant need for flexibility, has understandably led to more executive involvement in budgeting for public spending. However, recent Presidents have reached far beyond these bounds toward unrestricted impoundment of appropriated funds—that is, the outright refusal by the President to spend funds in accordance with the will of Congress. (The money, if blocked, remains in the General Fund at the end of the fiscal period.)

Although Democratic Presidents engaged in impoundment in no small way, the Nixon Administration has gone all out. At last count, impounded funds this year total nearly \$13 billion; under Johnson the high was an estimated \$10.6 billion; under Kennedy, \$6.5 billion. Every day, news stories describe discussions within the Nixon Administration as to whether funds Congress has appropriated for housing, pollution control and health services ought to remain impounded or be released from the executive purse. Commonplace are such news items as: The Administration "may be ready to release the \$586 million in extra funds voted last year by Congress for the fight against water pollution"; or "under Congressional pressure, the Budget Bureau released a backlog of 56 civilian projects."

There are occasions, certainly, when the impoundment of appropriated funds is legitimate. For example, if only part of an appropriated sum is needed for, say, an irrigation project, then duty dictates that the remainder not be spent. Or, if Congress, as it sometimes does, makes an appropriation permissive, the President is obviously free to spend or save the money as he chooses. Or impoundment may be expressly directed, as in Title 6 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, where Congress mandates the executive branch to withhold certain funds from localities practicing unlawful discrimination. The area of dispute does not involve such categories but rather executive impoundment made in defiance of Congressional intent.

Obviously the Constitution did not mean to allow the President complete control over spending. It gives him no item veto—if he finds a specific spending item unpalatable, he is obliged to veto the entire appropriation bill in which the item is contained. Furthermore, his veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both bodies of Congress.

As Sen. Charles Mathias (R., Md.), recently observed, respecting the impoundment practice:

We cannot allow . . . the President or the executive branch to have an informal line item veto of appropriated money which cannot be overridden. This is, in effect, to impound declared Congressional policy and threaten Congress' very existence. It is clearly in violation of the spirit and intent of our Constitution.

It should be understood that a vital ingredient of our democracy is the opportunity afforded diverse political interests—farmers, businessmen, veterans, the elderly and others—to appeal in a meaningful way to Congress on behalf of programs they favor. Once it becomes recognized that any given program may be entombed by the President—even when Congress has authorized it and appropriated the money for it—the American people will sense the futility of turning to their elected representatives. This will compound an already discernible sense of frustration, even helplessness, that many social observers find today among Americans. The public will conclude that the executive branch, largely beyond local reach, is wholly in charge. Confidence and respect for representative government will evaporate and the stage could be set for the coming of an American Cromwell.

What is to be done? Senators of both parties and of differing political outlook have become increasingly concerned. Senator Mansfield, the Majority Leader, recently proposed that the House, where appropriation bills customarily begin their legislative journey, institute a court suit to challenge Presidential action. Legal scholars have concluded that no court decisions to date pass directly upon the issue and that decisions of tangential relevance leave the matter in doubt. Some specialists would hesitate to resort to the courts, on the ground that the relationship between the President and Congress is essentially political and not susceptible to judicial remedies.

As for other means, Congressional recourse to the process of impeachment is clearly too harsh to be practical. More realistically, Congress can deny funds requested by the President for programs he may strongly favor, and thus bring pressure on the Chief Executive to implement Congressional intent in other areas. This tack was suggested in March by Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the appropriations committee.

The most dramatic expression of Senate restiveness over the impoundment issue occurred earlier this fall. The Foreign Relations Committee, when reporting out a foreign aid bill, included a provision forbidding expenditures abroad until the President had released selected loan-development funds impounded last year.

As a minimum, in any struggle for rectification, Congress must strengthen and regularize its review of executive compliance with Congressional appropriations. At present, once an appropriation is passed, Congress usually loses sight of it. The duties of the General Accounting Office, an arm of the legislative branch, should be augmented to include supervision of expenditures in order to identify when impoundment occurs. The appropriations committees of both House and Senate might be required to follow appropriations through the executive branch to insure that they have been allocated and spent as directed. Going further, legislation might be enacted requiring the Office of Management and Budget, formerly known as the Budget Bureau, to inform Congress whenever funds are impounded.

Sen. Sam Ervin of North Carolina, chairman of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, recently introduced a bill, S. 2581, requiring

the President to notify each body of the Congress by special message of every instance in which he impounds funds, or authorizes such impoundment by any officer of the United States. The message must specify the amount of the projects or functions affected, and the reasons. Another provision specifies that the President shall end the impoundment of such funds within sixty calendar days of the start of a continuous session after the special message is received by Congress—unless the impoundment shall have been ratified by Congress.

Of course the most desirable general solution of the problem would be for the executive branch to discipline itself by recognizing that the dominant Presidential initiative in the budgetary process must be matched by meaningful Congressional control. But President Nixon seems insensitive to the problem. In March, when asked about the impoundment issue by Howard K. Smith during an interview on ABC Television, the President replied:

... when I was a Senator and a Congressman, particularly when I was a Senator and a Congressman with a President of the other party in the White House, I played all of these games, with very little success. These games are going to be played. . . .

But the issue is not a matter of "games." It goes to the heart of the separation of powers, the principal accomplishment of the founding fathers.

As such, the matter deserves more respectful attention than it can be resolved. It need not lead to a fierce collision between the two branches of the federal government. Solutions are available—and should be mutually worked out. For it is clear that the Congress cannot regain its rightful role under the Constitution without a resolution of the impoundment issue.

CALL IT MAFIA

The Police, the Press & the Legend

EUGENE RUFFINI

Mr. Ruffini, a television and radio news reporter, has been a working journalist in New York City for the past fifteen years.

On June 28, a black gunman fired three bullets into the head of Joseph Colombo, Sr., a reputed mob leader and founder of the Italian-American Civil Rights League. The event gave the police and the news media another chance to indulge in what Tom Buckley of *The New York Times* called "Mafiaology," a study into "the machinations of the crime kingdom . . . none of it provable." When unable or unwilling to solve the crime, police can thus say that the solution is tangled irretrievably in "gangland rivalry." The news media can sell more newspapers or gather more viewers and listeners by dispensing speculation and rumor as fact. Some newsmen can transform themselves into "instant experts" by presenting what they term inside information. The public can pant over Byzantine theories while saying, "Good riddance, another mob-

ster goes." And the principles of due process and honest journalism fly out the window as individuals are slandered and libeled. The media are only too willing to echo and embellish the charges leveled by authority against unpopular minorities, but the pattern established is dangerous for all Americans. The true and widespread nature of lawlessness in the United States is unpublicized and Italian-Americans wince anew under the implication that they invented organized crime and continue to monopolize it.

Colombo was shot at about 11:45 A.M. inside the press section and before the start of a League rally at Columbus Circle in New York City. He was taken to Roosevelt Hospital and two months later, on August 28, was removed in a semi-comatose condition to the Brooklyn home of his son, Anthony. A hospital official said "Colombo's chances of survival are good, but his chances of showing appreciable improvement in his ability to function would have to be considered poor."

Colombo's assailant was identified as Jerome Adonis

Johnson, 24, of New York City, was seen at the scene. Johnson was arrested by posing as a reporter before the shooting. He was carrying a 16 mm. Bolex movie camera which had been rented with a license from a store on June 22. The camera was a stolen 7.65 mm.

That is about all that is known about the case; the details are contradictory and contradict the remarks reported here. From my own investigation and from other reporters, a picture has emerged. It has been a psychological experiment who liked to invent a dream world in which he could be a writer, cameraman and actor. He was on the edges of sordid "massage" parlors, photographing studios and was good at talking his way. The girls have said that Daniel P. Hollman, a Justice Department's informant, Force of the South, was in the thorough of Manhattan. He said that he appeared in the room, and added that he was either to assist the Johnson or to take the Johnson's Columbus Circle.

Although no other names were mentioned, Joseph F. Lynch, Healy, District of New York, was in the State Island area at the time of the shooting. He said that he was in the area to indicate either the presence of a rival of Colombo. Furthermore, many people have said to me that they were with the officer who was the cause of the shooting.

And yet from the evidence shown, the police have shown flatly to say that Colombo was the cause of the shooting. This brings into question the reliability and objectivity of the police. Speculation about the cause of the shooting is a safety toward Carlo Gambino's "houses" in New York City. Joseph Gallo, a supervisor, has a larger share of the blame. According to the police, the fact that the Italian-American Civil Rights League by its actions has organized crime.

Police have never been by name with the shooting. After the shooting, the police are questioning. Unclear.

to review its choice of priorities and rearrange them if changed conditions make such action desirable. But it will ensure that any rearrangement will be effected by the Congress and not by the President, who has no legislative power under our Constitution.

The Impoundment Control Bill actually is rather simple. It requires the President to notify each House of the Congress by special message of every instance in which he impounds or authorizes an impoundment by any officer of the United States. Each special message must specify, first, the amount of the funds impounded; second, the date on which funds were ordered to be impounded; third, the date the funds were impounded; fourth, any account, department, or establishment of the Government to which the impounded funds would have been available for obligation except for the impoundment; fifth, the period of time during which the funds are to be impounded; sixth, the reasons for the impoundment; and seventh, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary effects of the impoundment.

The bill further provides that the President shall cease the impounding of funds specified in each special message unless the Congress approves the impoundment within 60 calendar days of continuous session after the message is received.

The intent of the bill is to preclude any form of impounding, withholding, delaying expenditure or obligation of funds, or the termination of authorized projects or activities unless such action is specifically mandated by Congress, and to that end it defines "impounding of funds" in such a way as to foreclose the use of semantic stratagems.

I hope that these hearings will alert the Congress and the American people to the constitutional crisis that we face and to the urgent necessity that some redress be found if our form of government is to survive.

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From testimony given on January 30, 1973, before hearings on proposed legislation to limit the impoundment of powers of the President held jointly before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers and an ad hoc Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee.

ARTICLE I OF THE Constitution explicitly states that Congress is an equal and separate branch of government, exercising exclusively prescribed powers in some cases and sharing powers with the Executive branch in others. In no case, does the Constitution contemplate that the role of Congress is to merely underwrite the power of the Executive branch. I have offered and worked for legislation to strengthen the rightful role of the Congress to share with the Executive on a coequal basis, the formulation of national policy, whether it be in matters

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"I hope these hearings will alert the American people to the constitutional crisis that we face . . ."

"In no case does the Constitution contemplate that the role of Congress is to merely underwrite the power of the Executive branch."

of war and peace, the allocation of American assistance abroad, strengthening our social security system here at home, improving our environment, or steering budgetary priorities along the path of productive and needed social services. The history of our nation provides ample proof that if the separate branches remain strong and vital they are an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of unfettered power; this system of restrained power is the bedrock principle on which our political system was founded and has been the very genius of our form of government. As Aristotle noted long ago, "If liberty and equality . . . are to be founded in democracy, they will be best attained when all [institutions] share in government to the utmost." In this regard, Congress' prime role is its power over appropriations and directing the allocation of federal funds. This power is the key to Congress' independence, influence, and integrity.

Under the Constitution, the right to appropriate belongs to Congress. Article I, Section 9.7, of the Constitution reads, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law . . ." In this century, however, through a process of subtle attrition, Congress has gradually surrendered this traditional well-spring of strength. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 enlarged the President's spending discretion and established a procedure whereby the Executive no longer needed to send up to Congress itemized budget requests as had been the custom, and replaced this procedure with a budgeting and appropriating system based on a "keep the faith" attitude among executive officials and appropriations committees. The Act also created the Bureau of the Budget, now reorganized into the potent Office of Management and Budget. This legislation has, over a period of years, tilted the balance of political power clearly in favor of the Executive. Instead of "More Power to Congress!" as was the Hamiltonian demand during the discussions preceding the Philadelphia convention in 1787, Congress, divesting itself of its own power, granted "More power to the Executive!"

Through the growth of "central clearance," then, the appropriations power, once exclusively a legislative function, emerged as a strong new arm of the Executive. One observer suggests with devastating candor that "Congress, according to the Constitution, must appropriate—but what is appropriated, speaking very generally, is what is presented to them by the Administration." The growing volume and complexity of governmental transactions, and the flexibility with which they must be handled in the absence of Congressional efforts to adapt its procedures to handle greater complexity, inevitably has led to increased Executive control over public spending. In the light of the major role that the Executive branch has assumed, the importance of safeguarding what remains of Congressional power over the purse is manifest.

Executive impoundment represents a clear threat to that remaining Congressional power, as recent history illustrates. In my view, it was during the Roosevelt Administration, acting under a continual state of emergency in the Depression and later in World War II, that Executive impoundment changed its character from that of simple economy measures and became a widely used instrument for Executive policy. From 1933 on, a quantum jump occurred in the frequency of im-

"Congress' prime role is its power over appropriations and directing the allocation of Federal funds."

"Executive impoundment represents a clear threat to remaining Congressional power . . ."

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poundment. Measures were passed by Congress to permit President Roosevelt to pursue those activities he deemed necessary to ease the economic crisis of the Thirties; and, similarly, during the Forties Congress supported the President in his policy of deferring projects which he believed might absorb funds required for the war effort.

Throughout this period of crisis, the Executive branch based its rationale for impounding funds chiefly upon the war powers of the President.

Congressional abdication of its "most effective check on Presidential power," the power of the purse, was directly linked to the war. However, several Members of Congress, I am happy to note, were clearly unhappy and were concerned that the claimed emergency powers might become normal powers. A legislative amendment introduced by Senator McKellar in 1943 was "the first across-the-board curtailment of the Budget's impounding procedure to be accepted by either House of Congress." After passing the Senate by a voice vote, the McKellar amendment was resoundingly defeated in the House. The floor debate over the issue, however, made it evident that even given the wartime emergency, many influential Members believed that the Executive had stepped into Congress' domain and a Constitutional crisis was in the making.

The record on impoundment since the war discloses that—far from abating—the practice has grown markedly, expanding beyond the general area of "national defense" to challenge frontally Congressional control over all aspects of civilian spending.

Breaking the Executive's hardening habit of impoundment is now one of the crucial tests before us—if Congress and Constitutional government are to survive. To salvage a position of power and policy, both bodies of the Congress must draw the line; Members need to live up to their oath of office and join together in a concentrated effort to restore the power of the purse as required by the Constitution. S.373, which I wholeheartedly cosponsor, requiring the President to come to Congress for affirmative votes by both Houses for each specific instance of impoundment, is a fitting legislative bulwark on which to stand and fight. The Supreme Court represents, one would hope, another forum for fortifying Congress' dominant position in regard to control over the purse where suit might be sought against the Executive for impounding federal funds.

Seen with startling regularity now are references to the impoundment of funds for highways, for combatting water pollution, for housing, for flood control projects, for hospital construction, for medical research, and other important domestic programs. Is Congress to pass legislation creating and funding programs and then plead with the White House to release the funds to implement duly enacted laws? Surely not! As Thomas Jefferson wrote long ago, "An elective despotism was not what we fought for," in our War of Independence. The words of a Senator who served in this body during World War II, speaking on the impoundment issue are even more poignant today: "Then how does the Congress express itself or announce a Congressional policy? After all, we represent the people."

If the United States is to preserve its democratic institutions, the President cannot be allowed to continue his self-appointed privilege of ignoring a mandated appropriation.

"Breaking the Executive's hardening habit of impoundment is now one of the crucial tests before us—if Congress and Constitutional government are to survive."

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year Senate terms with all of the House members and half the senators elected in presidential years. He argued that "under normal conditions" such a constitutional change "would insure the same political complexion" with respect to the House and the presidency and mean the "likelihood" of the same thing for both houses of Congress.

Ike versus Congress

The first session of the 86th Congress is now nearing its end. At the beginning there was defiant talk from the jubilant Democrats of serving up to the President a batch of measures on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. But after a couple of timorous experiments, the Democrats demonstrated that they could not quite muster the necessary two-thirds vote in both houses to override Eisenhower on even the most minor measure.

Had the 1958 recession continued well into 1959, the story might have been different, with pressures from back home enough to sway the additional votes against the President. By spring, however, it was clear that a new boom was under way. And the President, confident that he had been right last year in fighting off massive spending, took the offensive on the budget issue. His success against the big Democratic majority has pleased him enormously and disgruntled the bulk of his opposition.

Many observers in Washington continue to consider the budget balancing or fiscal responsibility issue, as raised by Eisenhower, to be a phony. They argue, among other things, that whatever pressures there are from the voters on something vaguely called "the budget" have their origin not in federal taxes and expenditures, which have not appreciably changed for some years, but in the massive demands for greater spending by state and local governments, with many resultant tax increases at these levels.

The President has been getting some expert help from fellow Republican leaders in his running battle with the Democrats. The new House leader, Indiana's Charles Halleck, especially has been getting under Johnson's skin with his pronouncements on the White House steps following the regular Tuesday morning GOP legislative conferences with Eisenhower. Johnson growled about

"partisan slogans shouted hastily into a microphone on a Tuesday morning." Halleck grinned and retorted that "it would really be quite flattering if we were able to exercise any real control over the legislative program." And GOP Chairman Morton hit another soft spot by calling the current Congress the Democratic "won't-do" Congress.

The Johnson-Rayburn strategy has always been to make a Democratic record for the country to judge. This has paid off in congressional elections. It did not in the 1956 presidential election, but no one really thought that any Democrat could defeat the incumbent Eisenhower. Now the problem is to create a record on which to elect not only another Democratic Congress but a President as well. Here the Eisenhower attack has knocked the Democrats off balance.

Senator Church of Idaho


A century and a half ago Henry Clay took his seat in the Senate though he was still several months under the constitutional age of thirty. But in recent years Senate "babies" have tended to be newspaper items rather than important members of the upper house. Rush Holt of West Virginia arrived in a blaze of publicity and waited outside for his thirtieth birthday before taking the oath. He soon departed into political oblivion. Russell Long arrived at thirty in 1948. But his record is hardly distinguished.

The current Senate baby, however, is something else again. Now in his third year in Washington, Frank F. Church will be thirty-five on July 25. He is still mistaken by visitors for a Senate page boy, and he speaks in the stilted manner of the school orator. This latter characteristic, incidentally, won him the national American Legion oratorical contest and a \$4000 scholarship at Stanford University when he was a high school junior. His eighteen months of wartime experience in the infantry in India, Burma, and China delayed his law degree but did not rub the youthful appearance from his face.

Church is a Senate liberal, but not a Senate radical. His boyhood hero was Idaho's long-time lion, William E. Borah. But where Borah was an isolationist, Church is an internationalist. And where Borah often bucked his party leadership, Church is a man on whom Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson can usually count.

Two years ago Church was tapped by Johnson to put forward and argue for a compromise on the jury trial issue in the then pending civil rights bill. Earlier this year he helped put through the Johnson compromise on loosening, however slightly, the Senate's filibuster rule. In both cases he showed himself an effective middle-of-the-roader.

Report on Washington



More and more this year Church has begun to speak up on international affairs. He has been able to do so because he was given a seat on foreign relations committee, making him the youngest and most junior senator in a long time to win such a coveted post.

Church has joined that little band of senators, including Humphrey and Gore, who pay some attention to disarmament. Young enough to be an enthusiast yet old enough in politics to be practical, he has tried to find a middle ground between Humphrey's almost all-out support of a nuclear test ban and Gore's reluctance to go further than a ban on tests in the atmosphere lest a total ban inhibit American weapons development.

C O N—MORSE, continued from page 113—

"If the ultimate choice is given us of staying there on a unilateral basis, with no jurisdiction being exercised under existing international law procedures by any one of these three groups I have mentioned, or getting out, then I am for getting out. But not until then. I do not think we will ever have to get out, because I think we will be surprised by the enthusiastic response that a relieved world will give to the kind of international statesmanship I am calling upon my Government to exercise in respect to South Vietnam. I think it will be hailed around the world.

"The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have said that North Vietnam and Red China and others should leave South Vietnam alone. If we would go over there, we would find in countries in that area that the sentiment is for the United States to let South Vietnam alone. The truth is that the war there is a civil war. It is not a war between two nations. It is a war civil in nature. It is true that North Vietnam is receiving assistance, but it is true also that South Vietnam is getting aid from the United States, in the amount of over \$1.5 million a day now; and since the war began in 1946, \$6 billion of the taxpayers' money have been poured into South Vietnam, not covering the cost of keeping American forces there. Much of that, I want to say, and I say it sadly, has resulted in great waste and has produced great corruption in South Vietnam.

"We are not going to end this civil war by any of the courses of action being recommended by the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon Building. We cannot win this war by the policies we are following. We can win military victories. We can bomb and kill by the thousands. We can destroy the cities of Red China and Vietnam. We can destroy the nuclear installations of Red China. But we will lose the war, for, do not forget, we are dealing with a people and a philosophy of a people to whom time does not matter. And after we win all these military victories, what are we going to do with South Vietnam and North Vietnam and Laos and Red China and the rest of the nations that will be involved, assuming for the moment that we might get into a nuclear war? We would have to police them for decades. We have neither the manpower nor the resources to rebuild that part of Asia after that type of war. We will inherit as a legacy for generations of Americans yet to come the undying hatred of the yellow man. He will hate us for hundreds of years. It will be an unending war. Let us think not in terms of the present time, but let us think in terms of the next 100 years. We have the responsibility in our time to lay out courses of action that will not produce the type of holocaust that will bring about for millions of Amer-

ican boys and girls the hatred of many people of the world that will be incurred if we continue to pursue our course of action in South Vietnam."

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From an address given on the floor of the U. S. Senate on February 17, 1965. Sen. Church is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Interior and Insular Affairs Committees.

"THE PENDULUM of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other. Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our business; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business. In the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has been transformed into an excess of interventionism.

"To the case against excessive American intervention in Africa and Asia, the State Department has a stock answer: The Communists will not let us quit. South Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong to overthrow the Saigon Government, then the gates are open, so the argument goes, to successful Communist subversion of all the other governments in southeast Asia.

"But the hard fact is that there are limits to what we can do in helping any government surmount a Communist uprising. If the people themselves will not support the government in power, we cannot save it. We can give arms, money, food, and supplies, but the outcome will depend, in the final analysis, upon the character of the government helped, and the extent to which the people are willing to rally behind it.

"The Saigon Government is losing its war, not for lack of equipment, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied than Saigon, but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported; it must come from within. It is nothing that we Americans can supply from our side of the Pacific. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the spoiling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese themselves can furnish the solution.

"As to the other governments in southeast Asia, they are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support, and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. The Malaysians, with British help,

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because of their own determined resistance to communism, successfully put down a long and bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars—even when nourished from without—can be won by sitting governments, but only in countries where shelter for the enemy is not furnished by the people themselves.

“Our reason for being in the Orient is not that of fashioning Asian governments. It is not communism, as such, which accounts for our presence in the Far East, but rather the containment of Peiping. This can be best accomplished if China is ringed with stable, independent governments, which refuse to be the pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugoslavia has proved in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, even a Communist government can play such a role.

“It would be to our national advantage to seek an international agreement for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French Indochina. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both sides, and to maintain order, while an independent and unaligned new government is formed by the Vietnamese themselves.

“The neutrality of the whole region could be guaranteed by the signatories to the international agreement. Thus, the military might of the United States would remain available as a deterrent against Chinese aggression from the north, which is—or ought to be—our governing national objective in southeast Asia anyway.

“In like manner, we may find it in our national interest to pledge our armed might behind the defense of India, Thailand, or some other Asian government, against any future Chinese attack, that these governments might avoid the need for developing nuclear shields of their own, while we avoid the dangers of further proliferation of nuclear arsenals. This kind of guarantee, which would be a real deterrent to Chinese military aggression, lies within our capability, and would preclude a power vacuum in Asia, so feared by the architects of our present policy. If this kind of defense commitment is sufficient to prevent an overt Chinese attack upon, say, India or Thailand, it ought to suffice for the rest of southeast Asia as well.

“To those who protest that such a policy will fail to protect against growing Chinese influence over such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam, brought on through intensified Communist subversion from within these countries, I submit that the scoreboard on our present policy of direct intervention in southeast Asia shows that we are now losing this contest. Burma and Cambodia, though both non-Communist governments, have been

moving steadily closer to China. Laos is in limbo, after an American involvement, at heavy cost, in that country's internal affairs, turned sour. The war in Vietnam, despite Saigon's preponderant military advantage, is going from bad to worse.

“This somber truth is underlined in the stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon American bases in South Vietnam, and the consequent loss of more American lives. We must hope that our retaliatory bombings of military installations in North Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the strength of our will and purpose, may persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not, and never has been, a paper tiger. Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it. The military might we can bring to bear upon North Vietnam is formidable indeed, and so it would behoove the Communists to explore with us the way to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.

“As the beat of the war drums intensifies, and passions rise on both sides, I recognize that negotiation becomes more difficult. Already cries of ‘appeasement’ are being directed at anyone who speaks up for a negotiated settlement of this escalating war. So soon the country seems to have forgotten the wise words of John F. Kennedy, that we should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

“All of us recognize the heavy burden of decision which our President bears. And we would do well to remember that the seal of his office is an American eagle, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch represents our best hope for avoiding a widening war in Asia.

“Those who would use the arrows alone are actually calling for war. The systematic and sustained bombing of North Vietnam, unattended by any proffered recourse to the bargaining table, can only lead us into war. North Vietnam, lacking air and sea power, must answer on the ground. Her response, in the form of added military pressures against the south, Saigon can hardly be expected to withstand. As a consequence, the next step will be to send American land forces into battle, thus converting the struggle into an American war on the Asian mainland. That China will, sooner or later, enter such a war, I have no doubt.

“Let those who urge this course upon us answer for its consequences. A spreading war on the Asian mainland, pitting American troops against Asian troops, is a war we cannot finish. In the end, after a tragic trail of casualties out of all proportion to our real national interest, we will have to negotiate a settlement with the Communists, even as such a truce was finally negotiated in Korea. The question really is not whether we should negotiate, but when.

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"To those who say that we must not parley now, because we would bargain from a position of weakness, I reply that they take too restricted a view of our strategic position in southeast Asia. They look only to the plight of the war in South Vietnam, forgetting that American power in southeast Asia rests not upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon the strength of our own possession of the sea and air. Our recent retaliatory blows should make it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not quit under fire, nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist coercion. We can strike back with relative impunity, from floating bases which are beyond Communist reach, and inflict heavy punishment upon them. Ours is not a position of weakness from which to deal.

"So I would hope that the President of the United States will undertake to use, not only his arrows, but his olive branch as well. Willingness to parley is not a sign of weakness, but the symbol of strength, nor should it destroy what remains of the fighting morale of the South Vietnamese. Negotiations preceded the end of the fighting in Korea by nearly 2 years. In South Vietnam, the active bargaining for a peaceful solution could even lift morale by offering some hope to the people that there might come an end to their ordeal. Moreover, an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement would not be incompatible with the keeping of our pledge to give military aid and advice to the Saigon Government.

"It is mandatory, in these former colonial areas, that we establish foreign policy goals which are not beyond our reach; that we observe priorities which correspond with our real national interests; that we concern ourselves less with other peoples' ideologies, and that we adopt techniques which are sensitive to, and compatible with, the prevailing sentiment of the people in each great region of the world. Measured by these criteria, we are too deeply involved in the internal affairs of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia."

"So one wonders to what purpose our aid was directed in the first instance. To be sure, when the program was first started, it was designed to give relief to people who were the victims of war.

"There has been some success, not only in the development of a country's resources, but in the reestablishment of their economic systems. That has happened in some instances. It has happened in Germany. What was the result? A stable currency and a country that peddles its merchandise practically all over the globe. West Germany has practically no unemployment.

"When the Chancellor of West Germany was in this country, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, or one of the distinguished members of that committee had a luncheon for him. I went to the luncheon and I asked the Chancellor about unemployment in his country. He said, 'We could use a million extra people right now.'

"So that country has done it. It has followed a pattern tested by time and found not to be wanting.

"Are we to be in the fix of the ancient Greek runner, who collapsed when his goal was in sight, finally bit on his wrist, sucked his blood, won the race, but fell exhausted and died at the end? Does that have to be the end of a program of this kind, after all the good will we have invested, together with our funds? Must that be the reward for our country?"

