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FORD THEMES

(1) Peace

- First President since Eisenhower able to seek Presidency without a single American fighting overseas
- Achieved and maintained because of affirmative diplomatic actions (Sinai, SALT, Rhodesia) and because of strong defense

(2) Respect for Leadership Role

- World now respects U.S. for resuming its role as Free World leader (when Ford took office that role had been tarnished by Vietnam and shortchanged defense budget)
- sought new paths to peace: Middle East, SALT, Africa
- sought restructured world economy (Rambouillet, Puerto Rico)

(3) Strength of Alliances

- Took office at time when allies doubted our will and leadership
- Now alliances with Atlantic Community and Japan are stronger than ever

(4) Defense Now Strong; Cuts Would Weaken

- Reversal of 10 year pattern of Congressional defense cuts (\$50 billion) -- now largest defense budget ever and we are now second to none militarily.

- Only through increased spending can we preserve peace
- Carter did call for \$15 billion cut; his present \$7 billion proposed cut would weaken nation's defense

(5) Experience and Proven Record

- Protecting nation's security requires experienced person; Carter only low-level Navy officer
- Last two years have provided peace and progress in Middle East, Southern Africa, SALT, human rights; Carter has no record, only countless promises

(6) Carter Deceptive in First Debate

- Made 14 distortions and inconsistencies
- Key ones:
 - lied about \$15 billion proposed cut
 - wrong about overthrow of Chile
 - wrong about Ford's support of facility at Portsmouth
 - wrong about arms to Saudi Arabia
 - wrong in saying Ford supported Arab boycott
 - wrong about U.S. not breadbasket of world
 - wrong about State and Defense approval of Mayaguez

ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND VOTING RECORD
OF REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD, NOMINEE FOR
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

[excerpted from]

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF GERALD R. FORD TO BE THE VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 26, 1973

Serial No. 16

ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND VOTING RECORD
 OF REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD, NOMINEE FOR
 VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY AND VOTING RECORD OF REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD, NOMINEE FOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

A REPORT PREPARED ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, OCTOBER 25, 1973

INTRODUCTION

This report analyzes the philosophy and voting record of Representative Gerald R. Ford, nominee for Vice President of the United States, on major issues before the American people during his service of 25 years in the House of Representatives. It was prepared by the Congressional Research Service under instructions from the Committee on Rules and Administration of the United States Senate.

The issue profiles are based overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, on remarks made, legislation introduced, and votes cast by Representative Ford in the House of Representatives from 1949 through 1973. Because of the need for timely delivery, the Congressional Record served as the principal, although not exclusive, source of factual information. All sources are cited fully and specifically. It should be noted, furthermore, that the report focuses on major rather than on all issues that arose in the 25-year period. In addition to the detailed table of contents, an alphabetical index is appended at the end of the text.

In accordance with long-standing directives from its oversight committees, the Congressional Research Service does not provide personal information about, or the legislative record of, individual Members of Congress except at the specific request or with the specific approval of the Member concerned. Representative Ford gave the Service such approval before this report was prepared.

Dr. Joseph B. Gorman, of the Government and General Research Division, coordinated the preparation of the report, to which all subject divisions of the Service contributed.

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Director, Congressional Research Service.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY

From the earliest days of his Congressional career, Congressman Ford can be placed with the reasonably balanced budget school of fiscal policy. Virtually without deviation, he has favored reducing spending and balancing the budget. He has resisted increasing the share of the public sector at the expense of the private and frequently has advocated cutting taxes within the structures of a balanced budget. Rep. Ford has also stressed the need for Congress to be more active in using the power of the purse—both with regard to individual programs and overall spending limitations. Since the 1968 election he has defended both fiscal conservatism and mounting deficits. He has done both through a combination of attributing economic disruption on previous administrations and pointing up past deficits.

Congressional Responsibility: In 1957, Rep. Ford opposed a Congressional move to ask President Eisenhower for recommendations on where to cut the budget. Pointing out the rapid rate of increase in the legislature's own budget, Rep. Ford stressed the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to control expenditures. He strongly criticized attempts to "pass the buck to somebody else." (CR Mar.

(721)

12, 1957, p. 3507.) In 1967, however, Rep. Ford introduced House Res. 407 . . . "respectfully requesting . . . [President Johnson] . . . to reconsider his fiscal 1968 budget and to indicate where substantial reductions in spending could best be made." (CR, June 8, 1967, p. 15190.) At the same time, however, he favored imposing a spending ceiling rather than simply leaving it up to the Executive branch (CR, Oct. 3, 1967, p. 27664).

Balanced Budget: Congressman Ford has never evinced a blind allegiance to the balanced budget. Although always advocating fiscal discipline, he has not drawn a direct analogy between a family or private business and the operation of the Federal Government. On the other hand, deficits have variously been viewed with disparagement or embarrassment. With a brief insertion in the Congressional Record in 1971, Rep. Ford put himself behind the full employment budget concept. The concept, which is fully compatible with both budget surpluses and deficits, was cited by Mr. Ford as another one of the "sound management principles" that have come "from the Nixon Administration." (CR, Feb. 1, 1971, p. 1266).

FEDERAL FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS

For the past 25 years, U.S. farm price support operations have had as their recognized objective the stabilization of farm prices and farm income in fair relation to other sectors of the economy. Price support programs have been heralded by advocates as the guiding incentive behind impressive farm production gains, and have been attacked by critics as the stumbling block to a free farm market, a cause of overproduction, and an unnecessary drain of taxpayer's money. At issue since 1954, when one of the after-effects of the Korean conflict proved to be a serious decline in reserve stocks of agricultural commodities, has been the controversy between a fixed, high support level and a flexible lower support level. Congressman Ford's position has favored flexible supports at the lower level.

Since 1949 when Mr. Ford supported an amendment to maintain rigid price supports¹ he has been on record as favoring the concept of flexible farm price support levels. In 1970, when the Omnibus Farm Bill reflected the Administration's policy toward modified production controls and contained a provision to limit subsidy payments to \$55,000 per crop, Mr. Ford voted for passage of the bill.² In explaining his support for the measure, he said that though it contained features he thought to be unsound, he favored it as a compromise measure that would accomplish the broad objective—which he supported—of providing the agricultural subsidies necessary for a sound agricultural economy.³ In 1973 the question of limiting subsidy payments were considered again. Mr. Ford supported a \$20,000 payment limitation, but voted against one amendment designed to limit payments to \$20,000 per farm because he felt, in the case of the particular amendment that "rigid, inflexible limitations (would) hurt us rather than help us in the production of our necessary food."⁴

IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS

Congressman Ford has generally supported restraints on the budget, including Presidential discretion in spending funds.

In 1962, concerning an effort by the House Committee on Armed Services to mandate the spending of \$491 million on the RS-70 aircraft, Ford was "unalterably opposed" to such a directive. He gave three reasons. Mandatory language (1) invaded the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the President as Commander in Chief, (2) usurped the appropriating authority of the Committee on Appropriations, and (3) threatened to create "inflexibility" in the management of the program which "undoubtedly would have led or conceivably would have led to harm and detriment to the program rather than helping and assisting it. Inflexibility in such a complicated weapon system would hamstring the responsible management in the Air Force." (Cong. Rec., v. 108, March 21, 1962: 4714)

The House Armed Services Committee charged that the Eisenhower Administration—from fiscal 1956 through fiscal 1961—had failed in 13 instances to do what Congress had asked. Ford defended the record of the Eisenhower

¹ Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, *Congressional Quarterly*, p. 53a.

² *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, XXVI, 1970, p. 53H.

³ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 116, Part 20, 91st Congress, 2nd session, August 4, 1970, Page 27146-27147.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 119, No. 106, p. H5360, July 10, 1973.

Administration by saying that "during this same period of time the executive branch of the Government has followed the recommendations of the Congress 28 times in toto" (*id.*) While Ford agreed that "Nothing is more obnoxious in my opinion than to have someone in the executive branch of the Government, whether he is in the Defense Department or the Department of Agriculture, place a halo over his head and decide on his own that all the wisdom in the world exists in his Department," he cautioned against placing restrictions on the President. He was "jealous that the Congress not invade the jurisdiction of the Chief Executive. . . . I do not want the Congress to usurp and take from the Chief Executive authority that is his." (*id.* at 4715).

In 1971, when the Nixon Administration was being criticized for withholding approximately \$12 billion, Ford placed in the Congressional Record a table showing "frozen funds" from 1959 to 1971. He quoted from the U.S. News & World Report to further emphasize that impoundment dated back many years, at least to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Moreover, he pointed out that Democratic party leaders did not raise their voices against impoundment when it was carried out by Democratic Administrations: "If it was bad then it is bad now. If it was good then it is good now. The fact that the gentleman did not object to this practice when Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did it and is objecting now when President Nixon does it puts a rather political coloring on the comments made by the gentleman from Massachusetts." (Cong. Rec., v. 117, April 27, 1971: 12087).

Spending Ceiling in 1972.—Ford introduced H.R. 16338 in 1972 to provide for a spending ceiling of \$250 billion for fiscal 1973. The bill permitted the President to "reserve from expenditure and net lending, from appropriations or other obligational authority heretofore or hereafter made available, such amounts as may be necessary to effectuate" the spending ceiling. When that proposal was included as Title II of the public debt limit bill, he supported the notion of a spending ceiling: "I think the public will demand this kind of limitation. They want the President to hold the line on spending. They want this Congress to do it." (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 118, October 10, 1972: H9377)

On the Mahon amendment to the public debt limit bill, to subject Presidential impoundments to congressional review and action, Ford voted against the amendment (*id.* at H9401). It was "too little and it is far too late. The Mahon amendment will not come into effect until January of next year." (*id.* at H9377) Ford voted for the public debt limit bill, which included the spending ceiling and authorized the President to withhold whatever funds were necessary to preserve the ceiling. (*id.* at H9402)

1972-73 Impoundments.—The Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP) and the Water Bank Program were both terminated on January 26, 1973. The amount of \$210.5 million was impounded from REAP, while \$11.4 million was withheld from Water Bank. According to the Department of Agriculture, the action was legal in that "the legislation authorizes but does not require that the programs be carried out." H.R. 2107 was introduced to require that the programs be carried out. During debate on the measure, Ford stated that the President had decided that "in order to achieve a degree of fiscal responsibility, holding the line of \$250 billion for this fiscal year, he has to make some downward adjustments in certain programs, and REAP is one." (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, February 7, 1973: H807) Ford voted for a substitute amendment which would have removed the mandatory language (*id.* at H831). After that amendment failed, he voted against the bill (*id.* at H838).

The Rural Electrification Administration's loan program was terminated by the Department of Agriculture on December 28, 1972. This action resulted in the impoundment of \$456 million. The House considered H.R. 5683, which was designed to reinstate the program, accepting some of the Administration's recommendations but also adding language mandating that the program be carried out. The Administration substitute, which would have removed the mandatory feature, was defeated. Ford voted for the substitute. (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, April 4, 1973; H2422) Ford voted against final passage of the bill (*id.* at H2424).

On January 26, 1973, the Nixon Administration terminated the rural water and waste disposal program, impounding \$120 million. H.R. 3298 was introduced to make the program mandatory by replacing the phrase "is authorized to" by the word "shall." Ford did not vote on the bill, which was later vetoed by President Nixon. Ford supported the veto, saying "Let us reiterate the two points.

No. 1, we get better service, more quickly, out of EPA and rural development than we would get out of the rural water and sewer grant program. No. 2, this bill is just one of a number of spending bills which are coming down the line. The Senate did a good job last week: it is our turn to do an equally good job on this budget busting program by sustaining the President. . . ." (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, April 10, 1973: H2545) The veto was sustained by the House (*id.* at H2552).

Impoundment Control Bill. Ford expressed his preference for making impoundment control part of a general budget reform package. (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, July 24, 1973: H6542) On recorded votes, he supported an amendment which would have exempted from impoundment control procedures those impoundments which the Comptroller General determined to be in accordance with the Antideficiency Act (*id.* at H6573). He supported an amendment which would have required both Houses to disapprove an impoundment rather than a single House (*id.* at H6577). He opposed an amendment to require impoundments to cease after 60 days unless ratified by both Houses. That amendment contrasted with the pending bill which allowed impoundments to continue unless specifically rejected by one House (*id.* at H6603). In a floor statement, he supported an amendment to reduce the fiscal 1974 spending ceiling from \$267.1 billion to \$263.3 billion (*id.* at H6607).

In other votes on the impoundment control bill, he opposed an amendment to reduce the spending ceiling still further to \$260 billion (*id.* at H6611-12) and supported the \$263.3 billion ceiling (*id.* at H6612). He supported a motion to recommit the bill (*id.* at H6625) and voted against the bill on final passage (*id.* at H6626).

INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS

Federal Revenue Sharing With State and Local Governments:

Rep. Gerald Ford has consistently supported proposals which would share a portion of Federal tax revenues with State and local governments with few or no Federal "strings" attached on the expenditure of these funds by recipient governments.

In the 90th Congress, he introduced H.R. 4074 which authorized Federal tax sharing with the States which would be financed from a cutback in Federal aid funding.

He supported the Nixon Administration's general revenue sharing proposals submitted to the 91st and 92d Congresses and cosponsored each of the bills introduced incorporating these recommendations (H.R. 13982, 91st Congress and H.R. 4187, 92d Congress.). Rep. Ford supported Nixon's general revenue sharing proposal. On August 13, 1969 he stated: "As a supplement to other Federal aid, revenue sharing can be the catalyst for problem solving on a scale we have never yet witnessed in America, problem-solving at the local level on the basis of priorities viewed as local people see them in their own communities." (CR, Aug. 13, 1969, p. 23S35.)

During the 92d Congress, Rep. Ford voted for passage of H.D. 14370, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972—which represented a modification of a proposal which had been submitted by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Wilbur Mills as an alternative to the Nixon Administration general revenue sharing proposal (H.R. 4187, S. 680, 92d Congress). This bill was signed into law on October 20, 1972 (Public Law 92-512).

Rep. Ford has also supported the Nixon Administration special revenue sharing proposals submitted to the 92d and 93d Congresses. During the 92d Congress he introduced H.R. 6770—the Law Enforcement Revenue Sharing Act of 1971, which incorporated President Nixon's special revenue sharing proposal for law enforcement. He also cosponsored other Nixon Administration special revenue sharing measures: H.R. 6181, the Manpower Revenue Sharing Act of 1971 and H.R. 8853, the Urban Community Development Revenue Sharing Act of 1971 and issued statements advocating enactment of the President's Education and Rural Community Development special revenue sharing proposals.

During the 93d Congress, Rep. Ford has expressed his support for President Nixon's recommendations set forth in his community development message transmitted to Congress on March 8, 1973 (House Doc. 93-57). He made the following statement: "In urging adoption of the Better Communities Act, I would underscore a point made by the President—that no city would receive less funds for community development under that act than it has received under categorical grant programs. And I am most enthusiastic about the fact that the Better Communities Act substitutes local decision-making for so-called bureaucratic wisdom." (CR, March 12, 1973, p. H1636.)

Representative Ford was not confronted with the issue of public debt limit legislation until 1954, at which time the first debt limit increase since 1946 was enacted. Rep. Ford's voting on debt limit legislation has followed a distinctive pattern of first supporting, then opposing and in recent years again supporting legislation to increase the public debt limit.

From 1954 to early 1962 there were recorded votes in the House on eight bills to increase the public debt limit, Rep. Ford voted for all of these measures. From mid 1962 to 1967 there were recorded votes on nine measures to raise the public debt limit, Rep. Ford voted against all of these bills. From 1969 to present there have been 7 recorded votes on bills to increase the public debt limit, Rep. Ford was absent for one vote (H.R. 15390, June 27, 1972) and voted affirmatively on the other six measures.

On March 19, 1969, (CR March 19, 1969, pp. 6804-5), Rep. Ford explained his voting pattern on public debt limit legislation on the House floor. In effect, he said that he chose to support President Kennedy during financial crises in 1961 and 1962, but then changed his view with the hope of eliciting some actions in Congress which would assure greater fiscal responsibility. He felt that this had been achieved with the enactment of a spending limitation and tax measure to raise additional taxes (Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968). Therefore he could again support legislation to raise the public debt limit.

TAX REFORM

Congressman Ford has always indicated a primary concern for collecting sufficient taxes to match expenditures; however, in recent years he has expressed increased concern that consideration also be given to the effect of tax changes on economic conditions as well. Over the years, he has indicated a moderate approach to tax reform.

During 1949-52, he did not support major tax bills but during the remainder of the Fifties he generally supported major tax legislation (voting for the major tax revision in 1954). He opposed the Revenue Act of 1962 (which introduced the investment tax credit) and the 1964 act reducing taxes. He voted for the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, imposing the surcharge. He supported the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue Act of 1971.

One of Congressman Ford's earliest tax proposals (subsequently enacted into law) was nonrecognition of gain on the sale of a residence when the proceeds were used to buy another residence. In connection with this proposal he commented on a proposal to increase the capital gains tax: "There may be some need and justification for an overall increase in this rate." (CR, Feb. 28, 1951, p. A1049).

His general position on taxation is typified by a statement on the 1963 tax cut proposal: "... the President must be selective and make a decision between unlimited spending and a reasonable limit on expenditures..." (CR, Sept. 25, 1963, p. 18093). During the late Sixties, his statements increasingly reflected concern over the effects of tax legislation on economic conditions. In 1967, in support of the investment tax credit, he stated: "There are ominous signs of an economic slowdown this year. Unless our course is redirected decisively we may well face the paradox of a recession with both increased inflation and increased taxation." (CR, Jan. 23, 1967, p. 1189.) In same speech he stated that the President had not indicated where budget reductions would be made. When speaking in favor of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, he said: "Tax increases are painful... But the alternative before us is far worse. Galloping inflation and a major recession—that is the alternative... If we future sharp restraints on Federal spending now, tax relief will be possible in the future... Basically, I take the tax increase to get the spending restraints." (CR, June 20, 1968, p. 18184).

Rep. Ford urged the elimination of the investment tax credit in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, as an aid for curbing inflation, and also remarked: "The 'big news' in the President's tax reform message should not obscure other highly meaningful proposals—elimination of income taxes for Americans at the poverty level, the imposition of what in effect is a minimum income tax for a small group of high-income individuals, and the closing of a number of income tax loopholes." (CR, April 21, 1969, p. 9686). He once more expressed his basic concern that revenues should balance expenditures. (CR, June 30, 1969, p. 17791.)

In regard to the current tax reform issues, Rep. Ford has stated: "As for tax reform, I am opposed to wholesale repeal of so-called tax loopholes, with some of them to be put back on the books. I therefore feel the better approach to tax reform is to consider the various provisions of the tax code without the sledgehammer approach to broad scale repeal." (Roll Call, Jan. 11, 1973, p. 1.)

FOREIGN TRADE

Congressman Gerald Ford has generally supported legislation designed to liberalize trade with our foreign trading partners through the reduction of tariffs. He has also supported efforts to protect domestic industries and workers from trade related dislocations through adjustment assistance programs.

Mr. Ford voted in favor of various bills extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreement program in 1949, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1958. In 1962, however, Mr. Ford voted to recommit to committee the landmark Trade Expansion Act and substitute for it a one year extension of the expiring Trade Agreement program; when this was rejected by the House, he then supported the Administration sponsored bill. He made no statement in the Congressional Record to explain his action (Congressional Record, Vol. 108, pp. 12089, 12090).

After the beginning of the Nixon Administration, Mr. Ford, as Republican minority leader, announced his support for the Administration trade bill of 1969, claiming that "There is no question that movement toward free trade is necessary if we are to move toward the much desired goal of a favorable balance of trade." (Cong. Record, Vol. 115, p. 34623). Late in 1970, when this legislation was up for a final House vote after certain protectionist amendments imposing statutory import quotas on textiles and footwear had been added, Ford opposed a move by House liberals which would have permitted the possible deletion of some of these controversial amendments. Pres. Nixon had been neutral on this issue (Cong. Record, Vol. 116, pp. 38227, 38228).

The Congressional Record has no mention of Mr. Ford's views on the pending Trade Reform Act of 1973. Last year, however, he said that "it would be catastrophic and disastrous for this country to retreat into a new round of isolationism which is represented by the Burke-Hartke bill" (Cong. Record (daily), Vol. 118, p. E5305).

GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND CONSUMERS

Representative Ford has generally favored passive Federal policies toward the American marketplace for most of his twenty-five years in Congress.

In 1966, he summarized his approach to many of the Great Society's programs in remarks challenging President Johnson's rent subsidy proposals:

"I fail to understand why Congress has so much faith in nonexistent regulations that supposedly insure that this program will benefit truly low-income families." (3/29/66 Cong. Record 7107)

Citing what he regarded as the failure of an earlier subsidy effort, the Michigan legislator also cautioned the House of Representatives about the program's possible impact on taxes and the then accelerating inflation. Yet, while expressing confidence in the free enterprise system, he joined a majority of his colleagues in approving the Lockheed loan guarantee. (H.R. 8432, 7/30/71, H.7519F) and supported the Nixon Administration in its unsuccessful bid to extend massive public financing of the SST (H.R. 9667, 7/29/71, H.9384F.)

Seldom debated before the mid-Sixties, the difficult problems of Consumer Protection afford no simple index of Mr. Ford's thinking. The Minority Leader in 1968 spoke with pride of the passage of important Truth-in-Lending legislation (5/20/68, Cong. Record, 14106). In 1969, Mr. Ford enthusiastically endorsed President Nixon's proposed creation of an Office of Consumer Affairs, arguing that it would give consumers "full protection under the laws... complete representation in Washington and access to product testing information which Federal agencies have gathered over the years." Rep. Ford later voted for the establishment of a consumer protection agency and against limiting this agency to a purely advisory part in Federal policy-making (H.R. 10835, 10/14/71, H.9571f.). Subsequently, he opposed efforts to broaden the agency's authority to argue in a wider range of suits before other government agencies. He also supported the 1972 compensation to commercial interests injured by the Food and Drug Administration's ban of cyclamates in food products (H.R. 13366, 7/24/72).

Congressman Ford's record on consumer affairs has been scored uneven by the Consumer Federation of America, a national association of consumer groups which establishes its own norms for rating Members of Congress.

HOUSING

Over the course of his career Rep. Gerald Ford has opposed many of the important housing and community development proposals before the Congress. Except for the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 he has consistently taken a position of minimal Federal involvement in this field. His support of the 1968 bill and the House version of the 1970 Housing and Urban Development bill, however does seem to indicate a move away from his position of opposition to "drastic changes or innovations in our credit facilities"⁵ first stated in 1949.

Rep. Ford consistently voted against housing legislation designed to assist low and moderate income families between 1949, when he voted in favor of an amendment to delete a section providing low rent public housing, and 1967, when he voted in favor of deleting program funds for model cities. In 1954 while voting for the urban renewal bill, Rep. Ford voted against recommitting the bill to committee with instructions to increase assistance for low income housing. He apparently broke with his previous position, and the majority of Republicans, in 1968 voting in favor of the Housing and Urban Development bill, even though it contained provisions for interim services, tenant services, and new-town programs which he opposed. He did, however, "put on notice [those favoring these services] that when the appropriation bill for funding of those programs comes to the floor of the House for consideration, we will do everything we possibly can to prevent any funding for those programs."⁶ Rep. Ford has made no reference to the subsidized housing programs (Sec. 235 and 236) established in this bill that have subsequently come under strong Administration attack. In 1970, the last year there was major housing legislation before the House, Rep. Ford voted in favor of the House bill, but against the conference report which contained new town proposals he opposed.

MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Rep. Ford's position on minimum wage legislation has been fairly consistent throughout his 25 years in the House of Representatives. In the seven times this issue has been actively considered and voted on in the House since his election in 1949, he has consistently voted with the basic Republican position which opposed measures proposing increases in the minimum wage considered too large or too rapid.

In 1949, his first year in Congress, he voted for a more moderate Lucas substitute bill to the Lesinski bill as did the vast majority of Republicans in the House.

In 1955, he voted for an increase in the minimum wage as did a substantial majority of both major parties in the House.

In 1960 and 1961, Rep. Ford supported and voted for the Kitchin-Ayres substitute bill to the Committee's bill. The substitute reduced the increase in the minimum wage rate proposed in the Committee's bill. When the bill reported out of the House Senate Joint Conference re-instated the original higher rate in 1961, he voted against the Conference Report.

In the 1966 Amendments, the less liberal Ayres-Morris Amendment was supported and voted for by Rep. Ford along with most other Republican Congressmen.

More recently, he continued his call for moderation in increasing and expanding coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act both in 1972 and in 1973. In the 1972 stalemate between the House and Senate versions of the FLSA Amendments, he urged his colleagues in the House, and especially Congressman Dent, Subcommittee Chairman, to go to conference with the Senate in order to get a minimum wage bill enacted (See C.R. page H7034-5, H8635, 1972). In that year, the Erlenborn substitute bill proposing a lesser increase, no major extension of coverage, and a youth differential supported by the Administration, was passed in the House and was supported by Mr. Ford. However, he voted against the resolution to go to conference on the bill.

The latest legislative activity on minimum wages (HR 7935, 93rd Congress) saw Rep. Ford vote with the Administration's position supported by a large majority of the House Republicans. He voted for the Administration-supported Erlenborn substitute with the youth differential, which was defeated, voted for deletion of provisions extending coverage to government workers and was against final passage of the bill containing the higher rate, extension of coverage and

other liberalizing provisions. In keeping with the Administration and most Republicans in the House, he voted against the Conference Report and for sustaining the President's veto of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1973 (H.R. 7935).

STRIKES CREATING, OR WITH THE POTENTIAL TO CREATE, A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Representative Ford's earlier position is indicated by a 1967 statement on the House floor: "Mr. Speaker, I never thought when I came to the Congress 18½ years ago that I would ever in any circumstance, or under any situation, vote for some form of Government interference in a process of free collective bargaining. I have said repeatedly in communications with my constituents and others, by word of mouth or by letter, that I thought this was a principle that had to be upheld under any circumstances. I inwardly feel that that principle is right today." (CR, bound ed., 7/17/67, p. 19039.) On that day, July 17, 1967, Mr. Ford voted for a bill to end a two-day nationwide rail strike, which became P.L. 90-54 (81 Stat. 122). His reason for this statutory interference in the process of free collective bargaining was that "there is another principle that is of a higher order—the necessity of a free government and its free people to protect itself at home and abroad." (CR, bound ed., 7/17/67, p. 19039.)

On February 27, 1970, President Nixon sent recommendations to the Congress to deal with national emergency labor disputes in the transportation industries. His proposals were incorporated in major bills introduced in 1970, 1971, and 1972; nothing along the lines of his recommendations has been enacted. One of the President's proposals to settle transportation strikes with an emergency-creating potential was to invoke a procedure called "final offer selection", but which the AFL-CIO and the transportation unions called compulsory arbitration. Organized labor vigorously opposed the proposals, Representative Ford has been a staunch supporter of them.

He introduced the Administration proposal as H.R. 16226 on March 2, 1970—the same day that the Presidential message on national emergency disputes was referred to committee. On July 8, 1970, he urged the Congress to "move immediately to consider the Emergency Public Interest Protection Act" [the Administration bill]. (CR bound ed., 7/8/70, 23130.) He repeated this plea five months later, during another railroad labor-management crisis: "I deeply wish we could get some permanent legislation that would achieve a finality in disputes . . ." (CR, bound ed., 12/9/70, 40690), and also importuned the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for a commitment to hold hearings in the next session on the President's proposals: "Would the chairman of that committee . . . assure . . . the Members of the House that there will be hearings held on this permanent legislation in the next Congress?" (CR, bound ed., 12/9/70, 40697.) On the same day Rep. Ford voted for a bill, signed the following day as P.L. 91-541, to end a one-day nationwide rail strike.

Early in the 92nd Congress, Mr. Ford repeated his urging that the Congress take up the Presidential proposals for permanent legislation to strengthen procedures for ending national emergency disputes (CR, bound ed., 2/3/71, 1518.) In February 1972, he took an active role in supporting an administration bill to end a 134-day West Coast longshore strike, the longest port strike in the Nation's history (CR, daily ed., 2/2/72, H560-1; 2/8/72, H887-9; and 2/9/72, H969-70, H992, 1009, and 1010.) Rep. Ford, since 1967 at least, is clearly on the side of government intervention in certain instances of strike or lockout action.

THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY PROGRAM, AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND

Minority leader Gerald R. Ford has consistently and enthusiastically supported the Federal highway program, and the Highway Trust Fund through which the program is funded. The Federal highway program, in being for more than 50 years received a major boost in 1956 upon enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (Public Law 84-627) which provided for the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways (Interstate System) and Title II, the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, which created the Highway Trust Fund. Congressman Ford voted for the measure, as he has for most subsequent highway authorizations.

One exception was the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966. Congressman Ford stated his opposition to the measure on grounds that it contained \$493 million

⁵ Congressional Record, p. 12184, Aug. 24, 1949.

⁶ Congressional Record, July 26, 1968, p. 23638.

expenditure beyond what the Administration has asked. He voted present when the bill came to vote.

THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND

On the question of urban transit, Congressman Ford has been somewhat unpredictable in his voting pattern. On the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, which established a capital grant/loan program of assistance to transit systems, he voted no. However, he spoke out on the House floor, in support of the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, which greatly strengthened that program (September 29, 1970). At that time he said,

"I endorse the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 as recommended by President Nixon. The need for this legislation is beyond question."

Continuing transit problems led to proposals to tap the Highway Trust Fund for money to fund greater transit efforts. This was a major issue in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972 (which was never passed) and the 1973 Highway Act. Congressman Gerald Ford firmly opposed opening the Highway Trust Fund for mass transit, even though the Administration strongly supported it. Congressional Quarterly (Political Report for October 17, 1973) found this significant in stating,

"Ford's most significant break with the Nixon administration in 1973—a decision apparently related to Ford's residence in the auto-producing state of Michigan—came on mass transit legislation. Ford voted against an administration-supported proposal to permit use of \$700 million a year in highway trust fund money for mass transit projects in urban areas."

When HR. 6452, the proposal for transit operating subsidy, came up for vote on October 3, 1973, Congressman Ford opposed it. This position was in accord with that of the Administration on operating subsidies for mass transit.

WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS

Representative Ford's position on wage and price controls has been consistent with the various positions taken by the Nixon Administration since the enactment of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.

When the Congress granted broad powers to the President to control prices, wages, salaries and rents in August 1970—which the President strongly opposed and said he would not use—Mr. Ford expressed firm opposition. During the floor debate in the House, he said—

"... after listening to the remarks of my good friend, the Majority leader, I cannot help but feel that in effect he is advocating the need and necessity for mandatory price and wage controls right now. Such an amendment will be offered so that those who want to cripple the American economy by bureaucracy can vote for it." (Congressional Record, July 31, 1970, p. 26801)

In response to growing concern about inflation and other problems confronting the economy, the Nixon Administration in August 1971 dropped its opposition to controls and announced a 90-day freeze on wages and prices. This was followed by a Phase II program of flexible and selective mandatory controls on wages, prices and rents. When Phase II was announced by the President on October 7, 1971, the *New York Times* reported on October 8 (p. 27): "Mr. Ford declared that he was confident that the plan would receive public support and would be 'an effective method of stimulating the economy,' which was experiencing high unemployment and the continuing threat of inflation."

An August 2, 1972, Mr. Ford praised the performance of the Phase II program, saying—

"... of late there has been speculation as to when price and wage controls would end. I submit that such speculation is premature. It will take some time before our control objectives are fully realized."

However, let me emphasize that our price and wage controls are working despite the fact they are limited in nature and that enforcement does not require a huge bureaucracy." (Congressional Record, August 2, 1972, p. H7130)

When the President, announced on January 11, 1973 the dismantling of the Phase II program and the adoption of a less restrictive Phase III program of "voluntary or self-administering controls," Mr. Ford expressed strong support, saying—

"I am pleased that the President acted to move the country beyond Phase II of the price and wage control program to a new type of program which is self-

administering and based on voluntary compliance. His timing is excellent, given the progress we have made thus far in achieving economic stability and proper economic growth." (Congressional Record, January 11, 1973, p. H210).

Following the failure of Phase III to prevent record price increases, the President on June 18, 1973 announced a 60 day freeze on prices to be followed by selective mandatory controls on prices and wages put into effect under Phase IV during August and September of this year. Our search of available sources did not produce any comments by Mr. Ford on these actions.

EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE

CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Mr. Ford has consistently taken a tough stand against crime, as opposed to a more civil libertarian approach. ("Idle talk about repression contributes nothing to the sober resolution of serious problems." *C.R.*, July 15, 1970, p. 24475). For example, he has strongly supported wiretapping, preventive detention, and no-knock legislation. He was critical of the Johnson Administration's alleged failure to formulate a coherent and effective anticrime program. In contrast, he has supported the Nixon Administration's anticrime statement and legislation virtually without qualification (e.g., "I commend the President for exerting precisely the right kind of leadership in the law enforcement field", *C.R.*, March 14, 1973, p. H1735).

The following comment is indicative of Mr. Ford's general position on crime: "the Congress should launch the Nation into a new get-tough era in dealing with crime" (*C.R.*, March 14, 1973, p. H1735). Key votes and/or statements illustrative of positions he has taken on some major crime-related issues follow:

A. Federal financial assistance

Mr. Ford has voted for all legislation providing Federal financial assistance for State and local crime control. In 1967, he voted in favor of State block grant funding for LEAA, a vote against the Johnson Administration's position (*C.R.*, Aug. 8, 1967, p. 21860).

B. Wiretapping.

Mr. Ford spoke in favor of wiretapping in 1968, in connection with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("The other body added some substance in the area of wiretapping legislation. . . . This may be our last chance," *C.R.*, June 5, 1968, p. 16074); and in 1970, with reference to the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, a Nixon Administration bill which he strongly supported.

C. Preventive detention.

Mr. Ford voiced support for the preventive detention provision of the 1970 D.C. crime legislation (*C.R.*, July 15, 1970, p. 24475). and on May 17, 1971 introduced H.R. 8418, "to amend the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to provide for pretrial detention of dangerous persons charged with dangerous or organized crime acts."

D. No-knock entry.

"Exaggerated concern about police barging into private homes is completely unfounded in the accumulated experience of 29 States. Authority to enter a premises in exigent circumstances without first knocking is often essential to the life and safety of an officer or the preservation of critical evidence" (*C.R.*, July 15, 1970, p. 24475).

E. Capital punishment.

Mr. Ford introduced the Nixon Administration's death penalty bill, H.R. 6028, on March 22, 1973 (*C.R.*, p. H2094). He stated on another occasion that, "I was dismayed when the Supreme Court ruled out capital punishment" (*C.R.*, March 14, 1973, p. H1735).

F. F.B.I.

Mr. Ford "categorically" denied that the F.B.I. carried on "Gestapo-type activities," as charged by the late Majority Leader, Hale Boggs (*C.R.*, April 5, 1971, p. 9470).

G. Gun control.

Mr. Ford voted for the bill which was enacted as the Gun Control Act of 1968, stating during debate that he believed the bill as reported by the House Judiciary

Committee was "about the only legislation in this controversial area that can be approved" (C.R., July 24, 1968, p. 23086).

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Mr. Ford has voted consistently throughout his career in favor of legislation relating to the prevention and control of drug abuse. He has supported measures dealing with the treatment and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and education aspects of the problem.

Mr. Ford's position on drug abuse control issues is well illustrated by his remarks in the *Congressional Record* of July 14, 1969 (p. 19329):

I would note that only through the sweeping approach adopted by President Nixon—the strengthening of efforts to halt the production and sale of illegal narcotics, the improving of rehabilitation programs for drug addicts, and the educating of all Americans to the dangers of drug abuse—can we begin to cope effectively with this most complex problem of drug addiction and its rise and spread.

Mr. Ford voted "yea", always in support of the Administration position (under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon), on each of the following key measures, all of which were passed by overwhelming majorities:

Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 (H.R. 2, P.L. 98-74). To expand Federal controls over distribution, profession and manufacture of barbiturates, amphetamines and other drugs affecting the central nervous system.

Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (H.R. 9167, P.L. 89-793). To authorize civil commitment of narcotic addicts for treatment for up to 3 years if charged with a Federal crime and up to 10 years if convicted of a Federal crime. (Mr. Ford did vote in opposition to President Johnson's position by voting "yea" on a motion to deny civil commitment to persons charged with selling or importing narcotics and to deny extension of the Federal Young Corrections Act to persons convicted of certain narcotics violations.)

Alcoholic and Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Amendments of 1968 (H.R. 15758, P.L. 90-584). To authorize funds for grants for the construction and staffing of facilities specifically concerned with the prevention and treatment of narcotic addiction.

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Amendments of 1968 (H.R. 14096, P.L. 90-584). To provide criminal penalties for the possession of illegally obtained stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic drugs and to increase the penalties for the illegal sale of such drugs.

Community Mental Health Centers Amendments of 1970 (S. 2523, P.L. 91-211). To extend and increase funding authorizations for treatment and rehabilitation programs for narcotic addicts.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (H.R. 18583, P.L. 91-513). To authorize expanded drug abuse education programs and prevention, treatment and rehabilitation programs, and to revise the Federal narcotics laws and penalty structures, and to provide additional law enforcement tools.

