Frank Church

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Frank Church
The Chameleon In The Senate
by Alan Stang
May 29, 1976

Mr. Hamilton Jordan
National Chairman
Carter for President Committee
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jordan:

I think the time has come to tell the truth about Senator Frank Church, and some of the problems we had with him, in years gone by, especially those of us who were formerly active in the Young Democratic Party of Minnesota.

I enclose some newspaper clippings about a famous "flap" those of us involved with civil rights had with the famous Senator. This is not meant to be vindictive, but I thought that the Governor would want to know who he is dealing with.

I have long been a supporter of Senator Humphrey, and long ago urged him to run for the Presidency, but when I got a flat "no go" in a letter to me last fall, I ran and won as a precinct delegate for Governor Carter in our Spring caucuses. Unfortunately there were not enough of us under the proportional rules now in existence, to gain even one delegate on our national delegation.

If Governor Carter is our candidate, I hope that I may be of assistance to him in any way I can.

Incidentally, I am on good terms with both "Fritz" Mondale and Senator Humphrey, but have not been active in the party since being thrown out by the McCarthy "radicals" in 1968. Maybe its time I got active again.

With warmest personal respect,

Gene H. Rosenblum, Esq.
Ford’s Campaign Strategy

Gerald Ford’s selection of Army Secretary Howard H. (Bo) Callaway as his presidential campaign manager may prove a master stroke in Mr. Ford’s pre-convention strategy: fence to his more liberal followers by designating Callaway as presidential go-between, a former congressman from Ohio, a former member of the House of Representatives who was virtual heresy to Richard Nixon, and a former aide to Ohio National Guard Maj. Gen. Alan L. Nefcy.

But beyond that, selection of the exuberant, rich and extraverted Georgia conservative, who had been under active but secret consideration at least since May 27, reveals important details about Mr. Ford’s developing political style and its healthy contrast to that of Richard M. Nixon’s.

For example, the President himself has had a series of confidential talks with long-time Republican tacticians such as Jack Milks, president of the Tobacco Institute who will be a part-time campaign aide, Ohio National Committeeman Ray C. Bliss and many more. He is looking to old friends from his days in the House, including Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Balis, a former congressman from Kansas, for major jobs in his campaign organization and is leaning toward Richard Cheney as White House liaison for the campaign.

As top aide to White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Cheney’s designation as presidential go-between with campaign chief Callaway would give Mr. Ford automatic contact with all elements of the campaign.

Such personal, detailed involvement was virtual heresy to Richard Nixon, who seldom deigned to talk politics with traditional politicians.

Ford’s success in building an all-volunteer army with the highest black percentage—22 per cent—since World War II.

The underlying Ford strategy, in trying to convince Reagan and his conservative pursuers that a race against the President would be futile, has the South as its focal point. Callaway, as a southern organizer for Barry Goldwater in the 1964 pre-convention period and southern regional director for Nixon in 1968, has outstanding credentials among southern Republican conservatives.

Thus, his selection as campaign manager gives Mr. Ford another lever in the South to go along with his nomination of Dr. F. David Mathews, president of the University of Alabama, to be Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

Although some anti-Ford conservatives describe this as “tossing the South a couple of bones,” the honesty is having an indubitable impact. That was clear last Saturday in Columbus, Ga., when Mr. Ford spent a highly fruitful hour behind closed doors with Georgia Republican leaders.

The President told the Georgians that “my philosophies is like yours,” and the evidence he produced—his successful vetoes of anti-recession spending bills—drove his point home.

The danger in this pre-convention strategy is obvious: that the President will succeed in fencng in Reagan, thus winning the nomination battle hands down—but risking the election war when conservative Republicans will comprise a minor slice of the total vote.

Ford Campaign Unit
Now Formal Entity

By Jules Witcover
Washington Post Staff Writer

In the increasingly popular game of getting into the presidential election swim one toe at a time rather than jumping in with both feet, President Ford yesterday authorized "the President Ford Committee" to raise and spend money to further his still-undeclared bid for a full four-year term next year.

Dean Burch, already appointed temporary chairman of the committee, personally registered the group at the Federal Election Commission, as required by the new campaign reform law. Burch said the President would make a formal announcement of candidacy soon, but this step certainly indicated his intentions clearly.

Burch submitted a letter from the President that said: "I, hereby authorize the President Ford Committee to solicit and receive contributions and to incur expenses and to make expenditures to further my nomination for the office of President of the United States."

In an obvious reference to the Watergate scandal that grew out of the previous Republican President's re-election campaign in 1972, Burch said he was convinced that Mr. Ford "is committed to the most straight-up campaign that has ever been run by an incumbent President."

He said he thought the President would be nominated, but that former Gov. Ronald Reagan of California was "the most credible of the potential challengers. However, he said, "I'm inclined to think that the President's strength has grown in just the last few weeks, enough at least to lead any challenger to reconsider."

The registration is required of any political committee which expects to raise more than $1,000 for a candidate. Burch said the statutory limit on contributions of $1,000 from any individual to any one candidate and on expenditures assured that the 1976 election would be "an entirely new ball game."

The registration listed Burch as chairman, but the White House already has announced that Secretary of the Army Howard H. (Bo) Callaway will leave the Pentagon next month and take over from Burch.

Listed as treasurer and finance chairman of the committee is David Packard, former under secretary of defense. Other members of the organizing committee are Robert Douglass, a close associate of Vice President Rockefeller; former Nixon White House adviser Bryce Harlow; Richard L. Herman, former Republican national committeeeman from Nebraska; former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; Leon W. Parma, an executive of Teledyne, Inc., of San Diego, and former Gov. William Scranton of Pennsylvania.

The registration listed the Riggs National Bank at Dupont Circle as the committee's depository, and said the campaign headquarters will be at 1200 18th St. NW, Suite 918.
CIA PROBE BOOSTS SEN. CHURCH

Continued from First Page

to give the coming hearings a big buildup. The effort failed.

Church coyly told reporters that the first day or two would deal with "a very important subject that has not yet come to light." But word began to leak out from Administration sources that he was referring to the CIA's retention of bacterial poisons, and Church was forced to provide details.

Subsequent hearings will deal with alleged abuses against U.S. citizens by the CIA, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other intelligence agencies. The committee's findings on the CIA's alleged involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be made public in a report.

Church is not known as a tough-skinned, hard-nosed investigator. On the contrary, during his 18 years in the Senate, he has been regarded by some as a bit soft, somewhat erudite and more eager for compromise than confrontation. He is cautious and deliberate. When he speaks, he knows how his sentences will end. In briefing reporters after dozens of closed hearings by his CIA committee, Church has been precise in his remarks, yet reluctant to give sensitive details.

His patience has paid off in obtaining CIA records. Although the White House and CIA at first resisted giving Church the top-secret material he wanted, Church spent weeks working out a careful agreement for handling different files.

"We think we have it all," he said, referring to records that deal with the CIA's alleged involvement in foreign assassination plots. In an interview, he acknowledged that there were gaps in the written record but said that this was "not because anything was withheld but because the evidence simply doesn't exist in some cases."

No date has been set for release of the assassination report.

"It's like writing 'War and Peace,'" Church said, referring to the length of the report. "We have reviewed a vast number of documents, including National Security Council files, and have taken 8,000 pages of testimony from over 100 witnesses."

As to why the committee felt it necessary to disclose any CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church said:

"It's an aberration, really, from the traditional American practice in the world and our historic principles. It fell to me to do this job because the Rockefeller commission would not treat it." This was a reference to the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, a group headed by Vice President Rockefeller.

Church said the report would address such questions as how did it happen and who ordered it."

"Some of the conclusions we reach will have general application to the rest of the CIA investigation," he added. "They will deal with the command and control of the CIA."

Church said in July that the panel had found no direct involvement by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy or former Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy in plotting foreign assassinations. Some Republi-
SEN. CHURCH'S ROLE IN CIA PROBE

Continued from 6th Page

tries. It was the old Uncle Sucker business.

"I began to look more critically at military aid and other aid programs—how we often wound up arming both sides in a conflict and getting blamed by both," he said.

Church recalled the early 1960s, when the United States chiefly assisted the South Vietnamese with American advisers and limited aid.

"I went along with it, believing that we were assisting the Diem government to prevent the Communists from taking over," he said.

But Church said he became "increasingly cynical when we began sending in our own people in large numbers."

In February, 1965, he broke with the Johnson administration in a speech that called for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

A furious President Lyndon B. Johnson zeroed in on Church's remark that he (Church) agreed with columnist Walter Lippmann on Vietnam. Johnson told reporters he had advised Church: "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."

Church said that Mr. Johnson had never told him this, "but he probably wished that he had said it."

Continuing his opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, Church was coauthor with former Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) in 1970 of the landmark legislation that came to be known as the Cooper-Church amendment. It prohibited the use of funds for introducing combat troops into Cambodia and Laos.

The first statutory limit of its type ever imposed by Congress, the Cooper-Church legislation was followed by additional restrictions on the President's war-making powers in 1971 and 1973.

Church's familiarity with foreign affairs has undoubtedly been an asset in his CIA investigation. Aside from investigating U.S. links to the murders of foreign leaders, his committee has sought documents and testimony about CIA covert operations abroad.

Activities abroad, however, are not likely to be disclosed in the public hearings. Church and other committee members have said they do not want to impair the effectiveness of the CIA but only to show where reforms and improvements are needed.

Whether Church decides to seek his party's nomination for President will largely depend on how well the committee does its work and how the public perceives its efforts.

"This investigation," Church says, "could be a minefield."
Frank Church
Hot Darkhorse

By LOUISE SWEENEY
Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON, D.C.—There were nine or ten farmers gathered in a room in Shoshone County, Idaho, back in the summer of '56, listening to a young Democratic lawyer who was running like a deer for the United States Senate.

The lawyer, Frank Church, was talking and swigging great gulps of water as he unrolled a long campaign speech designed for a major rally.

Finally, one great big farmer at the back of the room said, "Young man, I want to tell you something, I'm gonna vote for you, but you're the only windmill I ever saw that ran entirely on water."

After the meeting someone asked Frank Church why he had given a whole speech to just a handful of people.

"Why unload the whole bale of hay, Frank?"

His answer: "Because I'm out to make converts—if I tell it to ten, they'll tell it to ten more."

That attitude, which at 32 made him one of the youngest men ever to win a Senate seat, may be an asset again during another important summer in Frank Church's life.

This is the summer when ten million people may tell it to another ten million as Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chairs televised hearings on the domestic role of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairmen of controversial TV hearings have a way of becoming famous, as Senators Estes Kefauver and Sam J. Ervin Jr.

proven, so before the next election Frank Church's name may be as familiar as John Wayne's.

But Senator Church is not now a candidate for the presidency, although his long-time campaign manager Carl Burke admits, "He was prepared to put his foot in the water last January (when he was asked to chair the intelligence committee) and then pulled out because he knew that maintaining a political posture when running a serious type of investigation would be a disaster."

When he is asked what the U.S. most needs in a president and whether he would be willing to give it, he answers:

"I think the country (he sighs) needs to have its confidence restored in political leadership. Any man who can do this, whoever he may be, that man we need for president."

Is he ruling himself out? "No, I'm not ruling one way or another. That's thebedrock requirement in the aftermath of Watergate and a whole decade of disillusionment."

Although he's not in the running now, the liberal weekly, "The Village Voice," profiled him as "the hottest liberal dark horse." He pushes the levers of power in several important Senate committees, appears almost often on camera to answer questions about CIA assassination charges or hearings on the scandals of multinational corporations.

Senator Church looks different off camera. On camera, answering volatile questions, he is formal, guarded, his eyes hooded, almost scholarly, with a certain heaviness of manner and appearance which are deceptive. In person he is trim, ebullient, tall (six feet) with a tan face that grins easily, brown eyes, Indian black hair with some features of gray in it, and a warmth that the camera somehow doesn't catch.

The one constant, off camera or on, is the voice, a soft baritone that falls in measured cadences like lines from Tennyson, with no slang.

Frank Church's Capitol office, a long room decked with senatorial brown leather furniture and an oil portrait of one of his heroes, the legendary orator Sen. William Borah, "the Lion of Idaho," is hidden away at one end of a maze of marble corridors. One of the precautions he takes as chairman of the intelligence committee is to have it swept regularly for "bugs."
UNFUNDED WELFARE PLANS

Brown Lambasts U.S. Bureaucracy

SACRAMENTO (UPI) - Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. charged Friday that the Ford administration is forcing California to encourage more people to join welfare programs without providing the money to finance them.

"So, here we are in a position of the state of California basically being run by those bureaucracies in Washington," he declared. "They force us into programs that we don't want to get into. If we don't, they threaten to cut off the money."

The governor told a news conference he complained to newly appointed Health, Education and Welfare Secretary F. David Mathews and would discuss the issue with President Ford next month in Sacramento. "If the President cares to listen."

Brown's criticism was similar to former Gov. Ronald Reagan's heavy attacks on the federal welfare bureaucracy and his jealous defense of states' rights.

"Everywhere we look in this federal government, we find they are forcing us to do things that we don't have the tax base to do and for which they are unwilling to pay," Brown declared.

At his third formal meeting with reporters in the theater-like Capitol news conference room, the Democratic chief executive also discussed:

TAXES — He said he now could think of no circumstances under which he would sign a bill increasing the gasoline tax from seven to nine cents a gallon.

"I'm very reluctant to see any new taxes and I'm doing everything I can to prevent that," he said.

SCHOOLS — He suggested California could come close to complying with the requirements of the Serrano education finance decision if over the next six to eight years the state pumped equalization aid into poor school districts and at the same time limited the spending of wealthier districts.

PRESIDENT — He insisted again he was not a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination next year, but said to "offer a Sherman-like statement is a little silly," Republican William T. Sherman said in 1885 that if he was nominated, he wouldn't accept and if elected, wouldn't serve.

Convention Kicked Off By Chavez

FRESNO (UPI) — United Farm Workers Union leader Cesar Chavez and between 500 and 600 delegates to the UFW's 2nd Constitutional Convention concentrated on getting the formalities out of the way during the opening session Friday so more important matters could be taken up today.

Chavez, looking trim and fit after completing all but the last leg of his 1,000-mile march through California to recruit new members and inform farm workers about the state's new Agricultural Labor Relations Act, welcomed the delegates in a brief address Friday morning to open the convention.

Chavez was greeted with a standing ovation that turned into a singing, slogan-shouting cheer.

After his brief talk, Chavez turned the convention over to other members of the union executive committee for the usual reports and seating of official delegations.

California Furniture Sales

"YOUR MONEY'S WORTH" SHOP and COMPARE

ANNIVERSARY SALE
A sociologist's look at whites' flight to the suburbs

Knight News Service

WASHINGTON — Sociologist James Coleman, one of the nation's leading thinkers on school integration policy, is easing away from his recent contention that school desegregation has become a major reason for white flight from the cities.

Coleman is the University of Chicago scholar whose 1966 segregation research report became a rationale for many subsequent court-ordered integration programs.

Earlier this year, he drew criticism from colleagues and civil rights advocates when he said new research showed forced integration of single school districts to be self-defeating because it drove whites out.

But at a meeting of academicians in Washington Friday, Coleman presented a new draft report of his 68-city study, and it contained some significant new qualifications. Among them:

- There is no way to determine from Coleman's study what differences there are — if any — in the way white families react to reductions in school segregation that come by court order or deliberate policy, compared to those that come by such natural forces as changed residential patterns.

That last point is important because of the political use to which Coleman's findings and interpretations have been put since he began talking about them in April.

Anti-busing forces quickly seized on his remark that "court-induced school desegregation had served only to swell the white exodus from the big cities."

But academic colleagues have argued that he has no specific facts to back up his claim, since none of the cities he studied were under court orders during the 1968-73 period the research covered.

In seeming reaction to some of that criticism, Coleman would make no comments on court policy Friday, nor would he discuss his own ideas on what judicial and administrative approaches might relieve the problems he discussed.

In fact, some of his remarks suggested that he considered the issue of desegregation to be almost moot in the long run, at least in some northern cities whose school systems are fast becoming all-black.

Gary Orfield, who is attached to the Brookings Institution, where the meeting occurred, said that an argument against court-ordered integration based on Coleman's figures was a weak one.

Orfield argued that a family that would move because of a more integrated school system probably is already on its way out of town anyway.

"A family that leaves Detroit next fall when the school integration plan is implemented," he said, "will also be aware of the city's income tax, its 1967 riot, the extremely high level of violent crime, the cut-backs in the police force, the city's black mayor, the massive housing abandonment in the city, the recent loss of more than a fifth of the city's job base, its severe current economic crisis and other factors."
BY RON ROACH
SACRAMENTO [AP]–California's new Energy Commission won't take sides on the proposed Nuclear Safeguards Initiative, but individual commissioners say they won't duck the issue.

To date, it is 1-0 among commissioners in favor of the initiative.

The four other commissioners haven't taken public stands yet on what may be the most important socio-economic decision facing Californians.

They say Californians should lay emotions aside and take a cool, hard look at the facts in the initiative proposal on next June's presidential primary ballot.

The initiative would set standards for nuclear power plants which critics say are so tough they would prohibit any new plants and would phase out operation of existing multi-million-dollar plants.

Richard Maulin, chairman of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, said a commission stand would be powerful fuel for either side's campaign.

And, Maulin said, "Certainly a decision by voters to approve or reject will be taken as a signal for the rest of the nation."

Only commissioner Ronald Doctor takes a stand: "Strictly as an individual, I am in favor of the initiative."

Moretti is the only commissioner in the election. I'll make my views known publicly."

Moretti said the implications of the decision must be set before the public which must try to make a decision based on logic rather than emotions, because there are emotions on both sides of the issue.

Al Pasternak said he was undecided.

Richard Tuttle said he wouldn't hesitate to speak out once he has totally analyzed all data.

But they all have feelings on the impact of passage or failure of the initiative.

Maulin said he hopes all the facts will be brought out by opponents and proponents and by hearings in October conducted by assemblyman Charles Warren, D-Los Angeles.

If they don't, "I might change my position and say something which might affect the election," Maulin said.

Which way, Maulin didn't say.

"Being a political scientist by profession," said Maulin, former Rand Corp. researcher, "I know it won't be until next April when the broad public becomes aware of the battle. Right now there are special interest groups."

Doctor, a nuclear engineer, explained his position:

"I believe the initiative goes to the heart of some very serious problems that have arisen, problems of such magnitude and overwhelming importance."
How a noncandidate can run for presidency

Church plays a 'waiting game'

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Sen. Frank Church is what might be called a "biding-his-time" candidate, making all the motions toward entering the race without actually getting in yet.

What the Senator's intentions are — he told a group of reporters over breakfast — is to jump into the race in late February or early March, after the first primaries are over in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Florida. Mr. Church considers these early contests "inconclusive."

After them, he thinks that "most" of the candidates will have exhausted much of their funds and will have to either drop out or cut back on campaigning.

Already, he says, a Church campaign committee has half the contribution commitments in the 20 states that are necessary for qualifying a candidate for matching federal funds.

The Church "undeclared candidacy" status draws attention to an oddity in the bidding for the Democratic nomination: that beyond the large field of 11 declared candidates (Bayh, Wallace, Jackson, Bentsen, Harris, Byrd, Shapp, Sanford, Udall, Shriver, and Carter) several other noncandidates wait in the wings.

Foremost is Hubert Humphrey, who says he will not enter the primaries but is willing to be the draft choice of a brokered convention.

There are also other former presidential candidates — Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. They would take the nomination if it began to move in their direction.

Those who are playing this "noncandidate" game feel that all of the 31 primaries may turn out to be a waste of time — and that the convention will have to turn elsewhere.

Thus, they believe that their noncandidacies may well turn out to be the best strategy for capturing the nomination.

There are other Democratic "hopefuls," those who think that "lightening just might strike."

On that list — one top Democratic leader has said — "is just about every Democratic Senator and a lot of Democrats in the House, too."

One who would definitely take the nomination from a convention draft is Sen. Walter Mondale, of Minnesota who recently dropped his official candidacy because he said he didn't want the hardships of a campaign — including the problem of raising sufficient funds to carry him through the many primaries.

Vance Hartke is interested in the nomination. So is William Proxmire. So is Adlai Stevenson. And there are many more.
By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Feb. 3—Under the customary form of analysis and interpretation as applied in the nation’s capital, Sen. Frank Church’s fuzzy denial of the fact in a televised interview means that he will definitely be a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

This has to be bad news for Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who intends to announce his own candidacy in a TV address Thursday, for the bulk of the church support lies in the ultra-liberal wing of the party, a segment Jackson has been pursuing with surprising vigor in recent weeks.

Church, the still-young 50 Idaho Democrat and outspoken anti-Viet war critic now starting his fourth term in the Senate, has been a sort of lay-back sleeper in the party’s presidential sweepstakes. Hardly anybody knew he had the White House in mind before yesterday’s rejection; speculation had focused on Jackson, an declared candidate Rep. Mo Udall (D-Ariz.); ex-Gov. Jimmy Carter of Georgia; former Sen. Fred Harris (D-Okl.) and Sens. Lloyd Bentsen (Tex.), Robert Byrd (W. Va.) and Birch Bayh (Ind.), and 40 others.

Church was being interviewed on television because he is the newly named chairman of the Senate special committee that will be probing the CIA spy system, the FBI, and any and all other intelligence activities for the next six months. Somebody said there had been talk about a presidential candidacy.

“Let’s scotch that right now,” Church replied, before proceeding to un-scotch it. He admitted that some “people” had discussed the subject with him, then gone away to solicit support. The senator had told them he “would weigh the matter.” But then came the appointment as CIA committee chairman; he notified the “people” that “there would be no further activity on my behalf, throughout the life of the investigation.”

The operative words, of course, are “throughout the life of the investigation.” That will be before the end of this year—and during the intervening months it is doubtful that any other senator or would-be candidate will have a crack at anything like as much television and press exposure.

Church has a hot property on his hands, a titillating issue filled with spies and secrets, all of the factors going toward a fascinating probe, and he has assured, “public hearings whenever we can.” He has a very liberal Democratic majority on his committee and a couple of liberal Republicans, one of whom, Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), made at least one of those several White House enemies lists during the Nixon administration.

There isn’t anything else around the Washington scene to compete with the Church committee for air time and headlines except the economy and taxes, neither of which is particularly photogenic or sexy.

So Church can lie doggo so far as presidential pretensions are concerned, while getting more national attention and recognition than all of the other candidates combined, and come out with a resounding report at year’s end, just at the proper time for a presidential announcement. He can thus begin his drive well before the competition has burned itself out a year too soon.
Senator hopes hearings will enhance candidacy

By Harry Kelly

WASHINGTON—"The report will make some clear findings. Of wrongdoings and failures of proper command and control of inexcusable actions in a whole series of assassinations and assassination attempts that extend through three administrations." Sen. Frank Church [D., Idaho] has lowered his voice. He leans closer, as if he is talking about something so bad he doesn't want to be overheard. Now there are voices break in from the other offices where they are worried about more mundane things, like press releases, making coffee, finding car keys, and solving constituents' problems.

Church is late to a meeting with the group from his Select Senate Intelligence Committee that is drawing up the final report on CIA involvement in assassination plots. He is late, so he sits in the straight-backed chair like a jockey waiting for the gate to open.

"HE HAS SO many balls in the air that I don't see how he does it," an aide says.

Still in the air is the weighty question: Can the intelligence hearings, with their press and TV coverage, turn Frank Church into a presidential candidate?

At 51, Church has a smooth, young, full face and sad, very serious, brown eyes. The eyes of the boy orator who grew up to face death and barely won. The eyes of a boy wonder elected to the Senate at 32 who sees the leaves beginning to fall.

Now he seems to be everywhere. Turn on the evening news, he is there. Pick up the paper, he is on page one.

TO CRITICS, Church has been using the intelligence hearings as a forum to gain exposure so he will be a household

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Column 1

Will probes carry Sen. Church to top?

Continued from page one

word by the time he enters the contest in January.

One Republican complains about the committee's failure to hold public hearings on the plot he feels would have revealed the role of John and Robert Kennedy in authorizing the CIA to plan the assassination of Fidel Castro.

Because of this "picking and choosing, instead of laying it all out," the committee has appeared to be concentrating on such quickie headline-grabbers as shellfish poisons, dart guns, and FBI break-ins, the Republican critic said.

SO FAR THE hearings have lacked the oomph—and thus the TV coverage—to turn Church into an Estes Kefauver or Sam Ervin. Public television began by covering the hearings live, but finally gave up.

More than one obscure but talented member of Congress has used televised hearings to make his name a household word. The most notable is Sen. Kefauver [D. Tenn.], who was propelled by a Senate racketeering investigation into contention for the 1952 and 1956 presidential nominations. The most recent is Sen. Howard Baker [R., Tenn.], relatively unknown nationally until he became ranking Republican on the Watergate Committee.

Despite the lack of television exposure so far, Church feels the investigation is the most important thing he has been involved in, topping the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on the Viet Nam war, which, he said, "gave legitimacy to the protests" against the war.

Although he has a reputation for integrity and honesty at a time when both are politically rare, he grinds on the nerves of some of his fellow Democrats, including liberals.

"CHURCH IS another small-state politician," a Democratic strategist says. "Another McGovern! Another Goldwater! Who needs it? Church couldn't figure out national politics if you gave him a roadmap.

"Church is a loner," another Demo-

- Mc\n- l crat complains, applying another standard of big-city politics and finding him wanting. "He smiles a lot, but I don't think I've ever heard him tell a joke. He takes himself too seriously. Just like McGovern does."

He has a reason for being serious. While at Stanford Law School, Church was diagnosed as having incurable cancer. Prognosis: death within six months. But he survived, cured, after X-rays that burned out the malignancy.

Ironically Church's first job in government service was in the intelligence field—as a young Army officer in World War II whose daily duties included producing an intelligence estimate of Japanese troop strength.

Now in his fourth six-year term, he has a Senate reputation as a pragmatic liberal, unusually articulate and ever ready to compromise.

BORN JULY 25, 1924, in Boise, Church is the son of conservative Republican parents whose opposition to Roosevelt's New Deal obviously did not influence him. Church was impressed more by the liberal views of Chase A. Clark, a Democratic governor of Idaho and U.S. District judge whose daughter, Bethune, Church married in 1947.

Now at this moment Church doesn't seem interested in talking about politics.

Behind the glasses the brown eyes sharpen only when he talks about the report on assassinations, about the CIA, and "the glimpses into this world of mystery."

"If the press thinks certain Presidents will be nailed to the wall on the basis of the evidence, well the press is going to be disappointed . . . . When you read it there will be enough evidence there that you will be able to make up your own mind about what happened in these cases . . . ."

But, he adds, his voice low and quiet, "you wouldn't as a juror make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that would indict a man or put a man in prison or hang him, because there are too many gaps and contradictions in the evi-
Liberal Church Stumps West

Waxing Conservative, Specific

By Paul G. Edwards
Washington Post Staff Writer

BOISE, Idaho, May 17—Frank church concluded three days of camp
aing throughout his Western home
ase today, presenting himself as the 1st presidential hope for moderate-lib
eral Democrats while in fact reflecting
moderate-conservative viewpoint on
broadsag range of specific issues.

In three speeches and a dozen ques
tion-and-answer sessions with press and
able, the Idaho senator:
• Called for a Supreme Court re
ew of its busing decisions.
• Opposed federal gun controls in
form.
• Supported the renewal of clearcut
ng of national forest timber.
• Told a permissive attitude to
ound proliferation of nuclear power
nt.
• Advocated the right of states
ther than the federal government to
ide fundamental domestic policy
ons whenever possible.

Even in foreign policy, where op
on to the war in Vietnam helped
ture his liberal image, Church's an
rs seemed simply to be the current
odiment of the well-established
nterventionist philosophy ex
ended by such other heartland fig
s as Robert Taft, J. W. Fulbright
Mike Mansfield.

Church's moderate-conservative posi
ts are well documented by his 20-
record in the Senate. But his ef
o turn the Democratic primaries
 issues and, the unrelent
pecificity of his answers, may dis
ert some of those Democrats
and the country who are the object
appeals.

g is generally believed that in the
aska primary Church managed to
 Jimmy Carter, the front-runner
Democratic nomination, by rai
the liberal supporters of Hubert
mprey, Morris K. Udall, Ed
M. Kennedy, Henry M. Jackson
 Mike Harris.

ain and again on this campaign
Church called for backers of
tive to unite behind him Never
ver, did he appear to flinch at a
tion that might produce an answer
sive to the liberal wing of the

a broad-brush way, his speeches
with the apparent contradiction
beliefs by insisting that contra

dictions are inestimable in a thought
ful approach to the country's prob
lems.

"I am as conservative as Sam Ervin
my views on the constitutional
ights of the individual," he said. "I
am as progressive as Teddy Roosevelt
in my view of the monopolistic powers
of huge corporations. I am as liberal as
Franklin Roosevelt in my belief that

the federal government should provide
jobs and not welfare for the jobless. I
am as common-sensical as the Ameri
can people in my belief that America
should not involve itself in futile for
eign wars."

In Montana, Church sometimes sub
stituted the name of Majority Leader
Mansfield, the state's retiring senior
 senator, for "American people" when
describing his common-sense foreign
policy.

Church is striving for victories in his
home state on May 25 and in Montana
on June 1 impressive enough to sus
tain his late candidacy if he fails to
win in Oregon, which also votes on
May 25.

Church is counting on victories in the
West to attract national press atten
ation as he goes into the June 8 primaries in three states with big con
vention delegations: California, Ohio
and New Jersey.

Despite the first wave of publicity
generated by his Nebraska victory, his
press following through the two states
last weekend was meager: Only one
tlevision network, CBS and two large
newspapers, The Los Angeles Times
and The Washington Post.

Although the sprawling mountain
and-plains states offer a colorful set
ning, Church's cerebral style sometimes
seemed to have a bleaching effect.

At the annual Bucking Horse Au
cion in Miles City, Mont., on Saturday
he shook some hands and then sat
rather stiffly in the back of a pickup
truck while a lusty crowd of thousands
around him drank beer by the six
and bet on horse races between
sales of rodeo brons.

He doffed his coat, but in tie and
wing-tip shoes, he looked positively
Wilsonian in a setting that called for a
Teddy Roosevelt. At the 1900 auction,
Teddy Kennedy got national picture
publicity by riding a bronco as he cam
paigned for his brother, the late Presi
dent.

Church did much better at a packed
campaign headquarters in Billings ear
lier Saturday. For almost 30 minutes
he was peppered with questions by
Montanans on everything from wheat
sales abroad to federal aid for the arts.

The persistent inquiries seem to leg
itimize his assessment of the Nebraska
campaign victory: "Proof that the peo
ple are hungry to talk about the is
ues."
Foreign Relations—After Fulbright

For more than four years, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, strongly opposed the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, especially as it related to Southeast Asia, but today few in Washington mourn the coming retirement of Fulbright more than the Secretary of State.

Since Dr. Kissinger took over the State Department last fall, he and the Democratic senator from Arkansas, who was defeated last month for renomination, have not only worked together harmoniously but have become good personal friends. It was made possible by U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the detente with Russia and China and the administration's effort to establish peace in the Middle East through a new deal with the Arab nations, all of which have long been favored by Fulbright.

It is no secret that in recent months the Secretary of State has privately as well as publicly consulted Fulbright on almost every administration move and, in the process, has kept the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a whole well informed on plans and operations. It has been a remarkable and constructive example of bipartisan foreign policy.

As an incidental result, Dr. Kissinger knows he can now count on getting a fair and sympathetic hearing when, at his request, Fulbright and the committee review for the second time the Secretary's role in the controversial White House wiretapping case.

If there is a silver lining to Fulbright's defeat, and the consequent loss of perhaps the most experienced and best-informed chairman in our time, it is the legacy of bipartisan independence he will leave behind, and, along with it, a renewed sense of committee responsibility and self-respect.

After a long period of being little more than a rubber stamp for the White House, the committee in recent years has been standing up to both Democratic and Republican Presidents (notably Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon), and, in the process, inspiring the Senate to reassert its constitutional role in the making of foreign policy.

Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.), who will become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in January, is no Fulbright. His tendency is to get along with whatever administration is in power, as exemplified by his support of the Vietnamese war. He will be surrounded, however, by determined colleagues. Sparkman says he doesn't believe in a "controlled committee."

Moreover, as he adds, "You can't control it anyway—there are a lot of strong individuals on it."

The committee does include some of the most prominent senators of both parties. On the Democratic side there are two former presidential nominees (Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and George McGovern of South Dakota) and a former vice-presidential nominee (Edmund Muskie of Maine). Just behind Sparkman in seniority is Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, and behind him is the young and forceful Frank Church of Idaho.

Church seems destined to be chairman in the not-too-distance future for both Sparkman and Mansfield are in their 70s and probably won't run again.

The other Democrats are all seasoned, influential senators: Stuart Symington of Missouri, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Gale McGee of Wyoming.

The Republicans (all moderates or liberals) are headed by the venerable George Aiken of Vermont, one of the most respected men in the Senate. The others in order of seniority are the independent Clifford Case of New Jersey, Jacob Javits of New York (called the most "intelligent" member of the Senate), Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, James Pearson of Kansas, presidential hopeful Charles Percy of Illinois and Assistant Minority Leader Robert Griffin of Michigan.

Critics of the committee have recently argued that, as one wrote, it "has lost power to the relatively obscure, but more united, active and aggressive House Foreign Affairs Committee." The assessment is wide of the mark. The reason the House group is "relatively obscure" is that it deserves to be. It does not compare in caliber or performance with the Senate committee.

Where the House panel has been united chiefly in merely doing the bidding of the White House, the Senate committee has been united, often unanimously or near unanimously, in the boldest kind of independent action, such as successfully sponsoring the War Powers Act, which is designed to stop Presidents from plunging into wars without consulting Congress.

Under Fulbright and former Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, the committee repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Lyndon Johnson used to legalize the Vietnam war. It led the fight to force U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia. It cracked down on military aid to military dictatorships. It encouraged the approachment with China and Russia.

In addition, it has put so-called executive agreements as well as formal treaties under sharp scrutiny. And, among other things, the creation of two new subcommittees headed by Sens. Church and Symington has extended the committee's influence over U.S. foreign bases and the rapid spread of powerful multinational corporations all over the world.

Walter Lippman once said that the removal of Fulbright from public life would be "a national calamity." When he leaves next year, however, the loss will be cushioned by the fact that he leaves a committee that is likely to carry on for some time in his bipartisan, independent tradition.
Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Frank Church: Spokesman for Detente

One of the things which most dismays us partisans of virtue and progress in international affairs is the way our natural political spokesmen tend to fritter away their opportunities to make a public case for the cause. The quality of debate and, to an extent, the quantity of policy suffer accordingly.

This is particularly so on the eve of the retirement of Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), who, at his peak, brilliantly championed a liberal and humane international policy. No Hill figure with a potential for similar stature and appeal is in sight. That means that congressional foreign policy debate will continue to be dominated by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), a hardliner who makes his case very well.

Now, some would say this doesn't matter: that the national security debate now under way is already over: that no one is listening; that the "good guys" have lost.

But this is almost surely wrong. It is an insult to the democratic process and a misreading of the political arithmetic to conclude that there is no further practical point to discussing the great security issues of the day. That is precisely why a powerful softline voice is so vital, someone who will convert to public coin the expertise of the detente-minded specialists in the fair and effective way in which Scoop Jackson uses the stuff of the experts who lean the other way.

This brings one, with some chagrin, to Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who has a liberal outlook and is otherwise politically presentable, who has a good deal of seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee, and who in effect offered himself as Fulbright's successor in a Senate floor speech delivered last Aug. 19—while the rest of us were off on vacation.

"The Substance and Shadow of Detente" rang all the right bells. For the faithful, and with considerable eloquence and style. Church reaffirmed his conviction that "we must think of national security in broader than military terms," and pleaded for "a breakthrough to reason and sanity."

Merely to warm the hearts of the faithful, however, is too limited a goal for someone trying to affect the course of a public debate on a matter at once so delicate in its details and so prone to manipulation through symbols as national security. Two other considerations are relevant.

First, the legitimacy of the other guy's anxieties—the subject is, after all, security—must be acknowledged. Church here does not pass muster. He presents breathlessly as a new in-sight, one "lost to view in the arcane wranglings of the military intellectu­als," the utterly well known and uncontested fact that currently the United States has more warheads than does the Soviet Union. The worry is over the future balance.

Church actually seems to believe that the virtual invulnerability of subs to an adversary's first strike is "another simple salient fact passed over by the Pentagon." But what other strategic reason is there for "the Pentagon" to put missiles to sea?

At one point he works himself into the impossible corner of stating that land-based missiles are without political value. There is more.

In tone and content, I think, Frank Church falls short of the stands which supporters of the international values he believes in have every right to expect from someone so politically well placed as he. There is a way to make a reputation as a fearless fighter among liberals and there is a way to do beyond that to carry those others whose support is vital to the success of his own enterprise.
George F. Will

An Apostle of Non-Interventionism

A portrait of the late Sen. William E. Borah hangs over the mantle in Sen. Frank Church's Capitol Hill office. The relationship between these two men (they never met) is the closest thing to apostolic succession in American politics.

Borah, an Idaho Republican senator from 1907 until his death in 1940, was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the late 1920s. He never went abroad: "One might become merely confused by firsthand information." He was called an isolationist.

Church, an Idaho Democrat, will be chairman of Foreign Relations someday soon. He, too, is called an isolationist but dissents, obliquely, by insisting that Borah was just a non-interventionist.

Borah voted for war in 1917, but was the trumpet of the "irreconcilables" against the League of Nations and World Court, and also opposed repeal of the neutrality acts in the late thirties. He was addicted to the legalisms by which Americans, especially American legislators, apply to foreign affairs the nation's evangelical faith in litigation.

He was ardently for the Kellogg-Briand pact which, you may remember, outlawed war.

He dissented hard and often against the use of Marines to promote the interests of fruit companies and other businesses in places like Nicaragua. Such were the excesses of the imperial presidencies of Calvin Coolidge and others.

Today Church wants the U.S. "off the mainland of Asia," which means, most importantly, out of Thailand and Korea. He says that if we try to "hang on" in Thailand, that will be proof that we have not learned the lesson of Vietnam, and that Secretary of State Kissinger should depart.

He believes that it was a mistake for U.S. forces to cross the 38th parallel in Korea, and that U.S. forces should have been withdrawn from Korea after the armistice. Today, he says, Korea is irrelevant to our vital interests.

Leaving Thailand would involve acknowledging (as Church sees it) that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is a nullity. Leaving Korea would involve acting on the provisions for nullifying our treaty with that nation.

There is a surface plausibility to this much of Church's argument: The U.S. should not have troops in places where the American public will not countenance the use of American troops. Today Thailand and Korea may be such places.

Church may represent the public mood today, as Borah certainly did in 1920. And Church, at 50, is a rising star. Elected to the Senate in 1956 when he was a cherubic 32-year-old, today only 15 senators (10 Democrats) have more seniority, and their average age is 70.

A senator who wants to specialize in foreign affairs should represent a state like Idaho: population 713,000 (42d), four cities over 25,000 and none over 100,000, population density 8.3 per square mile (45th). His constituents want water and reclamation projects: they don't want gun controls or interference with their methods of disciplining coyotes. His constituents do not require him to spend every waking moment wringing grants from the government.

As ranking Democrat (behind chairman Henry Jackson) on the Interior Committee, Church can look after the interests of his state, two-thirds of which is owned by the federal government. On Foreign Relations, Church ranks behind only Chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala.), 75, and Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), 72.

In four elections to the Senate, Church has averaged 58 per cent of the vote. Re-elected last year, he now has, as Borah had, a safe seat. That can be, as it was for Borah in his later years, an invitation to a frivolous, merely rhetorical, career.

This danger is especially acute for a senator on Foreign Relations, which under William Fulbright (D-Ark.) became the Senate's most publicized and most ineffectual committee.

The committee has lacked a doctrine and an energetic man to promote it. Church, the apostle, has a doctrine that is suited to the temper of the times and the capabilities of his institution.

Committees and legislatures can only control foreign policy by reducing it to elementary impulses expressed in simple declarations—yes, we declare war; no, we will not fund bombing after Aug. 15; the troops must be out by June 30.

Non-interventionism is a doctrine of withdrawal and abstinence. It can be declared, simply. It may not fit the needs of the nation, but it fits the capabilities of Congress.
Church discounts importance of New Hampshire primary

By the Associated Press

Boise, Idaho

Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho, predicted recently that no Democratic candidate will come out of the New Hampshire primary as the front-runner for the party's presidential nomination.

Mr. Church told a Boise news conference he believed the Massachusetts Democratic primary race will be more significant this year.
Dear Friend:

Thank you for your recent letter requesting my views on several subjects because of the fact that I have been mentioned as a Democratic Presidential Candidate.

I am sorry that I cannot give you a personal response to your letter. The large volume of correspondence I have received, combined with my limited campaign staff, does not make that possible.

Enclosed is a brochure published by the Church for President Committee which addresses itself to my positions on many of the issues which face our country today. I hope that this information will be helpful to you.

As my campaign progresses additional material will be printed addressing itself to issues in more detail than this brief summary can hope to do. Please feel free to write me later if you would like additional material.

With thanks for your interest.

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Enclosure

POSTAGE PAID
Frank Church is no longer ahead of his time. His time is now.

There comes a moment in the career of such a man when his leadership is so well honed by years of broad experience that he is ready.

Now is that moment for Frank Church.

The gifted 32-year-old who brought his bright promise to the Senate nearly 20 years ago has arrived. Today, he is a respected senior senator. Today, he is a central figure in the national government with a command of almost any issue that could confront a President.

In this, the era of the accidental President, Democrats must do better. They must offer the nation a candidate who is prepared for the Presidency.

Frank Church is prepared.
FRANK CHURCH... is prepared for the Presidency

Aging Frank Church is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging. In that role he has mobilized the compassionate nature of America around the reversal of social insecurity for the aged. His knowledge of senior problems is encyclopedic. His list of legislative achievements is long. It was, for instance, the Church Committee on Aging which inserted a cost-of-living escalator clause into the Social Security statute, making it the law that payments to the aged must keep pace with inflation.

Vietnam Frank Church is a ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was one of the earliest foreign policy experts in the land to warn that foreign obsession would lead to domestic neglect. He first spoke out against the Vietnam War in 1964 at a time when everyone assumed his courage would cost him the next election. But, he won the election and persisted in his opposition to that misbegotten war. He co-authored the Cooper-Church Amendment, which prevented American ground forces from returning to Cambodia or entering Laos. And he co-authored the Case-Church Amendment, which finally forced an end to the bombing of Cambodia.

Middle East As a specialist in foreign affairs, he has been among the most persistent—and effective—advocates for Americans of all creeds who insist on the right of Israel to exist as a free and independent nation.

Energy Frank Church is Chairman of the new Senate Subcommittee on Energy Research and Water Resources. It was Frank Church who forced an increase last year in Administration requests for development of non-nuclear energy alternatives. It is Frank Church who says America's appetite for energy must be curbed to cope with the twin threats of dwindling resources and dependence on foreign sources of oil.

Multinational Corporations As Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, he has conducted the only in-depth Congressional investigation of the big oil companies and other huge American corporations operating overseas. In the process, he has acquired a comprehensive knowledge of oil policy. Frank Church is the leading advocate of a series of initiatives to break up the Arab oil cartel. And Frank Church would create additional jobs by eliminating the special tax breaks which cause American corporations to invest their capital abroad rather than in the United States.

Environment Frank Church is the ranking member of the Senate Interior Committee. Americans anxious to save the last remnants of our environment from the rude hand of overdevelopment know Frank Church as a founding father of the modern conservation movement. He was floor manager of the Wilderness Act. He authored the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Since long before it was safe or popular, Frank Church has stood up to the powerful interests who would plunder nature's legacy to future generations.

Agriculture Frank Church is a farm-state senator. No one can be elected four times from a state like Idaho without knowing farm issues backward and forward.

Education Frank Church has an exemplary record of helping upgrade education which can be succinctly stated: education has no better friend in the Senate. Ask any teacher familiar with his career.

Labor Frank Church is, by any yardstick, a friend of labor. He has persistently supported increases in the minimum wage and other measures designed to benefit working people. He has enjoyed strong labor support, while maintaining his right to disagree. Even when he has differed with the unions, they have respected him for his integrity and independence.

Human Rights Frank Church has been in the thicket of the fight, throughout his career, to win a full measure of liberty and opportunity for all citizens. He made his convictions plain from the outset. In 1957, upon arriving in the Senate, he played a major role in enacting the first civil rights bill. Similarly, he has always strongly favored equality for women. Civil liberties would be alive and thriving with Frank Church in the White House.

Intelligence Community During the past year, the two great causes of Frank Church's career—civil liberties and curbing foreign policy excesses—came together in the single most precarious and exacting assignment of his years in the Senate. Frank Church was made Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee charged with investigating and cleansing the Internal Revenue Service, the FBI, the CIA and a host of other secret and powerful government agencies. The reforms now under way are the proof of how well Frank Church handled his assignment.

Public Candor Frank Church has built another public record—a life of personal honesty and public candor. He has supported virtually every legislative proposal for political disclosure. Moreover, if he had his way, the law would require every candidate for Congress, including incumbents, to disclose their personal income and assets. Since 1964, Frank Church has voluntarily published a complete accounting of his personal finances.
And what do the people of Idaho—the people who have known him all his life—think of Frank Church?

They have elected him four times by landslide margins.

Frank Church is a native of Idaho, born July 25, 1924, in Boise, where his mother still lives. His pioneer grandfather settled in Idaho City—the center of a gold rush—shortly after the Civil War.

While still in high school, Church won a national oratorical contest, and met the girl he would one day marry—Bethine Clark. Bethine's father, Chase A. Clark, was governor of Idaho, so she shared Frank Church's fascination with public service. They were married June 21, 1947. They have two sons, Chase, born September 20, 1957, a University of Idaho freshman, and Forrest, born September 23, 1948. Forrest is now a minister in Boston. His wife, Amy, is Dean of Students at Harvard Divinity School.

Bethine and Frank Church are widely recognized as one of the most happily married couples in Washington. Bethine is as much a student of politics and government as her husband.

"If candidates for First Lady were placed on the ballot," he says, "she would strengthen the ticket."

The Churches were married after the Senator returned from World War II. He had enlisted, at the age of 18, as a private, and was commissioned a lieutenant on his 20th birthday. As a military intelligence officer in the China-Burma-India Theater, he was awarded the bronze star. He is a member of the Infantry Hall of Fame at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Church left the Army in 1945 to enter Stanford University, where he received his undergraduate degree. He excelled in debating and was graduated Phi Beta Kappa. Upon completing his law studies at Stanford, Church returned to Boise to begin practice. Four years later, in 1956, at the age of 32, he became one of the youngest persons ever elected to the U.S. Senate.

He was re-elected in 1962, 1968 and 1974. Today, at the age of 51, he is one of the most respected figures in the national government.

The long years of seasoning that prepare a natural leader for the Presidency are over.

Frank Church is ready.
WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1975

Vol. 121

SENATOR CHURCH

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on September 21—last Sunday—Parade magazine carried a cover story on our colleague, Senator Frank Church. This article was given nationwide circulation.

It found Church to be an articulate portrait of a man who can only be described as a legislator, and I commend it to any of my colleagues who missed it.

To that end, Mr. President, I ask unanimously that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

Ben, Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, would like to be elected President of the United States next year. So, too, would a dozen other Democrats, declared and undeclared.

At 81, however, Church seems more qualified than most. He is honest, intelligent, semi-charismatic personality, but most important, experienced.

A boy wonder of sorts, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1956, at age 32, the youngest Senator in the 85th Congress and then the fifth youngest in the history of the Senate.

Frank Church is into his fourth term, the first Democratic Senator from Idaho to be so honored, and he ranks 11th in seniority, which means he has power, prestige and precedents.

Soon he will become a nationwide TV celebrity as chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Interminably the Committee, with its revelations of questionable and illegal behavior by the CIA and FBI, has made headlines and prime time.

But open TV hearings in Watergate are scheduled to get underway any day now if they haven't already. And possibly TV will do for Frank Church what it did for Ben, Sam Ervin of North Carolina. It will boom him into a household name, a political celebrity, a widely known personality.

POLITICAL FAMILY

Senator Church's wife is one of the most politically knowledgeable of all Congressional wives. Her father, the late Federal Judge Chase A. Clark, was Governor of Idaho; her uncle was also a governor; her cousin, the late Worth Clark, was a U.S. Senator. Says Mrs. Church: "Frank is not thinking about the Presidency, he is concentrating on the intelligence investigation and his other committee hearings. Ever since his bout with cancer, he's been pretty much of a recluse. When he was 24 the doctors gave him about six months to live."

Frank Porter Church was born in Boise, Idaho, on July 25th, 1918, into the conservative Republican family of Frank and Laura Church, who owned a sporting goods store.

When young Church was in Boise High School, he won first prize in the American Legion's National Americanism Oratorical Contest. It won him a $4000 scholarship to any college of his choice.

In 1945 he chose Stanford University at Palo Alto, Cal., then after one term quit at 19 to enlist as a private in the U.S. Army. He was sent as an odd-man candidate to Ft. Benning and later shipped overseas to the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater as a military intelligence officer. After the war Church returned to Stanford where he made Phi Beta Kappa, earned his B.A., then married Jean Bethune Clark, and decided to enter Harvard Law School.

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

"At Harvard he came down with enucleating back pains. "At first," says his wife, "we thought it was the climate of that place."

"But life in Palo Alto did nothing to relieve the back pain. Finally we found the cause: cancer of the testicles and abdomen. They operated and discovered that the cancer had spread to the lymph nodes. They pronounced it incurable, predicting death within six months."

"They were wrong," Church says proudly. "This was an X-ray treatment. At that time he was one of the leading authorities in cancer at the Stanford Medical School. When he looked at the pathology report, the biopsy analysis, he said that what he had was a very rare type of cancer, frequently confused with incurable malignancy, but that in fact it was a type of cancer which was highly responsive to X-ray treatment."

Dr. WOOD'S TREATMENT

"Dr. Wood insisted that I be given the full course of X-ray treatment, and in the end that saved my life."

Says Mrs. Church: "It was truly a miracle. There he was 6 feet tall and down to a little more than 60 pounds. The X-rays burned into him, turning him increasingly nauseous. It was an almost unbearable. I read to him aloud during the treatments trying to divert his mind, trying to beat the names, trying to hold him. He did, yes, he did, and he beat it."

Trimm, athletic, in good health, Church says, "Whenever I go out to Walter Reed or the National Institutes of Health for my yearly physical, they tell me 'I'm lucky to be alive. I tell them 'I'm lucky to have Bethune. It was her determination which pulled me through.'"

Like most men who have cheated death, Frank Church believes passionately in the nobleness of life. "Right now," he declares, "what I want most is to do a creditable job in this present Intelligence investigation that I'm heading, because I think that perhaps the most important service I can render in my whole career in the Senate."

CIA MURDER PLOTS

Of all the sins and crimes the CIA has been accused of, Church says, "The most shocking is that the agency was involved in murder plots and murder attempts directed against foreign governments with which we were at war. These particular attempts were directed against small countries whose leaders could never have been a real threat to the United States."

"I think that when the committee makes its report, it will be clear that in these cases there was malicious prosecution, an urgent national interest that had to be protected."

"But we should make certain that the future that assassination never again becomes an instrument of American foreign policy."

Church believes that it was a suggested instrument during four administrations—Eisenhower's, Kennedy's, Johnson's, and Nixon's—when an operation in San Francisco which tends to show that the CIA may have been behind, like a consultant or a handmaiden."

"I am not in favor of abolishing the agency; it's not a sin," he says. "I am for re-structuring. The laws governing the agency
need to be more strictly drawn. The control of the agency needs to be tightened.

One thing that is clear from the present investigations is that the agency itself is sometimes too authority more broadly than those concerned have intended. The question here is whether the future we will have to be more careful that the President, through the CIA, does not have too much control over the agency. Also it may be possible to establish a joint committee on the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, so that we may make certain that the committee is fully empowered to deal with intelligence.

"By that I mean it must have the authority to determine the money they should have. It must have full authority to know at all times what is happening, to know the full scope of covert operations. It must be advised in advance or concurrently of decisions that are made in this field so that the committee can make sure that the agency is living with the law." Church is unsure whether the CIA should or should not partake in covert operations.

"As regards covert activities," he says, "I think the agency is probably most proud of the support it gave to the constituting of democratic governments in Western Europe in the period following World War II. Now that kind of covert activity at least conforms to our traditional values. I'm not speaking of the methods that are used. I'm speaking of the objectives. The worst example of excess is that in each of the administrations, we have done covert things. But I don't think we have done covert things in the CIA."

I think that, in the future, we should not become too sanctimonious about the covert activities. And it may be better to have the CIA take responsibility in the business of operating an intelligence agency and not just to gather intelligence. We need to be careful about what we are doing and what we are signing. The CIA has been very successful in gathering the information we need for our own defense and to conduct an informed foreign policy.

I would say, and the agency itself would today admit, that 85 percent or 95 percent of the intelligence that is gathered comes from other covert sources or through the cooperation of governments that are friendly to the agency. The old clock-and-dagger work which is connected with the Espionage Act of the past accounts for precious little.

According to the Senator, the intelligence agency obtains the least amount of information from undercover agents in Communist countries.

A REAL JOB TO DO

"I have no objections whatever," he maintains, "to the utilization of whatever means are at our disposal to collect essential information about foreign governments and their intentions and capabilities. That's intelligence work. I think most of it will come from our technical capabilities, but even if clandestine operations are necessary, I have no objection to them if they are confined to that purpose. But when it comes to manipulating events abroad through covert actions, then the first thing you must realize is that it's not intelligence. That is a method of concealed interference in the affairs of others. In order to manipulate events abroad through covert actions, you must have the moneys of the central state that the agency it's always been possible for the agency itself to conceal its authority more broadly than those concerned have intended."

Church also has the subcommittees investigating multinational corporations such as International Telephone and Telegraph (which offered the CIA a million dollars to intervene in Chile), Exxon, Merkator, and Lockheed for which years we have regularly been bribing government officials overseas. "What you have here," he explained, "is that the American intelligence community and the American big-business community taking part in the internal affairs of foreign countries. We would not tolerate it if it were done to us. That's the double standard we live with all the time."

FEMINISM A BREEZE

What Church hopes to do in the weeks to come in his open interest hearings is to demonstrate the dangers that are implicit in the spreading use of illegal methods of surveillance, improper mail openings, and various other ways of spying on the American people.

"I suppose," he offers, "that George Orwell would have called it Big Brother government in this country. The sad truth is that the methods first adopted by law enforcement and intelligence agencies like the FBI and CIA have spread to other departments of the government. And if this isn't exposed and checked, then it could continue to grow into the beginnings of a police state in this country."

"I want to dramatize the dangers so that there will be ample public support for the changes in the law that must come to prevent this from happening further.

"George Williams, one of the much beloved professors of history at Harvard Divinity School, said to me one time something that I have always remembered. You can't be very careful, you will grow to be more like Big Brother. After World War II the Soviet Union became our perceived enemy and we undertook to contain the Russians everywhere in the world.

"CONWAY WOAH SWEAT"

"To just list their methods we said we had to treat fire with fire. And in the process of course, we've become more like them. In a free society that can go only so far. We become our own worst enemy if we bring down a free society in the very name of defending it."