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From the debate of July 27, 1966, on the floor of the U. S. Senate during consideration of amendments seeking to curtail authorization levels in S. 3583, the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966. Sen. Church is a member of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Interior & Insular Affairs.

"THE PENDING amendment would reduce the authorization for military assistance for fiscal 1967 by \$100 million, leaving with the administrators of the program all decisions as to where the reductions should be made.

"In passing judgment on the proposed amendment, the Senate should be completely clear as to what is, and what is not, involved in this authorization bill.

"Vietnam is not involved in any way. The bill is 'in addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized

(Continued on page 218)

"We have to take these things as they occur. We cannot prevent them. We cannot pre-set them. That is part of the price we pay for world leadership. Unless we are willing to be an aggressor, unless we are willing to make the world over in our image, we have to take our chances as a sort of policeman and arbiter of the world, particularly a world in which some still find some ward for the use of force."

by HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN
United States Representative, Pennsylvania, Democrat

From the debate of July 12, 1966, on the floor of U. S. House of Representatives during consideration H. R. 15750, the proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. The bill, introduced by Rep. Morgan in his capacity as Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, embodied both the economic and military portions of the foreign aid program. In the Senate, these subjects were created in separate bills.

"IT LOOKS as though the Communists may be losing the cold war, and they do not appear to be winning the war in Vietnam.

"I do not mean to say that from now on everything will be all right. Any quick review of the world situation shows that the United States is confronted with serious problems in all areas, and it is not too difficult to find examples of waste and inefficiency in our foreign aid program.

"Nevertheless, there have been encouraging developments. In countries where free elections have been held, the extreme leftists have been defeated and governments friendly to the United States have been elected. Although in a number of countries governments have been thrown out and military dictatorships have taken power, the new governments appear to be anti-Communist, to be sincerely concerned with improving living conditions, and to desire the friendship and cooperation of the United States.

"Furthermore, if you look around, there is evidence that many people are better off as a result of U. S. assistance.

"There is a tendency to focus so much attention on the scrap pile that we overlook the skyscraper which has been built.

"I do not believe that there are very many who think that the idea of foreign aid is all wrong and

PRO A. Should A Vacancy In The By Presidential Nominatio

by HON. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Former President of the United States

From a letter written by Mr. Eisenhower on March 5, 1964, to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

"I SUGGEST that at any time a Vice President succeeds to the Presidency he should immediately nominate another individual as Vice President to fill the vacancy, with the nomination to be approved, preferably, by both bodies of the Congress rather than merely by the Senate.

"Should such an event occur during recess of Congress, I believe that a special session should be promptly called so that there could be no question that public opinion, as represented by the Congress, would approve of the new President's nominee.

"There, of course, arises the bothersome possibility that some type of disaster might remove the President and the Vice President simultaneously. I believe that to cover this contingency we should return to the provisions of the law that governed succession before 1947, but with the proviso that if both President and Vice President should be lost their successor should be considered only as an 'Acting President' and the Congress should provide for another election of a President and a Vice President to serve out the Presidential term then current.

"I believe that these changes should be accomplished by Constitutional Amendment."

by HON. FRANK CHURCH

United States Senator, Idaho, D.

From an address on the floor of the U. S. Senate on January 22, 1964. (See also page 157.)

"REPAIRS to our constitutional roof are rarely undertaken when the Republic enjoys unobstructed sunshine; it is likely that they will be made, if at all, at a time, like the present, when recent crisis has dramatized the need.

"It is significant, however, that a constitutional procedure to insure that the office of Vice President would be promptly filled, when vacant for any reason, would render moot most of the argument about statutory succession to the office of President. For the need would arise only in the unlikely event, against which careful pre-

cautions are taken, that both the President and the Vice President should perish or suffer disability at the same time.

"Something akin to the constitutional role which the House of Representatives plays in relation to the Presidency might be made applicable to the Vice Presidency for the special purpose which here concerns us. Only the House can elect a President if no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the electoral college. Accordingly, the amendment I am proposing would leave the final selection of a Vice President chosen to fill a vacancy in that office to the House of Representatives.

"Here is a procedure which conforms as closely as possible to the existing practice under the Constitution. It provides the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives with a role in the selection for which each is best suited: The President exercises his responsibility in such a way as to insure that the new Vice President will be acceptable to him—reflecting the actuality of our present nominating procedures at party conventions—and that continuity of party and policy can be maintained; the Senate scrutinizes the qualifications of each nominee, free from the pressures to which a President may sometimes be subjected, to insure that each is fully qualified for the second highest office in the Nation; the House, most representative of the people, makes the final choice of the candidate it believes to be best endowed with the qualities of leadership and popularity without which no President can realize the full potential of the office."

by HON. BIRCH BAYH

United States Senator, Indiana, D.

From a statement of January 22, 1964, opening hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. (See also page 153.)

"I BELIEVE strongly that we can provide a Vice President for the Nation by the relatively simple means of having a President nominate an individual for a Vice President, when the Vice Presidency is vacant. Then the Congress should act on the President's recommendation by electing or rejecting the nominee.

"The President must have a voice in the selection of a Vice President. It would assure the selection of a man—

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Vital Speeches of the Day

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Vietnam

DISENGAGEMENT NOW

By FRANK CHURCH, *Democrat, United States Senator from Idaho, Member of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

Delivered in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., October 8, 1969

IN THE SECOND year of the American Revolution the great William Pitt rose in the House of Lords and spoke words which, in a less civilized nation, might have been taken for treason. "My lords," he declared, "you cannot conquer America . . . You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly; pile and accumulate every assistance you can buy or borrow; traffic and barter with every little pitiful German prime that sells and sends his subjects to the shambles . . . your efforts are forever vain and impotent, doubly so from this mercenary aid on which you rely, for it irritates, to an incurable resentment, the minds of your enemies. . . If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms—never—never—never!"¹

The England to which Pitt counseled was not a decrepit nation but a rising empire still approaching the peak of its power. The inglorious end of the American war, from the British point of view, was not followed by a worldwide loss of confidence in Britain's word or Britain's power. Yorktown was followed by Waterloo and in the nineteenth century Great Britain acquired vast new domains, becoming the vital center of world commerce and industry. The real loser of the American Revolutionary War was America's ally, France, whose prodigal waste of resources—all for the sake of humbling England—almost certainly helped bring about the French Revolution of 1789. To compound the irony, when the British Empire finally did disintegrate, it was not in the wake of defeat but of British "victories" in the two World Wars.

The paradox burns back upon us full circle. The victory denied George III by ragtag American rebels fighting to end foreign rule, has now, nearly two centuries later, been denied to us in distant Vietnam by stubborn, native guerrilla fighters equally determined to drive the foreigner from their land.

Faced with their implacable resolve, what kind of "victory"

can be won? The "victory" of holding a proud people hostage? The "victory" of inflicting a "favorable kill ratio" upon an enemy who will not quit? The "victory" of maintaining a puppet government in Saigon propped up by the money we lavish on it, and sustained in the field by the troops we send—and others we hire—to fight for it? No, there is no "victory" we can win in Vietnam worthy of the name. President Nixon himself concedes as much when he says: "We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield."

In fact, our favored euphemism regarding Vietnam is not victory at all but an "honorable settlement," a term allowing of almost unlimited possibilities of interpretation. In the present circumstances, however, its meaning seems clear enough. On the one hand, we have been unable to suppress the rebellion; on the other hand, we do not wish to acknowledge that fact. We do not wish to acknowledge it to the communists, for fear their appetite for conquest will be whetted. We do not wish to acknowledge it to our allies, for fear their confidence in our power will be diminished. And most of all, we do not wish to acknowledge it to ourselves, for fear that our own, surprisingly fragile confidence in ourselves will be undermined. And so we seek an "honorable settlement," an agreement under which no one will say what everyone knows: that the United States of America has made a bad mistake and finds it necessary to liquidate that mistake.

The time has come for the pretense to end; for the prideful nonsense to stop about securing an "honorable settlement" and avoiding a "disguised defeat." The truth is that as long as our troops stay in South Vietnam, we shall occupy a hostile country. There is no way that the United States, as a foreign power and a Western one at that, can win a civil war among the Vietnamese. Even now, five years after we entered the conflict, it remains a struggle between rival factions of Vietnamese for control of the government in Saigon. The outcome rests, now as before, on the Vietnamese themselves.

¹ November 20, 1777.

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If we can find the resolution to end our protracted involvement in this war, we shall suffer no lasting injury to our power or prestige. I do not think that the liquidation of our intervention in Vietnam will mean the loss of our global greatness, any more than the loss of the American colonies cost England her greatness in the eighteenth century, or any more than the loss of Algeria and Indochina cost France her national stature. On the contrary, the end of empire was not a defeat for France but a liberation, in the wake of which a demoralized nation recovered its good name in the world and its own self-esteem. The termination of our war in Vietnam would represent a similar liberation for America, and even a victory of sorts—a victory of principle over pride and of intelligent self-interest over messianic delusion.

The United States Government is not a charity-dispensing institution; its primary obligation is not to the Saigon generals, or to some portion of the Vietnamese people, but to the American people, to *their* security and well-being. When all is said and done about our "honor" and "commitment," the fact remains that our presence in Vietnam can be justified—if it can be justified—in terms of *American* interests, correctly defined as the freedom and safety of the American people.

Before anyone can prescribe an American course-of-action for Vietnam, it is necessary to be absolutely explicit about what our interests are in that benighted country and what they are not. I do not agree with President Nixon that, having crossed the bridge of intervention, it is useless to belabor the original issue²—as if the presence of half a million American troops and the loss of nearly 40,000 American lives represented an investment that had to be redeemed by sacrificing still more lives, regardless of the wisdom of our continued presence there. It is quite essential that we reexamine the decisions of preceding Administrations, not for the sake of political retribution, or even for the sake of history, but for the express purpose of identifying our interests. Why we intervened in Vietnam in the first place has everything to do with whether and how we should get out.

"A great nation," the President says, "cannot renege on its pledges."³ What pledges, indeed, have we failed to keep? The amount of money, weapons, ammunition, food, equipment and supplies we have funneled into South Vietnam is beyond belief, vastly exceeding the outside help given North Vietnam and the Vietcong by all the communist governments combined. To fight for the South, we have sent an American expeditionary force of half a million men; no Russians or Chinese have been imported to fight for the North. Hanoi and the Vietcong do their own fighting. I say that Saigon—with larger and better-armed forces in the field than any arrayed against it—must stop relying on us to fight its war. We have kept our pledges, and done far more besides. We didn't undertake to make South Vietnam the 51st American State; we didn't promise to stand guard over the 17th parallel as though it were an American frontier.

But, the President argues, if we were to allow the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to prevail, "the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability." Here Mr. Nixon espouses Mr. Rusk's concept of an exemplary war, which presumably demonstrates to other countries that the United States stands willing to intervene wherever necessary, in order to put down threats of internal communist subversion as well as external communist aggression. Yet the President himself has now announced to the world that the United States has a new policy: in the future, Asian governments must defend

themselves against subversion from within, and not look our way again. The motto, "No more Vietnams" cannot be reconciled with the fiction that we are still fighting an exemplary war in that country.

Withdrawing from Vietnam, according to President Nixon, "would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later."⁴ The assertion that by fighting in Vietnam we prevent other wars is pure speculation, rooted not in evidence but in analogy, the analogy of the thirties when appeasement whetted Nazi Germany's appetite for aggression.

No good historian will buy that analogy. History unfolds more in paradoxes than in parallels. Mark Twain once observed that "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again—and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one anymore."⁵ In the case of Vietnam we would do well to settle for the *unwisdom* that is in it and stop the sacrifice of *real* American lives for the sake of saving hypothetical ones in some conjectural war in an unforecastable future.

We dare not, says the President, abandon the South Vietnamese to "a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life." Here again we are dealing with something that might happen; in the meantime does no one who values human life feel "shock and dismay" by the senseless sacrifice of American lives in endless assaults on useless hilltops and by death tolls of hundreds of GI's every week? Surely there is another way to protect those South Vietnamese who may feel the need for sanctuary, if it comes to that. Better that we open our own gates to them, than keep on sending Americans to die for them in their own land. As for the Saigon generals, there should be ample facilities for them on the French Riviera.

What indeed does Vietnam have to do with the vital interests of the United States, which is to say, with the *freedom* and *safety* of the American people? I attempted to define those interests four years ago shortly after our full-scale intervention in Vietnam began. As to *freedom*, I said:

"Freedom, as a matter of fact, is not really at issue in South Vietnam, unless we so degrade freedom as to confuse it with the mere absence of communism. Two dictatorial regimes, one sitting in Hanoi, the other in Saigon, struggle for control of the country. Whichever prevails the outcome is not going to settle the fate of communism in the world at large, nor the problem of guerrilla wars. They did not begin in Vietnam and will not end there. They will continue to erupt in scattered, farflung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions within a country permit Communist subversion to take root."

And as to the safety of the American people, I added:

"Nor can it be soundly contended that the security of the United States requires a military decision in South Vietnam. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored there. Saigon does not stand guard over Seattle. We conquered the Pacific Ocean in the Second World War. It is our moat, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very shores of China. There is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific; there is no need for us to retain a military base on the mainland of Asia."⁶

After four years of futile warfare, I see no reason to alter that evaluation of American interests. The plain fact is that we

² Address of May 15, 1969.

³ Address of May 15, 1969.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Pudd'nhead Wilson: Pudd'nhead Wilson's Calendar, ch. 11.

⁶ "The Vietnam Imbroglia," *Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 111, Part 11, Senate, June 24, 1965, p. 14631.

did not then, and do not now, have a vital interest in the preservation of the Thieu-Ky government, or even in the preservation of a noncommunist government, in South Vietnam. Nor do we have a vital interest in whether the two Vietnams are united or divided. We have preferences, to be sure, and our pride is at stake after committing ourselves so deeply, but preference and pride are sentiments not interests. From the standpoint of our interests, we have been fighting an unnecessary war for five long years, making it possibly the most disastrous mistake in the history of American foreign policy. It can never be vindicated; it can only be liquidated.

The war in Vietnam has been more than unnecessary; it has been unsuccessful as well, and that, in the hard world of politics, is usually the greater crime. The Dominican intervention was unnecessary, illegal, and destructive of our relations with Latin America, but it achieved its immediate objective, the suppression of a revolution, with the result that the issue has not remained to plague and divide us. Had Mr. Rostow and his colleagues been right in 1965 in their supposition that the war in Vietnam could be won with "surgical" air strikes and a few months of ground warfare, the question of the war's necessity would not be the lacerating issue that it is today. But the Vietnam strategists were neither wise nor prescient nor lucky. With disastrous insensitivity to the thought processes of an alien culture, and with contemptuous disregard of the warnings offered by some of us in the Senate, they applied their "scientific" theories of warfare in the apparent belief that the Vietnamese would respond to "graduated" degrees of punishment as they themselves would have responded—by weighing immediate costs against prospective gains. But the Vietnamese turned out not to be scientists. They reacted irrationally and unaccountably by refusing to give up. Their calculations of cost and gain turned out to be different from ours; their willingness to endure punishment turned out to be greater than we had thought possible.

Our strategy in Vietnam has failed but neither the Johnson Administration nor—thus far—the Nixon Administration has been willing to acknowledge that failure. In lieu of the tortured rationalizations of the previous Administration, President Nixon experiments with a cautious troop withdrawal tied to the tenuous hope of a growing South Vietnamese military capacity. In their Midway communique Mr. Nixon and Mr. Thieu rejoiced in hamlet elections, in "the failure of the other side to achieve its objectives," and in the new-found strength of the Saigon army, while Mr. Thieu himself recited appropriate lines about the "constant duty" of the Saigon forces "to assume a greater share of the burden in South Vietnam."

Perhaps this time, for the *first* time, the optimistic prognosis will be borne out, so studiously does it ignore hard issues and well-known facts, that one strongly suspects that what we are confronted with today is not a new strategy but a new "image" for the discredited old strategy, a new device for postponing difficult decisions, a new expedient for holding off the critics of the war. It would appear that President Nixon, like President Johnson, is becoming preoccupied with politics to the neglect of policy.

This, in turn, leads to the frustration which gives rise to a search for scapegoats. In much the same way that the German General Staff—which had actually initiated Germany's surrender in World War I—later perpetuated the myth of defeat by betrayal on the home front, the men who led us into the Vietnam quagmire have sought to place the blame for the catastrophe on their domestic critics, on those of us who said that we never should have entered the quagmire in the first place and who now insist that we ought to get out. The "real

battlefield," according to this self-serving doctrine of the architects of failure, is not in Vietnam but in America, where, if only the critics would be silent, the will of the enemy would supposedly be broken. In its crude form as a spurious, jingoist "patriotism," the argument runs that the war critics are near-traitors, provisioners of "aid and comfort to the enemy." In the scarcely more august language of our last two Presidents, the critics are "nervous nellys" and "neoisolationists"—deriders of patriotism, as Mr. Nixon put it, a "backward fetish."⁷

The critics are also credited with the failure to make progress in over a year of negotiations at Paris. With a cold eye fixed on the agitated state of American opinion, so the argument runs, the enemy is emboldened to resist our "reasonable" proposals. "It's awfully hard to play chess with twenty kibitzers at your elbow," Mr. Kissinger complains, "all of them demanding explanations of the purpose of every move, while your opponent listens."⁸

The "kibitzers" who are such an inconvenience to Mr. Kissinger are the very dissenters whose protest finally persuaded President Johnson to stop the escalation of the war and go to the conference table. Had these critics remained silent as the war makers would have had them do, the limited war in Vietnam might by now have escalated into a full-scale war with China. Whatever hope of peace there now is, it is the "kibitzers'" gift to the architects of failure. Long may they "kibitz," acting, let it be remembered, on their own concept of patriotism—which is not the patriotism of silent acquiescence in a policy they detest, but the patriotism of Camus, who would have us love our country for what it ought to be, and of Carl Schurz, that "mugwump" dissenter from McKinley imperialism, who proclaimed: "Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right."

For all the misjudgment of generals and policy makers—and for all the allegedly disruptive dissent at home—the root cause of failure lies not with ourselves but with our Vietnamese allies. Had an honest and patriotic government ruled in Saigon, it would probably have beaten the Vietcong long ago, with no more than material support from the United States. The Vietnamese people are not lacking in military courage and resourcefulness; the Vietcong have demonstrated that. What is lacking is the ability of the Saigon government to inspire either the confidence of its people or the fighting spirit of its army. There is little mystery as to why this ability is lacking. An American study team made up primarily of prominent churchmen recently reported, after a trip to Vietnam, that the Thieu government ruled by terror, using torture and brutality to suppress political opposition, and that the regime relied "more upon police state tactics and American support to stay in power than upon true representation and popular support."⁹

Of all the misrepresentations which have been perpetrated about Vietnam none has been more insulting to the intelligence and offensive to the moral sensibilities of young Americans than the portrayal of the Saigon regime as an upholder of freedom and democracy.

Mr. Clark Clifford, our last Secretary of Defense, who found the courage to tell President Johnson the truth about Vietnam, had this to say of the Saigon generals:

"There is complete callousness about the cost of the war to us. They have no concern over the loss of our men or treasure. They see us as a big, rich country, well able to afford it. They are going one way and we are going another. I see no likelihood of our goals getting closer together. But

⁷ Speech at the Air Force Academy, June 4, 1969.

⁸ Quoted by Stewart Alsop in "The Powerful Dr. K." *Newsweek*, June 16, 1969, p. 108.

⁹ *The Washington Post*, June 11, 1969.

they have become very adroit at saying what the American public wants to hear . . . They are sweet talking us."

What's more, I would add, they are exercising a veto over American policy in Vietnam. At his latest press conference, President Nixon reiterated that we were willing to negotiate on anything, except "the right of the people of South Vietnam to choose their own leaders." Then, calling for "internationally supervised elections," Nixon said, "we will accept the result of those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Communist government . . ."

Mr. Nixon may think so, but not Mr. Thieu. His immediate rebuttal was plain enough. The Saigon Government, he said, had no intention of accepting a "coalition with the Communists" or "domination by the Communists" under any circumstances whatever. This is hardly surprising, since Mr. Thieu has consistently defied American policy. No sooner had he returned to Saigon from his love-feast with President Nixon at Midway last June, than he proclaimed: "I solemnly declare that there will be no coalition government, no peace cabinet, no transitional government, not even reconciliatory government."¹⁰

In neither instance, did any disavowal issue from the White House. President Nixon, like his predecessor before him, appears to be manacled to the Saigon generals. Lyndon Johnson flew five times to Mid-Pacific rendezvous with these same men. Now President Nixon has followed in that beaten path and emerged, like Mr. Johnson, with the same pretensions of harmony. Lacking either the willingness to depend on their own army or the support of their own people, the Saigon generals have held an ace-in-the-hole which has kept them in power and in command of events: their influence amounting to a veto over America's war policy. Had they anything like the same influence in Vietnam that they have had in Washington, Thieu and Ky would have overpowered the Vietcong long ago.

Well, we have an ace-in-the-hole too: the fact that this war is not now and never was essential to our interests, which is to say, to the freedom and safety of the American people. Pride has cheated us of the power deriving from our own interests, because, in order to gain access to that power, we would have to admit error. That same pride has been Saigon's lever over America's war policy: they survive on it, while Americans die for it.

Sooner or later, Vietnam will revert to the control of the Vietnamese. Whether on the basis of a negotiated peace or an unnegotiated withdrawal, American forces will eventually have to be removed from Vietnam. When that happens, if not before, the Vietnamese civil war will be settled—as it should and would have been settled long ago but for American intervention—by the interplay of indigenous forces within Vietnam. If a formal settlement comports with the indigenous balance of forces, whatever it may be, the settlement will be a lasting one. If it does not, it will be overthrown.

There are—as we have learned and should have known without this trial by fire—limits to the ability of an alien power to work its will in a hostile environment. Our own Civil War provides an example: after four years of savage warfare and eleven years of military occupation, the Union finally withdrew its forces from the South, allowing that region to revert to the political domination of the same people who had dominated the secessionist Confederacy. Another example is provided by the Boer War, Britain's turn-of-the-century "Vietnam." After more than two years of frustrating warfare against a guerrilla force of provincial rebels—in the course of

which the mighty British Empire became an object of universal scorn and detestation—the British finally beat the Boers, organized the Union of South Africa and then, perforce, turned the political control of the country back to the defeated Boers, who have dominated South Africa ever since.

The common factor in the American Civil War, the Boer War and the Vietnam War is that each confronted a dominant alien power with an intolerable dilemma: it could impose its will only by the sustained application of overwhelming force; the alternative was to withdraw that force, leaving the indigenous factions to strike their own natural balance more or less as they would have if the alien power had not intervened in the first place. In the one instance "victory" becomes insupportable, in the other meaningless.

Weighing this dilemma along with the other main considerations I have set forth—that this war is a failure and was never in our interests to begin with—what is to be inferred for a strategy of peace?

The point of departure is the clear, candid acknowledgement of our own lack of vital interest in the internal regimes of the two Vietnams. This means that we must break through the pride barrier which has thus far deterred us from admitting that, from the standpoint of our own interests, this war is and always has been a mistake. The purpose of this admission is not flagellation but freedom—the freedom of action which will only be ours when we end our thralldom to the Saigon generals and begin to act in our own interests and no longer on the basis of theirs.

In recent weeks, there has been increasing talk of changing the military mix in Vietnam by replacing American ground troops with Vietnamese, while retaining American supply and support troops in their combat role. This is not a formula for extricating the United States from Vietnam; it is, rather, a formula for keeping up to 300,000 American troops engaged in Vietnam indefinitely. Its purpose is not to get out, but to stay in.

The imperative is that we get out. This does not mean, of course, that the South Vietnamese Government would have to follow suit, or that it would be helpless in the face of its enemies. It would still have 1,500,000 men under arms as against 135,000 Vietcong and 90,000 North Vietnamese soldiers now in South Vietnam. If the ARVN could be inspired to defend the Saigon government, it would survive; if it could not be so inspired, then the government does not deserve to survive. In any case, we have done enough. We have fought their war for five long years and sacrificed almost 40,000 American lives. It is enough.

The process of disengagement need not be a long, protracted one. We can initiate it immediately by starting to withdraw forces on a significant scale—not the token scale initiated by the Nixon Administration. At the present rate of withdrawal, American troops will be engaged in Vietnam for the next 8 to 10 years!

Nearly everyone now recognizes that our intervention in Vietnam was in error. Two years ago, our political skies were still filled with hawks; today, scarcely a hawk can be seen on the wing. President Nixon himself, once a ferocious hawk, may not openly admit, but he implicitly acknowledges, that this country has no vital interest at stake in Vietnam. Otherwise, we couldn't possibly leave the outcome for others to decide, even in a free election.

But we have our own hang-ups: twenty years of obsession with communism—deeply ingrained in the wormwood of our politics. Mr. Nixon keeps searching for a settlement that will be popular, or at least welcome, here at home. He keeps pushing for an American-style election in Vietnam, presided

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, June 10, 1969.

over by a special electoral commission composed of all factions, and internationally supervised, and then wonders aloud why so "generous" a proposal should fall on such deaf ears. For an answer, we might ask ourselves how, during our own Civil War, the Union Government would have responded to a British or French proposal for an internationally supervised plebiscite on Southern secession!

A policy wrong from the start can't be made to come out right. Our country is accustomed to imposing unconditional surrender on its enemies; there can be no compromise settlement of the war in Vietnam which will be applauded by the American people. Nor can there be any settlement worthy of reliance, regardless of its terms, for once we have left, no force remains to keep it.

Still, Mr. Nixon stalls for time, trying to pry loose a settlement with modest troop withdrawals. He talks of bringing pressure on Hanoi. But you cannot bring pressure on an enemy by starting to leave! His real purpose is to bring pressure on Saigon to dignify our exit by accepting a transitional arrangement that will make it seem to the American people that the war has not been entirely pointless, that all the sacrifice has not been in vain.

So we wait, month after month, for some miracle to occur in Saigon or Hanoi that will bring the moribund peace talks back to life. We hint to Hanoi that progress at the conference table, or a wind-down of the war, will mean faster withdrawal of American troops, while we tell Saigon that the pace will depend on the demonstrated ability of their forces to replace our own. In the resultant muddle, all we have succeeded in doing is to place the time-table out of our hands into theirs. I say American policy must wait no longer upon the pleasure of either Saigon or Hanoi. It is time to come home!

For our own part, we have neither the need nor the *right* to sacrifice a single American life for any objective exceeding our own vital interest, which is the preservation of the freedom and safety of the American people. If this be thought ungenerous or unaltruistic, I put it to you that no nation has the moral right to be generous or altruistic with the lives of its own citizens. Perhaps a totalitarian nation, conceiving itself a spiritual entity transcending its individual citizens, may claim that right. A democratic nation cannot: its very existence is for the purpose of protecting and serving its citizens.

That is why it has become so necessary to disengage from Vietnam, leaving it to the indigenous forces in that tortured land to vote, negotiate or fight their civil war through to the conclusion which, but for our intervention, would long ago have been reached.

We must get out of Vietnam because a process of deterioration has begun in our society which cannot be arrested, much less reversed, until we do get out. Dividing the American people as no issue since the Civil War has divided them, the war in Vietnam has been the cause and catalyst of great domestic ferment in the United States. The crisis it has directly caused is a moral one: the deep offense done to so many Americans by the blatant incompatibility of this war with the traditional values of our society. At the same time, by diverting financial and political resources, and by dividing and demoralizing the American people, the war has incapacitated us for effective action in respect to the worsening crises of race and poverty, crime and urban deterioration, pollution and ecological decay.

None of this has to do with simple war-weariness, or, as President Nixon seems to think, with weariness "of the weight of free world leadership that fell upon us in the wake of

World War II."¹¹ Something more fundamental than fatigue is involved. Twenty-five years ago the American people were simultaneously fighting two great wars on a vastly greater scale and at an even larger cost than the war in Vietnam, and their spirit never flagged. It is not just the burden of leadership or the exertions of warfare that outrage so many of our citizens, but *this* war, with its blood-soaked strategy of attrition, its unsavory alliance, and its objectives both irrelevant to our interests and offensive to our principles. Nor is "weariness" in any way descriptive of what the war critics are experiencing; they are not tired but angry—angry about the needless killing and the stubborn pride which has kept us from putting a stop to it.