Drug Abuse Education Act of 1970 (H.R. 14252, P.L. 91-527). To authorize grants to conduct special educational programs concerning the use of drugs. (Mr. Ford did not vote on this measure, but announced himself to be in favor of it.)

Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 (S. 2097, P.L. 92-255). To establish a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention in the Executive Office of the President which would coordinate drug abuse prevention programs of all departments and agencies except in the law enforcement field.

In the 93rd Congress, Mr. Ford has co-sponsored an Administration bill (H.R. 5946) to provide strict mandatory minimum penalties for persons convicted of narcotics trafficking offenses.

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Representative Gerald Ford's voting record for programs relating to Elementary and Secondary Education is mixed. While he has supported some of the bills, for instance H.R. 2362, the original 1965 House bill for aid to elementary and secondary schools, he has voted against some of the amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. On the few occasions when the *Congressional Record* contains an explanation of his position, Ford has generally emphasized one of what appears to be his two major concerns in regard to education: (1) the need to return responsibility to State and local governments or (2) the need to curtail Federal spending.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was first amended in 1966 (H.R. 13161). The *Congressional Record* contains no explanation of Ford's decision to vote against these amendments. In 1967, Congressman Ford again voted against amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (H.R. 7819), but voted in favor of the Conference Report. Representative Ford's major concern appears to have been with the degree of Federal control. During the House debate, he noted: "We have to give more than lipservice to the issue of State and local control, if we really believe in it." (*Congressional Record/Bound edition*, May 24, 1967: p. 13830). In this instance, Congressman Ford was speaking in support of Congressman Quie's amendment which would have consolidated four categorical aid programs for elementary and secondary schools into one grant.

When arguing in support of this amendment, Ford asserted that it was the purpose of this amendment to "cut Federal tape in the channeling of Federal aid to elementary and secondary schools and to let State and local educators set priorities." (*Congressional Record*, Bound edition, May 2, 1967, p. 11392.) In 1969, Representative Ford voted in favor of the ESEA amendments (H.R. 514). The *Congressional Record* shows no explanation of this support.

Congressman Ford has expressed his concern with high Federal expenditures during House debate on Labor/HEW appropriations bills. The *Congressional Record* shows that during the 1967, 1969, 1971 and 1972 House debate on these appropriations, Ford emphasized the need to keep down the expenditures. In 1969, he argued against Congressmen who were willing to increase Federal education expenditures but unwilling to support any efforts at tax reform. (*Congressional Record*, Bound edition, August 13, 1969, P. 23809.)

It appears that Ford has been in complete support of President Nixon's education policies. When the President vetoed the Labor/HEW appropriations in 1970, Ford asserted, "If you vote to sustain the President's veto you are contributing the maximum in an effort to save \$1 billion." (*Congressional Record*, Bound edition, August 13, 1970, p. 28761.) Ford spoke in support of Nixon's Special Education Revenue Sharing program on at least two occasions. His explanation of his support is consistent with his desire to return responsibility for education related programs to the local level. "There would be no fragmentation of Federal grants, no rigid assignment of funds. Instead there would be an assured Federal contribution toward the overall quality of local education, with flexibility for local planners." (*Congressional Record*, Bound edition, April 6, 1971, p. 97534.)

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

On the issue of school desegregation Representative Gerald Ford has been cautious in recent years, adhering to the position of the Administration and generally within the voting pattern of the other Michigan delegates. The State of Michigan is often used as an example of the increasing Northern opposition toward busing. In the past few years Rep. Ford has supported antibusing amendments and has favored the Administration's Emergency School Aid plan for giving money to school districts undergoing desegregation to be used for purposes other than pupil transportation.

A. Busing Amendments

Rep. Ford seems to favor the principle of school desegregation, but is opposed to busing as the means to carry it out. He has said: "I happen to think it is far wiser timewise for kids to be in their neighborhood schools rather than to spend a lot of time traveling from their home to a school which may be 3, 4, 5 or 10 miles away." (*Congressional Record*, November 4, 1971, p. 39304.)

As far back as 1956 he voted in favor of an amendment to H.R. 7535, a school construction aid bill, which prohibited the allotment of funds to States that did not comply with the 1954 Supreme Court decision, *Brown v. Board of Education*. The amendment was adopted 225-192 (*Congressional Quarterly*, Oct. 17, 1973, p. 7). Then in 1964 Rep. Ford supported the passage of the Civil Rights Act which, among other things contained provisions intended to expedite the process of school desegregation. (CQ, Oct. 17, 1973, p. 7).

In 1970 his position on school desegregation, especially with regard to busing, was more cautious. He voted for the Whitten amendment to the second fiscal year 1970 Labor-HEW appropriations bill. This amendment prohibited the use of appropriated funds to force a school district to bus students, abolish schools or make pupil assignments against the choice of students' parents, or to require

these actions as a prerequisite for receiving Federal funds. The amendment was agreed upon 191-157. (CQ, Oct. 17, 1973, p. 7.)

The major busing legislation considered in 1971 and 1972 was added on to the higher education bill. On November 4, 1971 the House passed three amendments concerning busing. Rep. Ford voted in favor of all three amendments. The first was the Broomfield Amendment which postponed the effectiveness of any Federal court order requiring busing for racial, sexual, religious, or socio-economic balance until all appeals—or time for all appeals—had been exhausted. The second amendment by Rep. John Ashbrook prohibited the use of appropriated funds for busing, and the third amendment by Rep. Edith Green forbade Federal departments to promise to reimburse school districts for busing expenses. (1971 CQ Almanac, 80-H, 81-H.) When the bill went to conference Rep. Ford voted in favor of a motion instructing the House conferees to insist upon the retention of the three amendments. (CQ, Oct. 21, 1972, p. 2738). When the bill came out of conference, Rep. Ford expressed dissatisfaction with the busing provisions. He said: "The antibusing provisions are inadequate. The only meaningful part of the conference report in the busing field is in the Broomfield amendment. But even there we are getting a part of a loaf, not all of the original amendment passed by the House" (*Congressional Record*, daily ed., June 8, 1972, p. 5405-6).

The other major busing legislation in the 92d Congress was the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, H.R. 13915, which authorized the concentration of \$500 million of Emergency School Aid funds on educationally deprived students and also specified remedies for the removal of vestiges of the dual school system and at the same time severely restricted the use of busing. Rep. Ford introduced the bill, which was first proposed by President Nixon, in the House and supported its passage on August 17, 1972. He voted against an amendment, which was ultimately rejected which provided that nothing in the act was intended to be inconsistent with or violate the U.S. Constitution (CQ, Oct. 21, 1972, p. 2738).

B. Emergency school assistance

This program has been favored by the Administration as a remedy for unequal educational opportunities arising out of racially segregated schools and as a means of easing the burdens of court-ordered desegregation. In 1970 Rep. Ford voted for H.R. 19446 to establish Emergency School Aid (1970 CQ Almanac-87-H). The bill passed the House, but was filibustered in the Senate at the end of the session. In 1971 a modified version of Emergency School Aid was added, with Ford's support, to the Higher Education Act of that year (1971 CQ Almanac-81-H). With regard to Emergency School Aid, Rep. Ford has declared: "It is equity and justice on the part of the Federal government to provide that financial assistance. I am interested in the best education that we can get at the elementary and secondary level. The best way in this emergency to obtain that best education is to provide Federal financial assistance rather than to force busing. Forced busing to attain racial balance is not the best way to get good education." (*Congressional Record*, Nov. 4, 1971, p. 39304.)

HIGHER EDUCATION

With regard to Representative Gerald Ford's philosophy on aid to Higher Education, his recorded votes through the years 1949 to 1973 reveal a consistent pattern of support for various aspects of higher education, with especially strong support for student aid proposals and reiterating the current administration's views on allowing college access for more students. Representative Ford offered relatively few remarks on his philosophy of higher education until 1969, so his recorded votes have to speak for his views.

As early as 1950, Congressman Ford showed a commitment to higher education by voting in favor of the College Housing bill S. 2246 (*Congressional Record* (bound) August 23, 1950, p. 3882). In 1958, Ford voted to accept the conference report on (NDEA) the National Defense Education Act (*Congressional Record* (bound) August 23, 1958, p. 19618), the purpose of this act being to assist in the expansion and improvement of educational programs to meet critical national needs. Title II of this act provided loans to students in institutions of higher education. In 1961, Ford voted for the NDEA extension (H.R. 9000) (*Congressional Record* (bound) September 6, 1961, p. 18256).

In 1962, Ford voted to recommit the conference report of the Construction of Higher Education Facilities (H.R. 8900) with instruction to insist upon the House position on Title II, deleting the portion of the bill concerned with student

aid. Since he made no remarks, it is difficult to interpret whether or not this is a departure from his previous support of higher education (*Congressional Record*, (bound) September 20, 1962, p. 20152). However, he returned to support higher education in 1963 as he voted for the Higher Education Facilities Act (H.R. 6143) (*Congressional Record*, (bound), August 14, 1963, p. 21135) a bill providing a five-year program of federal grants and loans for construction or improvement of higher education academic facilities and authorizing \$1.195 billion for the program for three years.

After assuming the role of minority leader, Congressman Ford was no more outspoken in debates on higher education than in previous years. Although Ford made no remarks concerning the Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-329) he voted in favor of the conference report on H.R. 9567 (*Congressional Record*, (bound) October 20, 1965, p. 27697). Again, in 1968, Ford voted in favor of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968 (H.R. 15067) P.L. 90-575) (*Congressional Record*, (bound) July 25, 1968, p. 7528). This act did include an amendment requiring colleges to deny federal funds to students who participated in serious campus disorders.

In connection with his stance on student unrest and in combination with his previous support of student aid, Ford made the following remarks prior to his vote for the Emergency Insured Student Loan Act (H.R. 13194) (*Congressional Record*, (daily edition) October 16, 1969, H 9653):

"I hope this bill passes and we do not go to conference with the Senate on it because this bill is urgently needed in this form. . . . I want the people who are interested in strong student unrest legislation to know that I am with them and when a bill comes up, that is, where we can act affirmatively, I am going to help. But I do not think we should let the problems of the Committee interfere with affirmative action today because there are some 200,000 students who want to go to college and who need our help now. We can handle the student unrest proposals in the near future and we will with stronger provisions." (*Congressional Record*, (bound) September 15, 1969, p. 25358-9).

Prior to passage of the Education Amendments of 1972 and immediately after President Nixon's speech to propose the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 1971 (H. Doc. No. 92-50), Ford inserted in the *Record* the remarks that "we must open higher education to all of our qualified young people. . . . America must truly be the land of opportunity." He reinforced what President Nixon had said by reiterating that "no student should fail to go to college for lack of funds." (*Congressional Record*, (daily edition) February 22, 1971, H3372).

Upon adoption of the conference report for the Education Amendments of 1972 Ford indicated that although he had some reservations about the higher education portion of the conference report, if it were standing alone he would vote for it. He did not enumerate what those "reservations" were about higher education but he went on to say that he had major objection to the total conference report and for that reason intended to vote against it. (*Congressional Record* (daily edition) June 8, 1972 H5404). After passage of the Education Amendments in his remarks concerning "Salute to Education" Ford called the act a "landmark higher education bill" (*Congressional Record*, (daily edition) June 20, 1972, H 5856).

MANPOWER

Mr. Ford voted for the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962. In the middle sixties he supported bills providing tax credits for employers providing employment and training opportunities for the unemployed and during the last three Congresses he has supported the Administration's manpower proposals. He has not participated in the Congressional debates on manpower legislation.

FOOD PROGRAMS

Mr. Ford opposed the establishment of the Food Stamp Program in 1964. Since then, he has had various responses to measures affecting the program. With respect to the Federal child feeding programs (School Lunch, school milk, etc.), Mr. Ford has consistently supported measures to create and expand these programs until the most recent vote on increased Federal subsidies. In none of the Congressional consideration of food programs has Mr. Ford taken an active part in debate.

Food stamps

Mr. Ford's first recorded vote on a food stamp plan was in favor of an early (1958) attempt to set up a \$1 billion program for food stamps to buy surplus

foods. The measure (proposed by Mrs. Sullivan) failed to receive the 2/3 majority needed for House passage under suspension of the rules.

However, in 1959, he voted against an amendment to H.R. 8609 (P.L. 86-341) which authorized (though it did not require) the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a food stamp plan similar to that proposed in 1958. This authority was not used by the Administration, which had expressed opposition to the proposed food stamp plan.

In 1964, Mr. Ford voted against the passage of the Food Stamp Act, which established the Food Stamp Program as it now exists. In his vote in support of one of the floor amendments to the 1964 bill, he reflected interest (to be reiterated later) in requiring States to share in the cost of the program.

In the consideration of Food Stamp Program legislation prior to the major amendments of 1970 and 1973, Mr. Ford generally supported extension of the program with several limitations. The limiting amendments to Food Stamp Act legislation that he supported included a limited authorization of appropriations, State sharing of the costs of the program, and prohibitions on food stamps to strikers and students.

In the consideration of the first set of major Food Stamp Act revisions (1969-1970—P.L. 91-671), Mr. Ford was the co-sponsor of an Administration proposal which would have liberalized several aspects of the program. However, in the final consideration of the committee-reported bill on the House floor, Mr. Ford supported the more restrictive committee bill and voted in favor of a prohibition on food stamps to strikers. In contrast, during the House consideration of a ban on food stamps to strikers in 1971 and 1972, Mr. Ford opposed the prohibition.

During the consideration of the 1973 amendments to the Food Stamp Act (contained in the 1973 farm bill—H.R. 8860—P.L. 93-86), Mr. Ford supported provisions (substituted for the more restrictive committee language) proposed by Mr. Foley and voted in favor of two amendments which added restrictions to the program—i.e. prohibitions on food stamps to strikers and recipients of Supplemental Security Income assistance (House bill).

Child feeding

In the 1950's, Mr. Ford was an early supporter of the school milk program (established in 1954). His support included two bills introduced (in 1955 and 1956) to extend and reform the program.

In 1962, Mr. Ford voted in favor of the first major piece of School Lunch Program legislation since 1946—provision of special assistance to needy children in School Lunch Program schools (H.R. 11665—P.L. 87-823).

More recently, Mr. Ford has consistently supported legislation expanding and revising the Federally-supported child feeding programs. The only time that he was recorded as having opposed any of the numerous expansions of these programs was during the consideration of the most recent child feeding program legislation (H.R. 9689—93rd Congress). During the House consideration of H.R. 9639, Mr. Ford voted in favor of an Administration-supported attempt to eliminate a proposed increase in Federal subsidy payments for all school lunches served.

HEALTH CARE FINANCING

In 1961, Congress became concerned with major efforts to underwrite the costs of health services for certain limited segments of society—the aged, poor, and medically indigent. A review of testimony during this period, as presented before the House Ways and Means Committee and as expressed in debates appearing in the *Congressional Record*, indicates no significant stance taken by Congressman Ford regarding health care financing until Medicare legislation, as proposed by the House Ways and Means Committee, reached the House floor for debate in 1965. At that time, Congressman Ford (already the minority leader) took to the floor urging that the Committee bill be re-committed to Ways and Means and that the Republican proposal for health care for the aged (H.R. 7057, introduced by Congressman John Byrnes) be adopted in its place.

In his remarks, Congressman Ford said:

"To me, the legislation before us is not a political issue; it presents the honest question of how best to deal with a recognized problem in a manner that meets the tests of adequacy, fairness, and effectiveness. . . . I would like to suggest that we recognize that our votes are not for or against an adequate social security system nor is there involved the question of: Should our aged receive adequate health care? Rather, the vote is on which alternative do you prefer. . . . Mr. Chairman, it will be my purpose to support the Republican

alternative embodied in the motion to recommit. It is to be recognized that on this particular issue under the existing parliamentary situation, such a vote in my judgment is not a negative vote but is, indeed, a positive vote for an improved bill that treats our retired people more adequately and our working citizens more equitably." (*Congressional Record*, April 8, 1965: 7174-75.)

Congressman Ford's principal objections to the Medicare legislation, as proposed by the Ways and Means Committee, appear to have dealt with the compulsory nature of the health program and financing by means of the social security tax:

"What then are the medicare proponents really advocating? They are proposing compulsion and higher payroll taxes and that alone. Compulsion and regressive payroll taxation are the essence of their approach to this matter. If compulsion is necessary, why do not the medicare proponents have the courage of their convictions and go all the way with it? Why should they tolerate any voluntary aspect in the program? If payroll taxation is so sound, why do not the medicare proponents go all the way with payroll taxation to finance the entire program?" (*Congressional Record*, April 8, 1965: 7175).

Congressman Ford was recorded as voting in favor of recommitment of the legislation to the House Ways and Means Committee and as voting against final passage. In his remarks, he stated:

"As far as final passage is concerned, if the motion to recommit fails, neither the House Republican Policy Committee nor the House Republican Conference have recommended any guidelines. . . . Many of my Republican colleagues, in weighing the Republican portions of H.R. 6675 against the administration's part of the same bill, with understandable logic will vote for the bill on final passage. On the other hand some of us, including myself, have strongly and consistently opposed the regressive payroll tax methods of financing hospital care for the aged. In my judgment, that portion of H.R. 6675 which is unsound, outweighs the good. In the final analysis it is one's own conscience not a Republican policy position, that will determine how Republicans will vote on final passage." (*Congressional Record*, April 8, 1965: 7175).

More recently, Congressional attention has been focused on national health insurance proposals. In this area, Congressman Ford has co-sponsored the House version of the Nixon Administration's National Health Insurance Partnership Act of 1971 (H.R. 7741, introduced into the 92nd Congress by Congressman John Byrnes). A review of hearings on national health insurance proposals held in 1971 by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee indicates that Congressman Ford presented no testimony at that time. His remarks in the *Congressional Record* commending President Nixon's message on health care in 1972 appear to give some indication of Congressman Ford's position with regard to health care needs:

"I further agree with the President that we should build on our present health care delivery system, not tear down what we have and start from scratch simply because we are plagued by some deficiencies. My party's position is sound. We should meet our health care problems by improving the present system, not by scrapping it and erecting a horrendously costly Federal bureaucratic structure in its place." (*Congressional Record*, March 2, 1972: H-1684).

HEALTH RESOURCES LEGISLATION

In addition to programs which help to finance the health services of certain population groups (e.g. the aged, the poor, etc.), Congress has, over the years, enacted a variety of legislation that is intended to promote the development of health resources in the United States—manpower, facilities, special services, and so forth. A review of the *Congressional Record*, however, shows that, until Congressman Ford became the minority leader in 1965, he made no major pronouncements regarding health resources development legislation. Since 1965, Mr. Ford has consistently supported his party's and administration's position regarding specific health resource measures. For example, he has repeatedly urged the House to sustain Presidential vetoes of a number of health bills returned to the Congress. Generally speaking, Congressman Ford, in his remarks on such legislation has not dealt with the content of specific measures, but rather with such matters as budgetary or fiscal considerations or other policy positions prescribed by the administration.

In 1970, for example, on the House floor, regarding the vetoed Hill-Burton legislation (Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments), Congressman Ford said:

"The vote to be taken very shortly is not a question of support for or opposition to the Hill-Burton program. Members on both sides of the aisle over a long, long period of time have voted for the authorizations and voted for the appropriations. A vote to sustain the veto today is really a reaffirmation of the bill that was passed by the House, and it is a denial of the bill passed by the other body. The issue is really only section 601. As a matter of fact, the issue here today is not the Congress vis-a-vis the President; it is the House and the President against the other body; if we are to uphold our House position, we should vote to sustain the President here today." (*Congressional Record*, June 25, 1970: H-8025-26).

Congressman Ford's support of Presidential actions apparently arose over the question of potential inflation in the mandatory spending provision and alleged incursion into Executive prerogatives embodied in section 601 of the legislation, a provision which would have required all money appropriated for health programs to be spent within the year. Congressman Ford said "those who vote to sustain the President can claim credit in trying to do something affirmative about inflation." Ford voted to sustain the Presidential veto.

In 1970, speaking on the vetoed HEW appropriations bill, Congressman Ford summarized his feelings as follows:

"In my judgment, if this appropriations bill is approved in this form, we will seriously weaken our efforts to do something affirmatively about the problem of inflation . . . One of the worst features of this legislation is the mandatory spending provisions included in the bill . . . If you include this mandatory expenditure provision forcing the President to spend the money in these limited areas, inevitably . . . other highly desirable programs will have to suffer." (*Congressional Record*, January 28, 1970: 1551).

With regard to the Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973, Congressman Ford voiced his opposition as follows:

"I do not think this issue of the Public Health Service hospitals is a red herring. I believe that we should have emergency medical services legislation. I disapprove of the Public Health Service hospital provisions which, although nongermane to the EMS bill, were tacked on. . . . I assure the Members of this body who are here that I can be sufficiently persuasive to convince the President of the United States that he should sign an EMS bill minus the Public Health Service features. I am convinced that we can get it through the White House if the gentleman from West Virginia will report it out of committee." (*Congressional Record*, September 12, 1973: H-7768).

Congressman Ford voted to sustain the President's veto of the legislation.

MINE SAFETY AND BLACK LUNG

Congressman Ford voted for final passage of the conference report on the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (December 17, 1969; CR vol. 115, part 29, p. 39721) but he did not participate in debate. In addition, he previously voted for a motion to recommit that conference report (December 17, 1969; CR vol. 115, part 29, p. 39720) but given his lack of public comment on the issue, the reasons for this latter vote are not clear.

Ford voted against passage of the conference report on the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, but did not participate in debate. (May 10, 1972; H341)

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Congressman Ford indicated his support for some type of Federal legislation relating to occupational safety and health with a statement of support for President Nixon's message calling for such Congressional action. Ford noted that in this field "many of the State programs . . . have proven sadly inadequate." Further, he applauded the President for "not preempt[ing] the role of the States [but] instead . . . develop[ing] a plan to help them play their role better." (August 6, 1969; CR vol. 115, part 17, p. 22548.) He voted for the conference report on the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 but did not participate in debate. (December 17, 1970; CR vol. 116, part 31, p. 42209.)

POVERTY—OEO LEGISLATION

Congressman Gerald Ford has generally voted against legislation to expand the anti-poverty program, as reflected in Economic Opportunity legislation. He voted against the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and subsequently voted against many of the early bills to appropriate additional

funds for the program. He has voted in favor of some OEO legislation during the Nixon Administration, however.

In 1967, during debate on an amendment to channel Community Action Agency funding through local public officials, Ford expressed his position with regard to OEO when he stated, "I am not here to speak up for the Office of Economic Opportunity. My record here is clear in voting for a substantial reduction in the funds in the overall program." (*Congressional Record*, Nov. 14, 1967—p. 32365.)

Listed below are Congressman Ford's votes on major OEO legislation.

1964—Ford voted against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, authorizing the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

1965—Ford voted in favor of reducing the FY 1966 authorization of \$1.9 billion to \$947.5 million, and against authorizing \$1.9 billion for OEO in FY 1966.

1966—Ford voted in favor of a motion to kill the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, and in favor of substituting the Republican "Opportunity Crusade," which would parcel out various OEO programs to other Federal agencies, leaving OEO with the Community Action Program and VISTA. Ford voted against a bill authorizing \$1.75 billion for OEO during FY 1967.

1967—Ford voted in favor of reducing the FY 1968 authorization for anti-poverty programs by \$460 million, from \$2.1 billion to \$1.6 billion. Ford subsequently voted against authorizing \$1.6 billion for anti-poverty programs in FY 1968.

1968—Ford voted against an amendment to cut appropriations for OEO by \$100 million. Ford voted in favor of a motion to authorize a \$5 million supplemental appropriation for Headstart, instead of \$25 million as proposed by the Senate.

1969—Ford voted in favor of a motion to give control of OEO programs to state governments. Ford voted against the OEO authorization bill, which would extend the program for an additional 2 years.

1971—Ford voted against an amendment to establish a comprehensive child development program to provide educational, nutritional, and health services free of charge for disadvantaged children. Ford also voted against the conference report on the 1971 Economic Opportunity Amendments, which would extend OEO for 2 additional years, authorize \$5 billion for programs administered by the agency, create a child development program, and establish a national legal services corporation. The House adopted the conference report, despite what the *Congressional Quarterly* described as "an intensive effort by Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford . . . to defeat the conference agreement because of [Administration] objections to the child care sections." In floor debate, Ford stated, "The White House is opposed to this legislation and is doing as any Administration has sought to do where it differs with a legislative conclusion." (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1971, p. 518)

1972—Ford voted for the adoption of the conference report authorizing \$4.75 billion over 2 years for anti-poverty programs, extending OEO through FY 1974, and continuing the legal services program within OEO.

1973—Ford voted in favor of an Administration bill to establish an independent legal services corporation to replace OEO's legal services program. Ford voted in favor of an amendment to reduce appropriations for OEO from \$333.8 million to \$141.3 million for FY 1974.

VETERANS

Congressman Gerald Ford introduced eight bills pertaining to veterans between 1949-1954 (and none since that period). He testified four times before Congressional Committees considering veterans' benefits, most recently in 1965. He has consistently supported Committee recommendations and voted with the majority in all areas of veterans benefits, including compensation, pension, medical care, and education. He has not actively participated in floor debates on this issue.

WELFARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Congressman Gerald Ford has generally voted in favor of proposed amendments to the Social Security Act which have contained provisions pertaining to public assistance, with the exception of the Amendments enacted in 1962 and 1965 (of which, in the latter instance, the establishment of the Medicare program was actually the most significant issue). Since 1949 he has introduced several bills seeking to enforce court-ordered child support obligations, primarily by making support orders enforceable in Federal courts and by making it a crime to travel in interstate and/or foreign commerce to avoid compliance with such orders.

A. Position on welfare reform

In August 1969, Mr. Ford addressed the House in strong support of the President's newly issued welfare reform plan (the "Family Assistance Plan"), recommending especially the measures included in the plan for expanded work opportunities for welfare recipients, incentives for maintaining the family unit intact, and ensuring greater equity for the taxpayer (*Congressional Record*, 8/11/69, H-23149). In 1970 and 1971, he again participated in the House debate by urging support for the proposed amendments to the Social Security Act which contained the Administration-endorsed Family Assistance Plan. During the House debate on H.R. 1 he lauded the bill as a "result of collaborative effort (addressing) the essential issues related to welfare", and included among these work requirements and incentives, training, child care, public service employment, national standards, and program integrity (*CR*, 6/22/71, H-5603). His vote was cast against the amendment proposed by Rep. Al Ullman which would have eliminated the Family Assistance Plan from the bill, and in favor of the bill as reported out by the Committee on Ways and Means. Upon voting to adopt the Conference agreement on H.R. 1 (which did not contain provisions pertaining to the family program), Mr. Ford stated that he recognized the difficulties that had been confronted by the Conference committee due to the number of differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill, but cited that nonetheless, the failure to act on reforming the family program represented a "Congressional failure to the American people" (*CR*, 10/17/72, H-10213).

B. Child Support

Since 1949, Mr. Ford has several times introduced legislation seeking to provide Federal enforcement of child support obligations. In an appearance before the House Judiciary Committee in August 1949 (during hearings on this issue, in which two of his bills were being considered), he cited the enforcement of support orders as a Federal problem and stated that the threat of Federal enforcement "will have a salutary effect and will assist materially in bringing about a change in the attitude of the people who will cross State lines with the very definite intention of evading their family responsibility" (Hearings, p. 22). Mr. Ford introduced similar bills in 1951, 1971, and 1973; upon introducing H.R. 2309 on Jan. 18, 1973, he reiterated his belief that the Federal government should become involved in the enforcement of support orders (*CR*, 1/18/73, H-339).

C. OASDI

Since Mr. Ford came to Congress there has been (starting in 1950) an almost total revision of the social security program, including 10 general benefit increases—providing a cumulative 362 percent increase in benefits. Although he has not generally spoken out in debate on these amendments, Mr. Ford has voted for them with one notable exception. The exception came in connection with the 1965 amendments (H.R. 6675) which in addition to changes in the cash benefits program (including a 7 percent general benefit increase) created the Medicare and Medicaid programs. (This is discussed at length in the section on "Health Care Financing.")

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (P.L. 92-190) is umbrella legislation which requires the Federal agencies to enumerate the environmental impact of their actions. Mr. Ford voted for the NEPA bill (H.R. 12549)⁷ but made no supporting statement of record. Lack of legislative activity on NEPA makes it impossible to gauge his current attitude toward the Act, nor has Ford made definitive pro-con statements concerning his position. Judicial review of the NEPA environmental impact statement is limited by the Alaskan Pipeline Bill (H.R. 9130):⁸ Ford voted against the Dellenback amendment to eliminate the restrictions on the NEPA process,⁹ and supported the bill entirely.

The pipeline issue was a complex mixture of environmental and energy supply considerations, so Ford's action on the bill is difficult to evaluate on strictly environmental grounds.

The only other bill introduced to suspend the requirements of NEPA, the temporary nuclear licensing provisions (H.R. 14655, P.L. 92-307) was not

recorded by roll call vote.¹⁰ Ford did introduce a strong pro-environment bill, a citizen suit-class action proposal (H.R. 2288) in the 92d Congress, which would relax the jurisdictional problems of bringing environmental lawsuits. Of significance in interpreting this action, it should be noted that Michigan was the first state to adopt such a measure at the state level.

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL

Mr. Ford has consistently supported clean air legislation since 1963 when the first Clean Air Act was passed. (P.L. 88-206, H.R. 6518). He has voted in favor of the 1967 Air Quality Act (S. 780, P.L. 90-148);¹¹ the 1969 extension of the law (H.R. 12085, P.L. 91-137)¹² to permit additional research in air pollution resulting from fuel combustion; the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments (H.R. 7255, P.L. 91-604);¹³ and the one-year extension of this legislation in 1973 (H.R. 5445, P.L. 93-15).¹⁴

He introduced two air pollution-related bills in 1971; H.R. 2288, providing a private right of action to protect the nation's air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein; and H.R. 9952 permitting coordination and cooperation in accelerated research and development of devices and equipment to meet Federal standards for motor vehicle exhaust emissions and air pollution abatement. His 1973 air pollution bill, H.R. 4942 would exempt manufacturers from antitrust requirements to foster cooperative research and development in low emission auto engines.

Mr. Ford has not made any statements relative to his position on this issue at any time, as far as can be ascertained, nor did he participate in the debate preceding the House roll calls in which he voted.

PESTICIDE REGULATION

Mr. Ford made no statements on the floor about any of the two major or several minor pesticides bills that have passed Congress since 1949. On Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act of 1972, a major bill,¹⁵ Mr. Ford opposed two amendments, thereby supporting the Agriculture Committee position; but he was absent for another amendment vote, the final vote, and the conference report vote. He was absent for a vote on a minor bill, H.R. 4487, in 1964.¹⁷ Other legislation passed by voice vote.

TOXIC SUBSTANCES

Mr. Ford has not engaged in floor discussions of toxic substances control legislation, which was originally proposed by the Administration in 1971. In 1972 he voted for S. 1478, Toxic Substances Control Act of 1972¹⁸ (which was not enacted because of adjournment). Mr. Ford was absent when similar legislation again passed the House, in 1973.¹⁹

WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

Congressman Gerald R. Ford has consistently supported water pollution control legislation. He voted for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500) and for the over-ride of the President's veto of this bill prior to this, he voted for every major water pollution control legislation from 1956 through 1970.

The following activities are illustrative of Congressman Ford's interest in water pollution. In 1955, he sponsored H.R. 3550 to encourage the prevention of air and water pollution,²⁰ and H.R. 2289 in 1971 to prohibit dumping of dredgings and other refuse in navigable waters.²¹ In 1967, he was a co-sponsor of H.R. 14203 to require water supply and waste disposal systems to comply with health and safety standards.²² He co-sponsored H.R. 5966 in 1971, to amend the Federal Wa-

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 118, Daily Edition, H4048, May 3, 1972.

¹¹ *Congressional Record*, November 2, 1967, p. H14452.

¹² *Congressional Record*, November 25, 1969, p. H11360.

¹³ *Congressional Record*, June 10, 1970, p. H5388.

¹⁴ *Congressional Record*, March 22, 1973, p. H2090.

¹⁵ *Congressional Record*, v. 118 (October 12, 1972), p. H9798.

¹⁶ *Congressional Record*, v. 117 (November 9, 1971), pp. H10768-H10774.

¹⁷ *Congressional Record*, v. 110 (September 1, 1964), p. 21184.

¹⁸ *Congressional Record*, v. 118 (October 13, 1972), p. H9930.

¹⁹ *Congressional Record*, v. 119 (July 23, 1973), pp. H6467-H6514.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101, Pt. 1, p. 1121: 84th Congress, 1st session.

²¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 117, Pt. 1, p. 523: 92nd Congress, 1st session.

²² *Congressional Record*, Vol. 113, Pt. 25, p. 34210: 90th Congress, 1st session.

⁷ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 115: 26590, September 23, 1969.

⁸ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 119, Daily Edition, H7232, August 2, 1973.

⁹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 119, Daily Edition, H7282, August 2, 1973.

ter Pollution Control Act.²³ However, a review of the Congressional Record did not disclose any substantial contribution by Mr. Ford to floor discussion or debates on water pollution legislation. Gerald Ford's views and continuous support for water pollution control are best summarized by his statement:

"The Federal Government should be setting an example for the States, localities, and private industry in our effort to restore and preserve our environment."²⁴

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

During the past 25 years, great strides in agricultural productivity have combined with a lure—however valid—of urban job opportunities to inspire an out-migration of unprecedented proportions, from rural America. The decline in population—primarily a result of a change in agricultural production methods involving a shift from high labor inputs to high capital inputs—has caused a severe economic and social decline in rural areas. To date, most rural development efforts have originated at the national level through loan and grant programs administered through the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, and by independent commissions such as the Appalachian Regional Commission. Mr. Ford has recognized the need to give special assistance to rural Americans.

At the beginning of his career in 1949, Mr. Ford voted for passage of the National Housing Act—one title of which provided the first major Federal rural housing assistance program.²⁵ Though he was not present to vote for the Rural Development Act of 1972, Congressman Ford indicated in a Congressional Quarterly poll that he would have voted for the bill.²⁶ Mr. Ford's approach to rural development programs has generally been one of streamlining the Federal Government's role: "But if we keep all three programs going, the rural development, the EPA, and the rural water and sewer, we have this never ending duplication and proliferation of programs;"²⁷ and of minimizing direct Federal assistance and encouraging local initiative and planning as evidenced by his support of Mr. Nixon's proposed program of Special Rural Revenue Sharing.²⁸

MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Over the past 25 years, Congressional activity on mineral resources has concerned jurisdiction over the submerged lands and the continental shelf, leasing of public lands, regulation of natural gas, and establishment of national policies relating to mining and minerals and public lands. Mr. Ford has not been particularly active on any of these issues.

When the House, in 1953 passed the Submerged Lands Act (P.L. 83-31) giving States title to resources out to the three-mile limit, he voted in the affirmative, but made no statement for the record.²⁹ Mr. Ford voted for passage of the Outer-continental Shelf Lands Act (P.L. 83-212) in 1953, which extended Federal control over OCS land to include the contiguous zone; but he is not recorded as having participated in debate on the measure.³⁰ The partial exemption from FPC regulations of natural gas was provided in the Natural Gas Bill (H.R. 6645), passed by the House in 1955. Although he personally favored it, President Eisenhower vetoed the bill on discovery of the attempt by a lobbyist to bribe a Senator. Mr. Ford voted against the bill,³¹ but did not participate in debate on the measure. In the 1964 House action approving establishment of the Public Land Law Review Commission (P.L. 88-60), he neither participated in the debate, nor is he recorded on the vote, having paired with Mr. Sheppard.³²

Mr. Ford did not participate in House debate on the Geothermal Steam Act (P.L. 91-581) in 1970, which provided for leases for development by private industry on public lands. The record of House action in 1970 on the National Mining and Minerals Policy Act (P.L. 91-631) to establish a national minerals policy and promote efficient use of mineral resources on public lands reveals no formal position taken by Mr. Ford. He did not participate in debate on House passage of

²³ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 117, Pt. 5, p. 6061; 92d Congress, 1st session.

²⁴ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 116, Pt. 9, p. 11863; 91st Congress, 2nd session.

²⁵ *Congress and the Nation*, 1945-1964, *Congressional Quarterly*, p. 53a.

²⁶ *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. XXVIII, 1972, p. 60H.

²⁷ *On Rural Water and Sewer Grant Program*, *Congressional Record*, April 10th, 1973, H2545.

²⁸ *Congressional Record*, March 10, 1971, p. H5845.

²⁹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, April 1, 1953, p. 2638 (83d, 1st).

³⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 99, Mar 17, 1953, p. 4895 (83d, 1st).

³¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101, July 28, 1955, p. 11930 (84th, 1st).