The Senator, having been a schoolboy ora- tor, is, of course, a loquacious man. He has been accused of being overbearing, a Boy Scout, too sincere, self-righteous, and a goosey-goody who's in thrall with the sound of his own voice.

When Church became one of the first Senators to oppose the Vietnam war, an angry Lyndon Johnson began referring to him as Frank "Sunday School" Church. Later, apoplectic John Birchers in Idaho called him a "Commie-Sniper," tried by petition to remove him from office by charging breach.

Convinced that the President did not have the right to order American troops into combat in Vietnam without Congressional consent, he spoke in his mind that the American involvement in Vietnam was a tragic mistake. Church refused to be swayed then by well-meaning friends who told him he was committing political suicide. In the end he was proved right.

Altho'he is a pragmatist and willing to compromise—'I've always had the pragmatic view that you might have to legislate, and so regrettably, I'll have to do it.'—Church says the reality of the possible—Church is recognized by most of Congress as an expert in intelligence."

"Frankly," says one veteran Senator, "I'm not interested in what sort of image Church projects. Some members around here think he'd be better off if he stopped playing Mr. Clean, or Mr. High Guy or Mr. Senator. I'm not interested in that. What interests me is the kind of work a Senator puts out. Church does good work. He does his homework. His work is hard and long. I don't care about his style. I care about his substance. He's got plenty of that. One day he was presiding over the Committee and said that he would do a good job as Bill Fulbright did."

"Another Senator, 'Personally I like Church. He's pleasant, intelligent, hard nosed but not so like. But if you ask him what time it is, he will give you the very real danger of getting an answer on the history of watchmaking.'"

A NEWSPAPER VIEW

A journalist who's covered Church for some claims the Idaho Senator is 'suspicious because he never denounces anyone as a 'stupid son-of-a-bitch,' he doesn't tell tall color stories; he drinks hardly at all, and has a political braintrust in his wife the lines of which few other Senators have. Bethine Church is the ideal campaigner. Whether he gone, she goes, a politically supportive spark plug."

Frank Church is aware of his Boy Scout image and laughs at it. "They keep calling me a Boy Scout. I mean, I never got beyond Boy Scout Second Class."

"They also keep calling him the American Legion leader who uses words portentously says his wife. But he's not one bit portentous. I think Frank likes words. I think he's a Johnson-type on his feet. He's in China during the war where he wrote letters to me and they became_Finalds and ended with Love, Pesty. In between they omitted the word and then and there it was actually happening in China at that time."

Frank Church is a man of humor and laughs at himself more than anyone I know. And he has the kind of humor and laughs at himself more than anyone I know."

"Just because he comes through as being very careful and serious on these intelligence hearings doesn't mean he's that way about himself at all."

Church is serious about matters of principle. And he believes that the people's right to privacy and freedom has been violated on occasion by the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, the Post Office, the Secret Service and other government agencies."

"I'm pretty relaxed about most things," he concludes. "But when it comes to the growing tendency to danger to freedom in this country, when it comes to Big Brother government, I want to fight them. If I see it in our lifetime, I'm not relaxed about that. I'm alarmed."
SENATOR CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED CAREER

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, last Sunday, the Washington Post Potomac magazine and the Washington Star both featured stories about the career of the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church).

Myra MacPherson, the author of the Potomac article, and Norman Kempster, who wrote the Star piece, have both pointed out what all of us who serve with Senator Church know full well. I have known Frank Church for 20 years and greatly admire him and hold him in the highest personal esteem. He approaches his tasks with meticulous and firm resolve. He is conscientious and independent. And, I might add, he would make an excellent President.

I commend these articles to the attention of my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that the Potomac cover story and the Washington Star feature article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Star, June 15, 1975]

THE POLITICAL SPOTLIGHT SWINGS TOWARD
FRANK CHURCH

(By Norman Kempster)

"Senator Church and I are good friends," Henry A. Kissinger said, oozing mock good will. "He calls me 'Henry' and I call him 'Cooper.'"

The line, delivered as after dinner repartee at one of those black tie events that simulate bipartisan fun, was intended to be the ultimate put-down: After almost two decades in the Senate, Frank Church was little more than second billing on the Cooper-Church amendment that restricted U.S. military activity in Indochina.

There is some truth to that. Although he has been at the center of legislative battles on emotional issues ranging from social security to Vietnam to giant oil companies, Church has not become a household word. A recent Gallup poll showed that only about one out of four Americans had ever heard of him.
Frank's always had that problem of the American Legion order. It hurts him in his political future. Some feel he's over doing it more than the critical thing. I think the chances are slim that he'll make his last visit down there and then he'll have to come out of the ground. But then there seems to be no deeper feeling to belong. He often uses the phrase, "I am resigning the whole thing and...". However, he has expressed his genuine desire to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee again, and if that was to happen, the chances for his being chairman would be even better.

Another bane to the Church is that he had never been a member of the Vice President or the Presidency for that matter. It was his first time that he had a feeling of a real responsibility. The Five Democrats had announced their candidacy, "they are all tied up for the lead." But the church is not concerned about the economic and its future, could a public official do more with the President and the public rally behind a Gentleman Candidate? Could another New York paper by the Democratic candidate and almost anyone can be considered running. Church has not a candidate of the first order, independent. He does not stand in the same league, not something up to other people's values.

But yes, they tell me the Church had the desired desire of those other guys would lie outside the process.

I think most of the men would be a new and excellent man in the country. They are already "good people," but there is no reason they should be excluded from this. "What is the point?"... but the church is also a good way of writing things as unusual, and effective. It is very effective on everything he's ever done.

Undoubtedly, as far as the present time, the Church has not been able to reach the people of the American Indian. But, there are great people the Church has not addressed. In the next period, a Church member, a Church man has seen something in front of the church change in front of an audience of the American Indian. The Church may be on those who indulge in the unconventional Washington assert.

Students cheer now that he is calling for a more "non-party" in the political campaign. He probably is the one who I think is a great way of working things as unusual, and effective. It is very effective on everything he's ever done.

The President continues to non-existent emergencies. His older son, the President's and secret service, since the eighth grade. His firm smug and managed to persuade some of the wealthiest and most powerful, and the most powerful, and the most powerful, and the most powerful, and the most powerful, and the most powerful.

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When the President was asked what he was going to do about the tax reform proposal for his first term, he said, "I am going to bring in a tax reform proposal for my first term." He had been asked by a reporter if he was going to run for re-election in 1980. He replied, "I am not sure, but I am considering it." He had been a strong supporter of the tax reform proposal when it was introduced in Congress.

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That all could change soon. Frank Church is shutting between the chairmanship of two important committees—the special panel investigating the CIA and a Foreign Relations subcommittee of the Senate investigating the over-Sea Treaty by such American corporations as MCA, and the CIA.

The failure of the commission headed by Your Honor, Judge Fahy, to complete its report on a revolution in government, the CIA investigation, is for me that the Senate committee will all the blanks left by the Rockefeller commission.

Church is going about his investigation with a single-minded, objective goal. His committee has been the most resolvent of the two, or any others, to press for the right to go ahead and get the background of the line of operation. Staletime at energy policy had been shaped for 50 years by a secret agreement. Thus in October 1964.

Church first registered his opposition to Vietnam policy in 1962 when he objected to the plan to bomb the Tonkin Gulf in Vietnam. His opposition was sporadic. He voted for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, but shortly after that he became a firm and public opponent of U.S. involvement. And he has been re-elected three times since then, in his first lost time.

One, for the first time, Church has avoided the pitfall that led to the defeat of such Senate figures as W. E. Borah and William Borah in 1920. Church, who ran for the presidency in 1946, had been re-elected three times since then, in his first lost time.
Church says Bethine is the greatest inducement on his life. "She is aware of all the pressures. Probably one reason we have a happy marriage is that we understand all of politics," he says, if someone were to go through his life, he prated at the podium. He got national publicity before his election as governor. It is a bag where many included such lines as "only an awakening of some of the rednecks. A lexicon raise a standard around which the great investment in television that we can rally," Many contemporaries went to step. A long-time friend recalls, "They are a marvelous opportunity to break down the national scenes, and, frankly, blow it with superficial reality. You don't get a chance to blow too many chances. Maybe he's more and this with his CWA business." "They really caught my ear and shaked his head about that speech. With a laugh he says, "Don't think so, "All I care about in my defense is--I didn't know any better."

On the Senate floor, "Who is usually introduces me and then we answer questions. After, she circulated and I circulated through the floor."

One former aide said, "Occasionally we had to ask the police, there are only two senators from Idaho--and she isn't one of them."

When Fein first ran for other, Bethine drove the car for him and, to counter his image, she attended public school, usually actually push you out the door. His low-education is as much on his upbringing as possible and by the end of the campaign, the church arranged between his finger and thumb on his shaking hand is hard and hard. A story that he was precise that Church was prancing his thumb too hard without breaking his hand.

In 1966, Church's opponent hammered away at his (Church) anti-Semitism and other domestic legislation, his doe stances and support of the Vietnam War was the biggest threat. His 1974 opponent did the same and was aided by a pamphlet that Church himself distributed. More than 56% of the votes went to Church. That's enough for some states but for Idaho, one staffer said, "any Democratic victory is considered a landslide." Church won the first time with 54.5% in 1966 and a whopping 64% in 1968. Church wins by doing deliberately parochial back home, stressing his ability to best represent the people, and his fun-loving state, where practically everyone is a hunter, he said. One suicide in mon- tion--he vouchsafes fights gun registration legislation.

Church's multi-national subcommittee findings were more important to enthusiasts in detailing such areas as the involvement of the international corporations with foreign policy and developing the CIA link in China. Church he was determined to write a report less assertive and aggressive than his more flashy hearings; some on the Hill wonder if Church was more for the CIA than rather than for affecting legislation and policy.

For example, a Church-Hart bill for a federal government agency to act as a purchasing agent for all United States oil imports has been described as "un-creditable, unworkable and impossible by some in the administration." The oil industry, The proposal is designed to weaken the power of OPEC's government-owned companies. Church denies such governments in general would purchase oil under a secret bidding system and might then begin to make the private companies. John Lintott, executive director of the Petroleum Industry, the American Petroleum Institute, an independent consultant working with both industry and government agencies--argues, "What is to prevent OPEC from turning the tables and submitting a collective bid above the prevailing world market price? Our only options would be to accept the bid or do without OPEC. They know we won't accept the second choice." Church says "I don't think the government is the blackest at all. There is no indication they would respond this way. That would be like being black and that he is black and put the end to all the large. They're now getting their way and we're not going to lose on their part as well." He added casual- ly, "This bill makes it clear that if companies don't want any interference in their business, they have to pay.

Church underlines that the bill refers to any company that has a bill that is 1986, he was a happy and confident man. The rest of the committee just wanted it all to go away.

He was the only shiah who promoted on All That's Done. The Tenn. Post-Gazette said that one of the best was how the report of would come out if we did not have the "Bethine's and crew. The State Department and the Defense Department are coming to stop and he just blasted them all to get where they are. The best man for the job." Things that had previously been cumbersome."

In 1968, Church will come back to another one to 16 or 12 companies, plan- ning, as Russell in Idaho, "a long, hot summer for U.S. companies that are already necessary--cost of doing business abroad."

Church's book is a guide to those who run a political life. "He told me, "I'm not a politician. It's not the job that you get elected. But if you have to do it."

In earlier days, the Churches allowed politicians to approve on their private time--weekend embassy dinners, Idaho where probes' report had staff phone calls at night. "The kids didn't complain, but pretty much no we were going to do these things together," recalls Church. They recalled that politics were interfering and creating a dia- logue between economic political, they felt (Church), now 18. "I don't want to be married, is married, and has just been, quickened that she was asked. "This is the first time since 1865 that I've been married. It was a tough time for me."

In Idaho, Bethine is well known as the city of a very strong political will. Church's father was a U.S. District judge and a former governor. Next to his wife and his daughter, Bethine, Church served in the Burma-China-India theater as an Army major and became the biggest problem on the Burma road was not always the Japa- nese who were sabotaging it. American troops. But the time Church ate was well known and was, strangely, the evening of the Japanese surrender. When his plane landed in Hanoi the Americans faced row on row of crack Japanese units in perfect formation. Church thought for a moment, "This is absolute insanity. Who says they're going to give up and just walk back?" and he came through and all was peaceful.

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"As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, Senator Frank Church has been the leading voice in Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans."

--The National Council of Senior Citizens

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT ON BEHALF OF OLDER AMERICANS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, the Senate Committee on Aging was created in 1961 to be a focal point and advocate in the Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans.

Today the Committee on Aging has 23 members—making it the second largest committee in the Senate just after the Appropriations Committee.

The Committee on Aging is superbly served by its chairman, Senator FRANK CHURCH.

As the former chairman and now the ranking majority member of the committee, I have been impressed by his leadership, his fundamental grasp of the issues, his innate decency, and his legislative skills.

He became chairman of the committee in 1971. During that time, he has been in the forefront in advancing legislation on behalf of older Americans, including:

- Enactment of the 20-percent social security increase in 1972, the largest dollar raise by far in the history of the program.
- Establishment of a cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to make social security benefits inflation-proof for the elderly.
- Approval of amendments to strengthen the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.

Recently the National Council of Senior Citizens compiled a listing of some of Senator CHURCH's major legislative achievements for the elderly.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this summary, entitled "Senator Frank Church: A Distinguished Record of Achievement"—be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATOR FRANK CHURCH: A DISTINGUISHED RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT

As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, Senator Frank Church has been the leading voice in Congress on behalf of aged and aging Americans. He has consistently been in the forefront on everyday issues of direct concern to the elderly. And, his legislative accomplishments in the field of aging have been unequaled by any other Member of Congress. Among his major achievements—either as the sponsor or cosponsor of legislation:

Enactment of a 20-percent Social Security increase in 1972, which enabled more than 1 million Americans to escape from poverty.

Enactment of a two-step, 11-percent Social Security increase in 1974. Senator Church personally led the fight for the interim 7 percent Social Security hike by winning the support of 57 cosponsors in the Senate.

Enactment of a new cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to protect Social Security beneficiaries from the harsh impact of inflation. Increased Social Security benefits in 1973 for more than 3 million aged widows, who represent one of the most economically disadvantaged groups in our society.

Extension of Medicare coverage to 1.7 million disabled Social Security beneficiaries under age 65.

Enactment of a national hot meals program for persons 60 and over in conveniently located centers. Nearly 240,000 older Americans now receive meals under the Title VII nutrition program for the elderly.

Passage of the Older Americans Comprehensive Services Amendments of 1973 to (a) provide new and improved community services for elderly persons; (b) strengthen the Administration on Aging; (c) establish model programs to come to grips with the practical problems and challenges of aged and aging Americans, including services for the handicapped, preretirement counseling, and continuing education; and (d) creation of a transportation program to help the immobile elderly.

Enactment of a two-step, 11-percent Social Security increase in 1974. Senator Church personally led the fight for the interim 7 percent Social Security hike by winning the support of 57 cosponsors in the Senate.

Allowing States greater flexibility in providing social services for former and potential aged public assistance recipients.

Exempting the value of maintenance and support furnished by private, nonprofit retirement homes in determining eligibility for Supplemental Security Income benefits. Thus, the subsidized portion in a nonprofit home for the aged will no longer be considered as unearned income and will not reduce or eliminate the individual's SSI payments.

Blocking the Administration's proposed 5 percent ceiling for the 1975 Social Security cost-of-living adjustment—thus allowing older Americans to receive the full 8 percent increase as authorized by law.

Creation of a nationwide community education program to provide recreational, educational, and a variety of other community services for the young and old alike.

Establishment of a model program to make home health services more readily available to provide alternatives to unnecessary and more costly forms of institutionalization.

On other fronts, Senator Church is also working for the enactment of additional important legislation, including:

Establishment of an independent, nonpolitical Social Security Administration outside the Department of HEW; a recipient's maintenance in a nonprofit home for the aged will no longer be considered as unearned income and will not reduce or eliminate the individual's SSI payments.

Coverage of essential out-of-hospital prescription drugs under Medicare.

Extending the definition of the Older Americans Act to enable more elderly persons to continue to live independently in their own homes.

An older Americans Home Repair and Winterization Act.

Extension and expansion of the Older American Community Service Employment Act to provide new job opportunities for elderly persons.

Extension of the cost-of-living adjustment mechanism to persons receiving Social Security benefits.

Authorization of two Social Security cost-of-living adjustments a year during periods of accelerated inflation.

UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C. 20510

Q

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AMERICANS . . . And The Law

An address by Senator Frank Church on the growing lawlessness in the United States.

"That sense of community -- of the duty each citizen owed to his fellow citizens -- seems to be evaporating. A social cannibalism is emerging in its place. We are beginning to feed on each other. We are taking rather than giving. Selfishness is displacing scruples about the common good."

-- Senator Frank Church

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Senate

AMERICANS AND THE LAW

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. Church) has drawn our attention in a recent speech to a growing lawlessness abroad in the land. As he points out, this is not simply the conventional lawlessness of garden-variety criminals, but worse, the growing lawlessness of those who traditionally set the lawful example. Some of our most prominent corporate and governmental leaders have strayed from the ethical habits of this Nation in recent years. And perhaps worst of all, some of our law enforcement agencies have not been true to the law.

Mr. President, this is a speech that spotlights a growing weakness at the top of our society, which fosters a general disrespect for the law at every level. It is worth wider attention, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from this remarkable address.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

EXCERPT FROM A SPEECH BY SENATOR CHURCH

Of late, the seems to have lost much of its traditional respect, and not just because of the growth in conventional crimes. Ordinary criminals have never respected the law. We seem to have come to the disquieting point
today where citizens who are normally law abiding have taken to bending the law and even to breaking it.

That sense of community—of the duty each citizen owes to his fellow citizens—seems to be evaporating. A social cannibalism is emerging in its place. We are beginning to feed on each other. We are taking rather than giving. Selfishness is displacing scruples about the common good.

This feeds a spreading anarchy which takes on different forms. It reaches into the workplaces of our land.

In frustration over the exorbitant price of bread, the longshoremen refuse to load wheat sold to Russia. Their refusal has nothing to do with wages or working conditions. But rather with their opposition to the sale. The law is disregarded. By refusing to load the grain, the union displaces the government and usurps for itself the right to determine trade policies.

Lacking a law which requires binding arbitration, a New York teachers union defies a court order against a strike, rather than taking an appeal to a higher court. What do those teachers now tell the children who find given laws personally inconvenient?

And this audience remembers well that the police in San Francisco recently staged an illegal strike and ignored court orders, while packing pistols on the picket line. If the police can defy public order, then the army is next. No society can long endure strikes against the public health or safety.

We must insist that the government provide mechanisms for settling grievances of public employees, and public employees must—in turn—work through legal channels to accomplish their economic goals. Otherwise essential public services will collapse. And the very fabric of our society will start to unravel.

But, lest there be any thought that public employees are alone in flouting the law, we have only to look to the boardrooms of our largest corporations. For the past two years, as a matter of fact, I have been peering into those boardrooms, as part of the inquiry being conducted by my Subcommittee on Multi-national Corporations. This is what we have found:

ITT secretly offering the CIA a million dollars to prevent Allende, lawfully elected by the people of Chile, from becoming President. In return, the longshoremen refusing to load wheat, this giant corporation sought to usurp for itself the right to determine the course of American foreign policy.

Exxon parceling out 27 million dollars in illegal political contributions in Italy in return for economic favors from the government.

Gulf Oil doling out four million dollars in illegal corporate contributions in Korea.

Northrop paying an agent 450 thousand dollars for the purpose of bribing Saudi Arabian generals.

United Fruit slipping the President of Honduras 1.2 million dollars to lower the export tax on bananas.

Lockheed admitting illegal payments to government officials in countries around the globe ... in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and in the Far East, amounting in the aggregate to many millions of dollars.

All of this wrong-doing is acknowledged by straight-faced executives who say they had to break the law in order to get the business. The excuse, after all, is written plainly in the adage, "When In Rome. . . ."

But the excuse is hollow. The bad habits of Rome were brought home to America. The roster of companies that made illegal corporate contributions to the Nixon campaign in 1972 include many of the companies which have turned to bribery abroad. If we condone bribery of foreign officials, we will sow the seeds of corruption in our own land.

Perhaps the most depressing aspect of this corporate lawlessness is that it is authorized at the highest executive levels. These corrupt practices are not aberrations engineered by underlings. They are corporate policy.

Contempt for the law has come to reside in the boardrooms of some of the largest companies. Unless we support the moral and honest among our business leaders we are in danger of sinking into a quagmire of corporate lawlessness.

My work on the foreign relations committee has revealed another very disturbing area of the executive branch's disregard for the law:

The Export Administration Act of 1969 declares it to be the "policy of the United States to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries." It also requires that the Department of Commerce be notified of any requests for compliance with such boycotts.

Yet, the Department of Commerce distributes, through unscrupulous American businessmen, a notice from the Government of Iraq, detailing intentions to buy 3.550 prefabricated buildings. The bid specifications disseminated by the Department included a requirement that would force any U.S. firm bidding on the project to support an economic boycott of Israel, a direct violation of official government policy.

And at whose request was the Commerce Department distributing these Iraqi bid specifications?

None other than our own State Department.

In justification of this outrageous breach of law, the Secretary of Commerce urges that a refusal to distribute such specifications would deny U.S. firms "prompt access to business opportunities in the Arab markets . . ."

On September 19, the Secretary of Defense informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Defense Department plans to sell one and a half billion dollars of military planning, design and foreign military work to Saudi Arabia under the foreign military sales act.

Hearings I chaired have revealed United States Government compliance with Saudi discriminatory boycott and visa regulations on such construction projects in the past.

Yesterday Senator Clifford Case and I informed Secretary Schlesinger by letter that we would fight this billion and a half sale unless we receive assurances of complete adherence to the principles of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in all aspects of the sale and construction.

What is missing in the Administration's position on the boycott and visa restrictions is a decent respect for the basic principles on which the republic was founded. Our principles—not theirs!

The situation we now face is not without historical precedent. On December 17, 1911, President Taft abrogated a lucrative trade agreement with Czarist Russia which was shortly to go into effect because the latter refused visas to American Jews. In May 1885, the United States was informed by the Austrian government that Mr. Anthony Kelley would be unacceptable as envoy extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna, "The position of a foreign envoy wedded to
a Jewess by civil marriage would be untenable and even impossible in Vienna.”

The Secretary of State Bayard replied in these terms:

“It is not within the power of the President nor of Congress, nor of any judicial tribunal in the United States, to take or even hear evidence, or in any mode to inquire into or decide upon the religious beliefs of any official, and the proposition to allow this to be done by any foreign government is necessarily and a fortiori inadmissible.

To suffer an infraction of this essential principle would lead to a disfranchisement of our citizens because of their religious belief, and thus impair or destroy the most important end which our constitution of Government was intended to secure.”

Would that we had today a President and Secretary of Commerce equally sensitive to the “most important end which our constitution of Government was intended to secure.”

But it is not only members of the corporate leadership which seek to evade the law. Government leaders as well invent specious rationalizations to evade the clear intent of the Congress.

I would like to think that the high fever point of our national afflication of disregarding the law came a year ago, with the resignation of Richard Nixon, when proof of his unlawful conduct finally forced him out of office, a step ahead of impeachment. The lesson of that painful ordeal is that, if we are to restore respect for the law to a position of primacy in our society, we will have to begin at the top.

Within the Federal Government, the place to start is with the keepers of the law—those agencies charged with law enforcement and secret intelligence activities. If they won’t respect the law, who will?

The investigation of these agencies—the FBI and the CIA—by the Senate Committee I chair came about as a result of widespread charges of unlawful conduct and wrongdoing. We know now that the CIA has toyed with murder abroad—in league with the Mafia, no less! The FBI has admitted to a whole series of infractions, unrelated to law enforcement, but directed instead toward the harassment of law-abiding citizens.

Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote:

“Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subject to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizens. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”

Happily, such wisdom is not the sole province of learned jurists. A few days ago, a chicken farmer up in Pennsylvania approached me to ask if it were true that the CIA had worked with the Mafia. When I told him, “Yes,” it was true, he looked down at the ground, pushed at the dirt with his foot, and said:

“Senator, how will I ever teach my kids to grow up honest, when the government, itself, goes partners with the underworld?”

It is with such matters that the Senate Intelligence Committee must deal. The scope of our inquiry ranges far beyond attempted assassinations abroad. Indeed, the whole sordid subject of murder plots formed no part of the Committee’s original mission. It was dropped in our laps when the Rockefeller Commission ducked it, and President Ford passed it on to us to deal with. Since then, the Committee has taken over eight thousand pages of testimony, interrogated nearly a hundred witnesses, examined a vast array of documents, and compiled a record on the assassination issue alone that compares in size to the entire investigation of the Senate Watergate Committee.

All of this work has been conducted in executive sessions, behind closed doors. But the Committee intends to publish soon a full and detailed report of its findings. Doubtlessly, public hearings on such a subject, telecast to every corner of the globe, would have played to an unprecedented audience. The political box office, however, would have been far exceeded by the political damage that such a proceeding would inflict upon the United States. Hence the Committee chose closed hearings, to be followed by a full disclosure in the form of a printed report.

Now, as the Committee goes into open hearings, we will focus on unlawful conduct by the CIA and the FBI. We are investigating the FBI and the CIA against law-abiding American citizens. To what degree have these agencies, established to spy on foreign governments and fend off foreign spies, turned their techniques inward to spy on the American people instead?

That is a vital question, not only for what it tells us about our government today, but for what it portends for the future.

I don’t know whether Big Brother Government waits for us, as we enter the third century of our Republic. Big Brother may still be the fictional figment or an Orwellian imagination, but the electronic hardware to sustain his rule exists in the American Government today. It has already been invented. It has been built. And it is in use.

In the need to know what foreign governments—some of them potential enemies—are doing, our own government has projected an awesome technology that enables us, not only to spy from the sky, but also to monitor the messages that course through the air. We have in place and functioning the capability to eavesdrop on messages between ships at sea, between planes in the air, and military units in the field. We possess an amazing capacity to intercept messages of every kind, whether governmental or commercial, military or civilian, public or private wherever they are transmitted through the atmosphere.

The issue is how to keep that capacity outward-reaching in the service of legitimate national security needs. For if it were ever turned around, no American would have any privacy left, such is the government’s potential for monitoring any telephone conversation, any telegram, any unguarded conversation. There would, in short, be no place left to hide.

If an American President ever aspired to dictatorship, the existing technology of the Federal intelligence agencies could facilitate it. In his hands the means to impose near absolute surveillance. The most careful efforts to combine together in resistance, no matter how discreetly undertaken, would be within the reach of the tyrant to know. Such is the sweep of this technology.

That is why the Senate authorized this investigation, why I accepted its Chairmanship, and why this has been the most disturbing assignment of my career. It is now more apparent than ever to me that the agencies which control this technology must always operate strictly within the law, and under the close and continuing supervision of the Legislative, as well as the Executive Branch of our government.

I know first-hand the wartime worth of
intelligence-gathering, because I served with the Military Intelligence as a young Army officer in World War II. Now, as a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am fully aware of the great value of good intelligence in times of peace. Without it, an informed foreign policy could not be conducted; without it, nuclear arms controls could not be policed; without it, the United States would be left groping in a dangerous world.

But the maintenance of such agencies poses a dilemma for a free society. They must function in the most delicate of all realms: mandated to maintain security without impairing freedom. If they engage in wrongdoing, it is not a casual matter that can be safely swept under the rug. If the charges raised in the press, which gave rise to the investigation, should prove largely true, then it is urgent that we learn in time. If they prove largely false, then the investigation will serve to redeem the reputation of prestigious agencies which find their honor in upholding the law.

But even if the lawkeepers commence again to set a sound example for upholding the law, we must pull ourselves together as a people and reestablish a general respect for the law at every level. We must begin to assert a self-discipline which recognizes that everybody can't have everything at the expense of everyone else.

If we fail to restore a proper regard for the common good within the framework of the law, then creeping anarchy will gradually replace the rule of law altogether. In its wake will surely come the repressive measures that a frightened people will then find preferable. There can be no successful preservation of liberty outside the law.

The foremost example of lawful conduct must come from the top. But a proper regard for the law must be regenerated throughout—in the treatment of one citizen by another, in the self-discipline exercised by our great unions and in the lofty centers of corporate power.

Indeed, there is some hope on that score. Certain unions in financially-beleaguered New York City have agreed to wage freezes during the current fiscal emergency. Police and firemen in other cities, recognizing their duty to protect life and property, have urged the adjudication of their grievances in lieu of striking. And many American corporations have sacrificed business at home and abroad, rather than adopt dishonest methods.

But much sturdier political leadership is needed if a decent regard for the general welfare is to be regained. It will not come from the politicians who practice and encourage a double-standard, who reject lawbreaking from one quarter with a mailed fist, while accepting it from another with a welcoming hand. These politicians offer us no solutions, because they are part of the problem.

Adlai Stevenson, as civilized a man as ever sought the Presidency, tried to tell us: "As citizens of this democracy," he said, "you are the rulers and the ruled, the law-givers and the law-abiding—the beginning and the end."

I know Adlai Stevenson would agree that, if we don't regain our respect for the law and for each other, then our generation will be, in this our 200th year, not merely the end of a great beginning, but the beginning of the end.
A day in the Washington swirl of a senator who has arrived—or
A Church Without a State

By staff writer Jay Shelly and photographer Barry Keogh

WASHINGTON — Although he won't admit it, Frank Church must be a lonely man.

Viewed by many of his home constituents as a whipped-up-by-colleges, corporately律师, liberal intellectual and Washington whirligig star, Joseph Biden now appears to be anything but. As he so rarely

sees any of the dozens of events of the senior senator, the man who daily shakes hands with presidents, predictors and power brokers.

It would seem he must be in any way of this East Or Congress, sheriff in a cowboy hat and screaming by the mouth. That is not so. He is instead a personal, straight-talking wonder. And he has become the darling of the aspiring Establishment that recently
discarded him. Which is why the Senate Appropriations Committee, that usually takes a vote without a show, this time invited Frank Church

to its meeting last week. He was the only senator to be invited this year.

The Eastern Establishment and its marquee figures often disagree over domestic issues. But they do not have a driving source for
growing and power. And so Church is a welcome star. In the Senate.

The Church he is an exception. He is, after all, a young senator. He was trying to look out of check for a Federal Communications Commission meeting by

brushing his hair and slipping into his best, as if preparing for a major news conference. But Church will be growing less and less

seized of the Senate as long as he remains on the Appropriations Committee.

This is his first bread, given in the

important committee. Church is clearly a man of high potential.

The other, given to the women's movement, is his continuing to

make himself known in the business of national

The situation being presented by the security

was the start of the Central Intelligence Agency's hearing

on Senator Frank Church's future

in the Senate's Select

Committee on Intelligence.

Church has at least

seven years of Senate experience and is now the ranking

Republican member of the committee.

He has shown himself to be an eloquent, persuasive, and

fully-armed critic of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities.

But the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the Foreign

Affairs Committee has been under

scrutiny since the

Church hearings began.

Church's reputation as an independent

member of the Senate has been

damaged by the hearings on CIA activities.

The hearings have

damaged Church's chances of

being re-elected to the Senate.

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The making of a Church...

(Continued from page 60)

Vietnam. Shortly after the deposition-taking began, Church leaves to join with Rumsfeld in the Sassy dining room. They have made some John and Abe什除此之外, 聂罗姆塞尔德和刘xFusheken在小房间中, 聂白有是可增加大量的。Church's ejection of the author 2000 miles away from the scene... In the beginning, Church and... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... Church's... 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SWAMPLAND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

—report of the chairman of the senate intelligence committee
What if there's nothing left for her?

The need to provide for one's children is one of the most deeply felt emotions of mankind. When we look at our children we can't help wondering if there will be enough of the world's scarce resources left for them when they grow up—enough oil to provide heat, as well as fertilizer for food, enough energy to produce clothing and means of transport. Or will they be left desolate in a world we have depleted of all the fundamental resources?

Our diminishing resources are being spent at an incredible rate, and it is hard to imagine any incentive that would cause politicians who are elected today to make politically difficult decisions whose payoff will come tomorrow.

Present political programs make no allowance for the fact that, at current consumption rates, the world's supply of non-renewable resources will be gone in a century or less. What is needed is a group which can speak out on these questions, can find solutions for the technological problems involved, and can command worldwide respect and the ear of governments.

There is such a group in existence: Pugwash.

Pugwash is a movement which began in 1957 when a small group of scientists from East and West broke through the wall of suspicion that separated their nations. Basing their rapport on the objective language of science and their professional respect for one another, they formed "Pugwash," named after the small town in Nova Scotia where their first meeting was held. These world-famous scientists, many of them Nobel prize winners, have been meeting regularly since that year to solve the problems of nuclear war, weapons proliferation, over-population and hunger. They have worked with the objective tool of scientific knowledge and communicated their findings and accords to their governments. Their calm and lucid proceedings have been reported back to governments and have been responsible for significant breakthroughs in areas where governments have found it traditionally difficult to act.

Pugwash is giving serious consideration to the issues that revolve around the depletion of our diminishing resources. If you care about this issue, if providing for our children is a matter of deep concern to you, you can make a real and important contribution by helping Pugwash.

Because Pugwash itself is in danger. Dependent as it is on private donations, its financial base has always been insecure. Now it faces disaster. Inflation and the drying up of grants have taken their toll and this situation cannot continue. Pugwash may be the best hope we have. Pugwash needs your support now—now when its work is most urgent.

You can help by becoming a Friend of Pugwash. As a Friend you will be kept up to date on Pugwash meetings and publications. Your contribution, of course, will be fully tax-deductible.

A $100 donation enrolls you as a Friend of Pugwash. Students and those unable to contribute $100 can enroll as associate members for $30. Please don't delay. Fill out the coupon or send your check with the information required.

☐ Please enroll me as a Friend of Pugwash and send me summaries of its major meetings. I enclose $100 as my 1975-76 contribution.

☐ Please enroll me as an associate member of Friends of Pugwash and send me digests of its important meetings. I enclose $ Make Check payable to BAS Pugwash and mail to the Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale St., Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Mass., 02130.

Name
Address
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All contributions are tax deductible
COVERT ACTION:
swampland of American foreign policy

The Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee finds in the excesses of the CIA the symptoms of an illusion of American omnipotence which has entrapped and enthralled the nation’s presidents.

Frank Church
Two hundred years ago, at the founding of this nation, Thomas Paine observed that “Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world.” I still believe America remains the best place on Earth, but it has long since ceased to be “remote from all the wrangling world.”

On the contrary, even our internal economy now depends on events far beyond our shores. The energy crisis, which exposed our vulnerable dependence upon foreign oil, made the point vividly.

It is also tragic but true that our own people can no longer be made safe from savage destruction hurled down upon them from the most hidden and remote regions on Earth. Soviet submarines silently traverse the ocean floors carrying transcontinental missiles with the capacity to strike at our heartland. The nuclear arms race threatens to continue its deadly spiral toward Armageddon.

In this dangerous setting, it is imperative for the United States to maintain a strong and effective intelligence service. On this proposition we can ill-afford to be of two minds.

Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, which was formed on January 27, 1975, to examine the intelligence activities, both domestic and foreign, of the CIA, FBI, IRS, and the U.S. Postal Service as well as other government agencies. The Committee will be dismissed on February 29, 1976.
We have no choice other than to gather, analyze, and assess—to the best of our abilities—vital information on the intent and prowess of foreign adversaries, present or potential.

Without an adequate intelligence-gathering apparatus, we would be unable to gauge with confidence our defense requirements; unable to conduct an informed foreign policy; unable to control, through satellite surveillance, a runaway nuclear arms race. "The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators," wrote Gibbon. Those nations without a skillful intelligence service must navigate beneath a clouded sky.

With this truth in mind, the United States established, by the National Security Act of 1947, a Central Intelligence Agency to collect and evaluate intelligence, and provide for its proper dissemination within the government. The CIA was to be a clearing house for other U.S. intelligence agencies, including those of the State Department and the various military services. It was to be an independent, civilian intelligence agency whose duty it was, in the words of Allen Dulles, CIA Director from 1953-1961:

To weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty.

"The Central Intelligence Agency," concluded Dulles, "should have nothing to do with policy." In this way, neither the President nor the Congress would be left with any of the frequently self-interested intelligence assessments afforded by the Pentagon and the State Department, to rely upon.

In its efforts to get at the hard facts, the CIA has performed unevenly. It has had its successes and its failures. The CIA has detected the important new Soviet weapons systems early on; but it has often over-estimated the growth of the Russian ICBM forces. The CIA has successfully monitored Soviet adherence to arms control agreements, and given us the confidence to take steps toward further limitations; but it has been unable to predict the imminence of several international conflicts, such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a word, though it deserves passing marks for its intelligence work, the CIA has certainly not been infallible.

While one may debate the quality of the agency's performance, there has never been any question about the propriety and necessity of its evolvement in the process of gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence. Nor have serious questions been raised about the means used to acquire such information, whether from overt sources, technical devices, or by clandestine methods.

What has become controversial is quite unrelated to intelligence, but has to do instead with the so-called covert operations of the CIA, those secret efforts to manipulate events within foreign countries in ways presumed to serve the interests of the United States. Nowhere are such activities vouchsafed in the statutory language which created the Agency in 1947. "No indication was given in the statute that the CIA would become a vehicle for foreign political action or clandestine political warfare," notes Harry Howe Ransom, a scholar who has written widely and thought deeply about the problems of intelligence in modern society. Ransom concludes that "probably no other organization of the federal government has taken such liberties in interpreting its legally assigned functions as has the CIA."

The legal basis for this political action arm of the CIA is very much
open to question. Certainly the legislative history of the 1947 Act fails to indicate that Congress anticipated the CIA would ever engage in covert political warfare abroad.

The CIA points to a catch-all phrase contained in the 1947 Act as a rationalization for its operational prerogatives. A clause in the statute permits the Agency "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may, from time to time, direct." These vague and seemingly innocuous words have been seized upon as the green light for CIA intervention around the world.

**Malignant Plots**

Moreover, these interventions into the political affairs of foreign countries soon came to overshadow the Agency's original purpose of gathering and evaluating information. Just consider how far afield we strayed. For example:

- We deposed the government of Guatemala when its leftist leanings displeased us;
- We attempted to ignite a civil war against Sukarno in Indonesia;
- We intervened to restore the Shah to his throne in Iran, after Mossadegh broke the monopoly grip of British Petroleum over Iranian oil;
- We attempted to launch a counter-revolution in Cuba through the abortive landing of an army of exiles at the Bay of Pigs;
- We even conducted a secret war in Laos, paying Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries to do our fighting there.

All these engagements were initiated without the knowledge or consent of Congress. No country was too small, no foreign leader too trifling, to escape our attention.

- We sent a deadly toxin to the Congo with the purpose of injecting Lumumba with a fatal disease;
- We armed local dissidents in the Dominican Republic, knowing their purpose to be the assassination of Trujillo;
- We participated in a military coup overturning the very government we were pledged to defend in South Vietnam; and when Premier Diem resisted, he and his brother were murdered by the very generals to whom we gave money and support;
- We attempted for years to assassinate Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The various plots spanned three Administrations, and involved an extended collaboration between the CIA and the Mafia.

Whatever led the United States to such extremes? Assassination is nothing less than an act of war, and our targets were leaders of small, weak countries that could not possibly threaten the United States. Only once did Castro become an accessory to a threat, by permitting the Soviets to install missiles on Cuban soil within range of the United States. And this was the one time when the CIA called off all attempts against his life.

The roots of these malignant plots grew out of the obsessions of the Cold War. When the CIA succeeded the Office of Strategic Services of World War II, Stalin replaced Hitler as the Devil Incarnate. Wartime methods were routinely adopted for peacetime use.

In those myopic years, the world was seen as up for grabs between the United States and the Soviet Union. Castro's Cuba raised the specter of a Soviet outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer an additional opportunity for the Soviets and their allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Soviet penetration there was viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in emerging Africa. There was a great concern that a communist takeover in Indochina would have a "domino effect" throughout Asia. Even the lawful election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was still seen by some as the equivalent of Castro's conquest of Cuba.

In the words of a former Secretary of State, "A desperate struggle [was] going on in the back alleys of world politics." Every upheaval, wherever it occurred, was likened to a pawn on a global chessboard, to be moved this way or that, by the two principal players. This led the CIA to plunge into a full range of covert activities designed to counteract the competitive efforts of the Soviet KGB.

Thus, the United States came to adopt the methods and accept the value system of the "enemy." In the secret world of covert action, we...
threw off all restraints. Not content merely to discreetly subsidize foreign political parties, labor unions, and newspapers, the Central Intelligence Agency soon began to directly manipulate the internal politics of other countries. Spending many millions of dollars annually, the CIA filled its bag with dirty tricks, ranging from bribery and false propaganda to schemes to "alter the health" of unfriendly foreign leaders and undermine their regimes.

In his handwritten notes for this meeting, Nixon indicated that he was "not concerned" with the risks involved. As CIA Director Helms recalled in testimony before the Senate Committee, "The President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't care how." To Helms, the order had been all-inclusive. "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office," he recalled, "it was that day." Thus, the President ordered the CIA to prevent the ratification of Allende's election by the Chilean Congress. Quite properly, this offer was rejected. But the CIA then spent much more on its own, in an effort to accomplish the same general objective.

The ultimate outcome, as you know, of these and other efforts to destroy the Allende government was a bloodbath which included the death of Allende and the installation, in his place, of a repressive military dictatorship.

Why Chile? What can possibly explain or justify such an intrusion upon the right of the Chilean people to self-determination? The country itself was no threat to us. It has been aptly characterized as a "dagger pointed straight at the heart of Antarctica."

Was it to protect American-owned big business? We now know that I.T.T. offered the CIA a million dollars to prevent the ratification of Allende's election by the Chilean Congress. Quite properly, this offer was rejected. But the CIA then spent much more on its own, in an effort to accomplish the same general objective.

Yet, if our purpose was to save the properties of large U.S. corporations, that cause had already been lost. The nationalization of the mines was decided well before Allende's election; and the question of compensation was tempered by insurance against confiscatory losses issued to the companies by the U.S. government itself.

No, the only plausible explanation for our intervention in Chile is the persistence of the myth that communism is a single, hydra-headed serpent, and that it remains our duty to cut off each ugly head, wherever and however it may appear.

Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the ground that since the Soviets do it, we must do it, too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis.

Before Chile, we insisted that
communism had never been freely chosen by any people, but forced upon them against their will. The communists countered that they resorted to revolution because the United States would never permit the establishment of a communist regime by peaceful means.

In Chile, President Nixon confirmed the communist thesis. Like Caesar peering into the colonies from distant Rome, Nixon said the choice of government by the Chileans was unacceptable to the President of the United States.

The attitude in the White House seemed to be: If—in the wake of Vietnam—I can no longer send the Marines, then I will send in the CIA.

What Have We Gained?

But what have we gained by our policy of consummate intervention, compared to what we have lost?

- A "friendly" Iran and Indonesia, members of the OPEC cartel, which imposes extortionate prices on the Western World for indispensable oil?
- A hostile Laos that preferred the indigenous forces of communism to control imposed by Westerners, which smacked of the hated colonialism against which they had fought so long to overthrow?
- A fascist Chile, with thousands of political prisoners languishing in their jails, mocking the professed ideals of the United States throughout the hemisphere?

If we have gained little, what then have we lost? I suggest we have lost—or grievously impaired—the good name and reputation of the United States from which we once drew a unique capacity to exercise matchless moral leadership. Where once we were admired, now we are resented. Where once we were welcome, now we are tolerated, at best. In the eyes of millions of once friendly foreign people, the United States is today regarded with grave suspicion and distrust.

What else can account for the startling decline in American prestige? Certainly not the collapse of our military strength, for our fire power has grown immensely since the end of World War II.

I must lay the blame, in large measure, to the fantasy that it lay within our power to control other countries through the covert manipulation of their affairs. It formed part of a greater illusion that entrapped and enthralled our Presidents: the illusion of American omnipotence.

Nevertheless, I do not draw the conclusion of those who now argue that all U.S. covert operations must be banned in the future. I can conceive of a dire emergency when timely clandestine action on our part might avert a nuclear holocaust and save an entire civilization.

I can also conceive of circumstances, such as those existing in Portugal today, where our discreet help to democratic political parties might avert a forcible take-over by a communist minority, heavily subsidized by the Soviets. In Portugal, such a bitterly-unwanted, Marxist regime is being resisted courageously by a people who earlier voted 84 percent against it.

But these are covert operations consistent either with the imperative of national survival or with our traditional belief in free government. If our hand were exposed helping a foreign people in their struggle to be free, we could scorn the cynical doctrine of “plausible denial,” and say openly, “Yes, we were there—and proud of it.”

Senator Frank Church (right) and Dr. Edward Schantz, professor of chemistry at the University of Wisconsin, one of many witnesses who appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Dr. Schantz, who first developed shellfish toxin for the United States Army, testified that the poison could be put to good use in the medical community.

We were there in Western Europe, helping to restore democratic governments in the aftermath of World War II. It was only after our faith gave way to fear that we began to act as a self-appointed sentinel of the status quo.

Then it was that all the dark arts of secret intervention—bribery, blackmail, abduction, assassination—were put to the service of reactionary and repressive regimes that can never, for long, escape or withstand the volcanic forces of change.

And the United States, as a result, became ever more identified with the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new.

The remedy is clear. American foreign policy, whether openly or secretly pursued, must be made to conform once more to our historic ideals, the same fundamental belief in freedom and popular government that once made us a beacon of hope for the downtrodden and oppressed throughout the world.

February 1976 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 11
U.S. destroyer Dahlgren tails a missile-laden Soviet freighter, home-bound from Cuba, at the height of the crisis in 1962.
Frank Church Is Moving Center Stage

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON

WASHINGTON—Take it from Senator Frank Church of Idaho, chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in general and spy murder plots in particular, that "if the answers are there, we will find them."

"It's clear, isn't it, to the country that the most delicate and inflammatory issue of all has been bucked over to the Senate committee," Mr. Church was saying last week after President Ford and the Rockefeller Commission wrapped up their inquiry into the Central Intelligence Agency and handed the dark mystery of foreign-policy-by-assassination to the Congress.

"Someone has to deal with it," he said, toying with a small cigar in his calm, cozy study just off the Senate floor. "I don't exactly welcome it, but it's fallen to the committee, and once we've satisfied ourselves we have all the facts, we'll have to figure out the timing and the method for making the appropriate disclosure.

"In our kind of society," he said, "there's no way this kind of issue can be brushed under the rug, but I hope we can make the disclosure. I hope we can relate the acts in a manner that will least injure the country."

In framing the committee's mission, Frank Forrester Church Jr. helps to frame a picture of himself—a serious, cautious man, acutely conscious of form, and mainly absorbed now in the question of how to tell a gruesome story in language that is politically acceptable not only to more conservative colleagues on the Senate committee but to the nation at large.

Though he offers no details, Mr. Church has clearly known the worst of the assassination story for some time now and never hesitated to cast it in the gravest moral terms. When Vice President Rockefeller declared two weeks ago that the C.I.A.'s transgressions were "not major," Senator Church responded that his committee had hard evidence of assassination planning. "I don't regard murder plots as a major matter," he said. "Ours is not a wicked country and we cannot abide a wicked Government.

"You know, they're trying to compare it now with the idea of doing away with Hitler in the late thirties," he went on the other day. "But we were dealing here with little countries who couldn't possibly menace the United States, whose leaders were simply inconvenient nuisances! If we're going to lay claim to being a civilized country we must make certain in the future that no agency of our Government can be licensed to murder. The President of the United States cannot become a glorified godfather."

Yet righteous rhetoric and powerful punch lines are second nature to Frank Church. He won the American Legion's oratorical contest at age 16. He made his national debut with a bombastic keynote address at the Democratic convention of 1960: "The hinge of history swings on the United States," he said then. "The maintenance of peace, the preservation of freedom, the fate of the world, all ultimately depend upon American principle, American prestige and American power." Even to friends he has long seemed to be in love with the sound of his own voice.

And so the question about Frank Church is hardly whether he will be able to draw a stirring speech from his examination of the Central Intelligence Agency but whether he can shape a majority of the committee and rally a constituency outside Idaho behind the kind of indignation he feels. On past performance it is not an easy question to guess at.

He has always been viewed as a model "loner" in Senate politics. A conscientious and independent student of policy, a wide reader and effective writer, he repented of his cold war certitude not long after that keynote speech and became an early dissenter on Vietnam, at considerable peril back...
Frank Church is moving Center Stage

New York Times Sunday, June 15, 1975

Frank Church home. He has seemed at the same time a soloist, a somewhat vain and distant man even with his fellow Senators, an orator whose eloquence sometimes has more performance value than persuasion in it.

Into his fourth six-year term and still only 50, it may be partly chance that Frank Church has long been overshadowed on his major committees by more senior Democrats such as former Senator J. William Fulbright on foreign relations and by Senator Henry M. Jackson in interior.

But he has also lacked their stubborn legislative skill, their taste for aggressive staffs and their love of the game. For sound provincial political reasons, he long refused to pay any assistant more than the Governor of Idaho's salary, which was $12,500. He has admitted to feeling "lonesome" in political Washington.

Senator Church's chairmanship, on the other hand, of the frisky young Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations has been cited as the most promising current version of the old Kefauver phenomenon—the Presidential launching of small-state Senators through hot-news television hearings which, though it didn't quite work for Estes Kefauver in the fifties, has never lost its allure.

The multinational inquiry cut its teeth two years ago on the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation's political machinations in Chile, including the $1-million offer to the C.I.A. to help thwart the late Dr. Salvador Allende's presidential ambitions. The subcommittee has delivered blockbusters on a steady schedule ever since, from the examination of the international oil cartel and the limitation on American credit for the development of natural gas in the Soviet Union to the most recent revelations of corporate bribes for political favors abroad.

But the hard-charging, publicity-wise staff of the multinational subcommittee plays by looser rules than Senator Church has set down on the Central Intelligence Agency investigation. The political and institutional stakes are bigger in the project, and certainly the Republican members of the committee, led by Senators John Tower of Texas and Barry Goldwater of Arizona, are a more aggressive presence than their colleagues on the multinational panel.

"He'll try to settle for half a loaf on the C.I.A," says a Senate staff man who has watched Mr. Church closely for 10 years. "He's persuadable. In that academic, abstract way he has, he'll come out looking to the future, trying maybe to amend the statute. I'm just not confident that he'll stand up in a committee showdown when the right-wingers get rough. Where is his support going to come from?"

"Whatever the consequences," says Senator Church, "this investigation must be thorough and it must be honest."

A long-shot Presidential candidacy may well be at stake here. Senator Church broke up an exploratory finance committee when he took the intelligence committee assignment, but the glint is still in his eye and supporters are still interested, from super-rich contributors in Malibu, California to Mary Perot Nichols of The Village Voice in Manhattan, who calls Frank Church "the hottest liberal dark horse" for the 1976 campaign.

At a minimum, and it is not small minimum, Washington and the world are probably watching the next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That chairmanship is an older and closer ambition than the Presidency, and it is now only one seat and four years away if Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama retires, as expected, at the end of his term.

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argument, the public will vote for the party that at least appears to have decided something. In defeat, even Labour Party loyalists will have to accept that Mr. Wilson has been discredited as a leader, and to whom then will they have to turn? At the moment none of them would dream of admitting it—but the one figure who can hope to emerge unscathed from the whole bruising process is none other than the man they are now desperately trying to make the scapegoat for all the party’s troubles. If Mr. Roy Jenkins is wise he will not despair. Instead, like Beppe Rabbit, he will simply lie low.

Anthony Howard

Farewell to Foreign Aid

Why I Voted No

by Frank Church

When revolution comes—as it likely will in many of the still ‘stable’ countries of the third world—it will bear no resemblance to the kind of benign, gradual ‘takeoff’ into self-sustaining growth envisioned by American aid officials and private investors. The notion that a stable, nonrevolutionary social structure is the essential condition of economic development is a self-serving rationalization. It enables American policymakers to believe that the interests of the United States, as they conceive them, are identical with the social and economic interests of the poor countries.

‘Stability,’ they insist, is not only essential for the exclusion of Communism and the preservation of American influence; it is also in the best interests of the developing countries themselves, because—so the argument runs—revolution means violence, disruption, inefficient management, and the loss of investment capital as well. In this way, we rationalize our support for regimes whose very existence is the principal barrier in their countries to real economic development and social justice.

The conditions essential for development are not so much economic and technological as they are psychological and political. No infusion of capital and know-how from without can galvanize a society in which the rewards of development are grabbed up by a small privileged caste while the majority of people are left hopeless, debilitated and demoralized. As the Brazilian bishop Dom Antonio Batista Frugoso put it, “We do not need paternalistic redemption. We need conditions so that those who are now abandoned may free themselves from their own underdevelopment with their own united force.” The poor have no hope in those who still have economic power. And the poor are those who struggle for justice. If those who fight for justice are called subversive, then subversion is their hope.

In countries long under the domination of corrupt oligarchies nothing less than a radical redistribution of political power may be the essential precondition for economic development. If the bulk of the people are to make the concerted effort and accept the enormous sacrifices required for lifting a society out of chronic poverty, they have got to have some belief in the integrity of their leaders, in the commitment of those leaders to social justice, and in the equality of sacrifice required of the people. Reactionary regimes have neither the ability nor the interest to foster such a conception of social justice. They value aid from the United States as a means of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power. The lip service paid to reform is a crumb for their benefactors; it helps to make the Americans feel good and it costs them nothing. In fact, American economic aid is commonly used to promote industrialization programs which generate a high level of consumption for the privileged, with little, if any, “trickle-down” benefit for the dispossessed. At the same time, American military assistance, and such para-military programs as the training and equipping of a country’s police force, help such regimes as those of Brazil, Greece and Pakistan to suppress reformist movements. In this way, American aid is being used not to promote development but for the quite opposite purpose of supporting

Frank Church, United States Senator from Idaho, is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. This article is based on a major floor speech, largely unreported, delivered before the Senate voted 41 to 27 to reject the foreign aid authorization bill.
November 13, 1971

The rule of corrupt and stagnant but vociferously anti-Communist dictatorships.

Even if we should succeed in purging our minds of the anti-Communist obsession which has driven us into league with military dictatorships and oppressive oligarchies all over the globe, it would still be all but impossible for us to promote radical reform in the countries of the third world. Even indeed if we were a revolutionary society ourselves and were committed to a revolutionary conception of development as most assuredly we are not, there is still very little we could do to foster social revolution in alien societies. The catalyst of radical change in any society must be an indigenous nationalism giving rise to a sense of community, commitment and shared sacrifice.

I do not suggest that the United States prefers or admires the dictatorial regimes it subsidizes, but only that there is little we can do with our aid to change them. All the more since these regimes can blackmail us so easily with the threat of Communism if they should fail. The Kennedy Administration did make an effort to encourage democratic and progressive policies in countries to which it extended aid, especially in Latin America, but that effort was a failure and the reasons for that failure are instructive. We failed because we had neither the ability to impose reform from outside nor the will to pursue it from within. The one was simply impossible, the other went against the priority of our own interests as we conceived them. However much we may have wanted reform and development, we wanted "stability," anti-Communism and a favorable climate for investment more. The experience of twenty years of aid shows that we can neither bring about fundamental reform in tradition-encrusted societies nor prevent revolution in those countries where the tide of change runs deep and strong; all we can really do is to service the status quo in countries where it is not strongly challenged anyhow.