I recently received a letter from a young man who is deeply troubled by these matters. With your indulgence I will read a portion of my reply:

"The deep disillusionment of young people in their country has its roots in the Vietnam war. When the power of the state is used to force young men to fight a war they believe to be wrongful, under penalty of imprisonment if they refuse, the seeds of sedition are sown. We now reap the bitter harvest, manifested in angry uprisings on campuses from coast to coast . . .

"Whenever the limb is shaken, all the leaves tremble. Once the moral authority of the government is rejected, on an issue so fundamental as a wrongful war, every lesser institution of authority is placed in jeopardy. Every sacred principle, every traditional value, every settled policy becomes a target for ridicule or repudiation. Cauldrons of anarchy soon begin to bubble and boil.

"So it has happened that our country is coming unstuck. The ferment distorts every issue; perspective is lost . . .

"I am convinced we must end the war—or at least our participation in it—before we can begin to stick this country back together again. Then we must have the help of men like you, men who haven't abandoned all faith, and who regard the job as worth doing."

Even now there is one thing in which we can take hope, and that is the great force of our American moral traditions. Out of all the dissent and disruption we have learned something about ourselves—that we still believe in our own values, that Jefferson's idea of liberty and Lincoln's idea of equality and Woodrow Wilson's idea of a world community of law are still capable of moving us and guiding our behavior. We have learned, to be sure, that we are capable of violating our traditional values, but we have also learned that we are not capable of violating them easily, or permanently, or indeed without setting in motion the regenerative forces of protest and moral reassertion.

There will be time enough, when peace is restored, to contemplate the "lessons of Vietnam." Perhaps, if peace comes in the way that I believe it must come, some of our recent and present leaders will take it as the war's "lesson" that America has shown itself unworthy of world leadership. Others will conclude that we must develop more sophisticated techniques of intervention, or that we must improve our "social science," or substitute political and economic for military means of intervention. Still others, at the opposite extreme, will probably judge that we must never again involve ourselves in war on a distant continent. All of these propositions, and variations upon them, will undoubtedly be put forth as the "lessons" of Vietnam, but my own hunch is that none of these will stand as a definitive "lesson" or as a reliable guideline for the future.

It may be that there is no lesson in Vietnam other than the modest one suggested by Jim Thomson of Harvard: "never

¹¹ Air Force Academy Speech, June 5, 1969.

again to take on the job of trying to defeat a nationalist anticolonial movement under indigenous communist control in

¹² James C. Thompson, Jr., *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (Richard M. Pfeiffer, ed., New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 258.

former French Indochina."¹² Or the equally modest lesson: that we have got for a time—not necessarily forever—to tend to neglected matters at home. Or perhaps we will have learned nothing more than that we are a people with a moral tradition, a people who discriminate among their wars and who do not easily act against their own traditional values.

Crime Legislation

WHAT HAPPENED CONGRESS?

By HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL, *Attorney General of the United States*

Delivered before the Annual Conference of United Press International Editors & Publishers, Hamilton, Bermuda, October 6, 1969

IT IS A pleasure to address the more than 400 newspaper executives and guests of the Annual United Press International Editors and Publishers Conference.

As you probably know, my introduction to the world of the press was rather unusual. For many years, I maintained a quiet practice as a Wall Street lawyer. Then suddenly, I became a Presidential campaign manager and found myself surrounded by reporters persistently probing and analyzing every aspect of the campaign.

I soon discovered that my ideas of the press were the victim of the generation gap and that the days of the "Front Page" were over. My experience in the campaign, and later in the Cabinet, has impressed me with the new generation of reporter—well-educated, sophisticated about the working of government and particularly knowledgeable about economic and social philosophy.

For example, the UPI reporter at the Department of Justice, Mrs. Isabelle Hall, probably knows more about the activities of our Antitrust Division than I do. She has surprised me by quoting all of the latest statistics on economic concentration and by digesting the most complicated theories about conglomerate mergers.

The late A. J. Liebling wrote about the press as the necessary "slat under the bedspring of democracy." By that, he meant to say, I believe, that without our kind of press—knowledgeable, independent and at times querulous—our experiment in representative government might fail.

Of course, the classic function of the press has been to report what happens. But I also favor one new journalistic trend which is to devote increasing in-depth coverage as to why an event happens or doesn't happen. For it is here, in this process of extended news analysis, that the press tends to measure governmental action against certain acceptable moral standards of behavior.

In the old days of journalism, government was simple and the ethical standards for governmental action were also simple. The breaking point tended to be the commission of a crime as in the Teapot Dome scandal.

But government is a great deal more complex now than in the days of President Harding and ethical standards have become more refined.

Today, government officials on the highest level are likely to ask—not whether a certain decision is politically or legally feasible—but whether it conforms to the morality of national leadership. This is particularly true in our Administration because we are extremely sensitive to the great divisions in our society and to the necessity to heal these wounds as quickly as possible.

In examining the changing standards of the press and the

changing standards of government, I think one of the most important aspects should be a concentration on errors of omission rather than, as in the past, exclusively on the errors of commission.

Many of the worst mistakes committed by government are the errors of doing nothing at all; of passively watching problems and confusion over these problems mount on every side.

The first action that government is likely to take when a problem arises is to talk; and to hope that, if it talks enough, the problem will go away. That, of course, is substantially what occurred with the crime problem.

In February 1967, the President's Crime Commission reported: "There is much crime in America, more than ever is reported; far more than ever is solved, far too much for the health of the nation. Every American knows that. Every American is, in a sense, a victim of crime. . . . The most understandable mood into which many Americans have been plunged by crime is one of frustration and bewilderment."

The latest FBI Uniform Crime Reports shows that in 1968 there were 4.5 million serious crimes committed in the United States, a 17 per cent increase over 1967.

There was a 30 per cent increase in armed robbery; a 15 per cent increase in rape; a 13 per cent increase in murder and an 11 per cent increase in aggravated assault.

From 1960 to 1968, the volume of serious crime has risen 122 per cent, while the population has increased only 11 per cent. The citizen risk of becoming a victim of a crime has nearly doubled from 1960 to 1968.

Despite this Presidential report and the ever increasing crime rate, there had been a tendency by government to shrug its shoulders and to talk and to hope that the problem would eventually disappear.

When the Federal Government did act, it tended to ignore practical and immediate solutions in favor of the approach of the social scientists who can explain the motivations of the criminal, but who can do little to protect the innocent against the mugger or armed robber.

Let me tell you that, as Attorney General, I am first and foremost a law enforcement officer. I believe the Department of Justice is a law enforcement agency. I think that persons who break the law ought to be promptly arrested and tried—*today*.

Of course, I sympathize with physical conditions and emotional problems which may cause persons to commit crimes.

I recognize the need for and strongly support research and development projects which may help us solve crime tomorrow—sometime in the future.

AUG. 1 1969

Two Sentinels Of The Status Quo

U.S. & U.S.S.R.

By FRANK CHURCH, *United States Senator from Idaho, Member of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee*

Delivered on the Senate Floor, July 11, 1969

FOR ALL THEIR IMMENSE physical power, the two dominant nations in the world—the United States and the Soviet Union—suffer from a neurotic sense of insecurity, although neither regards itself as being in imminent danger of attack by the other. At tremendous cost, their nuclear armories keep them at bay and, even if each were foolishly to add a new inventory of ABM missiles to the awesome stockpile, the delicate equilibrium will hold, leaving the two rivals in a state of chronic but only low-grade anxiety over the danger of attack by the other. It is a costly and desperately dangerous way of keeping the peace, but it is all we have shown ourselves capable of thus far.

The immediate threat that each superpower perceives from the other is its ideological impact on third countries, most particularly those that it regards as its protective buffers. It is one of the supposed realities of international politics—a kind of higher law transcending such legal documents as the United Nations Charter—that great powers are allowed to have spheres of influence made up of "friendly" neighbors. In the case of maritime powers such as the United States, the neighborhood may extend to the fringes of distant continents; but, whether or not the buffer is contiguous, the principle is the same: In order to guard itself against even the most remote or hypothetical threat to its security, a great power is held entitled to intervene in the affairs of its small neighbors, even to the extent of making the basic decisions as to how they will organize and run their own societies.

This is where ideology comes in. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States seems to regard itself as being in danger of *direct* ideological subversion by the other, although there have been times—the period of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and of McCarthyism in the United States—when they did. In more recent years, the focus of great-power apprehension has been on their small-power buffers. Over these, each great power displays frenzied determination to exert ideological control. Within its sphere, the Soviet Union insists on the maintenance of Communist governments, inaccurately described, for the most part, as socialist; the United States, on the other hand, insists on the maintenance of non-Communist governments that we, for the most part, incorrectly call free.

Starting with the assumption that ideology is an instrument of foreign policy through which the rival great power will establish its political domination over others, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises, each great power seems to look upon its own buffer states as peculiarly susceptible to ideological subversion by the other great power. It is further assumed that the ultimate aim of this subversion is to isolate and undermine the great power itself; that ideology, being contagious, is singularly suited to this purpose; and that, like a disease, it must therefore be isolated and destroyed before it can spread. These assumptions lead to the conclusion that it is no more than an act of self-defense for a great power to take such measures as it judges necessary to preserve the ideological purity of its sphere of influence.

Seen in this way, the various interventions of the United States and the Soviet Union are explained not only as legitimate defensive measures but as positive services. Thus, in

the case of the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, American policy makers were untroubled by the fact that the U. S. actions violated both the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States and that the revolution the U. S. suppressed was on behalf of a freely elected government that had been expelled by a coup. These were judged only superficial considerations when weighed against the need to defend America from the specter of a "second Cuba" while rescuing the Dominicans from their foolhardy flirtation with communism. Similarly, in the case of Vietnam, far from wishing to impose anything on anybody, the United States, in former Secretary of State Dean Rusk's view, seeks only to save the world from being "cut in two by Asian communism."¹

It remained for the Russians to devise a doctrine of ideological justification for the policy of interventionism. In a document that has come to be known as the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet government pointed out that, in invading Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and its protégés were doing no more than "discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia" and defending their own "socialist gains" against "anti-socialist forces" supported by "world imperialism" seeking to "export counter-revolution."² Turn this phraseology around, substitute "anti-democratic" for "anti-socialist," "world communism" for "world imperialism," "revolution" for "counter-revolution," and the resultant rationale differs little from the official explanation of our own interventions in recent years.

Whether or not the Russians actually believed their excuse, I would not venture to guess. At any rate, I don't believe it; I believe that the Russians—even if they persuaded themselves otherwise—suppressed the liberal government of Czechoslovakia because they feared the contagion of freedom for the rest of their empire and ultimately for the Soviet Union itself. Nor do I believe that, in suppressing revolutions in Latin America and in trying to suppress revolution in Vietnam, the United States is acting legitimately in its own self-defense. There are, God knows, profound differences between the internal orders of the United States and the Soviet Union—ours is a free society and theirs is a totalitarian society whose leaders have shown themselves to be terrified of freedom—but, in their foreign policies, the two superpowers have taken on a remarkable resemblance. Concerned primarily with the preservation of their own vast hegemonies, they have become, in their respective spheres, defenders of the *status quo* against the pressures of revolutionary upheaval in which each perceives little but the secret hand of the other.

Suppressing revolution in its own immediate vicinity is an easy if embarrassing task for a superpower. Suppressing it on a distant continent is more difficult; and, as we have learned in Vietnam, beating down a strongly motivated, capably led and well-organized indigenous force is a virtual impossibility. Confronted with rising nationalistic movements, the super-

¹ Press Conference of October 12, 1967. *The New York Times*, October 13, 1967, p. 15.

² "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries," *The New York Times*, September 27, 1967.

powers, to their own astonishment, sometimes find themselves muscle-bound. Their nuclear power, though colossal, is so colossal as to be unusable except for keeping *each other* terrified. But in dealing with the unruly "third world," as Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger pointed out, "Power no longer translates automatically into influence."³

Nor, one might add, does influence translate readily into desirable or usable power. In Europe before World War One, there was a significant relationship between influence and power and between territory and power—though perhaps even then, the correlation was less than it seemed. Yet, by conquering territory or forming alliances, a nation could hope to gain material resources and political predominance. Accordingly, the balance of power was maintained—more or less—by isolating and denying opportunities for territorial expansion to the most powerful or ambitious nation. In our own time, the balance of power is determined far more by economic and technological developments *within* countries than by alliances and territorial acquisition. China, for example, has gained far greater power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia.

Nonetheless, the great powers struggle to establish their influence in neutral countries. Guided by a ritualized, anachronistic, 19th Century concept of the balance of power, they seek influence for its own sake, as if it were a concrete, negotiable asset. I am thinking not only of Vietnam but of India, where we worry about Soviet economic aid, and to whom the President once even cut off food supplies because the Indian prime minister had sent birthday greetings to Ho Chi Minh. I am thinking of Laos, where we are not only fighting a proxy war against the Communist Pathet Lao but are engaged in an agitated rivalry with the French for the control of secondary education. And I am thinking of the global propaganda effort of the United States Information Agency, with its festivals and exhibits and libraries carefully pruned of books that seriously criticize America, all aimed at manufacturing a favorable image of the United States.

All this, we are told, is influence, and influence is power. But is it really power? Does it secure something valuable for either the other country or ourselves? If so, I have never heard a satisfactory explanation of what it is; and that, I strongly suspect, is because there is none. The real stake, I apprehend, is not power at all, but a shadow that calls itself power, nourishing an egotism that calls itself self-interest.

Vietnam, in this context, is a showcase of bankruptcy, a hopeless war fought for insubstantial stakes. As a war for high principle, Vietnam simply does not measure up: The Saigon government is neither a democracy warranting our support on ideological grounds nor a victim of *international* aggression warranting our support under the United Nations Charter. As an effort to contain Chinese power, the war in Vietnam is irrelevant as well as unsuccessful; even if a Communist Vietnam were to fall under Chinese control, as I do not think it would, the gains to China would be trivial compared with those accruing from her industrialization and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The case on which Vietnam must stand or fall—if it has not already fallen—is the theory of an exemplary war, a war fought not so much on its own intrinsic merits as to demonstrate something to the world, such as that America will always live up to its alleged commitments or that "wars of national liberation" cannot succeed. The stake, then, is ultimately a psychological one—influence conceived as power.

Knocking down the case for an exemplary war is at this point very nearly belaboring the obvious. How we can demonstrate faithfulness to our commitments by honoring dubious promises to the Saigon generals while blatantly violating our treaty commitments in the Western Hemisphere—as we have done no fewer than three times since 1954⁴—is beyond my understanding. As to proving that wars of national liberation cannot succeed, all that we have proved in four years of bitter, inconclusive warfare is that, even with an Army of over 500,000 Americans, we cannot win a victory for an unpopular and incompetent regime against a disciplined, nationalist insurrectionary force. In the harsh but accurate summation of a British conservative who was once a supporter of the war:

Instead of the Americans impressing the world with their strength and virtue, they are making themselves hated by some for what they are doing, and despised by the remainder for not doing it more efficaciously.⁵

At least two prominent members of the Nixon Administration have explicitly recognized the bankruptcy of our Vietnam strategy. Henry Kissinger writes:

Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is clear that it has greatly diminished American willingness to become involved in this form of warfare elsewhere. Its utility as a precedent has therefore been importantly undermined.⁶

President Nixon's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Charles Yost, has made the point as forcefully as possible:

The most decisive lesson of Vietnam would seem to be that no matter how much force it may expend, the United States cannot ensure the security of a country whose government is unable to mobilize and maintain sufficient popular support to control domestic insurgency. . . . If indigenous dissidents, whether or not Communist, whether or not supported from outside, are able to mobilize and maintain more effective popular support than the government, they will eventually prevail.⁷

Vietnam is only one—albeit the most striking and costly—instance of a general, if not quite invariable, American policy of opposing revolution in the developing world. In some instances, this policy has been successful, at least for the short term. With our support, repressive governments in Brazil and Greece and a conservative government in the Dominican Republic, to cite but a few examples, have successfully held down popular aspirations for social and economic change. Through our support of reactionary governments in Latin America and elsewhere, we are preserving order in our sphere of influence and momentarily, at least, excluding revolution. But it is order purchased at the price of aligning ourselves with corruption and reaction against aggrieved and indignant indigenous forces that by and large are more responsive to popular aspirations than those that we support.

This policy of preserving the *status quo* is an exceedingly short-sighted one. Sooner or later, there can be little doubt, the rising forces of popular discontent will break through the brittle lid of repression. So, at least, historical experience suggests. We did it ourselves in 1776 and much of the history of 19th Century Europe consists of the successful rebellion of nationalist movements—German, Italian, Belgian, Greek and

⁴ The covert intervention against the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

⁵ Peregrine Worsthorne, "Goodbye, Mr. Rusk," *The New Republic*, January 18, 1969, p. 8.

⁶ "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in *Agenda for the Nation*, p. 591.

⁷ Charles W. Yost, "World Order and American Responsibility," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1968, pp. 9-10.

³ Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in *Agenda for the Nation* (Kermit Gordon, ed., Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 589.

Slavic—against the powerful European order forged by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In the 20th Century, we have seen the great European empires—British, French and Dutch—break up in the face of nationalist rebellion in hardly more than a decade after World War Two.

Since then, the revolutionary tide has continued to swell across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it seems unlikely that even the immense resources of the United States will prove sufficient to contain the tide much longer. We have all but acknowledged our failure in Vietnam. What would we do if Souvanna Phouma's government in Laos should collapse, as it probably would if we terminated our counterinsurgency efforts and as it may, anyway? Or if a popular rebellion should break out against the military dictatorship in Brazil? Or if a Communist-Socialist government should come to power in Chile through a free election, as it could in 1970? Would we send armies to these large countries, as we did to South Vietnam and the small Dominican Republic? With aid and arms, we have helped delay the collapse of regimes whose very existence is an obstacle to social and political justice. Eventually, there seems little doubt, they will collapse, the more violently and with greater upheaval for having been perpetuated beyond their natural life span.

Thus far, I have been talking of the fragility and shortsightedness of our policy of repressing revolution. Something should be said about its morals as well. "Order" and "stability" are antiseptic words; they do not tell us anything about the way human beings live or the way they die. The diplomatic historians who invoke the model of Metternich's European order in the 19th Century usually neglect to mention that it was an order purchased at the cost of condemning millions of people to live under the tyranny of the Russian Czar, the Turkish sultan and other ignorant and reactionary monarchs. The absolute primacy of order over justice was neatly expressed by Metternich in his assertion that, "Barbarous as it is, Turkey is a necessary evil." In a similar vein—if not, let us hope, with equal callousness—when we speak of "stability" and "order" in the developing countries, we neglect to note that in more than a few instances, the order purchased by our aid and by our arms is one that binds millions of people to live under a feudalism that fosters ignorance, hunger and disease. It means blighted lives, children with bellies bloated and brains stunted by malnutrition, their parents scavenging food in garbage heaps—a daily occurrence in the omnipresent slums of Asia and Latin America. Only the abstractions of diplomacy take form in high policy councils; to see its flesh and blood, one must go to a Brazilian slum or to a devastated village in Vietnam.

Besides being shortsighted and immoral, our policy of perpetuating the *status quo* has a third fatal defect—a defect that represents our best hope for formulating a new foreign policy: It goes against the American grain. That is the meaning of the dissent against Vietnam and of the deep alienation of so many of our youth. It is their belief in the values they were brought up to believe in—in the idea of their country as a model of decency and democracy—that has confounded the policy makers who only a few years ago were contending that we could fight a limited war for a decade or two without seriously disrupting the internal life of the United States. What they overlooked in their preoccupation with war games and escalation scenarios was the concern of millions of Americans not just with the cost but with the character of wars they fight and their consequent outrage against a war that—even at what the strategists would consider tolerable cost—has made a charnel house of a small and poor Asian country. In this moral sense, there is hope—hope that we will recognize at last that a foreign policy that goes against our national character is untenable.

The question to which we come is whether order, in the sense in which we now conceive it, is, indeed, a vital interest of the United States, or whether, in this revolutionary age, we can accommodate ourselves to a great deal of disorder in the world. My answer, as I am sure will be clear by now, is that we must and can learn to live with widespread revolutionary turmoil. We *must* because it is not within our means to stem the tide; we *can* because social revolution is not nearly so menacing to us as we have supposed—or at least it need not be. If we can but liberate ourselves from ideological obsession—from the automatic association of social revolution with communism and of communism with Soviet or Chinese power—we may find it possible to discriminate among disorders in the world and to evaluate them with greater objectivity, which is to say, more on the basis of their own content and less on the basis of our own fears. We should find, I think, that some revolutionary movements—including even Communist ones—will affect us little, if at all; that others may affect us adversely but not grievously; and that some may even benefit us.

All of which is to say nothing about the *right* of other peoples to settle their own affairs without interference by the great powers. There is, after all, no moral or legal right of a great power to impose its will on a small country, even if the latter does things that affect it adversely. Americans were justly outraged by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, not primarily because we thought the Russians could have endured Czech democratization without loss to themselves but because we thought the Czechs had a *right* to reform their system, whether it suited the Russians or not. Ought not the same principle apply in our relations with Latin America and, indeed, with small countries all over the world?

I believe that it should. I would go even further and suggest that we rededicate ourselves to the Good Neighbor Policy enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt 30 years ago. There is, of course, nothing new about the principle of non-intervention: We have been preaching it for years. What I suggest as an innovation is that we now undertake to *practice* it—not only when we find it perfectly consistent with what we judge to be our interests but even when it does not suit our own national preferences. I suggest, therefore, as a guiding principle of American foreign policy, that we abstain hereafter from military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries under any circumstances short of a clear and certain danger to our national security—such as that posed by Castro's decision to make Cuba a Soviet missile base—and that we adhere to this principle whether others, including the Russians and the Chinese, do so or not.

Surely, it will be argued, we cannot be expected to refrain from interference while the Russians hold eastern Europe in thrall and the Chinese foster wars of national liberation in Asia and both seek opportunities to subvert non-Communist governments all over the world. Would this not throw open the floodgates to a torrent of revolutions leading to communism?

Setting aside for the moment the question of whether Communist rule elsewhere is invariably detrimental to the United States, experience suggests a policy of nonintervention would *not* throw open the floodgates to communism. Communist bids for power have failed more often than they have succeeded in countries beyond the direct reach of Soviet military power—Indonesia and Guinea, for example. Of all the scores of countries, old and new, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, only four are Communist. There is, of course, no assurance that an American policy of nonintervention would guarantee against new Communist takeovers—obviously, our abstention from Cuba in 1959 was a factor in the success of Castro's revolution. But neither is there a guarantee that

military intervention will defeat every Communist revolution—witness Vietnam. Neither abstention nor military intervention can be counted on to immunize against communism, for the simple reason that neither is of ultimate relevance to the conditions that militate for or against revolution within a country, in the first place.

We have, in fact, had positive benefits from pursuing a policy of nonintervention. There is no country in Latin America more friendly to the United States than Mexico, which expelled American oil interests 40 years ago, while seemingly enthralled with Marxist doctrines, and which even now pursues an independent foreign policy, including the maintenance of cordial relations with Cuba. The thought presents itself that a policy of nonintervention could now serve as well to liberate us from the embrace of incompetent and reactionary regimes, which ignore popular aspirations at home out of confidence that, if trouble develops, they can summon the American Marines, while holding us in line by the threat of their own collapse.

The critical factor is nationalism, which, far more than any ideology, has shown itself to be the engine of change in modern history. When an ideology is as strongly identified with nationalism as communism is in Cuba and Vietnam and as democracy is in Czechoslovakia, foreign military intervention must either fail outright or, as the Russians have learned in Czechoslovakia, succeed at such cost in world-wide moral opprobrium as to be self-defeating. My own personal feeling is that, in a free market of ideas, communism has no record of achievement to commend itself as a means toward rapid modernization in developing countries. But, be that as it may, it will ultimately succeed or fail for reasons having little to do with the preferences of the superpowers.

We could profitably take a leaf from the Chinese notebook in this respect. The Lin Piao doctrine of "wars of national liberation," often mistaken as a blueprint for world conquest, is, in fact, an explicit acknowledgement of the inability of a foreign power to sustain a revolution without indigenous support. This is what Lin Piao said:

In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid—even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution (i.e., China)—no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.⁸

One hears in this the echo of President Kennedy, speaking of South Vietnam in 1963: "In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it." Or, as Theodore Draper summed it up, "The crisis in 1965 in South Vietnam was far more intimately related to South Vietnamese disintegration than to North Vietnamese infiltration."⁹

Nationalism is not only the barrier to communism in countries that reject it; it is a modifier and neutralizer of communism in those few small countries that do possess it. As Tito has demonstrated in Europe and as Ho Chi Minh has demonstrated in Asia, a strongly nationalist regime will defend its independence regardless of common ideology; and it will

do so with far greater effectiveness than a weak and unpopular regime, also regardless of ideology. It is beyond question that the Tito government has been a vastly more effective barrier to Soviet power in the Balkans than the old pre-war monarchy ever could have been; and as Edwin O. Reischauer has written:

It seems highly probable that Ho's Communist-dominated regime, if it had been allowed by us to take over all Vietnam at the end of the war, would have moved to a position with relation to China not unlike that of Tito's Yugoslavia toward the Soviet Union.¹⁰

If freedom is the basic human drive we believe it to be, an act of faith seems warranted—not in its universal triumph, which experience gives us no particular reason to expect, but in its survival and continuing appeal. The root fact of ideology to which we come—perhaps the only tenet that can be called a fact—is that, at some basic level of being, every man and woman alive aspires to freedom and abhors compulsion. It does not follow from this—as, in the rhetorical excess of the Cold War, it is so often said to follow—that communism is doomed to perish from the earth as a distortion of nature, or that democracy, as we know it in America, is predestined to triumph everywhere. Political forms that seem to offend human nature have existed throughout history, and others that have seemed attuned to human needs have been known to perish. All that can be said with confidence is that, whatever is done to suppress them, man's basic aspirations have a way of reasserting themselves and, insofar as our American political forms are attuned to these basic aspirations, they are a long leg ahead in the struggle for survival.


Faith in the viability of freedom will not, in itself, guarantee our national security. But it can and should help allay our extravagant fear of communism. It should enable us to compete with confidence in the market of ideas. It should free us from the fatal temptation to fight fire with fire by imitating the tactics of a rival who cannot be as sure of the viability of his ideas in an open contest. The Russians, when you come right down to it, have better reason to fear freedom in Czechoslovakia than we have to fear communism in Vietnam. Appealing as it does to basic human aspirations, the contagion of Czech liberty very likely is a threat, at least in the long run, to the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union; by no stretch of the imagination can Ho Chi Minh's rule in Vietnam be said to pose a comparable threat to democracy in the United States.

The greatest danger to our democracy, I dare say, is not that the Communists will destroy it, but that we will betray it by the very means chosen to defend it. Foreign policy is not and cannot be permitted to become an end in itself. It is, rather, a means toward an end, which in our case is not only the safety of the United States but the preservation of her democratic values. A foreign policy of intervention must ultimately be subversive of that purpose. Requiring as it does the maintenance of a huge and costly military establishment, it must also entail the neglect of domestic needs, a burgeoning military-industrial-academic complex, chronic crises and marathon wars—all anathema to a democratic society. Every time we suppress a popular revolution abroad, we subvert our own democratic principles at home. In no single instance is the self-inflicted injury likely to be fatal; but with each successive occurrence, the contradiction and hypocrisy become more apparent and more of our own people become disillusioned, more become alienated or angry, while a few are simply corrupted.



⁸ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 3, 1965, p. 22.

⁹ Theodore Draper, "The American Crisis: Vietnam, Cuba and the Dominican Republic," *Commentary*, January 1967, p. 37.

¹⁰ "What Choices Do We Have in Vietnam?" *Look Magazine*, September 19, 1967, p. 27.