³² *Congressional Record*, Vol. 110, March 10, 1964, p. 4875 (88th, 2d).

a bill to regulate surface mining of coal, on October 11, 1972; in the vote on that measure, he paired with Mr. Annunizio.³³

OIL IMPORT CONTROLS

The U.S. oil import control program originated as a restrictive amendment to laws otherwise designed to promote trade relations globally. The 1955 Reciprocal Trade Extension Act (P.L. 84-86) included a provision delegating to the President the responsibility of limiting oil imports to the level needed to maintain "national security" and this was reenacted in successive trade expansion laws. The 1957 voluntary import control program, the 1959 mandatory import control program and President Nixon's 1970, 1972 and 1973 moves to relax oil import quotas were objects of extensive legislative debate.

There is nothing in the record of Mr. Ford's votes or remarks to indicate any specific oil import position from 1955 up to 1973. While he voted consistently for the reciprocal trade expansion legislation, there are no votes of record on the oil import provisions or comments of record on the President's 1970 and 1972 moves to relax quotas. He endorsed only in very general terms the President's April 18th 1973 Energy message, which included announcement of elimination of "all existing tariffs on imported crude oil and refined products."³⁴ However, in the course of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline debate, he strongly articulated the need for U.S. independence of foreign oil sources as required by "national security interests", in terms fully consistent with the historical oil import protectionist philosophy.³⁵

WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Water resource programs of the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation and other agencies of the Federal Government have not undergone basic revision in the last 25 years. However, creation of the Small Watershed Program of the Soil Conservation Service and passage of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 were important developments in water resource policy.

The Small Watershed Program (P.L. 83-566) passed the House in 1954, but without a recorded vote. The Water Resources Planning Act (P.L. 89-80) passed the House in 1965, and Ford is recorded under the "yea" votes; there were no dissenting votes. In the 83rd Congress, Ford voted for establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation and for adding additional power facilities at Niagara Falls; on both issues Republicans were strongly in favor, and Democrats about evenly split.³⁶ In the 86th Congress, the fiscal 1960 Public Works appropriation bill contained many unbudgeted projects, and was subsequently vetoed; a revised bill was passed, and it too, was vetoed, but the second veto was overridden. On the vote to override, Ford was paired against—most Republicans opposed the vote to override. In the 83rd and 84th Congresses, he opposed efforts to increase water diversion from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal.³⁷ In 1952, as a member of the subcommittee which produced the fiscal 1953 Public Works appropriation, he helped to manage its passage.³⁸ Otherwise, he has made few comments in the House relating to water resources. In the past four years, Ford has not testified before appropriations hearings on projects in his district.

WILDERNESS PRESERVATION

Representative Ford voted in support of the establishment of a National Wilderness Preservation System on July 30, 1964 when the measure was approved by a vote of 374-1.³⁹ He did not participate in floor debate on the proposal. He has since served as sponsor of several additional wilderness proposals including the administration omnibus wilderness expansion proposal in the 92nd Congress (H.R. 9965) and a current proposal for the designation of wilderness in Isle Royale National Park in Michigan (H.R. 5462).

³³ *Congressional Record*, (daily summary), October 11, 1972, p. H9610.

³⁴ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 110, Daily Summary, April 18, 1973, p. H2892, 93rd Congress, 1st session.

³⁵ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 110, Daily Summary, August 2, 1973, pp. H7266, 93rd Congress, 1st session.

³⁶ *Congress and the Nation*, Vol. 1, pp. 38a-97a.

³⁷ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101 (1955), pp. 9991-9993, 1002-1003, and *Congress and the Nation*, Vol. 1, pp. 968-969.

³⁸ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 98 (1952), pp. 3295-3300, 5578-5581.

³⁹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 110, July 30, 1964, p. 17458. Roll call vote no. 197.

The Wilderness System is to protect specific areas of National Parks, National Forests and Wildlife Refuges from development and to maintain the areas in a natural condition.

Mr. Ford has not been particularly active in the matter of wilderness protection or related National Park issues. When he has spoken on these items he has taken a position which seems to favor utilization of recreational resources rather than preservation. In debating the establishment of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Michigan, legislation which he cosponsored. Mr. Ford said the residents of the area had done a commendable job of protecting the natural conditions. He added:

But I think we have to recognize that the more certain way, the more positive way to see to it that this area is not only preserved but open to more people or to all the people is by the enactment of this legislation. I just feel that this is the better course of action in trying to save an area in our State, not only for the 8 million residents of Michigan but also the literally millions and millions and millions of other Americans who, we hope, will come to see this gorgeous spot and be inspired by the sight and the natural beauty of that area of Michigan.⁴⁰

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

UNITED STATES POLICY IN INDOCHINA

Representative Ford has been a consistent supporter of U.S. policy in Indochina since the administration of President Truman, though he did question the application of that policy during the latter part of the administration of President Lyndon Johnson. He supported President Nixon's efforts to end the war in Vietnam and in the 1970-1973 period opposed legislation aimed at setting a cutoff date for U.S. military operations in Indochina. However, he voted for a proposal, accepted by the White House, which set an August 15, 1973, deadline for U.S. military operations in Cambodia. He summarized his approach to Vietnam policy in a speech on the House floor on August 10, 1972, in which he said he believed that Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon had all done their utmost to solve and settle the problem.⁴¹

In June 1964 he said that he and other members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee had been concerned about the Vietnam problem for some time and had urged the Executive Branch to adopt firmer policies and strategies "for that area of the world." The United States could not, he added, run away from its obligations. Congress must exert every effort to urge the President to seek a "just and honorable solution for Southeast Asia and give our assurance that we will back up any decision based upon just and honorable terms, no matter how difficult they may be."⁴²

Representative Ford in August 1964 voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but said this did not mean that he approved without qualification administration policies toward Vietnam in the previous 3½ years. He said he had been critical of certain administration policies in Southeast Asia and that he would point out any deficiencies he saw in the new policies. Past policies, he noted, had not produced victory; more positive U.S. military action "affecting our own ground forces on prior occasions might have turned the tide our way much sooner."⁴³

On April 28, 1965, Representative Ford said he had both privately and publicly supported the President's "present firm policy" in Indochina. He said that a "very high degree of bipartisanship" was necessary to prevent the North Vietnamese from miscalculating on the basis of statements made by any public official including any Member of Congress.⁴⁴

Representatives Ford and Laird in August 1965, in a discussion with reporters, said they would urge the President and Members of Congress to cut back on domestic expenditures in order to meet the growing expenses of the Vietnam war. Both said they would not criticize the President for his course in Vietnam until there had been time to see whether the troop buildup had been effective.⁴⁵

In January 1966, Representative Ford said that neither he nor any other Republican in the Congress had sought to make the war a political issue: "No

Republican had called this the President's war. No Republican has called this McNamara's war."⁴⁶ On January 31, 1966, Ford said that the President's decision to resume the bombing of North Vietnam was one of the most critical in American history and "We . . . hope and pray that this decision is the right one."⁴⁷

On August 8, 1967, in a major speech on Vietnam, Ford rose to voice misgivings "which have been growing for many months" about the conduct of the Vietnam war. He said he had given complete support to the President in the past, to the extent that he had been "branded a hawk, and worse" for urging firmness and for using U.S. conventional arms to "compel a swift and sure peace." The United States, he said, was pulling its punches in regard to the use of military power, particularly its air power. He said that whatever military plans the U.S. had for ending the war were not being used, or were being tried piecemeal. A war of gradualism, he added, could not be won, as the enemy was able to match each U.S. buildup. He said that present policy had produced a stalemate, that Republican warnings about getting involved in a land war in Asia had been ignored, that a Republican recommendation for a quarantine of Haiphong Harbor had been rejected. Ford said the Republicans were not urging escalation, but urging better use of present conventional weapons and a selection of more vital military targets. The President, he said, had indicated he would continue the "same inadequate level of pressure permitted in the past." He concluded by asking, "Is this any way to run a war?"—and said that ending the war should be given first priority among national aims, otherwise the U.S. would continue to "wallow and weave and wobble."⁴⁸

Ford has given strong support to the Vietnam policy of the Nixon administration. In May 1969, he opposed an amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal 1969 which would have eliminated \$640 million in procurement funds for the Army. This amendment, he said, would "slow down materially hinder and hamper" the attempt to turn over more of the fighting to South Vietnamese troops.⁴⁹

He strongly supported the President's peace initiatives in 1969 and after, arguing that the program of phased troops withdrawals and Vietnamization were parts of a "carefully drawn plan to end the war." He noted after the October 1969 "moratorium" protest on Vietnam that press reports regarding the size of the crowds participating were exaggerated and that a sizable majority of Americans supported President Nixon's efforts to achieve "peace with honor."⁵⁰

Ford supported the sanctuary operations in Cambodia in May-June 1970, arguing that the operation would shorten the war and would enable the U.S. to continue withdrawal of combat forces from Vietnam. After the President's interim report on the Cambodian operation, Ford said the President had kept his word to the American people and deserved the broadest possible support.⁵¹ He said in September 1970 that the sharp decline in U.S. casualty rates since the Cambodian operation had borne out President Nixon's prediction.⁵²

Representative Ford supported the bombing of North Vietnam following the invasion of South Vietnam across the DMZ in April 1972.⁵³ In May 1972 he said President Nixon must be supported in the mining and blockading of North Vietnamese ports to shut off the supplies that were feeding the invasion of South Vietnam. He said that the mining was right and proved to the world that America's word was good.⁵⁴

In the 1970-1973 period, Ford voted consistently to oppose any cutoff date limiting the President's authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia. However, he supported the bill to end bombing operations in Cambodia on August 15, 1973. He said in a speech to the House that the President would accept and sign such a bill, and "if military action is required in Southeast Asia after August 15, the President will ask Congressional authority and will abide by the decision that is made by the House and the Senate." In the same speech, Ford summarized his past approach to cutoff date legislation:

⁴⁰ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 112, January 25, 1966: 1086.

⁴¹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 112, January 31, 1966: 1556.

⁴² Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 113, August 8, 1967: 21897.

⁴³ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 115, May 21, 1969: 13250.

⁴⁴ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 115, October 21, 1969: 30882.

⁴⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, May 5, 1970: 14192. Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, May 6, 1970: 14422. Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, June 4, 1970: 18448.

⁴⁶ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 116, September 28, 1960: 33923.

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, April 17, 1972: H3054. Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, April 27, 1972: H3697.

⁴⁸ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, May 9, 1972: H4263.

⁴⁹ Congressional Record, Vol. 116, September 22, 1970, p. 83146.

⁵⁰ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, August 10, 1972: H7483.

⁵¹ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 110, June 1, 1964: 12250-12251.

⁵² Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 110, August 7, 1964: 18551.

⁵³ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 111, April 28, 1965: 8648.

⁵⁴ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 111, August 4, 1965: 19461.

My record is very clear from the beginning. I have time after time after time opposed any cutoff date, period. I have resisted many efforts by Members on the other side of the aisle who have repeatedly over a span of years sought to get the Congress to approve amendments that would limit the authority of the President to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia.

... But we have a different situation today. It seems to me that we should now, at this critical juncture, accept the language of the appropriation bill . . . It is a compromise that in my judgment reasonable people can accept as we face a very critical problem in the U.S."⁵⁵

U.S. POLICY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Congressman Ford has advocated bipartisan support for a United States policy toward the Middle East which would (1) maintain the military balance in the region by providing arms for Israel, (2) provide U.S. assistance for "moderate" Arab governments committed to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli problem, (3) seek an Arab-Israeli peace settlement derived from direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis, and (4) stop the Soviet Union from undermining U.S. security interests in the Middle East.

Stating that it is ". . . in the best interests . . . of the United States (and) the free world . . ."⁵⁶ to sell jet aircraft to Israel, Congressman Ford has supported the U.S. policy of maintaining the arms balance and not allowing it to "turn against Israel."⁵⁷ He has supported U.S. assistance to "moderate" Arab governments so that they could resist "radical forces" in the Middle East⁵⁸ and he has opposed giving assistance to "demagogues" such as Egypt's Nasser and favored the passage of legislation which restricted PL 480 sales to Egypt.⁵⁹ In Mr. Ford's expressed opinion, the Soviet Union is collaborating with the Arabs to impose a peace settlement on Israel, while the United States is against an imposed settlement and seeks a directly negotiated peace.⁶⁰ Congressman Ford has stated that ". . . the fate of Israel is linked to the national security interests of the United States . . ." and that the Soviet Union is trying ". . . to create a sphere of influence in the Middle East that would undermine vital American security interests . . ."⁶¹

Mr. Ford's interest in Middle Eastern affairs appears to have emerged recently, particularly since the 1967 war, which he said was ". . . instigated by Communists. . ."⁶² He has consistently advocated a bipartisan approach to foreign policy in the Middle East, although he was criticized by some of his colleagues in the House of Representatives for using American policy toward the Middle East for an attack on a prominent Democrat.⁶³

U.S. POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE

Congressman Gerald R. Ford has spoken only briefly and infrequently on European questions during his service in the House of Representatives. He has limited his remarks on these occasions chiefly to defense issues and relations with the Soviet Union. On both of these topics he has generally taken unyielding positions, although he has adopted a more positive attitude toward detente since President Nixon's visit to Moscow.

In June 1973 Congressman Ford hailed the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting in June as having strengthened peaceful relations between Washington and Moscow and having been fruitful and productive.⁶⁴ In the same month he spoke favorably of MBFR negotiations as providing an opportunity of reducing U.S. troops in

⁵⁵ Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, July 9, 1970: 23517, Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 117, June 17, 1971: 20536, Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 118, August 10, 1972: H7470, H7473, Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 119, June 25, 1973: H5267, Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 119, June 26, 1973: H5365, Congressional Record, [daily ed.] v. 119, June 29, 1973: H5663.

⁵⁶ Congressional Record, v. 116, June 9, 1970: 19006.

⁵⁷ Congressional Record, v. 116, February 24, 1970: 4616.

⁵⁸ Congressional Record, v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38250, 38260.

⁵⁹ Congressional Record, v. 111, January 26, 1965: 1190.

⁶⁰ Speech before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, reprinted in the Congressional Record, v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12953.

⁶¹ Speech before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, reprinted in the Congressional Record, v. 115, April 24, 1969: 10321.

⁶² Congressional Record, v. 113, May 23, 1967: 13625.

⁶³ Congressional Record, v. 117, May 4, 1971: 13352-13356.

⁶⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 119, no. 99, June 25, 1973, p. H5348.

Europe without weakening NATO defense.⁶⁵ In 1972 he cosponsored a joint resolution approving the acceptance by the President of the interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.⁶⁶ At the same time he warned against allowing any foreign power to achieve overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis the United States and strongly supported the President's military budget.⁶⁷

In 1969 he expressed the view that the United States should seek enforceable agreements with the Soviet Union aimed at avoiding a third world war but described as "the greatest hypocrisy" closing "our eyes to the wrongs that the Soviet Union has done to millions of human beings deprived of individual freedom and national independence."⁶⁸ In the same speech he cited with approval Dean Acheson's view "that the United States should enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union only from the strongest possible position."⁶⁹ In 1968 he spoke in favor of the United States strengthening NATO militarily and politically but urged the European allies to contribute their fair share.⁷⁰ In the same year he inveighed against "the spirit of false co-existence" and described as a myth the belief that if the United States should furnish trade and aid to help the economies of the captive nations, "the Communist monolith would breakup."⁷¹ In 1964 in summarizing a report entitled American Strategy and Strength prepared by a task force of Republican Congressmen of which he was a member, he warned against "the subtle belief that survival against the Communist threat has ceased to be an issue." He quoted from an earlier report a statement that there is "no sound economic alternative for the cold war" which was described as a basic prerequisite for both preparedness and the preservation of economic freedom and strength." He recommended exploring plans for nuclear sharing among the NATO "Big Four", entertaining the possibility of new command structures in the NATO alliance and urged a new entente cordiale with France. He attacked the Democratic Administration for abandoning military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union for parity and charged that the Administration had weakened NATO by negotiating unilaterally with the Soviet Union.⁷² In 1963 he opposed Export-Import Bank loans to communist countries for the purchase of grain.⁷³ In 1960 he defended U.S. financial contributions to NATO.⁷⁴ In a speech in the House in the same year he called for a greater sharing of defense burden by NATO allies, supported the doctrine of massive retaliation, attacked the strategic concept of a "pause," and stressed the gravity of the Sino-Soviet peril.

Throughout his career in the House Congressman Ford has sponsored or supported resolutions protesting the Soviet subjugation of captive nations and regularly made strongly anti-Soviet statements on Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Romanian, Estonian, and Hungarian national days, and on the anniversaries of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1971 he spoke in favor of giving the President the right to determine when aid to Greece is justified as necessary for our own self-interest.⁷⁵

Congressman Ford's voting record has followed the same pattern. He has regularly supported Administration requests for Department of Defense budgets. Early examples of his views as reflected in his voting record were his vote in 1952 against limiting the amount specified in the military budget to \$46 billion and his vote in favor of the financing of a special committee to investigate the Katyn massacres.

U.S. ROLE AND POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Congressman Gerald Ford has, in general, supported the United Nations and argued for continued U.S. participation in and cooperation with the United Nations. In extending his support, however, he has emphasized what he regarded as a need for firm control over U.N. finances.

While Congressman Ford did, in 1950, vote against H.J. Res. 334, which increased the authorization on U.S. contributions to five international organiza-

⁶⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 119, no. 100, June 26, 1973, p. H5471.

⁶⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, no. 95, June 13, 1972, p. H5570.

⁶⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, no. 100, June 20, 1972, p. H6339-40.

⁶⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 115, part 14, July 14, 1969, p. 19330.

⁶⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 115, part 14, July 14, 1969, p. 19348.

⁷⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 111, part 13, July 27, 1965, p. 18477.

⁷¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 110, part 12, June 29, 1964, p. 15282-6.

⁷² Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 109, part 19, Dec. 24, 1963, p. 25228-31.

⁷³ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 106, part 10, June 16, 1960, p. 12912.

⁷⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 106, part 1, Jan. 20, 1960, p. 929-932.

⁷⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 117, part 22, Aug. 3, 1971, p. 29114.

tions and which also required the President to report to the Congress annually on the extent and disposition of all U.S. financial contributions to the international organizations in which the United States participated, his record since then supports the statement made in the first paragraph.⁷⁶ He voted in 1958 in favor of a resolution calling for the development of U.N. peace forces.⁷⁷

Three years earlier, he had spoken out against the transfer of the U.N. Narcotics Division from New York to Geneva. In his remarks on the House floor in January 1955 he observed,

In fighting this international evil the U.N. needs the complete cooperation and assistance of the United States and the United States needs the same from the United Nations. This mutual cooperation and assistance will not be increased by moving the U.N. Narcotics Division to Geneva.⁷⁸

When he spoke out on this issue in March 1955 he voiced concern over the cost involved in building and equipping a new Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva, when at that time the Narcotics Division in New York was able to use the U.S. Treasury Department's laboratory in New York "at no additional expense to the United States or the United Nations." He indicated he would recommend that "the House Committee on Appropriations reduce the appropriation, namely the United States contribution, for the general operation of the U.N. by \$30,000 if the Narcotics Laboratory is transferred to Geneva. * * * To deduct \$30,000 will not destroy the effectiveness of the United Nations, but it will indicate to the Secretary General that the Congress is opposed to this uneconomical, unwise, and unnecessary transfer of the Narcotics Laboratory."⁷⁹

Representative Ford also supported the authorization of funds for expansion of the U.N. Headquarters in 1970. He voted against recommitment of the resolution to committee and in favor of passage of the resolution.⁸⁰

In support of his vote he said: "as disappointed as I sometime am with the United Nations, and I think this is a reaction many of us have from time to time, I do believe it is important to keep the United Nations alive so that it can hopefully do a better job in the future.

* * * The United Nations is a hope for peace and we should not back out at this crucial hour when the U.N. can perform a useful function. To defeat the rule on the bill, undoubtedly, the U.N. will be fragmented and New York and the United States will lose the benefits of this organization."⁸¹

During the South Asian conflict in 1971 Congressman Ford urged the United States to "take the lead in shifting the India-Pakistan cease-fire resolution away from the Security Council and placing it before the General Assembly. Only there can the peace-loving nations of the world work their will."

He noted, in concluding, his view that "any nation that refuses to cooperate with the U.N. in its peace-keeping efforts should not expect a receptive atmosphere in the Congress or by the American people."⁸²

Mr. Ford's statement on not appropriating funds for the Narcotics Division illustrates his concern with fiscal responsibility as early as 1955. In the 1960's the Congress passed legislation which authorized and appropriated funds for the U.S. bond loan to the United Nations (in 1962) and passed a resolution (in 1964) which urged the United States to continue efforts to secure payments by U.N. members of assessments in arrears. Representative Ford spoke and voted in support of each of these measures.⁸³ In 1964 he said:

"I would like to state categorically that I fully support what I believe to be the intent of this concurrent resolution, but in my support of it I want it clearly understood that the President and our representatives at the United Nations shall be very hard and tough. There is no room for compromise. Our U.N. delegates should demand that those other nations make their payments as they are required to do under the charter and the World Court decision. This is not a negotiable issue in the U.N. Payment is to be made, or else."⁸⁴

During the 1972 discussions in the House on reducing contributions to the United Nations and its agencies to 25 percent of the total budget of each agency, Representative Ford voted and argued in support of the Derwinski amendment which would have restored the cuts made by the House Appropriations Committee.

Ford acknowledged that much of the progress made by the United States in getting its assessments reduced throughout the years was due to the "pressure from that Congress . . . that we have been contributing too much." He noted that, "the mere fact that the Committee on Appropriations recommended this cut ought to be a signal to our people up at the United Nations and to the other nation members that we anticipate at the next negotiation, which takes place in 1973, that our contribution had better be down to 25 percent or less."⁸⁵

However, Congressman Ford pointed out that if the United States should default on its obligations, U.S. credibility in getting other nations to pay up would be eroded very seriously. (The Derwinski amendment was rejected, 156 ayes, 202 noes, 72 not voting.)⁸⁶

THE MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 480

Representative Ford's position on both the multilateral financial institutions and P.L. 480 is basically the same: he has consistently given strong support to the basic goals of the programs and to assure their continuation, but at various times has opposed specific aspects or amounts proposed.

From the beginning of P.L. 480 in 1954, he has supported the program and, except for 1962,⁸⁷ has voted for final passage of the successive bills. However, he was in favor of prohibiting P.L. 480 sales to any country trading with North Vietnam,⁸⁸ and against P.L. 480 sales to Egypt.⁸⁹ During the major overhaul of P.L. 480 in 1966, he opposed granting 40-year dollar credits on sales because he felt that the loans would most likely not be repaid such a long time after the food was consumed. In addition, he indicated his feeling that any country poor enough to qualify for the 40-year credits should be considered under the provisions of the bill grants in place of sales.⁹⁰ That year he voted to recommit the P.L. 480 authorization and, when that failed, voted in favor of final passage of the bill.⁹¹ This pattern—opposition to specific provisions, perhaps support for recommitment, then a favorable vote on final passage—has been common in Congressman Ford's votes on P.L. 480.

Congressman Ford's support for the multilateral financial institutions has been fairly consistent over time. He voted for the creation of the Development Loan Fund in 1957,⁹² and for the increased U.S. subscription to the World Bank and the IMF in 1959.⁹³ He supported the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959,⁹⁴ and the International Development Association in 1960.⁹⁵ In 1966, he favored U.S. membership in the Asian Development Bank,⁹⁶ and in early 1972 spoke out clearly in favor of the third replenishment of the IDA and in favor of a U.S. contribution to the Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank.⁹⁷

In 1964, he supported the increase in the U.S. subscription to the IDA,⁹⁸ but opposed the increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF in 1965 on the grounds of his concern over President Johnson's management of the economy.⁹⁹ His 1967 votes to reduce the U.S. share of the increase in the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, and to recommit the bill were cast because of his reluctance to "rubber stamp" decisions made by President Johnson at Punta Del Este.¹⁰⁰

⁷⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, May 18, 1972: H4690.

⁷⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.] v. 118, May 18, 1972: H4695.

⁷⁸ Congressional Record, v. 108, July 19, 1962: 14198, and September 20, 1962: 20129.

⁷⁹ Congressional Record, v. 112, August 30, 1966: 21288.

⁸⁰ Congressional Record, v. 111, January 20, 1965: 1190.

⁸¹ Congressional Record, v. 112, June 9, 1966: 12861.

⁸² Congressional Record, v. 112, June 9, 1966: 12893, 12894.

⁸³ Congressional Record, v. 103, July 19, 1957: 12226.

⁸⁴ Congressional Record, v. 105, March 25, 1959: 5259.

⁸⁵ Congressional Record, v. 105, July 27, 1959: 14369.

⁸⁶ Congressional Record, v. 106, June 26, 1960: 14967.

⁸⁷ 1966 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 854.

⁸⁸ Congressional Record, v. 118, February 1, 1972: H483.

⁸⁹ Congressional Record, v. 110, May 13, 1964: 10722.

⁹⁰ Congressional Record, v. 111, April 27, 1965: 8575.

⁹¹ Congressional Record, v. 113, July 26, 1967: 20231.

⁷⁴ Congressional Record, v. 96, June 22, 1950: 9092-9093.

⁷⁵ Congressional Record, v. 104, August 21, 1955: 18973-18974.

⁷⁶ Congressional Record, v. 101, January 11, 1955: 232-253.

⁷⁷ Congressional Record, v. 101, March 29, 1955: 3927.

⁷⁸ Congressional Record, v. 116, December 21, 1970: 43131.

⁷⁹ Congressional Record, v. 116, December 21, 1970: 43111.

⁸⁰ Congressional Record, v. 117, October 26, 1971: 44894.

⁸¹ Congressional Record, v. 108, September 14, 1962: 19485-19486; Congressional Record, v. 110, August 17, 1964: 19886-19887; Statement in 1962: Congressional Record, v. 108, September 14, 1962: 19467-19468.

⁸² Congressional Record, v. 110, August 17, 1964: 19884.

THE U.S. BILATERAL AID PROGRAM

Speaking in 1961 Congressman Ford stated, with reference to the foreign aid program: "Also the record should show that I have consistently supported the program both for the authorization and the appropriation."¹ He particularly supported the military assistance program and the defense support program, several times offering amendments to restore cuts or increase expenditures in those areas. He also backed the Development Loan Fund. However, he opposed long-term Treasury financing of aid as "backdoor financing," and during the early and mid 1960's a pattern appeared in his voting record whereby he voted for motions whose effect was to reduce the amount of assistance, and then voted for the final authorization or appropriation bills. This dual pattern is no longer apparent.

The substance of Congressman Ford's position is that he supported U.S. foreign assistance, but his support was more vocal with respect to military assistance and defense support than with respect to economic aid. However, the purpose of the Development Loan Fund was economic, and Ford was a steady supporter of its full funding in its early years. When, in 1961, he opposed long-term development lending, he made the point that such a program would weaken Congressional control over the foreign aid program. He also argued that long-term planning was possible without Treasury financing, citing the phenomenal improvement of Formosa under traditional methods of Congressional review, and defended the record of Congress in funding administration foreign aid requests.²

As indicated above, Congressman Ford's position changed during the years a Democratic administration was in power, but only to the extent that he would vote for amendments or recommittal motions which aimed at reducing the amounts to be authorized or appropriated for foreign aid. Thus on August 23, 1963, he voted to recommit the Foreign Assistance Act in order to reduce the foreign aid authorization by \$585,000,000, and on the same day voted for the final passage of the authorization.³ On May 25, 1965 he voted to recommit the Foreign Assistance Act to reduce funds for development loans, and then vote for passage of the authorization bill, again on the same day.⁴ He consistently voted for the final authorization and appropriations bills. This pattern emerged before Mr. Ford became Minority Leader. With a Republican administration in power, he has consistently supported the administration's position. Thus, for example, he was paired for the foreign aid authorization adopted on January 25, 1972.⁵

The Congressman's record may be said to have featured a strong anti-Communist position. His strong backing for military aid and defense support reflected this point of view. In 1960, for example, he sponsored amendments to both the authorization and appropriation bills which would have substantially increased the defense support program.⁶ In other words, his emphasis in supporting foreign aid is on building up the military strength of the non-Communist nations. The record shows somewhat more space devoted to expounding this philosophy than to advocating the economic benefits of aid, either to the developing countries or the United States.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (SELECTED ISSUES)

In the area of general foreign policy it is difficult to characterize or find a pattern in Congressman Gerald Ford's remarks on any one subject. Therefore, an attempt is made in this brief report to give an overall picture of the Congressman's views by looking at his statements on several subjects.

One issue which Congressman Ford addressed again and again throughout the fifties and sixties was Congress' role in foreign policy making. In 1950, for example, he sponsored legislation which would prohibit the unreasonable suppression of information from the Congress by the President,⁷ and in 1951 he sponsored legislation which would set up a select committee on foreign policy.⁸ In a floor speech in 1968 on legislation allowing the President to make Export-Import Bank loans to certain Communist countries, he stated: "Mr. Speaker, there is nothing in the Constitution which precludes the Congress from having an impact on or playing a role in the determination of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, since dollars have become so involved in the execution of our foreign

policy through foreign aid legislation, the Congress has a specific responsibility to help guide and direct foreign policy. Over the years, the Congress, whether there was a Democratic or a Republican President, has helped to shape foreign policy by the use of the various foreign aid programs."⁹

Earlier, in 1963, Mr. Ford made a speech on Executive Privilege. At that time he said concerning the role of the Congress that "The investigatory power of Congress is well founded in law and so basic to its legislative function that without freedom to investigate thoroughly Congress can have no effective check on the executive branch. It should be superfluous to say that without adequate information no investigation can succeed."¹⁰ Further in the speech he said either "It is one of the great legislative challenges of our time and we must either face it, or accept the certainty of continued assaults upon Congress' right to know."

In June 1959, during the debate on the foreign aid bill, Congressman Ford spoke in favor of limiting the executive's discretion in the use of foreign aid funds with the reasoning that the Congress must retain fiscal control over the foreign aid program. He stated that "the Congress should retain certain control over how these programs should be administered; and if this provision is left in the bill we will lose fiscal control for the Congress. I think that is bad for the country."¹¹

Nevertheless, a statement made by Congressman Ford in 1970 may indicate a change in his feeling on this subject. During a speech in the House on February 24, 1970, Mr. Ford made the following statement.

"It has been a basic tenet of our government that while we may be divided at home on foreign policy matters we are nevertheless willing to permit our Government to deal in an orderly and diplomatic manner with other governments."¹²

In discussing actual foreign policy matters Congressman Ford in a November 19, 1970, statement said that the "greatest single American national interest is the avoidance of a Third World War—a war which could destroy all mankind."¹³ He elaborated on this further by stating the need to deter the "predatory instincts and appetites of aggressors" by a world system of collective security arrangements. Furthermore, he stated: "In all of these free world collective security arrangements, there is one constant ingredient: The power of the United States of America and the credibility of this power—the recognition by the world at large of the fact that the United States will use its power to deter aggression and support its friends and allies if they come under attack. The credibility of the American deterrent is vital to the prevention of aggression—either by calculation or by miscalculation—aggression which could lead to a third world war."¹⁴

Among the friends and allies which should thus be supported in order to maintain U.S. credibility, Congressman Ford consistently mentions the state of Israel: "the United States Government must continue to give Israel the backing necessary to maintain the credibility of our friendship. This is in our own self-interest. We will not dip the Stars and Stripes in retreat and defeat in the Mediterranean."¹⁵

In a speech on April 24, 1969, Congressman Ford stated: "I firmly believe that the fate of Israel is linked to the national security interests of the United States: I therefore cannot conceive of a situation in which the U.S. Administration will sell Israel down the Nile."¹⁶

The same sentiment was again reiterated in a speech in April, 1971, when he said: "It is vital that we retain our unity in supporting the Israeli cause. The Soviet Union, collaborating with the Arabs, is trying to impose a unilateral peace that would compromise Israel's future. The Arabs would achieve through diplomacy what they failed to win on the field of battle. The Russians would serve their own aggressive ends."¹⁷

In addition to giving verbal support to Israel, Congressman Ford has supported giving Israel U.S. arms: "I am very gratified to be part of an Administration that responded to the realities in the Middle East by providing Israel with some of the finest U.S. weapons."¹⁸

⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 112, October 21, 1966: 28601.

¹⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 109, April 4, 1963: 5819.

¹¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 105, June 18, 1959: 11304.

¹² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, February 24, 1970: 4616.

¹³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38240.

¹⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, November 19, 1970: 38240.

¹⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12954.

¹⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 115, April 24, 1969: 10321.

¹⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12953.

¹⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12953.

¹ Congressional Record, v. 107, August 15, 1961: 15813.

² Congressional Record, v. 107, August 15, 1961: 15813.

³ Congressional Record, v. 109, December 24, 1963: 25589.

⁴ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. 21, 1965: 962.

⁵ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. 28, 1972: 2-H.

⁶ Congressional Record, v. 106, June 17, 1960: 13117; August 31, 1960: 18693.

⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 97, October 2, 1951: 12500.

⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 96, August 26, 1958: 13371.

Congressman Ford also expressed support for the establishment of "defensible frontiers" for Israel: "Israel, the victim of aggression, is entitled to reasonable claims for new and secure boundaries. Israel has every right to seek a defensible frontier which may not correspond identically with the frontiers of 1967 when the forces of aggression imposed an unwanted war upon Israel."¹⁹

In discussing United States foreign policy in its relations with states in the Western Hemisphere, Congressman Ford in 1965—speaking in support of H. Res. 560 (Resolution on Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere)—stated: "I specifically endorse the resolution because of two features: First, the fact that it reaffirms against the Monroe Doctrine after some lapse and doubt about its application in the last several years; and second, it does call for collective action by the Organization of American States. Such joint action is most important."²⁰

He stated further that he would support and in fact had supported (specifically in the case of the Dominican Republic) action taken by the Chief Executive against Communist subversion in the hemisphere. He concluded this statement, however, with the reservation that: "I want to make it crystal clear that by our voting for the resolution it does not mean that we, in advance, endorse any specific method of meeting the challenge of Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere."²¹

Congressman Ford's 1970 statements concerning the events around the death of Dan A. Mitrione, chief safety advisor for AID in Uruguay indicate some elements of his view of the U.S. aid role: "Indeed he was trying to help the police assume their proper role in Uruguayan society."²²

In remarking on what United States policy should be in view of the tragic event, Congressman Ford stated: "It is suggested by some that this tragedy raises questions as to whether the United States should be engaged in this activity. I submit that it proves how important it is for us to persevere in this essential task."²³

Moreover, Congressman Ford denied the existence of the "political prisoners" whose release was sought: "The frequent reference we have heard to 'political prisoners' is totally misleading. The MLN demanded release of all 'political prisoners' held by the Government as ransom. It should be noted that these people are not being held nor were they convicted because of their political beliefs. They are criminals arrested for murder, bank robbery, extortion, and the like. Constant reference to them otherwise by us all gives an erroneous impression as to why they are being held by the Uruguayan Government."²⁴

U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY: GENERAL

Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., was appointed to the House Appropriations Committee in 1951, two years after he entered Congress. In 1953 he became a member of the Department of Defense Subcommittee where he served from the 82d through the 88th Congress. During the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ford became known as a Republican spokesman on defense and mutual security policies. In addition to supporting close adherence to overseas commitments, he has consistently advocated adequate active duty and reserve force levels, balanced and powerful weapons systems, and attractive and equitable conditions of military service. In terms of current policy, he endorses the "triad" concept of strategic deterrence, backs the all-volunteer force, and supports the "total force concept." He has reservations, however, concerning the depth and durability of detente, the promptness with which reserve forces can be made combat-ready following call to duty, and the country's capability to sustain the rising costs of military pay and incentives.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY

Throughout the 1960s Congressman Ford was a member of the large bipartisan House majority supporting authorizations and appropriations for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and supporting U.S. participation in arms limitations negotiations. In 1972, Ford endorsed the interim SALT agreement with the Soviet Union, urging House approval of the agreement.

¹⁹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, April 30, 1971: 12954.

²⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 111, September 20, 1965: 24352.

²¹ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 111, September 20, 1965: 24352.

²² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

²³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

²⁴ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, August 11, 1970: 28141.

Ford did not record a vote on 1961 legislation initially authorizing the Arms Control Agency. In 1963,²⁵ 1965,²⁶ 1966,²⁷ and 1970,²⁸ however, he voted in favor of extending the Agency's authorization. (In 1965 he voted with the House majority to limit the authorization to 3 years instead of the Committee-recommended 4 years; in 1968 he again voted with the majority to limit the Agency's authorization to 2 years, although the reported bill had recommended 3 years.) While supporting the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the achievements of the SALT negotiations, Ford has never argued for cuts in U.S. defense spending. In a 1972 speech supporting the SALT agreement, he maintained that "we can have peace in the age of nuclear weaponry and so-called wars of liberation only if we remain strong." He described the effect of the agreement as "slowing the Russians' headlong rush into nuclear superiority"; while the agreement would limit the quantity of U.S. weapons, "we can still maintain the quality of our nuclear weapons."²⁹ In urging support for a House resolution approving the SALT agreement, Ford noted that the agreement should not be considered a unilateral Executive action, because throughout the negotiation process the President must bear in mind the attitudes and opinions of Congress.³⁰

ATOMIC ENERGY

The nominee appears to have few remarks on the record associated with atomic energy. Three instances of dismission in an atomic energy context have been found in the Congressional Record Index—in 1957, 1967, and 1972.³¹ In 1958, a one-page discussion of H.R. 12575—creation of a civilian space agency—was presented by the nominee, which included favorable mention of the Atomic Energy Commission as an example of the kind of agency which ought to be established.³² The nominee appears to have voted with the prevailing side in the principal enactments relating to atomic energy³³ which are taken to be the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the extension in 1965 of the (Price-Anderson) amendments which provide for Federal indemnification of AEC licensees and contractors, in the event of liability in excess of that available from private insurers. Both of these enactments may be regarded as for the purpose of opening up the development of atomic energy to the private sector; under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, atomic energy had been the domain of government.