There is abundant evidence that our foreign aid program is much less philanthropic than we have cared to portray. Indeed, the figures suggest that it is patently self-serving. Former AID Director William Gaud dismisses that, as a result of tied loans "ninety-three percent of AID funds are spent directly in the United States. Just last year, some 4,000 American firms in fifty states received $1.3 billion in AID funds for products supplied as part of the foreign aid program."

Similarly, George D. Woods, former President of the World Bank, has observed that "bilateral programs of assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-income countries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales, toward practical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions thought to be strategic."

The oft-asserted lament that our foreign aid program lacks a constituency in the United States is just another of those myths we hold dear. Actually, our bilateral aid program is, in effect, the soft-loan window of the Export-Import Bank; it is the source from which foreign governments borrow money on easy terms with which to buy goods and services from within the United States. As such, it enjoys a lively constituency which exerts steady pressure on the government to keep the program going.

In addition to financing American exports, our foreign aid, both economic and military, has encouraged relationships of sustained dependency on the United States. In many underdeveloped countries, repressive governments draw reassurance from the arms we furnish and the military training we supply. As the source of money and weapons for their armies and police forces, the US government acquires a certain leverage over these regimes, while they last. Enlisted by attractive credit terms, by growing familiarity with American equipment, reliance on American replacement parts, by bargain prices on obsolete equipment, training programs for their soldiers and police, and the sales promotion techniques of our military advisory missions, these governments, soon enough learn to "think American."

No less than military aid, our economic assistance creates and perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for example, that aid shipments be carried only in American ships and that purchases be made only in the United States. Because of these and other requirements, the Peterson Report estimates that United States aid costs recipients about 15 percent more than world market prices.

Surplus food shipments under PL 480, on its face the most philanthropic of aid programs, in fact have served to unload costly surpluses, "at virtually no economic cost to the United States," according to economist Michael Hudson, a former balance-of-payments analyst for the Chase-Manhattan Bank. At the same time, Hudson points out, the PL 480 program has paid the aid-receiving countries in debt to us to the extent of some $2 billion, thereby tying them to the purse-strings of the State Department and the United States Treasury for nearly twenty years to come.

Dependency on the United States grows steadily too with the mounting burden of servicing past debts. The Peterson Report acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on a "short leash." As grace periods end on loans falling due in the 1970's and poor countries find themselves paying out ever greater amounts to finance past debts, new loans will be effectively neutralized and the poor countries will be threatened with economic paralysis. The upshot may well someday be a general default on debt payments to the United States reminiscent of the defaults on war debts which complicated and disrupted our relations with European countries in the 1930's and helped to drive us deeper into isolationism.

Nowhere have we seen more clearly the ineffec-
tiveness of aid as a deterrent to revolutionary pressures and as an instrument for the reconstruction of traditional societies than in Latin America. The Alliance for Progress represents the high water mark of our innocence in supposing that we could liberate traditional societies from their centuries' long legacy of tyranny and stagnation with a little bit of seed capital and some stirring rhetoric. It is true that the per capita income of Latin American countries has risen during the years of the Alliance for Progress, but it has risen in so unbalanced and inequitable a way that the gains have gone almost entirely to the 20 percent of the population who live within the modern economy. The benefits accruing to the lower 80 percent have not even kept up with population growth, so that they have become both relatively and absolutely poorer. Progress, though visible, is illusory. Shining modern cities have arisen and the Alliance for Progress has brought roads, transistor radios and Coca Cola to the Latin American countryside, but their social impact is negative and disruptive. Labor-saving devices make life more comfortable for the affluent few but they do not add to per capita output and they add to unemployment where there were labor surpluses to begin with. Indeed the effect of this distorted and inequitable development, which widens the gap between rich and poor, is demoralizing to the poor and therefore detrimental to genuine development.

The distortions of public aid to Latin America are heightened by the impact of private investment. Although United States direct investment in Latin America grew from $8 billion to $15 billion during the 1960's and continues to grow at the rate of $1 billion a year, according to Gary MacEoin, United States companies withdraw $2 in dividends, royalties and other payments for every new dollar they invest. United States private companies exercise a “double negative impact”. at the same time that they dekapitalize Latin America by the withdrawal of profits, they plow back a part of their profits to gain increasing control of the mineral assets, industry and production of Latin American countries. Under this devastating North American onslaught, resentment of the United States has grown and increasing numbers of Latin Americans have become convinced that they are the victims of a virulent new imperialism. As one Chilean political scientist commented on the experience of the 1960's, “If that is what one decade of development does for us, spare us from another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother us in debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets.”

In both Latin America and the rest of the third world the conviction is taking increasing hold that the poverty of the poor countries is not the result of imperfections in the old “models” of development but rather the inevitable result of the policies and prac-

I can no longer cast my vote to prolong the bilateral aid program, (estimated cost approximately $4 billion over the next five years) as it is now administered. I could understand—though perhaps no condone—a foreign aid program that is essentially self-serving. We live, after all, in a selfish world. The present program is designed primarily to serve private business interests at the expense of the American people. In far too many countries, as in the case of Brazil, we poured in our aid money for one overriding purpose, the stabilization of the economy in order to furnish American capital with a favorable climate for investment. The search for foreign investment opportunities by the largest American corporations is relentless and irreplicable, as the biggest profits are to be found abroad, where the tax burden can frequently be reduced or averted. Moreover, the risk of loss due to political instability, riot, revolution, or expropriation, has been largely lifted from the investor and shifted to the US Government. OI PIC or Overseas Private Investment Corporation, backed by the Federal Government, readily insures American companies against risks abroad for which no comparable insurance is available at home. The million dollar losses incurred by American companies, resulting from the nationalization of their holdings by Allende’s Marxist regime in Chile are likely to be borne not by the companies that eagerly invested there but by the American taxpayer. Our foreign aid program has become a spreader of money under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad. I wonder that the crumbling ghettos in our cities along with our declining rural communities have not been enough capital!

The major preoccupation of the present foreign policy is the massive disbursement of munitions which we either give away or make available at low base prices. We ply half a hundred foreign governments with our weaponry. Most of the value has become a dumping ground for ships, tanks, planes, which we label as excess to our needs. Each credit is available at interest rates well below the cost.
November 13, 1971

The public allocation of money to the US Government. The Military Assistance Program has become a preposterous scandal. It should be drastically curtailed, not enlarged.

As for our long-term bilateral loans made in the name of "promoting economic development," it is long past time that these functions were transferred entirely to the World Bank, the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other multilateral lending agencies, which were established for this purpose. I am prepared, now and in the future, to support substantial US contributions to these agencies. In this manner, we could set a worthy example of international responsibility and beckon other rich nations to share the load with us.

I would confine our bilateral aid in the future to technical assistance grants, administered, where feasible, by the Peace Corps. It was through technical assistance that the successor to Harry Truman's original Point 4 - that the "green revolution" was achieved in Asia and the hand of famine stayed. This aspect of our foreign aid, involving outright grants, not loans, has constituted the worthiest part of the program. On account of it - and in hopes that the objectionable parts would be whittled down and ultimately dropped - I have tarried too long as a supporter and indulged in too much wishful thinking. Events of the past few weeks on Capitol Hill have finally dispelled my illusions. Instead of cutting back on the foreign aid package, Congress is about to enlarge on it. We are in the process of doing the same with the gigantic military budget, approving more money for the Pentagon this year than we spent at the height of our involvement in Vietnam. Incredible, but true!

The acquiescence of Congress to these money demands of the Nixon administration makes it clear that we have no disposition, despite all the pious talk, of changing our spending habits. The "new priorities," promised the American people won't be realized so long as we refuse to cut our huge foreign and military spending. The long-neglected problems of crime, drugs, poverty and pollution, which afflict so many of our people here at home, will continue to fester and grow. I would advocate, as an alternative to the palliative of aid, that we lend positive support to developing countries by entering into commercial arrangements that redress the terms of trade which are now rigged against them.

As with so many of the difficult questions that divide and agitate our society, the answer to the dilemma of aid lies not abroad, not in the slums of Calcutta or in the rural backlands of Brazil, but within ourselves. Essentially, the question is whether we are prepared to recognize the limits of our own capacity - the moral and political as well as the technical and economic limits - and allow nature to take what may well be an unconfined course in many countries of the third world. The question, to put it another way, is whether we can recognize that there are some things we simply cannot do - such as restructuring another country through our own efforts - and other things that we cannot permanently prevent - such as social revolution, where and when it has come.

The dilemma of aid is not fundamentally different from the dilemma of Vietnam. It is a problem of power - our own power, the uses to which we wish to put it, and the moral and intellectual limitations which have resulted in such wide discrepancies between our intentions and our accomplishments. The dominant political attitude of the 60s was one of extravagant self-confidence. We were filled up and infatuated with the "simple fact" - to quote Professor Walt Rostow - that we are the greatest power in the world - if we behave like it. Now, in the wake of sobering tragedy, a new outlook begins to take shape, and one may hope that it will affect our thinking in matters ranging far beyond Vietnam. Having concentrated for a decade and more on the growth and uses of power, we may now perhaps be willing to cultivate other national attributes - such as prudence and common sense. If so, we may be prepared to come to terms with such conditions of our time as the following: that our social engineering, as applied to the poor countries of the world, has shown itself to be irrelevant and disruptive; that the threat of Communism in the long run is exaggerated and, in any case, beyond the last reach of our aid programs; that for many countries radical revolution is the only real hope for development and the single most helpful thing we can do is to leave them alone.

Contrary to the development "models" worked out in the 60s by our Agency for International Development, it now appears that thoroughgoing social revolution is the necessary prerequisite for the development of much of the third world. There is nothing the United States can or should do to promote revolution - to do so indeed would violate the United Nations Charter and sound traditional standards of diplomacy. What we can and should do is to stop promoting counterrevolution.

Several years ago Alan Moorehead wrote a book called The Fatal Impact in which he recounted the disastrous and largely unintended effects upon the Tahitians and Australian aborigines of the diseases, alcohol, firearms, laws, and concepts of morality brought to the South Pacific by the early European explorers and colonists. Reflecting on his own voyages to Polynesia, Captain Cook himself wrote that "it would have been better for these people never to have known us." It would represent a noteworthy advance in the standards of international relations if the United States profiting from its own experience as well as that of others, could lift its well-intentioned but no less fatal impact from the face of the third world, so that in time it may appear that it was not so bad after all for them to have known us.
The chairman of the Senate committee probing U.S. intelligence operations thinks the United States has been trying to carve out too large a role in the world.

"Our foreign policy has been excessively interventionist," says Senator Frank Church. "We have undertaken to be the world's policeman, banker and judge, and the time has come to redress the balance."

Such sentiments from the fourth-term Idaho Democrat are nothing new. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he was a leader in the Senate fight against U.S. military involvement in Indo-China.

**Increasing attention.** However, the views of Frank Church are getting increasing attention nowadays. And many are wondering whether telecasts of his hearings will make him a serious contender for the presidential nomination in 1976.

Some think the youthful looking, 50-year-old legislator may become a television hit at a time Democrats are casting about for a fresh personality as a national candidate.

Today, however, Senator Church is not widely known across the U.S. He was born July 25, 1924, in Boise, the son of a sporting-goods-store owner. Although reared as a Republican, he became a Democrat as a teen-ager after visiting the library to bone up on the New Deal.

After Army service in World War II, Mr. Church married Bethine Clark, daughter of Chase Clark, then Democratic Governor of Idaho. They have two sons, 26 and 18.

After graduation from Stanford University Law School, he practiced law in Boise. In 1956, when only 32, he was elected to the U.S. Senate.

Although Idaho is considered a conservative State, Mr. Church has taken a liberal stance on most issues but easily won re-election three times. He is the only Democratic Senator ever re-elected in Idaho.

Mr. Church reveres the late Republican Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, an apostle of isolationism in the 1930s. But he eschews the "isolationist" label for himself. He says U.S. involvement abroad should be limited to areas "where the vital interests of the United States are clearly at stake."
Lord Henderson, a one-time journalist, served the Labour Party as an M.P., a Parliamentary Private Secretary and, from 1948 to 1951, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He later was the British representative at the Assembly of the Council of Europe and presently sits in the House of Lords.

Frank Church, Junior US Senator from Idaho (D.), is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. A lawyer and a former Military Intelligence officer, he has also been active on behalf of the Crusade for Freedom.

Max Beloff, who teaches at Nuffield College, Oxford, has written Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, and The Great Powers.

Theodor Eschenburg has been on the Political Science faculty of the University of Tubingen since 1949, also serving in various positions in local government. Since 1953 he has been co-editor of Vierteljahres Hefte fur Zeitgeschichte, an historical quarterly.

Karl Jaspers has been a Professor of Philosophy for almost 40 years, the last 11 at the University of Basle, Switzerland. His books in English include Existentialism and Humanism, Man in the Modern Age and The Origin and Goal of History.

West Berlin and Federal Germany should be inferior to those between East Berlin and East Germany.

To my mind the minimum result of the coming negotiations should be to take the heat out of the Berlin problem and remove the anxieties and tensions which have bedeviled the daily life of the West Berliners and threatened the peace of Europe for a decade.

Lord Henderson

The Russian Motives

The world today seems to be so continuously teetering on the brink of disaster that our nerves sometimes threaten to usurp our judgment. The prospect of nuclear war is so appalling that we are dismayed at the lack of progress toward genuine peace. When approaching the conference table, we tend to set our sights higher than logic would justify.

This, I think, is a lesson implicit in Mr. Lippmann’s analysis of the Berlin crisis.

He writes: “We shall be better off and we shall feel better about it all if we grasp the realities and do not evade them.”

As Mr. Lippmann clearly points out, the existence of two German states is a fact. Neither we nor the Soviet Union are willing to permit the loss of either half to the other. This conflict of immovable interest is therefore a powerful force operating at the moment against
any major settlement in the heart of Europe.

The reality that emerges from this analysis, as I see it, is the likelihood that no forthcoming Foreign Ministers' or Summit conference will effect much change in Middle Europe.

If this is so, the worst mistake we could make would be to approach the negotiations with any notion of acquiescing to the implications contained in Mr. Khrushchev's November ultimatum.

Any retreat, including a reduction of Allied troops in Berlin to token size, might open the Pandora's box of fear that we are unable and unwilling to hold the line against determined Russian pressure to break it.

Of course there are concessions that Russia could make that would justify a withdrawal on our part. I would applaud concessions on both sides, provided they are genuinely reciprocal. But I see nothing in the present situation, or in the Russian attitude, to indicate that they will agree to concessions commensurate with the ones they are demanding of us. For what were Russia's motivations in handing down its ultimatum?

It has been suggested that Russia instigated the Berlin crisis to consolidate her hold on restive East Germany and the other satellite countries. But it is hard to see why, in the first place, this was necessary, or secondly, why it was worth the risk of a major war. For here, time and the status quo would seem to be on Russia's side.

More than three million East Germans have fled the puppet state since the end of World War II. These refugees were undoubtedly the most vehement opponents of the Communist regime. Presumably those who remain are more able to adjust themselves to the life there. And give the customary Communist methods of indoctrination and education, the younger generations, as they replace the old, will grow to know less and less about the free way of life.

The argument that Russia is really motivated by a fear of West German rearmament does not seem very convincing either. Is it plausible to say that the Soviet Union, with its 175 active divisions, feels seriously threatened by eight or nine West German divisions?

It would seem more likely that Russia's motivations go farther. Doubtlessly the Kremlin hopes to loosen West Germany from NATO. Perhaps it even hopes to panic the West and unravel the NATO alliance itself.

Given such objectives, and having been summoned to the conference table by a Russian ultimatum, it is difficult to visualize how we can find a way to join the Soviets in any acceptable plan for a general settlement in Middle Europe.

So Mr. Lippmann's approach is a realistic one. Without raising vain hopes, he has suggested a formula for Berlin that might serve the interests of both East and West, and thus prove a negotiable subject. It is based on a recognition that Berlin is going to remain an enclave in East Germany for some time to come, and that we are going to have to deal with Berlin apart from the question of a German settlement.

Perhaps there are some other attendant subjects suitable for negotiation at this time. The possibility of establishing a demilitarized corridor of some kind along the East-West German boundary line certainly ought to be explored.

When all is said and done, however, our range of opportunity in the coming negotiations is going to be narrow. Western Europe must be defended against further Russian encroachment, and West Germany is indispensable to that defense. We must not acquiesce in any new arrangement respecting Berlin that will weaken or undermine the strength and stability of the Western alliance.

Washington, D. C.

A "Free-wheeling" Germany

Mr. Lippmann's articles on "The Two Germanies and Berlin" have a great advantage over so many discussions of the subject that they do not seek to avoid saying things which are bound to offend against some current assumptions as to how things are and what people really want. They have been given even greater topicality by the likelihood that a new German Chancellor, whatever the measure of Dr. Adenauer's surviving influence, will not be able to avoid some radical rethinking of the position, quite apart from the intensity of the pressure about the Berlin question that the Russians may contrive in the course of the summer. My own views as to a desirable solution where Berlin is concerned are not far removed from Mr. Lippmann's. But in order to see what chances it offers Western policy-makers, it is necessary to look more closely at some of the points that Mr. Lippmann makes. I would suggest that the following at least require further examination on the part of those in a position to undertake it:

1. While it is true to say that fear of a reunited Germany is widespread in both halves of Europe, it is generally realized among the more rational students of international politics that this ought not to be because of what a reunited Germany could do on its own; Germany is and can only be a power of the second rank by the standards of the second half of the 20th Century. What causes worry is the possibility of diplomatic adventures or even military adventures in which such a Germany might engage; and that there might be a danger here confirmed by the outraged feelings expressed by the Germans when it is suggested (as recently by General de Gaulle) that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognized as a permanent frontier. For Germans, Germany is divided into three parts not two; and what we call Eastern
On the Right

Recall Senator Church?

W.M. F. BUCKLEY JR.

One can understand the impatience of the voters of Idaho to do better for themselves than Senator Frank Church. He is the gentleman best forgotten for his dreadful keynote address at the Democratic convention of 1960. Now his views on Vietnam are not those of the Administration or of the leaders of the Democratic Party, or, it appears, of the citizens of Idaho—who now desire to replace Senator Church by recourse to the populist extreme of recall. My own hope is a) that the recall movement will fail; b) that if it doesn't, that the courts will knock it out; and c) that Senator Church will be conventionally defeated at the polls in the fall of 1968 when he is due to run for re-election.

Although the recall movement is being backed primarily by conservatives, it is a most un-conservative thing that they are doing. It is especially strange that some of the people who have associated themselves with the movement adopt as their principal political slogan the motto “This is a republic, not a democracy. Let’s keep it that way.” One of the more important differences between a republic and a democracy is rule by representatives of the people rather than rule directly by the people themselves. If the latter were truly desirable, we could have running democracy without any difficulty at all by simply plugging in Dr. Gallup to a big IBM machine and turning on the dial. Do you prefer Johnson or Nixon? If the answer on Monday is Nixon 51, Johnson 49, we could simply flash the helicopter to jettison Lyndon, and pop up to New York to fetch Nixon, who then would be President until . . . Do you prefer Nixon or Romney? Tuesday, when Romney comes in.

And so for all the senators, and for all the congressmen, until someone stopped to ask the question: why have any elected officials at all? Why not just constantly submit questions about everything to the voters, and let them decide directly?

Why Not Wait?

The attitude of the gentlemen from Idaho who desire to recall Senator Church reminds one of the unfortunate citizens of Massachusetts who tried to suggest to John Quincy Adams in the 1830s that his business as congressman was to register exactly their views on public matters. To which the ex-President replied that for such a job clerks were available, that his notion of representative government was not that of someone sent to Washington to transcribe the fluctuations in popular opinion back home, but that of a man in whose capacities the voters have confidence, which confidence they may renew or not at regular intervals.

Those regular intervals are of course specified by the Constitution, and it is unlikely even if the voters of Idaho proceeded to recall Senator Church, that the Senate would comply with the recall. Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives, as reliable an exegete of the Constitution as any, reminds us that “a State may not add to the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution for members of the Senate and House of Representatives.” And gives two examples: “Asserting this principle, the House in 1807 seated a member whose election was contested on the ground that he had not been twelve months a resident of the district from which elected as required by State law. No attempt was made to ascertain whether these requirements were met because the State law was deemed to be unconstitutional. Both the House and Senate have seated members elected during their term of office as state judges, despite the provision of State constitutions purporting to bar the election of judges to any other office under the State or the United States during such term.”

No doubt Idaho would argue that to recall a senator is not the same as “adding to the qualifications” prescribed by the Constitution. And no doubt the Senate would reply that that is in effect what is being done to Senator Church: adding the qualification that he shall voice views harmonious with those of the majority. The latter is surely the more reasonable construction.

Why not wait? Nineteen sixty-eight is not so far away, and in the meantime Senator Church is not going to change our foreign policy. He is not, by his eccentric views, threatening the republic nearly so much as the new populists of Idaho.
region offers the little countries of Indochina their best hope for remaining independent. They would, of necessity, establish friendly ties with China, staying scrupulously neutral and unaligned, but they need not become the vassal states that a spreading war, drawing Chinese armies in, would surely make them. This even applies to North Vietnam, where nationalist feeling against China is deep, and where Ho Chi Minh does not yet take his orders from Peking. Clearly, if we seek to restrict Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia, a settlement in Vietnam is essential.

Those who urge the contrary course—a Korean-type war in Indochina—often argue that South Vietnam has become the testing ground of a new and vicious form of Communist aggression, the guerrilla war. They contend that the Viet Cong rebels, though perhaps not the pawns of Peking, are at least the agents of Hanoi; that indirect aggression by infiltration is being practiced by the North against the South; and that we Americans must see to it that the guerrillas are driven out, or such wars of subversion will spread.

I grant this seems a compelling argument, but it won't stand up under close analysis. Communist guerrilla wars didn't begin in Vietnam and won't end there, regardless of the outcome of this particular struggle. American muscle, sufficiently used, may hold the 17th parallel against infiltrators from the North, but our bayonets will not stop—they could even spread—Communist agitation within other Asian countries. A government may be checked by force, but not an idea. There is no way to fence off an ideology.

Indeed, Communist-inspired guerrilla wars have always jumped over boundary lines. They have erupted in scattered, far-flung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions...

the popular view.
PRESIDENT Johnson said recently of Europe: "The Europe of today is a new Europe. In place of uncertainty, there is confidence; in place of decay, progress; in place of isolation, partnership; in place of war, peace." Confidence, progress, partnership and peace—what better testimonial could there be to the health and vitality, both political and economic, of Europe today; and what better promise for Europe's future?

During the summer, in a month of hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee examined "the Europe of today." Our discussions ranged over the entire continent, literally from the Atlantic to the Urals, and beyond. For a diagnosis of the Atlantic Alliance means considering not only de Gaulle's aims, but the prospects for German reunification, Britain's association with the Common Market, nuclear arms control, greater European cohesion, East-West détente, the impact of Viet Nam, and much more. These problems are connected to each other in a seamless web that joins the United States with Europe, linking us together in the future as inextricably as in the past.

When the Committee's hearings began, it was announced that their purpose was educational. In preparation for them, I visited Europe in May for interviews with governmental leaders—including Wilson, Erhard and de Gaulle, along with prominent spokesmen of the opposition parties and other knowledgeable political observers. I have now had a chance to test my tentative conclusions against what the Committee has been told by a number of distinguished American experts on Europe.

The fact that there is in Europe today confidence, progress, partnership and peace is due, in no small part, to farsighted policy decisions we have taken since the end of the war. But we may stand in danger of being so dazzled by past successes that we could easily stumble into future failures. For Europe is now rumbling, not with discontent, but with a new spirit of independence, in both East and West. We seem to hear the sound, but we may not understand its meaning. To me it is the murmur of widespread European assent to the proposition: "Resolved, that the postwar period has ended."

Testifying before the Committee on July 13, Under Secretary
State George Ball said: “The NATO Crisis [not the period] . . . is over.” Such a statement assumes that the principal problem facing NATO is France’s refusal to continue her participation in SHAPE, or to permit NATO bases to remain on French soil, and that because the other allies have decided to retain a relocated military headquarters for the Alliance in Belgium, the crisis has ended.

But the questions General de Gaulle has raised have a much deeper significance. For he is the symbol of the growing desire of European countries to exert more control over their own destinies—the longing for a larger measure of national independence. To the extent that he has appealed successfully to these sentiments, General de Gaulle is not isolated, either in France or in Europe. And, perhaps more importantly, by leading the assault upon the old barriers of the cold war, which all Western Europeans want removed, he appears to many, if not to most, Europeans to be moving with the current of history, while the suspicion grows that we are anchored to the past. Europeans recognize that de Gaulle’s perspectives exceed his power, but they also believe that we are so preoccupied elsewhere, particularly in Viet Nam, and so tied to cold-war concepts, that we fail to take advantage of the openings our power presents. As one astute European observer remarked, “France has the objective but not the means, while the United States has the means but not the objective.”

Perhaps our resistance to the mood of Europe is most clearly reflected in our relations with de Gaulle’s government. We seem to have a peculiar ability to get under each other’s skin, to use one another as a foil. McGeorge Bundy described the present foreign policy of France as “disappointing in its manners, costly in its pride, wasteful in its lost opportunities, irrelevant in much of its dramatics and endurable in its fundamentals.” Though an intriguing epigram, Bundy’s assessment must be weighed on the scales of recent French history. When the General returned to power, France was on the verge of civil war. The Fifth Republic may be hard to live with, but who would prefer the France before de Gaulle, with its revolving-door governments? The previous régime was marked by feeble central power, a faltering economy, poor national morale, mutinous armies and a chronic inability to extricate France from costly and questionable colonial involvements. France today is prosperous and stable, shorn of her outdated imperial burdens, aglow with the rekindled pride of her
How has de Gaulle achieved all this for France? Perhaps, as Professor Henry Kissinger suggested, it was because the General saw the need to teach his country and Europe generally “attitudes of independence and self-reliance,” in the belief that “before a nation or an area can mean something to others it has to mean something to itself.” Above all, we should remember that, however disconcerting we find de Gaulle’s policies, or imperious his style, he has proved time and again, most recently in Moscow, that he is a man of the West.

Yet, despite de Gaulle’s basic loyalties, the present occupants of the seventh floor of our State Department will not forgive him for throwing roadblocks in the path of a united Western Europe. Secretary Ball, in his appearance before the Committee, referred repeatedly to the “compelling logic” of a unified Western Europe, to be built, presumably, in the general image of the United States. His testimony, in line with many previous Departmental statements, was replete with warnings that the alternative to unity is a return to the “corrosive nationalist rivalries” of prewar Europe, as though there were no middle ground.

Actually, there is scant basis to fear that Western Europe—knit together by a flourishing common market—is in any danger of unraveling, and even less reason to apprehend a reversion to the pattern of militant nationalism which plagued the period before the wars. The “either-or” argument is unreal, a rhetorical duel between two straw men. When pressed, Secretary Ball himself conceded that Western Europe was not likely to revert to the old habits of a discredited past. Summing up, he sought a more plausible case, declaring that “the central issue before the American government and the American people . . . is what kind of Europe and what kind of Atlantic world we want.”

My talks in Europe, and the comments of witnesses during the hearings, brought home to me the fact that it is not the kind of Europe we want that any longer governs. The question is really what kind of resurgent Europe the Europeans themselves will build. We can encourage them to move in certain directions, largely because they have looked to us for leadership. But we should avoid pressing them too hard to adopt our favorite schemes for solving their problems. Looking back over the statements of leading State Department officials, one is struck by the fact
that they seem to hold out for Europe no alternative between our form of unity and chaos, no awareness that European sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent a practical possibility. In brief, I believe it isn't wise to keep insisting that Western Europe should grow to resemble the United States of America.

At best, it is a dubious policy to keep prodding our NATO partners for their reluctance to make new offerings at the altar of European union. For we cannot forecast with any certainty that our Grand Design for Europe, even if it were to happen, would necessarily prove a blessing to the world.

What real assurance is there that world peace would be promoted by the emergence of another gargantuan state, comparable in size and strength to the United States or the Soviet Union, and equally capable of waging global war? Is it not just possible that a looser association of European countries, which rejects subordination to a single executive authority, might turn out to be the safer arrangement? After all, Bismarck's Reich welded together, under one Emperor, the separate principalities which had composed the German Bund in a union which proved a curse to peace. Yet the Bund itself was once touted for having been "impregnable in defense and incapable of aggression."

Can we really be so confident that a united Western Europe would always remain our faithful partner? We are dismayed by de Gaulle because he dissents from our view about how European defense, European political life and European relations with the rest of the world should be conducted. Why should we believe that a great European Union would not prove even more assertive, contrary and—dare I use the term?—disobedient than de Gaulle's France? Perhaps, as Professor Kissinger suggested, there are advantages to be found in preserving pluralism in Europe.

In any case, the fact remains that in Europe today there is a desire for diversity. Therefore, the task for us is to cast our policy so that it encompasses both the quest for cohesion and this desire for diversity. To accommodate these two aims concurrently, we should avoid taking rigid ideological positions. We must not insist that Europe evolve in any way which does not correspond to the real feelings of Europeans. Surely the United States does not hold the only patent on a Grand Design.
The same insistence on the solution we want—and that we think Europeans should want—has been applied to the nuclear sharing problem. Thousands of pages have been written on this subject. I can add nothing new to the debate. It does seem to me, however, on the basis of the accumulated evidence, that we have handled this problem with a rather heavy hand. The Committee, to be sure, was told that the United States had not been doctrinaire on the subject of a multilateral nuclear force, that we had been “very, very careful not to try to bring pressure” on our allies to accept the Multilateral Force (M.L.F.), and that the charge that there has been pressure is “nonsense.”

Our diplomats may believe that they avoided bringing heavy pressure to bear on behalf of the M.L.F. proposal, but this is not the frank opinion of most European officials directly involved and of most disinterested experts on both sides of the Atlantic. If we are so unaware of the resentment our tactics produced our antennae are in need of major repair.

Likewise, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the United States has nearly isolated itself in insisting upon retaining the so-called European clause in our draft proposal for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This clause would leave the door open for the creation of an independent European nuclear deterrent, although the necessary precondition for such a force is a degree of political unity which Secretary Ball himself has described as “far exceeding that foreseen in the near future by even the most optimistic proponents of European federalism.”

The official argument, rooted once again in our Grand Design for Europe, is that we are unwilling to foreclose the possibility that some future European Union might organize a nuclear deterrent force in which the Germans could participate. Besides, we want to preserve our option for a “hardware” solution to the nuclear-sharing problem within the Western Alliance. We say that the clause, which one knowledgeable observer has described as though written with a “ball-point corkscrew,” would not lead to proliferation because it permits no increase in the total number of “nuclear entities” in the world. I wonder what our attitude toward such an option would be if mainland China announced its intention to form an M.L.F. with Albania, Mali and North
Viet Nam, or the Soviet Union an M.L.F. with Poland and Cuba.

In any event, the State Department insists that the European clause is "not the real obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement." The Committee was told that German access to nuclear weapons, under an M.L.F. or a similar "hardware"-sharing scheme, would not even prove a serious obstacle to German reunification, which "will come about when conditions are ripe for it." Most Europeans would disagree.

Our refusal to drop the European clause seems to indicate that we have decided it is more important to bind West Germany more tightly to a truncated NATO than to improve relations with the Soviet Union. I think our priority is wrong. As far as I can determine, the other European nations at Geneva, including our allies, feel that we are mortgaging the present for the sake of a highly problematical future. In other words, most Europeans—I will mention West Germany in a moment—who would participate in a separate European deterrent and whose interests this hypothetical, if not visionary, force would presumably serve, are not pressing us to retain the European clause. Why, then, should we insist on keeping an option for them which they do not demand, or at least do not think is important enough to jeopardize closer relations with the Soviet Union? Is this in our interest—or in theirs?

In discussing the ultimate goal of our policy in Europe, Mr. Bundy said: "Settlement is the name of the game." If we are going to play the game, we must remember that the ball is labeled "relations with the Soviet Union." If we are not going to play, we will discover that the game will go on without us, and we shall soon become spectators in Europe rather than participants. However much we may doubt the Russians, most Europeans are persuaded that the danger of a Soviet attack has receded, and that, as a result of developments in the Communist world—particularly the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the necessity for Russia to turn about and face the challenge of a hostile China—the time has arrived for a diplomatic assault upon the unwelcome barriers which split the Continent. For the partition of Europe at the Elbe is regarded by Europeans on both sides as transitory and unnatural.

The United States should lead its allies in their reach eastward across the Elbe. for we alone can deal, on equal terms, with the
will press on, believing, as more Europeans do every day, that in Europe, at least, the cold war is over. It would be tragic for all concerned—except the Soviets—if by standing so far behind our Western European allies we forced them to turn their backs on us in order to seek reconciliation with Eastern Europe, as they are bound to do.

To lead the new search for a European settlement, we need not join in the European consensus that the Russian threat has faded away. We can parley without discarding the Western Alliance, to which even France proclaims her continuing fidelity. NATO still exists as a fort for the West, should the Soviet Union turn militant again.

On the diplomatic front, the best place for a breakthrough remains Geneva, where we may have come within reach of a non-proliferation treaty. Negotiations should not be permitted to break down on the issue of retaining the European clause. It is reunification, not nuclear sharing, which concerns the Germans most. Europeans, including many Germans, hold generally to the belief that reunification can come about only after much better relations have been established between the two halves of Europe. Maintaining the option for increased German access to nuclear weapons can only add to the fears and suspicions; closing the option, on the other hand, would tend to lessen tensions. As Mr. Bundy pointed out, so would a clear public statement by the West German government accepting the Oder-Neisse line. I have the impression, and several witnesses before the Committee did too, that German public opinion is coming around to a realization of the need to strengthen the East Europeans’ confidence in Germany. I would think that we should encourage the Germans to do so. I do not see why we, alone among the Western powers, seem unwilling to accept the thesis that reunification will follow relaxation. I do not see why we, again alone, continue to assert an almost mystical belief that eventually, for inexplicable reasons, conditions will somehow materialize making German reunification possible. By holding to this view, by insisting on a European clause as a prerequisite for a non-proliferation treaty, we are running the risk of not only falling between two stools but of knocking both over. For the prospect of an integrated European nuclear deterrent is most likely to prove a mirage. An empty hope can only disillusion the West Germans, causing them—more in sorrow than in anger—to pull away from NATO’s close embrace.
Latin America
TOWARD A NEW POLICY

By FRANK CHURCH, United States Senator from Idaho, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs

Delivered in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., April 10, 1970

HOPE, FRANCIS BACON once commented, makes a good breakfast, but it is a lean supper. As Latin America enters the 70's, her governments tremble beneath the bruising tensions that separate hope from fulfillment.

"Here is a subcontinent," historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., observes, "where one-eighth more people than the population of the United States subsist on less than one-eighth of our gross national product, where 5 per cent of the people receive a third of the income and 70 per cent live in abject poverty, and where in country after country the political and social structures are organized to keep things that way."

As Germán Arciniegas of Colombia pointed out in a famous observation, there are two Latin Americas: the visible and the invisible. "Visible Latin America is the Latin America of Presidents, generals, embassies, newspapers, business houses, universities, cathedrals, estancias and haciendas. But in the shadows lies 'mute, repressed' Latin America, a vast reservoir of revolution. . . Nobody knows what these . . . silent men and women think, feel, dream, or await in the depths of their being." In recent years, invisible Latin America has begun to stir. Workers and campesinos want three meals a day and a modicum of human recognition and dignity. Indians want to enter the national life of their countries. Intellectuals and students want social justice. Engineers and soldiers want modernization. Whatever the particular goal, the inherited condition of life is becoming every day more insupportable for many people.

Much of Latin America entered the 20th Century with a way of life inherited from 16th Century Spain and Portugal. This is a way of life which in many respects is incompatible with a modern, industrialized society. Latin Americans are plunging headlong into the 21st Century with precious little time to make a transition that took generations in the United States and centuries in Western Europe.

Yet the imperative is clear. In countries whose per capita income presently ranges from $80 to $800 a year, only the fastest economic growth conceivable can possibly produce enough food, shelter, clothing and employment to match the spiralling requirements of the swelling population. This multitude, which now numbers 276 million souls, is growing at the rate of 3 per cent a year, or more than any other population in the world; yet production, on a net per capita basis, is increasing at only half that rate. Inflation is endemic; foreign exchange is in short supply; export trade opportunities are restricted by barriers interposed by the already rich, developed nations; and overall economic growth is falling chronically short of satisfactory levels. The Sixties did not bring the much-heralded 'Decade of Development' to Latin America. The euphoric expectation of bountiful blessings generated by the Alliance for Progress has receded, and widespread disillusionment has set in.

Still, economists know what is required within Latin America to move it into an era of adequate, self-sustaining economic growth. There is general consensus on the necessity for far-reaching agrarian and fiscal reform, for increasing internal savings and enlarging international markets, for regional economic integration, and for more favorable trading arrangements with the developed countries. Most of all, there is the need to bring into the national economic life the large numbers of Latin Americans, amounting in some countries to the greater part of the whole population, who are now, for all practical purposes, subsisting outside a money economy.

Obviously, if such profound internal changes can be accomplished at all, they can be brought about only by the Latin Americans themselves. The impetus must come from within. Success or failure may be marginally influenced, but it cannot be bestowed from without—neither by the United States nor any other foreign power.

It is also evident that the means adopted, the economic

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systems devised, the political forms chosen, will likewise have
to be homegrown. Neither the leisurely evolution of modern
capitalism, as it matured in northern Europe and the United
States, nor the differing brands of Marxism, as practiced in
Russia or China, offer models for Latin America that are really
relevant to its cultural inheritance or its pressing needs. Even
Cuban-style communism has found a meager market in other
Latin lands. Che Guevara’s Romantic excursion to spread
Catholicism to the mountains of Bolivia ended in failure and
death. For Latin America, steeped in the Christian tradition
and prizing the individual highly, communism has little
appeal. Indeed, those in the forefront of the struggle for
radical, even revolutionary, reform in Latin America today are
more likely to be found wearing Roman collars than carrying
red banners.

So, as we peer into the 70’s, we must anticipate turmoil and
upheaval throughout Latin America, a decade of instability,
suppression and irreversible change. Each country will stake
out and cultivate its own political and economic terrain. The
spirit of nationalism will grow more fervent, and movement
along the political spectrum will be generally toward the left.
Inflamable sensitivities will run high.

As for the United States, we would be well advised to
practice an unaccustomed deference. The more gently we press
our hemispheric neighbors, the greater our influence is likely
to be. This will not be easy, for self-restraint is the hardest of
all lessons for a great power to learn. Too tempting and
seductive is the illusion of omnipotence. Every great power
would prefer to believe—and ascribe to itself—the verity of
the tribute once paid by Prince Metternich to imperial France:
“[When Paris sneezes, Europe catches cold.”

In casting our own weight about the Western Hemisphere,
the United States has shown typically little self-restraint.
Between 1898 and 1924, we directly intervened no less than
31 times in the internal affairs of our smaller neighbors. And
we have yet to kick the habit, as our abortive Bay-of-Pigs
invasion bears witness, not to speak of our military occupation
of the Dominican Republic, as recently as 1965.

In addition to its direct interventions, the United States has
deployed its economic and military power to great advantage
throughout Latin America, a continent that has been
extremely receptive to the temptation to acquire the
products of the advanced world. The abrupt fall in U.S.
investment in Latin America in the period 1960-1966
at $2.8-billion while the repatriation of profits and income
amounted to $8.3-billion. This means that over this period
foreign investment caused a net loss of $785-million a year in
Latin America’s balance of payments.

Working with later data on a somewhat different basis, the
Council for Latin America makes the very opposite claim,
putting the net positive contribution of U.S. investment to
Latin America’s balance of payments, during the 1965-1968
period, at $8.5-billion a year.

Wherever the truth may lie, it is clear that the influence of
United States business in Latin America is enormous, and that
its impact produces political as well as economic repercussions.
Whether or not the Latin Americans are right in their analysis
of the adverse effect of private foreign investment on their
balance of payments, the important political point is that they
think they are right about it.

The U.S. presence in Latin America is pervasive, culturally
as well as economically. Latinas listen to American music, go to
see American movies, read American books and magazines,
drive American cars, drink Coca-Cola, and shop at Sears. The
ubiquitous American tourist is to be seen on every hand,
worrying aloud about the water and food and complaining
about the difficulty of making himself understood in
English.

The Latin reaction to all of this is somewhat ambivalent.
Latinas like the products of U.S. culture and U.S. business, but
at the same time they feel a bit overwhelmed and fearful that
Yankees may indeed be taking over their countries. One of the
causes of internal resistance to proposals for a Latin American
Common Market is the fear that U.S. companies would be able,
through their sheer size, to benefit from it to the
disadvantage of local entrepreneurs.

Given this situation, it has to be expected that regardless of
the policies we adopt, however enlightened and beneficial they
may be, the United States will long remain a national target in
Latin America for criticism, misgiving, suspicion and
distrust.

The picture is not all that bleak, however. Millions of
people in Latin America think well of the people of the
United States. Certain of our leaders have been greatly
admired—Franklin Roosevelt for his “Good Neighbor” policy,
and John F. Kennedy for the way he besoke the heartfelt
aspirations of the dispossessed. No one can fault the sincerity
of President Kennedy when he launched the Alliance for
Progress in March of 1961, inviting the American Republics to
join in a “vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude
and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the people
for homes, work and land, health and schools.” Since then, the
United States has funneled in more than $10-billion in various
forms of aid.

Given the magnitude of our effort during the 60’s, we are
left to wonder why it produced such disappointing results. We
thought we were seeing the resurgence of democratic
forms of government; instead, we have seen a relentless slide toward
totalitarianism. We thought we could remodel Latin societies, but
the reforms we prescribed have largely eluded us. We thought
our generosity would meet with gratitude; but we have seen
antagonism toward us grow as our involvement in their
problems has deepened. We pledged ourselves to goals which
lay beyond our capacity to confer, objectives that could never
be the gift of any program of external aid; by promising more
than we could deliver, we have made ourselves a pausible
scapegoat for pent-up furies and frustrations for which we
bear little or no responsibility.

Worse still, the kind of aid we have extended, has tended to
aggravate, rather than mitigate, these difficulties. Bilateral in
character, administered on a government-to-government basis,
our foreign aid program is embroiled in the internal politics of
both the donor and recipient countries. The program's very nature makes this unavoidable, but the consequences are contributing to a steady deterioration in relations.

First, let us consider what has happened to the foreign aid program, due to the pressure of domestic politics within the United States. What commenced (back in the days of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe) as principally a grant-in-aid undertaking, has been transformed by the outcry against "foreign giveaways" into what is now primarily a loan program. Furthermore, in terms of accomplishing our foreign policy objectives, hindsight indicates we have gone about foreign aid backwards. The Marshall Plan should have been administered mainly on a loan instead of a grant basis, and the ready return of our investment would have done much to solve our balance-of-payments problems in the 1960's. In Latin America, the formula should have been reversed, with the emphasis on grants instead of loans.

Now the accumulation of these loans, and others as well, by Latin American governments, is creating serious debt service problems. "Heavy borrowings by some Western Hemisphere countries to support development," notes the Rockefeller Report, "have reached the point where annual repayments of interest and amortization absorb a large share of foreign exchange earnings. Within five years, a number of other nations in the Western Hemisphere could face the same situation. Many of the countries are, in effect, having to make new loans to get the foreign exchange to pay interest and amortization on old loans, and at higher interest rates."

This debt service problem is a major concern. If countries get into a position where interest and amortization payments on foreign loans require a disproportionately large share of available foreign exchange, then the general pace of development will be slowed by the inability to maintain imports of the capital equipment needed to support economic growth.

Of course, in fairness it should be pointed out that our foreign aid program is not the sole contributor, by any means, to this mounting debt service problem. From 1962 through 1969, the Export-Import Bank lent $1.7 billion to Latin America at commercial interest rates and generally shorter maturities than AID loans. Various European governments and banks (as well as U. S. banks) have made substantial loans, frequently at rates of 6 to 8 per cent and for maturities of no more than 3 to 5 years. It is clear that both we and the Europeans are going to have to review our lending policies and explore ways for stretching out repayment schedules. Joint action between the lending nations, the international lending institutions, and debtor nations is necessary. I agree with the Peterson Task Force suggestion to put this strategy "into effect now to prevent an emergency—not to deal with one after it has arisen."

Not only did the pressures of domestic politics change our aid to loans, but concern over our chronically adverse balance-of-payments led the Congress to insist upon "tying" these loans to the purchase of goods and services in the United States. Thus our "aid"—so-called—became an ill-disguised subsidy for American exports. While it undeniably constitutes an addition to Latin American economic resources, it can only be used for purchases in the United States, or, under the new Presidential directive, within the Hemisphere, where prices are often above European or Japanese levels. Moreover, still another politically-motivated restriction requires that half of the goods financed by the United States must be transported in American bottoms. It has been estimated that this provision alone reduces the effectiveness of each $100.00 of U. S. loan assistance by as much as $20.00, furnishing another irritant to developing countries.

But the worse political consequence of all has been the inability of Congress to resist temptation to use the aid program as both carrot and stick to reward or punish recipient governments, depending on how we may regard their behavior. Since 1961, the punitive sections of the Foreign Assistance Act have increased from 4 to 21.

Most notorious of these punitive provisions is the Hickenlooper Amendment. Although it has proved useless as a deterrent to the confiscation of American-owned businesses abroad, this amendment will remain on the books. Few Congressmen would relish explaining to their constituents why they voted to repeal a provision which prohibits giving further aid to a foreign government which has expropriated an American-owned business and failed to pay adequate compensation.

Yet, the Hickenlooper Amendment is only the most prominent of a whole series of penalties written into our Foreign Assistance Act. There are, for instance, the amendments designed to enforce the American view of fishing rights. On occasion, U. S. fishing boats have been seized by Ecuador or Peru for fishing in what we regard as the high seas, but what they regard as territorial waters. If a fine is imposed, our law provides that military sales and assistance must be suspended; it also provides that the amount of the fine must be subtracted from the economic aid we are furnishing the guilty government.

This provision, I must confess, was solemnly adopted as an appropriate punishment to put an end to any further meddling with American boats. But, alas, it has not worked that way. We "tie" so many strings to our "aid" that some governments have preferred to take their money in fines!

The trouble with attaching such penalties to the aid program is that, although they might give us some emotional satisfaction, they do not stop the behavior against which they are aimed. What is worse, they provoke a series of diplomatic showdowns that corrode, weaken and eventually destroy good relations.

Peru is a textbook case. The deterioration of our relations with Peru began in 1964, when the State Department, on its own initiative, started to draft its F-5's for Peru as a tactic to force the government to settle the IPC case. The tactic was not successful and resulted in some bitterness on the part of the Peruvian government, then headed by Fernando Belaunde Terry, a man who otherwise qualified as a true Alliance for Progress President.

This bitterness was increased when we refused to sell the Peruvians F-5 aircraft. But then, when they decided to buy Mirage aircraft from France, the State Department reversed itself and offered F-5's. At this point, Congress decreed that foreign aid should be withheld from countries buying sophisticated weapons abroad. The net result is that Peru now has Mirages, a plane aptly named for the contribution it makes to Peruvian security.

Finally, a military government more radical than the reformist Belaunde came to power and promptly expropriated IPC. The new Peruvian government has not only failed to pay compensation, but has actually presented IPC with a bill of $694-million for its alleged past transgressions. And through all of this, there has been the continuing wrangle over fishing boats.

This sketchy review is necessarily oversimplified. The story of U. S.-Peruvian relations in the last five years contains ample mistakes on both sides. The point is that each successive stage in the deterioration has been provoked, in one way or another, by some aspect of the United States aid program. Indeed, more than one U. S. Ambassador to Latin America has said privately that his difficulties stemmed directly from our aid program. One can scarcely imagine a more damning indictment.
Let us now consider the political impact of a bilateral, government-to-government aid program upon the recipient countries. They are naturally interested in putting the money into places of immediate advantage, where the political pay-off is greatest. Heavy emphasis falls on program, rather than project, loans, whereby lump sum transfers of dollar credits augment a given government's foreign exchange reserves. This is an indirect method of lending budgetary support. The reserves, of course, are available to be purchased with local goods or the purchase of foreign exchange reserves. It is thus a part of the rationale of a program loan that its proceeds should be used to finance the purchase of French perfume. AID early limited the purposes for which program loans could be used. But money is fungible, and restrictions applied solely to the loan do not insure that the borrowing government will not use its other resources for the purchase of frivolous luxury items, while relying on the United States to finance necessities. Little if any net economic gain would be made in these circumstances.

It became necessary, therefore, to make program loans contingent on agreement by the borrowing government to regulate its imports generally in such a way as to insure that its total foreign exchange reserves were used with optimum efficiency from our point of view.

Further, the question arose as to what to do with the local currency generated by the program loan. In the absence of agreements to the contrary, this currency can be used in ways that would undermine, neutralize, or offsets the intended purpose of the loan. So, to insure that these local currency proceeds are used in ways that meet with our approval, AID made agreement on this point a condition of program lending. As in the case of foreign exchange reserves, it followed, of course, that this agreement had to encompass the government's fiscal and monetary policies across the board.

All of this inevitably involves the United States in the most intimate areas of another country's sovereignty, its tax policies and its monetary system. Program loans are disbursed in installments, usually quarterly, and each disbursement is preceded by the most detailed review of our AID mission of the recipient country's economic performance for the prior quarter. Why has the government's tax program not been enacted? The central bank is letting the local money supply increase too fast. Recent wage settlements have been over-valued. A program review, typically raider, settles a hundred other similar questions and complaints. This is done with the best of motives, but at an exorbitant political price.

Our aid technicians must sit as advisers and overseers at the highest levels in the finance ministries of various Latin American governments. Inescapably, this places us in a patronizing position which is demeaning to our hosts. The large colony of our AID administrators, meanwhile, living in conspicuous luxury in every Latin capital, cannot help but feed popular resentment against the United States. If a militant nationalism directed against the gringos is now on the rise, it is quite possible that our own policies, largely connected with AID, have given it the spur.

One is left to wonder how so cumbersome and self-defeating an AID program has lasted so long. Again, I suggest, the answer can be found by examining the politics involved on Capitol Hill. The analysis, I assure you, is a fascinating one.

Year after year, in order to get the needed votes in Congress, a package of contradictory arguments is assembled. The package contains something for everyone, with the result that the life of the AID program has been prolonged by a hybrid coalition of both liberal and conservative members. Let us explore how this artful strategy has worked with respect to the two main categories of AID, military and economic assistance.

(1) Military Assistance. Conservative members of Congress have been wooed to support this kind of aid on the ground that bolstering indigenous armies and police forces furnishes us with a shield against the spread of communism in the hemisphere. Furthermore, it is argued, strengthened military power within Latin America is to be welcomed as a force for internal stability favorably disposed toward local American interests. For the most part, these arguments are accepted as articles of faith, even though evidence discredit them. In Cuba, it was demonstrated that once a regime has lost minimum essential support, no army will save it. Castro didn't walk over Batista's army; he walked through it. In Peru and Bolivia, on the other hand, where the government's army seized the governments, the new military regimes garnered public support behind them not by favoring, but for grabbing, local American interests. Each confiscated a major American-owned business, the Gulf Oil Corporation in Bolivia, the IPC in Peru.

Liberals in Congress have been lured to support military assistance by quite different, though equally flimsy, arguments. Furthermore, once a military junta has installed itself behind its American-furnished tanks, guns and planes, there is no assurance that the United States will be benignly regarded. In fact, the new "Nasserist" regimes of Peru and Bolivia, among all governments of South America, are the most aggressively hostile toward us.

Meanwhile, the military missions we have installed in no less than 17 Latin capitals, add to the debilitating image of the United States as a militaristic nation. Even the Rockefeller Report, which gave its blessing to military assistance, looks with disfavor upon "our permanent military missions in residence," since they "too often have constituted too large and too visible a United States presence."

That puts it mildly. Listen to the testimony of Ralph Dungan, our former Ambassador to Chile, given before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs: "I believe there is no shaking the prevailing Latin conception of the United States as a society dominated to a very large measure by the Pentagon. This perception is widely shared across the political spectrum." Dr. Dungan went on to say that "perhaps no single action which the United States has taken in recent years including the Bay-of-Pigs fiasco was so significant in confirming the view of Latin America of the United States as a nation willing and ready to use its vast military power unilaterally . . . as the unfortunate invasion of the Dominican Republic. Other friendly hemisphere observers have noted we will never know whether the Alliance was a success or failure because the program stopped the minute U.S. Marines landed in Santo Domingo in the Spring of 1965.

So much, then, for our misguided military policies in Latin America, and the contrived and contradictory arguments with which they are perpetuated. Let us now turn to the other side of the American AID program, economic assistance.

(2) Economic Assistance. Here again, Congressional support has been secured on the basis of false and conflicting doctrines. Conservative votes have been solicited upon the theory that economic assistance is good for business, that it can shore up the status quo in Latin America and thus prove an
effective deterrent to revolution. It is argued that our input of dollars will promote stability and thwart the anti-capitalists. Oddly enough, this proposition is widely believed, even though Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere which has gone communist, enjoyed a relatively high per capita income along with a highly concentrated investment of American capital.

Liberal in Congress, on the other hand, have accepted the need for economic assistance on the weakness of the opposite argument, namely, that far from preserving the status quo, our financial aid is meant to promote necessary economic and social change. But, as our experience with the Alliance for Progress bears out, external aid does not produce internal change. Because the money has been channeled through existing governments, it has mainly been spent for the benefit of the governing elites. It has perhaps helped, in some instances, to modernize Latin economies, but not to restructure them. In short, the liberals have also been taken in.

The conclusion I must reach is that our AID program, as administered in Latin America, has proved to be—on balance—a net loss. As our meddling has increased, resentment has grown. It lies at the root of an alarming deterioration in inter-American relations—deterioration which has led to the assassination of one of our Ambassadors, the kidnapping of another plus a labor atache; the riotous receptions given Governor Rockefeller as President Nixon's personal emissary, indeed, the refusal of some countries even to receive him; and most recently, the untrue student demonstrations following the arrival of our Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs on an orientation visit to Bolivia.

This does not mean that we shall throw up our hands in despair, or turn our backs on the hemisphere. What is necessary is that we first get off the backs of our neighbors! We must learn to hold ourselves at arms length; we must come to terms with the inevitable, letting changes take place without insisting upon managing or manipulating them. We must begin to show some self-restraint.

Here, then, are some guidelines I would favor for a new U.S. policy toward Latin America in the '70's:

1. First of all, we should begin to adopt trade regulations that give the developing countries in Latin America a better break. We should listen closely to the growing, unified Latin American complaint on this score, and give the most serious consideration to their urgent appeals for preferential treatment. The political hurdles to such a course are high; the strongest Presidential leadership will be necessary; but for too long we have avoided biting this particular bullet with the palliative of the AID program.