**Ralph Nader Congress Project
Citizens Look at Congress**



Frank Church

Democratic Senator
from Idaho



written by
Carol Payne & Margaret Carpenter

FRANK CHURCH

Frank Church: The Man Spying On the Spies



Philadelphia Inquirer / RUSSELL F. SALMON

Biography
News

CHURCH, Frank

PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER
(Philadelphia, Penn.)

Sept. 21, 1975

By STEVE NEAL
Inquirer Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In past years, televised hearings made national figures of such diverse personalities as Estes Kefauver, Joseph McCarthy and Sam Ervin.

This year, such well-published hearings are making a national figure of Sen. Frank Church, boyish Idaho Democrat.

After five months of closed-door sessions, Church, 51, last week opened the public phase of his Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigation into the CIA. Immediately, Church's comments on the CIA's illegal stash of deadly bacterial poisons became large headlines across the country.

That type of exposure could make Church a leading contender for the Democratic presidential nomination next year — or finish his chances.

"I recognize that it's a tightrope," Church said during an interview last week in his Capitol office. "Whatever I do as chairman will be subject to criticism from some quarters. In the end, the committee's work (and his presidential chances) can only be judged on the basis of the reports we issue and the public hearings we conduct."

So at least for now Church has taken himself out of presidential politics. "I am not interested in getting involved until this investigation is over," he says. "It won't be over until the end of the year. By then, it may not be possible. The door could be sealed and locked."

Still, with the overcrowded field of liberal Democratic hopefuls, none of whom have caught fire, Church's prospects are considered as good as

anyone's. Beyond the CIA investigation, he has emerged as the most articulate Democrat on the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee, since the defeat of Sen. J. William Fulbright last year.

He has also garnered attention as the head of a subcommittee on multinational corporations. Among the disclosures of those hearings were the efforts of the CIA and International Telephone & Telegraph to undermine the Marxist government of the late Salvador Allende in Chile.

For now, Church says the CIA public hearings will concentrate "primarily on domestic misdeeds."

"At the start, the committee reached a basic policy decision that we would examine the foreign operations of the CIA and other intelligence agencies in executive session," he says, "making public whatever we thought should be made public by means of committee reports."

That posture enabled Church to obtain CIA records on such top-secret activities as foreign assassination plots. The failure of the Rockefeller Commission (initially empowered to probe the CIA) to deal with political murders gives added significance to the Church committee.

"We have compiled a record of 8,000 pages of testimony on this subject alone," he says. "That's more than the entire report of the Senate Watergate Committee. We've interrogated over 100 witnesses and examined a vast array of documents."

And a committee report "of our findings together with detailed evidence of how it happened" is in the works.

Church has taken pains to make his inquiry the most leak-proof in recent memory and has been persistently careful about making sensational charges, although he has taken an adversary role in the hearings, speaking indignantly of CIA abuses.

"If these tendencies are not checked they could erode the whole foundation of freedom in this country," he says. "They could become a menace to the liberty of the people and lead gradually to the establishment of a police state."

To prevent future wrongdoing by the CIA, Church would like to see Congress exercise tighter control by establishing a joint committee to oversee and fund intelligence operations—a permanent committee without a permanent membership.

Although some Democrats are touting Church as a fresh personality, he has been in the Senate for 19 years. He is the only Democratic senator ever to win re-election in conservative Idaho.

One reason Church has survived is that he remembers who he is and where he is from. His staff gives prompt attention to letters and phone calls from constituents. Church has also catered to home-state sentiment by fighting gun-control laws.

But Church has waffled on fewer controversial issues than the great majority of senators. It was widely predicted that his opposition to the Vietnam war would defeat him.

Church's willingness to take such chances goes back to his little-known bout with cancer when he was a law student at Stanford. Doctors told him he had six months to live. Then he learned his cancer was responsive to therapy. "When I found out I wasn't going to die, I thought I'd take all the risks in life that came my way. As a result, I was much more inclined to gamble."

After completing law school, Church returned to his home town of Boise to practice law and teach public speaking at Boise Junior College. While a high school student, he had won the American Legion's national oratory contest. He became active in politics, serving a term as chairman of Young Democrats of Idaho and running, unsuccessfully, for the state legislature.

Then in 1956, Church, not yet 32, filed for the Senate. In the primary, he edged out former Sen. Glen Taylor, the singing cowboy who had been Henry Wallace's vice-presidential running-mate, by 170 votes. In the election, he defeated Republican Sen. Herman Welker, a McCarthyite witch hunter, by 50,000 votes.

Upon entering the Senate, Church came into conflict with then-Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. Against

(Continued from preceding page)

Johnson's orders, Church voted to liberalize Senate rules to end a filibuster.

"He put me in the deep freeze," he recalls. "Johnson didn't speak to me for six months."

Johnson changed his attitude when Church succeeded in adding a jury trial amendment to a civil rights bill, which made it possible to pass the bill without a filibuster.

"There wasn't anything he wouldn't do for me after that," Church says. "He took me off the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and put me on the McClellan rackets committee. And, as soon as there was an opening, he put me on the Foreign Relations Committee."

Church was a hard-line cold warrior in those days. In his keynote speech at the 1960 Democratic National Convention, Church advocated more missiles and bigger bombs.

But something happened to Church in the early 1960s. He began to question the wisdom of American intervention in Vietnam. His first speech dissenting from Johnson's war policy came in February 1965.

Called to Briefing

Shortly afterward, Church was among a group of senators invited to a White House briefing.

Johnson began his remarks by glaring at Church and snarling, "There once was a time when a senator from Idaho thought he knew more about war and peace than the President." LBJ was referring to Sen. William E. Borah, Church's boyhood hero, who after an illustrative career on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made the mistake of predicting World War II would not occur just weeks before it broke out.

Church avoided a confrontation with Johnson, sensing that it would be fruitless. But Johnson backed Church into a corner to lecture him.

"He always got his head around to the point where he was nostril-to-nostril. I always felt this put him at a big advantage because anyone talking to him had to figure out how to position their head."

On one point in their discussion of the war Church told Johnson, "I agree with Walter Lippmann." As Church recalls it, Johnson's response was, "Lippmann is good on this."

The next day, however, Church read newspaper reports quoting Johnson as saying, "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."

"It served Johnson's purpose," Church says. "He wanted to give congressmen a warning that they would understand."

Later, Johnson called Church to the

White House to see the text of a speech LBJ was to deliver at John Hopkins University in which he proposed "unconditional negotiations" in Vietnam.

"McGeorge Bundy took McGovern, Gabe McGee and me up to see the President," Church recalls. "Johnson was posing for a bust. It reminded me of all those pictures of Napoleon 3d sitting for portraits. He asked me, 'How's the dam building business going out in Idaho?' I said, 'Just fine. We're going to call the next dam we get the Walter Lippmann Dam.'"


Church says that the room became silent and Johnson's aides faces turned ashen before LBJ started laughing.

"Then Johnson said, 'I wonder who got that story started.' I told him I didn't know. And he said, 'Oh, probably some Republican.'"

Recall Campaign

Church's dovish position brought on a right-wing recall campaign in 1967. The effort was financed by California millionaire Patrick Frawley who said that big money would go further in a small state like Idaho and Church's recall would send a message to other politicians against the war.

"That comment made a lot of people in Idaho angry," Church says. "Although the state was strongly pro-war, they wouldn't buy the treason argument at all. Idaho is still close



enough to "High Noon" that people rallied behind my right to speak out against the war. The recall people were only able to gather 135 signatures statewide."

A year later, Church won re-election by his largest plurality. His long opposition to the war peaked in 1970 when he, with Senator John Sherman Cooper, sponsored legislation restricting American involvement in Indochina.

The similarity between Church and the late William E. Borah is profound. Both gentlemen from Idaho were ora-

tors, vigorous critics of American foreign policy and staunchly liberal on domestic issues.

"He was a very colorful man," Church says. "His role as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has been greatly misunderstood. He was against entangling treaties as George Washington was against them. He strongly believed in international law. He was the only major figure to urge recognition of the Soviet Union when it was anathema to do so. When the day came that Roosevelt recognized Russia, everyone said 'How sensible' — just like when Nixon recognized China."

May Be Chairman

It is expected that within the decade Church will be the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, replacing the aging John Sparkman of Alabama. When that occurs, former Pennsylvania Sen. Joseph S. Clark, who served with Church on the committee, says: "My own guess is that Frank will be the greatest chairman of the committee of the past half-century."

Church talks freely about the influence he would like to see the committee exert.

"I'd like to see it give a long-term direction to foreign policy. It can't make the day-to-day decisions. It can't participate in crisis management when emergencies arise. But it could lay down long-term objectives that make sense. For example, bringing an end to American military enclosures in Asia.

Church says the importance of the chairmanship depends mostly "on whether the committee takes a position in support or opposition to the President."

Yet another position for which Church is frequently mentioned is that of secretary of state, should another Democrat be elected President next year. Having observed five secretaries of state at close range, Church says, "The job has its appeal. But it would depend entirely on the President's concept of the office."

In the meantime, there are more and more people who think Church may win the presidential nomination at Madison Square Garden next summer. Frank Mankiewicz, one of the architects of George McGovern's nomination, says Church could draw off most support for other liberals.

Church has done nothing to discourage speculation on his candidacy. But he is skeptical about his chances. "I couldn't go into the early primaries. I would have to wait and gather money and put together an organization. It may not be possible to enter the race at a late date. But I have no alternative but to pursue the investigation."

1974 primary:	Spark Matsunaga (D), unopposed			
1972 general:	Spark Matsunaga (D)	73,826	(55%)	(\$127,753)
	Fred W. Rohlfling (R)	61,138	(45%)	(\$179,221)

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SECOND DISTRICT

Census Data Pop. 407,794. Central city, 0%; suburban, 66%. Median family income, \$10,848; families above \$15,000: 28%; families below \$3,000: 7%. Median years education, 12.2.

The Voters

Median voting age 38.
Employment profile White collar, 44%. Blue collar, 35%. Service, 15%. Farm, 6%.
Ethnic groups Japanese, 25%. Chinese, 4%. Filipino, 16%. Total foreign stock, 32%.

Presidential vote

1972	Nixon (R)	86,136	(63%)
	McGovern (D)	51,415	(37%)
1968	Nixon (R)	42,770	(37%)
	Humphrey (D)	70,345	(61%)
	Wallace (AI)	1,648	(1%)



Rep. Patsy T. Mink (D) Elected 1964; b. Dec. 6, 1927, Paia; home, Waipahu; Wilson Col., 1946, U. of Neb., 1947, U. of Hawaii, B.A. 1948, U. of Chicago, J.D. 1951; Protestant.

Career Practicing atty., 1953-64; Business Law Prof., U. of Hawaii, 1953-56, 1959-62; Atty., Hawaii Territorial House of Reps., 1955; Hawaii Terr. House of Reps., 1956-58; Hawaii Terr. Senate, 1958-59; Hawaii State Senate, 1962-64.

Offices 2338 RHOB, 202-225-4906. Also 346 Fed. Bldg., Honolulu 96813, 808-531-4602.

Committees

Budget (13th).

Education and Labor (9th). Subcommittees: Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education; Equal Opportunities; Select Subcommittee on Education.

Interior and Insular Affairs (7th). Subcommittees: Mines and Mining (Chairman); National Parks and Recreation; Territorial and Insular Affairs.

Group Ratings

	ADA	COPE	LWV	RIPON	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA
1974	91	100	83	47	100	88	92	17	0	0
1973	96	91	100	71	95	95	100	-	-	11
1972	100	91	100	80	86	80	0	0	0	0

Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid	FOR	6) Gov Abortn Aid	FOR	11) Pub Cong Election \$	AGN
2) Busing	FOR	7) Coed Phys Ed	FOR	12) Turkish Arms Cutoff	FOR
3) ABM	AGN	8) Pov Lawyer Gag	AGN	13) Youth Camp Regs	FOR
4) B-1 Bomber	AGN	9) Pub Trans Sub	FOR	14) Strip Mine Veto	AGN
5) Nerve Gas	AGN	10) EZ Voter Regis	FOR	15) Farm Bill Veto	AGN

Election Results

1974 general:	Patsy T. Mink (D)	86,916	(63%)	(\$97,104)
	Carla W. Coray (R)	51,894	(37%)	(\$34,089)
1974 primary:	Patsy T. Mink (D)	76,596	(79%)	
	George B. Carter (D)	19,998	(21%)	
1972 general:	Patsy T. Mink (D)	79,856	(57%)	(\$71,620)
	Diana Hansen (R)	60,043	(43%)	(\$39,836)

IDAHO

Back before the turn of the century, when William Jennings Bryan was urging Americans to abandon the gold standard for the unlimited coinage of silver, Idaho's silver interests dominated the state's politics. Although silver is still mined in places like Sunshine Mine near Kellogg, Idaho's principal economic concern today is agriculture. Potatoes, for which Idaho is famous, are grown in the rich farmlands of the panhandle region just east of Spokane, Washington, and along the Snake River valley in the southern part of the state. Because there is so much farmland here, Idaho's population is not concentrated in one or two large urban areas as in other Rocky Mountain and Pacific states. Idaho's largest city Boise (pop. 74,000)—like many Western cities, a conservative stronghold. The liberal voting base, if it can be called that, lies in the northern panhandle counties. But any liberalism, at least in terms of national politics, is vastly overmatched by the conservatism of the Snake River valley, and particularly of the large Mormon community there—the largest outside Utah.

In the recent past, Idaho politics seems to have travelled full circle—usually in just the opposite pattern of the nation as a whole. During the Eisenhower years, a public power vs. private power controversy over construction of Hell's Canyon Dam on the Snake River rounded to the benefit of the Democrats, who took the public power side. During the late 1950s, Idaho Democrats won most of the state's Senate and House races. In 1960 John F. Kennedy, though a Catholic and an Easterner, got 46% of the state's votes—one of his better showings in the mountain states. But during the sixties, the people of Idaho seemed to become increasingly upset with what they saw as a Democratic administration dominated by an alien East Coast establishment.

In 1964, a strong conservative movement—it was especially strong in the southern Mormon counties—resulted in 49% of the state's vote going to Barry Goldwater. In that same year, the state's 2d congressional district ousted its Democratic Congressman for a conservative Republican—the only district outside the South to do so in the year of the LBJ landslide. By 1968, Hubert Humphrey got only 31% of the vote here, and George McGovern did even worse four years later. Meanwhile, 13% of Idaho voters supported George Wallace in 1968, his strongest showing west of Texas; and even John Schmitz, the hapless American Party candidate in 1972, got 9% of Idaho's votes—his best showing in the nation.

But if Idaho was shifting right in national politics in the middle sixties, it has been shifting notably to the left in local races in the early seventies. As Idahoans overwhelmingly rejected the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, they reelected liberal Democratic Senator Frank Church with a resounding 60% of the vote. In 1972, when McGovern did worse here than in all but seven other states, Democrats came within 3% of electing another Senator. In 1974, Church was again reelected comfortably, and Democratic Governor Cecil Andrus, elected in an upset in 1970, was reelected with a landslide 71% of the vote.

Andrus's 1970 victory was one of the first signs of the burgeoning importance of environmental issues in Western electoral politics. His predecessor, crew-cut, ultraconservative Republican Don Samuelson, supported a mining company's proposal to extract molybdenum (a metal then in excess supply) from the White Clouds area, one of the scenic wonders of the Salmon River Mountains. Andrus attacked the proposal and won enough votes to carry the panhandle easily, hold even in Boise, and carry sometimes Democratic Pocatello in the southeast—and carry the state by 10,000 votes. After four years of Andrus's calm, conciliatory style, voters decided they wanted more, reelecting him almost unanimously, and incidentally electing Democrats to most of the statewide elective posts.

Andrus seems to have supplanted Church as the state's most popular Democrat; indeed, for a time in the late sixties, Church was just about the only elected Idaho Democrat. He was first

elected to the Senate at the age of 32 in 1956, beating a Republican candidate with personal problems. Building up a friendship with Lyndon Johnson, Church soon won a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; when Johnson was President, he was one of the first Senators to take a stand against the Vietnam War. Doves who make scholarly speeches are not ordinarily very popular in Idaho. But Church has carefully catered to opinion at home. He has opposed federal gun control legislation, and he keeps a seat on the Senate Interior Committee (which most Senators relinquish, resenting Chairman Henry Jackson's dominance), and has kept careful watch over the state's water needs. (Much of Idaho's farmland would be worthless without irrigation.) Moreover, his continual attacks on the foreign aid program—he thinks it is so often misused to provide military aid to dictators, among other things, that we would be better off without it—endear him, for somewhat different reasons, to most Idaho voters.

As a final counter to criticism Church can invoke the memory of a famous Republican Senator from Idaho: William E. Borah. A progressive and isolationist, Borah served in the Senate from 1907 to 1940. Fiercely independent and scholarly, and an expert on foreign affairs, Borah is said to have enhanced Idaho's reputation as J. William Fulbright did Arkansas's; Church supporters argue that their man is in the same tradition.

At any rate, the 52-year-old Church is edging to the top of the seniority ladder on Foreign Relations, now ranking behind only John Sparkman, 77, and Mike Mansfield, 73. Since Sparkman surely won't run again in 1978, and Mansfield would have to step down from the Majority Leadership to be Chairman, Church has an excellent chance for the post soon. Already he was chosen in 1975 to be Chairman of the special panel to investigate the CIA; in years past, that position would probably have gone to a Southern conservative, but now Church is perceived—and accurately enough—as well within the Democratic mainstream and responsible enough for such a task. Indeed, as 1975 went on, Church was even being mentioned as a possible candidate for President; preoccupied with the CIA probe, he made no moves toward the nomination.

Church was probably in his deepest political trouble in Idaho when his seat came up in 1968, and he was saved, in large part, by his most bitter adversaries. More than a year before that election, right-wing groups started circulating recall petitions against Church. Their drive ultimately fizzled—it wasn't clear if a Senator *could* be recalled—and people tended to rally around Church. Then it was revealed that most of the money for the recall had come from California conservatives—which allowed Church partisans to rally against out-of-staters dabbling in Idaho politics. Finally, Church's opponent turned out to be Congressman George Hansen (on whom more below), an enthusiastic conservative but hardly an adept campaigner.

All of which resulted in a solid 60-40 Church victory, his biggest margin yet. For 1974, the betting was he would win by even more votes. His opponent was Bob Smith, an ordained minister and former aide to free-market enthusiast Congressman Steven Symms. But this time the conservatives did not tip their hand too early; Smith's campaign was quiet until October, when he started spending significant amounts of money. He cut noticeably into Church's lead, and by November the Senator was reelected by only a 57-43 margin. He had not been in real danger, but the outcome illustrated the fact that a liberal Democrat like Church is always going to be vulnerable in conservative Idaho.

The state's junior Senator, elected in 1972, is Republican James McClure. A three-term Congressman and member of his party's conservative wing, McClure won a hotly contested four-candidate Republican primary with 36% of the vote. Among the defeated candidates were former Governor (1955-71) Robert Smylie, beaten for renomination by Don Samuelson in 1970; and former (1965-69) and future (1975-) Congressman George Hansen. After the primary, Hansen reported that four big Idaho corporations had tried to talk him out of the race. That caused McClure some problems, and so did environmental issues; he is not one to interfere with businessmen's interference with the environment. McClure's Democratic opponent, Bud Davis, had the misfortune to have announced his support of the United Farm Workers' lettuce boycott. McClure charged that the UFW's next goal was the Idaho potato—a charge never given an ounce of substantiation—and insinuated that Davis was a potato-boycotter. Davis was forced to make the indisputable point that no Idaho politician would ever come out against the potato, but McClure's spurious charge may have made the difference in his 53-47 bid. In his first few years in the Senate, McClure has been quiet as freshman Senators historically have been; his vote can be counted just about invariably on the conservative side of issues.

When McClure went to the Senate, he left vacant the 1st congressional district, traditionally the more Democratic of Idaho's two seats. This includes the panhandle, which is connected with the rest of Idaho by just one two-lane highway and no railroads; economically and sociologically this area is part of Spokane, Washington's "Inland Empire." With a large labor vote in Lewiston and

Coeur d'Alene, and the University of Idaho in Moscow, the panhandle often produces Democratic majorities.

But in 1st district politics these days, the panhandle is often outvoted by Boise and nearby Canyon County, both heavily conservative. These conservative votes were more than enough to produce 1972 and 1974 victories for Republican Steven Symms, a fruit rancher and businessman who was only 34 when he won his first term. His performance was impressive. In 1972, he beat the state Senate Majority Leader in the primary and did as well in the general as McClure had. In the Democratic year of 1974, he won with a convincing 58% of the vote; at the same time, his former aide Bob Smith was making a creditable showing against Frank Church. This is all the more remarkable in that Symms is that rarest of Congressmen these days, a free market ideologue; he likes to think of himself as a libertarian, and he doesn't hesitate to cast lone votes against legislation his principles oppose.

The state's 2d district is more of a geographic unit. Most of its people live within a dozen or so miles of the Snake River, in small cities or farmhouses near the irrigation ditches that bring water to the potato fields. The district includes Sun Valley, the Craters of the Moon National Monument, and Idaho's small slice of Yellowstone National Park. This is Mormon country and except for Pocatello (pop. 40,000) it is normally Republican. But even more significant, it is the home of Idaho's right-wing subculture. The John Birch Society is strong in the sparsely-populated farm counties and little mountain-locked towns, isolated from any center of urbanity. It is easy to see how a few enthusiastic, articulate right-wingers can come to dominate a town's school board and, by assiduous proselytizing change a small county's voting patterns. That is what appears to have been happening the last ten or fifteen years in southern Idaho; the results are all there to see in the election returns. They show up, for example, in the strong third-party finish of George Wallace in 1968, when in some Snake River counties he almost equaled Hubert Humphrey's totals—or in the fact that John Schmitz actually outran McGovern in four counties here in 1972.

Additional evidence comes from the 1974 congressional election, often referred to as the battle of the Hansens. The incumbent, Republican moderate Orval Hansen, had been first elected in 1968 when his predecessor, George Hansen stepped aside to run for the Senate. We have already seen how well George did in that contest; Orval, in contrast, won reelection easily in 1970 and 1972. His sometimes moderate or even liberal voting record helped him exceed even the usual high Republican percentages here. But many of the area's right-wingers were unhappy—from their point of view, quite sensibly—with Orval's record, and when George decided to challenge him in the 1974 primary they supported him enthusiastically. Orval carried Boise and Idaho Falls—the heaviest voting areas in the primary—but George carried almost all the smaller counties and cities like Pocatello and Twin Falls as well to beat his successor by a 52-48 margin.

That put George in the general election, this time against a Democrat named Max Hanson. Hoping to capitalize on moderates' resentment of George, Max campaigned vigorously making sure to mention that he was a conservative too. George had an additional problem: charges that he had utterly failed to report certain large campaign contributions. But that did not deter George's supporters and he went on to win a 56-44 victory; Max carried only Boise and Pocatello, and George won just about everything else. It was the second time he had captured the seat in a year of national Democratic landslide. Soon after being sworn in, George was formally charged with violating campaign disclosure laws, by filing inaccurate campaign finance reports weeks late and by accepting corporate contributions. Hansen was convicted in the spring of 1975; the judge at first sentenced him to jail, but then changed his mind. Theoretically, at least, the House could vote to expell him, although it is not expected to do so.

Census Data Pop. 713,008; 0.35% of U.S. total, 42nd largest; Central city, 11%; suburban, 5%. Median family income, \$8,381; 34th highest; families above \$15,000: 13%; families below \$3,000: 11%. Median years education, 12.3.

1974 Share of Federal Tax Burden \$776,664,000; 0.29% of U.S. total, 44th largest.

1974 Share of Federal Outlays \$966,879,000; 0.36% of U.S. total, 44th largest. Per capita federal spending, \$1356.

DOD	\$125,345,000	46th (0.18%)	HEW	\$308,181,000	42d (0.33%)
AEC	\$106,190,000	15th (3.48%)	HUD	\$2,134,000	44th (0.22%)
NASA	\$16,000	49th (-)	VA	\$54,710,000	41st (0.40%)
DOT	\$43,549,000	44th (0.51%)	EPA	\$7,926,000	44th (0.25%)
DOC	\$3,553,000	43d (0.22%)	RevS	\$25,326,000	43d (0.42%)

DOI \$51,973,000 15th (2.11%)
 USDA \$112,076,000 37th (0.90%)

Int. \$24,446,000 45th (0.12%)
 Other \$101,454,000

Economic Base Agriculture, notably cattle, potatoes, dairy products and wheat; food and kindred products, especially canned, cured and frozen foods; lumber and wood products, especially general sawmills and planing mills; finance, insurance and real estate; chemicals and allied products, especially industrial chemicals; trailer coaches and other transportation equipment.

Political Line-up Governor, Cecil D. Andrus (D). Senators, Frank Church (D) and James A. McClure (R). Representatives, 2 R. State Senate (21 R and 14 D); State House (42 R and 28 D).

The Voters

Registration 440,114 Total. No party registration.
 Median voting age 43.
 Employment profile White collar, 43%. Blue collar, 33%. Service, 13%. Farm, 11%.
 Ethnic groups Total foreign stock, 10%.

Presidential vote

1972	Nixon (R)	199,384	(71%)
	McGovern (D)	80,826	(29%)
1968	Nixon (R)	165,369	(57%)
	Humphrey (D)	89,273	(31%)
	Wallace (AI)	36,541	(13%)



Sen. Frank Church (D) Elected 1956, seat up 1980; b. July 25, 1924, Boise; home, Boise; Stanford U., B.A. 1947, LL.B. 1950; Presbyterian.

Career Army, WWII; Practicing atty., 1950-56; Keynote Spkr., Dem. Natl. Conv., 1960; Mbr., U.S. Delegation to U.N., 1966.

Offices 245 RSOB, 202-224-6142. Also 304 Fed. Ofc. Bldg., Boise 83702, 208-342-2711 ext. 363, and 204 Fed. Bldg., Pocatello 83201, 208-323-4650.

Committees

Foreign Relations (3d). Subcommittees: Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy; Multinational Corporations (Chairman).

Interior and Insular Affairs (2d). Subcommittees: Energy Research and Water Resources (Chairman); Environment and Land Resources; Parks and Recreation.

Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (Chairman).

Group Ratings

	ADA	COPE	LWV	RIPON	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA
1974	83	56	90	33	88	86	77	45	0	23
1973	82	78	78	50	100	-	100	-	-	22
1972	70	80	90	72	88	78	90	33	0	17

Key Votes

1) No-Knock	AGN	8) Gov Abortn Aid	AGN	15) Consumer Prot Agy	FOR
2) Busing	FOR	9) Cut Mil Brass	FOR	16) Forced Psych Tests	AGN
3) No Fault	AGN	10) Gov Limousine	AGN	17) Fed Campaign Subs	FOR
4) F-111	ABS	11) RR Featherbed	FOR	18) Rhod Chrome Ban	ABS
5) Death Penalty	FOR	12) Handgun License	AGN	19) Open Legis Meetings	AGN
6) Foreign Aid	AGN	13) Less Troop Abrd	FOR	20) Strikers Food Stmps	ABS
7) Filibuster	FOR	14) Resume Turk Aid	AGN	21) Gov Info Disclosure	FOR

Election Results

1974 general:	Frank Church (D)	145,140	(57%)	(\$300,300)
	Robert L. Smith (R)	109,072	(43%)	(\$127,926)
1974 primary:	Frank Church (D)	53,659	(86%)	
	Leon Olson (D)	8,904	(14%)	
1968 general:	Frank Church (D)	173,482	(60%)	
	George V. Hansen (R)	114,394	(40%)	



Sen. James A. McClure (R) Elected 1972, seat up 1978; b. Dec. 27, 1924, Payette; home, Payette; U. of Idaho, J.D. 1950; Methodist.

Career Practicing atty., 1950-66; Payette Co. Atty., 1950-56; Payette City Atty., 1953-66; Idaho Senate 1960-66; U.S. House of Reps., 1967-73.

Offices 2106 DSOB, 202-224-2752. Also 304 N. 8th St., Rm. 434, Boise 83702, 208-343-1421.

Committees

Budget (5th).