[NOTE. See also profiles on Arms Control and Disarmament Policy (p. 89) and Strategic Policy and Weapon Program (p. 98)]

INTERNAL SECURITY

From his first days in the Congress, Mr. Ford has spoken of the influence of Communists in the United States. On August 8, 1950, he decried Owen Latti-

²⁵ Congressional Record, v. 109, part 17, Nov. 20, 1963: 22538.

²⁶ Congressional Record, v. 111, part 3, Feb. 17, 1965: 2019.

²⁷ Congressional Record, v. 114, part 5, Mar. 6, 1968: 5427.

²⁸ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 10, April 28, 1970: 13244-13245.

²⁹ Congressional Record, v. 118 [daily ed.], June 20, 1972: E6339. Speech before VFW convention, Grand Rapids, Mich.

³⁰ Congressional Record, v. 118 [daily ed.], Aug. 18, 1972: H7953.

³¹ Ford, Gerald R. Authorizing appropriations for the Atomic Energy Commission (debate in the House) Congressional Record, v. 103, Aug. 8, 1957: Pp. 14116, 14125, 15523.

³² Ford, Gerald R. Action taken by Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to correct format of bill (floor discussion in House) Congressional Record, v. 113, June 29, 1967: Mr. Ford's remark thanking the committee for correcting the format of a bill is on p. 17894.

³³ Ford, Gerald R. Addition to legislative program (floor discussion in the House), Congressional Record (daily edition), May 1, 1972. Mr. Ford elicited comment from Mr. Boggs as to the relationship of the bill being scheduled to a bill passed the previous week. The bill being scheduled was H.R. 14655, authorization for the Atomic Energy Commission to issue temporary operating licenses for nuclear power reactors. Pp. H3790-H3791.

³⁴ Ford, Gerald R. National Aeronautics and Outer Space Act of 1958 (debate and vote in the House), Congressional Record, v. 104, June 2, 1958, P. 9939. Mr. Ford spoke in favor of the bill under consideration, commented on AEC programs in space nuclear propulsion and stated: "Civilian control . . . is a must. . . . It will not jeopardize our military effort. We have after all the example of the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC has perfected the A-bomb and H-bomb capability for the military, while at the same time building a whole new world through its advances in the field of peaceful nuclear and thermonuclear energy."

³⁵ Ford, Gerald R. Voting and attendance record. Congressional Record, v. 101, May 10, 1955, P. 6007 and V. 111, Oct. 22, 1965, P. 28716. The record shows that Mr. Ford voted against recommitment and for passage of H.R. 9757, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (passed 231 to 154). On Sept. 16, 1965, the nominee was absent; a footnote indicates that, if present, he would have voted yes to S. 2042: extending authority of the Atomic Energy Commission to indemnify licensees and contractors for public liability. The bill passed (337 to 30).

more—whom he described as a “fellow traveller”—for his urging of a UN seat for Red China and on August 29, 1950, he praised Richard Nixon in his fight against the “insidious Communist forces that would destroy our Nation.” 96 Cong. Rec. 11966, 13737. In 1965, Mr. Ford qualified his support of a resolution which would have given the President support in any action he may take “to prevent in a timely manner Communist subversion in the hemisphere” by stating that “those of us on the minority side of the aisle must reserve independent judgment as to the precise way in which the challenge to subversion is undertaken by our Government in Latin America.” 111 Cong. Rec. 24352 (9/20/65). Alleged communist influence in anti-war demonstrations led by Mr. Ford in 1967 to demand a report by the President on the extent of Communist influence in the October 21, 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon. 113 Cong. Rec. 33706 (11/22/67).

During the 1967 riots, Mr. Ford decried the exploitation of the disturbance for partisan purposes and criticized President Johnson's alleged delay in allowing use of Federal troops in Detroit and his explanation of the riots as being due to Congressional rejection of Democratic legislation such as the rat eradication bill. 113 Cong. Rec. 19949 (7/25/67). He also supported granting subpoena power to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 113 Cong. Rec. 20605 (9/31/67).

Anti-war and student demonstrators came in for criticism by Mr. Ford in the late sixties and seventies. On March 25, 1969 he supported withholding of financial aid to disruptive college students. 115 Cong. Rec. 7384. On November 24, 1969, he outlined in the Record the cost of the “destruction and violence engaged in by the relatively small radical elements among the [Nov. 15] demonstrators.” 115 Cong. Rec. 35540. On November 19, 1969 he contrasted the “astronauts and the spirit of American courage exemplified by them and the radicals who pulled down the American flag at the Justice Department last Saturday and raised the Vietcong flag in its place,” 115 Cong. Rec. 34972-3. He decried the tactics of Mayday demonstrators in 1971:

To try to block traffic and keep others from getting to their jobs is an action which cannot be tolerated. Such tactics are counterproductive.

I congratulate the authorities for handling the situation as skillfully as they have. Law-abiding citizens owe them a debt of gratitude, 117 Cong. Rec. 13104 5/3/71).

On May 1, 1971, Mr. Ford singled out college protests as being the “most lacking in logic.” 92d Cong., 2d Sess., H3813.

Mr. Ford has supported the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act (117 Cong. Rec. 31766 (9/14/71)) and making it a Federal crime to illegally possess, use or transport explosives (116 Cong. Rec. 9377 (3/25/70)). On January 23, 1973, Mr. Ford reiterated his support of the work of the House Committee on Internal Security and opposition to a resolution to abolish it. 119 Cong. Rec. H390 (1/23/73) and on May 23, 1973 he stated his support of President Nixon's statement on Watergate and national security. 119 Cong. Rec. H3970.

Throughout his twenty-five years in the U.S. Congress, Mr. Ford has voted in favor of such major national security legislation as the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954. More recently, Mr. Ford voted in 1971 to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950).

MILITARY MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

As an advocate of a strong military defense, Representative Ford has generally supported administration requests for active duty and reserve personnel strengths. On June 27, 1961, he not only supported the Kennedy administration's recommendations for 25,000 more active duty personnel than proposed by the outgoing Eisenhower administration in January, but also called for retention of 70,000 reserve billets which had been scheduled for elimination by both administrations. On this same occasion, however, Ford remarked that he had “grave doubts” that a new program announced by President Kennedy would make it possible for sizeable reserve forces to be deployed overseas within two to four weeks after activation for federal duty. He regarded four to five months as a more realistic goal for putting National Guard and Reserve divisions into combat in the event of war.³⁴

While somewhat skeptical of the prompt deployability of major reserve units, which is a key assumption in today's “total force concept,” Ford has emerged as

³⁴ Congressional Record, v. 107, June 27, 1961: 11442.

“a firm, strong supporter of the volunteer military force,” another major tenet of the Nixon administration's thinking on defense policy.³⁵ He is aware that increased personnel costs associated with the volunteer force are responsible for a large share of growing defense costs but has stated that he happens “to prefer getting the people for our Defense Department by a volunteer method.”³⁶ As precautionary measures preparatory to the launching of the all volunteer force, Ford urged a two-year rather than a single-year extension of the draft, and sufficient funding to enable the Selective Service to continue registration (but not induction) of young men. Earlier, he had resisted attempts to remove the draft exemptions of undergraduate college students and of divinity students.

Ford has supported pay increases for active duty military personnel, but he has shown concern that raises and incentives designed to attract and retain men and junior officers might be applied too liberally to the higher grades. He once worked to reduce hazardous duty payments (principally flight pay) to general officers whose primary duty did not involve aerial flight or comparable risk. Ford has introduced measures to increase the family allowances and to improve the housing of military personnel. He also successfully urged that military personnel be permitted to retire at the highest grade ever held while on active duty in any one of the services. He voted for recomputation of retired pay in 1960 but voted against it in 1963, pointing out that in the interim he has become aware of the enormous cost implications of the provision. He admitted that disallowance of recomputation might entail a breach of contract on the part of the government but pointed out that in that event opportunities should be explored for review and renegotiation of the issue.³⁷

Attempts to secure disability benefits and retirement credit for reservists marked Ford's early years in the Congress. He was particularly concerned that reservists on active duty receive treatment equal to that accorded personnel of the regular services. Although resistant to cuts in reserve strength, he has not tended to regard the reserves as a substitute for an adequate force in being. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he proposed that reserve call-ups be limited to Air Force and Navy elements, and in 1965 he opposed Presidential mobilization of the reserves without congressional endorsement.

MILITARY COMMITMENT AND OPERATIONS ABROAD

From the outset of his career as a Congressman, Representative Gerald Ford has been a forceful and consistent advocate of a strong U.S. national defense. He has supported an active role for the United States abroad, involving close working ties with this country's allies and a willingness to confront serious challenges to the nation's security whenever and wherever such threats might appear. In this regard, he has on a number of occasions criticized the administrations of Democratic Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson for not responding firmly enough in the face of provocations and hostile acts. In 1951, during the height of the Korean War, he called for the bombing of Communist China's supply bases and a blockade of the coast.³⁸ He criticized the withdrawal of vital support by the administration of John F. Kennedy in the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.³⁹ Four years later in 1965, Representative Ford urged the administration of Lyndon Johnson to crack down on Cuba because of its suspected involvement in the Dominican Republic revolt.⁴⁰ He also criticized the Johnson Administration in 1967 and 1968 for not prosecuting the war in Indochina with sufficient vigor.⁴¹

The inauguration of President Nixon in January 1968 marked the beginning of an historic transformation in U.S. foreign policy toward longstanding rivals—the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This change also involved a rearrangement of the country's approach to military commitments and activities abroad. A key feature of the so-called Nixon Doctrine has been the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces overseas and greater self-reliance by American allies on their own armed forces in the time of Crisis. An important corollary of the Nixon Doctrine and has been U.S. willingness to provide generous military support to its allies in the form of material assistance and advice. Representative Ford

³⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, June 22, 1973: H5232.

³⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, Jan. 31, 1973: H589.

³⁷ Congressional Record, v. 109, May 8, 1963: 8073-8074.

³⁸ Congressional Record, v. 97, Jan. 19, 1959: 454.

³⁹ Congressional Record, v. 110, June 29, 1964: 15284.

⁴⁰ New York Times, May 4, 1965: 21.

⁴¹ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. XXIII, 1967: 939.

has supported the Nixon Doctrine and its provisions, an observation which is consistent with his reputation of party adherence on most major policy issues.

In introducing President Nixon's February 1970 report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, Representative Ford endorsed those provisions relating to the country's military commitments and activities abroad. He stressed that the underlying theme of the Nixon Doctrine was "a willingness to help those who are willing to help themselves."⁴² However, the Congressman's statements on the Nixon Doctrine have not precisely mirrored those of the current Administration. It is possible to detect in his views a difference in degree if not in direction. He appears, for example, to exhibit greater wariness towards the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and their international intentions. He also appears to place a somewhat greater stress on the need for firm and unwavering U.S. support of its allies around the world. Over the years, Representative Ford has regularly supported the Mutual Security Act appropriations and similar legislation providing military grant aid and credit sales to deserving allies. During the administration of Dwight Eisenhower he even sought to increase these programs to a level higher than that recommended by the Republican leadership.⁴³

STRATEGIC POLICY AND WEAPON PROGRAMS

The legislative activities and public statements of Representative Ford during his 25 years in Congress have evidenced consistent support for a strong U.S. military posture predicated on the strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China and involving reliance on the "triad" concept of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched missiles, and strategic bombers. At the same time, he has advocated the maintenance of strong and balanced conventional forces and air defense capabilities.

For example, during the 1959 debate on Defense appropriations Representative Ford argued in favor of a mixture of air defense weapons including various Army and Air Force missile systems then in operation or under development as well as fighter-interceptors and manned aircraft programs. Declaring that "this air defense program is bigger than any service, bigger than any contractor," Ford observed that it involved "the national security of our homeland," and he deplored interservice rivalry in matters of such national importance. During this debate Ford also expressed his support for aircraft carriers which he deemed essential for "small wars such as the Lebanese crisis" of 1968.⁴⁴ Since that time, Ford has adhered to the main thrust of these positions and has generally supported the development and deployment of most of the major weapon systems proposed by the Defense Department. When the FY 1974 military procurement bill was before the House in July 1973, Ford was recorded as voting against efforts to halt or limit development of such programs as the CVAN-70 nuclear aircraft carrier and the B-1 strategic bomber.⁴⁵

An active supporter of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense program,⁴⁶ Representative Ford argued in 1969 that the ABM program would not hinder disarmament talks with the Soviet Union and, in fact, might make a positive contribution to these negotiations. He observed that shortly after President Johnson announced deployment of the Sentinel ABM the Soviets had asked for strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the United States. "If the United States enters into negotiations naked," Ford stated during the 1969 ABM debate, "we will come out of these negotiations naked." He compared the ABM decision with President Truman's decision to proceed with development of the H-bomb despite objections from some members of the scientific community.⁴⁷ The view expressed by Ford in 1969 to the effect that continued development of weapon systems furthers negotiations with the Soviets in the area of arms control has characterized his position on current weapon programs and the ongoing SALT activities.

During his early years in the Congress, Representative Ford expressed some concern over the high cost of defense programs, although in later years he has not been outspoken on this point and has generally opposed efforts to reduce military spending. In 1951, Ford addressed the House on the problem of cost escalation in weaponry and stated that "the high cost of our military defense

⁴² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 116, Feb. 18, 1970: H925.

⁴³ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. xiv, 1958: 189.

⁴⁴ Congressional Record, v. 105, June 2, 1959: 9599-9600.

⁴⁵ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 31, 1973: H6932, H6950.

⁴⁶ New York Times, Apr. 30, 1969: D. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, v. XXIII, 1967: 313.

⁴⁷ Congressional Record, v. 115, Oct. 2, 1969: 28137-28138.

programs should make us realize that inflation as well as Communist aggression is damaging our national security."⁴⁸ However, in 1952 Ford was one of 11 Republican members who voted with 120 Democrats in an unsuccessful effort to defeat an amendment to the FY 1953 defense appropriations bill limiting military spending to \$46 billion.⁴⁹ More recently, Ford has repeatedly opposed similar limiting amendments, such as the one offered by Representative Aspin in 1971 and another passed by the House in 1973. As on earlier occasions, Ford voted in 1973 against the Aspin amendment which would have placed a ceiling on over-all defense spending.⁵⁰

WAR POWERS

Congressman Gerald Ford has consistently maintained the position that the Congress should take a greater role in decisions concerning U.S. involvement in undeclared wars. However, Ford has opposed current proposals which would terminate a Presidentially initiated involvement of U.S. forces if Congress takes no action to approve the involvement.

In 1970,⁵¹ 1971,⁵² and 1972⁵³ Ford voted with a nearly unanimous House in support of legislation which would have required the President to consult with the Congress whenever he introduced U.S. troops abroad. In a 1970 House floor statement Ford noted that the proposed resolution would, in effect, change nothing under the Constitution. At that time he also stated that "without hesitation or qualification I know of no Presidents [during his tenure in Congress] who have been false or deceptive in the information that has come from the White House."⁵⁴ In addition, in a 1971 address before an American Legion convention in Pittsburgh, Ford called for legislation stating that any military action begun by a President must be approved, altered, or terminated by Congress within 30 days of its initiation.⁵⁵ He did not formally submit such a legislative proposal, to which the Administration reportedly was opposed at that time. In the 93rd Congress, Ford argued and voted against the war powers bill⁵⁶ reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, maintaining that if the Congress does not want a military conflict continued it "ought to have the guts and will" to vote against the action, rather than expressing disapproval by doing nothing. He supported an amendment comparable to the legislation he called for in 1971 which would have required Congressional action either to approve and authorize continuation of U.S. military involvement or to disapprove and require discontinuation of the action.⁵⁷ When the amendment failed, he voted against final passage of the war powers bill and against approval of the conference report. During debate on initial House passage of the 1973 war powers act, Ford read a telegram from President Nixon which indicated the President's intention to veto the bill as reported, while expressing Presidential interest in "appropriate legislation" to provide for an effective contribution by the Congress.⁵⁸

GENERAL GOVERNMENT

AID TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS (PAROCHIAL)

Although a one-time detractor of many Federal aid-to-education programs, Gerald Ford has recently been a staunch supporter of Federal aid, particularly by tax credits, to parochial education.

Gerald Ford did not support the Federal Government's earlier programs of aid to elementary and secondary education. He voted against the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which included aid to parochial schools, Cong. Rec. 6152, 89th Congress, 1st Session 1965. He voted against the 1966 amendments, Cong. Rec. 25588, 89th Congress, 2d Session, 1966, and the 1967 amendments to that act, Cong. Rec. 13899, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967.

⁴⁸ Congressional Record, v. 97, Mar. 13, 1951: 2325.

⁴⁹ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Oct. 17, 1973: 8.

⁵⁰ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 3, 1973: H6991.

⁵¹ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 28, Nov. 16, 1970: 37407-37408.

⁵² Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 117, Aug. 2, 1971: H7620. (Passed by voice vote under suspension of the rules.)

⁵³ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 118, Aug. 14, 1972: H7576.

⁵⁴ Congressional Record, v. 116, part 28, Nov. 16, 1970: 37403.

⁵⁵ Washington Post, July 17, 1971, p. A4. Representative Ford Urges Bars to Undeclared Wars.

⁵⁶ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6284-H6285, and Oct. 12, 1973: H8963.

⁵⁷ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6256.

⁵⁸ Congressional Record [daily ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6241.

In 1969, however, Mr. Ford supported amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Cong. Rec. 10099, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969. Since that time he has supported such aid to parochial schools.

In 1973 Gerald Ford introduced three bills relative to aid for parochial schools. His bills, H.R. 1176, H.R. 2989 and H.R. 13020 all provided for tax credits to be granted for tuition paid to private nonprofit schools including parochial schools.

CIVIL RIGHTS⁹⁹

Although not a vocal supporter of civil rights, particularly in his early years, Mr. Ford is recorded as voting yea on passage of the score of major and minor civil rights bills enacted during this period. Not infrequently in the early legislative stages, he has registered support for Republican sponsored alternative proposals. This is particularly true since election by his Republican colleagues as Minority Leader in the mid-1960's. Although his elevation to the Republican Leadership position generally marks the end of his floor silence on civil rights concerns, it also coincides with a number of procedural votes, viz., votes to recommit, seemingly at odds with his ultimate vote to pass the legislation in question. Notwithstanding statements explaining these apparent equivocations in procedural terms, these actions are resented by civil rights groups. *The Washington Post*, Thursday, October 18, 1973, at A2. In particular, his position on Fair Housing in 1968, and his backing for the Administration alternative proposals on voting rights in 1970 and equal employment opportunity in 1972, are denounced as attempts to "gut . . . the final product." *Ibid.* Neither his apparent switch on Fair Housing nor his consistent yea vote on passage seems to have effectively altered this image.

In the immediate post war years, the civil rights drive focused on legislation to outlaw the poll tax and to guarantee equal employment opportunity (then called fair employment practices). On at least three occasions in the 1940's the House passed poll tax legislation which went on to die in the Senate. The last of these came in 1949, Mr. Ford's first year in the Congress. Of the four roll call votes on the measure, Mr. Ford is recorded as voting yea on the rule, on consideration and on passage and nay on the motion to recommit. 95 Cong. Rec. 10097, 10098, 10247, and 10248 (1949).

Two lesser civil rights related measures were subject to House roll call votes in 1949. On one of these—an unsuccessful effort to recommit the Military Housing Act of 1949 to conference because it did not contain a non-discrimination clause—Mr. Ford is recorded as not voting. 95 Cong. Rec. 10294 (1949). The second proposal, a bill to establish a woman's Coast Guard reserve was recommitted after the House adopted an amendment barring segregation or discrimination because of race, creed, or color. Mr. Ford voted yea on the amendment. 95 Cong. Rec. 3806 (1949). There was no record roll call vote on the motion to recommit.

In 1950, civil rights supporters were successful in bringing an equal employment opportunity (FEPC) bill to the House floor for the first time. The reported bill provided for a compulsory FEPC commission having broad powers and recourse to the courts for enforcement. However, on the floor Pennsylvania Republican Samuel K. McConnell Jr. offered an amendment substituting a voluntary FEPC without any enforcement powers. The substitute was adopted. Mr. Ford voted yea to substitute the voluntary bill, nay on the motion to recommit it, and yea on passage. 96 Cong. Rec. 2253, 2300, 2301 (1950).

In another development, Mr. Ford voted with an overwhelming majority of House Members against recommitting the Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1950 with instructions to insert an anti-discrimination amendment. 96 Cong. Rec. 17061 (1951). The motion had been offered by Mr. Smith of Virginia, an acknowledged opponent of the legislation.

On June 6, 1951, Mr. Ford joined 222 Members in killing (i.e., striking out the enacting clause of) a bill for construction of a veterans' hospital for Negroes in Virginia. 97 Cong. Rec. 6201 (1951). The measure had been denounced as "class legislation" by Representatives Dawson and Powell.

In the interval between 1950 and 1956—in the latter year the House began laying the foundations of the 1957 Civil Rights Act—Members acted on countless civil rights matters, principally Powell amendments which would have banned discrimination in a variety of contexts including public housing, public schools and the National Guard. A great many of these proposals were disposed of either procedurally or by standing or teller votes. Because of this and the absence of

relevant floor remarks by Mr. Ford, it is virtually impossible to discern his position relative thereto.

On July 23, 1956, the House passed a bill embodying virtually all of the Eisenhower Administration's civil rights recommendations. In conformity with the President's 1956 State of the Union Message, the bill created a bipartisan Commission on Civil Rights to investigate charges that "in some localities . . . Negro citizens are being deprived of their right to vote and are likewise being subjected to unwarranted economic pressure." Additionally, the bill provided some new voting rights and civil rights safeguards and authorized an Assistant Attorney General to head up a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice. Mr. Ford is recorded as voting nay on a motion to recommit and yea on passage. 102 Cong. Rec. 13998, 13999 (1956).

In 1957, the House considered and passed a bill much along the lines of its 1956 passed measure. The latter had come too late in the session for Senate action. In all, five roll call votes were taken by the House in connection with the bill: three of these came during consideration of the rule on the bill and on the bill proper; two were prompted by virtue of later Senate amendments to the House-passed bill. Mr. Ford voted with the majority in each instance: yea on the resolution to consider the bill; nay on the recommitment motion; yea on passage; yea on the resolution to consider the Senate amended version; and, yea to accept the Senate amendments. 103 Cong. Rec. 8416, 9517, 9518, 16112, 16112 (1957).

Although the focus of activity in 1957 was on the groundbreaking general civil rights legislation, civil rights proponents continued their efforts to attach anti-segregation riders to other measures. For example, during House consideration of the Labor-HEW appropriations bills, a pair of amendments were offered to prohibit use of hospital construction funds for hospitals that segregate patients. Mr. Ford's position on these proposed amendments is not documented in the *Congressional Record* since one was ruled out of order and the other was defeated by a 70-123 standing vote. *Congress and the Nation, supra*, at page 1624.

A year later the Congress placed the Civil Rights Commission on a more solid financial footing. A committee amendment to the General Government appropriation bill for fiscal 1959 authorized \$750,000 as the Commission's first regular appropriation. Previously the Commission had been operating on an allocation of \$200,000 from the President's Emergency Fund. Mr. Ford voted yea on the amendment. 104 Cong. Rec. 5937 (1958).

The House took action on at least three civil rights-related measures in 1959. However, none of these appear to have been subjects to a roll call vote.

As in 1957, the bill enacted in 1960 was based on Administration proposals. As modified in both the House and the Senate, the legislation authorized judges to appoint referees to help Negroes register and vote. It also provided criminal penalties for bombing and bomb threats and mob action designed to obstruct court orders. Mr. Ford is recorded as not voting on the resolution to consider the bill, nay on the motion to recommit, and yea on passage. 106 Cong. Rec. 5198, 6511, 6512 (1960). He subsequently voted to accept the bill as amended by the Senate. 106 Cong. Rec. 8507 (1960).

On August 27, 1962 the House approved a proposed constitutional amendment barring payment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting in federal elections and primaries. Mr. Ford voted yea on the resolution which became the 24th Amendment when finally ratified by the required 38 states in 1964. 108 Cong. Rec. 17670 (1962).

Following a wave of protests which produced a "domestic crisis" in 1963, President Kennedy submitted new far reaching legislation. Congress spent the greater portion of the year on hearings and other preliminary action which paved the way for possible passage in 1964 of the Administration proposal which covered voting rights, school desegregation, fair employment under federal contracts, access to public accommodations, and the use of federal funds without discrimination. Republicans in the House offered their own omnibus civil rights proposal, some of whose provisions—for example, so-called Title III which proposed to give the Justice Department wide powers to combat civil rights deprivations—went beyond the Administration's request. The bill elicited Mr. Ford's support, in what appears to be among his first floor remarks on the general subject. He expressed regret that Committee work had made it impossible "to participate in this floor discussion on the House Republican proposals for better civil rights legislation." He continued: "If it were not for this demanding responsibility involving our national security I would have actively participated in this debate.

⁹⁹ This report deals with legislative developments in the post World War II years to improve the political, economic, and social status of the Nation's black population. Treated elsewhere are the related subjects of school desegregation and busing.

I want it clearly known, however, that I do favor action taken by Republican members of the House Committee on the Judiciary. I fully endorse their constructive efforts to offer sound proposals in this area." 109 Cong. Rec. 1573 (1963). The Republican bill additionally called for a permanent Civil Rights Commission, equal employment opportunity, school aid to the states, and presuming literacy for voting purposes for all persons who completed at least the sixth grade of education.

Toward the end of 1963, the House approved a Senate one-year rider to a minor House-passed bill extending the Commission on Civil Rights. Mr. Ford voted yea to accept the Senate amended bill. 109 Cong. Rec. 18863 (1963).

In early 1964, following more than a week of debate, the House passed a broad gauged civil rights bill. Mr. Ford voted yea on passage. 110 Cong. Rec. 2804 (1964). Some of the House-passed provisions, particularly the public accommodations and fair employment sections, were viewed by Senators as going too far. Accordingly, the Senate leadership in consultation with the Justice Department came up with a substitute which placed greater emphasis on attempts to work out the problems by local agencies before the Justice Department took action. To avoid any further complications, the House accepted the Senate substitute and sent it to the President. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Mr. Ford voted yea on the resolution to concur in the Senate amendments. 110 Cong. Rec. 15897 (1964).

Congress in 1965 responded to a series of Negro demonstrations against voting discrimination in the South by passing the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, Public Law 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). The Act, based on a proposal submitted to Congress by President Johnson on March 17 and signed into law August 6 represented a complete break with recent voting rights laws in that it provided for direct federal action to enable Negroes to register and vote, rather than the case-by-case approach.

The legislation suspended the use of literacy tests or similar voter qualification devices and authorized the appointment of federal voting examiners to register Negroes in states and counties in which voter activity had fallen below certain specified levels. The legislation brought the federal registration machinery automatically to bear on six Southern states, Alaska, 28 counties in North Carolina, three counties in Arizona and one county in Idaho.

In the House, debate centered on an attempt by Republicans to substitute their own bill for the Administration measure. For a while, the Republican substitute appeared to have a good chance of adoption, but it lost some support when Representative Tuck and others fell behind the Administration bill as the less "objectionable" of the two bills. The House then rejected the Republican substitute and approved the Administration bill. Although rejection of the substitute came on a 166-215 teller vote, Mr. Ford's position is clear since he and Representative McCulloch were its chief sponsors. Describing the bill as "comprehensive, expeditious and fair," he submitted a lengthy statement describing its principal terms and comparing it with the Administration measure. 111 Cong. Rec. 6891-6892 (1965). See also 111 Cong. Rec. 15709-15710, 16213-16214, 16218, 16280 (1965). During the debate Mr. Ford voted in support of Representative Cramer's amendment making it a crime to engage in certain vote frauds such as giving false information to federal registrars. 111 Cong. Rec. 16280 (1965). In all, Mr. Ford voted yea on the resolution to consider the bill, yea on the Cramer amendment, nay on Boggs' amendment (re listing procedures), nay on the Gilbert amendment (re 6th grade literacy presumption), yea on the motion to recommit and report back the Ford-McCulloch bill, and yea on passage. 111 Cong. Rec. 15643, 16281, 16282, 16282, 16285, 16285 (1965). During consideration of the Senate-passed substitute, Mr. Ford expressed the belief that the House conferees had given up too much ground and accepted "a weaker bill than that which passed the House on July 9." 111 Cong. Rec. 19197-19198 (1965). Accordingly he voted to recommit the conference report. 111 Cong. Rec. 19200 (1965). When the recommitment motion was defeated, Mr. Ford voted to accept the conference report. 111 Cong. Rec. 19701 (1965).

Also in 1965, the House took up a bill to strengthen and broaden the equal opportunity provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The bill, supported by civil rights groups "but not the Administration in 1965," was scheduled for floor action in October. However, action was put off until the second session. The House took

one roll call vote on the issue before postponing action. On September 13, by a 259-121 roll call, the House adopted an open rule for floor action. Mr. Ford joined the majority. 111 Cong. Rec. 23607 (1965). In 1966, he joined the majority in voting yea on passage. 112 Cong. Rec. 9153 (1966). The Senate did not take any action on the bill.

Far and away the most significant actions in 1966 come in connection with House passage of the Administration civil rights bill. The bill's most notable feature—the open housing provision—provoked a storm of controversy. Other important provisions included safeguards against discrimination in the selection of federal and state jurors, authority for the Attorney General to initiate desegregation suits and protected civil rights workers. The House added a number of other provisions including a prohibition against interstate commerce travel for the purpose of inciting to riot. The bill was passed by the House on August 9 on a 259-157 roll call vote. The Republican leadership noted for recommitment of the bill and also for passage, with the exception of Representative Poff, secretary of the House Republican Conference, who voted for recommitment and against passage. Mr. Ford urged support for the motion to recommit explaining that the debate had revealed a "great uncertainty as to the construction of the various provisions in Title IV. There have been many, many interpretations of the several provisions. There are many ambiguities involved in this very controversial area. We know there is some doubt—I say some doubt—in the minds of good lawyers as to the constitutionality of this title. . . . When we add up all of the problems, it seems to me that we would be far wiser to send this title back to the Committee on the Judiciary for further consideration. I so urge such action." 112 Cong. Rec. 18397 (1966). See earlier statement regarding "misuse, or irregular use of the 21-day rule." 112 Cong. Rec. 16337 (1966). Mr. Ford's votes included nay on the resolution to consider the bill; nay on the Mathias amendment (real estate brokers to follow discriminatory instructions of their principal); yea on the Cramer amendment (anti-riot provisions); yea on Whitener amendment (re complaint having to be in writing); yea on the recommitment motion; and yea on passage. 112 Cong. Rec. 16839, 18737, 18737, 19738, 18739, 18739 (1966).

Congress voted in 1967 to extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission for an additional five years. Mr. Ford voted yea on passage. 113 Cong. Rec. 18280 (1967).

The House on August 16, 1967 by a 327-93 roll call vote passed a bill to protect persons exercising or urging others to exercise certain federally protected rights. The legislation was intended to curb violence directed at Negroes and civil rights workers in the South. Mr. Ford voted yea on the resolution to consider the bill and on its adoption. A year later, this bill formed the basis of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Public Law 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). To the civil rights criminal safeguards, passed by the House, the Senate added a fair housing title, antiriot provisions, and a bevy of Indian rights safeguards. In the House, a controversy broke out on whether the House should send the bill to conference or should accept the Senate version without change. Democratic leaders decided on the latter course and proposed a resolution to accept the Senate amendments. "Republicans were divided on the procedure for handling the bill. Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R. Mich.) argued that it should be sent to conference because the House had no opportunity to consider most of its provisions. (Open housing had passed the House in the previous Congress, not the 1967-68 90th Congress). Mr. Ford, who had opposed open housing legislation in 1966, publicly expressed support for the principle of open housing for the first time March 14 but indicated that he would like a broader exemption for single-family houses. He rejected the pleas of two Republican presidential candidates, Richard M. Nixon and Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller (N.Y.), to accept the Senate version." *Congress and the Nation* 1965-1968, at page 382.

After some delay, the Rules Committee turned back a motion to send a bill to conference and approved the resolution sending it to the floor. During consideration of the bill, Mr. Ford urged that it be sent to conference following "the time-tested principles of parliamentary procedure," adding, however, that he only spoke for himself. 114 Cong. Rec. 9609-9613 (1968). The House accepted the Senate amendments by a 250-172 roll call vote. Mr. Ford voted nay on the motion on the previous question and yea on the resolution to agree to the Senate amendments. 114 Cong. Rec. 9620, 9620 (1968).

In 1969, the House considered a bill extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for an additional five years. The extension had been recommended by the Civil

Rights Commission and endorsed by President Johnson in his final State of the Union Message. Both the Commission and the President felt that this step was necessary in order to solidify the gains already made and insure permanent removal of obstacles to voting rights. See 115 Cong. Rec. H275 (daily ed. January 14, 1969). Under the terms of the Act, states and counties automatically covered would be free after August 6, 1970, to petition a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia for an order permitting them to reinstate their own requirements including heretofore suspended literacy tests. Since all such tests had been suspended during the preceding five years, the court order seemed assured.

During House consideration of the simple 5-year extension reported by the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Ford offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute on behalf of the Administration. 115 Cong. Rec. 38511-38512 (1969). The substitute called for a nationwide ban on literacy tests rather than the selective and largely regional ban imposed by the 1965 Act. Much more controversial, however, was a provision calling for elimination of the requirement that states covered by the law had to clear new or changed voting laws or procedures with the Attorney General. Instead the Administration proposal would have required the Justice Department to file a suit to abate the discriminatory law. Other recommended changes contained in the Ford-backed proposal included authority for the Attorney General to assign voting examiners and observers and creation of a Presidential commission to study voting discrimination and corrupt voting practices. On December 11, 1969, the House voted 208-203 to accept the substitute for the reported bill. The vote to pass the bill thus amended was 234-179. Mr. Ford voted yea on both roll calls. 115 Cong. Rec. 38535, 38536 (1969). The bill returned to the House by the Senate bore little resemblance to the House-passed version. In addition to the 5-year extension of the 1965 Act, the Senate had added provisions lowering the voting age to 18, establishing a 30-day durational residence requirement for voting for President and Vice President, suspending literacy tests in all states until August 6, 1975, and establishing an alternative triggering formula based on the 1968 presidential election. During debate on accepting the Senate version of the bill and sending it to the President or rejecting it, thereby sending it to conference, Mr. Ford questioned the constitutionality of the voting age provision. Asserting personal support for the 18 year old vote, he cited various legal schools who felt that it could only be accomplished by constitutional amendment. 115 Cong. Rec. 20196-20197 (1969). The vote to recommit the Senate bill was defeated by a vote of 224-183. The bill was passed by a vote of 272-132. Mr. Ford voted yea and yea respectfully. 115 Cong. Rec. 38535, 38536 (1969). The Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970, Public Law 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).

In 1970 Mr. Ford voted yea on a bill authorizing annual appropriations of \$3,400,000 for the Commission on Civil Rights through January 31, 1973. 116 Cong. Rec. 37360 (1970). The action came under suspension of the rules.

Because of the Supreme Court's ruling restricting the 18 year old votes feature of the 1970 Act to federal elections, the Congress passed a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment universally lowering the voting age to 18. Mr. Ford voted yea on the resolution which became the 26th Amendment when finally ratified by the required 38 states in July, 1971. 117 Cong. Rec. 7569 (1971).

In 1971-1972 the House renewed efforts it began in 1965, *supra*, to strengthen and broaden coverage of the equal employment opportunity provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In many respects, the course of this legislation followed the pattern of the 1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments, that is, civil rights supporters were frustrated in the House by adoption of an allegedly weaker Administration bill, but were somewhat mollified by Senate passage of a "stronger" bill which ultimately prevailed.

The Committee's recommended measure, generally supported by civil rights groups, would have given the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the power to issue cease-and-desist powers. Instead, the House approved the Erlenborn Administration-backed substitute which granted the EEOC the power to bring suits in the federal courts to enforce federal laws against job discrimination. The bills differed in a number of other respects, but it was this difference in enforcement that constituted the prime source of contention. Mr. Ford supported the Erlenborn proposal on grounds that the courts were the proper forum for the settlement of human rights. 117 Cong. Rec. 32091 (1971). Accordingly, Mr. Ford voted yea on the substitution of the Erlenborn bill, nay on the recommitment motion, and yea on passage. 117 Cong. Rec. 32111, 32113; 32112 (1971).