The great independence hero of Cuba, Jose Marti, once warned his countrymen that "a people economically enslaved but politically free will end by losing all freedom, but a people economically free can go on to win its political freedom." To achieve the latter, which Latin Americans believe they are now fighting for, Latin products must not be squeezed from the world's markets.

2. Next, we must start to observe, as well as praise, the principle of non-intervention. It was San Martin, one of Latin America's legendary figures, who said that "we are as we act." If we are to act in accordance with the principle of non-intervention, we must not only accept Latin governments as they come, but we must also refrain from the unilateral use of our military power in any situation short of one involving a direct threat to the security of the United States. Such was the case in our showdown with the Soviet Union when the Russians tried, in the Fall of 1962, to obtain a nuclear foothold in Cuba. But let there be no more military interventions, 1965 style, in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere.

3. We should bring home our military missions, and our grant-in-aid and training programs, and sever the intimate connections we have sought to form with the Latin military establishments. After all, the recent war between El Salvador and Honduras we made possible, in large part, by our gift of arms and training eagerly extended to both sides. This is a shabby business for us to mix in.

4. We should commence the liquidation of our bilateral government-to-government economic AID program, as the recent Peterson Task Force Report recommends, effecting at the same time a corresponding shift of economic assistance to the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other multi-lateral institutions. Such a transfer could be cushioned by phasing out our bilateral program in the following manner:

(a) The United States naturally should fulfill those loan commitments already in the pipeline, but the money should be "untied" so that the recipients may put it to the most efficient use. This can be done by Presidential action, which has thus far been limited to the freeing of only those markets within the hemisphere.

(b) The State Department should open negotiations for the reserving of debt repayment in those instances where the burden unduly restricts necessary economic growth. This, too, lies within the authority of the President, and accords with the recommendations of both the Rockefeller Report and the Peterson Report. We should seek, also, to involve European creditors in this process. I would oppose stretching out debts to the United States so that debts to other creditors can be paid on time.

(c) Financial assistance from the United States for public housing projects, schools, hospitals, family planning programs, and other social work should, in the future, be funneled through the newly-established Inter-American Social Development Institute. If this institute is administered properly, it will emphasize the use of matching grants instead of loans, and it will deal not directly with Latin governments but with private groups, trade unions, rural cooperatives and charitable foundations.

The Social Development Institute should be staffed with personnel ready to try a wide variety of new experiments, willing to refrain from sending another horde of North American directors into Latin countries, and who will share with Latin Americans the real experience of innovating and initiating new programs. In short, if the Social Development Institute is to succeed, it must be divorced entirely from the old ways of AID.

(d) As for technical assistance, the remaining part of AID, it somehow remains as much overrated in the United States as it stands discredited in Latin America. The program's present weakness was perhaps best summed up in an excellent study by a Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on the American AID program in Chile. Speaking for the Subcommittee, former Senator Gruening concluded that our technicians were "too far advanced technically ... for what is required in underdeveloped countries. They are also too ignorant of local conditions and customs and serve periods too short to make a significant impact." This criticism is endemic to our technical assistance program throughout Latin America.

The limiting factor on the amount of technical assistance we have extended has never been money; it has always been people. The technician not only has to be professionally qualified; he should also know the language and the culture. He should be accomplished at human relations as well as in his technical specialty. There just are not many people like this to export abroad, and it is better not to send technicians at all than to send the wrong kind.
Yet there remains a need to transfer technology as well as capital to Latin America. This can best be done through expanding the exchange-of-persons program to enable more Latin Americans to study in the United States, and through selective grants to a few outstanding Latin American universities. The role of shirt-sleeve diplomats, the concept which underlay the original Point Four program, can best be played by Peace Corps Volunteers.

5 Another promising agency has been created by last year’s Foreign Assistance Act, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, more commonly known as OPIC. Its purpose is to encourage, through a liberalized program of investment guarantees, a larger flow of American private capital into developing countries. In Latin America, OPIC could play a useful role, if it encourages the right kind of investment, directing it away from the sensitive resource areas, and pointing it toward joint ventures in which Latin Americans will share largely in both ownership and management. Here, again, everything depends on the way OPIC is administered.

The use of joint ventures deserves emphasis. I am well aware that joint ventures are distasteful to many—not all—American companies. But, in the long run, this may be the only way U. S. business interests can survive in Latin America.

Before concluding, let me just add one warning here. Private foreign investment is not economic cooperation and assistance; it is business, and most Latin leaders are willing to betray us. It is business, and most Latin leaders are willing to betray us.

On April 4, 1969, shots rang out in Memphis, Tennessee, and Martin Luther King was dead from the unlawful use of an assassin’s gun. Minutes later, thousands of people marched into the streets of Washington and for five days they burned and looted like invaders from another land. Fire after fire lighted the night. One... then another... a total of 711 were reported. 645 buildings were damaged or completely destroyed, while people wandered at will into the broken store fronts and walked away, weighed down with their plunder. Over one thousand people were injured, eleven were killed and property damage cost $24,000,000. Some excused the assassin’s act and the mob’s behavior as dissent.

A few months ago, the Black Panthers in San Francisco handed out coloring books to little Negro children. The book portrayed blacks shooting and knifing policemen, with the caption: “The only good pig is a dead pig.” Should such action be excused as lawful dissent?

In Los Angeles, drug addicts Charles Manson and his cohorts are awaiting trial for the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate. Last week, Manson threw a copy of the United States Constitution into the waste basket in defiance of law and order. His supporters called it dissent.

What do you call it when a man robs another, when he steals, when he burns a building, when he threatens another with a gun, when he murders, when he teaches others to burn and to kill? I call it crime.

Crime... and the paralyzing fear of crime... has exploded into one of the most serious threats to America today. And if we are going to correct this problem, then we must understand a few of the reasons behind the rising crime rate.

Many in this country have come to regard the Supreme Court with such reverence that it can do no wrong—even when it hands down irresponsible decisions that cripple the police in their efforts to prevent crime, detect criminals and prosecute them. Its rulings on mob marches, riots, pornography and subversive activity are all contributing to the crime wave.

One of the great deterrents to crime is realistic penalty. A criminal law without an enforced realistic penalty is no law at all. Yet, the courts have encouraged criminal irresponsibility by handing out light and unrealistic sentences.

Crime
SOME CALL IT DISSENT

By BILL CHAPPELL, United States Congressman from Florida
Delivered before the Kewanee and Rotary Clubs of Ocala, Florida, March 30, 1970

On December 6, 1967, San Francisco State College erupted into a state of chaos. Rioting students and off-campus militants broke into buildings, smashed property, and beat students and newsmen. Some called it dissent. In Washington, several weeks ago, four thugs ran out from a darkened building, surrounded an elderly lady, robbed her of the fifty cents she had on her person, and bludgeoned her into unconsciousness. Some excused their behavior as dissent.

In Los Angeles, drug addicts Charles Manson and his cohorts are awaiting trial for the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate. Last week, Manson threw a copy of the United States Constitution into the waste basket in defiance of law and order. His supporters called it dissent.

What do you call it when a man robs another, when he steals, when he burns a building, when he threatens another with a gun, when he murders, when he teaches others to burn and to kill? I call it crime.

Crime... and the paralyzing fear of crime... has exploded into one of the most serious threats to America today. And if we are going to correct this problem, then we must understand a few of the reasons behind the rising crime rate.

Many in this country have come to regard the Supreme Court with such reverence that it can do no wrong—even when it hands down irresponsible decisions that cripple the police in their efforts to prevent crime, detect criminals and prosecute them. Its rulings on mob marches, riots, pornography and subversive activity are all contributing to the crime wave.

One of the great deterrents to crime is realistic penalty. A criminal law without an enforced realistic penalty is no law at all. Yet, the courts have encouraged criminal irresponsibility by handing out light and unrealistic sentences.
The Atlantic Future: Europe’s Choice

by Senator Frank Church

Frank Church, the guest in the Easy Chair this month, has been U.S. Senator from Idaho since 1957 and is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was keynoter of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, and a Military Intelligence officer in World War II.

If the partial test-ban treaty is the first crack in the glacier we call the Cold War, it should serve to remind us of how massive and prolonged a thaw is yet required before the danger of nuclear disaster finally melts away. In the years immediately ahead, the treaty in no sense diminishes the importance of our defensive alliances, chief among which is NATO.

Yet NATO is now drifting into a deepening crisis that our European allies seem either unwilling or unable to counteract. Everyone agrees, on both sides of the Atlantic, as to the fact that a crisis exists. Paradoxically, it is the very success of NATO in accomplishing its original objectives which has led to the present impasse.

NATO was originally established to prevent Western Europe, the heartland of our common civilization, from falling under Russian rule. For over fourteen years, NATO’s shield has included large numbers of American troops, whose presence in Europe has been proof of the American commitment to invoke her nuclear power, as NATO’s sword, in the event of a communist attack. American arms of both conventional and nuclear character were required to make NATO work, that is, to keep the Russians at bay while the countries of Western Europe, battered and broken in the aftermath of the war, were regaining their health and strength.

I do not believe that either the American people or the Senate of the United States, which ratified the treaty establishing NATO, regarded our entry as an arrangement for positioning American forces permanently in Europe. Firemen are welcomed into a household threatened by fire, but they are not expected to remain inside indefinitely as residents. So it ought not to be surprising—in view of the remarkable recovery in Western Europe which has since occurred—that some Europeans should begin to ask, “How much longer are the Americans to stay?” or that some Americans should begin to inquire, “How much longer will we be welcome?”

We have come to the end of the era for which NATO was created. The circumstances have changed. We must remodel the alliance to fit present conditions, or the crisis within it will grow. NATO cannot remain static and stay relevant; it must be transformed or abandoned; it will adapt to the new era as a useful instrument to serve the objectives we hold in common with our allies, or it will come apart from the stress of mounting internal pressures. So we must clearly identify those changes in circumstances which have rendered NATO, as originally conceived, obsolete.

To begin with, there has been a change in the relative strength, and hence in the credibility, of the American nuclear deterrent. This change has taken place in three phases. In the first phase, only the United States possessed massive strike capability with nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union could oppose us with conventional land power alone. The deterrent was believable, and therefore effective, so long as the Soviet Union fact understood that it would be used to prevent, or to punish, irreversibly, a march by them on the West. In the second phase, the Soviets possessed weapons of mass destruction. But the ones which could damage and destroy the American continent were few in number, and vulnerable to neutralization by the enormous superior and diversified nuclear weapons system which we had then developed. While the risk to the United States had been greatly increased, there was room to pose that we could, if necessary, neutralize Soviet power without suffering mortal damage in return.

In the third and present phase, the assumption can no longer be that each nuclear giant possesses weapons sufficient in number, in diversification, in concealment, or in vulnerability, to ensure that it could withstand a first strike by the adversary and thereafter inflict total destruction upon him.

The consequence of this third phase is that Europeans must ask themselves—for the first time—it is really believable that the American nation would suffer immolation of their defense. And the question is not whether we, the Americans, believe that we would do it. For it is evident that a deterrent has failed if it has been used, and it follows from that it is only the Russians who would do it. For it is evident that a deterrent has failed if it has been used, and it follows from that it is only the Russians who would do it.
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would be used—not our belief or that of our allies, or even the objective fact itself—which is ultimately determinative.

I know of no way to remove, absolutely, the doubts which some Europeans have raised about the answer to this question. The cornerstone of American policy has been, and remains, that the defense of the West is indivisible. Our President has recently reaffirmed, in Germany, that our forces will remain so long as they are wanted and needed; that we will put our cities to the hazard in defense of theirs. He spoke with absolute sincerity and conviction, and with the support of the American people. Still, the proposition itself is without precedent in human history. It cannot be tested or proved in advance. While it may be convincing to the Soviets, it evidently is no longer convincing to all Europeans, for, if it were, there would clearly be no need for France to pursue the effort now in progress to create, at great difficulty and expense, a separate national nuclear capability.

This brings me to the second fundamental change in circumstances which accounts for the crisis in NATO. It is that Europe now has, for the first time, the capacity to create for itself an alternative to reliance upon American power. I make a distinction here between nuclear capability of modest dimensions, useful chiefly as a means of augmenting the prestige or bargaining power of its possessor—perhaps having the potential of invoking, under some conditions, the use of American power—and a genuine nuclear deterrent, capable of massive or controlled response in a variety of strategic situations. It is the latter which free Europe now has the population, the economic base, the technological resources, and the developing political institutions to create and command, if it chooses. In most of these categories, Western Europe now surpasses the Soviet Union itself. If Europe determines that the effort is necessary or desirable, it can in due course equip itself to match the Soviet Union, bomb for bomb, rocket for rocket. It would then, of course, be free from dependence upon a nuclear deterrent provided and controlled by the United States.

The present drift in free Europe points toward the eventual development of separate national nuclear systems, even though this course represents the most unstable, costly, and inefficient method for achieving nuclear self-sufficiency. Perhaps this is inevitable, as long as Western Europe remains a loose association of wholly sovereign states. The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the sovereign power to command them, for they represent in today's world the instruments of life or death—for the country which has them, for its adversaries, and quite probably for its allies.

What I have thus far said carries the implication that there is an inherent incompatibility in this new state of affairs between sovereignty, if that sovereignty involves possession and control of nuclear weapons, and alliance. I think this is the case, and that this single concept summarizes and explains the reasons for the crisis in NATO.

The continued expansion in Europe of nuclear capability under national control will expose the United States to intolerable risks, so long as our troops are there, and so long as we are committed to regard any attack upon our European allies as an attack upon ourselves. In these circumstances, every additional national finger upon the nuclear trigger means one more country other than the United States with power to decide what Americans will die for. While the risks involved in sharing this fateful power with a single independent European state, or with a suitable command structure representing all of Western Europe, might be acceptable, it is too much to ask that we share it with every European country stocking a nuclear arsenal of its own, each with its own sense of destiny and order of priorities.

In short, the present drift toward proliferation in the control of nuclear weapons, unless it is checked, will eventually force the United States to withdraw from Europe. Time is running out on the NATO alliance. The 1960s will tell the tale.

What then of the future? How are we to reconcile the conflicting positions on control of nuclear weapons which now plague the alliance? I think we must begin by recognizing that no device or technical arrangement designed to gloss over the differences, without really changing anything, will suffice. As strongly as de Gaulle feels that France must have its own deterrent, we feel just as strongly that we must retain control over the risks to which we are exposed—so long as American forces are committed in Europe and we supply the nuclear means for meeting or preventing an attack against us. It is possible to share a master plan for programming and targeting, but the core decisions about the use of American nuclear weapons must be made by Americans.

I think there are, however, alternative solutions to the problem. The first is for Europe—not France or Germany or even Great Britain, but Western Europe—to undertake a unified effort to arm itself with a genuine nuclear-deterrent capability. To do this would require an integrated program, not merely because of the expense, but chiefly because it would be necessary to create a unified command structure with the sovereign power to invoke the use of its nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me that it would be in the interest of the United States to encourage and assist Europeans to make this effort. We could then withdraw our forces from the Continent in an orderly fashion, leaving Europe with its own defense, and both Europe and America could thus minimize the risks inherent in the proliferation of separate national defenses.

This course need not involve a return to isolationism on the part of the United States. On the contrary, the creation of a European entity capable of assembling and commanding a unified European nuclear deterrent could contribute to a stronger partnership spanning the Atlantic, for the defense and development of our common civilization. I say it could contribute, because partnership is illusory if one partner is in a position to dominate the others. Just as there can be no authentic European entity under the hegemony of France, so there can be no equal partnership.
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across the Atlantic until Europe has achieved cohesion to match and balance the unified power of the United States.

In addition to this advantage, there would be others incidental to Europe’s assuming full responsibility for its own defense. The American adverse balance-of-payments problem would then lend itself to ready solution. It is entirely possible, also, that the vexing problems resulting from the artificial division of Europe between East and West, which do not seem amenable to negotiations between Washington and the Kremlin, could be approached from new perspectives by Europeans negotiating with Europeans.

If the problem of attaining a sovereign, integrated European Nuclear Defense Command proves to be insuperable, and this further step toward a more perfect union among the countries of Western Europe is not taken, there is the other alternative: Let Europe forgo nuclear armament and continue, so long as the Cold War makes it necessary, to rely on the United States to furnish the nuclear deterrent against a Soviet attack upon the Continent.

From our national point of view, this alternative is to be preferred; but I think that if we Americans are to be Europe’s nuclear sentinels, stationed there for indefinite duty, then we have a right to ask our allies for fairer arrangements.

Let it be understood that we are there as invited guests, not as intruders; that our presence in Europe is no longer a rescue mission, extended by the strong to the weak, but simply a division of responsibility, as between rich equals, for mutual advantage. If we furnish our nuclear deterrent for the defense of Europe, as well as our physical presence to make this deterrent convincing to the Soviets, then Europe must make fairer exchange, including at least two elements:

(1) No further diffusion of nuclear arms, for this will involve intolerable risks, both to us and to Europe itself. If we are to have the responsibility for holding at bay the weapons of mass destruction which might otherwise be used to smash or blackmail our NATO allies, we must ask that they rely on us to honor that trust in our common interest, come what may.

(2) Equitable financial and economic arrangements to assist us in solving our adverse balance-of-payments problem. In this connection, it is notable that our military disbursements abroad contribute five times as much to the drain on our dollar resources as do all of our foreign-aid programs. There is no good reason why the force levels of American troops quartered in Europe should not be reduced, and the difference made up by an added commitment of European troops to the NATO Command. It is essential, too, that European trade barriers against American agricultural and industrial products be reduced or removed as speedily as possible. Finally, we have a right to ask that Europe assume an increased share of the cost of aiding the underdeveloped countries of the world in those needy regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America where the struggle with communism is yet to be won.

There are heavy burdens and responsibilities, for Europeans as well as for Americans, whichever alternative is chosen. And the choice, after all, is Europe’s. Either course would seem acceptable to the United States. What is not acceptable is a continuation of present trends which point toward the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance, leaving a vacuum of policy and power, with diminished security for all.

These thoughts were largely the substance of an address I delivered this June at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Bavaria, before a gathering of lay leaders representing various professional, business, and labor groups. The conference was attended by numerous German political leaders, including Chancellor Adenauer and Berlin Mayor Brandt.

Although I spoke only my personal views at Tutzing, the reaction to my speech caused me to feel that the United States ought to acknowledge openly that Europeans have their choices to make.

If nuclear parity for Western Europe becomes their chosen course, then it can be realized only through the creation of a genuine European deterrent. This would be a great step toward European union, even if it...
"Congratulations, Son!" said "Whiskey restoration, we invite you to join an inner circle of ness" for both the man-and-lady
and behold, Johnny's report card listed him as the Number 2 student in his High School class.
"Congratulations, Son!" said his father. "But why not Number 1?"
"There was this girl . . ."
"You mean you let a mere girl get ahead of you?" the father asked.
"You see, Dad," the boy explained, "girls aren't as mere as they were in your day!"
Likewise, to us Kentucky distillers in search of valued customers, today's grown-up girls are not as mere as once they were. In fact, American women, in their role as chief guardian of the household purse string, now account for upwards of thirty percent of all beverage purchases.
And across the land the cocktail hour is happily shared, as a pleasant respite from the cares of the day, by both man and wife.
At such times of wholesome renewal, our OLD FITZGERALD has special appeal.
For ours is a bourbon with a pleasing richness of flavor best appreciated in leisurely sips. Whiskey so carefully nurtured is no more to be gulped than the expertly prepared dinner soon to be served.
As our not-so-mere customers rightly appreciate, this twilight hour is a time for sharpening, not dulling, the human spirit. And in providing heightened pleasure in fewer but better drinks, OLD FITZGERALD encourages healthful moderation, at the same time fostering a pleasant day's-end "togetherness" for both the man-and-lady of the house.
If you are one who looks to the cocktail hour as a time of rest and restoration, we invite you to join an inner circle of moderate men and women who find in fewer but better "OLD FITZGERALDS" a well-deserved reward for the rigors of the day.

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Britons see nothing odd in the fact that America should conscript its men to defend Europe while Britain has not only abandoned conscription but is hoping to bring its army back from Germany.
The widely held assumption in West Europe is that Europe can be both protectionist and prosperous, self-sufficient economically and dependent on the United States militarily, and that Washington will go on putting 11 percent of its gross national product into defense and foreign aid while some of the allies are doing less than half as much proportionately.
How this attitude of mind developed in Europe is clear enough. In the early postwar years of poverty and reconstruction, Western Europe not only came to rely on the United States but gradually accepted the idea that power in the modern world had become proportional to mass, and therefore that only gross material size (population, area, and raw materials) could be effective in world politics.
There is now less evidence of poverty and unemployment anywhere in Western Europe than in many parts of the United States but this attitude persists and, what is more disturbing, seems to be growing.

Once the Europeans realize that we are not imposing our presence upon them for purposes of our own defense, and that their continued reliance upon our nuclear power is the result of their own decision, then they will see the justice in assuming an increased burden in conventional arms, as their share of the common effort, and in helping us to solve some of our financial problems which are directly related to the cost of our presence in Europe.

Moreover, for Europeans to make this choice consciously will reduce the appeal of de Gaulle's resistance to American leadership on the Continent, and render more acceptable our insistence that other European nations must forgo separate nuclear armaments of their own.

After I had spoken at Tuttzing, one of the Germans in the audience said to me, "Senator, you have made a hard speech, but an honest one. To us, this is the best evidence of real friendship."
Another said, "As I see it, you have told us we will have to pay more. I think you are right."
CONSPIRACY USA

The Radical Right's totalitarian methods in the campaign, and since, seriously threaten American freedom, reports Senator Church: The mutual confidence essential to free government is slowly being cut away by propaganda. Step by step, decent citizens come to tolerate attacks upon the loyalty of loyal men.

BY FRANK CHURCH UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM IDAHO

"That's an extremist?"
"Why, that's a guy who keeps his socks up by walking on his hands!"

So went some of the banter in the recent campaign. If it had all been so flippant, we could give the country high marks for ready humor. American¨

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They cannot be shrugged off as a "crackpot" fringe; their numbers alone compel us to be concerned, and they spread the virus like Typhoid Marys. In many places, they dominate the letters-to-the-editor columns of the local newspapers. Here's a sample from the Sunday Statesman in the author's home city of Boise, Idaho: "The 'Social Studies' program [in the high schools] was initiated 30 years ago by American education intellectuals under the Soviet plan, for the acknowledged purpose of promoting the 'collectivist society' in America.

Another letter brings the startling news that "the present administration is working hard to undermine our whole defense system and make it much easier for the Communist party to make more gains overseas and even in our own country."

These people are...
dangerous enemy to the good than malice," Die- 
trich Bonhoeffer, the theologian, discovered in 
1942. "Malice always contains the seeds of its own 
destruction, for it always makes men uncomfort-
able." This Nazi-hunted pastor wrote these words 
before foolish men caught him and hanged him.

The treachery theme, in assorted versions, in-
spires a virulent fanaticism that many Americans 
have not yet learned to deal with. Most of us rec-
ognize, and dismiss, the extremists on the racial 
front, both white and black, who openly flaunt 
their bigotry. Such inciters may draw a following 
for a while, but the great bulk of our people, in 
their abiding decency, will not be taken in.

The same common sense accounts for the de-
cline of the Communist party in the U.S. Back in 
1932, it ran candidates in 39 states and garnered 
a total of 102,991 votes. In those desperate Depres-
sion days, the Communists were at work in labor 
unions and on college campuses. But the reforms of 
the thirties, the resurgence of free enterprise and 
its spreading abundance, robbed the "class strug-
gle" of its credibility. The unions cleaned shop, 
the Communist groups faded on campus, and the 
Communist party itself was outlawed by Congress.

In view of this collapse of the Radical Left as a 
political force within the United States, the precip-
itous rise of the Radical Right is all the more cu-
rious. Lacking a flesh-and-blood adversary with 
which to grapple, the Right has improvised one, 
conjuring up a phantom. It takes the vague form of 
conspiracy, a witch supposedly involves the to-
offices of the land. The Time Has Come, a Birch-
distributed pamphlet, trumpeted in 1964, "Wash-
ington has been taken over! By which we mean 
that Communist influences are now in full work-
ing control of our Federal Government."

Here, in the Birch Society, is the taproot of 
the conspiracy doctrine. It was no slip of the tongue 
when the Society's Robert Welch charged Dwight 
D. Eisenhower with "knowingly accepting and 
abiding by Communist orders and consciously 
serving the Communist conspiracy for all of his 
adult life." Mr. Welch listed similar charges against 
Milton Eisenhower, Allen and John Foster Dulles, 
General of the Army George C. Marshall and Chief 
Justice Earl Warren.

The thesis, that our leaders are Red-tainted, 
has to be regularly updated by the Radical Right. 
The newest summation appears in None Dare Call 
It Treason. From February to election day, 1964, 
more than eight million copies went out—one for 
every six families. The book's potential effect is 
sobering to contemplate, for it could work its poi-
son through our body politic for years to come like 
the slow, half-life chemistry of radiation. Bruce 
Felknor, director of the Fair Campaign Practices 
Committee, a nonpartisan group that studies smear 
tactics, says that the burden of Treason is to "make 
the Democratic party appear to be selling out to 
the Reds, and . . . to make liberal Republicans out 
as co-conspirators with the Democrats in advanc-
ing the cause of world communism."

I saw the marks of the conspiracy doctrine in 
some communities of my own state. For the first 
Brown, Republican editor of the Blackfoot (Idaho) 
News, backed Harding. One morning, Brown found 
his car with a red swastika painted on the door, 
tires slashed and sugar in the gas tank. Later, a 
female voice on his phone said: "Last time, it was 
your car; next time, it will be your home."

In Wyoming, Sen. Gale McGee, an outspoken 
critic of the Radical Right, found youngsters in 
Laramie and Cheyenne on a house-to-house canvass 
distributing mimeographed leaflets. They were in-
structed to say: "This is an enemy agent. Here are 
the facts about Communist McGee." The Senator's 
wife Loraine had her husband's campaign cards 
grabbed from her hands, torn into pieces, thrown 
at her feet and then spat upon.

A state director of a charitable foundation, 
whom I know, came home one night to find "Reds" 
painted on the mailbox, "damn Socialists" daubed 
on the lawn table, the house lights and windows, 
which were beyond the reach of children, painted 
bright red. What made him an enemy? A picture of 
the President of the United States in his window.

The Time Has Come

In the face of such vehemence, people voted heavily 
for the moderates. The landslide, some concluded, 
smothered the Radical Right.

"I do not agree. The Right Wing reports rapid growth. Since 
1955, its organizations have been expanding at an 
average annual rate of 22 percent. The Birch So-
ciety, the strongest and most influential group, re-
ports that the campaign months from August to 
October established all-time records in new-mem-
ber recruitment. Thirty of the largest organiza-
tions raised their aggregate annual budgets from 
$4,906,000 in 1958 to $14,300,000 in 1963. Total 
spending by all Right-Wing outfits hit $30 million 
in 1963, researchers estimate, half again more 
than both major parties spent in the Presidential 
campaign. The Birch Society will boost its 1965 
budget by a whopping one third.

The propaganda network of the Radical 
Right forms a giant web. Its 20 largest publica-
tions boast a combined circulation of excess of a 
million. The Right also makes its pitch on the 
public air through 7,000 radio broadcasts every 
week. The case history of one spokesman measures 
the menace: The Rev. Carl McIntire was broad-
casting in 1958 from a single radio station. He 
accused the National Council of Churches—Meth-
odists, Presbyterians and 29 other denominations— 
of lining up "alongside Communist action" in the 
racial conflict. Today, the avalanche of contribu-
tions he solicits from gullible listeners under-
writes daily broadcasts on 617 stations.

McIntire is only one of several Big Scare 
perveyors on radio-TV. Their conspiratorial in-
fluences have grown since their endless de-
triotls” into his secret army. In a post-election newsletter, DePugh exudes desperation: “The hopes of millions of Americans that the Communist tide could be stopped with ballots instead of bullets have turned to dust.” A St. Petersburg, Fla., Birch Society chapter passed out a Minutemen newsletter’s call to arms: “If you are EVER going to buy a gun, BUY IT NOW! . . . Form a secret Minutemen team. This is your best guarantee that someone will act promptly to help secure your freedom when the time comes that you unexpectedly turn up missing.”

Wild-eyed? Fanatical? Indeed, but only an extreme symptom of the Right-Wing affliction, which, if it keeps on spreading, will infect millions more with the fever of fear.

What, then, is to be done about it? First of all, I think we must undertake to reclaim the precious words of our own heritage. “Freedom,” “Christian,” “Americanism” are not nameplates to be exploited by charlatans. Nor, for that matter, is the time-honored term “conservative.”

There is plenty of room in this country for the welfare of minimum of opinion, from the most progressive to the most reactionary. The sweep of opinion is the essence of a free society. In the Senate, one quickly learns not only to tolerate, but to respect, the integrity of another man’s point of view. The range of opinion within each party extends from a Wayne Morse to a Harry F. Byrd, from a Barry Goldwater to a Jacob Javits. But each senator recognizes the essential loyalty and good faith of his colleagues. All understand that free government rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and upon its ruin, tyranny is built.

Robert Welch, taking a radically different position, describes democracy as “merely a deceptive phrase, a weapon of demagoguery, and a perennial fraud,” and admonishes his followers to understand that “the John Birch Society will operate under completely authoritative control at all levels.” This is neither the language of the true conservative nor the method of freedom.

Scholars differ on why so many conscientious Americans are being caught up in the Radical Right. It is, clearly, a revolt against the established order by the discontented, motivated by a mixture of reasons: a quest for some higher purpose than is satisfied by the commercial standards of our times; a fear of the new relationships being generated by the burgeoning growth, urbanization, and automation of the country; a resistance to the complexities of modern life, to the bigness of government, to the racial revolution, to a “cold war” that never ends, to the absence of quick and easy solutions; a frustration over the inability of the United States, in the nuclear age, to swiftly work its will upon the world. These are the conditions of life with which we must cope, but they stir many a rebel to go forth in search of a cause.

The rebel may find his cause when asked to join a study group where big things are “considered”—communism, the Constitution, the need for recapturing traditional values. Do the neighbors care about communism? They seem to care only about bowling, bridge and barbecues.

So a convert is made. He is taught that the Communists are corrupting the children by creating an allegiance to the United Nations, which is actually Communist-inspired (by Alger His- and operated (by U’ Thant, along with some Red generals and judges). Obviously, in order to save the children, the high-school textbooks must go.

Now, the institutions of the town itself are directly challenged. How will the teachers react, the parents in PTA, the ministers in their pulpits, the editors in their newscolumns? Will the sensible citizens fight back, or remain uninvolved? I can’t really blame those who choose the easy way out, when so many men in high public office duck for cover. For too long many have used our national repugnance to communism as a convenient crutch in their races. Little wonder that they now hesitate, though many see the need, to take issue with constituents who regard themselves as superpatriots, waving the compelling banner of “anti-communism.”

The strawman specter

But the local and national community can no longer afford to hesitate. The Radical Right is not so much the enemy of communism as it is the enemy of freedom. It opposes the only programs that fight the real Communist threat—which fester on the miseries of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America—and focuses instead on a strawman specter at home. The resulting fear undermines public confidence in the very institutions of popular government, in the men of Congress, the Supreme Court and the Presidency itself. When mutual confidence is destroyed, then we shall have cause to fear the loss of freedom in America.

The time has come to affirm that this country of ours is not a Victorian Haunted House, its foundations eaten away by Red termites. This country is a great, free land, rich beyond dreaming, powerful beyond belief; a land still striving, in ever-larger measure, to reach the goals of equality and personal liberty to which we pledged our nation in the days of its infancy.

The world is not a big Red sea in which this country is being scuttled, but a vast arena of political upheaval in which the quest for freedom, ever stronger, has overthrown the colonial empires of the past. It isn’t a tidy world, nor is it a secure one. But it is one for which the United States set the revolutionary example.

To put this world, and the nation, in a proper perspective for the American people—this is the urgent business of statesmanship today. The job cannot be done without first exposing the delusions of the fanatical Right. Its propaganda, its frequent resort to outright intimidation and coercion, represent nothing less than totalitarian methods. They must be repudiated by all responsible citizens; Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, who won’t run at the first cry of “Comsymp!”

If our inner strength fails, we may end like the frog: cooked before we know it. Daniel Bell, scholar of mass movements, put the danger wisely: “Barbarous acts are rarely committed out of the blue . . . Step by step, a society becomes accustomed to accept, with less and less moral outrage, and with greater and greater indifference to legitimacy, the successive blows. What is uniquely disturbing about the emergence of the Radical Right in the 1960’s is the support it has been able to find among traditional community leaders who have themselves become conditioned, through an indiscriminate anti-communism, to judge as respectable a movement which, if successful, can only end the liberties they profess to cherish.”
Crime

SOME CALL IT DISSENT

By BILL CHAPPELL, United States Congressman from Florida

Delivered before the Kewanis and Rotary Clubs of Ocala, Florida, March 30, 1970

ON DECEMBER 6, 1967, San Francisco State College erupted into a state of chaos. Rioting students and off-campus militants broke into buildings, smashed property, and beat students and newsmen. Some called it dissent. In Washington, several weeks ago, four thugs ran out from a darkened building, surrounded an elderly lady, robbed her of the fifty cents she had on her person, and bludgeoned her into unconsciousness. Some excused their behavior as dissent.

On April 4, 1969, shots rang out in Memphis, Tennessee, and Martin Luther King was dead from the unlawful use of an assassin's gun. Minutes later, thousands of people marched into the streets of Washington and for five days they burned and looted like invaders from another land. Fire after fire lighted the night. One... then another... a total of 711 were reported. 645 buildings were damaged or completely destroyed, while people wandered at will into the broken store fronts and walked away, weighed down with their plunder. Over one thousand people were injured, eleven were killed and property damage cost $24,000,000. Some excused the assassin's act and the mob's behavior as dissent.

A few months ago, the Black Panthers in San Francisco handed out coloring books to little Negro children. The book portrayed blacks shooting and knifing policemen, with the caption: "The only good pig is a dead pig." Should such action be excused as lawful dissent?

In Los Angeles, drug addicts Charles Manson and his cohorts are awaiting trial for the brutal slaying of Sharon Tate. Last week, Manson threw a copy of the United States Constitution into the waste basket in defiance of law and order. His supporters called it dissent.

What do you call it when a man robs another, when he steals, when he burns a building, when he threatens another with a gun, when he murders, when he teaches others to burn and to kill? I call it crime.

Crime... and the paralyzing fear of crime... has exploded into one of the most serious threats to America today. And if we are going to correct this problem, then we must understand a few of the reasons behind the rising crime rate.

Many in this country have come to regard the Supreme Court with such reverence that it can do no wrong—even when it hands down irresponsible decisions that cripple the police in their efforts to prevent crime, detect criminals and prosecute them. Its rulings on mob marches, riots, pornography and subversive activity are all contributing to the crime wave.

One of the great deterrents to crime is realistic penalty. A criminal law without an enforced realistic penalty is no law at all. Yet, the courts have encouraged criminal irresponsibility by handing out light and unrealistic sentences.
WE STAND IN this year 1971 at the end of one
decade of disillusion, with no good reason to believe
that we are not now embarked upon another. Ten
years ago, the leaders of the United States—and to a lesser
degree the American people—were filled with zeal about their
global goals. With supreme confidence both in our power and
capacity to make wise and effective use of it, we proclaimed
the dawn of a new era in which America would preserve
world peace, stem communism and lead the impoverished
masses of mankind through the magic point of “takeoff” into a
“decade of development.” To bring these glories to pass—so
we allowed ourselves to believe—we had only to recognize the
simple, central fact which Professor Walt Rossow assured us
would bring victory in Vietnam and success in all our other
foreign enterprises, “the simple fact that we are the greatest
power in the world—if we behave like it.”

Looking back on the sixties, no one can deny that we were
indeed “the greatest power in the world” and that we surely
did “behave like it”—if throwing our might and money
around is the correct measure of “behaving like it.” Nonetheless, we not only failed to accomplish what we set out
to accomplish ten years ago; we have been thrown for losses
across the board: in the name of preserving peace, we have
waged an endless war; in the guise of serving as sentinel for
the “free world,” we have stood watch while free governments
gave way to military dictatorship in country after country,
from one end of our vast hegemony to the other. Today,
confidence in American leadership abroad is as gravely shaken
as is confidence in the American dollar. As for the “decade of
development,” ten years of American foreign aid spread far
and wide, not only has failed to narrow the gap between rich
nations and poor; the gap between the small, wealthy elites
and the impoverished masses in most underdeveloped lands
has also widened.

Against this backdrop of general failure, the Senate is
being asked to authorize yet another year of foreign a
usual. For fiscal year 1972, President Nixon has asked
foreign aid authorization of more than $5.5 billion
compared with $3.1 billion appropriated last year, and
included $50 million added on for Israel. Clearly
Administration seeks not just to sustain, but to increase
level of spending.

The annual foreign aid authorization bill, however,
more than the visible tip of the iceberg. It constitutes
about two-fifths of a total foreign aid program of ow
billion proposed for this fiscal year by the Executive Branch.

The magnitude of the foreign aid program can be
grappled by projecting its costs over the period of the next
decades. Calculating these costs on a conservative
estimating on a projection of existing, not hypothetical
spending levels, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee forecasts that foreign assistance for five
period, FY 1973-1977, will exceed $50 billion! Less than
of the five year total will result from programs authorized
the regular foreign assistance and military credit sales.
Thirteen billion will be attributable to programs now
through the Defense Appropriation bill, and the PL
program will account for an additional $7 billion.

Staggering as these totals seem, it is probable that the
short of the mark. In calculating the estimates, the com
staff used only the most reliable and restrictive of ave
guidelines. For example:

1. Regional and country economic aid estimates were
on the projection of the average of the programs
2. Regional and country military aid and credit
estimates were based on the average of the program
FY 1971 and that planned for FY 1972, except

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The prodigious turnover of military equipment to the Vietnamese just doesn’t show up on the books, nor does the value of American bases being transferred to them. Furthermore, the number of ships available for giving aid to foreign countries is also likely to increase substantially as our navy’s participation in the Vietnam war diminishes and its modernization program expands.

For all of these reasons, the staff projection of the cost of foreign aid to the United States for the next five years, which calls $51,024,050,000, is probably too low. That, in itself, should give us pause. No Senator should vote to approve this authorization bill, without looking ahead. Perpetuating foreign aid through this annual ritual is a salami-slicing tactic. Only by studying the projections over the next five years, is it possible to appreciate what a tremendous outlay of this country’s financial resources is actually entailed. Accordingly, I am unanimous in consent that the committee staff charts, showing requested totals of foreign aid for FY 1972, and estimated levels for the next five years, appear at this point in the Record.

A perusal of these charts will reveal that foreign aid, in all forms, is costing the United States approximately $10 billion a year. This country simply cannot afford to sustain an outlay on this scale, especially when in terms of its objectives—the containment of communism, the promotion of economic development, and the advancement of freedom—the program is on the whole a proven failure, whose continuation is warranted on these empirical grounds alone.

It seems important, however, if we are to learn something from the experience, to consider why our aid programs have failed to achieve their objectives and whether, indeed, these objectives were sound to begin with. The technicalities have been examined and reexamined; every few years a new commission conducts a new study resulting in a new report and a new reorganization—and nothing else. Never yet have the aid programs been fully evaluated; never has the possibility that the failure of economic development, and the advancement of freedom—the program is on the whole a proven failure, whose continuation is warranted on these empirical grounds alone.

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On the basis of our experience over the last decade in dealing with the third world—unquestionably the “disaster area of our foreign policy”—John Kenneth Galbraith suggests four lessons that we should have learned:

First, it now seems clear that the “Marshall Plan syndrome”—the belief that American capital, energy and know-how could not fail to work economic wonders in any country on whom these blessings might be conferred—has turned out to be largely irrelevant and unworkable in the poor countries which lack Europe’s pre-existing organizational, administrative and technical capacities.

Second, it is evident now, if it was not before, that in the poor rural societies of the third world the concepts of “communism” and capitalism are of little more than “terminological” significance. The fact that these countries are poor and rural has vastly greater meaning than the fact that such little enterprise as they may have be “socialist” or “free.”

Third, in the course of discovering that the inner life and development of the third world lie beyond the reach of external control, we have also discovered that the futile effort to shape another country’s development calls into being an enormous, intrusive civilian and military bureaucracy. Whereas colonial power was exercised directly, Professor Galbraith observes, through a simple line of command, our campaign to win the hearts and minds of foreign populations requires “a much more massive table of organization.” Indeed, in the course of recent hearings on Brazil in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the fact came out that, relative to population, we have twice as many American officials administering our aid program in Brazil today as the British had in India governing that country before independence.

Finally, Professor Galbraith notes, we have seen how an overseas bureaucracy acquires a life and purpose of its own, only tenuously controlled by the Executive in Washington and effectively beyond the reach of Congress and the American people. Like any bureaucracy—especially a colonial service far removed from its home base—the American aid and military establishment abroad are motivated by one simple unshakable ambition: to survive and perpetuate their species.

Finally, I would suggest a fifth lesson to be drawn from the experience of the sixties: that, even with enormous power and the best of intentions, there are some things we cannot do, things which are beyond our moral and intellectual resources. If we learn nothing else from the experience of the sixties, it will profit us immeasurably to have learned that being richer and stronger than everybody else has not made us wiser. When it comes to wisdom, we are part of the pack; just knowing that will be wisdom enough.

It is astonishing in retrospect how little we questioned the seeming verities of the cold war during the fifties and sixties. Conservatives railed against “international communism” and prescribed military aid; liberals, believing themselves more sophisticated, spoke of the “Sino-Soviet bloc” and the greater usefulness of economic aid. Neither questioned the premises of the cold war or the purposes of aid. China and Russia alike were perceived as implacable enemies of the “free world;” if they differed, it was only on the most efficient means of “burying” us. Aid—both military and economic—was con-
ceived primarily as an instrument of containment, a weapon in the cold war, and if some Americans favored military assistance and other economic, that too was a matter of tactics, if not of how to “bury” the Communists, then at least of how to contain them.

Like most shibboleths, the trouble with containment is not that it was illusory in its original formulation but that it was subsequently elevated to the status of a universal truth, which it is not, and applied in areas where it had no bearing. Vietnam is the principal case in point: we supported the French, then supplanted them, and finally plunged into a war in which we are now still engaged because we had persuaded ourselves that Ho Chi Minh was the puppet of the Chinese, who in turn, at least until the mid-fifties, we regarded as puppets of the Soviet Union.

When the cold war philosophy developed, back in the late Forties and early Fifties, the Soviet Union had indeed represented a military threat to Western Europe. Extrapolating from that quite plausible threat, we came to suppose that we were confronted with a ruthless, coordinated global force to which we gave the name of “international communism.” By the time of the Johnson Administration, the cold war outlook had been refined to take account of the Sino-Soviet split, so that Mr. Rusk raised the specter not of “international communism” but of a “world cut in two by Asian communism.” Still this outlook was the direct descendant of the Acheson view of 1949 when the then Secretary of State proclaimed the Chinese Communists to be “a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism,” led by men who “have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia.”

Foreign aid, which had worked so well in Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, was conceived thereafter as one of the arsenal of weapons to be employed in the grand, global strategy of containment. Military assistance, starting with the Truman Doctrine, was designed to bolster the armed forces of the arc of nations along the periphery of the “Sino-Soviet bloc,” it was soon extended to support shaky regimes beyond the periphery of the “bloc,” in Asia and Latin America, against the danger of foreign sponsored subversion. Economic assistance, it was thought, would serve the same purpose by promoting development and prosperity, by robbing subversion of its appeal to the masses. Liberals and conservatives within the United States debated the proper mix of economic and military support; neither questioned their purpose nor underlying premise.

The premise, however, was open to question from the outset. As early as January 1945—so the Foreign Relations Committee was recently told by one of our leading China experts—Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai secretly informed President Roosevelt that they were willing to meet with him in Washington for exploratory talks as leaders of a Chinese political party. Soon thereafter—so reported an American Foreign Service Officer named John Stewart Service—Mao outlined a plan for postwar Chinese-American economic cooperation. “America,” Mao told Service, “is not only the most suitable country to assist the economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America.”

Again, in 1946, Chou En-lai made it clear to President Truman’s special Ambassador, General Marshall, that the Chinese Communists had no wish to be totally dependent on Stalin. “Of course we will lean to

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one side,” he said. “But how far we lean depends you.”

It has also become apparent that the notion of “communism with its headquarters in Peking” has been myth than reality. China had little or nothing to do with North Korea’s attack on South Korea in 1950, and entered the war reluctantly only to counter General MacArthur’s reckless thrust to the border of Manchuria. China also, little to do with the Vietminh insurrection in Vietnam, indeed, the first Indochina war began three years before Chinese communists won their own civil war in China.

Just as China had no wish to rely exclusively on the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh had no wish to be a satellite of China. According to an article of last June 30 in The Christian Science Monitor drawn from previously unpublished Pentagon documents, the United States “ignored eight direct appeals for aid” from North Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh in the five winter months following the end of World War II, more astonishing, according to this account, “Ho also several messages through secret channels even earlier August and September of 1945, proposing that Vietnam accorded the ‘same status as the Philippines’—an undetermined period of tutelage preliminary to independence.”

If there is any truth in this version of events—and evidence of much truth in it is overwhelming—we are to the conclusion that American foreign policy since World War II has been based in large part on a false premise—"international communism.” This is not to say that either of the great Communist powers has been benign, friendly but only that they have not been consistent in hostility, which in part has been provoked by our own. They have seldom acted in concert; that both have influence, but neither has ever really dominated the Communist movements of Southeast Asia; and that both of the Communist states and certain of the small ones—including North Vietnam—have on certain occasions been willing even eager to come to terms with the United States.

For reasons ranging from our dismay with Stalin's New after World War II to the intimidating effects of the anti-Communist hysteria at home, American policy inclining tenaciously through the fifties and sixties to the myth of the Communist monolith. This was in that frozen frame of reference that our foreign aid programs were designed, with an unprecedented array of alliances and a buildup of American military power, as part of a strategy for the containment of "international communism." Well over half of our aid to the so-called "developing countries has been military and paramilitary assistance, foreign aid, economic as well as military, was sold to as a national security measure. The "developing countries were portrayed as cold war battlegrounds which would be vulnerable to communism if we did not sustain them. Foreign aid programs, with an unprecedented array of alliances and a buildup of American military power, as part of a strategy for the containment of "international communism."

Even if the premise of a unified aggressive "international communism" had been sound, the strategy for containing it with foreign aid was not. Experience has shown that, although military assistance can be a potent factor in containing insurgency, it is by no means a reliable one, while American economic support has almost no influence whatever on whether a country "goes Communist," as Cuba and Chile shown. This is not for lack of skill or technical know-how.

2 United States Relations with China. Department of State. August 1949.
3 Allen Whiting, on June 28, 1971.
our part but because of the irrelevance of the instrument to the objective. The countries of Asia and Africa—I must here exclude Latin America—which have remained non-communist have done so not because the United States has succeeded in buying their allegiance or in launching them toward "takeoff" and self-sustaining economic growth, but because they have not wished to become Communist, regarding communism as an alien ideology, or because their populations have been too poor and illiterate to be interested in such sophistications as ideology or revolution.

Revealingly, the Russians have had no greater success in buying ideological converts with aid than we have had in trying to head them off. In one or two instances, small African countries have unceremoniously packed off their Russian aid technicians when their presence became too intrusive. Egypt, which has been the largest single recipient of Soviet foreign aid for the last fifteen years, has rigorously suppressed its mental Communists and repeatedly warned the Russians against meddling in internal Arab affairs. In July of this year, President Sadat responded to a Soviet appeal for Egyptian pressure against the crackdown on Communists in the Sudan, with an angry address before the Arab Socialist Union in which he declared that Egypt would never become Communist if it recognizes an Arab Communist government—although, President Sadat added, Egypt would remain friendly to the Soviet Union, even after a possible settlement with Israel. Occurrences such as this suggest the advisability of giving credit where it is due: when it comes to using aid for political purposes, the Russians have a greater talent for alienating people from communism than we do.

Nonetheless, our Administration persists in the delusion that it can buy influence with aid. So President Nixon seems to believe in his insistence on letting military and economic aid filter through to the government of West Pakistan, even though American arms may be used to carry out the savage oppression of the people of East Pakistan. When the House of Representatives voted in early August to suspend aid to the West Pakistani regime, except for relief assistance to East Pakistan and for East Pakistani refugees in India, President Nixon expressed his disapproval on the ground that an aid cutoff would jeopardize the Pakistani government's ability to create "stability" and would undermine our own ability to influence the course of events ..." In terms of the realpolitik, which this Administration seems so fond, our continuance of aid "already in the pipeline" to Pakistan is supposed to buy influence with the ruling generals in Islamabad and help set the influence of Communist China. The cost of this influence—such as it may be—is the loss of our influence with India, which has now concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Worse still, as the New York Times put it in a recent editorial, our continuing support of the Pakistani government "has put the United States in the position of bystander, and thus seeming to condone, crimes against humanity unexcelled since Hitler's time."

While experience has shown that our aid programs have little if any relevance either to the deterrence of communism or the encouragement of democracy, they have been effective in certain instances in keeping unpopular regimes in power. They have certainly contributed to that end in the cases of the zan colonels, the Pakistani generals and the Brazilian junta. Of these regimes are dictatorships, but they are anti-communist and therefore pass our eligibility test for membership in the "free world." A government may tolerate or even tolerate its own population but—from the standpoint of our policy makers—as long as it remains anti-communist, provides "stability," generally supports American foreign policy and is hospitable to American investment, it qualifies, for purposes of aid, as a "free country."

"Stability" is an antiseptic word; it reveals nothing about how individual people live and die. "Stability," as Richard Barnet points out, is an antidevelopment goal in countries where the established institutions perpetuate poverty and the ruling elites show no serious commitment to change.10

As the Tsars of Russia and the Sultans of Turkey understood very well, there is no better defense against radical revolution, no greater assurance of "stability," than an ignorant and inert population. Traveling in Latin America several years ago, a Senate staff member noted repeatedly in his diary the gentleness, submissiveness and conservatism of the campesinos in one country after another. "Like the peasants of northeastern Brazil," he noted, "the Indians in the barriadas of Lima are not revolutionary; they are too humble and ignorant and therefore subrevolutionary or prerevolutionary. That, however, is not necessarily going to be the case with their prodigal offspring, many of whom are getting a little schooling and a little view of the world beyond the sierra and the barriada. Some of them are going to get ideas and it only takes a few who are smart and tough to make a revolution."11

When revolution comes—as it likely will in many of the still "stable" countries of the third world—it will bear no resemblance to the kind of benign, gradual "takeoff" into self-sustaining growth envisioned by American aid officials and private investors. The notion that a stable, non-revolutionary social structure is the essential condition of economic development is a self-serving rationalization. It enables American policy makers to believe that the interests of the United States, as they conceive them, are identical with the social and economic interests of the poor countries. "Stability," they insist, is not only essential for the exclusion of communism and the preservation of American influence; it is also in the best interests of the developing countries themselves, because—so the argument runs—revolution means violence, disruption, inefficient management, and the loss of investment capital as well. In this way, we rationalize our support for regimes whose very existence is the principal barrier in their countries to real economic development and social justice.

The conditions essential for development are not so much economic and technological as they are psychological and political. No infusion of capital and know-how from without can galvanize a society in which the rewards of development are grabbed up by a small privileged caste while the majority of people are left hopeless, debilitated and demoralized. As the Brazilian bishop Dom Antonio Botas Fraga put it, "We do not need paternalistic redemption. We need conditions so that those who are now abandoned may free themselves from their own underdevelopment with their own united force ... the poor have no hope in those who still have economic power. And the poor are those who struggle for justice. If those who fight for justice are called subversive, then subversion is their hope."12

In countries long under the domination of corrupt oligarchies nothing less than a radical redistribution of political power may be the essential precondition for economic development. If the bulk of the people are to make the concerted effort and accept the enormous sacrifices required

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12 Quoted by Barnet, ibid., p. 12.
for lifting a society out of chronic poverty, they have got to have some belief in the integrity of their leaders, in the commitment of those leaders to social justice, and in the equality of sacrifice required of the people. Reactionary regimes have neither the ability nor the interest to foster such a conception of social justice. They value aid from the United States as a means of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power. The lip service paid to reform is a crumb for their benefactors; it helps to make the Americans feel good and it costs them nothing. In fact, American economic aid is commonly used to promote industrialization programs which generate a high level of consumption for the privileged, with little, if any, "trickle-down" benefit for the dispossessed. At the same time, American military assistance, and such para-military programs as the training and equipping of a country's police force, help such regimes as those of Brazil, Greece and Pakistan to suppress reformist movements. In this way, American aid is being used not to promote development but for the quite opposite purpose of supporting the rule of corrupt and stagnant—but vociferously anti-communist—dictatorships.

Even if we should succeed in purging our minds of the anti-communist obsession which has driven us into league with military dictatorships and oppressive oligarchies all over the globe, it would still be all but impossible for us to promote radical reform in the countries of the third world. Even indeed if we were a revolutionary society ourselves and were committed to a revolutionary conception of development—as most assuredly we are not—there is still very little we could do to foster social revolution in alien societies. The catalyst of radical change in any society must be an indigenous nationalism giving rise to a sense of community, commitment and shared sacrifice. Can anyone seriously believe, for example, that the United States, through massive infusions of aid, could ever have persuaded, inspired or cajoled the demoralized Chiang Kai-chek regime of the late forties into generating the kind of collective spirit which the Chinese communists have generated? Here is how James Reston describes it from Peking in August 1971:

"Whatever you think of their political system, they are consciously engaged these days in the common life of rebuilding the nation and even in reconstructing themselves. This country is engaged in one vast cooperative barn-raising. They work at it night and day with a pride and persistence that are astonishing . . ."

I do not suggest that the United States prefers or admires the dictatorial regimes it subsidizes, but only that there is little we can do with our aid to change them, all the more since these regimes can blackmail us so easily with the threat of communism if they should fail. The Kennedy Administration did make an effort to encourage democratic and progressive policies in countries to which it extended aid, especially in Latin America, but that effort was a failure and the reasons for that failure are instructive. We failed because we had neither the ability to impose reform from outside nor the will to pursue it from within. The one was simply impossible; the other went against the priority of our own interests as we conceived them. However much we may have wanted reform and development, we wanted "stability," anti-communism and a favorable climate for investment. The experience of twenty years of aid shows that we can neither bring about fundamental reform in tradition-encrusted societies nor prevent revolution in those countries where the tide of change runs deep and strong; all we can really do is to service the status quo in countries where it is not strongly challenged anyhow.

United States foreign aid certainly was unable to win support at the time of the recent two votes at the United Nations relating to the admission of the People's Republic of China.

As you recall, the first vote was an important procedural one, as a result of which member-states defeated the United Nations resolution declaring that expulsion of Nationalist China was an "important matter" and, consequently, required a two-thirds vote rather than a simple majority for passage. Fifteen nations voted against our resolution and abstained on this key vote.

Correspondingly, the bill contains aggregate authorization of approximately $2.4 billion for 55 member-states that either voted against our position or abstained on this key vote.