Interior and Insular Affairs (4th). Subcommittees: Environment and Land Resources; Indian Affairs; Parks and Recreation; Special Subcommittee on Integrated Oil Operations.

Public Works (4th). Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution; Economic Development; Water Resources; Transportation; Buildings and Grounds.

Group Ratings

	ADA	COPE	LWV	RIPON	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA
1974	0	18	22	36	18	33	11	75	100	100
1973	31	20	43	50	40	-	27	-	-	92
1972	0	20	17	40	0	0	-	86	100	94

Key Votes

1) No-Knock	FOR	8) Gov Abortn Aid	AGN	15) Consumer Prot Agy	AGN
2) Busing	AGN	9) Cut Mil Brass	AGN	16) Forced Psych Tests	AGN
3) No Fault	AGN	10) Gov Limousine	AGN	17) Fed Campaign Subs	AGN
4) F-111	FOR	11) RR Featherbed	AGN	18) Rhod Chrome Ban	AGN
5) Death Penalty	FOR	12) Handgun License	AGN	19) Open Legis Meetings	FOR
6) Foreign Aid	AGN	13) Less Troop Abrd	AGN	20) Strikers Food Stmps	AGN
7) Filibuster	FOR	14) Resume Turk Aid	FOR	21) Gov Info Disclosure	ABS

Election Results

1972 general:	James A. McClure (R)	161,804	(52%)
	William E. Davis (D)	140,913	(46%)
	Jean Stoddard (AI)	6,885	(2%)
1972 primary:	James A. McClure (R)	46,522	(36%)
	George Hansen (R)	35,412	(27%)
	Glen Wegner (R)	24,582	(19%)
	Robert E. Smylie (R)	22,497	(17%)

they cannot be regarded as Russia's friends and flunkeys. But there is one great unknown. Will not the Kremlin, or some people in the Kremlin, realize (if they haven't already done so) that the restoration of the monolithic Stalinist empire cannot be achieved in 1968? And will there not be a group of leaders who, to save the Socialist world from economic, ideological and psychological chaos, will realize that a quick withdrawal of the "allied" troops from Czechoslovakia can alone restore some degree of international order and mutual confidence? It is rumored that Kosygin and Suslov (yes, even Suslov who worries about the world Communist movement, and the great rally scheduled for next November in Moscow) were sharply against the invasion. Will not Suslov, who played the leading role in overthrowing Khrushchev in 1964, now bring about the fall of Brezhnev, the number-one villain of the Czech tragedy? The Czech people, with their

"Brezhnev-Hitler" posters, seem to realize it only too well. All reports from Prague show that the young Russian soldiers who occupied the city are extremely perplexed by the reception they got from the Czechs. They had been told that they were sent as friends to "save their allies from counterrevolution and from a West German invasion." They will have many sad stories to tell when they go home. But in a police state like the Soviet Union—getting worse in this respect every year—revolutions do not come from below; if anything is to change for the better, it will have to come from above—from a palace revolution inside the Kremlin. The best hope, I think, is for an agonizing reappraisal by the Kremlin of the entire Czech problem. This cannot happen without the elimination of certain people. My guess is that Brezhnev will go before the end of the year. But it is, unfortunately, no more than a guess.

The NATION Sept. 16, 1968

AN OUNCE OF LEAD

GUNNING FOR SENATOR CHURCH

MICHAEL McCRERY

Mr. McCrery has written extensively on Idaho politics, particularly for the Boise Intermountain-Observer. He is also a correspondent for the Republican magazine, The Ripon Forum.

Boise

Probably the dirtiest Political fight that will be waged in the months from the conventions to the elections will be that staged by George V. Hansen, Republican Representative from the Idaho 2nd District, to capture the seat of Democratic Sen. Frank Church.

Idaho has long been a fortress of reaction, and one of the states most isolated from the movement of the nation. After the Civil War, the then Idaho territory was settled by ex-Confederates fleeing the Reconstruction in Dixie, and Idaho today is, outside the South, probably the most racist state in the nation—despite a marked absence of Negroes on whom to exercise prejudice. In addition, it is one of the last states whose economy depends almost totally on agriculture; over the years, powerful farming interests have kept a tight clasp on Idaho, shielding it from the outside world and from such things as industrialization, better wages and living conditions and urban renewal. In this climate the John Birch Society thrives; Idaho is one of the five states where Birchism is said to be the strongest. The present Republican Governor, Don Samuelson, was listed by *Newsweek* (January 31, 1966) as a member of the John Birch Society, when he was running for office.

Against this background, Hansen is mounting a furious campaign against Senator Church, issuing bigoted appeals to Idaho's traditional conservatism, and apparently feeling that Church's liberalism will unseat him. One issue that Hansen has raised is civil rights for minority groups. Church has been an effective supporter of civil rights

legislation, and Hansen, who never voted for a civil rights bill during his four years in Congress, has been diligent to rally Idaho's racist vote.

Hansen takes to the Idaho campaign trail as a hard-line advocate of "law and order"; he has publicly called for the firm and vigorous repression of Negro demonstrations, demanded a moratorium on civil rights legislation (which he charges causes riots) and raised the implication of treason in a very wide spectrum of Negro leadership, ranging from Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown to Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young and even the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Of Dr. King's assassination, Hansen observed that it was a case of "the chickens coming home to roost," and not the tragedy it was being made out to be. Hansen has also endorsed Chicago Mayor Daley's order to his police to "shoot to kill or maim" Negro looters. Recommending this as a step to be taken nationally to "end violence," Hansen concedes that it might result in a good many deaths but adds that a little killing now to end riots might prevent more killing later. This ounce of lead prevention was too much for the GOP majority leader, state Sen. William Roden of Boise, who called Hansen's statements "unfortunate." "I don't think he's ever seen a riot," Roden said.

Others in Idaho have been more favorably impressed by Hansen's statements. The Idaho branch of the American Independent Party, which is offering candidates for most state offices, has declined to run a candidate for Senator, and has instead endorsed Hansen. AIP state chairman Joseph K. Stumph, Jr., of Twin Falls, reports that Hansen's "strong conservatism" and his "law-and-order" policies figured in the Party's decision to back him. Hansen has enthusiastically accepted the aid of the party which will run George Wallace for President in November. As well he might—Idaho is one Northern state where fear



of the "nigger" is so strong that in a three-way race Wallace may well carry the electoral vote.

Another area that has figured prominently in Hansen's attack is foreign policy. Church is one of the most outspoken "doves" in the Senate, and a charter opponent of Administration policies in Vietnam. In fact, his feelings on the war are so intense that earlier in the year, before LBJ withdrew, Church indicated that he might support the Republican candidate should the GOP offer a reasonable alternative. Presenting himself as a super-hawk, Hansen deplores the "appeasement" policy of President Johnson, and ridicules the notion of peace talks. He talks of the Vietnamese conflict as part of a Moscow-based Communist conspiracy to take over the world. He wants the Administration to get tough with the Soviet Union, applying any pressures necessary. Just what pressures he would in fact favor, Hansen does not make entirely clear. However, in other comments he has at times asserted that the best way to preserve America's "honor" and achieve a quick way out of Vietnam is by military victory. Asserting the "need" to stop communism somewhere, Hansen favors a no-holds-barred policy, saying he will not rule out either nuclear warfare or an invasion of North Vietnam and China.

Following the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hansen has further intensified his hawkishness: the Soviet action has proved to his satisfaction that communism is an evil system and can never be trusted. Following this line, Idaho Republican leaders have been quick to imply that Church's dovishness was somehow responsible for what happened to the Czechs (though Church has issued strong condemnation of the Soviet action).

In general, the Communist label has been frequently and indiscriminately used against Church ever since Hansen became the GOP candidate. The less respectable levels of the Hansen campaign have been suggesting for some time that a vote for Hansen is a vote against communism. Or, when communism is not the issue it is often "the nigger," although the more vociferous Hansen supporters seem often to equate "niggers" and "Communists." Church, on the other hand, has refused to compromise his liberalism, and so far has managed to avoid mud slinging. The Church people have, in fact, almost avoided mentioning Hansen, and have conducted a

low-key, bread-and-butter-issues campaign. They apparently believe that Hansen's bluster and bigotry will sink that Hansen in the election for Church. At the same time, the Senate is taking no chances, and has been stumping the state to demonstrate his concern for his constituents' welfare.

Present indications and polls suggest that, in the event Church will survive the Hansen flak and gain a third year in office. Despite the powerful grass-roots strength of Hansen's brand of conservatism, Idahoans admire Church's independence in politicians. Though a good many intensely dislike some of the things that Church has done for, they respect his integrity and opposition to the policies that his own Democratic Party has followed under Johnson. A thin majority of Idaho voters have rewarded Church for his independence in two previous elections, and may do so again. However, the contest is close and, whatever the outcome, it is apparent that Hansen's campaign has paid off for him. He will probably emerge as titular head of the Idaho Republican Party. Should Hansen manage to get as much as 46 per cent of the vote in November (and he will probably do better), he may well become in 1970 his party's candidate for governor.

The Congressional seat which Hansen is vacating this year is expected to be retained by the Republicans, and is therefore unlikely that Hansen would try to regain the seat two years hence. However, Governor Samuelson is up for renomination and re-election in 1970, and GOP stalwarts already wonder whether he can hold on for another term. The Governor's bumbling style has alienated many voters. Therefore, though Samuelson is conservative enough for most GOP leaders, they may scout about for an equally conservative but more impressive candidate to oppose him in a primary, rather than wait to test his popularity in the general election.

Should Hansen lose to Church this November by a thin margin, it is expected that he will take on Samuelson in 1970, and if he does he will probably be the governor of Idaho (a Republican nomination is usually tantamount to election in Idaho, the Democratic Ch...



being a notable exception). Though many Republicans now think that Hansen made a mistake to go gunning for Church, the fact that he has proved himself an impressive vote getter in the past (70 per cent of the vote in his 1966 Congressional campaign) would stand in his favor should he wish to try a comeback against someone of less formidable stature than Church. Samuelson looks to be the obvious victim.

Philanthropy: The Golden Crowbar

GEORGE G. KIRSTEIN

Mr. Kirstein was publisher of The Nation from 1955 to 1965. This article has been condensed from a chapter in his forthcoming book, The Rich: Are They Different?, which Houghton Mifflin will publish on October 24.

Only the rich are in the unique position of having more money than they need or can use; thus for them, and only for them, the singular question arises as to what to do with the excess. The social institution to accommodate the rich in disposing of this surplus is organized philanthropy. The enormous number of philanthropic organizations that have burgeoned in this country to support the church, the private school or college, the voluntary hospital, the library, or the museum are exactly tailored to serve as repositories for excess individual wealth. Tax laws favor gifts to philanthropy; press acclaim and public approval greet announcements of the donations. Government-licensed philanthropic institutions, those which enjoy tax exemption, supposedly assure the rich man that his money will not be wasted. Billionaire John Paul Getty's observation is typical: "Like almost all wealthy men—certainly, all with whom I am acquainted—I make my contributions only to organized, legitimate charities. . . . This is the only way one can give money with any degree of assurance that it will be received eventually by deserving persons." This timesaving and generally applauded approach has few critics. One of the more acid was O. Henry who wrote at the turn of the century: "How properly to alleviate the troubles of the poor is one of the greatest troubles of the rich. But one thing agreed upon by all professional philanthropists is that you must never hand over any cash to your subject. The poor are notoriously temperamental; and when they get money, they exhibit a strong tendency to spend it for stuffed olives and enlarged crayon portraits instead of giving it to the installment man."

But both Mr. Getty and O. Henry are talking of another era, despite the fact that the oil man's comment was made fairly recently. Today, charity, in the ancient sense of giving alms to the poor, has been taken over by the government, and all who pay taxes share the burden. Not the rich but the government declares "war on poverty"; organized philanthropy has very little to do with alleviating the miseries of the poor. This function today is the responsibility of federal, state and municipal governments that distribute funds raised by taxation to recipients entitled to aid as a matter of right under law. Today, Medi-

caid and Medicare laws provide payment for the indigent from federal, state and municipal funds, and for all those, indigent or not, over the age of 65. The healthy poor wend their monotonous way to the welfare office where governmental funds are doled out. Indeed the rich benefactor looking for a charitable organization which would distribute funds to those "deserving persons" mentioned by Mr. Getty would be hard pressed to find it. Today the donor who wishes to heap largess on his favorite hospital will discover that his money is required not to maintain poor patients but to refurbish outmoded buildings or construct new facilities for the installation of scientific devices. If a cure for cancer is discovered in a beautiful new research building it is obvious that poor and rich alike are benefited. If knowledge is advanced by a new library memorializing the donor in letters carved into marble, the society as a whole is enriched.

But though continuing problems of the poor have proved to be too urgent to leave to the whims of the rich, the rich still require conduits through which to siphon off their surplus wealth, and selecting the most suitable receptacle poses a problem. Julius Rosenwald, an original partner of Sears Roebuck, once declared that he found it "nearly always easier to make \$1,000,000 honestly than to dispose of it wisely," and any number of rich men have echoed his words. This type of remark may infuriate a great many people who have strived a lifetime to accumulate far less than a million dollars, but the fact remains that many rich men have pointed to their acquisition primarily as an instrument for philanthropy. Andrew Carnegie pontificated to the young graduates of a commercial college: "As an end, the acquisition of wealth is ignoble in the extreme. I assume that you save and long for wealth only as a means of enabling you the better to do some good in your day and generation."

Giving to philanthropic institutions is invariably hailed as an act of personal generosity, especially by professional fund raisers and public relations spokesmen for the institutions that receive the gift. Listen to the speeches at the dedication of a new building on the hospital grounds or college campus, with the donor in beaming attendance as he is heaped with praise for his generous gift. But here "generous" is equated with "large" rather than with any motive of the donor. If we think of the word generosity as connoting some sacrifice on the part of the giver,

Many of the "conventions" are small, but a big one, held in a barn or warehouse, will draw as many as 500 spectators, who pay an admission charge, collected by the promoter, of between \$3 and \$10. A fight card for a big meet may consist of six to ten matched sets of dogs, and bouts last from twenty minutes to 2½ hours. Dogfight fans think of themselves as good, virile Americans who believe it is natural for dogs to want to fight and "die gloriously." Women, even children, attend some of the meets. Beer is sold and occasionally whiskey, and prostitutes circulate at the big meets which, even without this added patronage, fill up the local motels. The police are paid off in advance and security arrangements are

THE IDAHO YAHOO'S

FRANK CHURCH & THE BIRCHERS

LOCH JOHNSON

Boise, Idaho

As cars streamed into the stadium lots for the first football game of the fall season in Boise, Idaho, they were greeted by young Volunteers for Church and Andrus (Cecil Andrus is the incumbent Governor). Each volunteer carried two sets of bumper stickers: "Church for Idaho" in red, white and blue and "Andrus" in bold white letters against a blue background. Church is seeking a fourth term in the Senate and Andrus a second term as Governor. Both Democrats, they are doing much of their campaigning in tandem.

In the East Lot a co-ed knelt at the rear of each car, peeling the stickers and smoothing them side by side on the bumper. The few who declined the stickers did so politely, until the twentieth car. After accepting "Andrus," the driver's heavy, buckskin-clad wife stormed against Church. "How can a sweet gal like you be for Church?" she asked. "Are ya really for Church?"

"Sure. What's wrong with him?" replied the co-ed, curious but chiefly seeking diversion from the kneel-peel-and-smooth routine.

"Have ya heard of the Seabed Treaty! You better look into that Church. He's just like Nelson Rockefeller. They're both out to destroy this country."

The Seabed Treaty. It is not a normal topic of conversation for Idahoans, but it does appear in a long litany of charges leveled against Church in a pamphlet prepared and circulated throughout Idaho by the John Birch Society. Recently some legislators, including Church, had discussed the possibility of financing the United Na-

Loch Johnson is a political scientist at present on leave from Ohio University to observe the Idaho Congressional elections. He has contributed a chapter on Senator Church's foreign policy to A Psychological Approach to Political Man (Hermann and Milburn, editors) to be published by the Free Press early next year.

elaborate. As one would expect, gambling is heavy. Bets may run as high as \$20,000 on a single match, but a few hundred dollars is nearer the average, and at small meets \$5 to \$10 is offered and taken.

At this stage it is impossible to say whether the spread of dogfighting evidences further deterioration of the national character or is just an offshoot of the mania for sports and gambling. Either way, it is a national disgrace and since state laws have proved inadequate, federal legislation, introduced by Rep. Peter N. Kyros of Maine and Sen. Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey, joined by Sen. Lowell P. Weicker of Connecticut and others, deserves support.

tions with mineral rights from international waters. The Birchers fear this so-called Seabed Treaty proposal as a pro-Communist plot to subjugate American oilmen and fishermen to the whims of an incipient World Government. Anyone not sharing their antediluvian perspective on world affairs is an enemy, and this year they intend to do something about their enemies.

At the top of its enemies list the Birch Society has placed three incumbent U.S. Senators; they are all Democrats and were all "doves" during the war in Vietnam. One is Mike Gravel of Alaska, whom the Birchers despise for reading the Pentagon Papers on the Senate floor. C.R. Lewis, a member of the Birch Society national executive board, has won the Republican nomination for U.S. Senator in Alaska and faces Gravel in November. Another is Alan Cranston, whose record of pro-Communist activities, according to the Birchers, is "longer than an income tax form." But the prime target is Frank Church.

The Birch Society sees a rare opportunity in Idaho this year. The state's fiercely independent voters have shown signs of a pronounced shift to the right. In 1972 John Schmitz, the right-wing Presidential candidate (American Party), won his largest vote in Idaho—almost 10 per cent. Andrus and Church are the only Democrats left in the upper ranks of Idaho politics. In 1972 a right-wing Republican with strong Birch ties was elected to Congress, joining a similarly inclined U.S. Senator (McClure) elected two years before. Earlier this year another incumbent Congressman, a moderate Republican friendly toward Church, was defeated in the primary by a conservative Republican who is now favored to win the seat in the general election—if he can survive current investigations into his campaign financing.

In short, Birch-oriented politicians have a good chance to dominate the Idaho delegation in the next Congress—at least numerically. The major obstacle to a clean sweep for the Birch Society is Idaho's senior Senator, and they believe that he is vulnerable. Not only is Church's voting record generally liberal but, unlike the popular new Governor Andrus, he has been in politics eighteen years and

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inevitably made some enemies. All of these years, moreover, have been spent in Washington where the decisions are more far-reaching and controversial than those faced by Idaho governors. Added to this is the almost inherent Idahoan distrust of the federal government, no doubt reinforced by Watergate.

The size of Idaho makes Church unusually vulnerable to a Birch attack. The voting population is relatively small (around 300,000) and concentrated, making it more susceptible to outside influence than would be the case in larger states. A reasonably effective attempt to persuade the California electorate to vote against Cranston would cost the Birchers \$1 million at least. The California population is immense and mobile, and the advertising market is expensive. In California, \$250,000 would buy a fair amount of media space and time in Los Angeles during the last week of the election; in Idaho, the same amount can finance an entire statewide campaign from beginning to end. If a quarter million dollars can make a dent in California, it can be decisive in Idaho.

An added Bircher incentive for focusing on Idaho is the realization that Church may soon become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is next in line after aging John Sparkman (75) and Mike Mansfield (71), the Majority Leader. The radical Right views the prospect of the Church chairmanship as the disastrous resurgence of "comrade" Fulbright's pro-Communist policies. Now 50 years old, Church could lead the Foreign Relations Committee for the rest of this century.

The defeat of Church and Gravel—and possibly Cranston—would be a major coup for the John Birch Society and would serve, it believes, to intimidate other members of Congress. Thus far their tactics in Idaho have been twofold: to distribute their attack against Church's record and to support Church's conservative GOP opponent, Bob Smith.

More than 100,000 copies of the article attacking Church have already been distributed throughout the state, one for every postal patron in many areas. It originally appeared in *American Opinion* (March 1974), a monthly published and edited by Robert Welch, founder and head of the John Birch Society. The distortion, misrepresentation and innuendo displayed in the article demonstrate that the tactics of McCarthyism linger on.

The article begins with an attempt to discredit Church's early stand against the war in Vietnam by making him appear hypocritical. It quotes Church as saying in a 1965 speech that America's "commitments solemnly made must be kept, whether wisely or unwisely." However, the next sentence in his speech is conveniently omitted: "But there never, at any time, has been any commitment on the part of the United States to fight the war in South Vietnam." As columnist Jack Anderson has aptly observed, "This is a little like quoting Abe Lincoln as saying he would carry on his work 'with malice,' without adding the words 'toward none.'"

A second allegation is that Church enthusiastically endorsed Cesar Chavez, head of the United Farm Workers Union, who led the nationwide lettuce boycott. Actually, Church has consistently opposed boycotts against any farm

products, and has been criticized by some Idaho liberals for not being more sympathetic to Chavez's fight on behalf of migrant farm workers. Church's vote at the 1972 Democratic Convention put the Idaho delegation on record in opposition to the Chavez boycott. The Birchers even suggest that Church would support a Chavez-led boycott of Idaho potatoes, which is as likely as a Kansas Senator declaring on *Meet the Press* that corn is hazardous to your health.

The Seabed Treaty is a favorite Birch target. From Church's point of view, the mineral resources that lie beyond national jurisdictions hold promise as an important source of revenue for the financially faltering United Nations. Funding the U.N. in this manner would permit a reduction in the substantial U.S. contributions to the organization, and release money that is badly needed for domestic programs. Of course, any proposal looking to improve the affairs of the U.N. is anathema to the Birchers. They term the U.N. a Communist organization; after all, several Communist nations are members. Simplistic deductions appear to be an identifying feature of extremist groups.

The most fanciful—and shameful—of the Birch allegations is the slur upon Church's administrative assistant, Verda Barnes. A daughter of Idaho pioneers and a government case worker on Capitol Hill for years, Mrs. Barnes is reputed by the Birchers to be the means whereby the Communists control Church. She is a mainstay on the Senator's staff, but for none of the reasons suggested by the Birchers. A fence-mender *par excellence*, her days are spent on the phone to Idaho, cultivating friendships for the Senator and smoothing the ruffled feathers that inevitably arise in any Senator's constituency. Her advice on Idaho political questions has been wise and helpful to Church; however, when it comes to foreign policy or any of the other issues which so provoke the John Birch Society, Frank Church makes up his own mind with little staff assistance.

The Birch article bases its slurs against Mrs. Barnes on the "research" of Frank (Francis A.) Capell, an *American Opinion* contributor. In 1965 Capell was indicted and pleaded no contest to a charge involving conspiracy to defame former Republican Sen. Thomas Kuchel of California with a phony allegation of homosexuality. Twenty years earlier, Capell was convicted on a felony charge for conspiracy to ask, accept and receive bribes during his service with the War Production Board.

The Church staff believes that, like the other Bircher allegations, this attempt to damage him by attacking Mrs. Barnes will fool only those who know nothing about the facts. They worry, though, about the many newcomers to Idaho who know little about Mrs. Barnes's integrity or Church's true position on the issues raised by the Society. The John Birch Society relies on the susceptibility of these new arrivals. Still, Church remains confident that the smear attempt will fail. "I have devoted all of my life to the service of my country both in war [Church won a Bronze Star in World War II] and peace," he recently told an impromptu press conference, "and Idahoans are much too fair-minded to be taken in by the efforts to taint me as some kind of pro-Communist."

Bob Smith, the GOP and John Birch Society candidate against Church, is an easy ally for the right wingers. Though his speeches contain less of the rabid anti-communism typical of Bircher publications, he is foursquare with the Society on its other basic tenets—especially its hatred of collectivism and the federal government. Most of all, Smith fears the demise of the free-enterprise system in the United States, and he attributes its decline directly to the growth of the federal government. Anti-federalism, coupled with a relentless hunt for Reds, is the backbone of the Birch organization, too. What makes Smith an attractive spokesman for this and other right-wing groups is that he is sufficiently articulate, sophisticated and attractive to give his anti-federal philosophy considerable appeal.

With degrees in political science at the College of Idaho, theology at Northwestern, law at the University of Idaho, as well as a certificate in Chinese from Yale University, Smith has been a Methodist missionary in Malaysia, a practicing attorney in Idaho, and the manager of a successful Congressional campaign in 1972 for Rep. Steve Symms. Most recently, Smith was Symms's administrative assistant in Washington. (Symms is a favorite speaker at Birch Society gatherings and was the keynote speaker at the 1974 Birch Society banquet in Chicago.) Thus Smith combines the smoothness of an educated man, he "mixing" abilities of a preacher and some political experience.

In public Smith steers clear of some of the more bizarre Birch positions (e.g., Nelson Rockefeller is part of an "inner circle" out to control the world), and stresses subjects having a broader appeal: cutting back on federal taxes, red tape and bureaucratic regulations. Church, too, has anti-federal strains in his philosophy. He is against federal gun controls, for example, and in 1967 was the first to warn of the growing Caesarism in the White House. In fact, every Idaho politician has a healthy dose of anti-federalism; but whereas Smith and the Birchers are completely negative about government, Church sees the possibility of its positive use, as with Medicare and Social Security legislation.

Smith tells audiences that our way of life and possibly even the survival of modern civilization is in jeopardy since our tradition of free enterprise and limited govern-

ment is under the most massive attack in history. "I am committed to devoting every ounce of my time and energy to stop the stampede to socialism" (one is reminded of Goldwater's phrase in 1964 about "stagnating in the swampland of collectivism"). Taking hear from recent Arkansas history, Smith is convinced that voters across the country will send other incumbents to join Senator Fulbright in the political pastures. "This year people are concerned with having too many incumbents who've been there too long," Smith told a meeting of the Nez Perce County Republican Central Committee. "They just want to get rid of career politicians." He promises to resign after two terms, if elected. This is a difficult dog to make hunt since many Idahoans understand the value of Church's seniority. As chairman of the Senate Internal Subcommittee on Water and Power, Church has successfully defeated several attempts to divert Idaho's precious water southward.

Church has other strengths which Smith will find difficult to combat. He has dotted the Idaho landscape with agricultural, conservation and sewer projects; he has assiduously cultivated constituent ties over the years, holding ombudsman-like "citizen conferences" in every county on a regular basis; and he is one of the nation's best orators and debaters. Church also has the usual advantages of the incumbent.

Smith, then, faces a battle, even if the political trend in Idaho is swinging to the right. Thus far he has condoned the Birch smear on Church and has even defended the Society as "a whipping boy to be attacked by liberal candidates who need to divert public attention from their own philosophies." This rigid tie to the Birchers goes beyond Smith's own deep-running doctrinaire conservatism. Members of the John Birch Society's national council are funding Smith's campaign and these dollars, apparently, are a strong binding adhesive. Also, Smith seems to be betting that the Birch attack will work its poison through the state.

So the battle shapes up as between a talented young conservative and a talented, experienced liberal. Whatever the outcome, the voters of Idaho are being offered this year a choice, not an echo.

PERUVIAN ADVENTURE

GENERALS AS REVOLUTIONARIES

PENNY LERNOUX

Lima, Peru

There are three truths, runs an old Chinese proverb: yours, mine and the truth. It is an apt description of Latin America these days because so many seem to have a monopoly on the truth—the generals in Chile, Castro in Cuba and the Peronistas (all five versions of them) in Argentina. But nowhere is the truth so elusive as in Peru, where a six-year-old military government claims to have started a non-capitalist, non-Communist revolution—a

claim hotly disputed by the Right, which describes the revolution as Communist, and by the Left, which denounces the regime as Fascist. It could be that none of these terms relate to what is actually taking place in Peru or for that matter anywhere else in Latin America. What is meaningful, or truthful, in a European or U.S. context does not necessarily apply in Latin America, yet these foreign terms still are used to explain behavior here.

Penny Lernoux is South American correspondent in Bogotá for Copley News Service.

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thodox Judaism, on the other hand, does not sanction sterilization.

No doubt the reader would like to know the author's attitude. I am absolutely opposed to any form of compulsory sterilization, but feel strongly that voluntary sterilization under some conditions and with certain safeguards is an excellent procedure. In addition to medical, eugenic and socio-economic considerations, a normal couple is sometimes entitled to sterilization. If the

couple finds all effective methods of contraception burdensome, or if they are continually accident-prone when using contraceptives, sterilization of husband or wife should be given thoughtful consideration. They should be counseled by their doctor against it if either husband or wife has any reservations, or if their marriage is unstable. Furthermore they should both be told precisely what surgical procedure is contemplated and should be warned

that the resulting sterility is likely to be permanent.