The Senate-passed measure—a "stronger" proposal than that adopted by the House, but somewhat short of that desired by civil rights groups—was accepted by the conferees and, in turn, by the House and Senate. Mr. Ford voted yea to accept the conference report. See Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 [Committee Print], Senate Labor Subcommittee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., November 1972, at 1872-73.

In a pair of minor bills, Mr. Ford voted yea on extending the life of the Civil Rights Commission for five years and five months, authorizing funds for its operations, and adding sex discrimination to its jurisdiction, and yea on a proposal to require questions of race and occupation to be answered by persons filling out federal juror's qualification forms. The latter was to assure non-discrimination in the selection of jurors. See 1972 *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* at pages 26H No. 82) and 12H (No. 36).

CONGRESSIONAL AND ELECTION ETHICS

Mr. Ford has supported legislation to guarantee full and accurate reporting of political contributions and expenditures for candidates to Federal office; and he has also supported efforts to establish guidelines for the official conduct of Members of Congress and the Supreme Court.

From the mid-sixties Mr. Ford introduced and/or worked for Republican-sponsored election reform legislation. He supported and voted in favor of the Federal Campaign Act of 1971. In a statement in support of the President's proposal for a bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform, Mr. Ford stated: "Clearly the Federal Campaign Act of 1971 needs improvement in the light of experience. . . . I have always felt that timely disclosure before election day is a better way to ensure clean campaigns than the most severe punishment afterwards." (Cong. Rec., [Daily Ed.], v. 119, May 16, 1973: H3698)

In the late sixties Mr. Ford favored the creation of a House ethics committee, voting for the creation of the House Select Committee on Standards and Conduct in late 1966. Early in 1967 he sponsored a resolution calling for the creation of a select committee on Standards and Conduct. Later that year he voted for the House resolution that created a standing Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. In 1968 he supported the resolution which continued this committee as a permanent standing committee of the House; established a code of conduct for Members, officers, and employees of the House; and provided for limited financial disclosure.

Although Mr. Ford has never gone beyond the House Rules in disclosing his business and financial transactions, he has stated that as a Vice Presidential nominee he will completely disclose his financial status. (*Grand Rapids Press*, Oct. 14, 1973, pp. 1A and 3A). Previously, according to the Nader Congress Project report on Ford, he stated that he saw "no reason to make his entire income public." He is further quoted by the Projects' interviewer, "I don't think a Member of Congress ought to be treated any differently than other citizens in this regard. I honestly believe the people here [in Congress] have a higher degree of integrity than any group I have ever worked with."

"I have lived up to the law," he said about disclosing his income. "I think that's the responsibility I have."

Mr. Ford told the Nader interviewer that he has an open-door policy in his office, and he said "I think it is my responsibility to listen to all groups—labor, business, professionals—anybody has access to an interview with me." In 1968 Mr. Ford was made a director of a bank in Grand Rapids. He received criticism for accepting the position and resigned. "I don't think it was a conflict of interest," he told the Nader Project, "but it wasn't worth it . . . if the people thought it was. I resigned before I ever attended a board meeting." According to the Nader report on him, Mr. Ford was, in 1972, serving as director of a small label manufacturing company in Grand Rapids and attends board meetings every two months. The company has no Federal business. Therefore, Mr. Ford believes his role there does not conflict with his role as Representative. (Nader Congress Report on Ford)

In January 1967, during the Adam Clayton Powell seating controversy, Mr. Ford offered the resolution which referred to a special committee the question of Congressman Powell's right to his seat in the 90th Congress. (Cong. Rec., v. 113, January 10, 1967: 24) Mr. Ford initially supported the committee's recommendation that Congressman Powell be seated, censured, and fined; but having been on the losing side in this matter, he switched on the final vote in favor of excluding Powell from the 90th Congress. (Cong. Rec. v. 113, March 1, 1967: 5020, 5036-5039)

In April 1970, Mr. Ford initiated efforts for the impeachment by the House of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. (See separate profile of Mr. Ford's philosophy on impeachment).

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Home Rule: Representative Gerald Ford made his first public statement on the issue of home rule for the District of Columbia in 1965. In the course of floor debate in that year on the Johnson Administration's home rule bill, H.R. 4644, Mr. Ford presented two minimum conditions for his support of home rule: 1) that elections be nonpartisan in character, and 2) that the budget for the District of Columbia be subject to review and approval by the full House and Senate and their respective Appropriations Committees (Cong. Rec., v. 111, September 27, 29, 1965: H25183-25184, 25424). In 1965 Ford voted against the Sisk amendment (charter commission) to H.R. 4644, then voted for the final bill, as amended, which passed the House overwhelmingly.

Mr. Ford did not speak out again on the home rule issue until the debate on H.R. 9682 (Democratic House leadership home rule bill) on October 10, 1978. On that occasion Mr. Ford said that "local District of Columbia judges should be appointed by the President" (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, October 10, 1973: H8822). An amendment to this effect carried. Ford also voted for an unsuccessful amendment to make the local chief of police a presidential appointee. On the final vote for passage of H.R. 9682, Ford voted in the affirmative. It is worth noting that H.R. 9682, as finally amended, contains the two qualifications Ford had stated in 1965 as being minimal for his support.

District Representation: In a floor statement in 1970 on the question of providing for non-voting District Delegate representation in the House, Mr. Ford argued that such a step ought to be taken without delay. Ford subsequently voted against amending the bill (H.R. 18725) which would have inserted a provision for a District Delegate in the Senate as well. Ford argued that a non-voting Delegate in the House was "Constitutionally correct" and supported by "precedent (Cong. Rec., v. 116, August 10, 1970: H28060). The Delegate bill passed overwhelmingly, and since 1971 the District has had a non-voting Delegate in the House.

The Congressional Record does not reveal Mr. Ford's position on amending the Constitution to provide District of Columbia presidential electors (23rd Amendment, ratified 1961) or proposals to provide, by Constitutional amendment, the District of Columbia voting representation in the House and Senate.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN REFORM

The most significant piece of legislation concerning campaign reform that was enacted into law during Congressman Ford's tenure in office was the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Congressman Ford spoke in favor of this measure (Cong. Record H97, 1/19/72) and voted for its passage (Cong. Rec. H99, 1/19/72). This position by the Congressman was consistent with his previous actions and statements calling for reform of campaign procedures and financing.

In 1963 Congressman Ford voted in favor of suspension of the equal time provision for Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates during the 1964 Presidential campaign (109 Cong. Rec. 11195). During the debate in the House on the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 the Congressman spoke against the repeal of the equal time provision for Presidential, Vice Presidential and Senatorial candidates only (117 Cong. Rec. 43149). However, he supported and voted for the repeal of the equal time provision for all candidates to Federal elective office (117 Cong. Rec. 43149, 43167).

As to campaign reform in general, the Congressman stated on August 1, 1966: "Mr. Speaker, the genuine interest and strong support for a fair and workable election reform law which exists throughout the Nation is seen in the editorial expressions of our most thoughtful and objective newspapers." (112 Cong. Rec. 17790-91). The Congressman then placed in the Record newspaper articles calling for reform of the campaign financing system.

In 1971 Congressman Ford made a statement in favor of prohibiting the extension of unsecured credit to political candidates by federally regulated corporations. (117 Cong. Rec. 31321). During the debate on the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, the Congressman voted against the Hanson amendment which allowed corporations and labor unions to establish voluntary, segregated political

funds. (117 Cong. Rec. 43391). The Congressman, however, voted in favor of the entire House campaign bill which contained this provision. (117 Cong. Rec. 43416).

In 1972 the Congressman spoke in favor of H.R. 15276 (92d Cong., 2d Session) which exempted corporations and labor unions from the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. 611, allowing these organizations to establish voluntary, segregated funds for political purposes even though they may have government contracts. The Congressman stated: "... I am convinced this legislation is good legislation, and I urge the Members on both sides of the aisle to vote for it."

(Cong. Rec. H8960, 10/2/72). Congressman Ford voted against the measure, however, because of his previous position that public hearings should be held on proposed amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. (Cong. Rec. H8963, 10/2/72).

As to the public financing of campaigns, Congressman Ford voted in favor of the income tax checkoff provisions for payments to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund as originally passed in 1966. (112 Cong. Rec. 28255). In 1971 the Congressman also voted in favor of the checkoff for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund as provided for in H.R. 10947, the Revenue Act of 1971. (117 Cong. Rec. 45871).

Additionally, the Congressman cosponsored various bills in the 92d Congress, 2d Session dealing with campaign ethics and campaign reform: (H.R. 6111, H.R. 6112, H.R. 6113, H.R. 6114 [117 Cong. Rec. 6779]; H.R. 5089, H.R. 6092, H.R. 5095 [117 Cong. Rec. 3877]).

ELECTION REFORM

Direct election of the president and the vice president

Congressman Ford has long supported direct election of the President and Vice President. He has indicated willingness to support several different proposals to modify the existing Electoral College system, albeit he has consistently voiced preference for direct, popular election.

On February 21, 1968, Congressman Ford noted: "I feel very strongly that it is better that the will of the people, as expressed in November, be the decision as to the individual who should be President rather than for the House of Representatives to be called upon to make that decision in January of next year, 1969." (114 Cong. Rec. 3698). The Congressman was referring to the possibility that neither major-party candidate would garner enough Electoral College votes, because of the third-party candidacy of Mr. Wallace, to avoid having the outcome of the election postponed until decided by the House of Representatives.) Then, on September 16, 1969, the Congressman explained, "The concern I had was that under the present method of selecting the President of this country, the world at large might well have been faced with the prospect of ourselves not knowing who the next President of the United States would be from November to January 20. The uncertainty, in my judgment, would have been harmful to the United States and detrimental to the world at large." (115 Cong. Record 25616). And, on September 30, 1969, it was observed: "Approximately ten days ago we had the overwhelming vote in the House of Representatives for the direct or popular method of selecting the President of the United States. If my recollection is correct, over 80 percent of all Members supported the committee's recommendation and further, if my memory is accurate, 80 percent of the Members on the Democratic side supported it, and 85 percent of the Members on our side of the aisle supported the direct method of choosing a President. . . . Again, Mr. Speaker, I say that I hope the Senate will respond, and I trust that the necessary three-fourths of the States will do likewise." At various times, the Congressman has proposed amending the Constitution to provide for direct election of the President and Vice President. For example, see H.J. Res. 924, submitted October 13, 1971 (117 Cong. Rec. 36081).

Nationwide presidential primaries

Congressman Ford has favored direct, popular nomination of presidential candidates.

Speaking in favor of a constitutional amendment he proposed on April 12, 1972, Congressman Ford noted: "After observing the antics of presidential hopefuls in the various State primaries this year, I feel we should put an end to this chaotic situation by having one same-day primary throughout the Nation. Unlike the present primaries, the national primary I proposed would decide something. It would, with a runoff if necessary, give us our presidential candidates." Under

the proposal, "... political parties would continue to nominate the vice presidential candidates and to adopt party platforms." (118 Cong. Rec. H3018-19). [See also: Election Campaign Reform, p. 117]

IMPEACHMENT

Rep. Ford's position on the subject of impeachment was most clearly stated during the attempt by the House of Representatives to impeach Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in 1970. Ford was a principal participant in that effort. At the time Ford stated: "What, then, is an impeachable offense? The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office." (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 116, April 15, 1970: H 11913)

The constitutional issue in the Douglas case concerned Article III, Section One of the Constitution which states: "The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior," and Article II, Section Four which states: "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The relationship of these provisions has been the subject of controversy in every impeachment proceeding brought against a Federal judge and was not resolved in this instance. A House Judiciary subcommittee ruled that evidence presented by Ford and others was not adequate to impeach Douglas.

In arguing the Constitutional grounds for impeaching Douglas, Ford stated: "No consensus exists as to whether, in the case of Federal Judges, impeachment must depend upon conviction of one of the two specified crimes of treason or bribery or be within the nebulous category of 'other high crimes and misdemeanors.'"

"... impeachment resembles a regular criminal indictment and trial but it is not the same thing. It relates solely to the accused's right to hold civil office; not to the many other rights which are his as a citizen and which protect him in a court of law. By pointedly avoiding any immunity an accused might claim under the double jeopardy principle, the framers of the Constitution clearly established that impeachment is a unique political device, designed explicitly to dislodge from public office those who are patently unfit for it, but cannot otherwise be promptly removed."

"The President and Vice President, and all persons holding office at the pleasure of the President, can be thrown out of office by the voters at least every 4 years. To remove them in midterm—it has been tried only twice and never done—would indeed require crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery." (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 116, April 15, 1970: H11913)

LOBBYING

Rep. Ford has had little to say publicly about lobbying, either about reform of the present statutes, or about his personal relationship and response to special interest groups. A survey of the *Congressional Record* revealed that Ford has not supported efforts to close some of the so-called "loop-holes" in the 1946 Regulation of Lobbying Act, the principal target of most lobby reform measures. He has said that he feels he has the personal responsibility to listen to all groups.⁸⁰ Interest group ratings of Ford reflect generally conservative positions on most issues; he tends to receive high ratings from conservative groups such as Americans for Constitutional Action, and low ratings from more liberal groups such as Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education.⁸¹

Allegations concerning Ford's activities on behalf of certain special interests were raised in a recent book, *The Washington Pay-Off: An Insider's View of Corruption in Government* by Robert N. Winter-Berger. Winter-Berger, who claimed that as a Washington lobbyist he had worked directly out of Ford's office, wrote that Ford was "a good example of power corrupting what had been, in my estimation, one of the few honest and sincere men in Washington."⁸²

⁸⁰ S. C. McElroy, "Ralph Nader Congress Project; Citizens Look At Congress; Gerald M. Ford," August, 1972.

⁸¹ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Oct. 17, 1978, p. 2.

⁸² *Ibid.*

Winter-Berger asserted that Ford was eager to repay contributors by using his influence on their behalf "... once the money issue was settled, Jerry Ford probably worked harder to carry out his end of the bargain—that is, to pay a favor for value received—than anyone else I knew in Washington."⁸³

Ford has steadfastly denied these accusations and has said he is prepared to answer any questions that might arise about the book during his confirmation hearings. Concerning his relationship to special interest groups, Ford has said: "I think it's my responsibility to listen to all groups—labor, business, professional—anybody has access to an interview with me."⁸⁴

MASS MEDIA AND BROADCASTING

Over the last 25 years, Gerald Ford has made very few statements in the Congress concerning the mass media and the broadcasting industry. A survey of the Congressional Record Index for this period did not reveal Mr. Ford's position on the charges made by former Vice President Agnew as to the liberal bias of the media, nor did it document Mr. Ford's support or lack of support for newsmen's shield legislation (offering newsmen statutory protection of confidential sources and information) pending before the current Congress. Mr. Ford did enter the floor debate and took the Administration position on a bill to extend the Public Broadcasting System. The Administration position advocated limited funding and more direct control over PBS by the White House. While Mr. Ford took a conservative position on PBS, he voted for a measure to reject a Congressional motion to issue a contempt of Congress citation to the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation and its president, Frank Stanton.

Mr. Ford's position on the bill to extend funding for the Public Broadcasting System appeared to be dictated by his role as House Minority Leader. As such, he represented the Administration's point of view that the Public Broadcasting System, as it was constituted at the time, represented the threat of a "fourth network." The original bill H.R. 13918, which Mr. Ford voted against, was vetoed by the President. This bill called for substantially increased funding of PBS. (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 118, June 1, 1972: H 5169). On August 15, Mr. Ford voted for an Administration backed version of the PBS bill, S. 3824 which was signed into law. (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.] v. 118, August 15, 1972: H 7654).

According to the CQ index of key votes, Mr. Ford voted with the House leadership, six committee chairmen, most liberal Democrats and freshmen Representatives as well as some conservatives in rejecting the motion made by Harley O. Staggers, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, recommending that the Columbia Broadcasting System and its president, Frank Stanton be cited for contempt of Congress. On June 24, 1971, Dr. Stanton had refused to comply with a subpoena issued by the Committee requesting film and sound recordings edited from the network's controversial documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon." (1971 CQ Almanac: p. 67).

ORGANIZATION OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT/U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

Although speaking infrequently on the issue, Mr. Ford has urged that the organization governing the postal service in the United States be constructed in such a manner that the optimum mail service system might be employed.

In 1950, Mr. Ford monitored the recommendations of the Hoover Commission as they related to better organization in the Post Office Department. (Cong. Rec., v. 96, June 7, 1950: A4288+). In remarks on the postal deficit, Mr. Ford urged that some Congressional action be taken "... to adopt every measure which legitimately seeks to make the mail service self-sustaining, and thereby relieve our already overstrained Federal budget." (Cong. Rec., v. 99, April 15, 1953: 3158). He was urging adoption of the policy which would eliminate the franking privilege of TVA and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which were assumed to be profit-making agencies. Following the President's Message on Postal Reform, Mr. Ford announced his pleasure in cosponsoring bi-partisan legislation to reform the postal service (Cong. Rec., v. 115, May 28, 1969: 14170, 14177). Mr. Ford stated that he is opposed to any effort on the part of Congress to enact legislation which would make the U.S. Postal Service less independent than it now is: "I believe that in the long run we are far better off to let professional

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ McElroy, *op. cit.*

management run the Post Office Department. . . ." (Cong. Rec., v. 119, [Daily Ed.], July 12, 1973: H6043).

Note: There appears to be no substantial change of policy on this issue over the years by Mr. Ford, and there was no evidence of the issue being placed in either a philosophical or ideological context.

PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Mr. Ford at an early date injected himself into the controversy surrounding the issue of prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. Throughout his congressional career he has publicly criticized the Supreme Court decisions in the *Prayer Cases* which effectively banned official prayer and devotional readings in the schools. His public position on the issue has been one of fundamental disagreement with the First Amendment principle propounded by the Court's majority in the *Prayer Cases* and he has frequently identified himself with the dissenting view of Justice Potter Stewart in his public statements on the matter. His position appears to be that the prayer question is peculiarly one which may more properly be resolved at the state and local level and that Congress has a "Constitutional" obligation to afford the people an opportunity to determine public policy on the issue. As such, Mr. Ford has lent his support to various efforts in Congress over the years to overcome legal obstacles to public school prayer by means of proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution.

In a newsletter to constituents dated June 28, 1963, Mr. Ford outlined his views on the subject as follows:

The action of the Supreme Court in declaring unconstitutional a state requirement that the Bible be read and the Lord's Prayer recited was not unexpected. But this does not make it right. I strongly disapprove of the majority decision which in effect is a backward step in the development of those principles which have contributed so much to our nation. (115 Cong. Rec. 18823 (July 9, 1969).)

In this same letter, he endorsed the minority position of the Court in the *Prayer Cases*, stating:

Justice Potter Stewart disagreed with his eight colleagues and wrote a 13-page dissent. His opinion is eminently sound and recognizes the need for the broad view if our children are to have the most comprehensive educational experience.

Fully agreeing with the majority that the government must be neutral in the sphere of religion, Justice Stewart wrote: ". . . A compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed as an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism, or at least, as government support of the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private." The effect of the Court's decision is to grant to a small minority power which it would not possess as the majority. This hardly seems consistent with broad constitutional principles. 115 Cong. Rec. 18824 (July 9, 1969)

That letter concluded with a pledge to his constituents: "I will support a resolution to submit to the state legislatures a constitutional amendment to overrule this decision of the Court." 115 Cong. Rec. 18824 (July 9, 1969).

More recently, a petition was circulated in the 92nd Congress to discharge committee consideration of H.J. Res. 191 and receive the requisite number of signatures. Mr. Ford's name did not appear on this petition. 117 Cong. Rec. 32576 (September 21, 1971). He did, however, vote in favor of the subsequent motion to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary from further consideration of H.J. Res. 191. 117 Cong. Rec. 39889 (November 8, 1971). On that same day, Mr. Ford made a statement on the floor supporting the resolution which would have permitted nondenominational prayer and/or voluntary prayer in the public schools, saying:

There are three reasons why I endorse the amendment: The Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of the first amendment as it applies to prayer

in school, the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to give the people an opportunity to decide this specific issue, and the proposed amendment deserves approval on its merits.

* * * * *
Mr. Speaker, whether we think the Supreme Court erred or not, I believe we have not only the right but also the duty to permit the people to decide this question. 117 Cong. Rec. 39952 (November 8, 1971)

On November 8, 1971, Mr. Ford voted in favor of the proposed resolution. 117 Cong. Rec. 39958.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The separation of powers concept, rooted in the Constitution, may be understood in a public policy context by examining certain issue areas where the branches of the Federal government functionally overlap and conflict: Executive accounting to Congress by providing requested information, congressional delegation of authority to the Executive, war powers, the impoundment of appropriated funds, and oversight of executive agreements.

In terms of the public record of Rep. Gerald R. Ford (R-Mich.), a position has been evidence on only the first and the third of these issues. (The impoundment issue is discussed elsewhere as a separate topic).

Information withholding: Ford entered this policy sphere in 1951 by introducing a bill (H.R. 5564) "to prohibit unreasonable suppression of information by the Executive Branch of the Government." Although never acted upon, the measure would have overturned E.O. 10290, a directive issued by President Truman that same year establishing an information security classification system for non-military agencies having a role in "national security" matters. Speaking on the floor of the House in January, 1959 (Cong. Rec., v. 105, January 15, 1959: 688) on the matter of Executive Branch witnesses testifying before congressional committees, Ford said: "It should be reemphasized that as long as all witnesses are given clearance to express their personal views when interrogated by a direct question there will be no interference with the responsibility of the Committee on Appropriations to carry out its duty to determine the validity of budget or executive programs." Ford's most recent comprehensive statement in this area was made in 1963 (Cong. Rec., v. 109, April 4, 1963: 5817-5819) when, in a discussion of the Administration's refusal to allow certain military and civilian personnel to testify on the Bay of Pigs debacle, the Minority Leader said "even if intelligence matters were involved, this would not justify refusal to tell the members of the [Defense Appropriations] subcommittee the full facts. . . ." Ford rejected security classification as a basis for withholding information from Congress, and apparently also rejected the concept of "executive privilege" saying "To maintain that the executive has the right to keep to itself information specifically sought by the representatives of the very people the Executive is supposed to serve is to espouse some power akin to the divine right of kings." He argued that "the power to collect facts from many witnesses, challenge the accuracy of those facts and analyze their importance—that power belong to Congress."

War powers: In 1970 Ford supported a measure (H.J. Res. 1355) reaffirming the role of Congress in declaring war and requiring the President, when utilizing troops in a combat situation or enlarging the military forces, to submit a written report to Congress detailing the circumstances for such action, the authority for same, and the scope of the mission, as well as other details of information which the President felt would be useful. Voting in the affirmative on a question of support for the bill (Cong. Rec., v. 116, November 16, 1970: 37407), Ford indicated he did not feel the provisions of the measure would hamper the President in dealing with emergencies in the same manner as prior Presidents had done. In 1973 Ford did not support the major war powers bill (H.J. Res. 542) and specifically opposed provisions which required congressional sanction of the use of troops in combat or compliance with a congressional recall of the armed forces from a combat situation. Regardless of certain amendments made on the floor, Ford voted against (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, July 18, 1973: H6284) the measure, first in the initial house vote and again (Cong. Rec. [Daily Ed.], v. 119, October 12, 1973: H8963) when the conference report was to be adopted.

SUPREME COURT

It does not appear from an examination of the *Congressional Record* that Mr. Gerald Ford has either sponsored significant legislation or spoken extensively with respect to the Supreme Court, its operation and jurisdiction, its members

or nominees. Although usual matters of appropriations would, of course, have been considered by the Congress during Mr. Ford's twenty-five years of service, Mr. Ford appears to have been silent with respect to the Court's activities, although he may well have taken positions on legislation triggered by court decisions. (See, in particular, papers on Ford re Crime and Justice, Civil Liberties, Civil Rights, etc.) One notable departure from this neutral stance involved the proposed impeachment of Justice William C. Douglas in 1970.

Gerald Ford was one of the first Members of the House of Representatives to call for an investigation of the conduct of Justice William O. Douglas for his activities both on and off the bench. In a speech given on the floor of the House on April 15, 1970, Mr. Ford outlined several criticisms of Justice Douglas including his financial associations and publications written by him, particularly a book "Points of Rebellion" and an article published in "Evergreen" magazine. Mr. Ford also commented on his understanding of the purpose and procedure of impeachment. 116 *Congressional Record* 11912-11919 (1970).

One of the most widely quoted remarks made by Mr. Ford about impeachment may be found at 116 *Congressional Record* 11914 (1970):

"What is an impeachable offense?"

The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office. Again, the historical context and political climate are important; there are few fixed principles among the handful of precedents."

The House Judiciary Committee ultimately undertook an investigation and issued two reports relating to impeachment and Justice Douglas' activities. No further action was taken by the House. During the period of investigation, Mr. Ford made several additional comments about the matter, including the presentation of a brief explaining impeachment and other articles relating to Justice Douglas. Some of these remarks may be found at 116 *Congressional Record* 12918-12919, 27670-27673, and 28091-28096 (1970).

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

An analysis of the career philosophy of Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., on this issue suggests that Mr. Ford has been neither a leader in the legislative effort for women's rights, nor has he been a leading opponent of this effort.

In 1967, Mr. Ford made a floor statement on the occasion of the anniversary of the birth of Susan B. Anthony and the fiftieth anniversary of the first woman in Congress, Jeannette Rankin (Cong. Rec., v. 113, February 25, 1967: 4813).

The equal rights amendment reached the floor of the House of Representatives for the first time in 1970, after Rep. Martha W. Griffiths was successful in obtaining the requisite 218 signatures on a discharge petition to free the measure from committee. Mrs. Griffiths said later that Mr. Ford "supplied some real moxie, too: He lined up 15 or 16 names right at the end." (Sherrill, Robert, That Equal Rights Amendment—What, Exactly, Does it Mean? New York Times Magazine, September 20, 1970: 101).

The House debated and voted on the amendment on August 10, 1970. In remarks on the floor that day, Rep. Ford said, "I would like to point out that I had something to do with the fact that 15 of the last 16 Members to sign the petition discharging the House Judiciary Committee from jurisdiction over House Joint Resolution 204, the Women's Equal Rights Amendment, were Republicans. In all seriousness, I am delighted to have had a hand in bringing to the House floor" the ERA, (Cong. Rec., v. 116, August 10, 1970: 28016).

Mr. Ford was not one of the 218 signers of the discharge petition (Cong. Res., v. 116, July 20, 1970: 24929-25000). He voted for the amendment on August 10, 1970 (Cong. Rec., v. 116, August 10, 1970, 28037). In remarks on the floor cited above, he referred to the fact that the amendment was tied up in committee for 47 years: "You would almost think there had been a conspiracy . . . (the amendment's) time has come just as surely as did the 19th amendment to the Constitution 50 years ago, giving women the right to vote. . ."

The Senate laid aside the amendment in the 91st Congress. When the amendment came up for a vote again in the 92nd Congress, there was an attempt in the House to add the so-called Wiggins amendment to the measure to specify that it would not affect Federal laws exempting women from the draft or Federal or State laws promoting and protecting the health or safety of women. In his 1970 floor statement, Ford had referred to the fact that the House was then

"passing the amendment free and clear of anything like the Senate's Hayden rider (1950 and 1953) which threw in a qualifier unacceptable to women." In 1971, Mr. Ford was marked absent on the vote on the Wiggins amendment (Cong. Rec., v. 117, Oct. 12, 1972: 35813) and paired in favor of the amendment in the final vote (Cong. Rec., v. 117, Oct. 12, 1971: 35815).

In 1971, Representative Ford voted against the Brademas amendment to the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971, establishing a comprehensive child development program (Cong. Rec., v. 117, Sept. 30, 1971: 34291).

In 1971, Mr. Ford voted for an amendment allowing the EEOC (which administers Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimination in employment based on sex and other categories) to bring suit against discriminatory employers in Federal court, rather than allowing the EEOC the stronger enforcement powers of issuing cease and desist orders to such employers (Cong. Rec., v. 117, Sept. 16, 1971: 32111).

On March 28, 1973, Mr. Ford and others introduced H.J. Res. 468, proposing an amendment to the Constitution which would provide that "nothing in this Constitution shall bar any State or territory or the District of Columbia, with regard to any area over which it has jurisdiction, from allowing, regulating, or prohibiting the practice of abortion."

SCIENCE POLICY

EXECUTIVE BRANCH SCIENCE POLICY ORGANIZATION

Mr. Ford has not been an active spokesman in matters of science policy or executive branch organization for the formulation of it during his tenure in Congress. Nevertheless, his record shows that he has supported the establishment of many of the science-policy-oriented executive branch organizations which have been created over the past two decades, and he is on record in support of the most recent changes in science policy organization which became effective on July 1, 1973, by the implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973.

Among the organizations which Mr. Ford has approved, either by remarks or "yea-and-nay" votes have been NASA,⁶⁵ the Council on Environmental Quality,⁶⁶ the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.⁶⁷ Mr. Ford voted against the establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950 and he also voted against the establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950 and he also voted against the removal of the \$15 million limitation on the NSF budget in 1953. However, he voted in favor of the 1968 amendments to the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, which greatly expanded the functions and mission of the Foundation.⁶⁸

In a statement issued on January 26, 1973, when Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 was presented to the Congress, Mr. Ford said that the plan "seems to make a good deal of sense. . . . The President is seeking to restructure his Executive Office. He is personally convinced his plans would promote greater efficiency. I believe Congress should concur in his plans."⁶⁹ The Reorganization Plan transferred important science policy advisory and coordinating functions formerly lodged in the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President to the Director of the National Science Foundation in an added assignment as Science Adviser to the President and to the Executive Office.

HEALTH RESEARCH ISSUES

During his career of some 25 years as a Republican representative of the U.S. House of Representatives from Michigan, Gerald R. Ford, Jr. has supported the major legislative issues related to the establishment and expansion of health research facilities as well as NIH health research and training programs. He has generally voted in favor of annual Health, Education, and Welfare appropriations during this period. However, he has not until very recently personally addressed major health research issues.

Early in his career, Mr. Ford participated in a unanimous House vote in favor of the Health Research Institutes Act (S. 2591) of 1949.⁷⁰ More recently, he

⁶⁵ Congressional Record, v. 104, June 2, 1958: 9939-40.

⁶⁶ Congressional Record, v. 115, Sept. 23, 1969: 26590.

⁶⁷ Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, Congressional Record, v. 116, July 9, 1970: 23532.

⁶⁸ Congressional Record, v. 115, Apr. 12, 1967: 9135; also June 27, 1968: 19068.

⁶⁹ Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, Congressional Record (daily ed.), v. 119, Jan. 26, 1973: H493.

⁷⁰ Congress and the Nation, 1945-64, p. 1184.

supported the National Cancer Act of 1971.⁷⁷ In 1972, he openly supported and/or co-sponsored a number of major health bills concerned with diabetes, sickle cell anemia, Cooley's anemia, and the National Heart, Blood Vessel, Lung, and Blood Act of 1972.⁷⁸ Although Mr. Ford has generally supported HEW appropriations proposed by the House and Senate, he has recently supported Administration vetoes of these appropriations. In 1972, he supported expenditure limitation as the "only way to ensure that the loaded and bloated appropriation bill will not be vetoed".⁷⁹ Although he initially voted in favor of the HEW appropriations bill (H.R. 15417) for FY-1973, he later voted in support of the Administration's veto of that bill.⁸⁰ He later voted in favor of the amended HEW appropriations for FY-1973.⁸¹ Mr. Ford has generally tended to support the present Administration's position on most major health issues.

OCEANS POLICY

The record indicates that Representative Gerald R. Ford has consistently supported a progressive United States policy toward research and development of the oceans' resources, and has demonstrated his concern for the maintenance of our nation's navigable waters through various legislative measures aimed at water pollution control.

Representative Ford has given indication of his general support of the Administration's ocean policy.⁸² The main points of this policy are contained in H. Res. 330⁸³: ". . . (1) protection of the freedom of the seas, beyond a twelve-mile territorial sea, . . . (2) recognition of . . . international community interests, . . . (3) an effective International Seabed Authority to regulate orderly and just development of the mineral resources of the deep seabed, . . . and (4) conservation and protection of living resources with fisheries regulated for maximum sustainable yield. . . ." These objectives reflect the sense of the President's Oceans Policy Statement of May 23, 1970. Mr. Ford also voted in favor of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1971,⁸⁴ which proposed to ". . . regulate the transportation of material for dumping into the oceans, coastal, and other waters, and the dumping of material by any person from any source if the dumping occurs, in waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. . . ." He has also introduced legislation in past Congresses aimed at prohibiting the dumping of dredgings and other refuse materials into navigable waters.⁸⁵ In 1968, he sponsored a Joint Resolution declaring the policy of the United States regarding the establishment of a Territorial Sea.⁸⁶ Mr. Ford's remarks concern Sea-Grant College and Program Authorizations have also been favorable.⁸⁷

SCIENCE IN THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

Gerald Ford has been a consistent supporter of a strong defense posture—on record in past and present years as favoring substantial military research, development, test and evaluation programs. Ford has favored the continued development, procurement and deployment of weapons systems considered essential for national security.⁸⁸ In reference to the specific issue of science in the defense estab-

⁷⁷ Congressional Quarterly, vol. 27, 1971, p. 582-583.

⁷⁸ Congressional Record, vol. 118, No. 7, 3 May 1972, p. H4011.

⁷⁹ Congressional Quarterly, vol. 28, 1972, p. 18-H; 56-H; 57-H; 62-H.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 887.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72-H.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 80-H.

⁸³ Congressional Record, Apr. 2, 1973, p. H2316 (vote: Ford in agreement with resolution—House agreed to 303 "yea" to 52 "nay").

⁸⁴ Congressional Record, Apr. 5, 1973, p. E2160. Address: "Humanities of the Sea."

⁸⁵ H. Res. 330, introduced by Mr. Fraser, et al., Mar. 28, 1973; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁶ Congressional Record, Sept. 9, 1971, pp. 31129-31160 (vote: Ford in favor of final passage of bill—House passed 305 "yea" to 3 "nay").

⁸⁷ Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; H.R. 19107, July 31, 1968; H.R. 460, January 3, 1969; H.R. 2280, Jan. 26, 1971; H.R. 6771, March 25, 1971.

⁸⁸ H.J. Res. 1063, introduced by Mr. Gerald R. Ford; Feb. 7, 1968; referred to Committee on Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁹ Congressional Record, May 10, 1973; E3124. Address: "Roundful Grants of the Sea".

⁹⁰ Sample of representative statements reflecting Ford's favorable position vis-a-vis a strong defense posture.

⁹¹ "The House vote on the military procurement authorization bill" statement by Ford, *Congressional Record*, Oct. 6, 1969, p. 28652.

⁹² "Reduced Spending and Increased Efficiency in the Department of Defense" Statement by Ford, *Congressional Record*, Mar. 29, 1971, p. 8285.

⁹³ *Congressional Record*, House, Ford's participation in the floor debate on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1973, Sept. 14, 1972, p. H8371.

lishment, Ford is not on record as having made definitive statements about his position. The issue of military support for scientific research came forward in 1969 with the introduction of the "Mansfield Amendment" to restrict military support for research. The amendment was passed by both Senate and House as Section 203 of the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1970. The section prohibited the Department of Defense from doing any research which did not have a "direct or apparent relationship" to the defense mission. Although retained in the Senate's version of the military authorization act for FY 1971, it was omitted from the House version, and, as a result, it was reported from Conference in a greatly modified form. The provision was passed in the final authorization act for FY 1971 as requiring that military-funded research must demonstrate a potential relationship to a military function or operation. The provision was excluded entirely from the authorization act for the subsequent year, FY 1972. Ford is not on record as registering a specific point of view with regard to the "Mansfield Amendment".

SPACE PROGRAM

Gerald Ford has consistently and unwaveringly throughout his career supported the space program. As a member of the Select Committee on Space he shared the task of drafting the enabling legislation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,⁹⁴ and has continued to vote for its appropriations. He has vigorously opposed cuts in the NASA budget on the grounds that the United States should acquire and maintain world leadership in the space program.

Mr. Ford has also supported an international agreement for joint cooperation in the advancement of scientific developments which are the product of outer space exploration.

SPACE SHUTTLE

Congressman Ford is a supporter of the space shuttle. While there has never been a separate House roll call vote on the shuttle, Mr. Ford has consistently voted for the NASA authorization bills which contained funding for the shuttle.

On April 20, 1972, during debate on the NASA authorization, Mr. Ford spoke out on behalf of the shuttle. The heart of his argument, against postponement of the shuttle program, is contained in the following paragraph:

"It would be very ill advised to postpone a decision on this matter because it would get us back into what we have done too frequently in the field of military weapons development and in many other scientific developments, that is, where we start something and stop it mid-way, we break up the organization, and then at a subsequent date try to reassemble and get the momentum going again. In other words, a peak and valley program."⁹⁵

THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

During the life of the supersonic transport program, which began in 1961 and ended with the Congressional vote to terminate the program in 1971, Congressman Ford consistently supported development of the supersonic transport.