If our long-term loans, made in the name of nourishing development abroad, serve neither to deter communism nor strengthen democratic government, and if they do so little—furnish the destitute with a broader measure of social justice wherever they may live, why do we persist in making them? To find the answer to that question, one must begin the search here at home, in the land of the lender.

There is abundant evidence that our foreign aid program is much less philanthropic than we have cared to portray. Indeed the figures suggest that it is patently self-serving. Former All Director William Gaud discloses that, as a result of tied loan "ninety-three per cent of AID funds are spent directly in the United States . . . Just last year some $4,000 American firms in fifty states received $1.3 billion in AID funds for products supplied as part of the foreign aid program." Similarly, George D. Woods, former President of the World Bank, has observed that "bilateral programs of assistance have had as one of their primary objectives helping the high-income countries themselves; they have looked toward financing export sales, toward tactical support of diplomacy, toward holding military positions thought to be strategic."

The oft-asserted lament that our foreign aid program lacks a constituency in the United States is just another of those myths we hold dear. Actually, our bilateral aid program is, in effect, the soft-loan window of the Export-Import Bank; it is the source from which foreign governments borrow money on easy terms with which to buy goods and services from within the United States. As such, it enjoys a lively constituency which exerts steady pressure on the government to keep the program going.

In addition to financing American exports, our foreign aid, both economic and military, has encouraged relationships of sustained dependency on the United States. In many underdeveloped countries, repressive governments draw reassurance from the arms we furnish and the military training we supply. As the source of money and weapons for their armies and police forces, the U. S. government acquires a certain leverage over these regimes, while they last. Enticed by attractive credit terms, by growing familiarity with American equipment, reliance on American replacement parts, by bargain prices on obsolete equipment, training programs for their soldiers and police, and the sales promotion techniques of our military advisory missions, these governments soon enough learn to "think American."

No less than military aid, our economic assistance creates and perpetuates relationships of dependency. The law requires, for example, that aid shipments be carried only in American

14 Quoted by Barnet, ibid., p. 7.
that purchases be made only in the United States. Because of these and other requirements, the Peterson Report estimates that United States aid crosses recipients about 15 per cent more than world market prices.

Surplus food shipments under PL 480, on its face the most philanthropic of aid programs, in fact have served to unload surplus "at virtually no economic cost to the United States" according to economist Michael Hudson, a former credit-risk analyst for the Chase-Manhattan Bank. At the same time, Hudson points out, the PL 480 program has sent aid-receiving countries in debt to the extent of $22 billion, "thereby tying them to the purse strings of the State Department and the United States Treasury for twenty years to come." Dependence on the United States grows steadily too with mounting burden of servicing past debts. The Peterson Report acknowledges that mounting debts, which must be continually refinanced on an emergency basis, keep the poor countries on a "short leash." As grace periods end on loans made in the 1970's and poor countries find themselves facing ever greater amounts to finance past debts, new gains will be effectively neutralized and the poor countries threatened with economic paralysis. The upshot may well someday be a general default on debt payments to the United States reminiscent of the defaults on debts which complicated and disrupted our relations with Western countries in the thirties and helped to drive us into the isolationism of that era.

Moreover, we have seen more clearly the ineffectiveness of this deterrent to revolutionary pressures and as an instrument for the reconstruction of traditional societies than ever before. The Alliance for Progress represents the water mark of our innocence in supposing that we could achieve traditional societies from their centuries' long legacy of tyranny and stagnation with a little bit of seed capital and some stirring rhetoric. It is the conclusion of one recent author, a Latin American, who spent three months last year in search of Latin American reality, that, despite the Alliance for Progress, "things are getting worse, not better, that each year more people are poorer, hungrier, less clothed, less sheltered than before, and that all the indices project a continuation of this negative trend for the foreseeable future. Life is barely tolerable for 80 per cent of Latin America's 275 million people, and it will be unspeakably worse for the 600 million projected for the year 2000."

It is true that the per capita income of Latin American countries has risen during the years of the Alliance for Progress, but it has risen in so unbalanced and inequitable a way that the gains have gone almost entirely to the 20 per cent of the population who live within the modern economy. The benefits accruing to the lower 80 per cent have not even kept up with population growth, so that they have become relatively and absolutely poorer. Progress, though visible, has not been progress. Shining modern cities have arisen and the Alliance Progress has brought roads, transistor radios and Coca-Cola to the Latin American countryside, but their social impact is negative and disruptive. Labor-saving devices make life more tolerable for the affluent few but they do not add to per capita output and they add to unemployment where there were surpluses to begin with. Indeed the effect of this miserable and inequitable development, which widens the gap between rich and poor, is deeply demoralizing to the poor and therefore detrimental to genuine development. As Eric Fromm and Michael Maccoby have shown in their study of a Mexican village, the impact of the "developed" ideology of "Consumerism" and waste on a traditional society is to destroy social cohesiveness, undermine personal psychological strength, and rob the people of joy in their lives.

The distortions of public aid to Latin America are heightened by the impact of private investment. Although United States direct investment in Latin America grew from $8 billion to $15 billion during the 1960's and continues to grow at the rate of $1 billion a year, according to Gary MacEoin, United States companies withdraw $2 in dividends, royalties and other payments for every new dollar they invest. United States private companies exercise a "double negative impact": at the same time that they decapitalize Latin America by the withdrawal of profits, they plow back a part of their profits to gain increasing control of the mineral assets, industry and production of Latin American countries.

Under this devastating North American onslaught, resentment of the United States has grown and increasing numbers of Latin Americans have become convinced that they are the victims of a virulent new imperialism. As one Chilean political scientist commented on the experience of the 1960's, "If that is what one decade of development does for us, spare us from another. Foreign aid has been used, not to develop us, but to achieve the political purposes of the donors, to smother use in debt, to buy up our most dynamic productive assets." In both Latin American and the rest of the third world the conviction is taking increasing hold that the poverty of the poor countries is not the result of imperfections in the old "models" of development but rather the inevitable result of the policies and practices of the rich countries. In his recent book, The Challenge of World Poverty, Gunnar Myrdal describes how the reforms promised in the Alliance for Progress were "rapidly emasculated by interaction between the holders of power in Latin America, including the American corporations working there, and the United States Government and Congress." The resulting economic and social relationship, not only between the United States and Latin America but generally between the rich and poor countries of the world, may not be one of deliberate, malicious exploitation, but we can hardly deny the name given to it by the Brazilian economist Helio Jaguaribe. It is, he says, "an objectively imperialist system."

I can no longer cast my vote to prolong the bilateral aid program, as it is now administered. I could understand—though perhaps not condone—a foreign aid program that is essentially self-serving. We live, after all, in a selfish world. But the present program is designed primarily to serve private business interests at the expense of the American people. In far too many countries, as in the case of Brazil, we poured in our aid money for one overriding purpose, the stabilization of the economy in order to furnish American capital with a "favorable climate for investment." The search for foreign investment opportunities by the largest American corporations is relentless and irressible, as the biggest profits are to be found abroad, where the tax bite can frequently be reduced or averted. Moreover, the risk of loss due to political instability, riot, revolution or expropriation, has been largely lifted from the investor and shifted to the U. S. Government.

OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, backed by the Federal Government, readily insures American companies against risks abroad for which no comparable

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21 Quoted by MacEoin, Ibid., p. 334.
insurance is available at home. The multi-million dollar losses incurred by American copper companies, resulting from the nationalization of their holdings by Allende's Marxist regime in Chile, are likely to be born—not by the companies that eagerly invested there—but by the American taxpayer. Our foreign aid program has become a spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter when they invest abroad! Small wonder that the crumbling ghettos in our cities, along with our declining rural communities, have to beg and scrounge for new capital!

As my service in the State amply demonstrates, I am not a foe of a genuine foreign aid program, having long since acknowledged that any country as advanced as ours should do what it can to help other people improve their lot. But no longer will I endorse with my vote a foreign aid program which has been twisted into a parody and a farce.

The major preoccupation of the present foreign aid program is the massive disbursement of munitions which we either give away or make available at bargain basement prices. We pay half a hundred foreign governments with our weaponry. Most of the world has become a dumping ground for ships, tanks and planes, which we label as excess to our needs. Easy credit is available at interest rates well below the cost of money to the U. S. Government. The Military Assistance Program has become a preposterous scandal. It should be drastically curtailed, not enlarged.

As for our long-term bilateral loans made in the name of promoting economic development, it is long past time that this function were passed over entirely to the World Bank, the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral lending agencies, which were set up for this purpose. I am prepared, now and in the future, to support substantial U. S. contributions to these agencies. In this manner, we could set a worthy example of international responsibility and beckon other rich nations to share the load with us.

I would confine our bilateral aid in the future to technical assistance grants, administered, where feasible, by the Peace Corps. It was through technical assistance—the successor to Harry Truman's original Point 4—that the "green revolution" was achieved in Asia and the hand of famine stayed. This aspect of our foreign aid, involving outright grants, not loans, has constituted the worthiest part of the program. On account of it—and in hopes that the objectionable parts would be whittled down and ultimately displaced—I have tarried too long as a supporter and indulged in too much wishful thinking.

Events of the past few weeks on Capitol Hill have finally dispelled my illusions. Instead of cutting back on the foreign aid package, Congress is about to enlarge on it. We are in the process of doing the same with the gigantic military budget, approving more money for the Pentagon this year than we spent at the height of our involvement in Vietnam. Incredible, but true!

The acquiescence of Congress to these money demands of the Nixon Administration make it clear that we have no disposition, despite all the pious talk, of changing our spending habits. The "new priorities" promised the American people won't be realized, as long as we refuse to cut our huge foreign and military spending. The long-neglected problems of crime, drugs, poverty and pollution, which afflict so many of our people here at home, will continue to fester and grow.

Shifting the necessary resources back to the solution of these problems doesn't mean we must chuck all foreign aid or turn our backs upon calamity elsewhere. We can still afford to make generous donations when disaster strikes in other lands.

Finally, I would advocate, as an alternative to the palliatives of aid, that we lend positive support to developing countries by entering into commercial arrangements that redress the terms of trade which are now rigged against them.

As with so many of the difficult questions that divide and agitate our society, the answer to the dilemma of aid lies not abroad, not in the slums of Calcutta or in the rural backlands of Brazil, but within ourselves. Essentially, the question is whether we are prepared to recognize the limits of our own capacity—the moral and political as well as the technical and economic limits—and allow nature to take what may well be an uncongenial course in many countries of the third world.

The question, to put it another way, is whether we can recognize that there are some things we simply cannot do—such as restructuring another country through our own efforts—and other things that we cannot permanently prevent—such as social revolution, where and when its time has come.

The dilemma of aid is not fundamentally different from the dilemma of Vietnam. It is a problem of power—our own power, the uses to which we wish to put it, and the moral and intellectual limitations which have resulted in such wide discrepancies between our intentions and our accomplishments. The dominant political attitude of the sixties was one of extravagant self-confidence. We were filled up and infatuated with the "simple fact"—again to quote Professor Rostow—that "we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it." Now, in the wake of so many, a new outlook begins to take shape, and one may hope that it will affect our thinking in matters ranging far beyond Vietnam.

As Gary MacEoin writes with reference to our excessive meddling in Latin America, "As with the pacification programs in Indochina, the more total the penetration, the more negative the result. Political scientists must, in the future, cite this experience as no less significant than that of the Vietnam war when they discuss the limits of power of the great." 22

Having concentrated for a decade and more on the growth and uses of power, we may now perhaps be willing to cultivate other national attributes—such as prudence and common sense. If so, we may be prepared to come to terms with such conditions of our time as the following: that our social engineering, as applied to the poor countries of the world, has shown itself to be irrelevant and disruptive; that the threat of communism in the third world is exaggerated and, in any case, beyond the last reach of our aid programs; that in many countries radical revolution is the only real hope for development and the single most helpful thing we can do is to leave them alone.

Contrary to the development "models" worked out in the sixties by our Agency for International Development, it now appears that thoroughgoing social revolution is the necessary prerequisite for the development of much of the third world. There is nothing the United States can or should do to promote revolution—to do so indeed would violate the United Nations Charter and sound traditional standards of diplomacy. What we can and should do is to stop promoting counterrevolution. Or, as Richard Barnet has succinctly put it: "As long as the United States views the successes of revolutionary governments as foreign policy defeats, we will continue to be an enemy of development." 23

Our aid policy is not only an aspect of our total foreign policy, it is also a reflection of the life and values of our society. As long as power and the application of power are our dominant preoccupations, as to a great extent they have been in the years since World War II, our impact upon the third

22 Revolution Next Door, p. 12.
world will be exploitative and damaging. But if, as a result of the sobering experience of Vietnam, we are disposed to revive more traditional American values, we may devise a constructive foreign aid program designed to really help the struggling world; will be

Several years ago Alan Moorehead wrote a book called The Fatal Impact in which he recounted the disastrous and largely unintended effects upon the Tahitians and Australian

**The Economic Game Plan**

**THOUGHTS FROM LABOR**

By LEONARD WOODCOCK, President, International Union, United Auto Workers

Delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, October 4, 1971

**LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: On August 15th we were told that the economic mess in our nation needed strong medicine, and we agree that the nation does have an economic mess. In the last 2½ years unemployment has gone from 2.6 million in December, 1968 to over 5 million in the summer of 1971, and that's not counting the almost one million persons, mostly women, who drop out of the labor force because of the impossibility of finding jobs, and who are no longer recorded as unemployed, and the several million more who are underemployed.**

Our unemployment has then gone statistically from 3.3 per cent to 6.1 per cent, and this in large measure due to a deliberately engineered recession, about which the country was sold by the President in October of 1969 when Mr. Nixon said he had inherited an inflationary situation—and he had—and that the only way in which that could be cured was by creating an unfortunately sharp measure of unemployment which would rein in the inflation.

Well, half of that promise was kept. We got the sharp measure of unemployment but we did not get the reining in of inflation. The inflation which in 1968 had been mounting at an annual rate of 4.2 per cent, in 1970 was raging at an annual rate of 5.9 per cent, and in May through July of 1971 was moving at an annual rate of 5.2 per cent. And this with 27 per cent of our industrial capacity idle. And our Gross National Product in 1970 in uninfated dollars was down for the first time since 1958.

We are experiencing in this year our first adverse balance of trade since 1893. We indeed are in an economic mess and the nation was ready for strong medicine, as was shown by the polls—which we do not question. But what kind of medicine is it? The Wage-Price Freeze we say is unfair, inadequate and obviously cannot be continued on its voluntary basis because wages certainly will be frozen, since the employers control that mechanism, but prices certainly would not continue to be frozen because employers too unilaterally control that mechanism.

We say, what happens to the suspended payments during these 90 days? We have a Letter of Agreement, for example, with the McDonnell Douglas Corporation attached to the old contract, now expired, which says that on the 16th of September the workers in that company were entitled to the Cost of Living which had accumulated beyond the ceiling payments provided under the old contract. That money is 34¢ per hour. It became effective under the Letter of Agreement terms on the 19th of July. That 34¢ from the 19th of July until the 15th of November for that company alone is over $5 million. And we say it does nothing to fight inflation to take that $5 million from the approximately 20,000 families who have it coming by virtue of contract and simply deposit it in the corporate treasury of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.

That is why we say that money coming due during this period is money owed and must be paid. After the 90 days the UAW has said, if our contracts are to be stopped in the operation of some of their terms, then as far as we are concerned those contracts are null and void. And when we so said we were labeled as being irresponsible and that such a position was unthinkable. Well, I submit to you that if an individual sold a house in November, 1970 for $30,000, and was receiving payments month by month based upon that contract for $30,000, and was told one year later in November, 1971, that sale cannot be for more than $25,000, that individual would certainly be free to say, "Well then, I will not sell." And we will not sell either under those terms and—and this needs to be thought about—if labor contracts can be torn up based upon the stroke of a pen, then obviously we can no longer in the future negotiate contracts for any longer than one year.

Now, some of the economists—including some of the economists on the Democratic side—say that we really should be grateful to the President because by his action he has taken us off the treadmill of mounting wage increases to keep pace with a mounting inflation. Well, we submit to you that we got off that treadmill one year ago. When we went into the automobile and the agricultural negotiate negotiations we were facing the prospect of bigger and bigger wage increases in the later years of long-term agreements, in anticipation of a future inflation. But unfortunately by virtue of getting those bigger and bigger increases, making certain that future inflation would come about.

And we told our leadership this was wrong. It was wrong in their interest and it was wrong in the nation's interest, and that we should negotiate for annual increases tied to the national productivity, provided that such increases were protected in their value by Cost of Living protection. This kind of contract worked very well for 20 years in the General Motors Corporation and just short of that in the rest of the industry.

The fact is that none of the three major inflations that we have had since World War II had their origin in labor cost

**--- 24 Alan Moorehead, The Fatal Impact (1966), pp. 61, 80-81. ---**
Walter Frederick Mondale, a forty-five-year-old Democrat from Minnesota, is an increasingly important member of the United States Senate—one of the second tier of leaders (the first is made up of those whose power lies in their seniority), who define the issues and get them on the agenda, and occasionally even win acceptance of their ideas. He is a liberal in the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor tradition. A protégé of Hubert Humphrey, he became Attorney General of the state at thirty-two and was appointed to fill Humphrey’s Senate seat when Humphrey was elected Vice-President in 1964. Mondale was returned to the Senate in 1966, and again in 1972. Despite Mr. Nixon’s overwhelming victory last year, Mondale won reelection then by fifty-seven per cent, and his efforts on behalf of Senator McGovern are credited with reducing Mr. Nixon’s victory margin in Minnesota to only six percentage points. Mondale has established credentials with both the center and the left of the Democratic Party, and has a growing reputation among members of the press and others in Washington who observe, and can affect, politicians’ careers. He was campaign manager of Humphrey’s 1968 Presidential campaign. He supported the war in Vietnam longer than many of his Democratic colleagues did. He has also fought for the powerless in our society, identifying himself with such unpopular issues as welfare and busing.

I interviewed Mondale recently, in his Senate office—Room 443 of the Old Senate Office Building. The office contains the typical objects a politician accumulates: the state seal; awards; books written by colleagues and friends. The furniture is Undistinguished Government Issue. Mondale, wearing a short-sleeved shirt, sat in a corner of the only unusual piece of furniture, a pale-blue tufted Victorian sofa. Above him were large color photographs of the St. Croix River. Mondale is slim, youthful, with a touch of gray at the temples. He has prominent blue eyes, a nose that is slightly beaked, and straight, dark-blonde hair cut in such a way as to avoid commitment on the length issue. He has the earnest air of a son of a Midwestern Methodist minister, which he is. But he also has a streak of wry irreverence, which has made him popular among Senate staff members.

As we talked, Mondale piled the loose pillows of the sofa under his right arm, arranging and rearranging them, occasionally pounding them for emphasis. From time to time, he put his feet on a coffee table that was in front of the sofa.

I began by asking Senator Mondale about the dilemmas of contemporary liberal. What gave Senator his belief that the social programs of the nineteen-sixties were really worth defending?

“Well, first of all, I have no agreement with those who seek reform of these programs, and maybe even elimination of some of them, because I don’t argue that they’re perfect. I argue that there is not waste,” he replied.

“But I believe that the federal government has a fundamental role in delivering services to people who are overwhelmed by problems that they can’t handle themselves—hungry children, and children who need to be educated; people who are handicapped, mentally ill, or retarded; people who have special learning difficulties; people who can’t find work; old people who can’t care for themselves. And then there is a need for social programs that deal with the environment, transportation, and a whole range of human problems, in which I think the federal government has an indispensable role, leading, and helping to find solutions. And I think many of these programs must include the provision of services, which means people, bureaucrats, delivery systems; and these programs cannot be disbanded. The President’s attack has not been one of reform. It’s been fundamentally an assault on the whole notion of delivery of services to people who need them. As a matter of fact, there’s very disturbing notion that I find which somehow suggests that in our society we’re incapable of efficiently and effectively delivering essential services through government employees.”

I asked him if he believed we were capable of doing so.

“I think there is more good going on than the President’s dark appraisal of these programs suggests,” he replied.

“Do you have appraisals that
monumental wave, we must either utilize the energy generated by our escalating hopes, or risk further severe buffeting as their tremendous force washes over us.

It is to the great credit of our nation that such hopes exist at all. Without our unparalleled past progress, we would not dare hope for—much less expect—so much more.

Whether we realize our dreams—whether we fulfill the promise of America—is ultimately dependent on our compassion and generosity.

There is room—indeed, there is grave need—for all of us in this great effort. It has been true of democracies through the ages that the effectiveness of government is directly proportionate to the degree of citizen interest and citizen participation.

Government can be relevant; it can be an effective device for meeting critical citizen needs; it can function as it should—as an extension of the people's will.

Whether it does or not is dependent on our willingness to demand relevancy, to demand efficiency, and to demand truthfulness—and to back up our demands with a commitment to make representative democracy function as it should.

Thank you.

The State Of The Aging

LEGISLATIVE RELIEF

By FRANK CHURCH, United States Senator from Idaho

Delivered in the U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C., February 7, 1972

Mr. PRESIDENT, recently I told the White House Conference on Aging that our Nation seems to be falling behind, rather than advancing, in terms of achieving genuine security and well-being for older Americans.

Nevertheless, my message was not one of pessimism. Instead, it was one of challenge.

That challenge, very briefly stated, is that the 1970's can be either a period of triumph or one of despair for older Americans.

We can seize this historic opportunity to translate the recommendations of the 1971 White House Conference on Aging into action—immediate and long-range.

Or we can fumble and fritter away our opportunity, with the result that the elderly will taste more disappointment and despair.

Quite bluntly, older Americans of today have already waited too long for too little.

They will not be willing—not will their successors—to wait until the White House conference of 1981 for action to begin.

For these reasons, I have requested time to make the leadoff address today—the first in what might be called a state of the aging message to be delivered by members of the Committee on Aging and others.

Our purpose is to press home certain facts to the Congress and the administration about the issues now facing the elderly, the significance of the recently concluded White House Conference on Aging, the immediate and long-range opportunities for legislative action, and some thoughts about the future of aging Americans.

And my own personal goal is to help generate impetus for bipartisan congressional and administration efforts to make the 1970's a memorable decade of achievement.

To begin, I would like to make a few comments on comparative costs. What are we talking about when we ask for reforms that would help older Americans?

Well, we could abolish poverty among the elderly for what it costs to run the war in Southeast Asia for just 3 months.

We could broaden medicare coverage to include out-of-hospital prescription drugs for what we now spend for an aircraft carrier.

We could establish a comprehensive manpower program for older workers for the cost of one submarine.

Given such incongruities in our present spending patterns, it is easy to understand why the 1970's could become a decade of despair for older Americans.

They see a nation which boasts a gross national product of more than $1 trillion, but in which nearly 5 million older Americans subsist below the poverty line.

They see a nation where the median family income is almost $10,000, but in which nearly one-fourth of all aged couples have incomes below $3,000.

They see a nation in which $70 million is requested for military aid for Spain, but in which only $30 million is appropriated for service programs to enable elderly Americans to live independently.

But they also see a nation where there is new reason for hope. Through the voices raised at the White House Conference on Aging, all of us have heard a stirring declaration for action.

And that call has already produced momentum on two key fronts.

Throughout 1971, the Congress struggled with a reluctant administration for more adequate funding for the Older Americans Act. And rightly so. A budget assigning the Administration on Aging approximately the same amount of money that was allocated to the Pentagon for publicity purposes was not worthy of a great nation.

We questioned the administration on these spending priorities. And finally, we won some limited victories, including a $15 million increase in appropriations.

But it took a White House conference to turn around an administration that was first willing to settle for $29.5 million for the Older Americans Act, about $1.45 for each senior citizen. It took a White House conference to demonstrate that the elderly were deeply dissatisfied. And it took a White House conference to provide the necessary impetus to secure a $100 million appropriation for the Older Americans Act, the highest in its history.

There is also no doubt in my mind that the conference helped to marshal support for establishing a national hot meals program. For nearly 2 years, the administration had opposed this measure. During the week of the conference, though, the Senate rejected this advice and approved the nutrition program for the Elderly Act, S. 1163, by a vote of 89 to 0.

This measure, which was sponsored by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), is now before the House of
Representatives. And, I understand that the House is scheduled to take action today on this proposal.

And behind it all, there is a firm bipartisan attitude in Congress when it comes to issues affecting older Americans. No where is this better demonstrated than in the Committee on Aging, on which I serve as chairman. We may have 11 Democrats and nine Republicans on our committee. But in our treatment of the issues affecting the elderly, we try to conduct our business in a bipartisan manner.

What is now necessary is a joint effort by Congress and a willing administration to construct a sound and coherent program for the aging.

Before discussing what form this action program should take, an examination of the administration's "game plan" is essential. This is not done in a partisan vein because no administration to date—whether it be Democratic or Republican—has really come to grips with the predicament of the elderly.

Despite the crying need, the administration, until recently, exhibited a narrow, negative attitude. Not only did it fail to propose new programs of its own, but it resisted, opposed, and even blocked several congressional initiatives.

Until last week, the administration opposed the enactment of the Nutrition Program for the Elderly Act. Yet, 8 million older Americans have diets insufficient for good health. And the administration’s own White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health strongly supported this type of legislation.

The administration has opposed legislation to create a midcareer development services program for older workers. But today, nearly 1.1 million persons 45 and older are unemployed. They account for less than 4 per cent of all enrollees in our Nation’s work and training programs, although they represent 21 per cent of the total unemployment in the United States and 37 per cent of all joblessness for 27 weeks or longer.

The administration has argued against the establishment of a National Senior Service Corps, although 4 million older persons may want to participate in this program. And many pilot programs under Mainstream—such as Green Thumb and Senior Aides—have shown beyond any doubt that community service employment is good for the elderly as well as the localities being assisted.

The administration opposed establishment of a National Institute of Gerontology and an Aging Research Commission.

Yet our Nation probably spends no more than 8 cents per person for biomedical aging research. And the low priority assigned to aging research continues to be one of the major problems in the field of gerontology.

The administration has presided over the continued decline of the Administration on Aging. Today, AOA is no longer the strong Federal focal point which Congress intended. Instead, it is a crippled agency with no real clout in the Federal bureaucracy.

To make matters worse, the administration now proposes sharp cutbacks in the scope of coverage under medicare and medicaid. Medicare protection has already eroded to the point that the elderly, as a group, are paying almost as much in out-of-pocket payments for health care as the year before this historic law went into effect.

But the fundamental weakness in the administration’s game plan is the failure to develop a real income strategy to provide security in retirement. Its policy of adding a few dollars every 2 years of monthly social security checks is just not going to get the job done.

Such small adjustments will also provide little protection if the administration continues to insist that his escalator should be pegged to an inadequate base. All this will do is perpetuate deprivation for persons who now receive low benefits.

We in the Congress have long supported automatic adjustments to protect the elderly from inflation. However, there is one crucial difference: The Congress wants to raise social security benefits to a more realistic level before employing this escalator mechanism. Only in this manner will older Americans have any meaningful protection from raising prices.

The retirement income crisis which now affects millions of older Americans is much too deep for the administration’s shallow treatment. It cries out for much more far-reaching action on several key fronts. And it deserves no less than a national commitment to eliminate poverty for the elderly and to allow them to share in the economic abundance which they have worked most of their lives to create.

Yet the administration’s income strategy has been pursued, to a large degree, in a half-hearted manner with no realistic goals.

In 1970, for example, the administration was first willing to settle for a 7-per cent increase in social security benefits. Later it upped the ante to 10 per cent when an avalanche of criticism forced reassessment. But the significant point is that neither of these proposals would even have kept pace with the rise in prices since the last social security increase.

Only because of bipartisan congressional insistence did the elderly win a 15-per cent raise. And then the administration threatened to veto this measure because of its "inflationary" impact. But fortunately the measure was tacked onto a tax proposal which the President could not veto.

Again last year, the Congress and the administration had another go-around on social security. This time high-level administration spokesmen urged the Congress not to rock the boat by approving a raise in excess of 5 per cent. Later the request was eased up to 6 per cent. But, once again, this increase would have been wiped out by the time the elderly received their first checks, and once again, a bipartisan Congress ignored the advice of the administration and approved a stopgap 10-per cent raise.

The net impact of this action is that social security recipients are now receiving about $4 billion more in benefits than they would have received, if the administration had prevailed. Equally significant, we would now have thousands more on the poverty rolls if the Congress had accepted the Nixon recommendations.

Now I turn to the President’s address to the delegates at the White House conference. In some respects, his remarks represented a step forward, particularly his proposal for increased funding for the Older Americans Act. However, his statement fell far short of prescribing what is really needed to come to grips with the basic problems confronting the elderly—relating to income, health, and housing. And once again, this was symptomatic of the administration’s failure to establish realistic goals.

The President, for example, recommended that H.R. 1 be approved ‘without delay.’ At the outset, I wish to express my support for early action on H.R. 1. In terms of numbers of persons affected, this could quite possibly be the most significant domestic legislation considered during this session. But many important changes are still needed to improve this bill and to eliminate some of its undesirable provisions. And I, along with other members of the committee, will have more to say about that later.

If the Congress were to accept H.R. 1 without any modifications, the elderly find themselves on the same old economic treadmill. The 5-per cent increase in social security benefits would not become effective until this June. Even more significant, this raise may not be sufficient to keep the elderly
even in their desperate race with inflation. By June, the jump in the cost-of-living, since the 1971 social security increase, which became effective last January, may well be in excess of 5 per cent.

Additionally, the proposed $1,560 income floor for a single aged person is nearly $300 below the existing poverty line. By the time this in one standard becomes effective, it will fall substantially below the poverty index.

There are also very crucial omissions of fact in the President's address. He did not, for instance, inform the delegates that his administration made no request for a social security increase for 1972. The 5-per cent raise was principally the result of bipartisan efforts in the House of Representatives. Nor did he tell the delegates that his administration was first considering a $65 income standard for its welfare reform proposal for the aged. With such a low threshold, this was tantamount to no welfare reform at all. Now that standard has been doubled, but once again largely because of bipartisan congressional efforts.

During the last 3 years, our unemployment rate has jumped from 3.4 to 6 per cent, adding nearly 2.5 million persons to the jobless rolls. Today more than 5.2 million individuals are looking for work. More than 1.1 million have been searching unsuccessfully for 15 weeks or more.

All age groups have felt the crunch of these economic policies—whether in the form of massive layoffs, shorter work weeks, smaller paychecks, rising prices, high interest rates, or just slow business. But older persons and their families have been especially hard hit.

Many have discovered that they have lost more than jobs. Thousands have also lost their pension coverage as well—even though they may have worked most of their lives for this little "nest egg."

And the elderly—perhaps more so than any other age group—have been especially hard-pressed by inflation. As prices go up, their limited purchasing power goes down.

Yet, despite my earlier skepticism about administration policies, I still find many hopeful signs for 1972 to be a year of decisive legislation victories for older Americans.

First, White House Conference Chairman Arthur Flemming has repeatedly emphasized the need for early action to implement the policy recommendations of the 3,400 conferees. Second, the President's White House Conference speech has provided a possible signal that the administration may look more favorably upon categorical programs for the elderly.

Third, issues related to aging now enjoy strong bipartisan support in Congress. This has been demonstrated time and time again. It may be revealed when Congress stands up and demands that social security benefits be raised to a much more realistic level. Or it may be demonstrated when bipartisan efforts turn an inadequate funding request for the Older Americans Act into a $105 million victory for the elderly.

Fourth, I believe that the Congress is ready, willing, and able to act on several major proposals during this session. Important momentum was generated during the week of the White House Conference, and I look for this impetus to continue during the months ahead.

Our Nation is now being challenged—as it never has been before—to develop and implement a national policy on aging. This will, of course, require a full fledged action campaign in several areas if the later years are to be a time for dignity and self respect.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of economic security. Today more than 4.7 million older individuals 65 and older fall below the poverty line, nearly 100,000 more than in 1968. And for the first time since poverty statistics have been tabulated, their impoverished number have increased, instead of decreased.
social service delivery systems which are far superior to those
that now exist. Adequate income will be of little consolation
to aged persons who are unable to go to the doctor, the
supermarket, or visit friends because suitable transportation is
unavailable or inaccessible.

Much of this lack of progress or retrogression, in some
respects, is reflected in the elderly's living environment. Less
than one-quarter of a century ago, our Nation announced a
goal for a decent home and suitable living environment for all
Americans. But this objective is far beyond the means of too
many older Americans. Nearly 6 million are estimated to live
dilapidated, deteriorating, or substandard housing.

Yet, our housing programs have lagged behind their
demonstrated needs. Only about 350,000 units have been
constructed for seniors under Federal programs during the
past 10 years. This is only about the equivalent of the net gain
in their population during any one year.

Large numbers of aged homeowners are also finding
themselves in a 'no-man's land' for housing. Rapidly rising
property taxes and maintenance costs are driving them from
their homes. And alternative quarters at prices they can afford
are simply not available.

Complicating everything else is the fact that the elderly are
among the chief victims of our Nation's most pressing
problems: such as the decline in our cities, the migration from
rural areas, the disintegration of our public transportation
system, and the sheer wastefulness of a nation which
overspends for military hardware while tightening its fiscal
belt for human investment expenditures.

But even these problems can be solved if we insist on an
appropriate national commitment and a soundly conceived
strategy. And this session of Congress provides a splendid
opportunity to launch a comprehensive action program to
implement the goals of the White House Conference on
Aging.

First and foremost, early action is needed to make H.R.1 as
strong as possible in terms of ending poverty for the elderly.
Several features adopted by the administration—such as full
social security benefits for widows, a liberalization of the
retirement test, an age-62 computation point for men, and
cost-of-living adjustments—provide a solid basis for genuine
reform of our social security program.

However, essential finishing touches are necessary to perfect
this measure. Heading the list, in my judgment, is
the Social Security Office has the trust and respect of
income standard which would be su-
icient for abolishing

poverty among all older Americans. In contrast, H.R. 1 fixes
the income floor for single persons only at $1,500 per year.
This is certainly a step forward. But the income standard in
H.R. 1 would still leave millions of elderly persons in poverty.
For these reasons, I urge the Senate to raise the threshold in
H.R. 1 to an amount which would wipe out poverty once and
for all. Moreover, I recommend that there be cost-of-living ad-
justments to make this standard inflation-proof for low-income
older Americans in the future.

Another important aspect of an income strategy is, we must not
overlook the need for further improvements in medicare through H.R. 1. For many older Americans, the single greatest
threat to their economic security is the high cost of illness.
Gaps still exist in medicare, causing a further drain upon their
limited pocketbooks.

Two vital reforms, in my judgment, are needed: first, the
elimination of the premium charge for doctor's insurance and
second, coverage of out-of-hospital prescription drugs under
medicare. These measures were strongly supported by the
1971 Social Security Advisory Council, as well as the delegates
at the White House Conference on Aging. Now, I believe, is
the time to extend this essential protection to the elderly.

Other changes are also necessary to improve the health care
provisions in H.R. 1. Since other members of the committee
will focus on these measures, I shall concentrate on two
provisions, which may seriously cut back the availability of
health care to the elderly:

The increase in the deductible for doctor’s insurance from
$50 to $60; and

The $7.50 copayment charge for medicare patients for each
day in the hospital from the 31st day to the 60th day.

The copayment charge, alone, could add $225 to the
hospital bill of an older American. Ironically, this provision is
likely to fall most heavily upon the very person medicare is
supposed to help the most—the individual who may be
exposed to costly health care expenditures because of a
prolonged period in the hospital.

These increased levies, I believe, should either be stricken or
substantially reduced by the Senate.

Another area for early action during this session is the
establishment of a strong Federal spokesman to represent the
elderly in the highest councils of Government. Recent
reorganization moves during the past 5 years have raised very
serious questions about the capability of the Administration on
Aging to serve as an effective advocate for older Americans.
Today, AOA is a weak agency with very little authority. Its
program responsibility has been reduced by two-thirds during
the past 2 years.

In short, we need a new, strong, and coordinated apparatus
to serve as a cornerstone for a cohesive and comprehensive
Federal approach on aging.

Within a few days, I shall introduce legislation to
implement this objective. Basically, the bill will be patterned
after the recommendations of the committee's advisory council
on the AOA or a successor. Their proposal—later adopted at
the White House Conference on Aging—called for:

Establishment of an independent office on aging at the
White House level to to mutate policy and monitor programs
on aging;

Creation of an advisory council to assist this office and to
prepare an annual report on the progress made in resolving
the problems of older Americans; and

Elevation of the AOA by placing it under the direction of an
Assistant Secretary on Aging in HHS.

Enactment of this measure, I believe, can provide the
operating governmental framework for developing coordinat-
ed policies on behalf of aging Americans. And early action on
this proposal becomes imperative, because June 30 is the deadline for extending the Older Americans Act.

Equally important, Congress should act promptly to enhance employment and service opportunities for aging Americans. With unemployment continuing to mount, mature workers are finding that they are among the first to be fired, but the last to be hired. Many now stand in need of a flexible manpower program which is responsive to their needs. Large numbers are jobless because their skills have been outdistanced by technology or because they are seeking the work of a bygone era.

For these reasons, I urge the administration to reassess its opposition to the Middle-Aged and Older Workers Employment Act. For thousands of unemployed or underemployed workers 45 and over, this measure could provide the training, counseling and other supportive services to enable them to move back onto the payrolls or to more productive work. It also authorizes placement and recruitment services in communities where there is a large scale joblessness because of a plant shutdown or other permanent reduction in the work force.

Another area meriting early attention is broadened service opportunities for older persons. Several mainstream pilot projects have amply demonstrated that there are thousands of older Americans who are ready and able to serve in their communities. We do not need any more proof that these programs will work. What is needed now is a genuine national commitment to build upon the solid achievements of these projects. And enactment of the Older American Community Service Employment Act, S. 555, can provide a basis for converting these projects into permanent, ongoing national programs.

Far-reaching action in the housing field is also essential if we are to assure a full and satisfying life for the elderly. We must begin at once to eliminate the conditions which force many older Americans to live in inferior and unsuitable homes simply because they cannot find or afford better housing. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing for the Elderly (Mr. Williams) will discuss in greater detail the committee's recommendations for improving housing programs for the aged; and my remarks will be brief.

Basically, I have two points to make. First, legislation should be considered during this Congress to make home repair services available for elderly homeowners who would otherwise have difficulty paying for these costs. Many urban and rural neighborhoods are deteriorating because essential home repairs must be delayed for several reasons—limited income, failing health, or the lack of necessary skills to perform the fix-up work. But these blighted neighborhoods can be renovated with the establishment of a national home repairs program, utilizing the skills of older persons to assist aged homeowners.

Second, the administration should, I believe, spell out more clearly its housing goals for older Americans. This should be done early to enable appropriate congressional units to act on administration proposals during this session. In this fashion, a comprehensive housing package—combining the best features of congressional and administration initiatives—could be developed.

Concluding my list of suggestions for early action is a proposal that legislation should be enacted early this year to authorize mini-White House Conferences on Aging every 2 years. These periodic conferences would permit more intensive review, one at a time, of specific issues raised at the 1971 conference—such as retirement income, health, housing, and others. Equally significant, this would establish a continuing mechanism for developing and implementing the policy recommendations of the 1971 conference. It would also provide vital followup work to assure that the proposals outlined by the 5,400 delegates lead to concrete action instead of mere words. This concept, I am pleased to say, has been enthusiastically endorsed in the report of the 1971 White House Conference. In the very near future, I shall introduce legislation to implement this proposal.

My earlier remarks have been directed essentially at action that can and should be taken now to meet immediate challenges. But the development and implementation of a national policy on aging would be incomplete without also establishing long-range goals and direction.

As chairman of the Senate Committee on Aging, I believe that the committee can play an important role in focusing on crucial issues with far-reaching and long-term implications for the aged of today and tomorrow. For example, the allocation of work and income is still a major unresolved problem in our country today. Instead of the "all or nothing" principle—100 per cent full-time employment during the adult years and then complete inactivity during the retirement years—new work lifetime patterns must be considered.

Greater experimentation, for instance, with phased retirement, trial retirement, and sabbaticals will be essential, particularly if the trends toward shorter work-weeks and longer periods of leisure time continue.

The resolution of this crucial problem has a far-reaching impact for all age groups. This point cannot be understated, because more than seven out of every 10 children born today can expect to reach age 65. And they can expect to spend longer periods in retirement—perhaps a third of their entire lives.

But how will these retirees make use of their new free time? Will it lead to fulfillment and enjoyment, or just boredom and frustration? All age groups, now and in the future, have a very deep interest in these fundamental issues.

Another major question requiring immediate attention is the crushing burden of the property tax upon the aged homeowner. Many now find themselves financially paralyzed because their property taxes have doubled, or even tripled, during the past 10 years. In 1970, property taxes hit an all-time high of $37.5 billion, nearly 35 per cent higher than in 1967. This tax, moreover, frequently takes a much greater chunk out of an elderly homeowner's limited budget because it is regressive in the extreme. Renters also feel the pinch since landlords usually shift this burden to the tenant.

Several potentially helpful measures—such as the proposal sponsored by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Eagleton) to provide a credit for low- and moderate-income homeowners and renters who are 65 and older—have been introduced during this Congress, and can provide welcome relief. But in view of recent state supreme court decisions, other alternatives may have to be considered for the financing of our elementary and secondary schools. For these reasons, the Committee on Aging will focus on several issues of vital concern to aged property owners and tenants, such as:

If a substitute for the property tax is developed, what type of impact will it have on the aged? Will it provide substantial relief for the elderly homeowner or tenant? Will it protect them from extraordinary burdens?

If the property tax is still retained, what would be the most effective method for providing relief for aged homeowners and renters? Should it take the form of a Federal tax credit or rebate for individuals confronted with extraordinary burdens? Should Federal assistance be made available to States which provide such relief?

Or, should other alternatives be developed?

Additionally, the committee will work with senior citizen organizations, educators, and others in the development of an...
effective system for the delivery of social and health services. The necessity for co-ordinately social and health services is now widely talked about, but it is still rarely practiced. But the much-sought goal—to assist aged persons to live independently, instead of being institutionalized—will not really be resolved until that principle is widely applied.

Another key concern is to find ways to involve the elderly more in programs meant to serve them. They must have a role, a voice, and an input in the decision-making process. One possibility is that our national policy should encourage the development of what might be called “Community Councils of Older Americans.” Elderly council members could work with governmental and private agencies to make programs more responsive to the special needs of the elderly.

Eventually, as in the case of the council of elders in Boston, these units could incorporate and become contracting agents for such programs.

Establishment of these community councils can also enable the elderly, more and more, to manage the programs which are now meant to serve them. There are many experts and professionals in the field of aging. But there is really no expert like the elderly person who has lived and experienced the very

As we move toward these goals, we must also remember that the field of aging will be the big loser if the politics of expediency is practiced for narrow partisan advantage. The elderly need the cooperation of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents alike.

The administration and Congress must also work together if we really intend to solve their problems, rather than debate them.

Today there are more than 20 million Americans who are 65 or older, about one out of every 10 Americans. The elderly’s combined numbers are nearly equivalent to the total population in 20 of our States.

Equally important, each year 1.4 million Americans have their 65th birthday. And by the year 2000, approximately 45 million individuals will have become newcomers to this age group.

Today our Nation has a unique opportunity to make advancing age a time of fulfillment, instead of neglect and despair. Perhaps even more significant, there is already broad agreement on many crucial policy goals and the course of action our Nation should take now and in the future. In many respects, the report of the White House Conference is a ringing reaffirmation of recommendations advanced by the Committee on Aging and its advisory councils.

With this broad base for support, our Nation can begin to develop, for the first time in its history, a comprehensive workable national policy for the elderly American.

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**Pesticides And Public Opinion**

**GET READY FOR THE TURNAROUND**

By H. L. STRAUBE, Vice President and General Manager, Agricultural Chemical Division, Stouffer Chemical Company

Delivered at a meeting of the Western Agricultural Chemicals Association, Portland, Oregon, January 12, 1972

**THE THEME** of our discussion today is “Marketing Chemicals in Today’s Restrictive Atmosphere.” In a sense, it sounds like it could be the latest episode on “Mission Impossible.” It doesn’t really sound like it can be done, but somehow, by the end of the program perhaps we will find that it can be done, that things are not as bad as they appear—and they very well may be getting better.

There are some who believe these restrictions have been thrust upon us by uncompromising Federal and State Governments. I do not think this is so. To me, this is simply a normal political reaction to what was obviously considered a problem.

If you examine our industry in the spectrum of American business, we’re fairly new on the scene. Think about it. With few exceptions, virtually all the products we sell today were not even known 25 years ago. Ours is an infant industry built on a foundation of technology and scientific facts. Our products were conceived in research laboratories throughout the world, tested in the experiment stations of our government and leading universities, and their performance has been proven over and over again on our nation’s farms.

The benefits have been tremendous. Americans enjoy the highest quality, the most abundant and the cheapest food available in the world today. Before pesticides, in the 1930’s and 1940’s, the American farmer produced enough to feed himself and 11 others. Today he feeds himself and 45 others. At the same time, today in the U. S. only five per cent of our total work force is engaged in farming, attesting to the massive increase in productivity during the past 25 years.

To look at it another way: Annual losses of crops and livestock to pests in the United States are $20 billion. If pesticides were withdrawn from U. S. agricultural production, total output of crops and livestock would be further reduced by 30 per cent. It is a fact that if pesticides were eliminated starvation in this country would be rampant and the price of farm products would likely increase by 50 to 75 per cent.

So much for statistics. With all of these herculean achievements, why, then, the hue and cry to ban pesticides? What has changed? Why are we constantly on the defensive, fighting for our existence and the right to market what we feel are highly beneficial products? Perhaps the answer to the can of worms our industry is being fed is in this recipe—take technology, stir in social concern, put it in a political pot, and let it stew and simmer.

Let me elaborate on this recipe by first asking you to think back. Over the past few years we have stood by in amazement watching dangerous developments occurring around us, listening but not hearing the outside world.

Yes, we talked about our accomplishments, but just as I stand here now, talking to you, we discussed these achievements then only among ourselves. Meanwhile, everyone else, even our own wives and children were listening to the righteous, the indignant, the advocates of various groups and crusades. Some of the statements were startling.

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**VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY**
WASHINGTON

The executive branch’s insatiable appetite for power is undermining the last bastion of Congressional control of the purse strings. This development—underscored by the impounding of funds—undermines the threat that far too much power is concentrated in the modern agency for the good health of constitutional government.

Historically, the rapid growth of Presidential power has directly resulted from the shaping experiences of the 20th century—two World Wars, the Great Depression and a protracted cold war. Unfortunately, the Congress itself accelerated the trend by tamely yielding its power. As a consequence, increasing executive authority has overshadowed the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution to the point where we must ask whether we are witnessing a permanent decline of constitutional government.

Most authority over foreign policy, including the war secretary’s, has passed to the President. Now, on the domestic front, Congress is steadily losing its constitutional grip on the public purse. The disastrous impact of this development can be felt only when one realizes that appropriating money is the most important business assigned to Congress by the Constitution.

The appropriation power, however, lies today as much within the executive domain as within the Congressional. In this part, this was inevitable. The increased complexity of governmental transactions, combined with a concomitant need for flexibility, has understandably led to more executive involvement in budgeting for public spending. However, recent Presidents have reached far beyond these bounds toward unrestricted impoundment of appropriated funds—that is, the outright refusal by the President to spend funds in accordance with the will of Congress (the money, if blocked, remains in the General Fund for the end of the fiscal period).

Although Democratic Presidents engaged in impoundments in no small way, the Nixon Administration has gone far. At last count, impounded funds this year total nearly $13 billion; under Johnson the high was an estimated $10.6 billion; under Kennedy, $6.5 billion. Every news story describes discussions within the Nixon Administration as to whether Congress has appropriated housing, pollution control and health services ought to remain impounded or be released from the executive domain. Commonplace are such news items as: The Administration may be ready to release the $586 million in grants voted last year by Congress for the fight against water pollution; or “under Congressional pressure the Budget Bureau released a backlog of 56 billion dollars in aid projects.”

There are occasions, certainly, when the impoundment of appropriated funds is legitimate. For example, if only part of an appropriated sum is needed for, say, an irrigation project, then duty dictates that the remainder not be spent. Or, if Congress, as it sometimes does, makes an appropriation permissive, the President is obviously free to spend or save the money as he chooses. Or impoundment may be expressly directed, as in Title 6 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, where Congress mandates the executive branch to withhold certain funds from localities practicing unlawful discrimination. The area of dispute does not involve such categories but rather executive impoundment made in defiance of Congressional intent.

Obviously the Constitution did not mean to allow the President complete control over spending. It gives him no line-item veto—if he finds a specific spending item unpalatable, he is obliged to veto the entire appropriation bill in which the item is contained. Furthermore, his veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both bodies of Congress.

As Sen. Charles Mathias (R., Md.), recently observed, respecting the impoundment practice:

We cannot allow ... the President or the executive branch to have an informal line item veto of appropriated money which cannot be overridden. This is, in effect, to impound declared ‘‘Congressional policy’ and threaten Congress’ very existence. It is clearly in violation of the spirit and intent of our Constitution.

It should be understood that a vital ingredient of our democracy is the opportunity afforded diverse political interests—farmers, businessmen, veterans, the elderly and others—to appeal in a meaningful way to Congress on behalf of programs they favor. Once it becomes recognized that any given program may be entombed by the President—even when Congress has authorized it and appropriated the money for it—the American people will sense the futility of turning to their elected representatives. This will compound an already discernible sense of frustration, even helplessness, that many social observers find today among Americans. The public will conclude that the executive branch, largely beyond local reach, is wholly in charge. Confidence and respect for representative government will evaporate and the stage could be set for the coming of an American Cromwell.

What is to be done? Senators of both parties and of differing political outlook have become increasingly concerned. Senator Mansfield, the Majority Leader, recently proposed that the House, where appropriation bills customarily begin their legislative journey, institute a court suit to challenge Presidential action. Legal scholars have concluded that no court decisions to date pass directly upon the issue and that decisions of tangential relevance leave the matter in doubt. Some specialists would hesitate to resort to the courts, on the ground that the relationship between the President and Congress is essentially political and not susceptible to judicial remedies.
As for other means, Congressional recourse to the process of impeachment is clearly too harsh to be practical. More realistically, Congress can deny funds requested by the President for programs he may strongly favor, and this brings pressure on the Chief Executive to implement congressional intent in other areas. This tack was suggested in March by Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

The most dramatic expression of Senate restiveness over the impoundment issue occurred earlier this fall. The Foreign Relations Committee, when reporting out a foreign aid bill, included a provision forbidding expenditure abroad until the President had released selected ban-development funds impounded last year.

As a minimum, in any struggle for rectification, Congress must strengthen and regularize its review of executive compliance with Congressional appropriations. At present, once an appropriation is passed, Congress usually loses sight of it. The duties of the General Accounting Office, arm of the legislative branch, should be augmented to include supervision of expenditures in order to identify when impoundment occurs. The appropriations committees of both House and Senate might be required to follow appropriations through the executive branch to insure that they have been allocated and spent as directed. Going further, legislation might be enacted requiring the Office of Management and Budget, formerly known as the budget Bureau, to inform Congress whenever funds are impounded.

Sen. Sam Ervin of North Carolina, chairman of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Judiciary committee, recently introduced a bill, S. 2581, requiring the President to notify each body of the Congress of every instance in which he impounds funds, or authorizes such impoundment by any officer of the United States. The message must specify the amounts he projects or functions affected, and the reasons. A provision specifies that the President shall end the impoundment of such funds within sixty calendar days after the special message is received by Congress—unless the impoundment shall have been ratified by Congress.

Of course the most desirable general solution would be for the executive branch to discover itself by recognizing that the dominant Presidential position in the budgetary process must be matched by meaningful Congressional control. But President Nixon is insensitive to the problem. In March, when asked about the impoundment issue by Howard K. Smith during an interview on ABC Television, the President replied:

... when I was a Senator and a Congressman, particularly when I was a Senator and a Congressman with a President of the other party in the White House, I played all of these games, with very little success. These games are going to be played.

But the issue is not a matter of "games." It gets to the heart of the separation of powers, the principal accomplishment of the founding fathers.

As such, the matter deserves more respectful attention than it can be resolved. It need not lead to a fierce collision between the two branches of the federal government. Solutions are available—and should be mutually worked out. For it is clear that the Congress cannot regain its rightful role under the Constitution without a resolution of the impoundment issue.

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**CALL IT MAFIA**

**The Police, the Press & the Legend**

**EUGENE RUFFINI**

Mr. Ruffini, a television and radio news reporter, has been a working journalist in New York City for the past fifteen years.

On June 28, a black gunman fired three bullets into the head of Joseph Colombo, Sr., a reputed mob leader and founder of the Italian-American Civil Rights League. The event gave the police and the news media another chance to indulge in what Tom Buckley of the *New York Times* called "Mafiaology," a study into "the machinations of the crime kingdom... none of it provable." When unable or unwilling to solve the crime, police can thus say that the solution is tangled irretrievably in "gangland rivalry." The news media can sell more newspapers or garner more viewers and listeners by dispensing speculation and rumor as fact. Some newsmen can transform themselves into "instant experts" by presenting what they term inside information. The public can pant over Byzantine theories while saying, "Good riddance, another mobster goes." And the principles of due process and honest journalism fly out the window as individuals are charged and libeled. The media are too willing to cover and embellish the charges leveled by authority over unpopular minorities, but the pattern established is dangerous for all Americans. The true and widespread nature of lawlessness in the United States is unpunished and Italian-Americans wince anew under the impression that they invented organized crime and continue to monopolize it.

Colombo was shot at about 11:45 A.M. inside the press section and before the start of a League rally at Columbus Circle in New York City. He was taken to Roosevelt Hospital and two months later, on August 23, was removed in a semi-comatose condition to the Brooklyn home of his son, Anthony. A hospital official said "Colombo's chances of survival are good, but his chances of showing appreciable improvement in his ability to function would have to be considered poor."

Colombo's assailant was identified as Jerome Addonizio.
to review its choice of priorities and rearrange them if changed conditions make such action desirable. But it will ensure that any rearrangement will be effected by the Congress and not by the President, who has no legislative power under our Constitution.

The Impoundment Control Bill actually is rather simple. It requires the President to notify each House of the Congress by special message of every instance in which he impounds or authorizes an impoundment by any officer of the United States. Each special message must specify, first, the amount of the funds impounded; second, the date on which funds were ordered to be impounded; third, the date the funds were impounded; fourth, any account, department, or establishment of the Government to which the impounded funds would have been available for obligation except for the impoundment; fifth, the period of time during which the funds are to be impounded; sixth, the reasons for the impoundment; and seventh, the estimated fiscal, economic, and budgetary effects of the impoundment.

The bill further provides that the President shall cease the impounding of funds specified in each special message unless the Congress approves the impoundment within 60 calendar days of continuous session after the message is received.

The intent of the bill is to preclude any form of impounding, withholding, delaying expenditure or obligation of funds, or the termination of authorized projects or activities unless such action is specifically mandated by Congress, and that it defines "impounding of funds" in such a way as to foreclose the use of semantic strategems.

I hope that these hearings will alert the Congress and the American people to the constitutional crisis that we face and to the urgent necessity that some redress be found if our form of government is to survive.

by Hon. Frank Church
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From testimony given on January 30, 1973, before hearings on proposed legislation to limit the impoundment of powers of the President held jointly before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers and an ad hoc Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee.