The Human Betterment Association for Voluntary Sterilization, Inc., in New York City, is a voluntary organization concerned solely with human sterilization. It collects facts about sterilization and transmits them to the medical and lay public. Also, it advises individuals on sterilization and will assist couples, whose situations meet the requirements of its screening committee, to achieve sterilization.

Mired Troops and Frozen Policy

The NATION April 6, 1964

THE KOREAN PARALYSIS . . . Senator Frank Church

American foreign policy tends to maintain fixed positions long after these have ceased to serve our best interests. An example of this rigidity is the continued stationing of two full combat divisions — some 52,000 American troops, including various supporting units—in South Korea.

I neither challenge nor disclaim our basic commitment to defend, by whatever means may be necessary, the integrity of the Republic of Korea. The fixed position to which I refer is not our commitment to defend the country, but the means by which we have chosen to do so. The perpetuation of these means is, I believe, demonstrably unsound, excessively costly and long since unnecessary.

Why does the United States need two full combat divisions in Korea? Since the end of the Korean fighting in 1953, we have given nearly \$5 billion dollars in aid to South Korea; more than \$2 billion of this aid has been used to equip their army. Today, the ROK army, numbering nearly 600,000 men, is the fourth largest in the entire world! It far outnumbered the entire North Korean armed forces of approximately 350,000 men, and is surpassed only by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. We have made the South

Korean Army combat-ready, and equipped it with the most modern weapons; it should, by now, be more than a match for the smaller North Korean force. If it is not, the American people are entitled to know how and where their money has been squandered.

The argument that we must leave 50,000 American sentinels on the front line in Korea to guard against, not a North Korean attack, but the possibility of another invasion by Communist China, is transparently weak. Against an all-out Chinese attack, two divisions of American troops would never suffice. Should Korea be so invaded again, the United States would have to intervene with the whole of her military might. To pretend otherwise is merely to tempt fate.

If another armed challenge of this dimension were to occur in South Korea, we would have to respond with forces now stationed outside that country. And we are prepared to do so. Our armed forces are far stronger and more mobile than in 1950, when the last invasion occurred. Our formidable base and staging area at Okinawa is within easy reach. Moreover, the success of the recent "Operation Big Lift," which flew a whole division from Texas to West Germany, indicates how swiftly we can move our troops from one part of the globe to another. Should a big new invasion ever require it, we could quickly airlift formidable numbers of American soldiers into the Korean peninsula.

The customary retort to these acknowledged facts is that two

American divisions must none the less remain in Korea as a psychological deterrent to any future Communist adventures, and to keep the South Koreans reassured of our determination to defend their country. As to the latter, one wonders why further reassurance should be needed after so vast an outpouring of American life and fortune in the Korean War; as to the former, if we accept the argument that our continued presence in Korea is required to make our commitment credible to the potential enemy, then it follows that American forces will have to patrol the 38th Parallel indefinitely — at least until such time as Korea's Communist neighbors either disarm or disappear!

I find neither of these propositions convincing. But, to play it absolutely safe, let us concede that the continued presence of American troops in Korea does offer further proof, to friend and foe alike, of our determination to uphold that country. Does it follow that we must keep two full divisions there? Surely, one regimental combat team would serve the purpose. With our capacity for rapid reinforcement from bases nearby, we can give South Korea the same guarantee of security, with far fewer American troops actually garrisoned there. It doesn't take a whole American Army to provide a "trip-wire" to warn of intruders.

Withdrawing the remainder of these two divisions to locations from which they could be speedily airborne would also add to our general mobility. Our troops now on

Frank Church, Democratic Senator from Idaho and a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations since 1959, made a recent tour of the Far East, including Korea. During World War II, Senator Church was a military intelligence officer in China.


the line in Korea can be used only to defend that country. They are dug deeply into the hillsides. Ironically, we have limited their utility by miring them down in a region of the world where their instant availability for use in a crisis, somewhere else around the rim of China, could mean the difference between success and failure.

Moreover, the case against the frozen deployment of two whole divisions in Korea is not limited to the benefits to be derived from a more fluid strategic position. There are pressing financial, as well as sound military, reasons for reducing the level of American troops in that country.

The cost of maintaining our military forces abroad is a far greater burden to our balance-of-payments problem than our total outlay each year in foreign aid. For instance, in 1962, our balance-of-payments deficit was \$2.18 billion. The drain on the balance from foreign-based military expenditures was more

than \$3 billion. In 1961, our balance-of-payments deficit was \$2.37 billion, while our foreign-based military costs contributing to this deficit exceeded \$2.93 billion. In both years, we would have had a balance-of-payments surplus, had it not been for the cost of our garrisons in other countries. Retaining two whole divisions in Korea adds more than \$100 million each year to our balance-of-payments deficit.

The United States has sustained a deficit in its balance of payments consistently since 1950. As a result, we have accumulated more than \$25 billion in short-term obligations abroad, while our gold reserves have dwindled to less than \$16 billion. If we subtract the \$12 billion in gold bullion earmarked by law to back the currency in our own country, we now have less than \$4 billion in gold reserves with which to redeem our outstanding obligations to foreign creditors. During the past five years, our gold reserves have been diminishing at an alarming rate. We have suffered



a gold outflow of more than \$7 billion since 1958!

All this is not to say that, wherever our vital interests require it, we should not continue to station American troops in other countries. But it is to say that the size of these garrisons should be reduced, wherever possible, to a prudent minimum.

I submit that a sound assessment of our position in Korea calls for the withdrawal of the bulk of our troops, for the following reasons:

•The South Korean Army can't repel a North Korean invasion.

•An invasion by Communist China would require us to make an effort of an entirely different magnitude than is implied by the two divisions currently quartered in Korea.

•A regiment of American combat troops on the front line in Korea would serve just as effectively as a "trip-wire" deterrent to the Communists.


•Removing the remaining units from their trenches in Korea would add to the mobility of our military posture in Asia.

•A reduction in the number of American troops stationed in Korea would mitigate our serious balance-of-payments problem.

Our paralysis of policy in Korea results not so much from pressures generated in Seoul as from those arising in Washington. They are partly bureaucratic and partly political.

To begin with, the Army has a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* in Korea, while there is no vested interest in changing it. It is the Army, principally, which regularly resurrects the specter of Communist aggression as the probable consequence of any force reduction there. I think it reasonable to suppose that the Army's judgment on this matter is somewhat

(Continued on page 356)



Harry Moss

him with a love that extends no further than his person. He grows ever less aware of his neighbors, his family, his society; his affections then tend toward the semi-incestuous. He cripples those closest to him; his negligence spells their death. He can save himself only by direct, unequivocal work required by the specific needs of his immediate community.

The flow and fascination of *Little Eyolf* arise from the interweaving of so many of Ibsen's preoccupations, some of which are merely hinted at. Whether or not we agree with William Archer's estimate that the play is "among the greatest of Ibsen's achievements" (an opinion shared in large measure by Shaw), we cannot fail to be struck by the "something more" in

the play's atmosphere. We breathe the very air of one of the Ibsen households—the place, the emotional pressures, the hidden thoughts, the unspoken words, the fate—which exercises a far greater spell than does the bare articulation of the play's structure or thesis.

It is just this substance of reality, this fabric of experience, which the players of Northwestern Productions are unable to create. This, I was going to say, is due to their youth, but it is not a matter of years. Physically the actors correspond entirely to the description of the characters in the printed text. They lack two things: the full technical training for such a play and, even more, the cultural "soil" which gives the European actor a ground wherein his personal knowledge of human relationships may mature sufficiently to express the life-laden gravity of Ibsen's world. Still, despite their inadequacy as instruments for this task, the Northwestern actors have faithfully followed a director who understands the play so that its lineaments at least are made clear.

The great dramatic work about the challenge of the American Negro to our country has not yet been written. But materials are accumulating in moralities, songs, documents—almost always impressive and stirring. Thus James Weldon Johnson's *God's Trombones*, adapted by Vinnette Carroll, has been made into a fine composite of gospel singing and folk preaching in *Trumpets of the Lord* (1 Sheridan Square) for which the actors and singers are fully equipped with both technical skill and the inner resources. Al Freeman, Jr., Theresa Merritt and Cicely Tyson head a group wholly admirable in spirit, speech and chant.

In assembling historical data from private and public sources, Martin Duberman, a Princeton professor, has wrought for the actor-speakers of *In White America* (Sheridan Square Playhouse) a shameful saga of the black man's agony in our land from the days of the slave trade to the present. Remarkable pace — which does not signify rapidity so much as variety — has been given to the various episodes, sometimes acidly ironic, sometimes poignantly intimate, sometimes almost epic, and always inescapably pertinent. The swell of an irresistible determination in this well-organized performance raises hope for the Negro in America.

HAROLD CLURMAN

KOREA

(Continued from page 348)

colored by its own perspective. I have yet to meet an Army officer who felt we were maintaining too many divisions anywhere, or one who believed that our regular Army ought not to be further enlarged. There is a natural tendency for the Army to seek, not alone in Korea but elsewhere, to perpetuate those deployments of troops in the field which will have the effect of rendering our present Army strength immune to question, and thus invulnerable to competing demands for the slice of the defense budget it represents. If we must wait for the Army to endorse a troop withdrawal from Korea, we shall wait a long time indeed!

However, whether or not we shall continue to garrison troops in Korea is a decision of foreign policy. It is to the State Department, not the Pentagon, that the President should properly look for any recommended changes of course. Unfortunately, the voice of McCarthy still intimidates at the State Department, even as the dread campaign charge, "soft on communism," still intimidates at the White House. Fear of Congressional reaction in the capital, and voter reaction in the precincts, stultifies our policy in Korea, as it does wherever we find ourselves "eyeball to eyeball" with the Communists. The overriding consideration against any reduction of our forces in Korea is the political calculation that such a move would "pay off" for the Republicans. If a Democratic President were to withdraw troops from Korea, the Republicans might denounce the move as some kind of retreat in the face of the enemy; on the other hand, a Democratic President can easily make a decision to stand still in Korea look like a determination to stand firm.

So it is likely that there will be no change in Korea in the near future. Perhaps we shall have to wait for a second-term President. But the paralysis of our policy in places like Korea, though it may sustain political interests at home, can also weaken our national interests abroad. Dean Rusk is reported recently to have said that we live in an era of diplomacy and boredom. For this, I suggest, we have ourselves partly to blame.

MEETING

MALCOLM X

Speaks on

"Black Revolution"

Wednesday, April 8, 8:00 P.M.
Palm Gardens
310 West 52nd Street, New York
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Speaking Out

Saturday Evening
Post April 24, 1965

We should negotiate a settlement in Vietnam

By Senator Frank Church

The senior senator from Idaho and a Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Church had wartime experience in Asia.



Our struggle in South Vietnam has reached a point where neither side can achieve a conclusive military decision, and the only visible prospect for resolution is to be found at the conference table. But there is so much Washington talk about stepping up the war that it threatens to engulf all rational discussion of the crisis we face—almost if peace were something to be avoided. The war hawks are putting on the heat. Anyone who disagrees with them is accused of “running up a white flag.” Debate is discouraged; dissent is condemned as endangering the country. Any talk of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is equated with Munich; any prospect of an eventual American withdrawal is likened to Dunkirk.

Yet everyone senses that peace in Vietnam can only be restored through a political settlement, and that the United States neither wishes nor expects to keep a foothold in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, I believe we should try to break the diplomatic deadlock (“First we withdraw, then we will talk”) that binds both sides, in effect, demanding the surrender of the other as the price of negotiations. I disagree with the prevailing doctrine that now is not the time to parley. The longer we wait, the harder it will become to achieve a satisfactory solution.

Opposing any negotiations, the war hawks contend that we Americans must first have it out with the Communists in Vietnam. They see the struggle there, which has thus far been mostly confined to the Vietnamese, as one of suddenly portentous importance. Hanson Baldwin, military editor for the *New York Times*, declares that we should ready ourselves to send a million Americans into battle. He writes: “We must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. . . . Vietnam is a costly place to fight. But . . . there is no

‘good’ place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China’s doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.”

Such trumpeting substitute sound for sanity. We may have invested prestige in Vietnam, but by no stretch of imagination does this struggle threaten the life of our country.

We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. It is our moat, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very shores of China. With unchallenged naval and aerial supremacy, we dominate it, patrol it and defend it. There is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea, nor the eagle from the sky. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored to Vietnam.

I believe that the containment of a hostile China is a proper goal for American policy. To avoid Chinese conquest of her neighbors, we fought in Korea, and we have solemnly pledged ourselves to defend Taiwan. The weakness of the Chinese-expansion argument, as it relates to Vietnam, is that China has thus far displayed no wish to invade Southeast Asia. To date, Chinese troops have not been fighting in Vietnam. Moreover, China hasn’t yet moved a cadre of “advisers” into North Vietnam that begins to compare, in numbers of men or in the amount of aid given, to the American presence in the South. The best way to keep China out of Vietnam is to settle the war there. An escalation of the war northward, if it continues unabated, is the most likely way to draw Chinese armies down, thus creating the very calamity our policy should be designed to avert.

However, a new definition of containment has emerged to justify the deepening involvement of the United States in the fighting in Southeast

Asia. Our presence there, it is said, is not to furnish a shield against an anticipated Chinese invasion, but rather to counteract the spread of Chinese influence. If this is our purpose, it is a vain one indeed.

China is the giant of Asia, unshackled and determined to reclaim her prerogatives as the dominant power of the mainland. In the natural course of events, we can no more expect to deny China her influence in Southeast Asia, the region immediately beneath her, than China could expect to deny the United States our influence in Central America.

No outpost bristling with bayonets—least of all one held in South Vietnam by American occupation forces—is going to stem the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. If we cannot live in a world where the Chinese exert influence in Indochina, then we had better forget Vietnam and commence now to destroy and dismember China, something no other nation in history has ever managed to do.

But since the conquest of China is not an American ambition, we should stop fooling ourselves with talk that our involvement in Vietnam can somehow bring an end to the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. In fact, the evidence is just the other way around. Because of the extent of our intervention in South Vietnam, the Peking government is able to pose as the champion of Asia for the Asians, defying the United States in the name of resisting the return of Western imperialism. Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said recently to a foreign visitor: “Once we worried about Southeast Asia. We don’t anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us.”

Although we cannot immunize Southeast Asia from Chinese influence, the restoration of peace to this war-weary

One measure of a democracy’s strength is the freedom of its citizens to speak out—to dissent from the popular view.

FROM THE U.S.A. TO ALL THE WORLD WITH LOVE

ESQUIRE

JULY 1967

2,106,000 rifles; 4,385 F-84 fighters; 2,812 F-86 fighters;
75,995 trailers; 1,362,000 carbines; 20,279 tanks;
72,777 machine guns; 29,716 mortars; and 30,340 missiles.
3,292 aircraft trainers, 150,552 two-and-a-half-ton trucks

by Senator Frank Church

In the eyes of much of the world, the United States is more intent on furnishing swords than plowshares. During the past seventeen years, we have bestowed on foreign governments \$8,000,000,000 in military vehicles and weapons, \$7,000,000,000 in aircraft, \$5,000,000,000 in ammunition, \$2,000,000,000 in ships, \$2,000,000,000 in communications equipment, \$1,500,000,000 in missiles and \$3,000,000,000 in other supplies. Services granted in the form of base construction, training, repair, and spare parts amounted to an additional \$8,000,000,000, for a staggering total of \$36,500,000,000 dispensed abroad since 1950.

The armaments which these sums represent are no less staggering: 4,385 F-84 fighters; 2,812 F-86 fighters; 3,292 aircraft trainers; 20,279 tanks; 75,995 trailers; 150,552 two-and-a-half-ton trucks; 1,362,000 carbines; 2,106,000 rifles; 72,777 machine guns; 29,716 mortars; 30,340 missiles.

As if to augment these massive gifts of arms, the Defense Department is now engaged in a mushrooming sales campaign. Direct sales to foreign governments already exceed \$16,000,000,000, while Pentagon officials anticipate orders worth another \$15,000,000,000 in the next decade.

Clearly, the supplying of munitions, quite apart from ordinary commercial sales by private American manufacturers, has become a big business in which the U.S. Government plays a central role. Today, our Federal Government is the principal arms dispenser of the world, giving away, advancing credit, and promoting the sale of a volume of arms more than six times that of our nearest rival, the Soviet Union.

It was not always so. Before World War II, sentiment in this country was decidedly against the export of weapons. Munition makers were scorned, their trafficking in arms condemned as mischievous, if not evil. Legislation in 1912 and 1922 placed embargoes on the export of war materials to China and certain Latin-American countries. The Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1939 sought to limit arms trade by setting up a licensing system which subjected export sales to strict governmental scrutiny. Furnishing arms abroad, both the public and government then believed, could entrap us in unwanted foreign wars. American politicians found favor by sternly rebuking the "merchants of death."

The shift came in 1940 with the desperate plight of Great Britain. Fearing a Nazi conquest of Europe, President Roosevelt approved the transfer of fifty American destroyers to the British Navy in exchange for rights to build military bases on British territory in the Western Hemisphere. The gates to the American arsenal, thus pried apart, were soon thrown open to the enormous demands of the war. Congress approved the far-reaching Lend-Lease Act, signed into law on March 11, 1941, which empowered the President "to authorize the manufacture of defense articles . . . for any foreign government whose defense he deemed vital," and to "sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend . . . to any such government any defense article." By the end of the war, we had furnished \$48,500,000,000 worth of weapons and supplies to forty-two foreign govern-

ments, the great bulk of which had gone to Great Britain (\$3,000,000,000), to the Soviet Union (\$11,000,000,000), and to France (\$3,000,000,000).

These weapons helped our fighting partners greatly in the common struggle to defeat the Axis powers, thereby saving the lives of many American soldiers. Much of the assistance was given without thought of repayment. But even for that part of the weapons "leased" or "loaned," in the genuine expectation of repayment, we have received nothing. After the war, for example, negotiations with the Soviet Union proved fruitless; and today we are still paying—in interest charges on our national debt—for this huge wartime disbursement of arms.

Nonetheless, the guns had hardly fallen silent before we commenced a new program of arms aid. In the Far East, from 1945 to 1949, to bolster Chiang Kai-shek's faltering grip on China, we gave him arms and supplies worth \$800,000,000 in original acquisition cost. In the Middle East, starting in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine, we helped Greece, which was threatened by a Communist guerrilla war, and Turkey, then under intense Soviet pressure. The onset of the "cold war" brought additional demands for further military aid—demands which intensified with the invasion of South Korea. Congress, in 1950, voted \$1,300,000,000 in military assistance to fourteen countries for "the performance of specific tasks" which we, presumably, would otherwise have had to undertake. The postwar period of "arsenal diplomacy" had begun.

Two years later we were spending \$6,000,000,000 in twenty-two countries. The dollars rained so thick and fast that, at one point, unfilled orders in the "pipeline" exceeded \$12,000,000,000, leading Congress, in some embarrassment, to level off new appropriations at about \$1,500,000,000 a year. Still, the number of recipients continued to grow, reaching in 1963 an all-time high of sixty-seven foreign governments, each with its own special shopping list brought to our disbursement window.

Procedures were quickly standardized by the burgeoning bureaucracy charged with the administration of the new program. American military attachés assigned to our Embassies abroad were called upon, not only to befriend their host counterparts, but to study their arms needs. From this contact came requests for special purpose military missions or for the establishment of American military advisory groups, pursuant to bilateral mutual-assistance agreements.

Today some 12,000 Americans are engaged abroad in training, advising and supervising the armed services of no less than thirty-five foreign countries. Each American detachment helps the local military work up a five-year plan of training and weapons needs. Then, invitations are issued to participate in military training within the United States or at special schools operated for that purpose abroad. To date, some 277,000 foreign soldiers have been trained in this manner, with millions more receiving American training inside their own countries. In addition, about 1,400 senior foreign officers enjoy a free "orientation" trip to the U.S. each year.

FROM THE U.S.A. TO ALL THE WORLD, WITH LOVE:

*2,106,000 rifles; 4,385 F-84 fighters; 2,812 F-86 fighters;
75,995 trailers; 1,362,000 carbines; 20,279 tanks;
72,777 machine guns; 29,716 mortars; and 30,340 missiles
3,292 aircraft trainers, 150,552 two-and-a-half-ton trucks;*

by Senator Frank Church

In the eyes of much of the world, the United States is more intent on furnishing swords than plowshares. During the past seventeen years, we have bestowed on foreign governments more than \$15,000,000,000 in military vehicles and weapons, \$7,000,000,000 in aircraft, \$5,000,000,000 in ammunition, \$2,000,000,000 in communications equipment, \$1,500,000,000 in base construction, training, repair, and spare parts, and \$3,000,000,000 in other supplies. Services granted amount to an additional \$8,000,000,000, for a staggering total of \$30,000,000,000 dispensed abroad since 1950.

The munitions which these sums represent are no less staggering: 4,385 F-84 fighters; 2,812 F-86 fighters; 3,292 aircraft trainers; 20,279 tanks; 75,995 trailers; 150,552 two-and-a-half-ton trucks; 1,362,000 carbines; 2,106,000 rifles; 72,777 machine guns; 29,716 mortars; and 30,340 missiles.

To augment these massive gifts of arms, the Defense Department has engaged in a mushrooming sales campaign. Direct sales to foreign governments already exceed \$16,000,000,000, while officials anticipate orders worth another \$15,000,000,000 in the next decade.

The supplying of munitions, quite apart from ordinary commercial sales by private American manufacturers, has become a major activity in which the U.S. Government plays a central role. The Federal Government is the principal arms dispenser of the world, giving away, advancing credit, and promoting the sale of arms more than six times that of our nearest rival, the Soviet Union.

It has not always been so. Before World War II, sentiment in this country was decidedly against the export of weapons. Munition trafficking was scorned, their trafficking in arms condemned as mischievous and not evil. Legislation in 1912 and 1922 placed embargoes on the export of war materials to China and certain Latin-American countries. The Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1939 sought to limit the export of arms by setting up a licensing system which subjected export of arms to governmental scrutiny. Furnishing arms abroad, both by private and government then believed, could entrap us in unprofitable and unwise wars. American politicians found favor by sternly opposing such "merchants of death."

It was only in 1940 with the desperate plight of Great Britain, threatened by the Nazi conquest of Europe, that President Roosevelt approved the Lend-Lease Act of fifty American destroyers to the British Navy in exchange for the rights to build military bases on British territory in the Western Hemisphere. The gates to the American arsenal, thus far closed, were soon thrown open to the enormous demands of the war. Congress approved the far-reaching Lend-Lease Act, signed on March 11, 1941, which empowered the President "to lend, lease, or otherwise dispose of defense articles . . . for any foreign country whose defense he deemed vital," and to "sell, transfer, lease, or otherwise dispose of such articles . . . to any such government any other way." By the end of the war, we had furnished \$48,500,000,000 worth of weapons and supplies to forty-two foreign govern-

ments, the great bulk of which had gone to Great Britain (\$32,000,000,000), to the Soviet Union (\$11,000,000,000), and to France (\$3,000,000,000).

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posure stimulates an appetite for the sophistries that have developed. Using an inventory of all available requests are drawn up and submitted to the American Ambassador. These are forwarded to the Department of State, where a decision is reached after consultation with the Defense Department.

Defense Secretary McNamara told Congress that the United States is deliberately easing out of business in many areas. After all, apart from the military-aid budget down almost half since

however, must be viewed in its proper context. What we gave away yesterday we are selling today. The total addition to the armament inventory of other than for any period since the Korean War.

The United States now spends \$70,000,000,000 a year on its own armaments. The rapid technological progress generated by this industry produces weapons which turn obsolescent soon after they leave the assembly line. For years our defense industry has been going through their use through arms sales abroad. In 1961 the industry went into high gear with the establishment, in the Office of International Logistics Negotiations.

The position of Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry J. Kuss, has steadily grown in size and substance. Today, it has the support of experts from each of the three Armed Services, the guidance of a twenty-five-man advisory committee, and the cooperation of private industry, Defense's arms salesmen, and a range of American promotion techniques. Kuss has said that "Behind the success of our military export program is the fact that no other nation can touch us in overall know-how, quality, price, delivery time, follow-up, and credit terms."

Whether for cash or on easy credit, with financing available through the Department revolving credit account, the government Export-Import Bank, or private banking facilities, the program has been authorized to guarantee credit extended to foreign governments buying weapons from us. The policy of the Office of International Logistics, as mentioned in a recent laudatory article, "has always been 'if you can't get it for you,' and they have yet to fail to do so." In some thirty countries were buying for cash and credit. Nearly \$3,000,000,000 of the arms sales in the last year were on credit.

It is, perhaps, for his "unparalleled ability as an international negotiator" that Secretary McNamara awarded Kuss with the Meritorious Service Medal. And for good reason. Until 1961, sales of arms were \$300,000,000 a year. Since then, Kuss has signed up for commitments on \$11,700,000,000 in arms sales, thereby creating a new armaments industry with an added billion-dollar profit. *Business Week* reported recently, "is becoming the prevalent slogan in the world arms market."

It is not surprising that within the short span of thirty years the American governmental policy toward the export of arms has gone from naive abstention to zealous promotion. The change is acceptable; the time has come for us to seek a balance.

Our present involvement is based, like a stool, on three rather compelling arguments. First, that we give aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression without and subversion from within. Second, that we strengthen our influence with the military elite in the Third World, that the sale of weapons helps to redress the balance of payments (caused, in large part, by the mass deployment of our own troops).

Each of these arguments lacks force; none can be summarily dismissed.

After World War II, the westward thrust of Russian aggression led to engulf all of Europe. The retention of an armistice in Germany, together with the formation of the Federal Republic, became indispensable. Western Europe lay pros-

trate, her cities in ruins, her peoples demoralized, her economy shattered by the remorseless hammer-blows of the war. Our economic aid, swiftly administered through the Marshall Plan, proved a brilliant success, but our military grants-in-aid were equally necessary to enable the Europeans to assume their proper place in manning the N.A.T.O. defense line.

The Marshall Plan-N.A.T.O. formula produced spectacular results in rejuvenating the war-torn economy of Western Europe and forging a common shield against the Soviet Union. So jubilant were we with its success that we continued military aid long after the need had passed. In 1964, for example, eight years after we had ended our economic aid to Western Europe, the United States was still providing over \$300,000,000 in military grants to our now rich and thriving N.A.T.O. allies.

The explanation rests, in part, on the tendency of any bureaucracy to remain in business. Programs once started are always hard to stop. In this case, the difficulty was compounded by "cold war" apprehensions, so that Congress was also reluctant to intervene. It took three years before Congress would approve an amendment I proposed to the Foreign Aid Act, finally prohibiting further grants of military assistance to rich countries. (Unfulfilled commitments, however, were permitted to continue, some even to the present day.)

The general success of our postwar policy in Europe inoculated our thinking on other fronts. Around the whole periphery of the Communist world, in the Middle East and Asia, we were soon applying the same formulas for assistance that had worked so well in Western Europe. But in these seething countries which had just thrown off colonial rule, conditions called for a highly discriminating kind of military aid. Instead, we slapped it on with eager hands.

We agreed to support armed-force levels totally devoid of strategic reality, as though it were possible for Turkey or Iran, without American intervention, to defend themselves successfully against a major Russian attack, or for Taiwan to resist an all-out invasion from the mainland of China. The result, in some cases, was little less than grotesque, as on the island of Taiwan, where the real protection has always been furnished by the American Seventh Fleet, but where we were induced to give nearly \$2,500,000,000 in injections of military aid to equip an army twice too big for its tactical role in any future defense of the island but not a tenth big enough to threaten the mainland.

Such unrealistic force levels, fed by our military assistance programs, have inevitably imposed top-heavy burdens on the fragile economies of many of these underdeveloped lands, with the result that we have had to prop them up with huge financial transfusions just to prevent their collapse. Accordingly, we have had to use some \$10,000,000,000—from a total of \$27,500,000,000 in economic aid—just to provide money to sustain the very military levels we ourselves encouraged.