Mr. Ford is on record in support of the SST as early as 1963, when he commended Pan American and TWA for making down payments on the first SST's to be built and expressed approval of the program generally.⁹⁶ During the heated debate and legislative maneuvering which took place during late 1970 and early 1971, his support for the program remained constant. He did vote for a continuing resolution, passed by the House on December 31, 1970, which served as a compromise between SST supporters and opponents postponing resolution of the issue for three months (and allowing the Department of Transportation to continue functioning).⁹⁷

After the final defeat of the SST in March, 1971, Mr. Ford expressed the disappointment felt by many SST supporters as follows:

" . . . one fact stands out more starkly than any other in connection with the congressional decision to ground the U.S. supersonic transport. That fact is that a majority in the Congress for the first time is satisfied to make the United States a second-best nation. The halting of the SST development marked a turning point for the United States. With that vote, the Congress

⁹⁴ Congressional Record, May 18, 1959; p. 8279.

⁹⁵ Congressional Record, Apr. 20, 1972; p. H3286.

⁹⁶ Congressional Record, Oct. 15, 1963; p. 19577.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1970, pp. 44297-44301.

said it does not matter if the Soviet Union, or England and France, surpass the United States in the production and sale of the commercial aircraft of the future."⁸⁹

Later in that same year, Mr. Ford voted against paying termination costs required to close down the program, and indicated that this was a protest vote against the Congressional decision for termination.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Apr. 1, 1971, p. 9059.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, May 20, 1971, pp. 16143-16144, 16197.

EDUCATION

1. Test scores have indicated that our children are now doing more poorly than in the past with basic reading, writing and math skills. What would you do to arrest such a decline? This has come at a time when the federal government has been heavily involved in financially supporting education.
2. You have indicated that the federal government is now providing an insufficient percentage of total education costs. What share do you think is an appropriate share, how much would it cost to get to that share, and can this be afforded within the context of achieving a balanced budget?
3. Do you support the Perkins education bill which has a price tag of some \$15 billion?
4. An increasing number of Americans are finding it difficult to pay for the costs of higher education. What relief, if any, would you provide to such parents so that higher education can become more available?
5. Private colleges are in bad financial straits. Is there anything that can be done to help them?
6. What is your position on aid to parochial schools?
7. Many analysts feel that the involvement of the federal government has not been helpful in the field of education. Do you feel that delivery of education ought to be more decentralized?
8. Do you favor a separate Department of Education and how does this square with your desire not to have more federal programs?

9. You obviously don't agree with those who state that there is very little correlation between the level of federal support to education and the quality of education. What are your views in this regard?

10. Do you favor HEW's requirement that Title IX Sex Discrimination be applied to private and other colleges?

11. President Ford proposed a consolidation of educational programs and funding which the Democratic Congress rejected. Isn't President Ford's program closer to your idea?

12. You are aware of a law suit brought by Mr. DeFunis contending that he had been discriminated against in law school admission because blacks were favored despite the fact that objectively they had less academic qualification. What is your view on such problems and to what extent does affirmative action in the education field discriminate against whites? Are white ethnic groups being discriminated against in admission standards? If there is such discrimination, what would you do about this?

13. How would you assess the impact of busing on our society? Has it been favorable or unfavorable? Has it led to better education or not?

14. What are your views on busing? If you are opposed to mandatory busing, why do you not favor a constitutional amendment to ban school busing?

15. Do you favor President Ford's approach that legislation ought to be introduced to limit the length of time that any busing plan can be in effect?

16. You have often talked about the applicability of the Atlanta plan. Does it have any real application to other areas?

17. While you were Governor you proposed a resolution by which the Georgia legislature would go on record as asking Congress to pass a constitutional amendment banning busing, yet you now oppose such a constitutional amendment. Why have you changed your mind?

18. Given the current situations in Louisville and Boston, what as President would you do to help the situations there?

19. The Republican Platform calls for a constitutional amendment to permit non-sectarian prayers in the public schools. Do you support such an amendment? If not, why? Would you support the efforts of those who seek such an amendment?

20. Would you favor a voucher system for education under which all parents, regardless of where they wished to send their children, would be entitled to a certain allotment to purchase that education? The American Federation of Teachers says that a voucher system would destroy the American system of education. Do you agree with that?

21. What is your view about the role of the federal government, if any, in equalizing fiscal disparities between school districts in terms of the per-capita expenditure for children within school districts?

22. How would you generally address the current financial problems of parochial schools and private schools?

23. There are now a number of categorical educational programs which the Republicans have suggested should be consolidated into one block grant for education. Do you support such a concept? Is such a proposal in line with your own suggestions?

24. There has been a recent report indicating that the emphasis on vocational education has had a detrimental affect on general education and basic math, writing and reading skills. What is your view in this regard, when you have stated that you favor expanding vocational opportunities?

25. What type of education do you feel should be emphasized? Aren't we educating our children for jobs that often do not exist?

CITIES:

1. You have indicated a commitment to help rebuild our central cities. Could you outline your program? How much would your program cost?

2. The Democratic Platform indicates a massive commitment to rebuilding our cities. Wouldn't the cost of such an effort be enormous?

3. You have recently indicated that you favor aid to New York City but during the primaries you were opposed to such aid. Why have you changed your position and how much should the federal government spend to bail out New York City?

4. Would you in any way modify or reform the current financial package for New York City?

5. Would you support a similar effort to bail out other cities if they got in similar financial straits?
6. Many cities are being required to reduce their services because of fiscal constraints. Do you favor the federal government assisting them in providing such services?
7. Should municipal employees such as firemen, garbagemen, policemen, and public school teachers, have the right to organize, bargain collectively, and to strike?
8. Cities must look to the property tax for their principal source of income. Yet this is becoming an exhausted revenue base. What can the federal government do to alleviate the property tax burden to provide alternative sources of revenue to the cities?
9. What would you do to strengthen neighborhood institutions and neighborhoods in general?

HOUSING

1. Middle-income families increasingly cannot afford new housing. What would you do to aid them?
2. You made a remark during the Pennsylvania primary regarding the ethnic purity of neighborhoods. What did you mean by that? How does it square with your commitment to civil rights? Do you believe in the right of open housing?
3. Do you believe that public housing should be put in the suburbs and in other white areas?
4. You have talked about the need for interest subsidies, to assist Americans to own their own homes. What levels of such subsidies should be provided and what would be the cost to the taxpayers of such subsidies?

HOUSING (cont'd)

5. You have been critical of the \$180 billion of income transfer payments that are made by the federal government. Which income transfer programs would you eliminate and at what saving?

6. The average cost of a new home is now \$46,000, a price which outprices new housing for many Americans. What do you propose to do to help Americans afford new housing?

CRIME

1. Do you feel, as you told Walter Cronkite, that unemployment is the principal cause of crime?

2. What do you propose that the federal government do to help reduce the crime rate?

3. Do you favor S-1, the codification of the criminal code with its related provisions?

4. What is your position on gun control?

5. What specific steps would you take to end the traffic in narcotics?

6. Is there anything that the federal government can do to reduce alcohol abuse, which has again become one of our more serious problems, especially among young people?

7. Would you make any changes in sentencing procedures?

8. What reforms do you suggest in the penal reform area?

9. Recent studies have indicated a very marginal benefit from rehabilitation programs for criminals. What does this indicate with respect to emphasis on rehabilitation?

CRIME (cont'd)

10. Juvenile crime is growing at the most rapid rate of any type of crime. What can be done to stop the growth in such crime?

11. There have been many recent revelations regarding break-ins and other abuses by the FBI and in FBI Director Kelly's role in recent break-ins. There also has been general criticism of the administration of the FBI. What would you do about this problem? If President would you fire Mr. Kelly?

12. Do you favor reopening the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy? Why, or why not?

13. What is your opinion about the effectiveness of the LEAA program? What reforms, if any, would you make in that program?

14. How do you deal with white-collar crimes, including pay-offs by major corporations to get business abroad?

15. What priority do you put on dealing with white-collar crime?

16. Would you have pardoned President Nixon and would you have pardoned any of the lesser officials in the Nixon administration involved in Watergate?

17. Do you think that those people who have been put in jail, such as Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt, have paid disproportionately for their share in the Watergate affair?

18. You have stated that you felt Mr. Nixon showed his guilt when he accepted the pardon, yet you have offered pardons to draft evaders indicating that this neither proves nor disproves whether they did anything wrong. How do you square this view?

CRIME (cont'd)

19. What are your views on the death penalty? Do you feel it has a deterrent affect?

20. What can be done to avoid future Watergates, particularly in light of your wishes to restor an honest government?

21. You have talked about the need for an active President, but isn't this one of the problems that we had with Watergate and isn't one of the lessons of Watergate that we need a President who has less power at his command.

22. There have been many revelations in the last few months indicating that some of our law-enforcement and security agencies have themselves violated the law. Yet none of their officials have been prosecuted. Would you favor the prosecution of any officials involved in such transgressions?

23. To avoid the problems which we have had with the CIA and the FBI, how would you insure that they properly fulfill their role and do not exceed it? It isn't sufficient to simply rely on the President to say that he will look after this. What is your specific plan?

24. Do you favor an independent special prosecutor?

25. Isn't it unrealistic to expect that the Attorney General could be removed from the political process and given some independent status? Would this not disqualify able people simply because they participated in the democratic process?

CRIME (cont'd)

26. What do you think should be done about the penetration of the Teamsters Union by organized crime and what kind of new protections are necessary to avoid such penetration of labor unions and, as well, abuses of their pension funds?

TRANSPORTATION

1. What is your position on the transfer of funds from the Highway Trust Fund to mass transit?

2. What is your view on the necessity for deregulating the motor-carrier industry and specifically your view on the Ford proposal for motor-carrier deregulation?

3. What is your position on the deregulation of the airline industry?

4. Do you favor the landing of the SST, even on a trial basis?

5. What can be done to upgrade the Merchant Marine? How much would such a program cost? Is their justification for the current subsidy to the Merchant Marine?

6. You have indicated that you would like to shift the emphasis in the construction of ships to private yards. What impact would this have on employment and on maritime unions.

7. The labor movement has supported the requirement that a certain percentage of goods move in American vessels. What is your position on this?

8. What can be done to revitalize the Merchant Marine?

9. What is your position on the need to improve inland waterways?

AGRICULTURE

1. What is your position on the present Mathis bill to reduce acreage allotments and support levels for peanut farmers? Do you favor further reductions than those in the Mathis bill?
2. Did you ever receive peanut subsidies?
3. There has been a good deal of confusion over your statement that there would be no embargoes. Do you support embargoes and under what circumstances?
4. Do you feel that the American farmer has been given appropriate support levels by the Republican administration? If not, what support levels would you favor and at what cost?
5. What is your view about the move toward the target price system undertaken by the Republicans?
6. Do you favor the creation of reserves? Would such reserves have a depressing effect on farm prices and income?
7. What size reserves would you favor if you do favor such reserves?
8. How much would it cost to establish the types of reserves you are talking about?
9. What programs would you undertake to help maintain family farms? What would such programs cost?
10. What can be done to prevent further abuses by the grain companies and the scandals that have been demonstrated in the last few years?
11. How do you solve the problem that farmers seem to get a decreasing share of the nation's wealth regardless of increases in supermarket prices?

CIVIL RIGHTS

(See questions on open housing, affirmative action quotas)

1. Is there any further need for further civil rights legislation or is there enough on the books now?
2. What is your view on equal application of the Voting Rights Act in the rest of the country? How would you change it?

ELDERLY

1. What, if any, improvements would you make in the Social Security program?
2. There is a large deficit now in the Social Security Trust Fund. What steps can be taken to reduce this deficit?
3. Wouldn't your national health insurance proposal, if financed by the employer-employee payroll tax on top of the already burdensome Social Security tax, impose an enormous burden on the American people and on the Social Security system?
4. What improvements, if any, would you make in the Medicare system?
5. Do you have a comprehensive program for Senior Citizens? If so, what does this program consist of?

VIETNAM

1. Would you keep the VA system separate from national health insurance so that it would continue to serve only veterans?
2. Do you feel that VA Hospitals are in proper condition and what would you do to improve their condition?

VIETNAM (cont'd)

3. What specific steps would you take and what would the cost of these steps be to improve benefits for Vietnam War veterans?
4. Do you favor continuation of GI education benefits for both war veterans and those who served but were not in war service?

ARTS

1. Do you favor additional funding by the federal government to support the arts? If so, what additional funding do you support?
2. Would you support a national endowment for the arts and humanities?

ENERGY

1. Your position on nuclear power is somewhat unclear. You came out in favor of the Oregon initiative but were quoted as stating that you could not favor the one in California. What is your position in this regard?
2. In 1975 you stated that a breeder reactor should be a first priority in the nuclear area and that we needed a crash program in this regard, whereas six months later you said such a program should have low priority. Why did you change your position on this and what is your current position?
3. A synthetic fuels bill is now pending in Congress. What is your position on this bill? Why have you taken such a position?
4. Today, three years after the oil embargo, we are now importing a greater percentage of our oil than we were prior to that embargo. What specific steps will you take to arrest the growing dependence on foreign oil? Don't you believe it is necessary to decontrol oil prices in order to encourage exploration and decrease consumption?
5. Don't you feel it is necessary to decontrol gas prices in order to discourage consumption and encourage exploration?
6. President Ford submitted a comprehensive energy program which the Democratic Congress rejected and, as a result, energy production is dropping and we have no comprehensive energy program. What is your comprehensive energy program and how much would it cost?
7. What specific steps would you take to increase oil and gas supply? Would these steps not require loosening environmental requirements which currently have a restrictive effect on such development?

ENERGY (cont'd)

8. You have talked about the need to shift toward an emphasis on coal production and that a crash coal program could be instituted without an adverse environmental impact. How could this be done?
9. Do you support prompt exploration and production of off-shore oil? Do you favor the creation of a federal corporation for such exploration and production?
10. Which of the two gas pipeline alternatives do you support? The one across Canada or the one through Alaska?
11. Which offers the least environmental harm and the greatest opportunity for production?
12. What is your position on horizontal and vertical divestiture in the oil industry? Do you feel there is sufficient competition in the oil industry? How do you attempt to deal with the absence of competition if you feel there is such?
13. Should the federal government play a more active role in the relations between American oil companies or multi-national oil companies and OPEC nations? If so, what type of role?
14. Do you support a reorganization of the federal government with respect to the energy area?
15. Do you feel that a crash program to reduce our dependence on foreign oil can be undertaken without substantial environmental damage?
16. You have stated that if you had to choose between environmental protection and growth, that you would choose environmental protection. Is this still your position and how does that relate to the energy area? Is this position consonant with your position to reduce unemployment?

ENERGY (cont'd)

17. What specific programs do you have for conservation of energy?

18. Do you favor mandatory federal standards on building performances, automobiles and the like, to force such conservation measures?

19. Would you provide federal tax incentives such as tax deductions for home insulation and the like?

SOCIAL ISSUES

1. There have been conflicting reports about your position on abortion. You have stated that you are personally opposed to abortion and opposed federal funds for abortion. If this is the case, how do you oppose a constitutional amendment banning abortion?

2. You stated in Iowa that certain types of national legislation might be passed to limit abortions. What did you mean by that and what did you have in mind?

3. Subsequently, you have indicated, after your meeting with the Bishops, that certain types of constitutional amendments might be acceptable to you and that you would not block efforts to pass other types of constitutional amendments. What types of constitutional amendments did you have in mind which would be acceptable to you? Wouldn't any type of constitutional amendment prohibit women from having their free choice as to whether they want an abortion?

SOCIAL ISSUES (cont'd)

4. Do you favor President Ford's position that he would leave the matter of abortions to the states through a constitutional amendment?
5. As Governor, you signed a bill which would provide for an abortion within the first six months at the request of a woman to her doctor. Why did you support such a bill? Wouldn't a fetus at six months be a person and wouldn't this be permitting murder?
6. What is your position on criminal penalties for marijuana?
7. With your emphasis on morality and the family, isn't your position in favor of decriminalization of marijuana contradictory?
8. How long did it take for your own sons to finally discontinue the use of marijuana after they began?

ENVIRONMENT

1. Can we maintain a healthy environment and at the same time build our energy resources?
2. Would you favor extension of the deadline by which automobile companies must meet certain air pollution requirements?
3. Do you support President Ford's plan to expand government resources for our national parks? Is this a priority item with you and what would your program to improve the parks cost?
4. What can the federal government do to prevent the injection of poisonous substances such as Kepone and Mirex into our environment?

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

1. Can the zero-based budgeting which you have suggested really be applied on the federal level without the creation of another massive bureaucracy?
2. You have suggested that you would reduce the number of federal agencies. Can you name several federal agencies which you would abolish?
3. You have talked about reducing the number of federal agencies from 1900 to 200. Can this be realistically done?
4. Isn't it true that in Georgia that, despite your reorganization, your state budget went up each year, as did the number of total state employees?
5. It is stated that you had a \$13 million greater surplus when you left office than when you started, but that at the same time the debt of the state went up by \$205 million. Can you explain this?
6. What is your position on the sunset law? Can this be realistically accomplished? Which programs do you feel should be abolished through a sunset review?
7. Do you favor continued cost-of-living increases for federal employees?
8. The mail system seems to be deteriorating rapidly. What would you do to reform the post office? Would you put the postal service back in the federal government or leave it as it is outside the federal government? Would you allow for private competition with the postal service, and if not, why not?

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION (cont'd)

9. You have talked about reducing the number of federal agencies and yet you have proposed a separate Department of Education and a separate Department of Consumer Affairs. Aren't these contradictory to your other statements?

10. Should the federal government provide funds to support consumer litigation against corporations and others?

11. It has been said that you have a very small, inexperienced, insulated Georgia-based inner group. If you talk about an open government, how can this be accomplished when you have such a situation? Isn't this just like the Nixon crowd?

12. Don't you feel that, as a Democrat, you will be less able to hold down Congressional spending than President Ford, who is not subject to the same pressure groups?

13. You have criticized President Ford's vetoes. Which bills would you not have vetoed and what would have been the additional cost to the taxpayers had you not vetoed such programs?

14. Do you favor new legislation to prohibit deferrals and recisions of amounts appropriated by Congress?

SMALL BUSINESS

1. What would you do to assist small businesses and how much would such a program cost?

RURAL DEVELOPMENT - THEMES

1. The two Republican Administrations have systematically tried to block or dismantle every significant program aimed at improving conditions in rural and small town America.

A. Although Nixon signed the Rural Development Act of 1972, both Republican Administrations have since done everything possible to prevent its implementation--impoundments, termination of programs by executive order, refusal to issue regulations, rescissions and deferrals, refusal to supply sufficient staff and other delaying tactics.

B. In FY 1976, the Administration asked Congress to rescind badly needed rural development funds as well as \$500 million in rural housing authority.

C. The Administration eliminated funding for important rural development grant programs in the FY 1977 budget--for water, sewer, housing, fire protection, business and industrial development and rural development planning.

D. The Administration cut back assistance for thousands of miles of rural roads in the wake of abandonment of thousands of miles of railroad.

E. The Administration has neglected rural health care delivery systems--hundreds of rural communities find themselves without doctors--estimated shortage of 20,000 doctors.

2. A Carter Administration would recognize that the problems of rural areas and small towns are unique. A Carter Administration would make sure that programs such as health care, postal service and credit would take into account the special needs of small towns.

A Carter Administration would strive to ensure the following rights to rural Americans:

1. The right of every farmer to income protection against disaster and the whims of nature--and to protection from the peaks and valleys of farm prices and production that make farmers especially vulnerable to economic fluctuations.

2. The right to a decent home with water and sewer service.

3. The right to good health services and the services of a doctor.

4. The right of access to telephone service and electric service.

5. The right to competent and convenient postal service.

6. The right to a quality education and to training in advanced vocational trades and skills.

FORD QUESTION - BUREAUCRATIC REFORM

Q. You have frequently criticized federal bureaucracy for its size, its red tape, its inefficiency, and its overregulation. In your criticism of the bureaucracy, you are different from every other American in that you are President and in a position to do something. What have you done in the last two years about the bureaucracy?

Likely Ford Response

I. Proposed reforms of regulatory agencies - CAB, ICC, and Trucking Industry. No congressional action taken.

Rebuttal:

1. Congressional reforms were ^{not enacted} ~~unacted~~ because they were poorly designed, failed to protect the interests of small towns, rural areas and small businesses, and because the executive branch failed to give Congress enough sound factual information on which to base its decisions about the impacts of regulatory reform. There was also insufficient consultation with the industries involved.

THE LACK OF REGULATORY REFORM ILLUSTRATES THE PROBLEM OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT & LACK OF LEADERSHIP

2. The more important reform the President could have made would have been to appoint people to the regulatory commissions and other high government posts who were representatives of the public interest rather than those of the industry. In the last five years more than half of those appointed to the regulatory commissions have come from the regulated industries. Yet, despite

public and congressional protests, many of the administration's appointments continue to come directly from the regulated industry. In fact, recent nominees to the Federal Energy Administration have had ^{very} direct connections to the industry: they were receiving huge retainers from the oil companies. We can't keep turning the chicken coop over to the foxes to guard. We need people with experience but people who are genuinely committed to the needs of the public.

II. Efforts to cut social bureaucracy and improve the administration of programs; efforts to decentralize the bureaucracy into ten regional areas of the country; efforts to turn decision-making responsibility back over to the state and local governments through revenue sharing.

Rebuttal to any statistics cited:

1. The administrative costs of the welfare program have doubled over the past four years and now total \$1.4 billion a year.
2. The number of bureaucrats in the Department of Transportation has increased by 10,000 while ^{8 yrs.} efficiency in the department has fallen. For example, delays in the processing of highway construction have increased by 2 years in the past decade.
3. The number of middle and upper level bureaucrats have increased in the Departments of HEW and HUD over the past 8 years at a rate faster than that of low level civil servants.
4. The regionalization of the federal bureaucracy, and the decentralization of decision-making has created new levels of bureaucracy. For example, the ten regional offices of the Department

of Labor require people to administer the CETA program while only positions were eliminated in the Washington office. By shifting administrative responsibilities onto the state and local governments, the federal government has been able to maintain its size while state and local bureaucracies have been forced to grow by ^{1.6 million people} \wedge over the past 5 years.

JIMMY CARTER on Telecommunications in California

June 2, 1976

Statement on telecommunications, energy conservation, and employment.

One important part of a comprehensive energy conservation program is the effective use of telecommunications technology--including the telephone, mobile radio, television, satellites, and computers. In a time of widespread inflation and high unemployment, telecommunications is one of the few sectors of the economy which has consistently provided more jobs with increased productivity. New applications of telecommunications can do much more to improve our quality of life and conserve our scarce resources.

I am pleased to note the efforts at a number of California universities and research institutes to evaluate the potential of telecommunications for increasing the efficiency of energy-intensive activities such as travel. New ways of using telecommunications--such as telephones linked to computers or audio and video conferencing--bring the promise of substantial time, money, and energy savings in the use of public transit.

In other areas, we can, for example, make better use of mobile radio and computers for on-the-spot diagnosis of heart attacks and delivery of emergency medical services. We can offer greater variety and quality of educational and community-oriented programming through broadcast and cable television. The technology is here today. What we need--but do not yet have--are the institutional mechanisms and commitment in both the public and private sectors to make best use of our technological assets.

The federal government can play a constructive role in encouraging more effective use of telecommunications. I believe that the federal research and development emphasis should be on innovative uses of telecommunications and information services--particularly for improving productivity in the delivery of public services by federal, state, and local government agencies.

In addition, there is a need to review the Communications Act of 1934--the basic legislative framework for national communications policy--with respect to the technological, economic, social, and other changes which have occurred since its enactment. When the Act was first passed, television, satellites, and computers did not exist. The thrust of new technology is raising policy issues which the Act does not now address.

Telecommunications is of growing importance to California and the nation and indeed to the world. We should encourage public participation in the formulation of communications policy, and insure that the views of users and consumers along with industrial producers and suppliers are well represented. Another goal will be to make sure that the promise of telecommunications technology reaches out to rural and lesser developed areas, as well as to our urban and suburban centers.

INFLATION

Q & A's

ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM:

Q: ISN'T IT SAME OLD STUFF?

23. Governor Carter, a lot of your suggestions for fighting inflation such as increased productivity, decreased regulation, increased enforcement of the anti-trust laws, etc., are things that most everyone supports and things which have never had much effect in the past. Do you think these tools will have ^{more effect} now, or is there something more to your inflation program?

Answer: There may have been a lot of talk about these things in the past, but I think we all know that there has never been much action. We all know that there hasn't been vigorous enforcement of our anti-trust laws. One of the biggest political issues in recent years has been the relationship of large corporations such as ITT to the Administration. And even when there is no question of special relationships, there is just a lack of enforcement. For example, you have the situation reported the other day where farmers are getting lower prices for their beef and consumers are still paying the same or higher prices at the supermarket. And not one word from The White House on it. People have been talking about sweetheart arrangements in the regulated industries for years, but nothing has been done about it. And you'll probably never get anything done about it until you get a President and a Congress who trust each other and ^{can} work together.

One thing we have done in our campaign, which I don't think has been done before, is to put together a specific set of programs which are targeted to deal with the many different causes of inflation. We're not going to try to use the blunder^{bus} approach of trying to sit on inflation by ~~throwing~~ throwing people out of work and having record interest rates. This Administration has continually been trying that approach and the result has been to have record levels of

unemployment, inflation and interest rates. ~~(See No. 24 for further details of inflation program.)~~

GO TO STANDARD ANSWER FOR
DETAILS OF INFLATION
PROGRAM

COUNCIL ON WAGE & PRICE STABILITY

29. Governor Carter, do you favor any strengthening of the powers of the Council of Wage and Price Stability?

ANSWER: I would want to look very carefully into how the Council of Wage and Price Stability works because I think ~~they~~^{it} can be a very useful tool in restraining inflationary pressures. Clearly, it hasn't worked very well in recent years. But that may well be due to White House political interference rather than any inherent lack of power. For example, most people think that the Council doesn't have any power to subpoena wage or price information. But it does and it always has had that power. It just hasn't used it in recent years. Another example is the recent aluminum industry case. The Council had apparently drafted a report and wanted to release it which sharply criticized pricing practices in the aluminum industry and urged certain remedies to correct those pricing patterns. However, after first letting the industry read the proposed report and make its complaints to the White House, the White House stepped in to force the Council to change its report and soften its recommendations.

So it's pretty clear that ^{no matter what} ~~what~~ written powers the Council has, if it doesn't have any support in the White House, it is not going to be able to do the job. If I'm elected President, the Council will have White House support. You see I don't think we're going to be able to contain inflation with a lot of talk about it being Enemy No. 1 because all that talk doesn't mean very much if you're not willing to act and upset any special relationships you may have.

JAW BOWING

30. Governor Carter, would you as President exercise jaw bowing power to limit price or wage increases?

ANSWER: I would. I think something's wrong when you have price or wage decisions which may set off an inflationary spiral which will upset a whole national pattern of prices and wages, which can affect every single person in this country, and the President sits back and acts as if nothing happened. We have to have some leadership on these tough economic issues and the President has to be prepared to speak out on behalf of all the people because if he doesn't no one else will.

I think one of John F. Kennedy's finest hours was when he exercised that responsibility of leadership in speaking out against ^{the} steel price increases. He took a lot of criticism for that but he did the right thing. And we ought to remember that the ^{average rate of} ~~arbitrary~~ inflation during the eight Kennedy-Johnson years was about 2%. We haven't had Jack Kennedy's kind of leadership in the past eight years. We have had the highest rates of inflation that we've experienced in this country in more than fifty years. So I don't see anything wrong or unbecoming with the President speaking out on behalf of the public against inflationary price or wage decisions. That's his job.

DOES INFLATION CAUSE UNEMPLOYMENT ISN'T INFLATION #1 PROBLEM

22. QUESTION: Governor Carter, lately an economic theory which is subscribed to now by a lot of people has arisen to the effect that inflation and the expectation of inflation itself causes consumers to reduce their spending plan and thereby increases unemployment. If that theory is right, it would seem to follow that cutting down on inflation should be our number one economic priority, as the Republicans say it should. Do you agree with that theory and would you agree that therefore we ought to be focusing our main efforts on cutting down inflation?

ANSWER: I think inflation is a very serious problem. I just might say that the Republicans ought to know about inflation -- their Administration and their approach to the economy has given us the worst inflation we've had in ^{over a QUARTER OF A CENTURY.} ~~more than 50~~ years. When you have a 20% increase in food prices in a single year, when you have a situation in which most Americans are being priced out of the housing market, and when you couple this with the greatest job insecurity since the Depression, of course a lot of consumers are going to very cautious and tend to reduce their purchases.

I think it is essential that we get inflation under control in this country. We've just come through, as I've said, the worst inflation rates we've had in more than ²⁵ 50 years. And even now the current rate of inflation of 6%, which this Administration seems to be very satisfied with, is greater than it's been at any time between the Korean War and the inauguration of Richard Nixon. I don't think that's good enough.

We've got to mount a direct assault on inflation. That means a number of programs carefully targeted at the specific causes of inflation. We're not going to beat inflation by just throwing a lot of people out of work. That's a do-nothing approach. It hasn't worked in the past and it won't work in the future. The way you restore a healthy economy is by taking on inflation and unemployment at the same time.

Go TO BASIC ANSWER ON INFLATION PROGRAM

Take in some of answer from No. 12.7

The point is that inflation and unemployment are twin evils. You take them on together or you won't be able to solve either one of them separately. What you do is adopt specific policies targeted at each.

Good employment programs will increase not reduce our ability to control inflation, and good anti-inflation programs will have a positive effect on unemployment in this country. That's what we have in mind, and that's what we're going to accomplish.

IS FULL EMPLOYMENT OR INFLATION
#1 PRIORITY? HAS CARTER SHIFTED?

43. Governor Carter, when you were a candidate for the Democratic nomination, you issued a position paper on the economy back in April in which you stated that full employment was the number one economic goal. Lately you've been stressing inflation. Have you shifted your position and where do you stand on these issues?

ANSWER: I think if you'll read my April position paper on the economy again, you'll find that I have always linked efforts to reduced unemployment with efforts to reduce inflation. I've always regarded both as twin evils and I've always stated that you are not going to be able to defeat one without also solving the other. My first major speech on the economy as a Presidential candidate given at the end of August made it very clear that we have to take on both unemployment and inflation at the same time. I have always stated that the first step in fighting inflation is to get our people back to work again ^{and} to get the economy back on a steady growth pattern. The important point is that we've rejected a do-nothing approach on these issues. We are not going to use the evil of unemployment to fight the evil of inflation, and we're not going to try to get full employment with the kind of careless spending programs that will result in as much inflation as employment. During this campaign, we have set out, and we're going to be setting out, a coordinated set of policies to deal with both of these problems at the same time. Good employment programs will strengthen our ability to control inflation, and good anti-inflation programs will have a positive affect on unemployment in this country.

43. (continued)

Page -2-

That's what we have in mind, and that's what we are going to accomplish.

TRADE OFF BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT & INFLATION; CAN YOU GET FULL EMPLOYMENT & STABLE PRICES?

15. QUESTION: Governor Carter, most economists have always thought that there is a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, that in order to get less of one you take the risk of getting more of the other. Now you've argued that if you were elected President, we could achieve both full employment and stable prices. Is that a realistic goal? Don't you think there is any trade-off between unemployment and inflation?

ANSWER: With a competently managed economy, we can have both full employment and stable prices. You have to remember that under this Administration we've had the highest ^{combination of un}unemployment ^{and inflation} in this country ~~since the Depression and the highest inflation~~ in more than 50 years. ^{for any Administration} That's not inevitable. We don't have to sit back, do nothing, and accept that kind of performance. During the 1960's, we had full employment in this country and we had a rate of inflation of about 2%.

So I think that you have to take on inflation and unemployment together. You're not going to solve one problem unless you solve the other.

GO TO BASIC EMPLOYMENT - INFLATION

~~Take in some of language from Nos. 12 and 22.~~

PROGRAM

Follow-up Question

Governor Carter, you've advocated an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy to reduce a considerable part of the current rate of the level of unemployment. Now I believe most of your advisors have stated that this will work, and can be done without inflationary pressures, until you get down to a level of about 5 to 5½% of unemployment. And that after that point there is a considerable trade-off between unemployment and inflation/in order to reduce unemployment beyond the 5 to 5½% level you have to risk considerable price pressure. Now, don't you agree with that view?

ANSWER: Most of my advisors have said that we can get down to a level of 5 to 5½% unemployment without risking a surge of increased prices. The reason for that is that we're starting from a point of such high unemployment -- almost 8% of our labor force -- and such low capacity in our manufacturing plants -- only about 75% of our industrial capacity is being used -- that it's easy to expand the supply of goods and services in the economy without touching off inflationary pressure; because that ability to supply is already there and not being used.

Now when you get down to a level of 5 to 5½% unemployment, most economists now think you have to be very careful with further expansion because of the threat of inflation. Don't forget though that moving from an unemployment rate of 8% to about 5 to 5½% means taking about 2½ million workers off the jobless rolls and putting them to work. So that's a significant accomplishment in itself, and one which this Administration has not even come close to achieving. But I don't think that's good enough. We think we can move to full employment, which historically in this country has always meant a level of unemployment of about 4%. And that you can do that without touching off inflationary pressures. And what we've done during our campaign -- and we don't think this ^{has} ~~is~~ ever been carefully done in a Presidential campaign before -- is to outline a whole series of specifically targeted programs which are designed to deal with both problems of unemployment and inflation. ~~These range from increasing productivity in our labor force, through new labor training programs, through being able to~~

Full employment and stable prices were achieved
in 1960's.

anticipate bottlenecks and capacity shortages and moves to prevent them, through the removal of regulatory restraints, through more vigorous anti-trust enforcement, through increased cooperation and consultation among labor, business, and the government.

The point is that if you're careful and competent, and just don't throw up your hands and give up on these problems, we can adopt policies which will get us working together again and achieve these goals.

LOWER INTEREST RATES ARE NOT AN ANTI-INFLATION TOOL

21. QUESTION: Governor Carter, you have urged lower interest rates as a way of fighting inflation. Most economist think the contrary, that lower interest rates stimulate borrowing demand and business expansion and therefore spur inflation. Are they right or are you?

ANSWER: Well I've never proposed a single, simple solution to dealing with inflation. The problem is much too complex for that and much too difficult. The major mistake that this Administration has made is that in attempting to fight inflation it hasn't used a set of programs that will deal with the many different causes of inflation. Instead, it has resorted to a policy of engineered recession, unemployment, and high interest rates. As we all know by now, that hasn't worked.

The problem with using high interest rates alone to try and fight inflation is that it's a blunderbuss approach; its effects spread out all over the economy. Now while higher interest rate may reduce some borrowing demand, they've also succeeded in causing a financial crisis in the country, making the average person unable to afford to finance a new home, causing a near-depression in the housing industry, and making a lot of small businesses unable to afford modest expansion.

So I think you have to use a much more careful approach and, as I've said before, you've got to adopt a set of policies which will take on both inflation and unemployment at the same time. Because you're not going to be able to solve one problem without solving the other. In that connection, I would support lower interest rates and the availability of investment capital ⁺ ~~and~~ reasonable costs. Without these,

we're going to continue to have a stagnant economy. Beyond that though I've put forth a whole set of proposals which will fight inflation directly without increasing unemployment. These include a more productive, better trained labor force; a set of steady agricultural policies which will both maintain the income of our farmers and ensure stable food prices for our consumers; an anti-trust policy which will mean something -- for example, I think it's a disgrace that our farmers are now getting lower prices for their beef and none of these price reductions are being passed through to the consumers at the supermarket and nobody in the federal government seems to care about that or be willing to anything about it; and I will support voluntary efforts by labor, business, and the government to get together to try and ensure a flow of steady jobs and prices which are not inflationary.

[Also see Answers to No. 12, 15 and 22.]

GO TO BASIC INFLATION

PROGRAM ANSWER

WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS

1. Q. Governor Carter, you have said that you think the president ought to have stand-by authority to control wages and prices. How soon would you seek such authority and when would you use it if you were elected president?

A. Stand-by authority to selectively control wages and prices would be the last step in my program to control inflation, a step which would be taken only if all other measures failed. Presently I do not see the need for the use of such authority, so it certainly would not be one of my first priorities if I'm elected.

Go to basic answer for details of Carter ~~and~~ inflation program:

- (1) Goal--to reduce inflation to 4% or less within 4 years ;
- (2) Rejection of Republican policy of forced unemployment and recession to fight inflation ;
- (3) Carter policy will take on inflation and unemployment together because either you take them on together or you won't be able to solve either of them separately ;
- (4) Set out details of inflation program.

2. Q. But Governor Carter, even if stand-by authority is a last resort, I understand you do not rule it out and I wonder under what circumstances you would use it?