"I hope these hearings will alert the American people to the constitutional crisis that we face . . ."
of war and peace, the allocation of American assistance abroad, strengthening our social security system here at home, improving our environment, or steering budgetary priorities along the path of productive and needed social services. The history of our nation provides ample proof that if the separate branches remain strong and vital they are an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of unfettered power; this system of restrained power is the bedrock principle on which our political system was founded and has been the very genius of our form of government. As Aristotle noted long ago, "If liberty and equality are to be founded in democracy, they will be best attained when all [institutions] share in government to the utmost." In this regard, Congress' prime role is its power over appropriations and directing the allocation of federal funds. This power is the key to Congress' independence, influence, and integrity.

Under the Constitution, the right to appropriate belongs to Congress. Article I, Section 9.7, of the Constitution reads, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law...

In this century, however, through a process of subtle attrition, Congress has gradually surrendered this traditional well-spring of strength. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 enlarged the President's spending discretion and established a procedure whereby the Executive no longer needed to send up to Congress itemized budget requests as had been the custom, and replaced this procedure with a budgeting and appropriating system based on a "keep the faith" attitude among executive officials and appropriations committees. The Act also created the Bureau of the Budget, now reorganized into the potent Office of Management and Budget. This legislation has, over a period of years, tilted the balance of political power clearly in favor of the Executive. Instead of "More Power to Congress!" as was the Hamiltonian demand during the discussions preceding the Philadelphia convention in 1787, Congress, divesting itself of its own power, granted "More power to the Executive!"

Through the growth of "central clearance," then, the appropriations power, once exclusively a legislative function, emerged as a strong new arm of the Executive. One observer suggests with devastating candor that "Congress, according to the Constitution, must appropriate—but what is appropriated, speaking very generally, is what is presented to them by the Administration." The growing volume and complexity of governmental transactions, and the flexibility with which they must be handled in the absence of Congressional efforts to adapt its procedures to handle greater complexity, inevitably has led to increased Executive control over public spending. In the light of the major role that the Executive branch has assumed, the importance of safeguarding what remains of Congressional power over the purse is manifest.

Executive impoundment represents a clear threat to that remaining Congressional power, as recent history illustrates. In my view, it was during the Roosevelt Administration, acting under a continual state of emergency in the Depression and later in World War II, that Executive impoundment changed its character from that of simple economy measures and became a widely used instrument for Executive policy. From 1933 on, a quantum jump occurred in the frequency of im-

(Continued on page 117)
poundment. Measures were passed by Congress to permit President Roosevelt to pursue those activities he deemed necessary to ease the economic crisis of the Thirties; and, similarly, during the Forties Congress supported the President in his policy of deferring projects which he believed might absorb funds required for the war effort.

Throughout this period of crisis, the Executive branch based its rationale for impounding funds chiefly upon the war powers of the President.

Congressional abdication of its “most effective check on Presidential power,” the power of the purse, was directly linked to the war. However, several Members of Congress, I am happy to note, were clearly unhappy and were concerned that the claimed emergency powers might become normal powers. A legislative amendment introduced by Senator McKellar in 1943 was “the first across-the-board curtailment of the Budget’s impounding procedure to be accepted by either House of Congress.” After passing the Senate by a voice vote, the McKellar amendment was resoundingly defeated in the House. The floor debate over the issue, however, made it evident that even given the wartime emergency, many influential Members believed that the Executive had stepped into Congress’ domain and a Constitutional crisis was in the making.

The record on impoundment since the war discloses that—far from abating—the practice has grown markedly, expanding beyond the general area of “national defense” to challenge frontally Congressional control over all aspects of civilian spending.

Breaking the Executive’s hardening habit of impoundment is now one of the crucial tests before us—if Congress and Constitutional government are to survive. To salvage a position of power and policy, both bodies of the Congress must draw the line; Members need to live up to their oath of office and join together in a concentrated effort to restore the power of the purse as required by the Constitution. S.373, which I wholeheartedly cosponsor, requiring the President to come to Congress for affirmative votes by both Houses for each specific instance of impoundment, is a fitting legislative bulwark on which to stand and fight. The Supreme Court represents, one would hope, another forum for fortifying Congress’ dominant position in regard to control over the purse where suit might be sought against the Executive for impounding federal funds.

Seem with startling regularity now are references to the impoundment of funds for highways, for combatting water pollution, for housing, for flood control projects, for hospital construction, for medical research, and other important domestic programs. Is Congress to pass legislation creating and funding programs and then plead with the White House to release the funds to implement duly enacted laws? Surely not! As Thomas Jefferson wrote long ago, “An elective despotism was not what we fought for,” in our War of Independence. The words of a Senator who served in this body during World War II, speaking on the impoundment issue are even more poignant today: “Then how does the Congress express itself or announce a Congressional policy? After all, we represent the people.”

If the United States is to preserve its democratic institutions, the President cannot be allowed to continue his self-appointed privilege of ignoring a mandated appropriation.

(Cons. continued on page 119)
Ike versus Congress

The first session of the 86th Congress is now nearing its end. At the beginning there was defiant talk from the jubilant Democrats of serving up to the President a batch of measures on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. But after a couple of timorous experiments, the Democrats demonstrated that they could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote in both houses to override Eisenhower on even the most minor measure.

Had the 1958 recession continued well into 1959, the story might have been different, with pressures from back home enough to sway the additional votes against the President. By spring, however, it was clear that a new boom was under way. And the President, confident that he had been right last year in fighting off massive spending, took the offensive on the budget issue. His success against the big Democratic majority has pleased him enormously and disgruntled the bulk of his opposition.

Many observers in Washington continue to consider the budget balancing or fiscal responsibility issue, as raised by Eisenhower, to be a phony. They argue, among other things, that whatever pressures there are from the voters on something vaguely called "the budget" have their origin not in federal taxes and expenditures, which have not appreciably changed for some years, but in the massive demands for greater spending by state and local governments, with many resultant tax increases at these levels.

The President has been getting some expert help from fellow Republican leaders in his running battle with the Democrats. The new House leader, Indiana's Charles Halleck, especially has been getting under Johnson's skin with his pronouncements on the White House steps following the regular Tuesday morning GOP legislative conferences with Eisenhower. Johnson growled about "partisan slogans shouted hastily into a microphone on a Tuesday morning," Halleck grinned and retorted that "it would really be quite flattering if we were able to exercise any real control over the legislative program." And GOP Chairman Morton hit another soft spot by calling the current Congress the Democratic "won't-do" Congress.

The Johnson-Rayburn strategy has always been to make a Democratic record for the country to judge. This has paid off in congressional elections. It did not in the 1956 presidential election, but no one really thought that any Democrat could defeat the incumbent Eisenhower. Now the problem is to create a record on which to elect not only another Democratic Congress but a President as well. Here the Eisenhower attack has knocked the Democrats off balance.

Senator Church of Idaho

A century and a half ago Henry Clay took his seat in the Senate though he was still several months under the constitutional age of thirty. But in recent years Senate "babies" have tended to be newspaper items rather than important members of the upper house. Rush Holt of West Virginia arrived in a blaze of publicity and waited outside for his thirtieth birthday before taking the oath. He soon departed into political oblivion. Russell Long arrived at thirty in 1948. But his record is hardly distinguished.

The current Senate baby, however, is something else again. Now in his third year in Washington, Frank F. Church will be thirty-five on July 25. He is still mistaken by visitors for a Senate page boy, and he speaks in the stilted manner of the school orator. This latter characteristic, incidentally, won him the national American Legion oratorical contest and a $4000 scholarship at Stanford University when he was a high school junior. His eighteen months of wartime experience in the infantry in India, Burma, and China delayed his law degree but did not rub the youthful appearance from his face.

Church is a Senate liberal, but not a Senate radical. His boyhood hero was Idaho's long-time lion, William E. Borah. But where Borah was an isolationist, Church is an internationalist. And where Borah often bucked his party leadership, Church is a man on whom Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson can usually count.

Two years ago Church was tapped by Johnson to put forward and argue for a compromise on the jury trial issue in the then pending civil rights bill. Earlier this year he helped put through the Johnson compromise on loosening, however slightly, the Senate's filibuster rule. In both cases he showed himself an effective middle-of-the-roader.
More and more this year Church has begun to speak up on international affairs. He has been able to do so because he was given a seat on foreign relations committee, making him the youngest and most junior senator in a long time to win such a coveted post.

Church has joined that little band of senators, including Humphrey and Gore, who pay some attention to disarmament. Young enough to be an enthusiast yet old enough in politics to be practical, he has tried to find a middle ground between Humphrey's almost all-out support of a nuclear test ban and Gore's reluctance to go further than a ban on tests in the atmosphere lest a total ban inhibit American weapons development.
"If the ultimate choice is given us of staying there on a unilateral basis, with no jurisdiction being exercised under existing international law procedures by any one of these three groups I have mentioned, or getting out, then I am for getting out. But not until then. I do not think we will ever have to get out, because I think we will be surprised by the enthusiastic response that a relieved world will give to the kind of international statesmanship I am calling upon my Government to exercise in respect to South Vietnam. I think it will be hailed around the world.

"The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have said that North Vietnam and Red China and others should leave South Vietnam alone. If we would go over there, we would find in countries in that area that the sentiment is for the United States to let South Vietnam alone. The truth is that the war there is a civil war. It is not a war between two nations. It is a war civil in nature. It is true that North Vietnam is receiving assistance, but it is true also that South Vietnam is getting aid from the United States, in the amount of over $1.5 million a day now; and since the war began in 1946, $6 billion of the taxpayers’ money have been poured into South Vietnam, not covering the cost of keeping American forces there. Much of that, I want to say, and I say it sadly, has resulted in great waste and has produced great corruption in South Vietnam.

"We are not going to end this civil war by any of the courses of action being recommended by the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon Building. We cannot win this war by the policies we are following. We can win military victories. We can bomb and kill by the thousands. We can destroy the cities of Red China and Vietnam. We can destroy the nuclear installations of Red China. But we will lose the war, for, do not forget, we are dealing with a people and a philosophy of a people to whom time does not matter. And after we win all these military victories, what are we going to do with South Vietnam and North Vietnam and Laos and Red China and the rest of the nations that will be involved, assuming for the moment that we might get into a nuclear war? We would have to police them for decades. We have neither the manpower nor the resources to rebuild that part of Asia after that type of war. We will inherit as a legacy for generations of Americans yet to come the undying hatred of the yellow man. He will hate us for hundreds of years. It will be an unending war. Let us think not in terms of the present time, but let us think in terms of the next 100 years. We have the responsibility in our time to lay out courses of action that will not produce the type of holocaust that will bring about for millions of American boys and girls the hatred of many people of the world that will be incurred if we continue to pursue our course of action in South Vietnam."

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From an address given on the floor of the U. S. Senate on February 17, 1965. Sen. Church is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Interior and Insular Affairs Committees.

"THE PENDULUM of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other. Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our business; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business. In the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has been transformed into an excess of interventionism.

"To the case against excessive American intervention in Africa and Asia, the State Department has a stock answer: The Communists will not let us quit. South Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong to overthrow the Saigon Government, then the gates are open, so the argument goes, to successful Communist subversion of all the other governments in southeast Asia.

"But the hard fact is that there are limits to what we can do in helping any government surmount a Communist uprising. If the people themselves will not support the government in power, we cannot save it. We can give arms, money, food, and supplies, but the outcome will depend, in the final analysis, upon the character of the government helped, and the extent to which the people are willing to rally behind it.

"The Saigon Government is losing its war, not for lack of equipment, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied than Saigon, but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported; it must come from within. It is nothing that we Americans can supply from our side of the Pacific. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the spoiling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese themselves can furnish the solution.

"As to the other governments in southeast Asia, they are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support, and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. The Malayans, with British help,
because of their own determined resistance to communism, successfully put down a long and bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars—even when nourished from without—can be won by sitting governments, but only in countries where shelter for the enemy is not furnished by the people themselves.

"Our reason for being in the Orient is not that of fashioning Asian governments. It is not communism, as such, which accounts for our presence in the Far East, but rather the containment of Peiping. This can be best accomplished if China is ringed with stable, independent governments, which refuse to be the pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugoslavia has proved in Europe vis-à-vis Russia, even a Communist government can play such a role.

"It would be to our national advantage to seek an international agreement for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French Indochina. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both sides, and to maintain order, while an independent and unaligned new government is formed by the Vietnamese themselves.

"The neutrality of the whole region could be guaranteed by the signatories to the international agreement. Thus, the military might of the United States would remain available as a deterrent against Chinese aggression from the north, which is—or ought to be—our governing national objective in southeast Asia anyway.

"In like manner, we may find it in our national interest to pledge our armed might behind the defense of India, Thailand, or some other non-Communist government, against any future Chinese attack, that these governments might avoid the need for developing nuclear shields of their own, while we avoid the dangers of further proliferation of nuclear arsenals. This kind of guarantee, which would be a real deterrent to Chinese military aggression, lies within our capability, and would preclude a vacuum in Asia, feared by the architects of our present policy. If this kind of defense commitment is sufficient to prevent an overt Chinese attack upon, say, India or Thailand, it might suffice for the rest of southeast Asia as well.

"To those who protest that such a policy will fail to protect against growing Chinese influence over such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam, brought on through intensified Communist subversion from within these countries, I submit that the scoreboard on our present policy of direct intervention in southeast Asia shows that we are now losing this contest. Burma and Cambodia, though both non-Communist governments, have been moving steadily closer to China. Laos is in limbo, after an American involvement, at heavy cost, in that country's internal affairs, turned sour. The war in Vietnam, despite Saigon's preponderant military advantage, is going from bad to worse.

"This somber truth is underlined in the stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon American bases in South Vietnam, and the consequent loss of more American lives. We must hope that our retaliatory bombings of military installations in North Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the strength of our will and purpose, may persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not, and never has been, a paper tiger. Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it. The military might we can bring to bear upon North Vietnam is formidable indeed, and so it would behoove the Communists to explore with us the way to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.

"As the beat of the war drums intensifies, and passions rise on both sides, I recognize that negotiation becomes more difficult. Already cries of 'appeasement' are being directed at anyone who speaks up for a negotiated settlement of this escalating war. So soon the country seems to have forgotten the wise words of John F. Kennedy, that we should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

"All of us recognize the heavy burden of decision which our President bears. And we would do well to remember that the seal of his office is an American eagle, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch represents our best hope for avoiding a widening war in Asia.

"Those who would use the arrows alone are actually calling for war. The systematic and sustained bombing of North Vietnam, unattended by any proffered recourse to the bargaining table, can only lead us into war. North Vietnam, lacking air and sea power, must answer on the ground. Her response, in the form of added military pressures against the south, Saigon can hardly be expected to withstand. As a consequence, the next step will be to send American land forces into battle, thus converting the struggle into an American war on the Asian mainland. That China will, sooner or later, enter, is no doubt.

"Let those who urge this course upon us answer for its consequences. A spreading war on the Asian mainland, pitting American troops against Asian troops, is a war we cannot finish. In the end, after a tragic trail of casualties out of all proportion to our real national interest, we will have to negotiate a settlement with the Communists, even as such a truce was finally negotiated in Korea. The question really is not whether we should negotiate, but when.

(Continued on page 119)
To those who say that we must not parley now, because we would bargain from a position of weakness, I reply that they take too restricted a view of our strategic position in southeast Asia. They look only to the plight of the war in South Vietnam, forgetting that American power in southeast Asia rests not upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon the strength of our own possession of the sea and air. Our recent retaliatory blows should make it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not quit under fire, nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist coercion. We can strike back with relative impunity, from floating bases which are beyond Communist reach, and inflict heavy punishment upon them. Ours is not a position of weakness from which to deal.

“So I would hope that the President of the United States will undertake to use, not only his arrows, but his olive branch as well. Willingness to parley is not a sign of weakness, but the symbol of strength, nor should it destroy what remains of the fighting morale of the South Vietnamese. Negotiations preceded the end of the fighting in Korea by nearly 2 years. In South Vietnam, the active bargaining for a peaceful solution could even lift morale by offering some hope to the people that there might come an end to their ordeal. Moreover, an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement would not be incompatible with the keeping of our pledge to give military aid and advice to the Saigon Government.

“It is mandatory, in these former colonial areas, that we establish foreign policy goals which are not beyond our reach; that we observe priorities which correspond with our real national interests; that we concern ourselves less with other peoples’ ideologies, and that we adopt techniques which are sensitive to, and compatible with, the prevailing sentiment of the people in each great region of the world. Measured by these criteria, we are too deeply involved in the internal affairs of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia.”
“So one wonders to what purpose our aid was directed in the first instance. To be sure, when the program was first started, it was designed to give relief to people who were the victims of war.

“There has been some success, not only in the development of a country’s resources, but in the reestablishment of their economic systems. That has happened in some instances. It has happened in Germany. What was the result? A stable currency and a country that peddles its merchandise practically all over the globe. West Germany has practically no unemployment.

“When the Chancellor of West Germany was in this country, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, or one of the distinguished members of that committee had a luncheon for him. I went to the luncheon and I asked the Chancellor about unemployment in his country. He said, ‘We could use a million extra people right now.’

“So that country has done it. It has followed a pattern tested by time and found not to be wanting.

“Are we to be in the fix of the ancient Greek runner, who collapsed when his goal was in sight, finally bit on his wrist, sucked his blood, won the race, but fell exhausted and died at the end? Does that have to be the end of a program of this kind, after all the good will we have invested, together with our funds? Must that be the reward for our country?”

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, Democrat

From the debate of July 27, 1966, on the floor of the U. S. Senate during consideration of amendments seeking to curtail authorization levels in S. 3583, the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966. Sen. Church is a member of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Interior & Insular Affairs.

“THE PENDING amendment would reduce the authorization for military assistance for fiscal 1967 by $100 million, leaving with the administrators of the program all decisions as to where the reductions should be made.

“In passing judgment on the proposed amendment, the Senate should be completely clear as to what is, and what is not, involved in this authorization bill.

“Vietnam is not involved in any way. The bill is in addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized.

(Continued on page 218)
PRO

A. Should A Vacancy In The
By Presidential Nomination

by HON. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Former President of the United States

From a letter written by Mr. Eisenhower on March 5, 1964, to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

"I SUGGEST that at any time a Vice President succeeds to the Presidency he should immediately nominate another individual as Vice President to fill the vacancy, with the nomination to be approved, preferably, by both bodies of the Congress rather than merely by the Senate.

"Should such an event occur during recess of Congress, I believe that a special session should be promptly called so that there could be no question that public opinion, as represented by the Congress, would approve of the new President's nominee.

"There, of course, arises the bothersome possibility that some type of disaster might remove the President and the Vice President simultaneously. I believe that to cover this contingency we should return to the provisions of the law that governed succession before 1947, but with the proviso that if both President and Vice President should be lost their successor should be considered only as an 'Acting President' and the Congress should provide for another election of a President and a Vice President to serve out the Presidential term then current.

"I believe that these changes should be accomplished by Constitutional Amendment."

by HON. FRANK CHURCH
United States Senator, Idaho, D.

From an address on the floor of the U. S. Senate on January 22, 1964. (See also page 157.)

"REPAIRS to our constitutional roof are rarely undertaken when the Republic enjoys unobstructed sunshine; it is likely that they will be made, if at all, at a time, like the present, when recent crisis has dramatized the need.

"It is significant, however, that a constitutional procedure to insure that the office of Vice President would be promptly filled, when vacant for any reason, would render moot most of the argument about statutory succession to the office of President. For the need would arise only in the unlikely event, against which careful precautions are taken, that both the President and the Vice President should perish or suffer disability at the same time.

"Something akin to the constitutional role which the House of Representatives plays in relation to the Presidency might be made applicable to the Vice Presidency for the special purpose which here concerns us. Only the House can elect a President if no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the electoral college. Accordingly, the amendment I am proposing would leave the final selection of a Vice President chosen to fill a vacancy in that office to the House of Representatives.

"Here is a procedure which conforms as closely as possible to the existing practice under the Constitution. It provides the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives with a role in the selection for which each is best suited: The President exercises his responsibility in such a way as to insure that the new Vice President will be acceptable to him—reflecting the actuality of his present nominating procedures at party conventions—and that continuity of party and policy can be maintained; the Senate scrutinizes the qualifications of each nominee; free from the pressures to which a President may sometimes be subjected, to insure that each is fully qualified for the second highest office in the Nation; the House, most representative of the people, makes the final choice of the candidate it believes to be best endowed with the qualities of leadership and popularity without which no President can realize the full potential of the office."

by HON. BIRCH BAYH
United States Senator, Indiana, D.

From a statement of January 22, 1964, opening hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. (See also page 153.)

"I BELIEVE strongly that we can provide a Vice President for the Nation by the relatively simple means of having a President nominate an individual for a Vice President, when the Vice Presidency is vacant. Then the Congress should act on the President's recommendation by electing or rejecting the nominee.

"The President must have a voice in the selection of a Vice President. It would assure the selection of a man—(Continued on page 150)
Vietnam

DISENGAGEMENT NOW

By FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, United States Senator from Idaho, Member of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Delivered in the United States Senate, Washington, D. C., October 8, 1969

In the second year of the American Revolution the great William Pitt rose in the House of Lords and spoke words which, in a less civilized nation, might have been taken for treason. "My lords," he declared, "you cannot conquer America... You may swell every expense and every effort still more extravagantly; pile and accumulate every French Revolution of the shambles... your efforts are forever vain and impotent, doubly so from this mercenary aid on which you rely, for it irritates, to an incurable resentment, the minds of your enemies... If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms-never-never-never!"

The England to which Pitt counseled was not a decrepit nation but a rising empire still approaching the peak of its power. The inglorious end of the American war, from the British point of view, was not followed by a worldwide loss of confidence in Britain's word or Britain's power. Yorktown was followed by Waterloo and in the nineteenth century Great Britain acquired vast new domains, becoming the vital center of world commerce and industry. The real loser of the American Revolutionary War was America's ally, France, whose prodigious waste of resources—all for the sake of humbling England—almost certainly helped bring about the French Revolution of 1789. To compound the irony, when the British Empire finally did disintegrate, it was not in the wake of defeat but of British "victories" in the two World Wars.

The paradox burns back upon us full circle. The victory denied George III by ragtag American rebels fighting to end foreign rule, has now, nearly two centuries later, been denied to us in distant Vietnam by stubborn, native guerrilla fighters equally determined to drive the foreigner from their land.

Faced with their implacable resolve, what kind of "victory" can be won? The "victory" of holding a proud people hostage? The "victory" of inflicting a "favorable kill ratio" upon an enemy who will not quit? The "victory" of maintaining a puppet government in Saigon propped up by the money we lavish on it, and sustained in the field by the troops we send—and others we hire—to fight for it? No, there is no "victory" we can win in Vietnam worthy of the name. President Nixon himself concedes as much when he says: "We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield."

In fact, our favored euphemism regarding Vietnam is not "victory at all but an "honorable settlement," a term allowing of almost unlimited possibilities of interpretation. In the present circumstances, however, its meaning seems clear enough. On the one hand, we have been unable to suppress the rebellion; on the other hand, we do not wish to acknowledge that fact. We do not wish to acknowledge it to the communists, for fear their appetite for conquest will be whetted. We do not wish to acknowledge it to our allies, for fear their confidence in our power will be diminished. And most of all, we do not wish to acknowledge it to ourselves, for fear that our own, surprisingly fragile confidence in ourselves will be undermined. And so we seek an "honorable settlement," an agreement under which no one will say what everyone knows: that the United States of America has made a bad mistake and finds it necessary to liquidate that mistake.

The time has come for the pretense to end; for the prideful nonsense to stop about securing an "honorable settlement" and avoiding a "disguised defeat." The truth is that as long as our troops stay in South Vietnam, we shall occupy a hostile country. There is no way that the United States, as a foreign power and a Western one at that, can win a civil war among the Vietnamese. Even now, five years after we entered the conflict, it remains a struggle between rival factions of Vietnamese for control of the government in Saigon. The outcome rests, now as before, on the Vietnamese themselves.

1November 20, 1777.

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If we can find the resolution to end our protracted involvement in this war, we shall suffer no lasting injury to our power or prestige. I do not think that the liquidation of our intervention in Vietnam will mean the loss of our global greatness, any more than the loss of the American colonies cost England her greatness in the eighteenth century, or any more than the loss of Algeria and Indochina cost France her national stature. On the contrary, the end of empire was not a defeat for France but a liberation, in the wake of which a demoralized nation recovered its good name in the world and its own self-esteem. The termination of our war in Vietnam would represent a similar liberation for America, and even a victory of sorts—a victory of principle over pride and of intelligent self-interest over messianic delusion.

The United States Government is not a charity-dispensing institution; its primary obligation is not to the Saigon generals, or to some portion of the Vietnamese people, but to the American people, to their security and well-being. When all is said and done about our "honor" and "commitment," the fact remains that our presence in Vietnam can be justified—if it can be justified—in terms of American interests, correctly defined as the freedom and safety of the American people.

Before anyone can prescribe an American course-of-action for Vietnam, it is necessary to be absolutely explicit about what our interests are in that benighted country and what they are not. I do not agree with President Nixon that, having crossed the bridge of intervention, it is useless to belabor the original issue—as if the presence of half a million American troops and the loss of nearly 40,000 American lives represented an investment that had to be redeemed by sacrificing still more lives, regardless of the wisdom of our continued presence there. It is quite essential that we reexamine the decisions of preceding Administrations, not for the sake of political retribution, or even for the sake of history, but for the express purpose of identifying our interests. Why we intervened in Vietnam in the first place has everything to do with whether and how we should get out.

"A great nation," the President says, "cannot renounce on its pledges." What pledges, indeed, have we failed to keep? The amount of money, weapons, ammunition, food, equipment and supplies we have funneled into South Vietnam is beyond belief, vastly exceeding the outside help given North Vietnam and the Vietcong by all the communist governments combined. To fight for the South, we have sent an American expeditionary force of half a million men; no Russians or Chinese have been imported to fight for the North. Hanoi and the Vietcong do their own fighting. I say that Saigon—with larger and better-armed forces in the field than any arrayed against it—must stop relying on us to fight its war. We have kept our pledges, and done far more besides. We didn't undertake to make South Vietnam the 51st American State; we didn't promise to stand guard over the 17th parallel as though it were an American frontier.

But, the President argues, if we were to allow the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to prevail, "the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability." Here Mr. Nixon espouses Mr. Rusk's concept of an exemplary war, which presumably demonstrates to other countries that the United States stands willing to intervene wherever necessary, in order to put down threats of internal communist subversion as well as external communist aggression. Yet the President himself has now announced to the world that the United States has a new policy: in the future, Asian governments must defend themselves against subversion from within, and not look our way again. The motto, "No more Vietnams" cannot be reconciled with the fiction that we are still fighting an exemplary war in that country.

Withdrawing from Vietnam, according to President Nixon, "would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later." The assertion that by fighting in Vietnam we prevent other wars is pure speculation, rooted not in evidence but in analogy, the analogy of the thirties when appeasement whetted Nazi Germany's appetite for aggression.

No good historian will buy that analogy. History unfolds more in paradoxes than in parallels. Mark Twain once observed that "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again—and that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one anymore." In the case of Vietnam we would do well to settle for the wisdom that is in it and stop the sacrifice of real American lives for the sake of saving hypothetical ones in some conjectural war in an unforeseeable future.

We dare not, says the President, abandon the South Vietnamese to "a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life." Here again we are dealing with something that might happen; in the meantime does no one who values human life feel "shock and dismay" by the senseless sacrifice of American lives in endless assaults on useless hilltops and by death tolls of hundreds of GI's every week? Surely there is another way to protect those South Vietnamese who may feel the need for sanctuary, if it comes to that. Better that we open our own gates to them, than keep on sending Americans to die for them in their own land. As for the Saigon generals, there should be ample facilities for them on the French Riviera.

What indeed does Vietnam have to do with the vital interests of the United States, which is to say, with the freedom and safety of the American people? I attempted to define those interests four years ago shortly after our full-scale intervention in Vietnam began. As to freedom, I said:

"Freedom, as a matter of fact, is not really at issue in South Vietnam, unless we so degrade freedom as to confuse it with the mere absence of communism. Two dictatorial regimes, one sitting in Hanoi, the other in Saigon, struggle for control of the country. Whichever prevails the outcome is not going to settle the fate of communism in the world at large, nor the problem of guerrilla wars. They did not begin in Vietnam and will not end there. They will continue to erupt in scattered, far-flung places around the globe, wherever adverse conditions within a country permit Communist subversion to take root."

And as to the safety of the American people, I added:

"Nor can it be soundly contended that the security of the United States requires a military decision in South Vietnam. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored there. Saigon does not stand guard over Seattle. We conquered the Pacific Ocean in the Second World War. It is our most, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very shores of China. There is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific; there is no need for us to retain a military base on the mainland of Asia."

After four years of futile warfare, I see no reason to alter that evaluation of American interests. The plain fact is that we

2 Address of May 15, 1969.
3 Address of May 15, 1969.
4 Ibid.
5 Pudd'nhead Wilson: Pudd'nhead Wilson's Calendar, ch. 11.
did not then, and do not now, have a vital interest in the preservation of the Thieu-Ky government, or even in the preservation of a noncommunist government, in South Vietnam. Nor do we have a vital interest in whether the two Vietnam are united or divided. We have preferences, to be sure, and our pride is at stake after committing ourselves so deeply, but preference and pride are sentiments not interests. From the standpoint of our interests, we have been fighting an unnecessary war for five long years, making it possibly the most disastrous mistake in the history of American foreign policy. It can never be vindicated; it can only be liquidated.

The war in Vietnam has been more than unnecessary; it has been unsuccessful as well, and that, in the hard world of politics, is usually the greater crime. The Dominican intervention was unnecessary, illegal, and destructive of our relations with Latin America, but it achieved its immediate objective, the suppression of a revolution, with the result that the issue has not remained to plague and divide us. Had Mr. Rostow and his colleagues been right in 1965 in their supposition that the war in Vietnam could be won with "surgical" air strikes and a few months of ground warfare, the question of the war's necessity would not be the lacerating issue that it is today. But the Vietnamese strategists were neither wise nor prescient nor lucky. With disastrous insensitivity to the thought processes of an alien culture, and with contemptuous disregard of the warnings offered by some of us in the Senate, they applied their "scientific" theories of warfare in the apparent belief that the Vietnamese would respond to "graduated" degrees of punishment as they themselves would have responded—by weighing immediate costs against prospective gains. But the Vietnamese turned out not to be scientists. They reacted irrationally and unaccountably by refusing to give up. Their calculations of cost and gain turned out to be different from ours; their willingness to endure punishment turned out to be greater than we had thought possible.

Our strategy in Vietnam has failed but neither the Johnson Administration nor—thus far—the Nixon Administration has been willing to acknowledge that failure. In lieu of the tortured rationalizations of the previous Administration, President Nixon experiments with a cautious troop withdrawal tied to the tenuous hope of a growing South Vietnamese military capacity. In their Midway communiqué Mr. Nixon and Mr. Thieu rejoiced in hamlet elections, in "the failure of the other side to achieve its objectives," and in the new-found resourcefulness; the Vietcong have demonstrated that. What is lacking is the ability of the Saigon government to inspire the Saigon army, while Mr. Thieu himself recited near-traitors, provisioners of "aid and comfort to the enemy." He is a technical architect of failure, is not in Vietnam but in America where the architects of failure, is not in Vietnam but in America where one strongly suspects that what we are searching for scapegoats. In much the same way that the German General Staff—which had actually initiated Germany's surrender in World War I—later perpetuated the myth of defeat by betrayal on the home front, the men who led us into the Vietnam quagmire have sought to place the blame for the catastrophe on their domestic critics, on those of us who said that we never should have entered the quagmire in the first place and who now insist that we ought to get out. The "real battlefield," according to this self-serving doctrine of the architects of failure, is not in Vietnam but in America, where, if only the critics would be silent, the will of the enemy would supposedly be broken. In its crude form as a spurious, jingoist "patriotism," the argument runs that the war critics are near-traitors, provisioners of "aid and comfort to the enemy." In the scarcely more august language of our last two Presidents, the critics are "subversive ninnies" and "neoisolationists"—derivatives of patriotism, as Mr. Nixon put it, a "backward fetish." 7

The critics are also credited with the failure to make progress in over a year of negotiations at Paris. With a cold eye fixed on the agitated state of American opinion, so the argument runs, the enemy is emboldened to resist our "reasonable" proposals. "It's awfully hard to play chess with twenty kibitzers at your elbow," Mr. Kissinger complains, "all of them demanding explanations of the purpose of every move, while your opponent listens." 8

The "kibitzers" who are such an inconvenience to Mr. Kissinger are the very dissenters whose protest finally persuaded President Johnson to stop the escalation of the war and go to the conference table. Had these critics remained silent as the war makers would have had them do, the limited war in Vietnam might by now have escalated into a full-scale war with China. Whatever hope of peace there now is, it is the "kibitzers" gift to the architects of failure. Long may they "kibitz," acting, let it be remembered, on their own concept of patriotism—which is not the patriotism of silent acquiescence in a policy they detest, but the patriotism of Camus, who would have us love our country for what it ought to be, and of Carl Schurz, that "mugwump" dissenter from McKinley imperialism, who proclaimed: "Our country, right or wrong. Whenever right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right." 9

For all the misjudgment of generals and policy makers—and for all the allegedly disruptive dissent at home—the root cause of failure lies not with ourselves but with our Vietnamese allies. Had an honest and patriotic government ruled in Saigon, it would probably have beaten the Vietcong long ago, with no more than material support from the United States. The Vietnamese people are not lacking in military courage and resourcefulness; the Vietcong have demonstrated that. What is lacking is the ability of the Saigon government to inspire the Saigon army, while Mr. Thieu himself recited near-traitors, provisioners of "aid and comfort to the enemy." There is little mystery as to why this ability is lacking. An American study team made up primarily of prominent churchmen recently reported, after a trip to Vietnam, that the Thieu government ruled by terror, using torture and brutality to suppress political opposition, and that the regime relied "more upon police state tactics and American support to stay in power than upon true representation and popular support." 10

Of all the misrepresentations which have been perpetrated about Vietnam none has been more insulting to the intelligence and offensive to the moral sensibilities of young Americans than the portrayal of the Saigon regime as an upholder of freedom and democracy.

Mr. Clark Clifford, our last Secretary of Defense, who found the courage to tell President Johnson the truth about Vietnam, had this to say of the Saigon generals:

"There is complete callousness about the cost of the war to us. They have no concern over the loss of our men or treasure. They see us as a big, rich country, well able to afford it. They are going one way and we are going another. I see no likelihood of our goals getting closer together. But

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7 Speech at the Air Force Academy, June 4, 1969.
9 The Washington Post, June 11, 1969
they have become so adroit at saying what the American public wants to hear... They are sweet talking us...

What’s more, I would add, they are exercising a veto over American policy in Vietnam. At his latest press conference, Pres. Nixon reiterated that we were willing to negotiate on anything, except "the right of the people of South Vietnam to choose their own leaders." Then, calling for "international supervision elections," Nixon said, "we will accept the result of those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Communist government..."

Mr. Nixon may think so, but not Mr. Thieu. His immediate rebuttal was plain enough. The Saigon Government, he said, had no intention of accepting a "coalition with the Communists" or "domination by the Communists" under any circumstances whatever. This is hardly surprising, since Mr. Thieu has consistently defied American policy. No sooner had he returned to Saigon from his love-feast with President Nixon at Midway last June, than he proclaimed: "I solemnly declare that there will be no coalition government, no peace cabinet, no transitional government, not even reconciliatory government." 10

In neither instance, did any disavowal issue from the White House. President Nixon, like his predecessor before him, appears to be manacled to the Saigon generals. Lyndon Johnson flew five times to Mid-Pacific rendezvous with these same men. Now President Nixon has followed in that beaten path and emerged, like Mr. Johnson, with the same pretensions of harmony. Lacking either the willingness to depend on their own army or the support of their own people, the Saigon generals have held an ace-in-the-hole which has kept them in power and in command of events: their influence amounting to a veto over America’s war policy. Had they anything like the same influence in Vietnam that they have had in Washington, Thieu and Ky would have overpowered the Vietcong long ago.

Well, we have an ace-in-the-hole too: the fact that this war is not now and never was essential to our interests, which is to say, to the freedom and safety of the American people. Pride has cheated us of the power deriving from our own interests, because, in order to gain access to that power, we would have to admit error. That same pride has been Saigon’s lever over America’s war policy: they survive on it, while Americans die for it.

Sooner or later, Vietnam will revert to the control of the Vietnamese. Whether on the basis of a negotiated peace or an negotiated withdrawal, American forces will eventually have to be removed from Vietnam. When that happens, if not before, the Vietnamese civil war will be settled—as it should and would have been settled long ago but for American intervention—by the interplay of indigenous forces within Vietnam. If a formal settlement comports with the indigenous balance of forces, whatever it may be, the settlement will be a lasting one. If it does not, it will be overthrown.

There are—as we have learned and should have known without this trial by fire—limits to the ability of an alien power to work its will in a hostile environment. Our own Civil War provides an example: after four years of savage warfare and eleven years of military occupation, the Union finally withdrew from the South, allowing that region to revert to the political domination of the same people who had dominated the secessionist Confederacy. Another example is provided by the Boer War, Britain’s turn-of-the-century “Vietnam.” After more than two years of frustrating warfare against a guerrilla force of provincial rebels—in the course of which the mighty British Empire became an object of universal scorn and detestation—the British finally beat the Boers, organized the Union of South Africa and then, perforce, turned the political control of the country back to the defeated Boers, who have dominated South Africa ever since.

The common factor in the American Civil War, the Boer War and the Vietnam War is that each confronted a dominant alien power with an intolerable dilemma: it could impose its will only by the sustained application of overwhelming force, the alternative was to withdraw that force, leaving the indigenous factions to strike their own natural balance more or less as they would have if the alien power had not intervened in the first place. In the one instance “victory” becomes insupportable, in the other meaningless.

Weighing this dilemma along with the other main considerations I have set forth—that this war is a failure and was never in our interests to begin with—what is to be inferred for a strategy of peace?

The point of departure is the clear, candid acknowledgement of our own lack of vital interest in the internal regimes of the two Vietnams. This means that we must break through the pride barrier which has thus far deterred us from admitting that, from the standpoint of our own interests, this war is and always has been a mistake. The purpose of this admission is not flagellation but freedom—the freedom of action which will only be ours when we end our thralldom to the Saigon generals and begin to act in our own interests and no longer on the basis of theirs.

In recent weeks, there has been increasing talk of changing the military mix in Vietnam by replacing American ground troops with Vietnamese, while retaining American supply and support troops in their combat role. This is not a formula for extricating the United States from Vietnam; it is, rather, a formula for keeping up to 300,000 American troops engaged in Vietnam indefinitely. Its purpose is not to get out, but to stay in.

The imperative is that we get out. This does not mean, of course, that the South Vietnamese Government would have to follow suit, or that it would be helpless in the face of its enemies. It would still have 1,500,000 men under arms as against 135,000 Vietcong and 90,000 North Vietnamese soldiers now in South Vietnam. If the ARVN could be inspired to defend the Saigon government, it would survive; if it could not be so inspired, then the government does not deserve to survive. In any case, we have done enough. We have fought their war for five long years and sacrificed almost 40,000 American lives. It is enough.

The process of disengagement need not be a long, protracted one. We can initiate it immediately by starting to withdraw forces on a significant scale—not the token scale initiated by the Nixon Administration. At the present rate of withdrawal, American troops will be engaged in Vietnam for the next 8 to 10 years!

Nearly everyone now recognizes that our intervention in Vietnam was in error. Two years ago, our political skies were still filled with hawks; today, scarcely a hawk can be seen on the wing. President Nixon himself, once a ferocious hawk, may not openly admit, but he implicitly acknowledges, that this country has no vital interest at stake in Vietnam. Otherwise, we couldn’t possibly leave the outcome for others to decide, even in a free election.

But we have our own hang-ups: twenty years of obsession with communism—deeply ingrained in the wormwood of our politics. Mr. Nixon keeps searching for a settlement that will be popular, or at least welcome, here at home. He keeps pushing for an American-style election in Vietnam, presented...
over by a special electoral commission composed of all factions, and internationally supervised, and then wonders aloud why so "generous" a proposal should fall on such deaf ears. For an answer, we might ask ourselves how, during our own Civil War, the Union Government would have responded to a British or French proposal for an internationally supervised plebiscite on Southern secession!

A policy wrong from the start can’t be made to come out right. Our country is accustomed to imposing unconditional surrender on its enemies; there can be no compromise settlement of the war in Vietnam which will be applauded by the American people. Nor can there be any settlement worthy of reliance, regardless of its terms, for once we have left, no force remains to keep it.

Still, Mr. Nixon stalls for time, trying to pry loose a settlement with modest troop withdrawals. He talks of bringing pressure on Hanoi. But you cannot bring pressure on an enemy by starting to leave! His real purpose is to bring pressure on Saigon to dignify our exit by accepting a transitional arrangement that will make it seem to the American people that the war has not been entirely pointless, that all the sacrifice has not been in vain.

So we wait, month after month, for some miracle to occur in Saigon or Hanoi that will bring the moribund peace talks back to life. We hint to Hanoi that progress at the conference table, or a wind-down of the war, will mean faster withdrawal of American troops, while we tell Saigon that the pace will depend on the demonstrated ability of its forces to replace our own. In the resultant muddle, all we have succeeded in doing is to place the time-table out of our hands into theirs. I say American policy must wait no longer upon the pleasure of either Saigon or Hanoi. It is time to come home!

For our own part, we have neither the need nor the right to sacrifice a single American life for any objective exceeding our own vital interest, which is the preservation of the freedom and safety of the American people. If this be thought ungenerous or unaltruistic, I put it to you that no nation has the moral right to be generous or altruistic with the lives of its own citizens. Perhaps a totalitarian nation, conceiving itself a spiritual entity transcending its individual citizens, may claim that right. A democratic nation cannot: its very existence is for the purpose of protecting and serving its citizens.

That is why it has become so necessary to disengage from Vietnam, leaving it to the indigenous forces in that tortured land to vote, negotiate or fight their civil war through to the conclusion which, but for our intervention, would long ago have been reached.

We must get out of Vietnam because a process of deterioration has begun in our society which cannot be arrested, much less reversed, until we do get out. Dividing the American people as no issue since the Civil War: has divided them, the war in Vietnam has been the cause and catalyst of great domestic ferment in the United States. The crisis it has directly caused is a moral one: the deep offense done to so many Americans by the blatant incompatibility of this war with the traditional values of our society. At the same time, by diverting financial and political resources, and by dividing and demoralizing the American people, the war has incapacitated us for effective action in respect to the worsening crises of race and poverty, crime and urban deterioration, pollution and ecological decay.

None of this has to do with simple war-weariness, or, as President Nixon seems to think, with weariness "of the weight of free world leadership that fell upon us in the wake of World War II." Something more fundamental than fatigue is involved. Twenty-five years ago the American people were simultaneously fighting two great wars on a vastly greater scale and at an even larger cost than the war in Vietnam, and their spirit never flagged. It is not just the burden of leadership or the exertions of warfare that outrage so many of our citizens, but this war, with its blood-soaked strategy of attrition, its unsavory alliance, and its objectives both irrelevant to our interests and offensive to our principles. Nor is "weariness" in any way descriptive of what the war critics are experiencing: they are not tired but angry—angry about the needless killing and the stubborn pride which has kept us from putting a stop to it.

I recently received a letter from a young man who is deeply troubled by these matters. With your indulgence I will read a portion of my reply:

"The deep disillusionment of young people in their country has its roots in the Vietnam war. When the power of the state is used to force young men to fight a war they believe to be wrong, under penalty of imprisonment if they refuse, the seeds of sedition are sown. We now reap the bitter harvest, manifested in angry uprisings on campuses from coast to coast . . .

"Whenever the limb is shaken, all the leaves tremble. Once the moral authority of the government is rejected, on an issue so fundamental as a wrongfull war, every lesser institution of authority is placed in jeopardy. Every sacred principle, every traditional value, every settled policy becomes a target for ridicule or repudiation. Cauldrons of anarchy soon begin to bubble and boil. "So it has happened that our country is coming unstuck. The ferment distorts every issue: perspective is lost . . . "I am convinced we must end the war— or at least our participation in it—before we can begin to stick this country back together again. Then we must have the help of men like you, men who haven’t abandoned all faith, and who regard the job as worth doing."

Even now there is one thing in which we can take hope, and that is the great force of our American moral traditions. Out of all the dissent and disruption we have learned something about ourselves—that we still believe in our own values, that Jefferson’s idea of liberty and Lincoln’s idea of equality and Woodrow Wilson’s idea of a world community of law are still capable of moving us and guiding our behavior. We have learned, to be sure, that we are capable of violating our traditional values, but we have also learned that we are not capable of violating them easily, or permanently, or indeed without setting in motion the regenerative forces of protest and moral reaffirmation.

There will be time enough, when peace is restored, to contemplate the "lessons of Vietnam." Perhaps, if peace comes in the way that I believe it must come, some of our recent and present leaders will take it as the war’s "lesson" that America has shown itself unworthy of world leadership. Others will conclude that we must develop more sophisticated techniques of intervention, or that we must improve our "social science," or substitute political and economic for military means of intervention. Still others, at the opposite extreme, will probably judge that we must never again involve ourselves in war on a distant continent. All of these propositions, and variations upon them, will undoubtedly be put forth as the "lessons" of Vietnam, but my own hunch is that none of these will stand as a definitive "lesson" or as a reliable guideline for the future.

It may be that there is no lesson in Vietnam other than the modest one suggested by Jim Thomson of Harvard: "never
again to take on the job of trying to defeat a nationalist anticolonial movement under indigenous communist control in  


Crime Legislation

WHAT HAPPENED CONGRESS?

By HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL, Attorney General of the United States


It is a pleasure to address the more than 400 newspaper executives and guests of the Annual United Press International Editors and Publishers Conference.

As you probably know, my introduction to the world of the press was rather unusual. For many years, I maintained a quiet practice as a Wall Street lawyer. Then suddenly, I became a Presidential campaign manager and found myself surrounded by reporters persistently probing and analyzing every aspect of the campaign.

I soon discovered that my ideas of the press were the victim of the generation gap and that the days of the "Front Page" were over. My experience in the campaign, and later in the Cabinet, has impressed me with the new generation of reporter—well-educated, sophisticated about the working of government and particularly knowledgeable about economic and social philosophy.

For example, the UPI reporter at the Department of Justice, Mrs. Isabelle Hall, probably knows more about the activities of our Antitrust Division than I do. She has surprised me by quoting all of the latest statistics on economic concentration and by digesting the most complicated theories about conglomerate mergers.

The late A. J. Liebling wrote about the press as the "sleaz under the bedspring of democracy." By that, he meant to say, I believe, that without our kind of press—knowledgeable, independent and at times querulous—our experiment in representative government might fail.

Of course, the classic function of the press has been to report what happens. But I also favor one new journalistic trend which is to devote increasing in-depth coverage as to why an event happens or doesn't happen. For it is here, in this process of extended news analysis, that the press tends to measure governmental action against certain acceptable moral standards of behavior.

In the old days of journalism, government was simple and the ethical standards for governmental action were also simple. The breaking point tended to be the commission of a crime as in the Teapot Dome scandal.

But government is a great deal more complex now than in the days of President Harding and ethical standards have become more refined.

Today, government officials on the highest level are likely to ask—not whether a certain decision is politically or legally feasible—but whether it conforms to the morality of national leadership. This is particularly true in our Administration because we are extremely sensitive to the great divisions in our society and to the necessity to heal these wounds as quickly as possible.

In examining the changing standards of the press and the former French Indochina: Or the equally modest lesson: that we have got for a time—not necessarily forever—to tend to neglected matters at home. Or perhaps we will have learned nothing more than that we are a people with a moral tradition, a people who discriminate among their wars and who do not easily act against their own traditional values.
Two Sentinels Of The Status Quo

U.S. & U.S.S.R.

By FRANK CHURCH, United States Senator from Idaho, Member of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Delivered on the Senate Floor, July 11, 1969

FOR ALL THEIR IMMENSE physical power, the two dominant nations in the world—the United States and the Soviet Union—suffer from a neurotic sense of insecurity, although neither regards itself as being in imminent danger of attack by the other. At tremendous cost, their nuclear armories keep them at bay and, even if each were foolishly to add a new inventory of ABM missiles to the awesome stockpile, the delicate equilibrium will hold, leaving the two rivals in a state of chronic but only low-grade anxiety over the danger of attack by the other. It is a costly and desperately dangerous way of keeping the peace, but it is all we have shown ourselves capable of thus far.

The immediate threat that each superpower perceives from the other is its ideological impact on third countries, most particularly those that it regards as its protective buffers. It is one of the supposed realities of international politics—a kind of higher law transcending such legal documents as the United Nations Charter—that great powers are allowed to have spheres of influence made up of "friendly" neighbors. In the case of maritime powers such as the United States, the neighborhood may extend to the fringes of distant continents; but, whether or not the buffer is contiguous, the principle is the same: In order to guard itself against even the most remote or hypothetical threat to its security, a great power is held entitled to intervene in the affairs of its small neighbors, even to the extent of making the basic decisions as to how they will organize and run their own societies.

This is where ideology comes in. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States seems to regard itself as being in danger of direct ideological subversion by the other, although there have been times—the period of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and of McCarthyism in the United States—when they did. In more recent years, the focus of great-power apprehension has been on their small-power buffers. Over these, each great power displays frenzied determination to exert ideological control. Within its sphere, the Soviet Union insists on the maintenance of Communist governments, inaccurately described, for the most part, as socialist; the United States, on the other hand, insists on the maintenance of non-Communist governments that we, for the most part, incorrectly call free.

Starting with the assumption that ideology is an instrument of foreign policy through which the rival great power will establish its political domination over others, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises, each great power seems to look upon its own buffer states as peculiarly susceptible to ideological subversion by the other great power. It is further assumed that the ultimate aim of this subversion is to isolate and undermine the great power itself; that ideology, being contagious, is singularly suited to this purpose; and that, like a disease, it must therefore be isolated and destroyed before it can spread. These assumptions lead to the conclusion that it is no more than an act of self-defense for a great power to take such measures as it judges necessary to preserve the ideological purity of its sphere of influence.

Seen in this way, the various interventions of the United States and the Soviet Union are explained not only as legitimate defensive measures but as positive services. Thus, in the case of the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, American policy makers were untroubled by the fact that the U.S. actions violated both the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States and that the revolution the U.S. suppressed was on behalf of a freely elected government that had been expelled by a coup. These were judged only superficial considerations when weighed against the need to defend America from the specter of a "second Cuba" while rescuing the Dominicans from their foolhardy flirtation with communism. Similarly, in the case of Vietnam, far from wishing to impose anything on anybody, the United States, in former Secretary of State Dean Rusk's view, seeks only to save the world from being "cut in two by Asian communism."

It remained for the Russians to devise a doctrine of ideological justification for the policy of interventionism. In a document that has come to be known as the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet government pointed out that, in invading Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and its protégés were doing no more than "discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia" and defending their own "socialist gains" against "anti-socialist forces" supported by "world imperialism" seeking to "export counter-revolution." Turn this phraseology around, substitute "anti-democratic" for "anti-socialist," "world communism" for "world imperialism," "revolution" for "counter-revolution," and the resultant rationale differs little from the official explanation of our own interventions in recent years.

Whether or not the Russians actually believed their excuse, I would not venture to guess. At any rate, I don't believe it; I believe that the Russians—even if they persuaded themselves otherwise—suppressed the liberal government of Czechoslovakia because they feared the contagion of freedom for the rest of their empire and ultimately for the Soviet Union itself. Nor do I believe that, in suppressing revolutions in Latin America and in trying to suppress revolution in Vietnam, the United States is acting legitimately in its own self-defense. There are, God knows, profound differences between the internal orders of the United States and the Soviet Union—ours is a free society and theirs is a totalitarian society whose leaders have shown themselves to be terrified of freedom—but, in their foreign policies, the two superpowers have taken on a remarkable resemblance. Concerned primarily with the preservation of their own vast hegemonies, they have become, in their respective spheres, defenders of the status quo against the pressures of revolutionary upheaval in which each perceives little but the secret hand of the other.

Suppressing revolution in its own immediate vicinity is an easy if embarrassing task for a superpower. Suppressing it on a distant continent is more difficult; and, as we have learned in Vietnam, beating down a strongly motivated, capably led and well-organized indigenous force is a virtual impossibility. Confronted with rising nationalist movements, the superpowers are easy to dislodge. 1


powers, to their own astonishment, sometimes find themselves muscle-bound. Their nuclear power, though colossal, is so colossal as to be unusable except for keeping each other terrified. But in dealing with the unruly “third world,” as Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger pointed out, “Power no longer translates automatically into influence.”

Nor, one might add, does influence translate readily into desirable or usable power. In Europe before World War One, there was a significant relationship between influence and power—and between territory and power—though perhaps even then, the correlation was less than it seemed. Yet, by conquering territory or forming alliances, a nation could hope to gain material resources and political predominance. Accordingly, the balance of power was maintained—more or less—by isolating and denying opportunities for territorial expansion to the most powerful or ambitious nation. In our own time, the balance of power is determined far more by economic and technological developments within countries than by alliances and territorial acquisition. China, for example, has gained far greater power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia.

Nonetheless, the great powers struggle to establish their influence in neutral countries. Guided by a ritualized, anachronistic, 19th Century concept of the balance of power, they seek influence for its own sake, as if it were a concrete, negotiable asset. I am thinking not only of Vietnam but of India, where we worry about Soviet economic aid, and to whom the President once even cut off food supplies because the Indian prime minister had sent birthday greetings to Ho Chi Minh. I am thinking of Laos, where we are not only fighting a proxy war against the Communist Pathet Lao but are engaged in an agitated rivalry with the French for the control of secondary education. And I am thinking of the global propaganda effort of the United States Information Agency, with its festivals and exhibits and libraries carefully pruned of books that seriously criticize America, all aimed at manufacturing a favorable image of the United States.

All this, we are told, is influence, and influence is power. But is it really power? Does it secure something valuable for either the other country or ourselves? If so, I have never heard a satisfactory explanation of what it is, and that, I strongly suspect, is because there is none. The real stake, I apprehend, is not power at all, but a shadow that calls itself power, nourishing an egotism that calls itself self-interest.

Vietnam, in this context, is a showcase of bankruptcy, a hopeless war fought for insubstantial stakes. As a war for high principle, Vietnam simply does not measure up: The Saigon government is neither a democracy warranting our support on ideological grounds nor a victim of international aggression warranting our support under the United Nations Charter. As an effort to contain Chinese power, the war in Vietnam is irrelevant as well as unsuccessful: even if a Communist Vietnam were to fall under Chinese control, as I do not think it would, the gains to China would be trivial compared with those accruing from her industrialization and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The case on which Vietnam must stand or fall—if it has not already fallen—is the theory of an exemplary war, a war fought not so much on its own intrinsic merits as to demonstrate something to the world, such as that America will always live up to its alleged commitments or that “wars of national liberation” cannot succeed. The stake, then, is ultimately a psychological one—influence conceived as power.