This depressing cycle of missed opportunity has drained billions of dollars away from aid which could have improved living conditions and stimulated economic expansion. Thus we have robbed our own effort to better the threadbare life of the multitudes, as we fostered that repugnant spectacle, so familiar around the rim of Asia today, a "combination of ill-fed people and well-fed armies deploying the most modern equipment."

The scale of our military aid has led to scandalous waste. Many a country on the periphery of the Communist world has been turned into a dumping ground for American military equipment. Stacks of General Accounting Office investigation reports have decried the excesses: rows of tanks inoperative for the lack of trained mechanics; parking lots filled with rusting vehicles that have no protection from tropical sun and rain; huge quantities of random supplies and spare parts piling up.

But these logistical excesses are more than matched by the political naïveté which has characterized our military-assistance programs in Asia and the Middle East. With the containment of Russia and China our avowed objective, we have been easily seduced into fueling regional arms races motivated more by ancient rivalries than by any shared concern over the threat of Communist aggression. We armed Greece and Turkey to strengthen their defenses against the Soviet Union, but today they are spoiling over Cyprus, where U.N. troops must police an uneasy truce.

We armed Pakistan that she might better resist invasion by Russia or China, but Pakistan knew that the arms had value only against India. Indeed, our Ambassador to India at the time, John

Naturally, this exposure stimulates an appetite for the sophisticated weaponry we have developed. Using an inventory of all American stocks available, requests are drawn up and submitted by the local government to the American Ambassador. These are then forwarded to the Department of State, where a decision is reached after consultation with the Defense Department.

Last year Defense Secretary McNamara told Congress that all this is changing, that the United States is deliberately easing out of the grant-in-aid business in many areas. After all, apart from Vietnam, is not the military-aid budget down almost half since 1962?

This reduction, however, must be viewed in its proper context. Much of what we gave away yesterday we are selling today. The fact is that our *total* addition to the armament inventory of other nations is now higher than for any period since the Korean War.

The United States now spends \$70,000,000,000 a year on its own armed forces. The rapid technological progress generated by this investment often produces weapons which turn obsolescent soon after they come off the assembly line. For years our defense industry has sought to prolong their use through arms sales abroad. In 1961 this drive shifted into high gear with the establishment, in the Pentagon, of the Office of International Logistics Negotiations.

Under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry J. Kuss, Jr., the office has steadily grown in size and substance. Today, its staff, with the support of experts from each of the three Armed Services and the guidance of a twenty-five-man advisory committee from private industry, travels the world in quest of new contracts. Working in tandem with private industry, Defense's arms salesmen employ the full range of American promotion techniques. Kuss has proudly boasted that "Behind the success of our military export program lies the fact that no other nation can touch us in overall technological know-how, quality, price, delivery time, follow-up logistical support and credit terms."

Sales may be for cash or on easy credit, with financing available through a Defense Department revolving credit account, the government-agency Export-Import Bank, or private banking facilities. Since 1964, Kuss has been authorized to guarantee credit extended by private banks to foreign governments buying weapons from us. The working policy of the Office of International Logistics, as described in a recent laudatory article, "has always been 'if you need credit, we'll get it for you,' and they have yet to fail to do so." At last count, some thirty countries were buying for cash and fifteen on credit. Nearly \$3,000,000,000 of the arms sales in the last five years were on credit.

Two years ago, for his "unparalleled ability as an international negotiator," Secretary McNamara awarded Kuss with the Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. And for good reason. Until 1961, sales had averaged \$300,000,000 a year. Since then, Kuss has signed up orders and commitments on \$11,700,000,000 in arms sales, thereby providing our munitions industry with an added billion-dollar profit. "Buy American," *Business Week* reported recently, "is becoming an increasingly prevalent slogan in the world arms market."

So it has happened that within the short span of thirty years the pendulum of our governmental policy toward the export of arms has swung all the way from naïve abstention to zealous promotion. Neither extreme is acceptable; the time has come for us to seek a more sensible balance.

To be sure, our present involvement is based, like a stool, on the legs of three rather compelling arguments. First, that we give military aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression from without and subversion from within. Second, that we give it to strengthen our influence with the military elite in other lands, frequently an important bulwark against Communist penetration. Third, that the sale of weapons helps to redress the deficit in our balance of payments (caused, in large part, by the overseas deployment of our own troops).

None of these arguments lacks force; none can be summarily dismissed.

In the wake of World War II, the westward thrust of Russian power threatened to engulf all of Europe. The retention of an American army in Germany, together with the formation of the N.A.T.O. alliance, became indispensable. Western Europe lay pros-

trate, her cities in ruins, her peoples demoralized, her aid, swiftly administered through the Marshall Plan, a brilliant success, but our military grants-in-aid were equal to enable the Europeans to assume their proper place in the N.A.T.O. defense line.

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The general success of our postwar policy in Europe has led to our thinking on other fronts. Around the whole perimeter of the Communist world, in the Middle East and Asia, we were using the same formulas for assistance that had worked in Western Europe. But in these seething countries where we had thrown off colonial rule, conditions called for a highly specialized kind of military aid. Instead, we slapped it on with equal results.

We agreed to support armed-force levels totally devoid of reality, as though it were possible for Turkey or Greece, without American intervention, to defend themselves successfully against a major Russian attack, or for Taiwan to resist an attack from the mainland of China. The result, in some cases, was less than grotesque, as on the island of Taiwan, where our protection has always been furnished by the American Seventh Fleet, but where we were induced to give nearly \$2 billion in injections of military aid to equip an army twice the size of its tactical role in any future defense of the island but not large enough to threaten the mainland.

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This depressing cycle of missed opportunity has done billions of dollars away from aid which could have improved conditions and stimulated economic expansion. Thus we have had our own effort to better the threadbare life of the military, but we have fostered that repugnant spectacle, so familiar around the world in Asia today, a "combination of ill-fed people and vast quantities of modern equipment, deploying the most modern equipment."

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But these logistical excesses are more than military aid; they are political naïveté which has characterized our military aid programs in Asia and the Middle East. With the advent of Russia and China our avowed objective, we have been into fueling regional arms races motivated more by a desire for power than by any shared concern over the threat of Communist aggression. We armed Greece and Turkey to strengthen their defenses against the Soviet Union, but today they are spoils of war where U.N. troops must police an uneasy truce.

We armed Pakistan that she might better resist the advances of Russia or China, but Pakistan knew that the arms were to be used against India. Indeed, our Ambassador to India at

eth Galbraith, expressed the opinion, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last year, that our military-aid program actually activated the Indo-Pakistan war:

... full consequences of the policy of indiscriminate arms aid have revealed themselves with a kind of heroic clarity in south Asia. ... I think, does history work itself out with such majestic, and ironic, completeness. . . . The arms we supplied . . . caused, I underline that word, the war last autumn [1965] between India and Pakistan. . . . If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought the one thing we wanted above all to avoid; namely, a military solution."

... rather than contributing to an effective defense against the Communist threat, as we conceived it, the actual result of our arms program was to foment war between two non-Communist governments, one of which was friendly to the United States. On the plains of Punjab and the Rann of Cutch we reaped a bitter harvest of resentment from both sides. And at Tashkent, the Russians emerged as the victors, providing, as Galbraith observed, "the crowning glory [when] the Soviets, at whom these arms were meant to be directed, stepped in and obtained a settlement of the conflict."

... Still, even this debacle seems not to have dampened our ardor for continuing Communist boundaries in Asia and the Middle East with foreign armies heavily subsidized by the United States. And, indeed, if we were really willing to rely upon them, the savings might be considerable. Secretary McNamara has told the Congress that it costs \$500 annually to support an American soldier, as against \$540 for a foreign soldier in the "forward defense countries"; that for our money, so to speak, we get eight times as many sentinels. The flaw in the argument, however, is that in the one place where we might have deferred to a foreign army to hold a defense line—in Korea at the 38th parallel—we have been unwilling to do it. Korea is the ideal test case; the peninsula is such that, as between the two halves of this divided country, the South is fully capable of maintaining an impregnable defense against the North. We have equipped eighteen R.O.K. divisions to American standards, making the South Korean Army not only larger than its adversary across the line, but the most modern in Asia. Furthermore, as a deterrent against any renewed threat from China, the United States could continue to meet its treaty obligations to come to the defense of South Korea. In case of attack, a pledge readily implemented by virtue of our unchallenged command of the sea, our domination of the air, and the close proximity of our gigantic island bases. Yet, despite these favorable conditions, we still insist, fourteen years after the truce in Korea, on stationing more than 50,000 American combat troops near the 38th parallel.

All of this is not to say that we should never have embarked upon a military assistance program in Asia or the Middle East. In some places, as in Korea, arms aid was essential to deal with the militant nature of the Communist threat. But the program should have been restricted to countries where the need was clearly apparent, and, where given, scaled to the capacity of recipient countries to absorb. Never should we have given it in situations ripe for local wars unrelated to our strategic goals and adverse to our national interests. In sum, what was called for was a disciplined program, applied with prudence and restraint. Instead, we have had a runaway program that has yet to be effectively checked.

The second broad justification for serving up American military hardware on a global platter, much of it to countries far removed from Communist neighbors, is that it serves to bolster resistance to subversion from within, and gives us more leverage with the military "elite" in many foreign lands. Frequently, it is argued, the army constitutes the only organized force opposing Communist infiltration. By supplying American weapons, so the argument goes, we can win favor with the army commanders and thus contribute to the maintenance of internal stability. The problem here is that we either fail to appreciate, or simply misjudge, the dynamics of change in underdeveloped societies.

Violent revolution will eventually occur wherever legitimate grievances can find no other outlet. Impoverished and impatient people throughout the underdeveloped world will doubtlessly topple any a shaky government before conditions improve sufficiently for universal order to prevail. We haven't bayonets enough in our arsenal, or money enough in our treasury, to quench the smoldering

embers of revolution everywhere. This means, once more, that instead of globalizing our military assistance in pointless proliferation, we should converge it on those particular fires which, in our own national interest, we must try to put out.

Nowadays, the revolutions which concern us most are those the Communists either start or try to take over. Usually they are labeled by the insurgents as "wars of liberation." When any government is so challenged, its survival depends less upon the weapons we supply than upon the willingness of the population to rally behind it. If the great bulk of the people are loyal, then the guns and ammunition we furnish can make the difference. This was the case for us in Greece, as it was for the British in Malaya. But in Cuba, where the Batista government was loathed, the weaponry we gave it proved of no avail against Castro.

The most poignant example, of course, is Vietnam itself. Our involvement there began with the military aid we extended to Ngo Dinh Diem, equipping him with forces vastly superior to the Vietcong. Yet, his unpopular regime (and those succeeding it) steadily lost ground. Massive injections of U.S. weapons, ammunition, equipment and supplies failed to turn the tide against the insurgents, though they were overmatched in numbers and totally outgunned. Our own troops had to be summoned and the war converted into an American engagement. Today we have a larger expeditionary force in Vietnam than we ever sent into Korea. The brunt of the fighting is ours, with current American battle casualties exceeding those of the South Vietnamese.

The lesson of Vietnam should make us wary of instituting new military-aid programs elsewhere. But it has not happened that way. Instead, we are busy getting them started in the most unlikely place of all, Africa. Here our favorite rationalization is that the gift of arms may gain us favor with the restless young African armies which have either seized, or which threaten to seize, political power. We cling to this belief, despite all of the evidence which has accumulated against it. As an institution, particularly in unstable lands, the military will often assert control over the government, but its allegiance can never be bought by the gift of arms.

The army we equipped in Iraq brought down the government we supported by a coup which caught us by surprise. The military assistance we furnished the armed forces of the Dominican Republic did not prevent them from overthrowing the elected regime of Juan Bosch, which we strongly favored at the time. Moreover, the same army later proved unable to put down the subsequent uprising in the streets of Santo Domingo, where the landing of American Marines only underscored, as in Vietnam, the failure of military aid.

For that matter, the Communist powers have done no better. In Indonesia, it was a Soviet-equipped army which turned upon the Indonesian Communist Party, putting 200,000 or more of its members to the sword. In Algeria, it was Russian-furnished tanks which ringed Ben Bella's palace and helped overthrow the Soviet-supported leader. Even in Egypt, where Nasser plays footsie with the Soviet Union and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, the military aid he has received from behind the Iron Curtain equips the very security forces that regularly suppress Communist activity on the Nile. Whenever I hear the argument that we must give arms to some foreign government "or else the Russians will do it," I am tempted to exclaim: "Please let them, for our sake!"

The fallaciousness of this argument is epitomized by what happened in Iran recently. Pentagon salesmen sold Iran a squadron of F-4 Phantoms, the most advanced jet fighter in our arsenal, after Iran threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for her arms needs. No sooner had the deal been consummated than Iran, a member of the C.E.N.T.O. alliance, made a \$100,000,000 arms deal with the Russians.

Not only have we refused to recognize that foreign armies are a risky investment, but we seem never to take into account the political cost we bear for supporting them. In any poor country of Asia, Africa, or Latin America, where there is an unconscionable concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, where civil liberties are suppressed and despotism governs, the army is usually the hated symbol of the status quo. Military governments, however stable they may appear, tend to be brittle as well as repressive, and lavish gifts upon them "Made-in-America" tanks and jet fighter planes can help but estrange the United States from the populace, delivering into Communist hands a lively issue to (Continued on page 12)

Kenneth Galbraith, expressed the opinion, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, that our military-assistance program actually activated the Indo-Pakistan war:

"The full consequences of the policy of indiscriminate arms aid have revealed themselves with a kind of heroic clarity in south Asia. Rarely, I think, does history work itself out with such majestic, and also ironic, completeness. . . . The arms we supplied . . . caused, and I underline that word, the war last autumn [1965] between India and Pakistan. . . . If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought the one thing we wanted above all to avoid; namely a military solution."

So, rather than contributing to an effective defense against the Communist threat, as we conceived it, the actual result of our arms aid was to foment war between two non-Communist governments, both of which were friendly to the United States. On the plains of Punjab and the Rann of Cutch we reaped a bitter harvest of resentment from both sides. And at Tashkent, the Russians emerged as the peacemakers, providing, as Galbraith observed, "the crowning irony [when] the Soviets, at whom these arms were meant to be pointed, stepped in and obtained a settlement of the conflict."

Still, even this debacle seems not to have dampened our ardor for manning Communist boundaries in Asia and the Middle East with foreign armies heavily subsidized by the United States. And, indeed, if we were really willing to rely upon them, the savings might be sizable. Secretary McNamara has told the Congress that it costs \$4,500 annually to support an American soldier, as against \$540 for a foreign soldier in the "forward defense countries"; that for our money, so to speak, we get eight times as many sentinels. The flaw in the argument, however, is that in the one place where we might have deferred to a foreign army to hold a defense line—in Korea at the 38th parallel—we have been unwilling to do it. Korea is the ideal test case; the peninsula is such that, as between the two halves of this divided country, the South is fully capable of maintaining an impregnable defense against the North. We have equipped eighteen R.O.K. divisions to American standards, making the South Korean Army not only larger than its adversary across the line, but the most modern in Asia. Furthermore, as a deterrent against any renewed threat from China, the United States could continue in effect its treaty obligations to come to the defense of South Korea in case of attack, a pledge readily implemented by virtue of our unchallenged command of the sea, our domination of the air, and the close proximity of our gigantic island bases. Yet, despite these favorable conditions, we still insist, fourteen years after the truce in Korea, on stationing more than 50,000 American combat troops near the 38th parallel.

All of this is not to say that we should never have embarked upon a military assistance program in Asia or the Middle East. In some places, as in Korea, arms aid was essential to deal with the militant nature of the Communist threat. But the program should have been restricted to countries where the need was clearly apparent, and, where given, scaled to the capacity of recipient countries to absorb. Never should we have given it in situations ripe for local wars unrelated to our strategic goals and adverse to our national interests. In sum, what was called for was a disciplined program,

applied with prudence and restraint. Instead, we have had a runaway program that has yet to be effectively checked.

The second broad justification for serving up American military hardware on a global platter, much of it to countries far removed from Communist neighbors, is that it serves to bolster resistance to subversion from within, and gives us more leverage with the military "elite" in many foreign lands. Frequently, it is argued, the army constitutes the only organized force opposing Communist infiltration. By supplying American weapons, so the argument goes, we can win favor with the army commanders and thus contribute to the maintenance of internal stability. The problem here is that we either fail to appreciate, or simply misjudge, the dynamics of change in underdeveloped societies.

Violent revolution will eventually occur wherever legitimate grievances can find no other outlet. Impoverished and impatient people throughout the underdeveloped world will doubtlessly topple many a shaky government before conditions improve sufficiently for universal order to prevail. We haven't bayonets enough in our arsenal, or money enough in our treasury, to quench the smoldering

embers of revolution everywhere. This means, once instead of globalizing our military assistance in point of view, we should converge it on those particular fires in our own national interest, we must try to put out.

Nowadays, the revolutions which concern us most are those of Communists either start or try to take over. Usually they are called by the insurgents as "wars of liberation." When any government is so challenged, its survival depends less upon the weapons it has than upon the willingness of the population to rally behind it. If the great bulk of the people are loyal, then the guns and ammunition we furnish can make the difference. This was the case for the British in Malaya. But in Cuba, where the government was loathed, the weaponry we gave it proved useless against Castro.

The most poignant example, of course, is Vietnam. Our involvement there began with the military aid we extended to Dinh Diem, equipping him with forces vastly superior to those of his cong. Yet, his unpopular regime (and those succeeding it) lost ground. Massive injections of U.S. weapons, ammunition and supplies failed to turn the tide against the Communists, though they were overmatched in numbers and total resources. Our own troops had to be summoned and the war converted into a large American engagement. Today we have a larger expeditionary force in Vietnam than we ever sent into Korea. The brunt of the war is ours, with current American battle casualties exceeding those of the South Vietnamese.

The lesson of Vietnam should make us wary of indiscriminate military-aid programs elsewhere. But it has not happened. Instead, we are busy getting them started in the most desperate of all, Africa. Here our favorite rationalization is that the arms may gain us favor with the restless young African states which have either seized, or which threaten to seize, power. We cling to this belief, despite all of the evidence which has accumulated against it. As an institution, particularly in the area of the military will often assert control over the government, the allegiance can never be bought by the gift of arms.

The army we equipped in Iraq brought down the government supported by a coup which caught us by surprise. The military assistance we furnished the armed forces of the Dominican Republic did not prevent them from overthrowing the elected government of Juan Bosch, which we strongly favored at the time. In the Dominican, the same army later proved unable to put down the successful revolution rising in the streets of Santo Domingo, where the landings of the U.S. Marines only underscored, as in Vietnam, the failure of our aid.

For that matter, the Communist powers have done well. In Indonesia, it was a Soviet-equipped army which turned against the Indonesian Communist Party, putting 200,000 or more soldiers to the sword. In Algeria, it was Russian-furnished arms which ringed Ben Bella's palace and helped overthrow the Soviet-backed leader. Even in Egypt, where Nasser plays footsie with the Soviet Union and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, military aid he has received from behind the Iron Curtain has strengthened the very security forces that regularly suppress Communist activity on the Nile. Whenever I hear the argument that we should give arms to some foreign government "or else the Russians will," I am tempted to exclaim: "Please let them, for our sake!"

The fallaciousness of this argument is epitomized by what happened in Iran recently. Pentagon salesmen sold Iran 100 F-4 Phantoms, the most advanced jet fighter in our inventory. No sooner had the deal been consummated than Iran, having broken the C.E.N.T.O. alliance, made a \$100,000,000 arms deal with the Russians.

Not only have we refused to recognize that foreign military aid is a risky investment, but we seem never to take into account the real cost we bear for supporting them. In any poor country in Africa, or Latin America, where there is an uncontrolled concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, where the masses are suppressed and despotism governs, the army is usually a symbol of the status quo. Military governments, however they may appear, tend to be brittle as well as repressive, and the help we give them "Made-in-America" tanks and jet fighters only help but estrange the United States from the population. To turn into Communist hands a lively issue to (Continued

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(Continued from page 86) exploit
 against us. Former elected President
 of Guatemala, Miguel Ydigoras
 Fuentes, who was ousted by a mili-
 tary coup in 1963, recently wrote
 that "... generally speaking, modern
 weapons are not used by the military
 to defend the territorial integrity of
 their respective countries, but to re-
 press popular aspirations to under-
 mine democratic institutions."

For these reasons, our military
 grants-in-aid, which have become a
 routine part of the package we offer
 foreign governments, ought to be
 terminated in most cases. The give-
 away arms program should be dras-
 tically curtailed.

As for the sale of the wares of war,
 there is obvious appeal in the
 argument that it helps to erase our
 balance-of-payment deficit. But our
 anxiety to ease the payments prob-
 lem must not blind us to far more im-
 portant long-range foreign-policy
 considerations.

It makes good fiscal sense to sell
 arms to such developed nations as
 Great Britain, West Germany, Bel-
 gium, Canada, or Australia. Rich na-
 tions which enjoy the protection of
 our defense umbrella should help off-
 set the costs we incur in maintaining
 so many American troops abroad
 (350,000 mark time in Western Eu-
 rope alone) by purchasing weapons
 from us. If we refrain from entering
 the market, these countries will fill
 their orders elsewhere, or manufac-
 ture the weapons themselves.

On the other hand, we should avoid
 export sales into troubled regions
 where war hangs in the balance, and
 we should never promote sales con-
 tracts in conflict with our basic for-
 eign policy objectives. Yet now, the
 tail wags the dog, for we have per-
 mitted our short-range concern over
 balance of payments to override more
 fundamental interests.

Congress itself is uneasy about the
 trend in our sales program. In the
 last session, it directed that sales be
 "... administered so as to encourage
 regional arms control and disarm-
 ment agreements and so as to dis-
 courage arms races, especially among
 less-developed countries." This lan-
 guage is nothing more than a statu-
 tory restatement of standing U.S.
 arms-sales doctrine. But how well
 have the guidelines been followed?
 Not very well, the record reveals.

Early last year, we agreed to sell
 Argentina fifty subsonic A-4B com-
 bat aircraft for an air force which
 has never fired a shot in anger, ex-
 cept against its own government.
 (Only twenty-five actually were
 sold.) Secretary McNamara justified
 this sale to the Senate Foreign Re-
 lations Committee by saying that: "The
 alternative was that the Argentine
 would accept the offer of another na-
 tion to sell fifty airplanes at a much
 higher price, which would involve a
 much greater diversion from her eco-
 nomic resources." He seemed to look
 upon this sale of an "unneeded mili-
 tary weapon," as he called it, as a
 victory for U.S. foreign policy. The
 victory has proved a Pyrrhic one.
 Argentina's traditional rival, Chile,
 reacted by purchasing twenty-one
 British Hawker Hunter jet fighters,
 a superior plane, at a cost of \$20,000,-
 000. This came on the heels of the
 withdrawal of a U.S. offer to sell
 Chile A-4B's because of Vietnam de-
 mands. The third act in the escala-
 tion saw Peru, determined to get its
 aerial nose ahead of Argentina and
 Chili, initiate negotiations with both
 the United States and the British for

even more advanced jet fighters.
 Yet Secretary McNamara contends
 that our military aid and sales pro-
 gram to Latin America "... has
 resulted in our being able to help con-
 trol a potential arms race and damp-
 en it down." On the contrary, by
 adopting the notion that we can de-
 fuse arms races by supplying arms,
 we implicate ourselves in a chain re-
 action, the end of which we cannot
 possibly foresee.

It is the same reasoning which
 leads us, in dealing with the powder-
 keg situation in the Middle East, to
 conclude that the United States can
 exercise some restraining influence
 by judicious intervention in the Arab-
 Israeli arms race. Our efforts to avoid
 the "polarization" of American arms
 in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab
 hands, and still keep on friendly
 terms with both sides, demands om-
 niscient qualities of judgment which
 mortals do not possess.

Last year alone, we sold Jordan
 fifty M-48 Patton tanks and an un-
 disclosed number of supersonic F-104
 Starfighters. If these armaments are
 used in combat, the receiving end will
 be Israel—which also will be using
 American equipment.

Not content to play at balancing
 the armed forces of Israel and her
 Arab neighbors, we have entered into
 a juggling act within the Arab camp
 itself. We are now attempting to
 balance armaments between Saudi
 Arabia and Egypt, Iran and Iraq,
 and Morocco and Algeria.


And what is true in the Middle
 East is true over the world; we are
 needlessly involving the prestige of
 the United States in local quarrels
 by selling arms, either to make a
 handful of dollars or in the vain as-
 sumption that we can play the role
 of Solomon.

It is true that we have at times
 turned down purchase orders. We
 have said "no" on occasion, but not
 nearly often enough. Although it is
 entirely proper for us to sell to in-
 dustrial countries which can afford
 to pay—and at least four-fifths of
 our arms sales for this year are in
 that category—we should not dangle
 our enticing military wares in front
 of poor countries, whose leaders de-
 lude themselves that a few planes and
 tanks constitute power and prestige.

The report of the Senate Foreign
 Relations Committee last year on the
 military-aid bill states: "The U.S.
 balance of payments is not in such
 perilous condition that it has to be
 salvaged by taking blood money from
 poorer countries." If we turn down
 every sales request for useless mili-
 tary equipment to nations which can-
 not afford such expensive baubles,
 the effect on our balance of payments
 would scarcely be noticed. But the
 same cannot be said for the obvious
 contradiction between these sales and
 the stated goals of American policy.
 Can it be seriously argued that the
 sale last summer of fifty-five M-41
 tanks to Brazil was consistent with
 President Johnson's plea urging
 Latin America to spend less on use-
 less military hardware, or that the
 sale was a step toward achieving the
 goals of the Alliance for Progress?

Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes
 of Chile laments the fact that \$1,400,-
 000,000 is being spent each year in
 maintaining Latin America's armed
 forces at the expense of economic
 development. President Johnson
 voiced the same concern at the cere-
 monies marking the Fifth Anniver-
 sary of the Alliance for Progress. In
 speaking of the necessity for avoid-
 ing excessive military expenditures

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


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
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costs "take the clothes off the backs and food from the stomachs and education from the minds of the children." The arms salesmen in the Defense Department should read that speech.

Finally, I think we must face down the argument that if we do not sell to poor countries they will buy elsewhere. This is nothing less than a demand for prostituting our own principles. If our announced policy of curtailing arms races has validity, then we must resist the temptation of the opposite course, simply because other countries may choose to follow it. Principles are still important in this cynical world and people everywhere would applaud if we began to practice what we preach on arms limitations. Rabelias wrote that "Coin is the sinews of war." This coin we can well afford to cast out of our collection.

The pressures which have made the United States the leading arms merchant to the world must be thoroughly probed. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition that there is a problem, and then the search for answers can begin.

At a Senate hearing on the appointment of Samuel De Palma as Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is charged with the responsibility for bringing some rationality into the world arms race, he was asked what voice the Agency had in proposed military sales to foreign countries. He answered that the Agency is not consulted. It would seem that the agency with the statutory duty to "deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments" should have some voice in whether or not we give or sell weapons to foreign governments.

The statute creating the agency states that "this organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the Executive Branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy." Clearly, the agency is neither in this "position" nor can it carry out the responsibility assigned to it by the Congress. Its budget for this year amounts to one-three-hundredth of our total military sales and aid programs. Such is the emphasis given to bringing the arms race under control.

The Executive Branch has shown no real indication that it is prepared to start turning off the weapons spigots. Excluding Vietnam from the calculation for both years, the military aid request presented to Congress for the 1967 fiscal year was larger than for 1966. And the proposed arms giveaway program for 1968, ignoring some budgetary sleight of hand, is greater than the Congress voted last year. Sales continue to climb. Congress could do much to put the program on a rational basis, and fortunately, the Senate has shown signs that it may start

The Senate version of the last military-aid bill restricted to forty the number of countries which could receive grant assistance, except for those receiving only training in the United States. Although this resulted in dropping only three countries from the giveaway list, Congress, for the first time, forced a numerical limitation on the Executive Branch. Hopefully, this will lead to Congressional imposition of further limitations this year. But the most effective Congressional action was to tighten the purse strings on the military-aid program. An amendment to lop \$100,000,000 from the authorization bill was adopted by the Senate, leading to additional cuts, in the appropriations process, for a net reduction of \$125,000,000. The cuts in amounts and in countries may be modest, but they are a beginning. This year the Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of in-depth hearings on our military sales and aid policy which, I believe, will result in further remedial action.