A. As I have said, I would use selective controls as a last resort, and I don't make any apologies for that. I would never sit back while food prices are going up 20% in a single year. That kind of inflation strikes at the heart of every family in this country and threatens all of our financial institutions. It seems to me that it is the duty of any national leader to protect the people against that kind of disaster, and if I'm elected I would do that duty.

3. Q. Governor Carter, what specific wages and prices would you control? And would your selective controls cover dividends, interest rates and profits as well as wages and prices?

A. My preference on this matter of controls is to take as careful and limited an approach as possible. I don't favor across the board controls because they would require a ^{huge} ~~manif~~ ^{v/ear} bureaucracy to administer and because they would tend to straight-jacket our economy. My first preference would be to look at those specific prices and wage ^{decisions} ~~divisions~~ that were threatening the national pattern of price and wage stability. By taking affirmative action on the leading price and wage decisions, we might be able to head off an inflationary surge and we also might be able to dampen any further inflationary expectations.

Of course, if there were a specific industry or sector of the economy whose price or wage decisions were threatening national price stability or threatening to set off an inflationary series of wage and price decisions, we would take action now.

And I want to add that in ^{the} ~~a~~ case of profits and dividends, where a company was taking price decisions that we felt that we had to control, we would of course also look at it^s profits and dividends. And in deciding whether selective controls were necessary in a particular case, we would treat interest like any other price and would look to the interest rates being charged by banks and lending institutions.

I think that there are two things that are particularly important in a control program and that we would stress. First is fairness. Business and labor and consumers have to be convinced that any government intervention is being taken impartially and on behalf of all the people. That wasn't true of our most recent

do

controls and it had a lot to deal with the controls not working. Second, I think that if the president exercises a firm hand in a limited number of price and wage decisions and makes clear that we are all in this economy together and have to work together, we can dampen inflationary pressures with a limited control program and we can get those controls off more quickly.

4. Q. But Governor Carter, isn't it true that our most recent experience with controls was a disaster, that controls don't work, and that mere existence of such authority might encourage unions and businesses to increase their wages and prices before such authority can be invoked?

- A.
1. Use of authority would be a last resort, only if other measures failed.
 2. Carter has set forth a specific set of policies which are target ^{ed to} ~~the~~ deal with the many different causes of inflation. These policies will work and can get inflation down to 4% or less by 1980.
 3. It is true that the Nixon controls program did not work:
 - (a) controls were across the board and too broad;
 - (b) controls were unfairly administered--much more pressure on unions and wage decisions than on businesses and price decisions;
 - (c) controls were being run by people who basically didn't want them to work and the public knew it.

So I wouldn't judge that experience as necessarily being a guide for the future.

4. And I don't agree that stand-by authority would ^{by} ~~not~~ it self cause unions and businesses to increase their wages and prices. I think any such wage and price increases could

A. 4. be rolled back and I also think that if the president is a person who the public believes would exercise any stand-by authority only if necessary and then fairly and firmly, the existence of the authority could well reduce ~~the~~ inflationary expectations.

INFLATION

QUESTIONS

1. Mr. Ford's economic policy focuses on containing inflation as the number 1 priority. A lot of economists and businessmen agree. What is your anti-inflation program?
2. You talk as if we can get both lower rates of inflation and lower rates of unemployment, but isn't there a trade off between the two? Don't you have to make some sacrifices on one in order to make progress against the other?

ANSWERS

Theme: Republicans have tried to fight inflation with high interest rates and by putting people out of work. That approach has failed: It has given us a stagnant economy and the worst combination of inflation and unemployment for any Administration in over 50 years; Carter approach will take on inflation and unemployment together by getting the economy moving again and by putting people back to work.

A. Attack Points

1. Republicans have tried to fight inflation with high unemployment and high interest rates. That policy hasn't worked and won't work. It has given us a stagnant economy and the worst combination of inflation and unemployment for any Administration in more than 50 years.
2. In 1968, a dollar was worth a dollar. Today it's worth 61¢. And if you spend it just for groceries, it's worth only 57¢. Cost of the average new home is over \$40,000, more than twice as high as it was eight years ago. Prices are rising today twice as fast as they were at the beginning of this year and are three times as great as under Kennedy-Johnson.
3. Because of high inflation, the average worker's weekly paycheck is worth less today than it was in 1968 and less than when Mr. Ford took office. The working man has been on an economic treadmill -- his paycheck can't keep up with the rising cost of living.
4. The economic waste caused by this Administration's policies have given us the largest deficits in our history. They can't even manage their own budget -- presently they've lost track of \$15 billion. They can't even find it. Spending for welfare and unemployment compensation, which is the most wasteful federal spending because nothing is produced for it, has skyrocketed.

5. They've accepted high inflation as a permanent fact of life. There are few cases in last eight years where White House spoke out against inflationary wage or price decision. They're not willing to take on the big corporations that are a major cause of inflation. Recently the Council on Wage and Price Stability, which is supposed to be an independent public watchdog on inflation, was going to issue a report sharply critical of pricing practices in the aluminum industry. However, when the White House got wind of the report, they stepped in, let members of the industry read the report in advance of publication, and then forced the Council to suppress 350 key pages of the report.

B. Positive Point

Carter economic policies will take on inflation and unemployment together because we won't make progress trying to fight them separately. With steady economic growth and competent economic management, we can get full employment and stable prices. JFK - LBJ did. Inflation must be attacked in a variety of ways:

1. Thorough reform of inflationary government regulations which increase costs to Americans, such as airline deregulation to lower airline fares and the backhand rule prohibiting a truck from carrying goods on its return haul.

2. More effective monitoring of excessive price and wage increases by the Council on Wage and Price Stability, with use of its subpoena power, and pre-notification requirements.

3. Development in coordination with management and labor of voluntary wage and price guidelines and effective Presidential leadership, such as JFK used in the 1962 steel price rise, to keep prices within reason. Also standby wage and price controls in an emergency (no present use foreseeable).

4. An increase in productivity so growth does not become inflationary.

5. A better matching of supply and demand, with increased attention to the supply side of our economy.

6. Strict anti-trust enforcement to encourage price competition.

7. Targeted employment programs to areas of highest unemployment and general growth will not be inflationary since only 73% of our industrial capacity is being utilized.

C. Likely Ford Response

1. The only real inflation program Carter has is wage and price controls, and this will be a disaster.

D. Rebuttal

1. Carter opposes comprehensive, across-the-board wage and price controls. We had those kind of controls under Mr. Nixon, and Mr. Ford supported them. Those controls were too broad, they weren't fairly administered, and of course they didn't work.

2. I would use selective controls only as a last resort, if double-digit inflation were threatening the stability of our national economy and other measures weren't working. I don't make any apologies for that. It seems to me that it is the duty of any national leader to protect the people from that kind of disaster, and if I'm elected, I would do that duty.

3. But it's not going to come to that because our policies of steady economic growth, strong competition, and Presidential leadership are going to bring inflation under control.

4. Ford is big deficit spender -- biggest in history.

INFLATION

Republicans charge that your spending programs for jobs, welfare and health can only trigger a new wave of inflation.

Basic Statement

1. The Republican Administration's timid policies have driven prices up faster than under any other administration. They have put more people out of work than at any time since the depression.

My policy and the policy of the Democratic Party has always been to fight both unemployment and inflation at the same time and with the same weapons -- strong, sustained, steady economic growth and active governmental vigilance to monitor and counter the forces which push prices up. That is the kind of leadership which has worked before, and it is the only policy which can work now.

--Under President Kennedy and Johnson, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 4.5%, even by 1966 unemployment was reduced to less than 4%, and inflation was held to an annual average of 2%. Our last two Democratic Presidents demonstrated that we could have both low unemployment and low inflation. And our nation has consistently done best against inflation during periods of high economic growth and productivity.

--So why do the Republicans tell us we can't afford to get unemployment below 7.9% today without unleashing even worse inflation than the current 6%?

--Why is it necessary for the American people to tolerate in 1976 a higher unemployment rate and a higher inflation rate than every single year from 1952 through 1968?

2. The Republicans now claim that their economic policies have been successful. Let's put that claim in perspective.

--Over the past decade average monthly mortgage payments have risen by 191% for an average home. Three out of every four families are priced out of the cost of new housing. Is that success?

--They take pride because the inflation rate has dropped from 12 percent to 7 percent last year -- still the highest rate point in 25 years. Is that success?

--The 1968 dollar is now worth 61 cents. The 1968 food dollar is now worth 57 cents. I think we should honor Secretary Simon by putting his picture on the \$2 bill.

--The value of your dollar is still shrinking. And it will continue to do so. The Republicans' own Federal Reserve Board Chairman very recently said that the underlying rate of inflation is 6% to 7% and that this rate has not diminished since mid-1975.

--Industrial commodity prices, which account for over 70% of wholesale prices, have been rising at an annual rate of about 8% for the last three months. This is the best barometer for future consumer price increases. Is that success?

--Unemployment has risen steadily for the past three months and it is as high today as it was 20 months ago, with 7.5 million people out of work.

3. The Republicans' do-nothing policies completely misunderstand the causes of inflation.

--The Republican platform says: "We wish to stress that the number one cause of inflation is the government's expansion of the nation's supply of money and credit..."

--This is nonsense. The ravaging inflation which we suffer has nothing to do with too much prosperity.

--The main causes of inflation are the extortionate price increases of the OPEC cartel.

--Two devaluations of the dollar by the Republican Administration.

--The great Russian grain giveaway of 1972;

--Commodity shortages, on-again-off-again wage and price control policies, and monopoly pricing in certain sectors of the economy.

--None of these causes of inflation have been or can be affected at all by the Republican policy of no-recovery, no-jobs economics. They are anti-jobs, without being anti-inflation. That has never worked. And it is not working now.

4. Inflation cannot be fought with WIN buttons. It takes leadership and management. That is what Democratic economic policies have provided and will provide.

--The Republicans only fight inflation by putting people out of work. We will attack inflation directly rather than the discredited policy of driving up unemployment. That's what the Democrats did under Kennedy and Johnson and that is what we will do again.

--Here is the anti-inflation program I will follow as President so that we beat inflation:

--I will restore economic growth and productivity so that costs are cut and adequate supplies of housing and other essential goods are provided.

--I will adopt employment policies carefully targeted to reduce unemployment among those groups and in those geographical areas where it is highest -- a policy which will allow us to cut unemployment without accelerating inflation.

--I would establish a food reserve program that protects farmers and consumers from the wild gyrations in food prices we have had in recent years;

--I would review all federal regulation, procurement activities, and programs to ensure that the government is not the party responsible for holding up prices;

--I would meet with the leaders of business and labor to ask them to cooperate in exercising voluntary restraint on wages and prices. Voluntary standards against which major price and wage increases could be measured, and about which the public could be informed, could serve as a great restraint on inflation.

5. Let me emphasize that I would take a hard look at any price or wage increases that are unjustified and could threaten national price stability. I owe nothing to any special interests. My only obligation is to the voters.

--The current Council on Wage and Price Stability has done some good studies on the problem of inflation, but no one in the White House ever reads them and acts. In fact, the evidence suggests that the White House attempted to suppress a recent study of suspicious price increases in the aluminum industry. I do not believe you can cover-up the problem of inflation.

--I would instruct the Council on Wage and Price Stability to investigate and report to me and the public, any price or wage increase which appeared to seriously threaten price stability. Let's give the people the facts about the price increases by the giant corporations in the aluminum industry.

--I would like to know, and I am sure the American people would like to know, why General Motors intends to increase the average retail price of cars to \$6,000, while at the same time steel companies, who supply the auto companies, have kept their prices from going up. Maybe it's justified, but we don't know.

--I would stand up to oppose any major price or wage increase that could not be justified. I think one of President Kennedy's finest hours was when he spoke out against the steel price increases in 1962. He took a lot of criticism for that, but he did the right thing. And we ought to remember that the average rate of inflation during the eight Kennedy-Johnson years was about 2%. We haven't had Jack

Kennedy's kind of leadership in the past eight years. We have had the highest rates of inflation that we've experienced in this country in more than fifty years. A President should speak out on behalf of the public against inflationary price or wage decisions. That's his job.

Budget Balance/Spending

Issue: Ford has proposed the creation of an Energy Independence Authority, a \$100 billion program to subsidize private development of new energy technology. The EIA would be entirely independent (not linked to ERDA), with authority to make loans, loan guarantees, investments, and purchase price guarantees (price supports) over a ten year period.

Carter Comment

^{the same that}
--In ~~a~~ year ~~when~~ President Ford announced ~~that~~ he would initiate no new federal spending programs, Vice President Rockefeller announced with considerable fanfare a proposal for a budget-busting \$100 billion subsidy program for new energy technologies.

--Reverses the previous administration position that decontrol of oil and gas would bring about high enough prices that the market would supply sufficient incentive to invest in new energy technologies. Under the current Ford proposal citizens would both underwrite \$100 billion in energy development and be forced to pay prices for energy which are set by OPEC.

--The proposed energy independence authority would be a freewheeling authority not accountable to the Energy Research and Development Administration, the President, or the Congress. It would have the sole power to determine where the \$100 billion is distributed. One of our major problems in the energy area has been a lack of coordination of energy R & D problems with our long term energy priorities.

--The EIA would be authorized to subsidize energy investments which would not produce economically competitive fuels, leading to a never-ending spiral of energy price supports so that the government could recoup its investment. The taxpayer pays twice.

--The EIA runs the risk of promoting high technology, capital intensive energy projects at the expense of decentralized, job producing, affordable energy technologies such as solar, geothermal, and biomass conversion. It has been criticized by some as a backhand bailout of the nuclear industry and the electric utilities which are overcommitted to potentially unsound nuclear technology.

--Even such conservative organizations as the Wall Street Journal and the National Association of Petroleum Investment Analysts have criticized the proposal as an unwarranted federal intrusion into the private sector and capital market.

--Would propose instead of this kind of authority, a carefully planned and specifically directed federal stimulus for those technologies which need demonstration but which are economically sound and will produce energy supplies at reasonable and competitive prices.

FIGHTING INFLATION

QUESTION: You have proposed an ambitious set of social programs and also said you will reduce unemployment to 4%. The social programs will cost money and add to the deficit. Your effort to get to 4% unemployment, many argue, will just set off a new round of inflation. How would you achieve all these ambitious goals without setting off a new round of inflation?

ANSWER: First, I would not continue the economic policies of the last eight years. The Republicans have completely misunderstood the complex nature of inflation. They have told us that inflation is our number one problem and they have created and tolerated the highest levels of unemployment since the Great Depression to fight inflation. This policy has not worked -- it has given us the highest combination of unemployment and inflation in over 50 years. This policy led to a 12% rate of inflation in 1974, and an average rate of inflation of the eight years of 6%. And that's the rate of inflation projected for next year. The Republicans have become 6 percenters on inflation.

-Cost of Inflation. The social and economic costs of such policies are enormous. The average retail price of a new car today is \$6,000. The price of a new home today is \$46,000, \$16,000 higher than it was in 1968. The high unemployment created to fight inflation has led to the highest deficits in our history.

-White House Leadership. To reduce inflation, we must have a President that understands its complex nature and is willing to take direct, forceful action to stop it. Inflation and unemployment are twin evils that must be attacked simultaneously. I believe inflation must be attacked on every front, with every resource available to the federal government, and through every program conducted by it. I will make that principle clear to every presidential appointee in my administration and everyone I work with in Congress. For one thing, I will insert that anyone recommending a new program or new policy by the Federal government must submit, for careful review by experts, an analysis of the full impact on the inflation problem anytime there is an inflationary solution, there must be a better noninflationary solution.

-Putting People to Work and Steady Growth. The basic step in reducing inflation is to put our people and plants to work in order to restore economic growth and productivity. We can do this by ending the stop-go budget and credit policies of the last eight years and substituting a coordinated and consistent set of policies that will reduce wasteful Federal expenditures and interest rates. The high interest rates of 8 to 10 percent that we have had in recent years must end so that business investment, school construction, and homes can be financed. The way to end the escalation of housing costs, for example, is to produce more homes.

Ford's recent speeches and responses to questions indicate that there are about 11 basic themes he would like to get across during the campaign. It is reasonable to expect that Ford will attempt to get one or more of those themes into every response he gives during the debates. Although there is some overlap, the 11 themes can be distinguished as follows:

- 1) Credibility, Openness, and Trust have been restored to the White House.
- 2) A clean break was made with the Nixon Administration; therefore, the Ford Administration cannot be held accountable for anything done by the Nixon Administration.
- 3) The economy is in full recovery from the depths Ford found when he assumed office.
- 4) Affirmative programs to solve the nation's major problems were proposed by Ford, but the Democratic Congress has failed to act on those programs.
- 5) Deficit spending and inflation were caused by a free-spending Democratic Congress; Ford resisted the Democratic Congress through his vetoes; and Carter has embraced the free-spending practices of the Congress.
- 6) The Democratic Platform would cost the American public \$100-\$200 billion; Carter has embraced the Platform and is no different from any other big-spending Democratic nominee.
- 7) Ford has taken positions on Federal issues for 27 years and the American people know where he stands; Carter flip-flops his positions so often we don't know where he stands.
- 8) Ford has experience in the Federal government and in the White House; Carter has no such experience and therefore cannot be trusted with the nation's most important job; (The Presidency is no place for on-the-job training.)
- 9) Ford is a common man, who did not seek the Presidency as a prize, who did not make a fortune while in public life, and who does not believe he knows all the answers; Carter spent two years of his life doing nothing but campaigning for the Presidency, is a multimillionaire businessman, and believes he has all the answers (though he won't tell us what they are until after the election).

- 10) If Carter is elected, the nation's moral fiber will be loosened: deserters will be pardoned, abortions will continue unabated, busing will become more widespread, and marijuana will be legalized.
- 11) The country is at peace because Ford has sought military strength and his diplomatic skills; Carter wants to cut the Defense budget and eliminate defense weapons like the B-1 bomber. (Although this is a foreign policy theme, Ford can be expected to weave it into his responses in the first debate, as Nixon did in the first of the '60 debates).

Ford will attempt to support these themes with the following statements and figures:

1. Credibility, Openness and Trust have been restored to the White House.

- (1) When I took over the nation was troubled about its leaders and institutions; the White House had lost some of its credibility with the American people; public confidence in the American system of government was shaken.
- (2) I have changed all that: respect for the Presidency and our government have been restored; any ~~affair~~ *stain of* scandal has been erased from the White House.
- (3) This has occurred because from the start my administration has been open, candid and forthright: I began my term as Vice-President by having my entire public and private life placed under a microscope by Congress; and the Congress then overwhelmingly endorsed my nomination. As President, I have been honest with the American people, telling them the harsh facts as well as the pleasant ones. And I have demanded honesty, decency and personal integrity from everyone in the Executive Branch of government. (Let me add that the Democratic Congress should be expected to do the same.)

2. A clean break was made with the Nixon Administration; therefore the Ford Administration cannot be held accountable for anything done by the Nixon Administration.

- (1) My Administration is different from the previous Administration: I have new advisors, I operate the government differently, and I have new policies. So there is no link between what the previous Administration did and what I am doing.
- (2) I was not involved with Watergate; I knew nothing about the break-in and the cover-up and thus it is not fair to blame me for either of those actions. That is true as well of my advisors.

3. The economy is in full recovery from the depths Ford found when he assumed office.

- (1) I have cut inflation by more than half since assuming office; inflation was rising at 12.2% a year when I took office, and for the first 6 months of this year the rate was only 4.6%.

- (2) Over 3 million people have obtained jobs since I assumed office.
 - (3) The unemployment rate has been cut: shortly after I assumed office unemployment peaked at 8.9%; it is now 7.9% and my advisors say that by the end of the year it will be only slightly above 7%.
 - (4) Key economic indicators are moving strongly upward: in the past year housing starts have risen by 40%, the GNP has risen by 10%, and per capita disposable income has risen by nearly 5%.
4. Affirmative programs to solve the nation's major problems were proposed by Ford, but the Democratic Congress has failed to act on those programs.
- (1) I have been a positive leader, a strong leader, I have proposed solutions that were both affordable and workable to the major problems of the people, but the Democratic Congress has failed to act.
 - (2) --I have called for a permanent tax cut coupled with spending reductions to stimulate the economy and relieve hard-pressed middle income taxpayers - but Congress has failed to act.

--I have called for reasonable, constitutional restrictions on court-ordered busing of school children - but Congress has failed to act.

--I have called for a major overhaul of criminal laws to crack down on crime and illegal drugs - but Congress has failed to act.
 - (3) When Congress has acted, it has done so the wrong way - over the last 10 years the Democratic Congress has cut \$50 billion from the national defense needs. I have reversed that trend; all of my proposed defense budget was accepted last year.
5. Deficit spending and inflation were caused by a free-spending Democratic Congress; Ford resisted the Democratic Congress through his vetoes; Carter has embraced the free-spending practices of the Congress.
- (1) The big spending programs proposed and passed by the Democrats in Congress in my Administration and in previous Administrations have been the cause of the budget deficits and the inflation caused by those deficits.
 - (2) I have done my best to resist the Democrat's big spending by using my veto: I have vetoed 55 extravagant and unnecessary bills and I have made 45 of those vetoes stick. Those vetoes have saved the American taxpayers over \$13 billion, and they have enabled me to get inflation down to its lowest level in years.

- (3) Carter is no different than the big spending Democrats in Congress. He has embraced their programs; their multi-billion dollar mandatory health insurance plan, their Humphrey-Hawkins bill, their public works bills, and their national welfare plans.
6. The Democratic Platform would cost the American public \$100 - \$200 billion; Carter has embraced the Platform and is no different from any other big-spending Democrat.
 - (1) The Democratic Platform calls for more big spending programs; if they were enacted American would be bankrupted. The cost of those programs is between \$100 and \$200 billion - or for every family in America.
 - (2) Carter had a major role in drafting the Democratic Platform and he has stated that it is a Platform upon which he can easily run.
 7. Ford has taken positions on federal issues for 27 years and the American people know where he stands; Carter flip-flops his positions so often we don't know where he stands.
 - (1) I was a member of Congress for 25 years; during that time I had to take a position on every national issue and I did - I voted over 3,000 times on bills and other measures during that period. Those votes were public and people knew where I stood.
 - (2) As President, I have not been able to hide my positions beyond a smile. I have let the American people know what I stand for - I have proposed legislation, I have signed bills, and I have vetoed bills. No one in the audience is uncertain of my positions, even if many of you disagree with some of those positions.
 - (3) Carter's positions are not well-known because they are always changing. He has flip-flopped on abortion, tax reform, Humphrey-Hawkins, national health insurance, grain embargoes and numerous other major issues.
 8. Ford has experience in the federal government and in the White House; Carter has no such experience and therefore cannot be trusted with the nation's most important job; (the presidency is no place for on-the-job training.)
 - (1) I was in Congress for 25 years, I was Vice-President, and I have been President for 2 years. During this time, I have learned how the federal government works. I know how our foreign adversaries think and act; I know how the bureaucracy operates, and I know how to keep the government running.
 - (2) Carter has had no federal government experience; it will take him years to learn how to deal with foreign governments and the federal bureaucracy. The country cannot

afford on-the-job training in its most important job. The country cannot afford two or three years of sputtering leadership.

9. Ford is a common man, who did not seek the presidency as a prize, who did not make a fortune while in public life, and who does not believe he knows all the answers; Carter spent two years of his life doing nothing but campaigning, is a multimillionaire businessman, and believes he has all the answers (though he won't tell us what they are until after the election).

- (1) I come from the ranks of the working people; I am not from a wealthy family; I got where I am by hard work.
- (2) I did not seek the presidency or vice-presidency as prizes to be won; because of unusual circumstances I came to both jobs without seeking them, and that has given me a special feeling for the offices. I am seeking election to the presidency now not because of the power or glamour of the office but because I want to finish a job I've started.
- (3) I am not a wealthy man. At the time of my confirmation hearings for vice-president, my net worth, after 25 years as a Congressman was only . . . Comments were widely made about how little worth I had accumulated. As President, my wealth has not increased very much. I am still not a millionaire, or even close to being one.
- (4) I do not claim to know all the answers to the problems facing the country. I do not claim that I have not made mistakes or that I will not make ones in the future. I only claim that I am always square with the American people; I let them know what I believe and what I plan to do.
- (5) My opponent stands in contrast to all of the above: he has said he is a farmer, but he is really a businessman; he has said he is a man of the people, but he has revealed a net worth of over \$5 million; he has said he is not a politician, but he has spent over two years doing nothing but campaigning for the presidency; and he acts as if he knows all the answers, but he refuses to tell us what his answers are (instead asking us to trust him).

10. If Carter is elected, the nation's moral fiber will be loosened: deserters will be pardoned, abortions will continue unabated, busing will become widespread and marijuana will be legalized.

- (1) I do not believe those who dodged the draft or deserted to Sweden should be welcomed back to society without any penalty; that would happen under Carter's amnesty/pardon program.

- (2) I am not only personally opposed to abortions and the Supreme Court decision but am willing to do something about it: to support a constitutional amendment to allow each state to decide if it wants to allow abortions. Carter says he is personally opposed to abortion but he does not support a constitutional amendment and he signed a law legalizing abortion while governor of Georgia.
- (3) I am opposed to mandatory busing of school children; I do not believe their education - which is the ultimate goal - is improved by forced busing. I have proposed constitutional legislation to limit forced busing. Carter favors busing of school children and will urge courts to order it with increasing frequency.
- (4) I oppose the decriminalization of marijuana; that is one step away from its legalization. Carter favors decriminalization.

11. The country is at peace abroad because Ford has sought military strength and has diplomatic skills; Carter wants to cut the Defense Budget and eliminate defense weapons like the B-1 Bomber.

- (1) When I took office, the Vietnam War was still going on, and tensions were high in the Middle East. Now the war has been ended and the Middle East calmed down; now there is not a single American fighting overseas.
- (2) My record of peace - which can be contrasted with the records of the last several Democratic presidents - has been achieved because of my commitment to a strong national defense and to my diplomatic skills. I have reversed the 10 year record of Democrats in Congress cutting the Defense budget. I made my budget stick, and the American people can now be assured that their security is being protected.
- (3) Carter is like other Democrats: he wants to cut the defense budget by an amount that will weaken our national defense. He wants to eliminate programs necessary for our national defense, like the B-1 Bomber. In brief, he is not committed to keeping the U.S. first in defense.

THEME 3: Gerald Ford's record as a Congressman, as Vice President, and as President indicates that he is capable of neither the strong nor the moral and compassionate leadership the country needs.

I. Congressional Record: 25 years of non-leadership; 25 years of callous voting.

A. Non-Leadership

-- Ford's Congressional career can be divided into 3 distinct periods:

- a. 1949-1964, member of Congress without Minority Leadership role;
- b. 1964-1969 - Minority Leader with Democratic President; and,
- c. 1969-1974, Minority Leader with Republican President

-- In each of these 3 periods, Ford showed that he was a Congressional go-along-to-get-along follower, totally incapable of strong, decisive leadership; (this is reflected in, among other things, the fact that during a 25 year period he was never considered by his party as a possible Presidential candidate; without Richard Nixon's help, Ford would never have risen to his present job.)

1. 1949-1964

- a. During his early years in Congress, Ford did little more than follow the Republican leadership (For instance, during his first decades in Congress, he followed the Republican leadership position on roll-call votes an average of nearly 80%); he spent most of his time working to become a member of the Republican "inner club" (joining, for instance, the Chowder and Marching Club, a Congressional social-political organization founded by Congressman Richard Nixon); he staked out virtually no legislative areas of specialty; and he failed to achieve any significant legislative accomplishments -- it's not possible, for instance, to name a major piece of legislation on which he played a leading role or which he can call his own.
- b. In 1963, Ford was elected to a minor Republican party position (conference chairman), but that was not because of any leadership exhibited during his decade and a half. Rather, some of Ford's colleagues decided to replace the incumbent (Charles Hoever) because of his age (67). Ford was fifth on his friends' list of five possible successors; the other four declined to run, so it was Ford. Charles Goodell, one of the friends, said: "It wasn't as though everyone was wildly enthusiastic about Jerry,"

terHorst, Ford's biographer, "The rebellion, Ford knew, was a symbol and not a personal triumph. Ford, in fact, had not even been an architect of the coup, but only a rally point for it."

2. 1964-1969

- a. In 1965, Ford was elected Republican leader by the same process by which he had been selected conference chairman -- not by leading but by following the ambitions of his friends (such as Melvin Laird, Robert Griffin, and Don Rumsfeld)
- b. When selected as the party's leader, Ford characteristically did not promise new or strong leadership; he pledged himself only to be a "team player." In writing about Ford's "club" qualities, the Washington Post said at the time of the selection: "Ford is lean, well-tailored, respectably conservative, never too far ahead of the country club crowd. He would have done as well at General Motors as he has on Capitol Hill."
- c. In his role as leader during Johnson's Presidency, Ford fulfilled his promise of non-leadership: Professor Peabody of Johns Hopkins, who has undertaken the most thorough study of Ford's performance during the Johnson Presidency, concluded (after interviewing 75 Republican House members): "...members deplored what they conceived to be a basic lack of political instinct and a hesitancy on Ford's part to utilize the full powers of his office." As one Republican leader quoted by Peabody said: "(W)hen it come to implementing a plan which requires a delicate sense of timing, a concern for the intricacies of details, an interweaving of the component parts, Ford is at a loss."
- d. Johnson's characterizations of Ford's ability as Republican leader during this period are too well known to need repeating.

3. 1969-1974

During Nixon's Presidency, Ford -- as Minority Leader -- obviously had some party obligation to follow the lead of Nixon. Ford went beyond that obligation, however; he often blindly followed Nixon's lead, and he tried to get his fellow Republicans to follow the same route (Ford roll-call support of Nixon's positions exceeded 80%; Ford's support on veto override votes was 100%)

- a. That other House Republican leaders and the Senate Republican leader, Hugh Scott, often chose not to blindly follow Nixon's command indicates not only the limits to which party loyalty can be stretched but also the extent to which Ford was a follower

rather than an independent thinker or a leader. (Comparison: Ford was one of Nixon's top 4 roll-call vote supporters in 3 of the 5 Nixon years; in 1973, he was 2nd; Scott was never in the top 5 supporters.)

b. Summaries of Ford's performance:

- (1) Reeves, Ford, Not a Lincoln -- "More careful House Republicans were sometimes outraged watching Ford mouthing little speeches delivered moments before by White House messengers from the offices of Nixon aides Charles Colson and Kenneth Clawson. 'He didn't even bother to read the damn things,' said a colleague. 'If the White House wanted something said, Jerry just jumped up and said it.'"
- (2) terHorst, Ford's former press secretary, Gerald Ford: "It was often difficult, if not impossible, to find measures on which the House Minority Leader dared to buck the White House."

c. Examples of support:

- (1) At White House request, initiated impeachment of Justice Douglas with unsubstantiated (and false) evidence supplied by John Mitchell.
- (2) At White House request, and admittedly without checking the accuracy of the allegations, led effort to kill House Banking Committee investigation of Watergate before 1972 election.
- (3) Defended Nixon's honesty on House floor, knowing that Nixon had lied about the secret bombings of Cambodia in 1970.
- (4) Publicly supported Nixon's nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court.
- (5) Introduced and fought for Nixon's bill to substantially weaken the extension of the Voting Rights Act of '65.
- (6) Supported Nixon's handling of "May Day" war protest in D.C. (subsequently held unconstitutional)
- (7) Supported Nixon's plan to bail out Lockheed with \$250 million federal loan guarantee.
- (8) Supported Nixon's plan to develop an ABM system.

- (9) Supported the "no-knock" and "preventive detention" provisions of Nixon's crime legislation.
- (10) Supported Nixon's invasion of Cambodia
- (11) Supported Nixon's wage and price control program (though such support abandoned 20 years of opposition by Ford to wage and price controls); supported Nixon's new China policy (though such support abandoned 20 years of opposition by Ford to easing relations with China; of such abrupt changes, J. terHorst, wrote: "Ford...found himself scrambling to keep up with the surprise moves by the White House. But each time he managed to put aside objections to such decisions and come to Nixon's defense.")
- (12) Supported Nixon's opposition to the War Powers Act; voted to uphold Nixon's veto
- (13) Supported all of Nixon's bombing operations in North Vietnam and Nixon's mining of Haiphong Harbor, as well as the rest of Nixon's Vietnam policy; terHorst: "Time and again, Ford pulled together the necessary Republican and conservative Southern votes to dilute and defeat the numerous end-the-war measures that dogged Nixon throughout 1972."
- (14) Supported without reservation or qualification Nixon's handling of Watergate.

B. Callous Voting

A 25 year record of moral and social insensitivity.

(1) Civil Rights

- (a) '69 - offered Nixon's substitute for the bill extending the Voting Rights Act of '65;

the substitute would have eliminated the requirement that states clear voting law changes with the Attorney General; substitute adopted by House, rejected by Senate; when House voted on Senate version (which became law), Ford voted to recommit.

- (b) '66-during consideration of '66 Civil Rights Act, which included a provision which became the nation's first open housing, Ford urged and voted for recommitment; stated that open housing might not be constitutional.
- (c) '65-sponsored Republican substitute to Johnson Administration's Voting Rights Act of '65; voted against Administration's bill; voted to recommit the final conference report.
- (d) All of above recommitment votes were followed by affirmative votes on final passage; to civil rights leaders, the recommitment votes indicate Ford's true concern for civil rights.

(2) Minimum Wage Legislation

- (a) Voted 7 times over 25 year period opposing measures proposing increases in the minimum wage.
- (b) Most recent vote--supported Nixon's substitute in '73 for minimum wage legislation which included exemption for youths (the McDonald's amendment); when substitute was defeated, Ford voted against final passage and the conference report of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments; voted to support Nixon's veto.

(3) Crime and Law Enforcement

- (a) Preventive Detention--supported preventive detention provision in '70 D.C. crime code, introduced in 1971 bill to amend Bail Reform Act of 1966 to provide for preventive detention
- (b) No-Knock--supported no-knock provision in '70 D.C. crime code.

(4) Health Care Financing

- (a) Urged and voted for recommitment of Medicare bill in '65; voted against final passage
- (b) Supported Nixon's limited national health Insurance program; opposed any more expansive health insurance program.

(5) Mine Safety and Black Lung

- (a) Voted to recommit conference report on Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of '69.
- (b) Voted against passage of the conference report on Black Lung Benefits of '72.

(6) Poverty -- OEO Legislation

- (a) '71 - Voted against establishment of a comprehensive child development program to provide educational, nutritional and health services free of charge for disadvantaged children; voted against, and led the fight to defeat, the conference report on the '71 Economic Opportunity Amendments, which would extend OEO for 2 additional years and authorize \$5 billion for programs administered by OEO.
- (b) '69 - Voted against OEO authorization bill to extend OEO for 2 years.
- (c) '68 - Voted against \$25 million supplemental appropriation for Head Start'
- (d) '66 - Voted against OEO Amendments and in favor of Republican substitute to distribute OEO programs to other Federal agencies.
- (e) '65 - Voted against OEO appropriations of \$1.9 billion
- (f) '64 - Voted against the establishment of OEO

(7) Food Programs

- (a) '73 - Voted for amendments to prohibit Food stamps to strikers and recipients of SSI assistance

- (b) '70 - Supported amendment to prohibit food stamps to strikers
- (c) '64 - Voted against the establishment of the Food stamp program

(8) Housing

- (a) Consistently voted against all housing legislation designed to assist low and moderate income families between 1949, when he voted for an amendment to delete a section funding low rent public housing, and 1967, when he voted in favor of deleting program funds for model cities.
- (b) '70 - Voted against conference reports on housing bill which contained new town proposals.
- (c) '68 - Voted for Housing and Urban Development bill, even though it contained provisions for interim services, tenant services and new-town programs (which he strongly opposed); said he would oppose any funding for those programs.
- (d) '67 - Voted against \$20 million for rat eradication program.

(9) Right to Work

Voted against repeal of Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley

(10) Internal Security

- (a) '73 - opposed resolution to abolish House Committee on Internal Security
- (b) '69 - supported the withholding of federal financial aid to disruptive students.
- (c) '71 - voted to continue Subversive Activities Control Board maintenance of secret blacklist
- (d) '67 - demanding report by President on the extent of Communist influence in anti-war demonstration at Pentagon
- (e) '67 - criticized President's failure to send federal troops to stop Detroit riots; gave as reason for delay the Congressional rejection of President's rat eradication program.

(f) voted for Internal Security Act of '50, Communist Control Act of '54, and Espionage and Sabotage Act of '54.

(11) Highway Trust Fund - voted in '73 against use of \$700 million of Trust Funds for mass transit projects in urban areas.

(12) National Defense Policy

(a) Weapons - '71 - voted against deletion of funding for development of B-1 Bombers.