Knocking down the case for an exemplary war is at this point very nearly belaboring the obvious. How can we demonstrate faithfulness to our commitments by honoring dubious promises to the Saigon generals while blatantly violating our treaty commitments in the Western Hemisphere—as we have done no fewer than three times since 1954—is beyond my understanding. As to proving that wars of national liberation cannot succeed, all that we have proved in four years of bitter, inconclusive warfare is that, even with an Army of over 500,000 Americans, we cannot win a victory for an unpopular and incompetent regime against a disciplined, nationalist insurrectionary force. In the harsh but accurate summation of a British conservative who was once a supporter of the war:

Instead of the Americans impressing the world with their strength and virtue, they are making themselves hated by some for what they are doing, and despised by the remainder for not doing it more efficaciously.

At least two prominent members of the Nixon Administration have explicitly recognized the bankruptcy of our Vietnam strategy. Henry Kissinger writes:

Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is clear that it has greatly diminished American willingness to become involved in this form of warfare elsewhere. Its utility as a precedent has therefore been importantly undermined.

President Nixon’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Charles Yost, has made the point as forcefully as possible:

The most decisive lesson of Vietnam would seem to be that no matter how much force it may expend, the United States cannot ensure the security of a country whose government is unable to mobilize and maintain sufficient popular support to control domestic insurgency. . . . If indigenous dissidents, whether or not Communist, whether or not supported from outside, are able to mobilize and maintain more effective popular support than the government, they will eventually prevail.

Vietnam is only one—albeit the most striking and costly—instance of a general, if not quite invariable, American policy of opposing revolution in the developing world. In some instances, this policy has been successful, at least for the short term. With our support, repressive governments in Brazil and Greece and a conservative government in the Dominican Republic, etc., cite but a few examples, have successfully held down popular aspirations for social and economic change. Through our support of reactionary governments in Latin America and elsewhere, we are preserving order in our sphere of influence and momentarily, at least, excluding revolution. But it is order purchased at the price of aligning ourselves with corruption and reaction against aggrieved and indignant indigenous forces that by and large are more responsive to popular aspirations than those that we support.

This policy of preserving the status quo is an exceedingly short-sighted one. Sooner or later, there can be little doubt, the rising forces of popular discontent will break through the brittle lid of repression. So, at least, historical experience suggests. We did it ourselves in 1776 and much of the history of 19th Century Europe consists of the successful rebellion of nationalist movements—German, Italian, Belgian, Greek and

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4 The covert intervention against the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.


6 “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Agenda for the Nation, p. 593.

Slavic—against the powerful European order forged by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. In the 20th Century, we have seen the great European empires—British, French, and Dutch—break up in the face of nationalist rebellion in hardly a decade after World War Two.

Since then, the revolutionary tide has continued to swell across Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it seems unlikely that even the immense resources of the United States will prove sufficient to contain the tide much longer. We have all but acknowledged our failure in Vietnam. What would we do if Souvanna Phouma’s government in Laos should collapse, as it probably would if we terminated our counterinsurgency efforts and as it may, anyway? Or if a popular rebellion should break out against the military dictatorship in Brazil? Or if a Communist-Socialist government should come to power in Chile through a free election, as it could in 1970? Would we break out against the military dictatorship in Brazil? Or if a

arms, we have helped delay the collapse of regimes whose very existence is an obstacle to social and political justice. Eventually, there seems little doubt, they will collapse, the more violently and with greater upheaval for having been perpetuated beyond their natural life span.

Thus far, I have been talking of the fragility and shortsightedness of our policy of repressing revolution. Something should be said about its morals as well. “Order” and “stability” are antiseptic words; they do not tell us anything about the way human beings live or the way they die. The diplomatic historians who invoke the model of Metternich’s European order in the 19th Century usually neglect to mention that it was an order purchased at the cost of condemning millions of people to live under the tyranny of the Russian Czar, the Turkish sultan and other ignorant and reactionary monarchs. The absolute primacy of order over justice was nearly expressed by Metternich in his assertion that, “Barbarous as it is, Turkey is a necessary evil.” In a similar vein—if not, let us hope, with equal callousness—when we speak of “stability” and “order” in the developing countries, we neglect to note that in more than a few instances, the order purchased by our aid and by our arms is one that binds millions of people to live under a feudalism that fosters ignorance, hunger and disease. It means blighted lives, children with bellies bloated and brains stunted by malnutrition, their parents scavenging food in garbage heaps—a daily occurrence in the omnipresent slums of Asia and Latin America. Only the abstractions of diplomacy take form in high policy councils; to see its flesh and blood, one must go to a Brazilian slum or to a devastated village in Vietnam.

Besides being shortsighted and immoral, our policy of perpetuating the status quo has a third fatal defect—a defect that represents our best hope for formulating a new foreign policy: It goes against the American grain. That is the meaning of the dissent against Vietnam and of the deep alienation of so many of our youth. It is their belief in the values they were brought up to believe in—in the idea of their country as a model of decency and democracy—that has confounded the policy makers who only a few years ago were contending that we could fight a limited war for a decade or two without seriously disrupting the internal life of the United States. What they overlooked in their preoccupation with war games and escalation scenarios was the concern of millions of Americans not just with the cost but with the character of wars they fight and their consequent outrage against a war that—even at what the strategists would consider tolerable cost—has made a charnel house of a small and poor Asian country. In this moral sense, there is hope—hope that we will recognize at last that a foreign policy that goes against our national character is untenable.

The question to which we come is whether order, in the sense in which we now conceive it, is, indeed, a vital interest of the United States, or whether, in this revolutionary age, we can accommodate ourselves to a great deal of disorder in the world. My answer, as I am sure will be clear by now, is that we must and can learn to live with widespread revolutionary turmoil. We must because it is not within our means to stem the tide; we can because social revolution is not nearly so menacing to us as we have supposed—or at least it need not be. If we can but liberate ourselves from ideological obsession—from the automatic association of social revolution with communism and of communism with Soviet or Chinese power—we may find it possible to discriminate among disorders in the world and to evaluate them with greater objectivity, which is to say, more on the basis of their own content and less on the basis of our own fears. We should find, I think, that some revolutionary movements—including even Communist ones—will affect us little, if at all; that others may affect us adversely but not grievously; and that some may even benefit us.

All of which is to say nothing about the right of other peoples to settle their own affairs without interference by the great powers. There is, after all, no moral or legal right of a great power to impose its will on a small country, even if the latter does things that affect it adversely. Americans were justly outraged by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, not primarily because we thought the Russians could have endured Czech democratization without loss to themselves but because we thought the Czechs had a right to reform their system, whether it suited the Russians or not. Ought not the same principle apply in our relations with Latin America and, indeed, with small countries all over the world?

I believe that it should. I would go even further and suggest that we re dedicate ourselves to the Good Neighbor Policy enunciated by President Franklin Roosevelt 30 years ago. There is, of course, nothing new about the principle of nonintervention: We have been preaching it for years. What I suggest as an innovation is that we now undertake to practice it—not only when we find it perfectly consistent with what we judge to be our interests but even when it does not suit our own national preferences. I suggest, therefore, as a guiding principle of American foreign policy, that we abstain hereafter from military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries under any circumstances short of a clear and certain danger to our national security—such as that posed by Castro’s decision to make Cuba a Soviet missile base—and that we adhere to this principle whether others, including the Russians and the Chinese, do so or not.

Surely, it will be argued, we cannot be expected to refrain from interference while the Russians hold eastern Europe in thrall and the Chinese foster wars of national liberation in Asia and both seek opportunities to subvert non-Communist governments all over the world. Would this not throw open the floodgates to a torrent of revolutions leading to communism?

Setting aside for the moment the question of whether Communist rule elsewhere is invariably detrimental to the United States, experience suggests a policy of nonintervention would not throw open the floodgates to communism. Communist bids for power have failed more often than they have succeeded in countries beyond the direct reach of Soviet military power—Indonesia and Guinea, for example. Of all the scores of countries, old and new, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, only four are Communist. There is, of course, no assurance that an American policy of nonintervention would guarantee against new Communist takeovers—obviously, our abstention from Cuba in 1959 was a factor in the success of Castro’s revolution. But neither is there a guarantee that
military intervention will defeat every Communist revolution—witness Vietnam. Neither abatement nor military intervention can be counted on to immunize against communism, for the simple reason that neither is of ultimate relevance to the conditions that militate for or against revolution within a country, in the first place.

We have, in fact, had positive benefits from pursuing a policy of nonintervention. There is no country in Latin America more friendly to the United States than Mexico, which expelled American oil interests 40 years ago, while seemingly enthralled with Marxist doctrines, and which even now pursues an independent foreign policy, including the maintenance of cordial relations with Cuba. The thought presents itself that a policy of nonintervention could now serve as well to liberate us from the embrace of incompetent and reactionary regimes, which ignore popular aspirations at home out of confidence that, if trouble develops, they can summon the American Marines, while holding us in line by revolutionary and reactionary maintenance of their power. But, be that as it may, it will ultimately succeed or fail for reasons having little to do with the preferences of the superpowers.

We could probably take a leaf from the Chinese notebook in this respect. The Lin Piao doctrine of “wars of national liberation,” often mistaken as a blueprint for world conquest, is, in fact, an explicit acknowledgement of the inability of a foreign power to sustain a revolution without indigenous support. This is what Lin Piao said:

In order to make a revolution and to fight a people’s war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one’s own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one’s own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one’s own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid—even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution (i.e., China)—no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.8

One hears in this the echo of President Kennedy, speaking of South Vietnam in 1963: “In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it.” Or, as Theodore Draper summed it up, “The crisis in 1965 in South Vietnam was far more intimately related to South Vietnamese disintegration than to North Vietnamese infiltration.”9

Nationalism is not only the barrier to communism in countries that reject it; it is a modifier and neutralizer of communism in those few small countries that do possess it. As Tito has demonstrated in Europe and as Ho Chi Minh has demonstrated in Asia, a strongly nationalist regime will defend its independence regardless of common ideology; and it will do so with far greater effectiveness than a weak and unpopular regime, also regardless of ideology. It is beyond question that the Tito government has been a vastly more effective barrier to Soviet power in the Balkans than the old pre-war monarchy ever could have been; and as Edwin O. Reischauer has written:

It seems highly probable that Ho’s Communist-dominated regime, if it had been allowed by us to take over all Vietnam at the end of the war, would have moved to a position with relation to China not unlike that of Tito’s Yugoslavia toward the Soviet Union.10

If freedom is the basic human drive we believe it to be, an act of faith seems warranted—not in its universal triumph, which experience gives us no particular reason to expect, but in its survival and continuing appeal. The root fact of ideology to which we come—perhaps the only tenet that can be called a fact—is that, at some basic level of being, every man and woman alive aspires to freedom and abhors compulsion. It does not follow from this—as, in the rhetorical excess of the Cold War, it is so often said to follow—that communism is doomed to perish from the earth as a distortion of nature. That democracy, as we know it in America, is predestined to triumph everywhere. Political forms that seem to offend human nature have existed throughout history, and others that have seemed attuned to human needs have been known to perish. All that can be said with confidence is that, whatever is done to suppress them, man’s basic aspirations have a way of reasserting themselves and, insofar as our American political forms are attuned to these basic aspirations, they are a long leg ahead in the struggle for survival.

Faith in the viability of freedom will not, in itself, guarantee our national security. But it can and should help allay our extravagant fear of communism. It should enable us to compete with confidence in the market of ideas. It should free us from the fatal temptation to fight fire with fire by imitating the tactics of a rival who cannot be as sure of the viability of his ideas in an open contest. The Russians, when you come right down to it, have better reason to fear freedom in Czechoslovakia than we have to fear communism in Vietnam. Appealing as it does to basic human aspirations, the contagion of Czech liberty very likely is a threat, at least in the long run, to the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union; by no stretch of the imagination can Ho Chi Minh’s rule in Vietnam be said to pose a comparable threat to democracy in the United States.

The greatest danger to our democracy, I dare say, is not that the Communists will destroy it, but that we will betray it by the very means chosen to defend it. Foreign policy is not and cannot be permitted to become an end in itself. It is, rather, a means toward an end, which in our case is not only the safety of the United States but the preservation of her democratic values. A foreign policy of intervention must ultimately be subversive of that purpose. Requiring as it does the maintenance of a huge and costly military establishment, it must also entail the neglect of domestic needs, a burgeoning military-industrial-academic complex, chronic crises and mar­thon wars—all anathema to a democratic society. Every time we suppress a popular revolution abroad, we subvert our own democratic principles at home. In no single instance is the self-inflicted injury likely to be fatal; but with each successive occurrence, the contradiction and hypocrisy become more apparent and more of our own people become disillusioned, more become alienated or angry, while a few are simply corrupted.

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10 "What Choices Do We Have in Vietnam?" Look Magazine, September 19, 1967, p. 27.
Ralph Nader Congress Project
Citizens Look at Congress

Frank Church
Democratic Senator from Idaho

written by
Carol Payne & Margaret Carpenter
Church has taken pains to make his inquiry the most leak-proof in recent memory and has been persistently careful about making sensational charges, although he has taken an adversary role in the hearings, speaking indignantly of CIA abuses.

"If these tendencies are not checked, they could erode the whole foundation of freedom in this country," he says. "They could become a menace to the liberty of the people and lead gradually to the establishment of a police state."

To prevent future wrongdoing by the CIA, Church would like to see Congress exercise tighter control by establishing a joint committee to oversee and fund intelligence operations—a permanent committee without a permanent membership.

Although some Democrats are touting Church as a fresh personality, he has been in the Senate for 19 years. He is the only Democratic senator ever to win re-election in conservative Idaho.

One reason Church has survived is that he remembers who he is and where he is from. His staff gives prompt attention to letters and phone calls from constituents. Church has also catered to home-state sentiment by fighting gun-control laws. But Church has waffled on fewer controversial issues than the great majority of senators. It was widely predicted that his opposition to the Vietnam war would defeat him.

Church's willingness to take such chances goes back to his little-known bout with cancer when he was a law student at Stanford. Doctors told him he had six months to live. Then he learned his cancer was responsive to therapy. "When I found out I wasn't going to die, I thought I'd take all the risks in life that came my way. As a result, I was much more inclined to gamble."

After completing law school, Church returned to his home town of Boise to practice law and teach public speaking at Boise Junior College. While a high school student, he had won the American Legion's national oratorical contest. He became active in politics, serving a term as chairman of Young Democrats of Idaho and running, unsuccessfully, for the state legislature.

Then in 1956, Church, not yet 32, filed for the Senate. In the primary, he edged out former Sen. Glen Taylor, the singing cowboy who had been Henry Wallace's vice-presidential running-mate, by 170 votes. In the election, he defeated Republican Sen. Herman Welker, a McCarthyite witch hunter, by 50,000 votes.

Upon entering the Senate, Church came into conflict with then-Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. Against
Johnson's orders, Church voted to liberalize Senate rules to end a filibuster.

"He put me in the deep freeze," he recalls. "Johnson didn't speak to me for six months."

Church changed his attitude when Church succeeded in adding a jury trial amendment to a civil rights bill, which made it possible to pass the bill without a filibuster.

"There wasn't anything he wouldn't do for me after that," Church says. "He took me off the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and put me on the McClellan Rackets Committee. And, as soon as there was an opening, he put me on the Foreign Relations Committee."

Church was a hard-line cold warrior in those days. In his keynote speech at the 1960 Democratic Convention, Church advocated more missile and bigger bombs. But something happened to Church in the early 1960s. He began to question the wisdom of American intervention in Vietnam. His first speech dissenting from Johnson's war policy came in February 1965.

Called to Briefing

Shortly afterward, Church was among a group of senators invited to a White House briefing.

Johnson began his remarks by glaring at Church and snarling, "There once was a time when a senator from Idaho thought he knew more about war and peace than the President." LBJ was referring to Sen. William E. Borah, Church's boyhood hero, who after an illustrious career on the Foreign Relations Committee, made the mistake of predicting World War II would not occur just weeks before it broke out.

Church avoided a confrontation with Johnson, sensing that it would be fruitless. But Johnson backed Church into a corner to lecture him.

"He always got his head around to the point where he was nostril-to-nos­tril. I always felt this put him at a disadvantage because anyone talking to him had to figure out how to position their head."

On one point in their discussion of the war Church told Johnson, "I agree with Walter Lippmann." As Church recalls it, Johnson's response was, "Lippmann is good for this."

The next day, however, Church read newspaper reports quoting Johnson as saying, "The next time you want a dam in Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."

"It served Johnson's purpose," Church says. "He wanted to give congressmen a warning that they would understand."

Later, Johnson called Church to the White House to see the text of a speech LBJ was to deliver at John Hopkins University in which he proposed "unconditional negotiations" in Vietnam.

"McGeorge Bundy took McGovern, Gabe McGee and me up to see the President," Church recalls. "Johnson was pacing for a bust. It reminded me of all those pictures of Napoleon 3d sitting for portraits. He asked me, 'How's the dam building business going out in Idaho?' I said, 'Just fine. We're going to call the next dam we get the Walter Lippmann Dam.'"

Church says that the room became silent and Johnson's aides faces turned ashen before LBJ started laughing.

"Then Johnson said, 'I wonder who got that story started.' I told him I didn't know. And he said, 'Oh, probably some Republican.'"

Recall Campaign

Church's dovish position brought on a right-wing recall campaign in 1967. The effort was financed by California millionaire Patrick Frawley who said that big money would go further in a small state like Idaho and Church's recall would send a message to other politicians against the war.

"That comment made a lot of people in Idaho angry," Church says. "Although the state was strongly pro-war, they wouldn't buy the treason argument at all. Idaho is still close enough to "High Noon" that people rallied behind my right to speak out against the war. The recall people were only able to gather 135 signatures statewide."

A year later, Church won re-election by his largest plurality. His long opposition to the war peaked in 1970 when, with Senator John Sherman Cooper, sponsored legislation restricting American involvement in Indo­china.

The similarity between Church and the late William E. Borah is profound. Both gentlemen from Idaho were opera­tors, vigorous critics of American foreign policy and staunchly liberal on domestic issues.

"He was a very colorful man," Church says. "His role as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has been greatly misunderstood. He was against entangling treaties as George Washington was against them. He strongly believed in international law. He was the only major figure to urge recognition of the Soviet Union when it was anathema to do so. When the day came that Roosevelt recognized Russia, everyone said 'How sensible'—just like when Nixon recognized China."

May Be Chairman

It is expected that within the decade Church will be the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, replacing the aging John Sparkman of Alabama. When that occurs, former Pennsylvania Sen. Joseph H. Clark, who served with Church on the committee, says: "My own guess is that Frank will be the greatest chairman of the committee of the past half-century."

Church talks freely about the influence he would like to see the committee exert.

"I'd like to see it give a long-term direction to foreign policy. It can't make the day-to-day decisions. It can't participate in crisis management when emergencies arise. But it could lay down long-term objectives that make sense. For example, bringing an end to American military enclaves in Asia.

Church says the importance of the chairmanship depends mostly "on whether the committee takes a position in support or opposition to the President."

Yet another position for Church is frequently mentioned is that of secretary of state, should another Democrat be elected President next year. Having observed five secretaries of state at close range, Church says, "The job has its appeal. But it would depend entirely on the President's concept of the office."

In the meantime, there are more and more people who think Church may win the presidential nomination at Madison Square Garden next summer. Frank Mankiewicz, one of the architects of George McGovern's nomination, says Church could draw off most support for other liberals.

Church has done nothing to discourage speculation on his candidacy. But he is skeptical about his chances. "I couldn't go into the early primaries. I would have to wait and gather money and put together an organization. It may not be possible to enter the race at a late date. But I have no alternative but to pursue the investigation."
HAWAII

1974 primary: Spark Matsunaga (D), unopposed
1972 general: Spark Matsunaga (D) .................................. 73,826 (55%) ($127,753)
Fred W. Rohlfing (R) ................................................................ 61,138 (45%) ($179,221)

SECOND DISTRICT

Census Data Pop. 407,794. Central city, 0%; suburban, 66%. Median family income $10,848; families above $15,000: 28%; families below $3,000: 7%. Median years education, 12.2.

The Voters

Median voting age: 38.
Employment profile: White collar, 44%. Blue collar, 35%. Service, 15%. Farm, 6%.
Ethnic groups: Japanese, 25%. Chinese, 4%. Filipino, 16%. Total foreign stock, 32%.

Presidential vote

1972 Nixon (R) ...................................................................... 86,136 (63%)
McGovern (D) ...................................................................... 51,415 (37%)
1968 Nixon (R) ...................................................................... 42,770 (37%)
Humphrey (D) ...................................................................... 70,345 (61%)
Wallace (AL) ........................................................................ 1,648 (1%)


Committees

Budget (13th).
Education and Labor (9th). Subcommittees: Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education; Equal Opportunities; Select Subcommittee on Education.
Interior and Insular Affairs (7th). Subcommittees: Mines and Mining (Chairman); National Parks and Recreation, Territorial and Insular Affairs.

Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid FOR
2) Busing FOR
3) ABM FOR
4) B-1 Bomber AGN
5) Nerve Gas AGN

I D A H O

Election Results

1974 general: Patsy T. Mink (D) ........................................... 86,916 (63%) ($97,104)
Carla W. Coray (R) ................................................................ 51,894 (37%) ($34,089)
1974 primary: Patsy T. Mink (D) ........................................... 76,596 (79%)
George B. Carter (D) ......................................................... 19,998 (21%)
1972 general: Patsy T. Mink (D) ........................................... 79,856 (57%)
Diana Hansen (R) ................................................................. 60,043 (43%)

IDAHO

Back before the turn of the century, when William Jennings Bryan was urging Americans to abandon the gold standard for the unlimited coinage of silver, Idaho’s silver interests dominated the state’s politics. Although silver is still mined in places like Sunshine Mine near Kellogg, Idaho’s principal economic concern today is agriculture. Potatoes, for which Idaho is famous, are grown in the rich farmlands of the panhandle region just east of Spokane, Washington, and along the Snake River valley in the southern part of the state. Because there is so much farmland here, Idaho’s population is not concentrated in one or two large urban areas as in other Rocky Mountain and Pacific states. Idaho’s largest city Boise (pop. 74,000)—like many Western cities, a conservative stronghold. The liberal voting base, if it can be called that, lies in the northern panhandle counties. But any liberalism, at least in terms of national politics, is vastly outnumbered by the conservatism of the Snake River valley, and particularly of the large Mormon community there—the largest outside Utah.

In the recent past, Idaho politics seems to have travelled full circle—usually in just the opposite pattern of the nation as a whole. During the Eisenhower years, a public power vs. private power controversy over construction of Hell’s Canyon Dam on the Snake River redounded to the benefit of the Democrats, who took the public power side. During the late 1950s, Idaho Democrats won most of the state’s Senate and House races. In 1960 John F. Kennedy, though a Catholic and an Easterner, got 46% of the state’s votes—one of his better showings in the Mountain states. But during the sixties, the people of Idaho seemed to become increasingly upset with what they saw as a Democratic administration dominated by an alien East Coast establishment.

In 1964, a strong conservative movement—especially strong in the southern Mormon counties—resulted in 49% of the state’s vote going to Barry Goldwater. In that same year, the state’s 2d congressional district ousted its Democratic Congressman for a conservative Republican—the only district outside the South to do so in the year of the LBJ landslide. By 1968, Hubert Humphrey got only 43% of the vote here, and George McGovern did even worse four years later. Meanwhile, 13% of Idaho voters supported George Wallace in 1968, his strongest showing west of Texas; and even John Schmitz, the hapless American Party candidate in 1972, got 9% of Idaho’s votes—his best showing in the nation.

But if Idaho was shifting right in national politics in the middle sixties, it has been shifting notably to the left in local races in the early seventies. As Idahoans overwhelmingly rejected the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, they reelected liberal Democratic Senator Frank Church with a resounding 60% of the vote. In 1972, when McGovern did worse here than in all but seven other states, Democrats came within 3% of electing another Senator. In 1974, Church was again reelected comfortably, and Democratic Governor Cecil Andrus, elected in an upset in 1970, was reelected with a landslide 71% of the vote.

Andrus’s 1970 victory was one of the first signs of the burgeoning importance of environmental issues in Western electoral politics. His predecessor, crew-cut, ultraconservative Republican Don Samuelson, supported a mining company’s proposal to extract molybdenum (a metal then in excess supply) from the White Clouds area, one of the scenic wonders of the Salmon River Mountains. Andrus attacked the proposal and won enough votes to carry the panhandle easily, hold even in Boise, and carry sometimes Democratic Pocatello in the southeast—and carry the state by 10,000 votes. After four years of Andrus’s calm, conciliatory style, voters decided they wanted more, reelecting him almost unanimously, and incidentally electing Democrats to most of the statewide elective posts.

Andrus seems to have supplanted Church as the state’s most popular Democrat; indeed, for a time in the late sixties, Church was just about the only elected Idaho Democrat. He was first
IDAHO

Coeur d'Alene, and the University of Idaho in Moscow, the panhandle often produces Democratic majorities.

But in 1st district politics these days, the panhandle is often outvoted by Boise and nearby Canyon County, both heavily conservative. For Republican Steven Symms, a fruit rancher and businessman, who was only 34 when he won his first term, his performance was impressive. In 1972, he was reelected to the Senate at the age of 32 in 1956, beating a Republican candidate with personal problems. Building up a base of support, he has steadily increased his margin of victory. His campaign and reelection drives have been marked by a commitment to conservative values, and he has been able to maintain a strong base of support in the rural areas of Idaho.

When McClure went to the Senate, he left vacant the 1st congressional district, traditionally the more Democratic of the two seats. This includes the panhandle, which is connected with the rest of Idaho by just one two-lane highway and no railroads; economically and sociologically this area is part of Spokane, Washington's "Inland Empire." With a large labor vote in Lewiston and...
IDAHO

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<th>DOI</th>
<th>$51,973,000</th>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>$112,076,000</td>
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Economic Base
Agriculture, notably cattle, potatoes, dairy products and wheat; food and kindred products, especially canned, cured and frozen foods; lumber and wood products, especially general sawmills and planing mills; finance, insurance and real estate; chemicals and allied products, especially industrial chemicals; trailer coaches and other transportation equipment.

Political Line-up
Governor, Cecil D. Andrus (D); Senators, Frank Church (D) and James A. McClure (R); Representatives, 2 R State Senate (21 R and 14 D); State House (42 R and 28 D).

The Voters
Registration 440,114 Total. No party registration.
Median voting age 43.
Employment profile White collar, 43%. Blue collar, 33%. Service, 13%. Farm, 11%.
Ethnic groups Total foreign stock, 10%.

Key Votes
- 7) Filibuster
- 6) Foreign Aid
- 5) Death Penalty
- 4) F-111
- 3) No Fault
- 2) Busing
- 1) No-Knock

Group Ratings

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Key Votes
1) No-Knock
2) Busing
3) No Fault
4) F-111
5) Death Penalty
6) Foreign Aid
7) Filibuster

Election Results
1974 general: Frank Church (D) 145,140 (57%) (300,300) (127,926)
1974 primary: Frank Church (D) 53,659 (86%)
1968 general: Frank Church (D) 173,482 (60%)


Career

Offices
2106 DSOB, 202-224-2752. Also 304 N. 8th St., Rm. 434, Boise 83702, 208-343-1421.

Committees
Budget (5th).

Interior and Insular Affairs (4th). Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution; Economic Development; Water Resources; Transportation; Buildings and Grounds.

Group Ratings

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Key Votes
1) No-Knock
2) Busing
3) No Fault
4) F-111
5) Death Penalty
6) Foreign Aid
7) Filibuster

Election Results
1972 general: James A. McClure (R) 161,804 (52%) (140,913)
1972 primary: James A. McClure (R) 46,522 (36%)
1972 primary: George Hansen (R) 35,412 (27%)
1972 primary: Glen Wegner (R) 24,582 (19%)
1972 primary: Robert E. Smylie (R) 22,497 (17%)

Interior and Insular Affairs (4th). Subcommittees: Environment and Land Resources; Indian Affairs; Parks and Recreation; Special Subcommittee on Integrated Oil Operations.

Public Works (4th). Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution; Economic Development; Water Resources; Transportation; Buildings and Grounds.

Committees

Select Committee on Intelligence Operations (Chairman).
"Brezhnev-Hitler" posters, seem to realize it only too well.

All reports from Prague show that the young Russian soldiers who occupied the city are extremely perplexed by the reception they got from the Czechs. They had been told that they were sent as friends to "save their allies from counterrevolution and from a West German invasion." They will have many sad stories to tell when they go home. But in a police state like the Soviet Union—getting worse in this respect every year—revolutions do not come from below; if anything is to change for the better, it will have to come from above—from a palace revolution inside the Kremlin. The best hope, I think, is for an agonizing reappraisal by the Kremlin of the entire Czech problem. This cannot happen without the elimination of certain people. My guess is that Brezhnev will go before the end of the year. But it is, unfortunately, no more than a guess.

AN OUNCE OF LEAD

GUNNING FOR SENATOR CHURCH

MICHAEL MCCRARY

Mr. McCrary has written extensively on Idaho politics, particularly for the Boise Intermountain-Observer. He is also a correspondent for the Republican magazine, The Ripon Forum.

Boise

Probably the dirtiest political fight that will be waged in the months from the conventions to the elections will be that staged by George V. Hansen, Republican Representative from the Idaho 2nd District, to capture the seat of Democratic Sen. Frank Church.

Idaho has long been a fortress of reaction, and one of the states most isolated from the movement of the nation. After the Civil War, the then Idaho territory was settled by ex-Confederates fleeing Reconstruction in Dixie, and Idaho today is, outside the South, probably the most racist state in the nation—despite a marked absence of Negroes on whom to exercise prejudice. In addition, it is one of the last states whose economy depends almost totally on agriculture; over the years, powerful farming interests have kept a tight clasp on Idaho, shielding it from the outside world and from such things as industrialization, better wages and living conditions and urban renewal. In this climate the John Birch Society thrives; Idaho is one of the five states where Birchism is said to be the strongest. The present Republican Governor, Don Samuelson, was listed by Newsweek (January 31, 1966) as a member of the John Birch Society, when he was running for office.

Against this background, Hansen is mounting a furious campaign against Senator Church, issuing bigoted appeals to Idaho's traditional conservatism, and apparently feeling that Church's liberalism will unseat him. One issue that Hansen has raised is civil rights for minority groups. Church has been an effective supporter of civil rights legislation, and Hansen, who never voted for a civil rights bill during his four years in Congress, has been diligent to rally Idaho's racist vote.

Hansen takes to the Idaho campaign trail as a hard-line advocate of "law and order"; he has publicly called for the firm and vigorous repression of Negro demonstrations, demanded a moratorium on civil rights legislation (which he charges causes riots) and raised the implication of treason in a very wide spectrum of 'Negro' leadership, ranging from Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown to Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young and even the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Of Dr. King's assassination, Hansen observed that it was a case of "the chickens coming home to roost," and not the tragedy it was being made out to be. Hansen has also endorsed Chicago Mayor Daley's order to his police to "shoot to kill or maim" Negro looters. Recommending this as a step to be taken nationally to "end violence," Hansen concedes that it might result in a good many deaths but adds that a little killing now to end riots might prevent more killing later. This ounce of lead prevention was too much for the GOP majority leader, state Sen. William Roden of Boise, who called Hansen's statements "unfortunate," "I don't think he's ever seen a riot," Roden said.

Others in Idaho have been more favorably impressed by Hansen's statements. The Idaho branch of the American Independent Party, which is offering candidates for most state offices, has declined to run a candidate for Senator, and has instead endorsed Hansen. AIP state chairman Joseph K. Stumph, Jr., of Twin Falls, reports that Hansen's "strong conservatism" and his "law-and-order policies figured in the Party's decision to back him. Hansen has enthusiastically accepted the aid of the party which will run George Wallace for President in November. As well he might—Idaho is one Northern state where fear
of the “nigger” is so strong that in a three-way race Wallace may well carry the electoral vote.

Another area that has figured prominently in Hansen’s attack is foreign policy. Church is one of the most outspoken “doves” in the Senate, and a charter opponent of Administration policies in Vietnam. In fact, his feelings on the war are so intense that earlier in the year, before LBJ withdrew, Church indicated that he might support the Republican candidate should the GOP offer a reasonable alternative. Presenting himself as a super-hawk, Hansen deplores the “appeasement” policy of President Johnson, and ridicules the notion of peace talks. He talks of the Vietnamese conflict as part of a Moscow-based Communist conspiracy to take over the world. He wants the Administration to get tough with the Soviet Union, applying “need” to stop communism, somewhere, Hansen favors a no-holds-barred policy, saying he will not rule out either nuclear warfare or an invasion of North Vietnam and China.

Following the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hansen has further intensified his hawkishness: the Soviet action has proved to his satisfaction that communism is an evil system and can never be trusted. Following this line, Idaho Republican leaders have been quick to imply that Church’s dovishness was somehow responsible for what happened to the Czechs (though Church has issued strong condemnation of the Soviet action).

In general, the Communist label has been frequently and indiscriminately used against Church ever since Hansen became the GOP candidate. The less respectable levels of the Hansen campaign have been suggesting for some time that a vote for Hansen is a vote against communism. Or, when communism is not the issue it is often “the nigger,” although the more vociferous Hansen supporters seem often to equate “niggers” and “Communists.” Church, on the other hand, has refused to compromise his liberalism, and so far has managed to avoid mud slinging. The Church people have, in fact, almost avoided mentioning Hansen, and have conducted a low-key, bread-and-butter-issues campaign. They apparently believe that Hansen’s bluster and bigotry will carry the election for Church. At the same time, the Senator in the personal campaign have been stumping throughout the country, demonstrating his concern for his constituents’ welfare and the fact that Church will survive the Hansen flak and gain a thumping victory.

Present indications and polls suggest that, in addition to Church’s independence in two previous campaigns, and may do so again. However, the context of the contest is close and, whatever the outcome, it is apparent that Hansen’s campaign has paid off for him. He will probably emerge as titular head of the Idaho Republican Party. Should Hansen manage to get as much as 46 percent of the vote in November (and he will probably do) he may well become in 1970 his party’s candidate for governor.

The Congressional seat which Hansen is vacating this year is expected to be retained by the Republicans, and is therefore unlikely that Hansen would try to regain that seat two years hence. However, Governor Samuelson is up for renomination and re-election in 1970, andGOP stalwarts already wonder whether he can hold another term. The Governor’s bumbling style has alienated many voters. Therefore, though Samuelson is conservative enough for most GOP leaders, they may scout about for an equally conservative but more impressive candidate to oppose him in a primary, rather than wait to test his popularity in the general election.

Should Hansen lose to Church this November by a thin margin, it is expected that he will take on Samuelson in 1970, and if he does so, he will probably be the governor of Idaho (a Republican nomination is tantamount to election) in Idaho, the Democratic
Philanthropy: The Golden Crowbar

GEORGE G. KIRSTEIN

Mr. Kirstein was publisher of The Nation from 1955 to 1965. This article has been condensed from a chapter in his forthcoming book, The Rich: Are They Different?, which Houghton Mifflin will publish on October 24.

Only the rich are in the unique position of having more money than they need or can use; thus for them, and only for them, the singular question arises as to what to do with the excess. The social institution to accommodate the rich in disposing of this surplus is organized philanthropy. The enormous number of philanthropic organizations that have burgeoned in this country to support the church, the private school or college, the voluntary hospital, the library, or the museum are exactly tailored to serve as repositories for excess individual wealth. Tax laws favor gifts to philanthropy; press acclaim and public approval greet announcements of the donations. Government-licensed philanthropic institutions, those which enjoy tax exemption, supposedly assure the rich man that his money will not be wasted. Billionaire John Paul Getty’s observation is typical: “Like almost all wealthy men—certainly, all with whom I am acquainted—I make my contributions only to organized, legitimate charities. . . . This is the only way one can give money with any degree of assurance that it will be received eventually by deserving persons.” This timesaving and generally applauded approach has few critics. One of the more acid was O. Henry who wrote at the turn of the century: “How properly to alleviate the troubles of the poor is one of the greatest troubles of the rich. But one thing agreed upon by all professional philanthropists is that you must never hand over any cash to your subject. The poor are notoriously temperamental; and when they get money, they exhibit a strong tendency to spend it for stuffed olives and enlarged crayon portraits instead of giving it to the installment man.”

But both Mr. Getty and O. Henry are talking of another era, despite the fact that the oil man’s comment was made fairly recently. Today, charity, in the ancient sense of giving alms to the poor, has been taken over by the government, and all who pay taxes share the burden. Not the rich but the government declares “war on poverty”; organized philanthropy has very little to do with alleviating the miseries of the poor. This function today is the responsibility of federal, state and municipal governments that distribute funds raised by taxation to recipients entitled to aid as a matter of right under law. Today, Medicare and Medicaid laws provide payment for the indigent from federal, state and municipal funds, and for all those, indigent or not, over the age of 65. The healthy poor wend their monotonous way to the welfare office where governmental funds are doled out. Indeed the rich benefactor looking for a charitable organization which would distribute funds to those “deserving persons” mentioned by Mr. Getty would be hard pressed to find it. Today the donor who wishes to heap largess on his favorite hospital will discover that his money is required not to maintain poor patients but to refurbish outmoded buildings or construct new facilities for the installation of scientific devices. If a cure for cancer is discovered in a beautiful new research building it is obvious that poor and rich alike are benefited. If knowledge is advanced by a new library memorializing the donor in letters carved into marble, the society as a whole is enriched.

But though continuing problems of the poor have proved to be too urgent to leave to the whims of the rich, the rich still require conduits through which to siphon off their surplus wealth, and selecting the most suitable receptacle poses a problem. Julius Rosenwald, an original partner of Sears Roebuck, once declared that he found it “nearly always easier to make $1,000,000 honestly than to dispose of it wisely,” and any number of rich men have echoed his words. This type of remark may infuriate a great many people who have strived a lifetime to accumulate far less than a million dollars, but the fact remains that many rich men have pointed to their acquisition primarily as an instrument for philanthropy. Andrew Carnegie pontificated to the young graduates of a commercial college: “As an end, the acquisition of wealth is ignoble in the extreme. I assume that you save and long for wealth only as a means of enabling you the better to do some good in your day and generation.”

Giving to philanthropic institutions is invariably hailed as an act of personal generosity, especially by professional fund raisers and public relations spokesmen for the institutions that receive the gift. Listen to the speeches at the dedication of a new building on the hospital grounds or college campus, with the donor in beaming attendance as he is heaped with praise for his generous gift. But here “generous” is equated with “large” rather than with any motive of the donor. If we think of the word generosity as connoting some sacrifice on the part of the giver,
Many of the "conventions" are small, but a big one, held in a barn or warehouse, will draw as many as 500 spectators, who pay an admission charge, collected by the promoter, of between $3 and $10. A fight card for a big meet may consist of six to ten matched sets of dogs, and bouts last from twenty minutes to 2½ hours. Dog-fight fans think of themselves as good, virile Americans who believe it is natural for dogs to want to fight and "die gloriously." Women, even children, attend some of the meets. Beer is sold and occasionally whiskey, and prostitutes circulate at the big meets which, even without this added patronage, fill up the local motels. The police are paid off in advance and security arrangements are elaborate. As one would expect, gambling is heavy. Bet may run as high as $20,000 on a single match, but a few hundred dollars is nearer the average, and at small meets $5 to $10 is offered and taken.

At this stage it is impossible to say whether the spread of dogfighting evidences further deterioration of the national character or is just an offshoot of the mania for sports and gambling. Either way, it is a national disgrace and since state laws have proved inadequate, federal legislation, introduced by Rep. Peter N. Kyros of Maine and Sen. Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey, joined by Sen. Lowell P. Weicker of Connecticut and others, deserves support.

THE IDAHO YAHOO

FRANK CHURCH & THE BIRCHERS

LOCH JOHNSON

Boise, Idaho

As cars streamed into the stadium lots for the first football game of the fall season in Boise, Idaho, they were greeted by young Volunteers for Church and Andrus (Cecil Andrus is the incumbent Governor). Each volunteer carried two sets of bumper stickers: "Church for Idaho," in red, white, and blue, and "Andrus" in bold white letters against a blue background. Church is seeking a fourth term in the Senate and Andrus a second term as Governor. Both Democrats, they are doing much of their campaigning in tandem.

In the East Lot a co-ed knelt at the rear of each car, peeling the stickers and smoothing them side by side on the bumper. The few who declined the stickers did so politely, until the twentieth car. After accepting "Andrus," the driver's heavy, buckskin-clad wife stormed against Church, "How can a sweet gal like you be for Church?" she asked. "Are ya really for Church?"

"Sure, What's wrong with him?" replied the co-ed, curious but chiefly seeking diversion from the knell-peel-and-smooth routine.

"Have ya heard of the Seabed Treaty! You better look into that Church. He's just like Nelson Rockefeller. They're both out to destroy this country."

The Seabed Treaty. It is not a normal topic of conversation for Idahoans, but it does appear in a long list of charges leveled against Church in a pamphlet prepared and circulated throughout Idaho by the John Birch Society. Recently some legislators, including Church, had discussed the possibility of financing the United Nations with mineral rights from international waters. The Birchers fear this so-called Seabed Treaty proposed as a pro-Communist plot to subjugate American cheeses and fishermen to the whims of an incipient World Government. Anyone not sharing their antediluvian perspective on world affairs is an enemy, and this year they intend to do something about their enemies.

At the top of its enemies list the Birch Society placed three incumbent U.S. Senators; they are all Democrats and were all "doves" during the war in Vietnam. One is Mike Gravel of Alaska, whom the Birchers persuades for reading the Pentagon Papers on the Senate floor. Of Lewis, a member of the Birch Society national executive board, has won the "Republican" nomination for U.S. Senator in Alaska and faces Gravel in November. Another is Alan Cranston, whose record of pro-Communist activities, according to the Birchers, is "longer than an income tax form." But the prime target is Frank Church.

The Birch Society sees a rare opportunity in Idaho this year. The state's fiercely independent voters have shown signs of a pronounced shift to the right. In 1972 John Schmitt, the right-wing Presidential candidate (American Party), won his largest vote in Idaho—almost 15 per cent. Andrus and Church are the only Democrats left in the upper ranks of Idaho politics. In 1972, a right-wing Republican with strong Birch ties, was elected to Congress, joining a similarly inclined U.S. Senator (McClure) elected two years before. Earlier this year another incumbent Congressman, a moderate Republican friendly toward Church, was defeated in the primaries by a conservative Republican who is now favored to win the seat in the general election—if he can survive current investigations into his campaign financing.

In short, Birch-oriented politicians have a good chance to dominate the Idaho delegation in the next Congress, at least numerically. The major obstacle to a clean sweep for the Birch Society is Idaho's senior Senator, and he is vulnerable. Not only is Church's record generally liberal but, unlike the popular Andrus, he has been in politics eighteen years and

Loch Johnson is a political scientist at present on leave from Ohio University to observe the Idaho Congressional elections. He has contributed a chapter on Senator Church's foreign policy to A Psychological Approach to Political Man (Hermann and Milburn, editors) to be published by the Free Press early next year.
products, and has been criticized by some Idaho liberals for not being more sympathetic to Chavez's fight on behalf of migrant farm workers. Church's vote at the 1972 Democratic Convention put the Idaho delegation on record in opposition to the Chavez boycott. The Birchers even suggest that Church would support a Chavez-led boycott of Idaho potatoes, which is as likely as a Kansas Senator declaring on Meet the Press that corn is hazardous to your health.

The Seabed Treaty is a favorite Birch target. From Church's point of view, the mineral resources that lie beyond national jurisdictions hold promise as an important source of revenue for the financially faltering United Nations. Funding the U.N. in this manner would permit a reduction in the substantial U.S. contributions to the organization, and release money that is badly needed for domestic programs. Of course, any proposal to improve the affairs of the U.N. is anathema to the Birchers. They term the U.N. a Communist organization; after all, several Communist nations are members. Simplistic deductions appear to be an identifying feature of extremist groups.

The most fanciful—and shameful—of the Birch allegations is the slur upon Church's administrative assistant, Verda Barnes. A daughter of Idaho pioneers and a government case worker on Capitol Hill for years, Mrs. Barnes is reputed by the Birchers to be the means whereby the Communists control Church. She is a mainstay on the Senator's staff, but for none of the reasons suggested by the Birchers. A Fence-mender, par excellence, her days are spent on the phone to Idaho, cultivating friendships for the Senator and smoothing the ruffled feathers that inevitably arise in any Senator's constituency. Her advice on Idaho political questions has been wise and helpful to Church; however, when it comes to foreign policy or any of the other issues which so provoke the John Birch Society, Frank Church makes up his own mind with little staff assistance.

The Birch article bases its slurs against Mrs. Barnes on the "research" of Frank (Francis A.) Capell, an American Opinion contributor. In 1965 Capell was indicted and pleading no contest to a charge involving conspiracy to defame former Republican Sen. Thomas Kuchel of California with a phony allegation of homosexuality. Twenty years earlier, Capell was convicted on a felony charge for conspiracy to ask, accept, and receive bribes during his service with the War Production Board.

The Church staff believes that, like the other Birch allegations, this attempt to damage him by attacking Mrs. Barnes will fool only those who know nothing about the facts. They worry, though, about the many newcomers to Idaho who know little about Mrs. Barnes's integrity or Church's true position on the issues raised by the Society. The John Birch Society relies on the susceptibility of these new arrivals. Still, Church remains confident that the smear attempt will fail. "I have devoted all of my life to the service of my country both in war [Church won a Bronze Star in World War III] and peace," he recently told an impromptu press conference, "and Idahoans are much too fair-minded to be taken in by the efforts to taint me as some kind of pro-Communist."
Bob Smith, the GOP and John Birch Society candidate against Church, is an easy ally for the right-wingers. Though his speeches contain less of the rabid anti-communism typical of Bircher publications, he is foursquare with the Society on its other basic tenets—especially its hatred of collectivism and the federal government. Most of all, Smith fears the demise of the free-enterprise system in the United States, and he attributes its decline directly to the growth of the federal government. Anti-federalism, coupled with a relentless hunt for Reds, is the backbone of the Birch organization, too. What makes Smith an attractive spokesman for this and other right-wing groups is that he is sufficiently articulate, sophisticated and attractive to give his anti-federal philosophy considerable appeal.

With degrees in political science at the College of Idaho, theology at Northwestern, law at the University of Idaho, as well as a certificate in Chinese from Yale University, as a practicing attorney in Idaho, and the manager of a successful Congressional campaign in 1972 for Rep. Steve Symms, most recently, Smith was Symms's administrative assistant in Washington. (Symms is a favorite speaker at the Birch Society gatherings and was the keynote speaker at the 1974 Birch Society banquet in Chicago.) Thus Smith combines the smoothness of an educated man, the mixing abilities of a preacher and some political experience.

In public Smith steers clear of some of the more bizarre Birch positions (e.g., Nelson Rockefeller is part of an inner circle out to control the world), and stresses subjects having a broader appeal: cutting back on federal taxes, red tape, and bureaucratic regulations. Church, too, has anti-federal strains in his philosophy. He is against federal gun controls, for example, and in 1967 was the first to warn of the growing Caesarism in the White House. In fact, every Idaho politician has a healthy dose of anti-federalism; but whereas Smith and the Birchers are completely negative about government, Church sees the possibility of its positive use, as with Medicare and Social Security legislation.

Smith tells audiences that our way of life and possibly even the survival of modern civilization is in jeopardy since our tradition of free enterprise and limited government is under the most massive attack in history. “I’m committed to devoting every ounce of my time and energy to stop the stampede to socialism” (one is reminded of Goldwater’s phrase in 1964 about “stagnating in the swampland of collectivism”). Taking hear from recent Arkansas history, Smith is convinced that voters across the country will send other incumbents to join Senator Fulbright in the political pastures. “This year people are concerned with having too many incumbents who’ve been there too long.” Smith told a meeti g of the Nez Perce County Republican Central Committee. “They just want to get rid of career politicians.” He promises to resign after two terms, if elected. This is a difficult dog to make hunt, since many Idahoans understand the value of Church’s seniority. As chairman of the Senate Internal Committee on Water and Power, Church has successfully defeated several attempts to divert Idaho’s precious water southward.

Church has other strengths which Smith will find difficult to combat. He has dotted the Idaho landscape with agricultural, conservation and sewer projects; he has assiduously cultivated constituent ties over the years, holding ombudsman-like “citizen conferences” in every county on a regular basis, and he is one of the nation’s best orators and debaters. Church also has the usual advantages of the incumbent.

Smith, then, faces a battle, even if the political trend in Idaho is swinging to the right. Thus far he has condemned the Birch smear on Church and has even defended the Society as “a whipping boy to be attacked by liberal candidates who need to divert public attention from their own philosophies.” This rigid tie to the Birchers is beyond Smith’s own deep-running doctrinaire conservatism. Members of the John Birch Society’s national council are funding Smith’s campaign and these dollars, apparently, are a strong binding-adhesive. Also, Smith seems to be betting that the Birch attack will work its poison through the state.

So the battle shapes up as between a talented young conservative and a talented, experienced liberal. Whether the outcome, the voters of Idaho are being offered this year a choice, not an echo.

PERUVIAN ADVENTURE

GENERALS AS REVOLUTIONARIES

PENNY LERNOUX

Lima, Peru

There are three truths, runs an old Chinese proverb: yours, mine and the truth. It is an apt description of Latin America these days because so many seem to have a monopoly on the truth—the generals in Chile, Castro in Cuba and the Peronistas (all five versions of them) in Argentina. But nowhere is the truth so elusive as in Peru, where a six-year-old military government claims to have started a non-capitalist, non-Communist revolution—a claim hotly disputed by the Right, which describes revolution as Communist, and by the Left, which announces the regime as Fascist. It could be that none of these terms relate to what is actually taking place in Peru or for that matter anywhere else in Latin America, where it is meaningful, or truthful, in a European or U.S. context does not necessarily apply in Latin America, yet foreign terms still are used to explain behavior here.

Penny Lernoux is South American correspondent in Lima for Copley News Service.

THE NATION/October 12, 1975
Mired Troops and Frozen Policy

THE KOREAN PARALYSIS...Senator Frank Church

American foreign policy tends to maintain fixed positions long after these have ceased to serve our best interests. An example of this rigidity is the continued stationing of two full combat divisions — some 52,000 American troops, including various supporting units — in South Korea.

I neither challenge nor discredit our basic commitment to defend, by whatever means may be necessary, the integrity of the Republic of Korea. The fixed position to which I refer is not our commitment to defend the country, but the means by which we have chosen to do so. The perpetuation of these means is, I believe, demonstrably unsound, excessively costly and long since unnecessary.

Why does the United States need two full combat divisions in Korea? Since the end of the Korean fighting in 1953, we have given nearly $5 billion dollars in aid to South Korea; more than $2 billion of this aid has been used to equip their army. Today, the ROK army, numbering nearly 600,000 men, is the fourth largest in the entire world! It far outnumbers the entire North Korean armed forces of approximately 350,000 men, and is surpassed only by the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Yet we have made the South Korean Army combat-ready, and equipped it with the most modern weapons; it should, by now, be more than a match for the smaller North Korean force. If it is not, the American people are entitled to know how and where their money has been squandered.

The argument that we must leave 50,000 American sentinels on the front line in Korea to guard against, not a North Korean attack, but the possibility of another invasion by Communist China is, I believe, weak. Against an all-out Chinese attack, two divisions of American troops would never suffice. Should Korea be invaded again, the United States would have to intervene with the whole of its military might. To pretend otherwise is merely to tempt fate.

If another armed challenge of this dimension were to occur in South Korea, we would have to respond with forces now stationed outside that country. And we are prepared to do so. Our armed forces are far stronger and more mobile than in 1950, when the last invasion occurred. Our formidable base and staging area at Okinawa is within easy reach. Moreover, the success of the recent "Operation Big Lift," which flew a whole division from Texas to West Germany, indicates how swiftly and on our terms, we can move our troops from one part of the globe to another. Should a big new invasion ever require it, we could quickly airlift formidable numbers of American soldiers into the Korean peninsula.

The customary retort to these acknowledged facts is that two American divisions must neutralize the less remain in Korea as a psychological deterrent to any future Communist adventures, and to keep the South Koreans reassured of our determination to defend their country. As to the latter, one wonders why further reassurance should be needed after so vast an outpouring of American life and fortune in the Korean War; as to the former, if we accept the argument that our continued presence in Korea is required to make our commitment credible to the potential enemy, then it follows that American forces will have to patrol the 38th Parallel indefinitely — at least until such time as Korea's Communist neighbors either disarm or disappear.

I find neither of these propositions convincing. But, to play it absolutely safe, let us concede that the continued presence of American troops in Korea does offer further proof, to friend and foe alike, of our determination to uphold that country. Does it follow that we must keep two full divisions there? Surely, one regimental combat team would serve the purpose. With our capacity for rapid reinforcement from bases nearby, we can give South Korea the same guarantee of security, with far fewer American troops actually stationed there. It doesn't take a whole American Army to provide a "trip-wire" to warn of intruders.

Withdrawing the remainder of these two divisions to locations from which they could be speedily airborne would also add to our general mobility. Our troops now on
the line in Korea can be used only to defend that country. They are dug deeply into the hillsides. Ironically, we have limited their utility by miring them down in a region of the world where their instant availability for use in a crisis, somewhere else around the rim of China, could mean the difference between success and failure.

Moreover, the case against the frozen deployment of two whole divisions in Korea is not limited to the benefits to be derived from a more fluid strategic position. There are pressing financial, as well as sound military, reasons for reducing the level of American troops in that country.

The cost of maintaining our military forces abroad is a far greater burden to our balance-of-payments problem than our total outlay each year in foreign aid. For instance, in 1962, our balance-of-payments deficit was $2.18 billion. The drain on the balance from foreign-based military expenditures was more than $3 billion. In 1961, our balance-of-payments deficit was $2.37 billion, while our foreign-based military costs contributing to this deficit exceeded $2.93 billion. In both years, we would have had a balance-of-payments surplus, had it not been for the cost of our garrisons in other countries. Retaining two whole divisions in Korea adds more than $100 million each year to our balance-of-payments deficit.

The United States has sustained a deficit in its balance of payments consistently since 1950. As a result, we have accumulated more than $25 billion in short-term obligations abroad, while our gold reserves have dwindled to less than $16 billion. If we subtract the $12 billion in gold bullion earmarked by law to back the currency in our own country, we now have less than $4.5 billion in gold reserves with which to redeem our outstanding obligations to foreign creditors. During the past five years, our gold reserves have been diminishing at an alarming rate. We have suffered a gold outflow of more than $7 billion since 1958!

All this is not to say that, wherever our vital interests require it, we should not continue to station American troops in other countries. But, it is to say that the size of these garrisons should be reduced, wherever possible, to a prudent minimum.

I submit that a sound assessment of our position in Korea calls for the withdrawal of the bulk of our troops, for the following reasons:

» The South Korean Army can repel a North Korean invasion.

» An invasion by Communist China would require us to make an effort of an entirely different magnitude than is implied by the two divisions currently quartered in Korea.

» A regiment of American combat troops on the front line in Korea would serve just as effectively as a “trip-wire” deterrent to the Communists.

» Removing the remaining units from their trenches in Korea would add to the mobility of our military posture in Asia.

» A reduction in the number of American troops stationed in Korea would mitigate our serious balance-of-payments problem.