The Administration can effect significant change. There is ample opportunity for initiatives to be taken, directly between governments or through the United Nations, toward arms limitations, border guarantees, or regional arms freezes. President Johnson's proposal to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, that "... countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige," should be given teeth through judicious use of leverage available to us under our overall foreign-aid program.

The greatest danger to world peace—assuming we can prevent the war in Vietnam from widening into world war—is from some regional dispute igniting into a conflagration which spreads out of the control of those who supplied the arms which touched it off. There is no conflict between our interests and those of the Soviet Union on this score. Neither nation wants to be drawn into a brush-fire war which may lead to nuclear conflagration. Surely, if there is room for agreement between us on defusing the nuclear race, there must be room for joint U.S.-Soviet initiatives in limiting the spread of conventional armaments. It would be appropriate, as a follow-up to agreement on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, for the U.S. to push for passage of a United Nations resolution encouraging action to limit regional arms races.

Of course there is no assurance that U.S. proposals of this kind would evoke a ready response or inspire the spirit of enlightened self-interest so necessary for international accord. But experience has taught us that failure cruelly crowns inaction or listless resignation. There is cause for neither in the United States. Our power—massive, ever expanding, unparalleled in the world's history—is such that we have a unique opportunity to influence others by the example we set. It is time for us to end the "arsenal diplomacy" which for years has vitiated and distorted our foreign policy. #

You can get an autographed copy of
Toys of a Lifetime
by Arnold Gingrich
See page 118.

Two chapters from the book were in Esquire last year:
Some Dreams I've Driven, and *Servants I've Worked For*.

FRANK CHURCH - SENATOR FROM ^{IDAHO} ~~OHIO~~

To understand Frank Church, it is important to have an understanding of Idaho.

The Idaho Territory was settled by Confederate refugees, who migrated there to escape Reconstruction and its companions, hunger and poverty. In its own way, Idaho is as southern as Alabama in its attitudes.

When Montana and Wyoming were created, the State of Idaho was left with some rivers and forests, and some mountain ranges. A large number of Mormons settled there, thinking they were in Utah. If Idaho had more than its present trace of a Black population, along with its southern and Mormon (26 percent of the population) heritage, the situation could be worse than in south Boston.

Politically, Idaho seems to vote contrary to the national trend, except in Presidential elections, where it almost always votes heavily Republican (although Lyndon Johnson took the 1964 election with 51 percent of the vote). In the 1950's, when the Republicans held their last majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and the White House, Idaho was going Democratic. As the Republicans lost power nationally, they gained power in Idaho. As the Republicans gained the White House again in 1968, Idaho began to swing back toward the Democrats.

Frank Church was brought up in a Republican house. As a teenager, he read books on the New Deal and decided that he would be a Democrat. After World War II service as a highly decorated intelligence officer in Asia, he attended and graduated from Stanford. He attended Harvard Law School for a

year and graduated from Stanford Law School. While in law school, he developed cancer, and had expected to die, but while he lived in fear of dying, Church kept on going to classes. The cancer responded to treatment, and Church became an Idaho lawyer. After six years' practice, Church ran for the Senate against Republican Herman Welker, a Republican who was a close ally of Joe McCarthy. When McCarthy's fortunes began to sag, Welker defended him on the basis that "McCarthy likes children". To get the nomination, Church had to defeat former Senator Glenn Taylor, the singing cowboy, who was Henry Wallace's running mate in 1948. Although they ran as Democrats, both Church and Taylor were descendants of a non-conformist streak which has its roots in the Progressive Republicans of the 1910's and 1920's. The best example of this was William E. Borah, who represented Idaho in the Senate from 1907 to 1940, was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was widely admired for his progressive leadership in both domestic and foreign affairs. In fact, Borah was the pattern Church used for himself in his Senate career. Church beat Welker by a 14 percent margin. In 1962, Church had established a reputation as a maverick, had alienated a number of Idaho industrialists, and won reelection with 54 percent of the vote.

In 1967, the John Birch Society decided to have a go at Church, and tried to get a recall for the liberal Senator. Much of the manpower for the recall drive (it is not legally clear if a Senator can be recalled) came from new, right-wing immigrants from southern California, and some extra people came from the California Birch Society to help.

In time, it was revealed that most of the recall effort's money had come from right-wing California industrialist Patrick Frawley, the President of Technicolor, who made the mistake of telling the press that his money would

go a lot farther in Idaho than in a big State like California, and that Church's recall would send a message to other liberal politicians, especially those who opposed the Vietnam War (like Church). Frawley's remarks were given wide circulation in Idaho, and the people rebelled so strongly against the petitions that many Birchers were afraid to sign the petitions themselves. The petitioners collected only 135 signatures statewide, according to Church, and the drive fizzled.

Resentment over the recall drive carried over into Church's election the next year, and he won by his largest majority. In 1974, he was again elected, this time by a 57 percent margin. Church is the first Democrat in Idaho's history to be elected to a Senate seat more than once. Church's popularity probably helped Democrat Cecil Andrus get elected in 1970 and 1974.

When Church entered the Senate, he was placed on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, even though he had requested Foreign Relations. He then made the mistake of voting to liberalize the Senate's filibuster rule, against the orders of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Johnson did not speak to Church for six months. Then, Church redeemed himself in LBJ's eyes by adding a jury trial amendment to a pending civil rights bill, which enabled the bill to pass without a filibuster. Johnson took Church off the Post Office Committee and put him on the McClellan rackets committee, and as soon as an opening appeared, Church went onto the Foreign Relations Committee.

In 1965, Church changed his mind about the Vietnam War and began his opposition. This brought on another confrontation with LBJ, who warned Church

that Borah had made a mistake in predicting that World War II would not happen just weeks before Germany invaded Poland. LBJ also warned Church that new dam projects for Idaho would be cut off if he didn't change his mind. Church stuck to his guns, and eventually won back LBJ's friendship through his good humor.

In spite of Johnson's claims, Church says that Borah was misunderstood. Borah, he says, was against foreign entanglements in the same way George Washington was, that he was a great believer in international law as the best way to solve international conflicts, and that Borah was in favor of recognition of the Soviet Union long before FDR actually recognized that nation. Here, Church draws a parallel with his urgings for the recognition of Red China, which Nixon finally did.

In the spring of 1972, Church became, along with John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the sponsors of the Cooper-Church amendment, which would have cut off funds for the Vietnam War at the end of 1972. Church did not advocate that South Vietnam be abandoned, but he did push for the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, and from the sea around Vietnam and the sky above it. He did say that the U.S. should continue to give the same material aid to the south that the Russians and Chinese gave in the North.

In 1971, Church led the fight to reject the \$4.2 billion foreign aid appropriation requested by the Nixon Administration. To Nixon's embarrassment, the Senate cut \$1 billion off the appropriation, in the first time a foreign aid appropriation had been returned to the White House with a lower

figure than requested in 20 years. The Senate's rejection of the appropriation followed a speech by Church in which he argued that American foreign aid was doing considerable harm. He said that American foreign aid had been used to prop up dictators and enrich the already rich of recipient nations, while further impoverishing the already poor of those nations and suppressing revolutions that should have been permitted to explode. He criticized the foreign aid program as expensive and mismanaged, and the only real purpose of foreign aid was to further the interests of American overseas investors and suppliers.

He went on to criticize the programs of the Agency for International Development (AID) by recalling that AID's director had stated in hearings that 93 percent of the AID appropriation was spent with suppliers in the U.S., and that the countries which were receiving AID assistance were in debt by \$22 billion to the U.S. Church said that political stability, which is an AID criterion for assistance, had been promoted primarily to protect American investors, and that in Latin America, U.S. companies were taking out \$2 in dividends for each dollar of new investment. Worst of all, said Church, the American taxpayer is bearing the cost of investment abroad, since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which is backed by the federal government, insures American companies abroad.

Church also stated that he opposed the military assistance program, and that it should be curtailed.

Church has constantly voted for reductions in domestic military spending. He voted in favor of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in favor of nonprolif-

eration in 1969, and in favor of ending military assistance to Greece. He also voted for the Hatfield amendment to end the draft, the Proxmire-Mathias amendment to place a \$68 billion defense spending ceiling in 1971, in favor of the Gravel amendment to cancel underground tests at Amchitka Island and against the Lockheed loan. Church voted to postpone the expenditure of funds for MIRV's, in favor of ending the Navy F-14 aircraft program, against increases in military aid and against the ABM. On conservation, Church has a good record. Environmental purists do not feel that he is one of them, since he tries to compromise at times, and he does not support them at every turn, preferring to take a practical view, since many of Idaho's jobs are oriented toward utilization of natural resources.

He was floor manager for the Wilderness Bill in 1961, which was bitterly opposed by Boise-Cascade and other Idaho industries. The bill, which set aside significant wilderness acreage for recreational use, passed, and Church was reelected.

Church had not decided what to do on the proposed Snake River dam when this information was published. The problem revolves around Hell's Canyon, the deepest gorge in North America, and a shrine to conservationists. A canyon as deep as Hells Canyon would be ideal for power generation and water storage, which is essential in arid Idaho.

Church's wife once owned half interest in a ranch in the Sawtooth-White Cloud range, but he sold his interest to avoid charges of conflict of interest. Although he realized that he could not get the area designated as a national park, he did move to block the creation of an open-pit mine in the range.

Church has also been criticized for his failure to act quickly on mine safety legislation after the 1972 Sunshine gold mine fire, which killed 91 men. Church's defense was that he wanted to see the results of the investigation of the disaster before making his move. Critics counter that a member of the law firm that represents the owners of the mines is a close political supporter and personal friend of Church's, and that he is afraid to take on the State's mining interests.

Lately, the collapse of the Teton Dam in eastern Idaho has caused some criticism of Church, since he was the Dam's major supporter in Congress. He is a strong opponent of gun control laws. Church is very concerned about the problems of the aged, and has authored several aid bills for the elderly.

While Church did not publish personal statements of assets for several years, he has published most of his contributor lists. In 1968, there was a \$50 a plate fundraiser for Church in Boise with Ted Kennedy and Jimmy Durante that brought out 800 paying guests. Poet Archibald McLeish made a major national mailing in behalf of Church and McGovern, which served as a major source of funds for Church, who says that the average contribution was less than \$12 (the names on this list are confidential, according to Church). The Church for Senate Committee raised a total of \$200,000 for his 1968 race, of which it is estimated that \$70,000 came from out-of-state peace groups. The average contribution was about \$1. About 15 percent of the total was supplied by union political action funds, although his COPE rating is often around 50 percent.

On May 22, 1974, three executives of the Charles E. Smith Co., a

Washington, D. C. real estate firm, which leases a large number of properties to the federal government, made contributions totaling \$2000 to Church. Robert Kogod gave \$580, Charles E. Smith gave \$1000 and Robert H. Smith gave \$500. Some charges have been made that the Smith firm, which is a partnership, is a government contractor, and is barred from making contributions in federal election campaigns by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 611. No indictments have been returned against any of the Smith executives.

On October 27, 1974, five executives of Food Fair Stores in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, gave \$500 each to Church's Senate campaign. While Church makes it a habit to solicit funds outside of Idaho, this is an extremely large contribution from one firm, and could attract press attention.

Church's financial statement in the Congressional Record in 1969 showed his assets to be mostly in cash and real estate. He listed their Bethesda home, a family home in Idaho, his wife's half-interest in a guest ranch in the Sawtooth range (since sold) and two cars. In a 1971 newsletter, he said that the major changes in his financial status were the cash from the sale of the ranch interest and the purchase of some municipal bonds. Church is a ramrod-straight, moral man, dedicated to his principles as he perceives them. That does not mean that he does not know how to compromise or bend when the occasion calls for it. When speaking, he has been called a lackluster campaigner, but his speeches get him elected and make a difference in the Senate.

It has been noted that his style has improved somewhat in recent years. Church has been supportive of Israel in the Senate, but has frequently voted

against blanket foreign aid bills which involve Israel. He has been supportive of pro-Israel programs, and he is admired for his role in exposing the oil companies' subservience to the Arab states as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. He could use more exposure in the Jewish community.

The CIA hearings.

On occasion, the material turned up by the Investigations Committee has been of good quality. However, a number of critics have stated that they feel that the Committee has only scratched the surface, and that they should have dug a lot deeper. Leaks from the Church Committee were viewed by many as harmful to the effectiveness of the CIA.

Church has authored a number of articles over the years, mostly for magazines like Nation and New Republic. His articles frequently explain his stands on various issues.

Church is 52. One of his two sons is a Presbyterian minister.

Many Senate watchers in Washington report that Church is not highly respected by his colleagues, is a shallow "boy orator", and that he will wear poorly over a long campaign.

Moreover, he adds little to the ticket. He is from a small state, and helps little with blacks or ethnics. He does have good Jewish ties in the West and since 1962 he has been strident in his opposition to multinationals and American companies in underdeveloped countries.

New Presidential Candidate:

Church: Counting on Democratic Stalemate

Hoping to take advantage of the still unsettled state of Democratic presidential politics, Idaho Sen. Frank Church launched a campaign bid March 18 that will concentrate on late spring primaries, particularly those in western states. Church has had a campaign finance committee in operation since December and has already qualified for federal matching funds.

Church had told aides early in 1975 that he wanted to run, but suspended plans after he was named to head the Select Committee on Governmental Intelligence Gathering Activities. "He didn't want to blow his biggest assignment yet in the Senate," press aide Bill Hall told Congressional Quarterly.

But with the committee finally completing its work—albeit several months behind schedule—Church is finally free to devote himself full time to a race he thinks is still wide open. "We were hoping for a confused result in the early primaries, with no candidate breaking away," said Hall. "And that's what happened."

Church's entry despite urging by Rep. Morris K. Udall, the strongest liberal candidate up to now, will further fracture support in that wing of the party. But the Idaho senator is banking his strategy on attracting committed Democrats who were supporters of other liberals, like Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana, a casualty of the early primaries.

Church plans to compete in caucuses in Colorado May 7 and Utah May 17, but his first major effort in a primary state will be in Nebraska May 11, where 10 other Democrats—including non-candidates Edward M. Kennedy and Hubert H. Humphrey—also appear on the ballot. But perhaps his best opportunity to make himself a force in the contest, observers say, comes May 25 when Idaho, Nevada and Oregon hold a "regional primary" on the same day. Church is also planning to enter the Rhode Island and Montana primaries June 1 and California June 8.

Like Udall, Jackson and other candidates from Congress, Church will try to use his long legislative record to promote his cause. He is currently serving his fourth term in the Senate. Only 51 years old, he is already one of that body's senior Democrats and occupies key seats on committees that influence national policy in a wide variety of fields. Besides chairing the CIA probe, Church heads the Select Committee on Aging and cochairs (with Maryland



Republican Charles McC. Mathias Jr.) the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. Church is the third-ranking Democrat on Foreign Relations and second-ranking on Interior and Insular Affairs, which is important to his electoral security in Idaho.

Political Career

One of Church's earliest interests, which later proved useful in politics, was debating. He built up his skills in high school in his hometown of Boise, Idaho, where his father operated a sporting goods store. In his third year at Boise High, Frank won the American Legion national oratorical contest. He used the \$4,000 prize to attend Stanford University.

In 1948, while studying law at Harvard, Church became seriously ill with what was later diagnosed as cancer. The prognosis was grave, but radical surgery and an intensive series of X-ray treatments resulted in a complete cure. He recovered in time to receive a law degree from Stanford in 1950.

Returning to Idaho, Church briefly taught public speaking before taking a job as legal counsel for the Idaho Office of Price Stabilization. From 1951 to 1956, he practiced law in Boise, taking time out for periodic forays into local politics. From 1952 to 1954, Church was state president of the Idaho Young Democratic Clubs. He keynoted the 1952 state Democratic convention. The same year, he sought elective office for the first time, running for the Idaho House of Representatives; he was defeated by about 12,000 votes.

Senate Victory

In 1956, Church set his sights on national office and took on Republican Sen. Herman Welker, who was seeking a second term. Welker had a conservative voting record and

Church's Background

Profession: Attorney.

Born: July 25, 1924, Boise, Idaho.

Home: Boise.

Religion: Presbyterian.

Education: Stanford University, A.B., 1947; LL.B., 1950.

Offices: Senate since 1957.

Military: Army, 1942-46; discharged as 1st lieutenant; Bronze Star.

Memberships: American Legion, VFW, Phi Beta Kappa, Mayflower Society, American Bar Association.

Family: Wife, Bethine Clark; two children.

Congressional Quarterly Vote Study Scores . . .

	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967
Presidential									
support	41	27 ¹ /25 ²	28	28	33	41	44	29	53
opposition	39	47 ¹ /56 ²	59	63	50	41	44	29	31
Voting Participation	81	71	85	85	81	76	91	54	81
Party									
unity	73	58	81	76	81	65	79	32	58
opposition	10	13	7	7	7	5	11	21	28
Conservative Coalition									
support	17	14	11	13	12	14	14	24	16
opposition	69	55	82	72	71	58	77	24	64
Bipartisan									
support	73	59	74	74	56	67	75	47	64
opposition	7	11	9	12	19	12	17	8	15

1. During President Nixon's tenure in 1974.
2. During President Ford's tenure in 1974.

had been a strong defender of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R Wis. 1947-57).

A political unknown outside Boise, Church began an extensive series of automobile trips to increase his visibility around the state. His travels paid off with a Democratic primary victory over former Sen. Glen H. Taylor (D 1945-51). Taylor was an entertainer, a former singer and one of the most colorful figures in Idaho politics. But his campaign for Vice President in 1948 on the ticket of Progressive Party nominee Henry Wallace made him anathema to Idaho Democrats, who dumped him in the 1950 primary. He became the party's Senate nominee again in 1954, but lost overwhelmingly.

The 1956 primary campaign was bitter, with Taylor accusing Church of being a "captive candidate of corporation politicians." In disputed returns, the political newcomer won the Democratic nomination by 200 votes. Taylor refused to accept the result and sought evidence of fraud or error in the tally, meanwhile preparing for an independent campaign for the seat.

In the general election, Church effectively attacked Welker's conservative voting record and opposition to the proposed Hells Canyon dam. Other major issues were development of industry in Idaho, reclamation projects for desert lands and aid to the aged. Welker had won only a minority of the vote in the Republican Senate primary, and his belated attempts to portray himself as a moderate Eisenhower Republican failed to convince party loyalists.

On election day, the voters split their tickets in record numbers as Church won with a 46,315-vote plurality, even though President Eisenhower was carrying Idaho. Church became, at 32, the Senate's youngest member.

Church's initial Senate committee assignments were modest ones—Post Office and Civil Service, Interior and Insular Affairs and Public Works. He gave up the Post Office and Public Works positions in 1959 in a move to the more prestigious Foreign Relations Committee, an honor for such a junior member.

But the post on the Interior Committee, which has jurisdiction over federal lands, mining, water policy and

other issues vital to Idaho, was the forum Church used for strengthening himself politically during his early years in the Senate. His maiden speech, six months after taking office, was a detailed and impassioned plea for federal construction of the Hells Canyon dam.

In 1962, Church won favorable publicity back home for his defense of Bruce Eddy, a \$186-million dam project on the Clearwater River in Idaho. He fought for it strongly in the Senate, only to see it threatened in conference as House conferees sought to delete funds from an appropriations bill. To discourage them, Church threatened to tie up the entire bill in a filibuster. "If they strike out Bruce Eddy," he warned, "I shall hold the Senate floor as long as God gives me the strength to stand."

Keynoter

Because of his speaking ability and the party's desire to show off a promising newcomer, Church was chosen as the keynoter of the 1960 Democratic national convention. It was his first national exposure, and he planned carefully for it. Before the convention, Church informed reporters that he would deliver "a fighting speech directed at the appalling failures of the Republican administration, at home and abroad."

The speech itself, however, demonstrated a potential weakness in Church's speaking skills—a capacity for verbal overkill and rhetorical flourishes at the expense of substance. It did not live up to advance expectations. Recalling it in a 1975 interview, Church said that "all I can say in my defense is—I didn't know any better."

Later Campaigns

In 1962, Church faced his most serious electoral threat in Idaho from Republican Jack Hawley, the same candidate who had beaten him in 1952 in the state house race. Hawley employed the themes Republicans were to use repeatedly and unsuccessfully against Church in future elections—that he did not care about local problems and was too involved in foreign affairs. But Church defeated Hawley with almost 55

.. Covering Church's 19 Years in Senate†

	1966	1965	1964	1963	1962	1961	1960	1959	1958	1957
Presidential										
support	46	55	63	69	62	77	48	33	50	63
opposition	17	16	24	15	18	18	43	45	42	26
Voting Participation	65	69	91	85	78	94	90	79	92	88
Party										
unity	54	58	71	80	66	79	78	69	89	61
opposition	13	9	22	8	12	13	13	10	5	21
Conservative Coalition										
support	20	11	22	19	24	26	13	12	*	*
opposition	57	46	73	70	68	63	70	55	*	*
Bipartisan										
support	51	54	59	70	64	83	81	72	81	81
opposition	12	15	25	12	13	12	9	7	10	10

† Explanation of studies, p. 107.

* No ratings in those years.

per cent of the vote and became the first Democrat ever elected to the Senate from Idaho.

His races in 1968 and 1974 were easier, as his seniority grew more important to Idaho and Republicans had increasing difficulty finding strong candidates to run against him. In 1967, as he was preparing to run for a third term, Church faced a bizarre "recall" petition campaign supported by extreme conservatives incensed over his dovish views on the war. Even though members of the Senate cannot be voted out of office before the end of their terms, the organizers thought the effort would help mobilize opposition to Church for the benefit of a conservative candidate. But it had just the opposite effect, garnering sympathy for the senator and bringing in campaign funds and support from around the nation. The recall bid collapsed quickly after it was discovered that it was financed by a right-wing California millionaire.

In 1968, the Republican nominee was Rep. George V. Hansen (R Idaho 1965-69, 1975-), who based his campaign on accusations that Church was giving aid to the North Vietnamese through his votes in the Senate. The effort proved much too shrill for Idaho voters, who re-elected Church by 59,000 votes, the largest margin received by an Idaho senator except for Republican William E. Borah in 1924.

Church's fourth-term victory in 1974 was by a more modest 36,068 votes over Bob Smith, a former aide to Rep. Steven D. Symms (R Idaho), who campaigned on the general theme of opposition to "big government."

Senate Record

Idaho voters have allowed their senators to pursue a broad range of interests—so long as local problems receive prompt attention. Church has been able to take advantage of this freedom to exert influence in many policy areas.

Foreign Affairs

His best known work in the Senate has been in foreign affairs, which had been the special interest of his old idol,

Borah, one of the leading isolationists of the 1920s. A major reason for Church's influence is his seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Church has been consistently skeptical about the effectiveness of the foreign aid program and has frequently offered amendments to reduce or restrict the scope of authorizations or appropriations. His activity in this area has caused him no problems in fiscally conservative Idaho.

Church's views on most foreign policy issues have been broadly internationalist. He was a strong supporter of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and advocated strengthening American ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Church has favored use of American military power in specific instances in which he thought the national interest was clearly at stake, but he has argued for regular re-examination of foreign policy and against excessive commitments abroad. He voted for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to take action against the North Vietnamese and made a speech in favor of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. He voted for funds for military operations in South Vietnam in 1965, but cautioned that his vote could not be construed as support for the use of American ground forces.

By 1966, Church had moved into a position of general opposition to Johnson administration policy in South Vietnam. He urged a bombing halt and cautioned the President against over-extending American commitment to the Saigon regime. "No nation—not even our own—possesses an arsenal so large, or a treasury so rich, as to damp down the fires of smoldering revolution throughout the whole of the awakening world," he said.

During the Nixon administration, Church was a cosponsor of the most significant anti-war amendments of the period.

In 1970, he and Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) sponsored an amendment to prohibit the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia. Introduced in the wake of the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops, the amendment touched off a six-month debate over whether

Congress could use its budget authority to limit the President's war-making powers. It finally became law in revised form late that year.

In 1972, an amendment by Church and Sen. Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) was the vehicle for an attempt to terminate American military activities throughout Southeast Asia. It was defeated after intensive debate. Both proposals, however, identified Church with the anti-war movement and gained him wide respect among liberals.

The Aged

As chairman of the Select Committee on Aging since 1971, Church has been active in the Senate on behalf of senior citizens. Although the committee does not have the authority to report legislation, it conducts investigations and makes recommendations. Church has played a significant role in pushing through legislation extending Social Security and Medicaid benefits and keeping them in step with increases in the cost of living.

Investigations

Church's principal efforts on Foreign Relations in the past three years have been as chairman of the Multinational Corporations Subcommittee, which was created in 1972. In 1973, Church conducted widely publicized hearings into the role of the CIA in its efforts to block the election of Marxist Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The subcommittee called for a more active oversight role by Congress in supervising the CIA. Church's performance in the hearings reportedly was a factor in his being considered for the chairmanship of the 1975 Senate CIA probe.

In 1974, Church took after the multi-national oil corporations and their Arab clients. He sponsored an amendment to the 1974 trade act requiring the government to gather more information on the foreign activities of the multi-nationals.

Church's conduct of the CIA inquiry has been cautious, an indication of his concern over future legislation that could come out of the probe rather than in using it as a launching pad for the presidency. He compromised with committee Republicans and strove to avoid confrontation with President Ford, but vehemently resisted White House attempts to prevent a probe of possible CIA involvement in assassinations. After Ford juggled personnel in the country's defense and intelligence agencies in November 1975, Church led the opposition to the confirmation of former Rep. George Bush (R Texas 1967-71) as director of the CIA, but Bush was confirmed Jan. 27.

Candidacy

Beginning his campaign effort in Idaho City, Idaho, March 18, Church denounced the "leadership of weakness

Church Staff, Advisers

National chairman: Carl Burke, a Boise lawyer who managed Church's four successful Senate races.

Special assistant: Verda Barnes, Church's former administrative assistant.

Campaign organization: Peter Curtin.

Press secretary: Bill Hall.

Church's Interest-Group Ratings

Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)—ADA ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the ADA position on selected issues.

National Farmers Union (NFU)—NFU ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the NFU position.

AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)—COPE ratings reflect the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with or was paired in favor of the COPE position.

Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)—ACA ratings record the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with the ACA position.

Following are Church's ratings since Congressional Quarterly began publishing them in 1960, plus a composite ACA score for 1957-59:

	ADA ¹	COPE ²	NFU ³	ACA
1975	78	76	100	9
1974	71	56	88	23
1973	70	78	100	22
1972	70	80	88	17
1971	93	83	100	17
1970	75 ⁴	100	100	11
1969	78	90	75	29
1968	43	75	43	68
1967	92	70	100	20
1966	55	75 ²	79	22
1965	88	75 ²	77	22
1964	86	80 ²	68 ²	7
1963	83	80 ²	68 ²	0
1962	75	73 ²	75 ²	4 ²
1961	100	73 ²	75 ²	4 ²
1960	92	80 ²	100 ²	6 ²
1959	77	80 ²	100 ²	6 ²

1. Failure to vote lowers score.
 2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.
 3. Percentages compiled by CQ from information provided by groups.
 4. ADA score includes some votes from December 1969.
 5. Score for votes on selected issues since 1957.

and fear" of the Ford administration and promised that "the first priority on our political agenda is the restoration of the federal government to legitimacy in the eyes of the people."

Citing the "twenty years of training" in national issues he had accumulated in the Senate, Church discussed his service on that chamber's Foreign Relations, Interior and Aging panels. He called for a "crash program" on energy problems and denounced "the siege mentality that kept us locked so long in the straitjacket of the Cold War."

Noting his campaign's delayed start, Church said he felt that "it's never too late—nor are the odds too great—to try. In that spirit the West was won, and in that spirit I now declare my candidacy...."

—By Matt Pinkus