Our paralysis of policy in Korea results not so much from pressures generated in Seoul as from those arising in Washington. They are partly bureaucratic and partly political.

To begin with, the Army has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in Korea, while there is no vested interest in changing it. It is the Army, principally, which regularly resurrects the specter of Communist aggression as the probable consequence of any force reduction there. I think it reasonable to suppose that the Army’s judgment on this matter is somewhat

(Continued on page 356)
him with a love that extends no further than his person. He grows ever less aware of his neighbors, his family, his society; his affections then turn toward the semi-incestuous. He cripples those closest to him; his negli-
genese spells their death. He can save himself only by direct, unequivocal work required by the specific needs of his immediate community.

The flow and fascination of Little Eyolf arise from the interweaving of so many of Ibsen's preoccupations, some of which are merely hinted at. Whether or not we agree with William Archer's estimate that the play is "among the greatest of Ibsen's achievements" (an opinion shared in large measure by Shaw), we cannot fail to be struck by the "something more" in the play's atmosphere. We breathe the very air of one of the Ibsen house-
holds—the place, the emotional pressures, the hidden thoughts, the un-
spoken words, the fate—which exercises a far greater spell than does the bare articulation of the play's structure or thesis.

It is just this substance of reality, this fabric of experience, which the players of Northwestern Productions are unable to create. This, I was going to say, is due to their youth, but it is not a matter of years. Physically the actors correspond entirely to the de-
scription of the characters. In the printed text. They lack two things: the full technical training for such a play, and, even more, the cultural "soil" which gives the European actor a ground wherein his personal knowl-
edge of human relationships may ma-
ture sufficiently to express the life-
laden gravity of Ibsen's world. Still,
despite their inexperience as instru-
cents for this task, the Northwestern actors have faithfully followed a di-
rector who understands the play so that its lineaments at least are made clear.

The great dramatic work about the challenge of the American Negro to our country has not yet been writ-
ten. But materials are accumulating in moralities, songs, documents almost always impressive and stirring. Thus James Weldon Johnson's God's Troubadours, adapted by Virginia Car-
roll, has been made into a fine com-
poite: of gospel singing, and folk
preaching in Trumpets of the Lord (1
Sheridan Square) for which the actors and singers are fully equipped with both technical skill and the inner re-
sources. Al Freeman, Jr., Theresa Mer-
riss and Cicely Tyson head a group
wholly admirable in spirit, speech and
chant.

In assembling historical data from private and public sources, Martin Duberman, a Princeton professor, has

KOREA

(Continued from page 348) colored by its own perspective. I have yet to meet an Army officer who felt we were maintaining too
many divisions anywhere, or one who believed that our regular Army ought not to be further enlarged. There is a natural tendency for the Army to seek, not alone in Korea, but elsewhere, to perpetuate those deployments of troops in the field which will neither end the war, nor help us win it, but which will render our present Army strengths immune to question, and thus, unvulnerable to competing demands for the slice of defense budget rep-
resents. If we must wait for the Army to eke out a troop with a 

army in Korea, we shall wait a long time indeed!

However, whether or not we shall continue to garrison troops in Korea in a decision of foreign policy it is to the State Department, not to the Pentagon, that the President should properly look for any recom-
mended changes of course. Un-
fortunately, the voice of McCord is still intimadates at the State De-
partment, even as the dread dog's 

perspective, still intimadates at the White

House. Fear of Congressional re-

nutation in the capital, and voter re-

nutation in the precincts, multiplies its policy in Korea, as it does wherever we find ourselves "eyeball to ey-

boll," with the Communists. The

overriding consideration again is any reduction of our fore-

Korea is the political calculation that such a move would "pay off" for the Republicans. If a De-

ocratic President were to withdraw troops from Korea, the Republicans might denounce the move as a kind of retreat in the face of our en-

emy; on the other hand, a De-

ocratic President can easily make the decision to stand still in Korea like a determination to stand in

future. Perhaps we shall have to wait for a second-term President. But the paralysis of our policy places like Korea, though it can also weaken our national interests abroad. Dean Rusk is re-

ported recently to have said to us we live in an era of diplomacy and boredom. For this, I suggest, we have ourselves partly to blame.

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Our struggle in South Vietnam has reached a point where neither side has achieved a conclusive military defeat; the only visible prospect for solution is to be found at the conference table. But there is so much Wash­ington talk about stepping up the war that it threatens to engulf all rational discussion of the crisis we face—almost as if peace were something to be avoided. The war hawks are putting on the war. Anyone who disagrees with them accused of “running up a white flag.” Debate is discouraged; dissent is defined as endangering the country. The talk of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is equated with Munich; any expectation of an eventual American with­drawal is likened to Dunkirk. Yet everyone senses that peace in Vietnam can only be restored through a diplomatic settlement, and that the United States neither wishes nor expects to see a foothold in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, I believe we should try to break the diplomatic deadlock (“First a withdraw, then we will talk”) that has both sides, in effect, demanding a surrender of the other as the price for a solution. I disagree with the pre­valing doctrine that war is the only possible solution.

Opposing any negotiations, the war hawks contend that we Americans must fight in Vietnam. They see the struggle there, which has thus far been acutely confined to the Vietnamese, as an extension of World War II. General Baldwin, military editor for The New York Times, declares that we should read ourselves to send a mil­lion Americans into battle. He writes: “We must fight a war of attrition and an inevitable defeat... Vietnam is a sorry place to fight. But... there is no

...good place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China’s doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.”

Such trumpeting substitutes sound for sanity. We may have invested pres­tige in Vietnam, but by no stretch of imagination does this struggle threaten the life of our country.

We conquered the Pacific in the Sec­ond World War. It is our most, the broadest on earth, from the Golden Gate to the very shores of China. With unchallenged naval and aerial su­premacy, we dominate it, patrol it and defend it. There is no way for the land­locked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea, nor the eagle from the sky. Our presence in the Far East is not anchored to Vietnam.

I believe that the containment of a hostile China is a proper goal for American policy. To avoid Chinese conquest of her neighbors, we fought in Korea, and we have solemnly pledged ourselves to defend Taiwan. The weak­ness of the Chinese-expansion argument, as it relates to Vietnam, is that China has thus far displayed no wish to invade Southeast Asia. To date, Chinese troops have not been fighting in Vietnam. Moreover, China hasn’t yet moved a cadre of “advisers” into North Viet­nam that begins to compare, in num­bers of men or in the amount of aid given, to the American presence in the South. The best way to keep China out of Vietnam is to settle the war there. An escalation of the war northward, if it continues unabated, is the most likely way to draw Chinese armies down, thus creating the very calamity our policy should be designed to avert.

However, a new definition of con­tainment has emerged to justify the deepening involvement of the United States in the fighting in Southeast Asia. Our presence there, it is said, is not to furnish a shield against an antici­pated Chinese invasion, but rather to counteract the spread of Chinese in­fluence. If this is our purpose, it is a vain one indeed.

China is the giant of Asia, unshackled and determined to reclaim her preroga­tives as the dominant power of the main­land. In the natural course of events, we can no more expect to deny China her influence in Southeast Asia, the region immediately beneath her, than China could expect to deny the United States our influence in Central America.

No outpost bristling with bayonets—least of all one held in South Vietnam by American occupation forces—is go­ing to stem the spread of Chinese in­fluence in Asia. If we cannot live in a world where the Chinese exert influence in Indochina, then we had better forget Vietnam and commence now to destroy and dismember China, some­thing no other nation in history has ever managed to do.

But since the conquest of China is not an American ambition, we should stop fooling ourselves with talk that our involvement in Vietnam can some­how bring an end to the spread of Chinese influence in Asia. In fact, the evidence is just the other way around. Because of the extent of our interven­tion in South Vietnam, the Peking government is able to pose as the champion of Asia for the Asians, defy­ing the United States in the name of resisting the return of Western imper­ialism. Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said re­cently to a foreign visitor: “Once we worried about Southeast Asia. We don’t anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us.”

Although we cannot immunize South­east Asia from Chinese influence, the restoration of peace to this war-weary...
In the eyes of much of the world, the United States is more intent on furnishing swords than plowshares. During the past seventeen years, we have bestowed on foreign governments $8,000,000,000 in military vehicles and weapons, $7,000,000,000 in aircraft, $5,000,000,000 in ammunition, $2,000,000,000 in ships, $2,000,000,000 in communications equipment, $1,500,000,000 in missiles and $3,000,000,000 in other supplies. Services granted in the form of base construction, training, repair, and spare parts amounted to an additional $8,000,000,000, for a staggering total of $36,500,000,000 dispensed abroad since 1940.

The armaments which these sums represent are no less staggering: 4,385 F-84 fighters; 2,812 F-86 fighters; 3,292 aircraft trainers; 20,279 tanks; 75,995 trailers; 150,552 two-and-a-half-ton trucks; 1,362,000 carbines; 2,106,000 rifles; 72,777 machine guns; 29,716 mortars; 30,340 missiles.

As if to augment these massive gifts of arms, the Defense Department is now engaged in a mushrooming sales campaign. Direct sales to foreign governments already exceed $16,000,000,000, while Pentagon officials anticipate orders worth another $15,000,000,000 in the next decade.

Clearly, the supplying of munitions, quite apart from ordinary commercial sales by private American manufacturers, has become a big business in which the U.S. Government plays a central role. Today, our Federal Government is the principal arms disperser of the world, giving away, advancing credit, and promoting the sale of a volume of arms more than six times that of our nearest rival, the Soviet Union.

It was not always so. Before World War II, sentiment in this country was decidedly against the export of weapons. Munition makers were scorned, their trafficking in arms condemned as mischievous, if not evil. Legislation in Congress, in some embarrassment, to level off new appropriations for the war period of "arsenal diplomacy" had begun. Two years later we were spending $6,000,000,000 in twenty-one countries. The dollars rained so thick and fast that, at one point, unfilled orders in the "pipeline" exceeded $12,000,000,000, lead Congress, in some embarrassment, to level off new appropriation at about $1,500,000,000 a year. Still, the number of recipients continued to grow, reaching in 1943 an all-time high of sixty-five foreign governments, each with its own special shopping list brought to our disbursement window.

Procedures were quickly standardized by the burgeoning bureau-ocracy charged with the administration of the new program. American military attachés assigned to our Embassies abroad were called upon, not only to befriend their host counterparts, but to study their arms needs. From this contact came requests for special military aid—demands which intensified with the invasion of South Korea. In 1950, voted $1,300,000,000 in military assistance to fourteen countries for "the performance of specific tasks" which we, presumably, would otherwise have had to undertake. The post-war period of "arsenal diplomacy" had begun.

Today some 12,000 Americans are engaged abroad in training and supervising the armed services of no less than thirty-five foreign countries. Each American detachment helps the local military work up a five-year plan of training and weapons need. Then, invitations are issued to participate in military training within the United States or at special schools operated for the purpose abroad. To date, some 277,000 foreign soldiers have been trained in this manner, with millions more receiving American training inside their own countries. In addition, about 1,400 semi-official foreign officers enjoy a "free orientation" trip to the U.S. each year.
FROM THE U.S.A.
TO ALL THE WORLD,
WITH LOVE:

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by Senator Frank Church

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march 1941, which empowered the President “to
 manufacture of defense articles . . . for any foreign
whose defense he deemed vital,” and to “sell, transfer
hange, lease, lend . . . to any such government any


and the great bulk of which had gone to Great Britain ($32-
,000,000,000), to the Soviet Union ($11,000,000,000), and to France
($5,000,000,000).
Those weapons helped our fighting partners greatly in the com-
struggle to defeat the Axis powers, thereby saving the lives
of many American soldiers. Much of the assistance was given with-
out thought of repayment. But even for that part of the weapons
leased” or “loaned,” in the genuine expectation of repayment, we
have received nothing. After the war, for example, negotiations
with the Soviet Union proved fruitless; and today we are still pay-
ing—in interest charges on our national debt—for this huge war-
time disbursement of arms.
Nonetheless, the guns had hardly fallen silent before we com-
enced a new program of arms aid. In the Far East, from 1945 to
1949, to bolster Chiang Kai-shek’s faltering grip on China, we
gave him arms and supplies worth $800,000,000 in original acquisi-
tion cost. In the Middle East, starting in 1947 with the Truman
Doctrine, we helped Greece, which was threatened by a Communist
guerrilla war, and Turkey, then under intense Soviet pressure. The
onset of the “cold war” brought additional demands for further
military aid—demands which intensified with the invasion of South
Korea. Congress, in 1950, voted $1,300,000,000 in military assistance
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foreign officers enjoy a free “orientation” trip to the U.S. each year.
issue stimulates an appetite for the sophisticated arms that have developed. Using an inventory of all available arms, the Department of Defense is already administering a massive shipment to the American Ambassador. These are destined to the Department of State, where a team is reached after consultation with the Defense Department.

Secretary McNamara told Congress that the United States is deliberately easing out business in many areas. After all, apart from the military-aid budget down almost half since however, must be viewed in its proper context. It gave away yesterday we are selling today. Theyal addition to the armament inventory of other nations, for any period since the Korean War.

The refrigeration of all these arguments lacks force; none can be summed up as a compelling argument. First, that we give protection has always been furnished by the American Fleet, but where we were induced to give nearly $2,500,000,000 in arms to our influence with the military elite in Africa. In 1960, Kuss has signed up thirty countries buying for cash and nearly $3,000,000,000 of the arms sales in the last year. So, for his "unparalleled ability as an international statesman," Kuss was awarded the Merito Service Medal, and for 1963, $200,000,000 a year. Since then, Kuss has signed up commitments of $11,700,000,000 in arms sales, thereby munitions industry with an added billion-dollar profit. In "Business Week" reported recently, "is becoming prevalent in the world arms market." In 1963, the government policy toward the export of arms was the way from naive abetment to zealous promotion. This is acceptable; the time has come for us to seek a balance.

The present involvement is based, like a stool, on the rather compelling arguments. A report that we give aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression-with a high regard for the Soviet Union. But today they are spoiling over Cyprus, where U.N. troops must police an uneasy truce. Where the United States is deliberately easing out business in many areas. After all, apart from the military-aid budget down almost half since 1961, into high gear with the establishment, in the office of International Logistics Negotiations.

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Secretary McNamara told Congress that the United States is deliberately easing out business in many areas. After all, apart from the military-aid budget down almost half since 1961, into high gear with the establishment, in the office of International Logistics Negotiations.
Naturally, this exposure stimulates an appetite for the sophisticated weaponry we have developed. Using an inventory of all American stocks available, requests are drawn up and submitted by the local government to the American Ambassador. These are then forwarded to the Department of State, where a decision is reached after consultation with the Defense Department.

Last year Defense Secretary McNamara told Congress that all this is changing, that the United States is deliberately easing out of the grant-in-aid business in many areas. After all, apart from Vietnam, is not the military-aid budget down almost half since 1962?

This reduction, however, must be viewed in its proper context. Much of what we gave away yesterday we are selling today. The fact is that our total addition to the armament inventory of other nations is now higher than for any period since the Korean War.

The United States now spends $70,000,000,000 a year on its own armed forces. The rapid technological progress generated by this investment often produces weapons which turn obsolete soon after they come off the assembly line. For years our defense industry has sought to prolong their use through arms sales abroad. In 1961 this drive shifted into high gear with the establishment, in the Pentagon, of the Office of International Logistics Negotiations. Under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., the office has steadily grown in size and substance. Today, its staff, with the support of experts from each of the three Armed Services and the guidance of a twenty-five-man advisory committee from private industry, travels the world in quest of new contracts. Working in tandem with private industry, Defense's arms salesmen employ the full range of American promotion techniques. Kuss has proudly boasted that "Behind the success of our military export program lies the fact that no other nation can touch us in overall technological know-how, quality, price, delivery time, follow-up logistical support and credit terms."

Sales may be for cash or on easy credit, with financing available through a Defense Department revolving credit account, the government-agency Export-Import Bank, or private banking facilities. Since 1964, Kuss has been authorized to guarantee credit extended by private banks to foreign governments buying weapons from us. The working policy of the Office of International Logististics, as described in a recent laudatory article, "has always been 'if you need credit, we'll get it for you,' and they have yet to fail to do so."

At last count, some thirty countries were buying for cash and fifteen on credit. Nearly $3,000,000,000 of the arms sales in the last five years were on credit.

Two years ago, for his "unparalleled ability as an international negotiator," Secretary McNamara awarded Kuss with the Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. And for good reason. Until 1961, sales had averaged $300,000,000 a year. Since then, Kuss has signed up orders and commitments on $11,700,000,000 in arms sales, thereby providing our munitions industry with an added billion-dollar profit.

"Buy American," Business Week reported recently, "is becoming an increasingly prevalent slogan in the world arms market."

So it has happened that within the short span of thirty years the pendulum of our governmental policy toward the export of arms has swung all the way from naive abstention to zealous promotion. Neither extreme is acceptable; the time has come for us to seek a more sensible balance.

To be sure, our present involvement is based, like a stool, on the legs of three rather compelling arguments. First, that we give military aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression from without and subversion from within. Second, that we give it to strengthen our influence with the military elite in other lands, frequently an important bulwark against Communist military aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression. Third, that the sale of weapons helps to redress the deficit in our balance of payments (caused, in large part, by the overseas deployment of our own troops).

None of these arguments lacks force; none can be summarily dismissed.

In the wake of World War II, the westward thrust of Russian power threatened to engulf all of Europe. The retention of an American army in Germany, together with the formation of the N.A.T.O. alliance, became indispensable. Western Europe lay prostrate, her cities in ruins, her peoples demoralized, her borders threatened by the remorseless hammer-blow of the war, her economic future threatened with assured disaster. The European Union, which we had so recently helped to bring into being, was in grave danger. We were banking on the Marshall Plan to save her, and every dollar allocated under its auspices was dedicated to the war against the Soviet Union, but today we are spoiling off a new Communist monster in the East. Since we embarked on the Marshall Plan, we have been working assiduously to ensure that the plan would not collapse when the war was over. We have, therefore, continued the military-aid program and the economic-aid program, in the hope that we could create a united Europe which would be able to withstand the Soviet threat. We have been successful in that respect, but our military grants-in-aid were equally essential in order to enable the Europeans to assume their proper place in the N.A.T.O. defense line.

The Marshall Plan-N.A.T.O. formula produced such results in rejuvenating the war-torn economy of Western Europe that many people began to believe that we had found the key to the Communist problem. We were given to understand that we had with its success that we continued military aid in order to prevent the collapse of the Marshall Plan.

So it has happened that within the short span of thirty years the pendulum of our governmental policy toward the export of arms has swung all the way from naive abstention to zealous promotion. Neither extreme is acceptable; the time has come for us to seek a more sensible balance.

To be sure, our present involvement is based, like a stool, on the legs of three rather compelling arguments. First, that we give military aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression from without and subversion from within. Second, that we give it to strengthen our influence with the military elite in other lands, frequently an important bulwark against Communist military aid to help foreign governments resist Communist aggression. Third, that the sale of weapons helps to redress the deficit in our balance of payments (caused, in large part, by the overseas deployment of our own troops).

None of these arguments lacks force; none can be summarily dismissed.

In the wake of World War II, the westward thrust of Russian power threatened to engulf all of Europe. The retention of an American army in Germany, together with the formation of the N.A.T.O. alliance, became indispensable. Western Europe lay prostrate, her cities in ruins, her peoples demoralized, her borders threatened by the remorseless hammer-blow of the war, her economic future threatened with assured disaster. The European Union, which we had so recently helped to bring into being, was in grave danger. We were banking on the Marshall Plan to save her, and every dollar allocated under its auspices was dedicated to the war against the Soviet Union, but today we are spoiling off a new Communist monster in the East. Since we embarked on the Marshall Plan, we have been working assiduously to ensure that the plan would not collapse when the war was over. We have, therefore, continued the military-aid program and the economic-aid program, in the hope that we could create a united Europe which would be able to withstand the Soviet threat. We have been successful in that respect, but our military grants-in-aid were equally essential in order to enable the Europeans to assume their proper place in the N.A.T.O. defense line.
eth Galbraith, the expression, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last year, that our military-aid program actually activated the Indo-Pakistan war—the full consequences of the policy of indiscriminate arms aid have died themselves with the history of Asia. I think, does history work itself out with such majestic, and ironic, completeness. . . . The arms we supplied . . . caused, I underline that word, the war last autumn [1965] between India and Pakistan . . . If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan . . . we have not sought the one thing we wanted above all to avoid; elegy a military solution."

rather than contributing to an effective defense against the imminent threat, as we conceived it, the actual result of our arms was to foment war between two non-Communist governments, of which were friendly to the United States. On the plains of Jubbulpore and the Rann of Cutch we reaped a bitter harvest of resentment from both sides. And at Tashkent, the Russians emerged as the emissaries, providing, as Galbraith observed, "the crowning irony [when] the Soviets, at whom these arms were meant to be directed, stepped in and obtained a settlement of the conflict."

still, even this debacle seems not to have dampened our ardor for funding Communist revolutionaries in Asia and the Middle East with arms heavily subsidized by the United States. And, if we were really willing to rely upon them, the savings might have been sizable. Secretary McNamara has told the Congress that it costs 500 annually to support an American soldier, as against $540 for an Argentine soldier in the "forward defense countries"; that for our ncy, so to speak, we get eight times as many sentinels. The flaw in the argument, however, is that in the one place where we might well defer to a foreign judgment to hold the line—in Korea the 38th parallel—we have been unwilling to do it. Korea is the test case; the peninsula is such that, as between the two halves this divided country, the South is fully capable of maintaining an impregnable defense against the North. We have equipped eight R.O.K. divisions to American standards, making the South Korean Army not only larger than its adversary across the line, but more modern in Asia. Furthermore, as a deterrent against any renewed threat from China, the United States could continue in fact its treaty obligations to come to the defense of South Korea in case of attack, a pledge readily implemented by virtue of our unchallenged command of the sea, our domination of the air, and the close proximity of our gigantic island bases. Yet, despite these favorable conditions, we still assist, fourteen years after the truce in Korea, on stationing more than 50,000 American combat troops ear the 38th parallel. . . .

All of this is not to say that we should never have embarked on a military assistance program in Asia or the Middle East. In one places, as in Korea, arms aid was essential to deal with the militant nature of the Communist threat. But the program should have been restricted to countries where the need was clearly appar- ent, where the enemy is both powerful and public, and where the cost we bear has some bearing on the stability of our allies in the area. Never should we have given it in situations ripe for local reaction and adverse to our national interests. In sum, what was called for was a disciplined program, applied with prudence and restraint. Instead, we have had a runaway program that has yet to be effectively checked.

The second broad justification for serving up American military hardware on a global platter, much of it to countries far removed from Communist neighbors, is that it serves to bolster re- sistance to Communist pressures from within, and gives us more leverage with the military "elite" in many foreign lands. Frequently, it is argued, the army constitutes the only organized force opposing the Communist governments of the world. But the early problem here is that we either fail to appreciate, or simply misjudge, the dynamics of change in underdeveloped societies. Violent revolution will eventually occur wherever legitimate grievances can find no other outlet. Impoverished and impatient people, who have contributed to the underdeveloped world's growth, will use every opportunity to challenge any government that even has a shaky government before conditions improve sufficiently for universal order to prevail. We haven't bayonets enough in our arsenal, or money enough in our treasury, to quench the smoldering embers of revolution everywhere. This means, once more, that instead of globalization our military assistance in pointless proliferation, we should converge it on those particular fires which, in our own national interest, we must try to put out. The most poignant example, of course, is Vietnam itself. Our involvement there began with the military aid we extended to Ngo Dinh Diem, equipping him with forces vastly superior to the Vietcong. Yet, his unpopular regime (and those succeeding it) steadily lost ground. Massive injections of U.S. weapons, ammunition, equip- ment and supplies failed to turn the tide against the insurgents, though they were overmatched in numbers and totally outnumbered. Our own troops had to be summoned and the war converted into an American engagement. Today we have a larger expeditionary force in Vietnam than we ever sent into Korea. The brunt of the fighting is ours, with current American battle casualties exceeding those of the South Vietnamese in Vietnam.

The lesson of Vietnam should make us wary of instituting new military-aid programs elsewhere. But it has not happened that way. Instead, we are busy getting them started in the most unlikely place of all, Africa. Here our favorite rationalization is that the gift of arms may gain us favor with the restless young African armies which have either seized, or which threaten to seize, political power. We cling to this belief, despite all of the evidence which has accumu- lated against it. As an institution, particularly in unstable lands, the military will often assert control over the government, but its allegiance can never be bought by the gift of arms.

The army we equipped in Iraq brought down the government we supported by a coup which caught us by surprise. The military assis- tance we furnished the armed forces of the Dominican Republic did not prevent them from overthrowing the elected regime of Juan Bosch, which we strongly favored at the time. Moreover, the same army later proved unable to put down the subsequent up- rising in the streets of Santo Domingo, where the landing of Ameri- can Marines only underscored, as in Vietnam, the failure of military aid.

For that matter, the Communist powers have done no better. In Indonesia, it was a Soviet-equipped army which turned upon the Indonesian Communist Party, putting 200,000 or more of its mem- bers to the sword. In Algeria, it was Russian-furnished tanks which ringed Ben Bella's palace and helped overthrow the elected president of the North. Even in Egypt, where Nasser plays footsie with the Soviet Union and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, the military aid he has received from behind the Iron Curtain equips the very security forces that regularly suppress Communist activi- ty on the Nile. Whenever I hear the argument that we must give arms to some foreign government "or else the Russians will do it," I am tempted to exclaim: "Please let them, for our sake!"

The fallaciousness of this argument is epitomized by what hap- pened in Iran recently. Pentagon salesmen sold Iran a squadron of F-4 Phantoms, the most advanced jet fighter in our arsenal, after Iran threatened to turn to the Soviet Union for her arms need. No sooner had the deal been consummated than Iran, a member of the C.E.N.T.O. alliance, made a $100,000,000 arms deal with the Russians.

Not only have we refused to recognize that foreign armies are risky investment, but we seem never to take into account the political consequences of the foreign arms we sell. For example, when we sell a large jet to a non-Communist government in Africa, or Latin America, where there is an unconscionable cal cost we bear for supporting them. In any poor country of the C.E.N.T.O. alliance, made a $100,000,000 arms deal with the Russians.

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Kenneth Galbraith, expressed the opinion, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, that our military-assistance program actually activated the Indo-Pakistan war:

"The full consequences of the policy of indiscriminate arms aid have revealed themselves in the kind of heroic clarity in action. Asia, Rarely, I think, does history work itself out with such majestic, and also ironic, completeness. . . . The arms we supplied . . . caused, and I underline that word, the war last autumn [1965] between India and Pakistan . . . If we had not supplied arms, Pakistan would not have sought the one thing we wanted above all to avoid; namely a military solution."

So, rather than contributing to an effective defense against the Communist threat, as we conceived it, the actual result of our arms aid was to foment war between two non-Communist governments, both of which were friendly to the United States. On the plains of Punjab, Pakistan threatened to spear a defense of South Korea from both sides. And at Tashkent, the Russians emerged as the peacemakers, providing, as Galbraith observed, "the crowning irony [when] the Soviets, at whom these arms were meant to be pointed, stepped in and obtained a settlement of the conflict."

Still, even this debacle seems not to have dampened our order for carrying Communist boundaries in Asia and the Middle East with foreign armies heavily subsidized by the United States. And, indeed, if we were really willing to rely upon them, the savings might be sizable. Secretary McNamara has told the Congress that it costs $4,500 annually to support an American soldier, as against $540 for a soldier in thement of "good friends"; the same money, so to speak, we get eight times as many sentinels. The flaw in the argument, however, is that in the one place where we might have deferred to a foreign army to hold a defense line—in Korea at the 38th parallel—we have been unwilling to do it. Korea is the ideal test case; the peninsula is such that, as between the two halves of this divided country, the South is fully capable of maintaining an impregnable defense against the North. We have equipped eighteen R.O.K. divisions to American standards, making the South Korean Army not only larger than its adversary across the line, but the most modern in Asia. Furthermore, as a deterrent against any renewed threat from China, the United States could continue in effect its treaty obligation of 1953 to supply a defense of South Korea in case of attack, a pledge readily implemented by virtue of our unchallenged command of the sea, our domination of the air, and the close proximity of our gigantic island bases. Yet, despite these favorable conditions, we still insist, fourteen years after the truce in Korea, on stationing more than 50,000 American combat troops near the 38th parallel.

All of this is not to say that we should never have embarked upon a military assistance program in Asia or the Middle East. In some places, as in Korea, arms aid was essential to deal with the militant nature of the Communist threat. But the program should have been limited to those countries where the need was clearly apparent, and, where given, scaled to the capacity of recipient countries to absorb. Never should we have given it in situations ripe for local wars unrelated to our strategic goals and adverse to our national interests. In sum, what was called for was a disciplined program, applied with prudence and restraint. Instead, we have had a runaway program that has yet to be effectively checked.

The second broad justification for serving up American military hardware on a global platter, much of it to countries far removed from Communist neighbors, is that it serves to bolster resistance to subversion from within, and gives us more leverage with the military "elite" in many foreign lands. Frequently, it is argued, the army constitutes the only organized force opposing Communist infiltration. By supplying American weapons, so the argument goes, we can win favor with the army commanders and thus contribute to the maintenance of internal stability. The problem here is that we either fail to appreciate, or simply misjudge, the dynamics of change in underdeveloped societies.

Violent revolution will eventually occur wherever legitimate grievances can find no other outlet. Impoverished and impatient people throughout the underdeveloped world will doubtless topple many a shaky government before conditions improve sufficiently for universal order to prevail. We haven't bayonets enough in our arsenal, or money enough in our treasury, to quell the smoldering embers of revolution everywhere. This means, once instead of globalizing our military assistance in point of view, we should converge it on those particular areas with our own national interest, we must try to put out.

Nowadays, there are a number of cases which concern us most a Communist either start or try to take over. Usually the insurgents as "wars of liberation." When any global so challenged, its survival depends less upon the weapon than upon the willingness of the population to rally behind the great bulk of the people are loyal, then the guns and am infernal can make the difference. This was the case as it was for the British in Malaya. But in Cuba, under communism was loathed, the weaponry we gave it proved against Castro.

The most poignant example, of course, is Vietnam. The assurance we first began to fear at the time of the Domino Dinh Diem, equipping him with forces vastly superior to the massive injections of U.S. weapons, ammunition and supplies failed to turn the tide against them. The money, the arms aid was to foment war between two non-Communist governments, both of which were friendly to the United States. On the plains of Punjab, Pakistan threatened to spear a defense of South Korea from both sides. And at Tashkent, the Russians emerged as the peacemakers, providing, as Galbraith observed, "the crowning irony [when] the Soviets, at whom these arms were meant to be pointed, stepped in and obtained a settlement of the conflict."

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tends, whether or not they are broadly framed. The \( x \) Barons and their ilk--people who feel alienated spirits of the avant-garde are not as ignorant of the basic characteristic of the art as those who do not appreciate it at all. The way is the way the artist leads us to the social science he feels in tune with, and that makes good fiscal sense to sell arms. If these armaments are to be used at all, we ought to be sure that the government selling them will also use them, and that the sale is not for the benefit of the seller alone. (Continued from page 86)
The pressures which have made the United States the leading arms merchant to the world must be thoroughly probed. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition that there is a problem, and then the search for answers can begin.

At a Senate hearing on the appointment of Samuel De Palma as Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is charged with the responsibility for bringing some rationality into the wild arms race, he was asked what voice the Agency had in proposed military sales to foreign countries. He answered that the Agency is not consulted. It would seem that the agency with the statutory duty to "deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments" should have some voice in whether we give or sell weapons to foreign governments.

The statute creating the agency states that "this organization must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the Executive Branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies, and our economy." Clearly, this is the "position" or can it carry out the responsibility assigned to it by the Congress. Its budget for this year amounts to one-hundredth of our total military sales and aid programs. Such is the emphasis given to bringing the arms race under control.

The Executive Branch has shown no real indication that it is prepared to start turning off the weapons spigots. Excluding Vietnam from the calculation for both years, the military aid request presented to Congress for the 1967 fiscal year was larger than for 1966. And the proposed arms giveaway program for 1968, ignoring some budgetary sleight of hand, is greater than the Congress voted last year. Sales continue to climb. Congress could do much to put the program on a rational basis, and fortunately, the Senate has shown signs that it may start

You can get an autographed copy of Toys of a Lifetime by Arnold Gingrich. See page 118.

Two chapters from the book were In Esquire last year:

Some Dreams I've Driven, and Servants I've Worked For.
To understand Frank Church, it is important to have an understanding of Idaho.

The Idaho Territory was settled by Confederate refugees, who migrated there to escape Reconstruction and its companions, hunger and poverty. In its own way, Idaho is as southern as Alabamian its attitudes.

When Montana and Wyoming were created, the State of Idaho was left with some rivers and forests, and some mountain ranges. A large number of Mormons settled there, thinking they were in Utah. If Idaho had more than its present trace of a Black population, along with its southern and Mormon (26 percent of the population) heritage, the situation could be worse than in south Boston.

Politically, Idaho seems to vote contrary to the national trend, except in Presidential elections, where it almost always votes heavily Republican (although Lyndon Johnson took the 1964 election with 51 percent of the vote). In the 1950's, when the Republicans held their last majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and the White House, Idaho was going Democratic. As the Republicans lost power nationally, they gained power in Idaho. As the Republicans gained the White House again in 1968, Idaho began to swing back toward the Democrats.

Frank Church was brought up in a Republican house. As a teenager, he read books on the New Deal and decided that he would be a Democrat. After World War II service as a highly decorated intelligence officer in Asia, he attended and graduated from Stanford. He attended Harvard Law School for a
year and graduated from Stanford Law School. While in law school, he developed cancer, and had expected to die, but while he lived in fear of dying, Church kept on going to classes. The cancer responded to treatment, and Church became an Idaho lawyer. After six years' practice, Church ran for the Senate against Republican Herman Welker, a Republican who was a close ally of Joe McCarthy. When McCarthy's fortunes began to sag, Welker defended him on the basis that "McCarthy likes children". To get the nomination, Church had to defeat former Senator Glenn Taylor, the singing cowboy, who was Henry Wallace's running mate in 1948. Although they ran as Democrats, both Church and Taylor were descendants of a non-conformist streak which has its roots in the Progressive Republicans of the 1910's and 1920's. The best example of this was William E. Borah, who represented Idaho in the Senate from 1907 to 1940, was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was widely admired for his progressive leadership in both domestic and foreign affairs. In fact, Borah was the pattern Church used for himself in his Senate career. Church beat Welker by a 14 percent margin. In 1962, Church had established a reputation as a maverick, had alienated a number of Idaho industrialists, and won reelection with 54 percent of the vote.

In 1967, the John Birch Society decided to have a go at Church, and tried to get a recall for the liberal Senator. Much of the manpower for the recall drive (it is not legally clear if a Senator can be recalled) came from new, right-wing immigrants from southern California, and some extra people came from the California Birch Society to help.

In time, it was revealed that most of the recall effort's money had come from right-wing California industrialist Patrick Frawley, the President of Technicolor, who made the mistake of telling the press that his money would
go a lot farther in Idaho than in a big State like California, and that Church's recall would send a message to other liberal politicians, especially those who opposed the Vietnam War (like Church). Frawley's remarks were given wide circulation in Idaho, and the people rebelled so strongly against the petitions that many Birchers were afraid to sign the petitions themselves. The petitioners collected only 135 signatures statewide, according to Church, and the drive fizzled.

Resentment over the recall drive carried over into Church's election the next year, and he won by his largest majority. In 1974, he was again elected, this time by a 57 percent margin. Church is the first Democrat in Idaho's history to be elected to a Senate seat more than once. Church's popularity probably helped Democrat Cecil Andrus get elected in 1970 and 1974.

When Church entered the Senate, he was placed on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, even though he had requested Foreign Relations. He then made the mistake of voting to liberalize the Senate's filibuster rule, against the orders of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Johnson did not speak to Church for six months. Then, Church redeemed himself in LBJ's eyes by adding a jury trial amendment to a pending civil rights bill, which enabled the bill to pass without a filibuster. Johnson took Church off the Post Office Committee and put him on the McClellan racketeers committee, and as soon as an opening appeared, Church went onto the Foreign Relations Committee.

In 1965, Church changed his mind about the Vietnam War and began his opposition. This brought on another confrontation with LBJ, who warned Church
that Borah had made a mistake in predicting that World War II would not happen just weeks before Germany invaded Poland. LBJ also warned Church that new dam projects for Idaho would be cut off if he didn't change his mind. Church stuck to his guns, and eventually won back LBJ's friendship through his good humor.

In spite of Johnson's claims, Church says that Borah was misunderstood. Borah, he says, was against foreign entanglements in the same way George Washington was, that he was a great believer in international law as the best way to solve international conflicts, and that Borah was in favor of recognition of the Soviet Union long before FDR actually recognized that nation. Here, Church draws a parallel with his urgings for the recognition of Red China, which Nixon finally did.

In the spring of 1972, Church became, along with John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the sponsors of the Cooper-Church amendment, which would have cut off funds for the Vietnam War at the end of 1972. Church did not advocate that South Vietnam be abandoned, but he did push for the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, and from the sea around Vietnam and the sky above it. He did say that the U.S. should continue to give the same material aid to the south that the Russians and Chinese gave in the North.

In 1971, Church led the fight to reject the $4.2 billion foreign aid appropriation requested by the Nixon Administration. To Nixon's embarrassment, the Senate cut $1 billion off the appropriation, in the first time a foreign aid appropriation had been returned to the White House with a lower
figure than requested in 20 years. The Senate's rejection of the appropriation followed a speech by Church in which he argued that American foreign aid was doing considerable harm. He said that American foreign aid had been used to prop up dictators and enrich the already rich of recipient nations, while further impoverishing the already poor of those nations and suppressing revolutions that should have been permitted to explode. He criticized the foreign aid program as expensive and mismanaged, and the only real purpose of foreign aid was to further the interests of American overseas investors and suppliers.

He went on to criticize the programs of the Agency for International Development (AID) by recalling that AID's director had stated in hearings that 93 percent of the AID appropriation was spent with suppliers in the U.S., and that the countries which were receiving AID assistance were in debt by $22 billion to the U.S. Church said that political stability, which is an AID criterion for assistance, had been promoted primarily to protect American investors, and that in Latin America, U.S. companies were taking out $2 in dividends for each dollar of new investment. Worst of all, said Church, the American taxpayer is bearing the cost of investment abroad, since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which is backed by the federal government, insures American companies abroad.

Church also stated that he opposed the military assistance program, and that it should be curtailed.

Church has constantly voted for reductions in domestic military spending. He voted in favor of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in favor of nonprolif-
eration in 1969, and in favor of ending military assistance to Greece. He also voted for the Hatfield amendment to end the draft, the Proxmire-Mathias amendment to place a $68 billion defense spending ceiling in 1971, in favor of the Gravel amendment to cancel underground tests at Amchitka Island and against the Lockheed loan. Church voted to postpone the expenditure of funds for MIRV's, in favor of ending the Navy F-14 aircraft program, against increases in military aid and against the ABM. On conservation, Church has a good record. Environmental purists do not feel that he is one of them, since he tries to compromise at times, and he does not support them at every turn, preferring to take a practical view, since many of Idaho's jobs are oriented toward utilization of natural resources.

He was floor manager for the Wilderness Bill in 1961, which was bitterly opposed by Boise-Cascade and other Idaho industries. The bill, which set aside significant wilderness acreage for recreational use, passed, and Church was reelected.

Church had not decided what to do on the proposed Snake River dam when this information was published. The problem revolves around Hell's Canyon, the deepest gorge in North America, and a shrine to conservationists. A canyon as deep as Hell's Canyon would be ideal for power generation and water storage, which is essential in arid Idaho.

Church's wife once owned half interest in a ranch in the Sawtooth-White Cloud range, but he sold his interest to avoid charges of conflict of interest. Although he realized that he could not get the area designated as a national park, he did move to block the creation of an open-pit mine in the range.
Church has also been criticized for his failure to act quickly on mine safety legislation after the 1972 Sunshine gold mine fire, which killed 91 men. Church's defense was that he wanted to see the results of the investigation of the disaster before making his move. Critics counter that a member of the law firm that represents the owners of the mines is a close political supporter and personal friend of Church's, and that he is afraid to take on the State's mining interests.

Lately, the collapse of the Teton Dam in eastern Idaho has caused some criticism of Church, since he was the Dam's major supporter in Congress. He is a strong opponent of gun control laws. Church is very concerned about the problems of the aged, and has authored several aid bills for the elderly.

While Church did not publish personal statements of assets for several years, he has published most of his contributor lists. In 1968, there was a $50 a plate fundraiser for Church in Boise with Ted Kennedy and Jimmy Durante that brought out 800 paying guests. Poet Archibald McLeish made a major national mailing in behalf of Church and McGovern, which served as a major source of funds for Church, who says that the average contribution was less than $12 (the names on this list are confidential, according to Church). The Church for Senate Committee raised a total of $200,000 for his 1968 race, of which it is estimated that $70,000 came from out-of-state peace groups. The average contribution was about $1. About 15 percent of the total was supplied by union political action funds, although his COPE rating is often around 50 percent.

On May 22, 1974, three executives of the Charles E. Smith Co., a
Washington, D. C. real estate firm, which leases a large number of properties to the federal government, made contributions totaling $2000 to Church. Robert Kogod gave $580, Charles E. Smith gave $1000 and Robert H. Smith gave $500. Some charges have been made that the Smith firm, which is a partnership, is a government contractor, and is barred from making contributions in federal election campaigns by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 611. No indictments have been returned against any of the Smith executives.

On October 27, 1974, five executives of Food Fair Stores in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, gave $500 each to Church's Senate campaign. While Church makes it a habit to solicit funds outside of Idaho, this is an extremely large contribution from one firm, and could attract press attention.

Church's financial statement in the Congressional Record in 1969 showed his assets to be mostly in cash and real estate. He listed their Bethesda home, a family home in Idaho, his wife's half-interest in a guest ranch in the Sawtooth range (since sold) and two cars. In a 1971 newsletter, he said that the major changes in his financial status were the cash from the sale of the ranch interest and the purchase of some municipal bonds. Church is a ramrod-straight, moral man, dedicated to his principles as he perceives them. That does not mean that he does not know how to compromise or bend when the occasion calls for it. When speaking, he has been called a lackluster campaigner, but his speeches get him elected and make a difference in the Senate.

It has been noted that his style has improved somewhat in recent years. Church has been supportive of Israel in the Senate, but has frequently voted
against blanket foreign aid bills which involve Israel. He has been supportive of pro-Israel programs, and he is admired for his role in exposing the oil companies' subservience to the Arab states as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. He could use more exposure in the Jewish community.

The CIA hearings.

On occasion, the material turned up by the Investigations Committee has been of good quality. However, a number of critics have stated that they feel that the Committee has only scratched the surface, and that they should have dug a lot deeper. Leaks from the Church Committee were viewed by many as harmful to the effectiveness of the CIA.

Church has authored a number of articles over the years, mostly for magazines like Nation and New Republic. His articles frequently explain his stands on various issues.

Church is 52. One of his two sons is a Presbyterian minister.

Many Senate watchers in Washington report that Church is not highly respected by his colleagues, is a shallow "boy orator", and that he will wear poorly over a long campaign.

Moreover, he adds little to the ticket. He is from a small state, and helps little with blacks or ethnics. He does have good Jewish ties in the West and since 1962 he has been strident in his opposition to multinationals and American companies in underdeveloped countries.
New Presidential Candidate:

Church: Counting on Democratic Stalemate

Hoping to take advantage of the still unsettled state of Democratic presidential politics, Idaho Sen. Frank Church launched a campaign bid March 18 that will concentrate on late spring primaries, particularly those in western states. Church has had a campaign finance committee in operation since December and has already qualified for federal matching funds.

Church had told aides early in 1975 that he wanted to run, but suspended plans after he was named to head the Select Committee on Governmental Intelligence Gathering Activities. "He didn't want to blow his biggest assignment yet in the Senate," press aide Bill Hall told Congressional Quarterly.

But with the committee finally completing its work—albeit several months behind schedule—Church is finally free to devote himself full time to a race he thinks is still wide open. "We were hoping for a confused result in the early primaries, with no candidate breaking away," said Hall. "And that's what happened."

Church's entry despite urging by Rep. Morris K. Udall, the strongest liberal candidate up to now, will further fracture support in that wing of the party. But the Idaho senator is banking his strategy on attracting committed Democrats who were supporters of other liberals, like Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana, a casualty of the early primaries.

Church plans to compete in caucuses in Colorado May 8 and Utah May 17, but his first major effort in a primary state will be in Nebraska May 11, where 10 other Democrats—including non-candidates Edward M. Kennedy and Hubert H. Humphrey—also appear on the ballot. But perhaps his best opportunity to make himself a force in the contest, observers say, comes May 25 when Idaho, Nevada and Oregon hold a "regional primary" on the same day. Church is also planning to enter the Rhode Island and Montana primaries June 1 and California June 8.

Like Udall, Jackson and other candidates from Congress, Church will try to use his long legislative record to promote his cause. He is currently serving his fourth term in the Senate. Only 51 years old, he is already one of that body's senior Democrats and occupies key seats on committees that influence national policy in a wide variety of fields. Besides chairing the CIA probe, Church heads the Select Committee on Aging and cochairs (with Maryland

Church's Background

Profession: Attorney.
Born: July 25, 1924, Boise, Idaho.
Home: Boise.
Religion: Presbyterian.
Offices: Senate since 1957.
Military: Army, 1942-46; discharged as 1st lieutenant; Bronze Star.
Family: Wife, Bethine Clark; two children.

Republical Charles McC. Mathias Jr. the Special Com mittee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. Church is the third-ranking Democrat on Foreign Relations and second-ranking on Interior and Insular Affairs, which is important to his electoral security in Idaho.

Political Career

One of Church's earliest interests, which later proved useful in politics, was debating. He built up his skills in high school in his hometown of Boise, Idaho, where his father operated a sporting goods store. In his third year at Boise High, Frank won the American Legion national oratorical contest. He used the $4,000 prize to attend Stanford University.

In 1948, while studying law at Harvard, Church became seriously ill with what was later diagnosed as cancer. The prognosis was grave, but radical surgery and an intensive series of X-ray treatments resulted in a complete cure. He recovered in time to receive a law degree from Stanford in 1950.

Returning to Idaho, Church briefly taught public speaking before taking a job as legal counsel for the Idaho Office of Price Stabilization. From 1951 to 1956, he practiced law in Boise, taking time out for periodic forays into local politics. From 1952 to 1954, Church was state president of the Idaho Young Democratic Clubs. He keynoted the 1952 state Democratic convention. The same year, he sought elective office for the first time, running for the Idaho House of Representatives; he was defeated by about 12,000 votes.

Senate Victory

In 1956, Church set his sights on national office and took on Republican Sen. Herman Welker, who was seeking a second term. Welker had a conservative voting record and
Politics had been a strong defender of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R Wis. 1947-57). A political unknown outside Boise, Church began an extensive series of automobile trips to increase his visibility around the state. His travels paid off with a Democratic primary victory over former Sen. Glen H. Taylor (D 1945-51). Taylor was an entertainer, a former singer and one of the most colorful figures in Idaho politics. But his campaign nominated Henry Wallace made him anathema to Idaho Democrats, who dumped him in the 1950 primary. He became the party's Senate nominee again in 1954, but lost overwhelmingly.

The 1956 primary campaign was bitter, with Taylor accusing Church of being a "captive candidate of corporation politicians." In disputed returns, the political newcomer won the Democratic nomination by 200 votes. Taylor refused to accept the result and sought evidence of fraud or error in the tally, meanwhile preparing for an independent campaign for the seat.

In the general election, Church effectively attacked Welker's conservative voting record and opposition to the proposed Hells Canyon dam. Other major issues were development of industry in Idaho, reclamation projects for desert lands and aid to the aged. Welker had won only a minority of the vote in the Republican Senate primary, and his belated attempts to portray himself as a moderate other issues vital to Idaho, was the forum Church used for strengthening himself politically during his early years in the Senate. His maiden speech, six months after taking office, was a detailed and impassioned plea for federal construction of the Hells Canyon dam.

In 1962, Church won favorable publicity back home for his defense of Bruces Eddy, a $186-million dam project on the Clearwater River in Idaho. He fought for it strongly in the Senate, only to see it threatened in conference as House conferees sought to delete funds from an appropriations bills. To discourage them, Church threatened to tie up the entire bill in a filibuster. "If they strike out Bruces Eddy," he warned, "I shall hold the Senate floor as long as God gives me the strength to stand."

Keynoter
Because of his speaking ability and the party's desire to show off a promising newcomer, Church was chosen as the keynoter of the 1960 Democratic national convention. It was his first national exposure, and he planned carefully for it. Before the convention, Church informed reporters that he would deliver "a fighting speech directed at the appalling failures of the Republican administration, at home and abroad."

The speech itself, however, demonstrated a potential weakness in Church's speaking skills— a capacity for verbal overkill and rhetorical flourishes at the expense of substance. It did not live up to advance expectations. Recalling it in a 1975 interview, Church said that "all I can say in my defense is—I didn't know any better."

Later Campaigns
In 1962, Church faced his most serious electoral threat in Idaho from Republican Jack Hawley, the same candidate who had beaten him in 1952 in the state house race. Hawley employed the themes Republicans were to use repeatedly and unsuccessfully against Church in future elections—that he did not care about local problems and was too involved in foreign affairs. But Church defeated Hawley with almost 55

Congressional Quarterly Vote Study Scores ...

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1. During President Nixon's tenure in 1974.
2. During President Ford's tenure in 1974.
Covering Church's 19 Years in Senate

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*Explanation of Studies, p. 107.

No ratings in those years.

In 1968, the Republican nominee was Rep. George V. Hansen (R Idaho 1965-69, 1975-79), who based his campaign on accusations that Church was giving aid to the North Vietnamese through his votes in the Senate. The effort proved much too shrill for Idaho voters, who re-elected Church by 59,000 votes, the largest margin received by an Idaho senator except for Republican William E. Borah in 1924.

Church's fourth-term victory in 1974 was by a more modest 36,068 votes over Bob Smith, a former aide to Rep. Steven D. Symms (R Idaho), who campaigned on the general theme of opposition to "big government."

Senator Record

Idaho voters have allowed their senators to pursue a broad range of interests—so long as local problems receive prompt attention. Church has been able to take advantage of this freedom to exert influence in many policy areas.

Foreign Affairs

His best-known work in the Senate has been in foreign affairs, which had been the special interest of his idol, Borah, one of the leading isolationists of the 1920s. A major reason for Church's influence is his seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Church has been consistently skeptical about the effectiveness of the foreign aid program and has frequently offered amendments to reduce or restrict the scope of authorizations or appropriations. His activity in this area has caused him no problems in fiscally conservative Idaho.

Church's views on most foreign policy issues have been broadly internationalist. He was a strong supporter of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and advocated strengthening America's ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Church has favored use of America's military power in specific instances in which he thought the national interest was clearly at stake, but he has argued for regular re-examination of foreign policy and against excessive commitments abroad. He voted for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to take action against the North Vietnamese and made a speech in favor of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. He voted for funds for military operations in South Vietnam in 1965, but cautioned that his vote could not be construed as support for the use of American ground forces.

By 1966, Church had moved into a position of general opposition to Johnson administration policies in South Vietnam. He urged a bombing halt and cautioned the President against over-extending American commitments to the Saigon regime. "No nation—not even our own—possesses an arsenal so large, or a treasury so rich, as to damp down the fires of smoldering revolution throughout the whole of the awakening world," he said.

During the Nixon administration, Church was a cosponsor of the most significant anti-war amendments of the period.

In 1970, he and Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) sponsored an amendment to prohibit the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia. Introduced in the wake of the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops, the amendment touched off a six-month debate over whether...
Congress could use its budget authority to limit the
President's war-making powers. It finally became law in
revised form late that year.

In 1972, an amendment by Church and Sen. Clifford P.
Case (R. N.J.) was the vehicle for an attempt to terminate
American military activities throughout Southeast Asia. It
was defeated after intensive debate. Both proposals
however identified Church with the anti-war movement
and gained him wide respect among liberals.

The Aged
As chairman of the Select Committee on Aging since
1971, Church has been active in the Senate on behalf of
senior citizens. Although the committee does not have the
authority to report legislation, it conducts investigations and
make recommendations. Church has played a significant
role in pushing through legislation extending Social
Security and Medicaid benefits and keeping them in step
with increases in the cost of living.

Investigations
Church's principal efforts on Foreign Relations in the
past three years have been as chairman of the Multinational
Corporations Subcommittee, which was created in 1972. In
1973, Church conducted widely publicized hearings into the
role of the CIA in its efforts to block the election of Marxist
Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The subcommittee
called for a more active oversight role by Congress in supervising the CIA. Church's performance in the hearings
reportedly was a factor in his being considered for the chairmanship of the 1975 Senate CIA probe.

In 1974, Church took after the multi-national oil corpora-
tions and their Arab clients. He sponsored an amendment
to the 1974 trade act requiring the government to gather more information on the foreign activities of the
multinationals.

Church's conduct of the CIA inquiry has been cautious,
an indication of his concern over future legislation that
could come out of the probe rather than in using it as a
launching pad for the presidency. He compromised with
committee Republicans and strove to avoid confrontation with President Ford, but vehemently resisted White House
attempts to prevent a probe of possible CIA involvement in
assassinations. After Ford juggled personnel in the country's
defense and intelligence agencies in November 1975, Church led the opposition to the confirmation of former
Rep. George Bush (R. Texas 1967-71) as director of the CIA,
but Bush was confirmed Jan. 27.

Candidacy
Beginning his campaign effort in Idaho City, Idaho,
March 18, Church denounced the "leadership of weakness
and fear" of the Ford administration and promised that
"the first priority on our political agenda is the restora-
tion of the federal government to legitimacy in the eyes of the
people.

Citing the "twenty years of training" in national issues
he had accumulated in the Senate, Church discussed his
service on that chamber's Foreign Relations, Interior and
Aging panels. He called for a more active oversight role by Congress in selected issues.

Following are Church's ratings since Congressional
Quarterly began publishing them in 1960, plus a com-
posite ACA score for 1957-59:

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1. Failure to vote lowers score.
2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.
3. Percentages compiled by CO from information provided by groups.
4. ACA score includes some votes from 1969.
5. Score for rates on selected issues since 1957.

Church Staff, Advisers

National chairman: Carl Burke, a Boise lawyer who managed Church's four successful Senate races.

Special assistant: Verda Barnes, Church's former administrative assistant.

Campaign organization: Peter Curtin.

Press secretary: Bill Hall.

Church's Interest-Group Ratings

Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)—ADA ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the ADA position on selected issues.

National Farmers Union (NFU)—NFU ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the NFU position.

AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)—COPE ratings reflect the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with or was paired in favor of the COPE position.

Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)—ACA ratings record the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with the ACA position.

Following are Church's ratings since Congressional House began publishing them in 1960, plus a composite ACA score for 1957-59:

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1. Failure to vote lowers score.
2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.
3. Percentages compiled by CO from information provided by groups.
4. ACA score includes some votes from 1969.
5. Score for rates on selected issues since 1957.

—By Matt Pinkus