'69 - supported actively the development of ABM (the wisdom of which he compared to the development of H-bombs by Truman) opposed its limitation to just two sites

(b) War Powers -- '73 - voted against the War Powers Act to control Presidential commitment of American Forces; supported Nixon's veto

(13) Foreign Policy

(a) Indochina

-- was consistent supporter of U.S. policy in Indochina since Truman Administration

-- supported Nixon's efforts to end Vietnam War on gradual basis; supported all of Nixon's bombing operations in North Vietnam and Nixon's mining of Haiphong

-- opposed during '70 - '73 all legislation aimed at setting cut-off date for U.S. military operations in Vietnam

-- '65 - urged President and Congress to cut back on domestic expenditures in order to meet the growing expense of Vietnam War

(b) Rhodesia - '71 - voted to violate UN sanction and to import chrome from Rhodesia

(14) Environment

(a) '72 - voted against requiring "best available" water pollution control required by 1981.

(b) '71 - voted against deletion of funds for Amchitka nuclear test.

(c) '70 - voted to increase logging in
National Forests

II. Vice Presidential Record

- A. As Vice President, Ford spent nine months endlessly criss-crossing the country defending Nixon's Watergate conduct and attending Republican fundraisers. (During this period, Ford traveled over 100,000 miles through the country, visited 35 states, and made more than 400 public appearances; he appeared at nearly 100 Republican fundraising events.
- B. That nine month period could have been used by Ford to prepare for the Presidency or to encourage Nixon to tell the truth on Watergate; either activity would, to some extent, have demonstrated Ford's leadership qualities in a moral crisis. But Ford undertook neither activity; instead, he refused to organize a transition effort (though a belated one was begun without his knowledge) and he refused to lead public opinion in any direction other than blind support of Richard Nixon.
- C. Examples of his blind support of Nixon:
1. Fully supported Nixon's firing of Cox; "no other choice after Mr. Cox refused to accept the compromise solution"
 2. Agreed with Nixon's very limited definition of an "impeachable offense" (though that definition differed from the expansive one Ford wanted to use against Justice Douglas.)
 3. Accused AFL-CIO and other groups of waging an all-out attack against Nixon (later admitting that Nixon's staff had written that accusation for Ford to deliver)
 4. Stated that Nixon had evidence to exonerate him but that he (Ford) had enough trust in Nixon to make unnecessary a personal look at the evidence.
 5. Stated that Nixon's being named an "unindicted co-conspirator" had not shaken his faith in Nixon's innocence.
 6. Publicly re-affirmed his belief in Nixon's innocence after having been informed of the "smoking gun" tape by Haig.

III. Presidential Record

- A. In two years as President, Ford has failed completely to provide the nation with strong leadership, with a sense that he is in charge and knows where he is leading the nation. He has provided no reason to believe that if given four more years in the White House, he would provide strong leadership.

B. In his two years in office, Ford has also failed to exhibit any concern for the unemployed, the poor, the elderly, the handicapped, the malnourished, the sick, school children, veterans, blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, women, and other groups in our society without memberships at Ford's Burning Tree Country Club; in short, he has evidenced no desire to provide moral and compassionate leadership. There is no reason to believe he would change during the next four years.

C. Lack of Strong Leadership

1. Inability to lead Congress

a. Dependence on Veto

- (1) Ford has been so unable to lead Congress -- to convince Congress of the merits of his proposals -- that he has had to resort to vetoes: 55 vetoes in 2 years. Ten of those vetoes were overridden, a higher percentage than any President in history (Eisenhower was overridden only twice in 8 years)
- (2) Even Nixon, who has operated with a Democratic Congress, did not have to resort to governing simply by veto: in nearly three times as long a tenure, he vetoed only 34 public bills.

b. Record Low Support by Congress

- (1) In 1975, on major Congressional votes where Ford took a position, Ford's position was supported by Congress in only 61% of the votes -- the lowest mark by a second year President since Congressional Quarterly began measuring Presidential support in Congress (In the House, where Ford spent 25 years, his support was only 50.5%)
- (2) In 1974, Ford's support in Congress was only 58.2%. When that figure is combined with the '75 figure of 61%, Ford record the lowest average support level in Congress for any President since Congressional Quarterly began measuring: Ford - 59.6%; Nixon - 67.3%; Johnson - 82.8%; Kennedy - 84.5%; Eisenhower - 72.2%.
- (3) When bills are considered as to which Ford has not only indicated support but has specifically requested (in his legislative messages to Congress), the lack of Ford support in Congress becomes even more glaring
 - (a) In '74, Ford won Congressional approval of only 36% of his specific legislative proposals

(b) In '75, Ford's approval percentage dropped even further -- to only 27%.

(4) To a considerable extent, Ford's low Congressional support and approval percentages are due to the destruction of his credibility with Congress; that has been caused by the numerous times he has sought approval of ill-considered, poorly-developed proposals intended to cure major national problems. Among the more significant of such proposals:

(a) 1974

- (1) imposing a 5% income tax surcharge as part of his WIN (Whip Inflation Now) program
- (2) delaying pay raises for federal workers (also part of WIN)
- (3) allowing the Freedom of Information Act to remain in original form (without the amendments necessary to plug its numerous loopholes) (Ford vetoed the amendments)
- (4) removing all remaining acreage limitations on rice, cotton and peanuts
- (5) immediately deregulating the price of oil and natural gas

(b) 1975

- (1) authorizing \$722 million in military aid and \$250 million in economic aid to South Vietnam in the last weeks of the Thieu regime
- (2) authorizing supplemental appropriations of \$222 million in military and economic aid for Cambodia just before its fall
- (3) seeking authority to provide additional funds for military aid to two of the three factions in Angola
- (4) attempting to solve the nation's energy problems by creating a \$100 billion Energy Independence Authority (whose purpose would theoretically be to encourage commercial development of alternative energy sources)

- (5) proposing \$28 billion spending cut (subsequently endorsed by Ford when he signed tax cut extension bill)
- (6) proposing initially to solve New York City's financial problems by doing nothing more than changing the bankruptcy laws.

(c) 1976

- (1) attempting to bypass the need for a Consumer Protection Agency by placing "consumer representatives" in each of the Cabinet Departments and Executive agencies. Example: Joan Braden at State Department
- (2) proposing to turn over any expansion of uranium enrichment activities to a private industry consortium
- (3) opposing any Watergate Reform Bill which would establish an independent special prosecutor mechanism (this position was changed when it became apparent in July that the Senate would pass such a bill in a few days)
- (4) opposed any effective Toxic Substance Control Act, such as the one passed by the Senate
- (5) proposing no sanction beyond disclosure to corporations making foreign bribes
- (6) proposing that Medicare patients pay substantially more for short-term coverage in order to get the limited benefits of a "catastrophic" health insurance program.

2. Depending totally on Henry Kissinger to determine and implement the nation's foreign policy

- a. Ford has completely turned over half his domain -- foreign policy -- to Henry Kissinger; it is Kissinger who really makes our foreign policy, with Ford merely assenting to it. Never in the nation's history has a Secretary of State so completely determined, to the exclusion of the President, what the foreign policy will be and how it will be implemented; and never before has a foreign policy

been so widely regarded as the Secretary of State's rather than the President's.

b. Ford's total dependence on Kissinger is another key indicator of weak Ford leadership; examples of the complete dependence:

- (1) Immediately before assuming the Presidency, Ford publicly stated that Kissinger would remain as Secretary of State (he made no similar statement about other Cabinet officers); since then Ford has repeatedly stated that Kissinger could remain as Secretary of State for as long as he wants, including any second Ford Administration (he has not said anything like that about any of the other Cabinet officers.
- (2) During the first few months, Ford refused to even consider foreign policy problems; "Take that up with Dr. Kissinger" was Ford's standard line when foreign policy came up in the Oval Office.
- (3) Ford initially refused to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn solely on Kissinger's advise that such a meeting would offend the Soviet Union
- (4) Although he has dropped the word "detente," Ford has avowedly continued to pursue this essentially Kissinger policy.
- (5) As part of the Sunday morning massacre, Ford fired the only Cabinet officer (Schlesinger) who publicly disagreed with Kissinger about the value of detente. Ford also allowed Kissinger to pick his successor as National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who had been Kissinger's long-time deputy; allowing Kissinger to make such a choice ensured that Kissinger's advice on foreign policy would continue to be the only advice Ford would get.
- (6) Ford followed without deviation Kissinger's opposition to the Jackson amendment designed to keep "most favored nation" status from the Soviet Union unless Jewish emigration policies were eased.
- (7) Ford has allowed Kissinger complete freedom in deciding what types and amounts of arms will be sold to Arab nations

- (8) Ford has allowed Kissinger complete freedom to negotiate a Middle East settlement and a SALT II agreement; there is for instance no evidence that Ford has provided any negotiating instructions to Kissinger that differ from Kissinger's previously stated views and statements.
 - (9) Ford vetoed a bill to add the Secretary of Treasury to the National Security Council solely because of Kissinger's opposition to the bill (Kissinger did not want Simon on the Council)
 - (10) Ford has blindly followed Kissinger's recommendations on emergency foreign aid requests
Examples: \$722 million in military aid; \$250 million in economic aid to South Vietnam just before its fall; \$250 million in economic aid to Cambodia just before its fall; and continued funding to support 2 factions in the Angolan civil war.
- c. Perhaps the best indication of the extent to which Ford has surrendered his leadership role in foreign policy is that it seems impossible to name a Ford foreign policy position, let alone achievement, which is not universally recognized to actually be Kissinger's. Even that was not true of Nixon.
3. Failing to take any meaningful action on major national problems
- a. Unemployment -- failed to do anything to bring down record unemployment rates, by either proposing some type of comprehensive program for that purpose or by offering attractive solutions to the numerous emergency employment bills vetoed by him.
 - b. Interest Rates -- failed to take any steps designed to lower record-high interest rates or to make mortgage money available to the average working family
 - c. Housing -- failed to make any attempt to correct the HUD scandals of recent years or to undertake any program to move the housing industry out of its Depression-rate performance; proposed no programs to make housing once again affordable for the average working family
 - d. Health Care -- failed to take any measures to arrest the skyrocketing costs of health care or to ease the burden of those costs (such as through a comprehensive national health insurance program)

- e. Energy -- failed to develop any comprehensive program to conserve the nation's energy supplies, other than through such unacceptable, unaffordable means like an Energy Independence Authority and immediate decontrol of oil and gas prices
- f. Environment -- consistently failed to support environmental needs when confronted with the desires of Big Business, such as by supporting a weakened Clean Air Act or a toothless Toxic Substances Control Act
- g. Nuclear Weapons -- failed to develop any plan to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Third World nations
- h. Government Organization -- failed to develop any program to eliminate wasteful programs, to remove overlapping, or to ensure efficiency in performance
- i. FBI -- failed to take steps to direct Clarence Kelley, or others, to finally determine what illegal actions the FBI has been committing
- j. Amnesty and Pardons -- failed to take any action to solve the problems of the great bulk of Vietnam War resisters or deserters who refused to participate in Ford's ill-conceived clemency program
- k. Welfare Reform -- failed to propose any comprehensive program to solve what he admits is an inadequate and unfair welfare system
- l. Tax Reform -- failed to propose any comprehensive program to decrease the income tax burden of the lower and middle classes
- m. Antitrust Enforcement -- failed to allow the Anti-trust Division to file major suits to enforce existing antitrust laws and failed to support changes in those laws to ease their enforcement
- n. Busing -- failed to do anything about the problems and concerns raised by busing other than to repeatedly attack the concept of busing and to propose unworkable and publicly unconstitutional legislation to limit busing to a 5 year period.
- o. Conflict-of-Interest -- failed to take any meaningful steps to ensure that appointees divest themselves of conflicts-of-interest or that departing appointees do not practice law or lobby before their former departments or agencies

- p. Elderly -- failed to take any actions to ease the problems of the elderly. Failed to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, failed to support the Community Services Employment for Older Americans Act, failed to increase subsidized housing, failed in Social Security, failed to exempt elderly from his restrictive Food Stamp eligibility rules, and failed to control the soaring cost of Medicare -- in short, failed to do anything
- q. Education -- failed to show any concern for the nation's education needs by either vetoing major appropriations bills, or attempting to impound appropriated funds.
- r. Agriculture -- failed to take necessary steps to ensure the price security needed by farmers through his vetoes of several price support bills and his grain embargoes
- s. Postal Service -- failed to take any steps to change the Postal Service's pathetic, conflict-of-interest-scarred management, to improve the Service's delivery system, or to keep mailing costs at affordable prices
- t. Voter Registration -- failed to take any measures to improve the abysmally low national rate of voter registration, such as by supporting universal (post-card) voter registration
- u. Federal Employees -- failed to take any steps to ensure that federal employees are treated with the respect they deserve, evidenced by his seeking to defer pay increases one year, lowering cost-of-living increases another year, and vetoing a bill to remove Hatch Act restrictions
- v. Transportation -- failed to develop any coordinated national transportation policy or to take steps to cure the nation's severe railroad problems
- w. Defense -- failed to even question the billions of dollars of arms sales to the Arab nations, the need for new, expensive weapons systems such as the B-1 bomber, the ABM system, the cruise missile system, or the enormous cost-overruns for so many weapons projects
- x. Foreign Affairs -- failed to do anything without Henry Kissinger (see section 2 above)

4. Accomplishing So Little Over a Two Year Period

a. As a result of Ford's having proposed so many ill-considered programs (which Congress was forced to ignore) and having failed to do anything at all about so many national problems, it is not surprising that two years of Ford's weak leadership have produced so few accomplishments; and it is not surprising that public polls indicate that so few Americans can name any accomplishments of Gerald Ford.

b. A look at what Ford has claimed are his ten major accomplishments (in The Ford Presidency, recently published by the White House) shows exactly how little has in fact been accomplished:

(1) Ford Claim: "Inflation has been cut by more than half" (evidence cited: consumer price index was rising at 12.2% a year when Ford took office; during first 6 months of '76, inflation rate was 4.6%)

FACTS:

(a) While it is true the current inflation rate is 6%, that is still a higher rate than at any time between the Korean War and Nixon's inauguration. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, inflation was only 2.2%.

(b) During 1974, when Ford was Vice President and then beginning in August President, the inflation rate was 12.2%. As Vice President Ford supported all of Nixon's economic policies

(c) During the Nixon-Ford Administration, inflation has averaged almost 7%, an average exceeding the highest rate of inflation for any year under any other Administration since WWII. (From 1969-1974, Ford was Republican leader in the House and fully supported all of Nixon's economic policies)

(d) Ford is essentially asking to be commended for having supported and implemented policies that gave the nation the highest inflation rate in 50 years and then reducing that rate to the highest in 20 years.

- (2) Ford Claim: "Over 3 million people have obtained jobs" (evidence cited: last year total employment was 84.3 million; now 87.7 million are employed)

FACTS:

- (a) The fact that 3 million have obtained jobs ignores the fact that 7.4 million are unemployed, a level exceeded on an annual basis only once since the 1930's -- by the 7.8 million unemployed during 1975.
- (b) When Ford took office, 5 million were unemployed -- 2.4 million below the current number.
- (3) Ford Claim: "The unemployment rate has been significantly cut" (evidence cited: in early 1975, unemployment peaked at 8.9%; today the rate is 7.5%, and the President's economic advisers predict the rate will go below 7% before the end of '76).

FACTS:

- (a) The fact that the unemployment rate has been cut ignores the fact that the unemployment rate, which is actually 7.8%, is at an annual level exceeded only once since the 1930's -- by the 8.5% rate for 1975. The unemployment rate for blacks is 13%; for teenagers 18%; for black teenagers 34%; construction workers 17% (Note: each additional point in unemployment costs the government \$17 billion -- \$12 billion in lost tax revenues and \$5 billion in legally mandated food stamps, unemployment insurance and other support programs)
- (b) When unemployment "peaked at 8.9%," it was in Ford's Administration and as a direct result of his "WIN" and tight money policies; when Ford took office the unemployment rate was 5.5% -- in ten months Ford allowed unemployment to climb from 5 million to more than 8.2 million -- a more than 60% increase
- (4) Ford Claim: "Key economic indicators are moving strongly upward" (evidence cited: in the past year, housing starts have risen by 40%, the GNP has risen by 10%, and per capita disposable income has risen by nearly 5%.)

FACTS:

Economic indicators are moving upward from recession-like levels; Ford is seeking credit for getting the country out of a recession that his tight money, high unemployment policies created.

- (a) Housing - In 1975, Ford's only full year in the White House, housing production was only 1.1 million units, the lowest in 20 years; apartment production was 268,000 units, the lowest since the Depression; home mortgage interest rates were 9-10%; and the average cost for a new single family house rose to \$45,000 -- a price beyond the capacity of 70% of American families.
- (b) GNP -- The relevant statistic is not GNP but real GNP, which accounts for inflation. in 1975, real GNP decreased by 1.8%; and in fact during the entire Nixon-Ford Administration, real GNP has grown only about 11%. (By contrast, during the Kennedy-Johnson years, real GNP increased by 45.9% -- a more than 300% improvement over the Nixon-Ford years. Throughout the Nixon-Ford years, real GNP has averaged only a 1.6% annual growth (and actually decreased in three years -- 1970, 1974, and 1975); during the Kennedy-Johnson years, the annual growth average was 4.5%.
- (c) Real Disposable Income Per Capita -- Throughout the Nixon-Ford Administration, real disposable income per capita has increased much more slowly than in the Kennedy-Johnson Administration; Nixon-Ford (1969-76) - 19.6%; Kennedy-Johnson - 28.4%. In two of the Ford Years, the nation had the lowest rate of increase in real disposable income per capita since the Depression: in 1974, there was a decrease of 2.3%; in 1975, the increase was only 1%. Of more significance, though, is the fact that the real average weekly earnings (which, unlike real disposable per capita income, includes only salary and wages and is therefore a better indicator of how the average working person is faring) has decreased during the Nixon-Ford years. In real terms, the average weekly earnings in 1968 was \$103.39; it is now, eight years later, only \$102.94.

- (5) Ford Claim: "Farmers are scaling new heights." (evidence cited: net farm income in 1976 reached \$26 billion, a record; farm exports in 1976 reached \$22 billion, a record)

FACTS:

- (a) Net farm income is only projected to reach \$26 billion this year, and even if it does that will be far from a record -- in 1973, net farm income was \$33 billion.
- (b) More importantly, "net farm income" is not the relevant measure of farmers' income; "real farm income," which accounts for inflation, is the relevant measure and that has been disastrous in the Ford Administration. For 1975, real farm income was \$16.8 billion and for 1976 it is projected at \$17.7 billion. By comparison, it was \$27.7 billion the year before Ford took office (1973) and \$22.6 billion in the year in which Ford assumed office (1974). That record does not indicate "new heights" for farms.
- (6) Ford Claim: "The growth of crime has been cut by more than 75%" (evidence cited: when Ford took office, crime was increasing at an 18% annual rate; in 1975, the rate of increase was 9%; in the first quarter of 1976, the rate of increase was 4%.)

FACTS:

- (a) That the annual growth in the crime rate has decreased ignores several major considerations:
- (1) the amount of crime is still enormous: in '74, there were 2.16 million serious crimes; in '75, there were 2.29 million serious crimes; and those figures included only reported crimes (which government studies show account for about one-half of all committed crimes).
- (2) During the Nixon-Ford Administration, counting only the reported crime, the rate of increase (through '75) for all serious crimes was 45%; for robberies 58%; for aggravated assaults, 48%. As Congressman and

Vice President, Ford supported all of Nixon's "law and order" policies, which were supposed to reduce crime, not just the rate by which crime increases.

- (3) Among the "law and order" policies Ford supported was the creation of LEAA, which was intended to provide funds to state and local communities in order to reduce crime. Through 1975, \$4.5 billion has been spent; there has been a 45% increase in reported serious crimes, and LEAA is now saying its mission is not to reduce crime but to reform the criminal justice system.
- (b) Leaving aside statistics about the crime rate, it is clear that the Nixon-Ford policies have done nothing to arrest the fear of crime: one half of Americans are still afraid of being the victim of a crime while walking in their neighborhoods, and one-quarter of Americans are still afraid of being the victim of a crime while sitting in their homes.
- (7) Ford Claim: "Dangerous downward trends in defense spending have been reversed" (evidence cited: in the decade before Ford took office, Congress cut proposed defense budgets by almost \$50 billion; in '76, Ford reversed that trend by persuading Congress to vote the first major increase in defense spending.)

FACTS:

- (a) Ford stated in the primaries that the U.S. military posture was No. 1 in the world; if that is true, it is difficult to see how the country has been hurt by saving \$50 billion.
- (b) The clear implication of Ford's statement is that defense spending can be directly equated with national defense posture, and it cannot. What is more important than the amount being spent is the efficiency with which it is being spent. Ford understandably makes no claim as to increased efficiency in the Defense Department.

- (8) Ford Claim: "Our alliances with the Atlantic Community and Japan have never been stronger" (evidence cited: When Ford took office, there was uncertainty in the international community over the constancy of American will and leadership, today the industrialized democracies are cooperating in many areas)

FACTS:

- (a) To the extent that there was foreign uncertainty over this country's will, Ford was a prime contributor; as Congressman and Vice President, he provided Nixon with the public support necessary to prolong Watergate into a two-year affair.
- (b) Our relations with the Atlantic Community are hardly at a peak; the Italians are resentful of the CIA's interference in their recent -- as well as past -- national elections; the Dutch are upset about the Lockheed bribes of Prince Bernard; the French and British are angry about the manner in which the question of Concorde landing rights has been handled; and the Canadians are increasingly upset with our unwillingness to recognize their desire for economic independence.
- (c) Since World War II, our relations with Japan have never been weaker. There is great resentment and embarrassment in Japan over Lockheed's bribing of Japanese officials. But more importantly, there is intense bitterness toward Ford's refusal for so long to provide the Japanese Parliament with the information requested about the Lockheed bribes.
- (9) Ford Claim: "The Nation is at peace abroad for the first time in over a decade" (evidence cited: when Ford took office, the Vietnam War was still going on and tensions were high in the Middle East; now not a single American is fighting overseas)

FACTS:

- (a) It was despite Ford's policies, not because of them, that the U.S. has ended its involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia and not become involved in other wars.
- (1) Ford consistently supported Nixon's Vietnam War policies as Congressman

and Vice President, and he sought \$722 million in emergency military aid and \$250 million in emergency economic aid for Vietnam in 1973 in order to keep the Thieu government going.

- (2) Ford sought \$250 million in emergency aid to Cambodia in 1975 in order to keep the Nol government going.
- (3) Ford was covertly funding in 1975 two of the factions in the Angolan Civil War, and he fought congressional efforts to stop that funding.

(b) If tensions have been eased in the Middle East during the past two years, the people living there have not noticed it. No permanent settlement of the Middle East situation seems near, the Arab nations are buying arms at record rates, Lebanon is rocked by a civil war of unbelievable dimensions, PLC terrorism continues unabated, and Israel is still forced to spend an extraordinarily high percentage of its funds on defense.

(c) If there are no Americans fighting overseas, how did two American soldiers get killed in Korea while chopping down a tree?

- (10) Ford Claim: "The nation is at peace with itself" (evidence cited: when Ford took office, the Nation was rocked by scandal and inner doubts about its leaders and institutions, "today the strain of scandal has been erased from the White House, doubts have been replaced by growing national confidence, and the mood of the country has brightened perceptibly.")

FACTS:

(a) Again, Ford cannot entirely escape blame for creating the "scandal and inner doubts" that led to Nixon's resignation. As a Congressman and Vice President, Ford fully supported and defended Nixon's handling of Watergate.

(b) More importantly, the White House's reading of the country's present mood shows

how isolated Ford has become in just two years. Public opinion polls show that the country's mood is still one of serious doubt about the country's future and the ability of the government to solve major economic and social problems. In addition, the White House's reading of the country's mood has little basis for credibility, as Governor Reagan readily discovered.

D. Lack of Moral and Compassionate Leadership

1. The callousness of Ford's 25 year Congressional voting record presaged his Presidency, for he has continued during the last two years to ignore the needs of the poor, the elderly, the disabled, the unemployed and others looking to the federal government to help with the nation's social and economic problems.
2. When Ford assumed the Presidency he told those concerned about his callous voting record to ignore it, for it really just represented Grand Rapids. The last two years have shown that his voting record really represented him, and that he is just not capable of moral or compassionate leadership. Examples:

a. Jobs for the Unemployed

- (1) Vetoed Public Works Employment Act of 1976 (overridden) (authorized \$3.95 billion in public works projects; 325,000 new jobs)
- (2) Vetoed Public Works Employment Act of 1975 (authorized \$6.3 billion in public works projects; 600,000 - 800,000 new jobs)
- (3) Vetoed Employment Appropriation Act of 1975 (\$5.3 billion for emergency jobs; 1 million new part and full-time jobs; 840,000 summer jobs)
- (4) Consistently opposed any program to reduce the level of unemployment to even a 4% level (Example: FY'76 - proposed to spend no more than \$1.3 billion on job creation)

b. Health Care

- (1) Vetoed Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of '75, which extended the health revenue sharing program, community mental health centers, National Health Service Corps program, and assistance for nurses' training (overridden)

- (2) Vetoed FY'76 appropriations of \$45 billion for HEW and Labor Departments; part of the reason for the veto -- appropriations for health programs exceeded Ford's request by \$1 billion (overridden)
- (3) Opposed any type of comprehensive national health insurance program
- (4) Sought to rescind 22 appropriations in FY'75, in health-related areas (totalling \$1.126 billion); Congress refused to approve any of these proposed recessions; sought to rescind 7 appropriations in FY'76 in health areas (totalling \$264 million); only one approved by Congress.

c. Education

- (1) Vetoed \$7.9 billion FY'76 appropriations for various educational programs including elementary, secondary, and higher education aid, National Institute for Education, and Impact Aid program; vetoed because amount exceeded Ford's recommendation of \$1.5 billion (overridden)
- (2) Vetoed Veterans Educational Benefit Act, which increased basic educational benefits for post-Korean and Vietnam War veterans by 22.7%; and increased on-the-job training funds and vocational aid for disabled veterans (overridden)
- (3) Proposed in FY'75 to rescind \$370 million and defer \$195 million in education funds (Congress rejected)

d. Elderly

- (1) Proposed in FY'75 a reduction to 5% in the guaranteed cost of living increase in Social Security benefits (8% enacted)
- (2) Continued a moratorium on construction of Sec. 236 subsidized housing programs for the elderly
- (3) Repeatedly failed to request any funds for Community Services Employment for Older Americans Act (though Congress has appropriated funds)
- (4) Sponsored legislation to increase by approximately 1/3 the cost of food stamps, which would have meant acquiring about 95% of food stamp recipients to pay 30% of their net monthly income for food stamps (20% of food stamps

recipients are over 60)

- (5) Proposed in FY'76 reductions in the Older Americans Act that would have been the sharpest reduction in history of the Act
- (6) Proposed financing "catastrophic" national health insurance for the elderly by substantially increasing short-term hospitalization charges
- (7) Vetoed bill to provide \$285 million to Railroad Retirement Fund in order to ensure its solvency (overridden)

e. Consumers

- (1) Opposed establishment of a Consumer Protection Agency
- (2) Opposed parens patriae antitrust bill (which would allow State Attorneys General to represent consumers injured by antitrust violations)
- (3) Supported immediate de-control of natural gas and oil prices
- (4) Vetoed the Freedom of Information Act Amendments

f. Civil Liberties

- (1) Failed to take any action against the FBI, CIA, or other intelligence agencies proven to in the Congressional investigations to have illegally violated the constitutional rights of Americans.
- (2) Supported (until the current campaign) enactment of S.1, the Criminal Codification Code that contains so many provisions designed to restrict basic civil liberties.
- (3) Proposed a foreign intelligence wiretapping bill that would allow American citizens to be tapped without "probable cause" of a crime
- (4) Refused to take any actions to pressure our foreign allies to stop the atrocities committed against political prisoners, as well as American citizens convicted of drug offenses.

g. Civil Rights

- (1) Opposed all federal efforts toward increasing the desegregation of the nation's public schools; recently released Report of U.S. Civil Rights Commission concluded that Ford's repeated anti-busing remarks and support of anti-busing legislation "undermine the desegregation process in communities across the country."
- (2) Proposed legislation which would permit busing of school children in any school district for no more than 5 years, regardless of how segregated a school district would become after busing ended.
- (3) Supported the practice of private schools of maintaining segregated student bodies (the Supreme Court subsequently held such a practice unconstitutional)

h. Environmental Needs

- (1) Twice vetoed a bill that would establish federal environmental standards for all strip mining activities
- (2) Supported the extension of EPA auto emission standards to 1982 (instead of 1977)
- (3) Supported amendments to substantially weaken the air pollution standards imposed by the Clean Air Act
- (4) Opposed any effective toxic substance control bill (such as the tough '76 Senate-passed bill)
- (5) Opposed legislation requiring mandatory fuel efficiency standards for new automobiles; opposed legislation taxing energy-inefficient automobiles
- (6) For two years, opposed any additions to the National Park System and the National Wildlife Refuge System, and changed only with the beginning of the general election campaign; agreed to give 1.5 million acres of Wildlife Refuge System to Bureau of Land Management (which is largely dominated by mining interests) (Congress overturned)
- (7) Vetoed bill to make certain that rights-of-ways in National Wildlife Refuge System are most protective of environmental needs.

THEME 2: DESPITE THE CLAIMS OF GERALD FORD, THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT HE HAS NOT RESTORED CREDIBILITY, INTEGRITY, OR OPENNESS TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

A. Failure to restore credibility: Ford has repeatedly misled the American people about his positions on key issues.

1. Pardon of Nixon

- a) At his confirmation hearings, Ford stated that he did not think the public would stand for a pardon of Nixon; at a subsequent press conference, he said that any decision on a pardon would have to await completion of the judicial process.
- b) In granting a pardon to Nixon, only a month after assuming office Ford said that his previous statements had been given too freely and fast and had been given merely to hypothetical questions.

2. Pardon of other Watergate Defendants

- a) After the Nixon pardon, Ford's acting press secretary said that Ford had authorized him to say that pardons for all of the other Watergate defendants were under consideration.
- b) When the public outrage at that statement became apparent, Ford sent word that there had been a "misunderstanding," and pardons were not under consideration. It has since become clear that Ford was considering pardons.

3. Presidential Candidacy

- a) At his confirmation hearings, Ford repeated his earlier

statements that he could foresee no circumstances under which he would run for President or Vice-President in 1976.

b) When he announced his candidacy in July of '75, Ford made no mention of his previous statements.

4. Financial Assistance to New York City

a) Ford repeatedly stated from May '75 through mid-November '75 that he opposed and ^{will} veto any bill designed to prevent a default by New York City.

b) When Ford asked Congress to approve Federal loans to NYC (Nov. 26), he confirmed that he had always intended to seek such assistance but first wanted to force New York State and New York City to increase taxes and layoff employees.

5. Tax Cut Extension - 1975

a) In October '75, Ford stated that he would support a tax cut extension only if: 1) the amount of the cut was \$28 billion in spending and 2) there was a corresponding spending cut of \$28 billion; he said any other type of cut would be vetoed

b) Ford agreed to and signed a tax cut extension of only \$8 billion for the first 6 months of '76, with no corresponding reductions in spending.

6. Common Situs Picketing

a) Throughout 1975, the Ford Administration strongly supported and helped to draft a common situs picketing bill. Ford assured Labor Secretary Dunlop and major labor leaders that he would sign the bill.

b) Ford vetoed the bill, stating that it had failed to gain the support of all parties to the common situs problem. Ford failed to mention that Reagan was urging a veto.

7. Anti-trust Bill (Parens Patriae)

- a) Throughout '75, the Ford administration testified for and helped to develop an antitrust bill that would allow a State Attorney General to sue on behalf of consumers in his state for antitrust violations (parens patriae).
- b) Ford informed the Congress in March '76 that he did not support parens patriae and would veto such a bill. He said he had not been aware of the bill until March of '76. He did not state that the Business Roundtable, and many of his key fundraisers, had personally spoken to him about their opposition to the bill.

8. Meeting with Alexander Solzhenitsyn

- a) When Solzhenitsyn visited U.S. in mid-1975, the Ford White House said Ford did not have time to meet with Solzhenitsyn. The Ford White House subsequently admitted that the real reason for the refusal to meet Solzhenitsyn was Kissinger's belief that the Soviet Union would be offended by a meeting.
- b) Because of American public opinion, Ford was forced to invite Solzhenitsyn and to admit that he did have time for such a meeting. (Solzhenitsyn declined the belated invitation).

9. Panama Canal

- a) While campaigning in the Texas Primary, Ford said U.S. would never give us its defense or operational rights to the Canal; the purpose of the statement was to counter Reagan's charges.
- b) Ford subsequently admitted that he had previously instructed Ambassador Bunker to negotiate a treaty that would surrender,

over a fixed period of time, both operational and defense rights.

10. Criminal Codification Code - S.1

- a) In his Crime Message of 1975, Ford urged Congress to pass the Criminal Codification Code (S.1) with relatively minor amendments. For most of the 94th Congress, Ford's Justice Department has been pushing for passage of S.1.
- b) Because of the intense opposition that has emerged to S.1, Ford has recently ignored his earlier position and stated in his campaign literature that he opposes enactment of S.1.

11. Replacement of Moynihan as Ambassador to UN

- a) Ford repeatedly stated publicly that he fully supported Moynihan's actions as U.N. Ambassador and did not want him to leave that position.
- b) At the same time, Ford, along with Kissinger, privately claimed that Moynihan's strident defense of Israel was harmful to American diplomacy and did not have Administration support. Because of these private statements, made to such persons as James Reston, Moynihan felt he had no alternative but resignation.

B. Failure to restore integrity: In trying to secure and maintain political support, Ford has abandoned the public interest and concentrated instead on the pursuit of Republican voters, Republican delegates and Republican campaign contributors.

- 1. Appointments made immediately prior to certain primaries or as a result of promises made during those primaries: (While directing the Ford campaign, Callaway admitted publicly that the Ford campaign organization recommended individuals for

federal appointments based on their political helpfulness to Ford).

(SPECIAL NOTE: While no appointments were actually made, on two separate occasions Ford offered Cabinet positions to Reagan, who believed the offers were clearly designed to keep him from seeking the nomination).

a) New Hampshire

Warren Rudman, N.H. Attorney General to be ICC Chairman (Ford supporter in N.H. primary; appointment announced before N.H. primary) (withdrawn because Senate Commerce Committee refused to hold hearings due to Rudman's obvious lack of qualifications).

b) Florida

Jerry Thomas, a former director of Florida Conservative Union who supported Ford in the Florida primary (the promise of such an appointment was known publicly prior to Florida primary)

c) North Carolina

-Barbara Simpson, North Carolina Public Utilities Commissioner, to Federal Power Commissioner (appointment announced before primary)

-James Scarce - to be Director of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

-James Holshouser, Governor of North Carolina and head of Ford's committee, to "be considered for high office in next Administration" (Ford statement)

d) Texas

- Kay Bailey, Republican state legislator, to National

Transportation Safety Board (Ford supporter in Texas primary; appointment announced before primary)

-Ross Sterling, law partner of John Connally, to U.S. District Judge (Ford announced appointment before Texas primary; said the fact that Sterling was Connally's law partner was "pure happenstance.")

e) Illinois

-C. Austin Montgomery, Illinois credit union lobbyist, to be Administrator of the National Credit Union (Ford fired the incumbent administrator, Herman Nickerson, to make room for Montgomery).

-Calvin Collier, son of former Illinois Republican Congressman, to be Chairman of FTC (Ford supporter; Ford announced the appointment to Illinois audiences while campaigning in that primary)

f) Indiana

-Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture from Indiana, to Chairman of new Cabinet level Agricultural Policy Committee (to develop nation's food policy). (Ford announced appointment while campaigning in Indiana primary)

2. Announcement of grants or other promises made prior to certain primaries: (Of Ford's propensity to distribute favors prior to primaries, Reagan said the band should play upon Ford's arrival "Santa Claus is Coming to Town" rather than "Hail to the Chief.")

a) New Hampshire

Promised to keep open the Portsmouth Navy Yard

b) Florida

- Promised \$15 million mass transit grant for Miami, \$33 million defense contract for Orlnado company, veterans hospital for St. Petersburg.
- = Announced that U.S. Travel Service had "instrumental" role in getting International Chamber of Commerce to schedule its '78 convention in Orlando.
- Promised to seek funds for completion of Interstate 75 across southwestern Florida.
- Promised "excellent consideration" for Florida as site for Federal solar energy research center.

c) North Carolina

Promised to prevent building of dam on the New River.

3. Favors granted to gain uncommitted delegates:

- 1) Richard Rosenbaum, New York Republican chairman, sought for months to obtain additional federal aid for New York and other uncommitted Norhteastern states. He now claims Ford has agreed to give additional aid to mass transit in Buffalo and to keep open part of the Griffis Air Force Base in Utica-Rome.
- 2) Edwin Schwenk, Suffolk County Republican leader, switched to Ford after Ford personally agreed to review the fiscal problems of the southwest Suffolk Sewer District.

4. Reversals of Policy to Meet Reagan Challenge: Ford was shameless in reversing long-held positions to counter attacks from Reagan.

- a) Panama Canal - Ford stated in Texas primary, to counter the effectiveness of Reagan's charges, that he would never allow U.S. to give up defense or operational rights to

Panama Canal; he subsequently had to admit that for over a year he has instructed Ambassador Bunker to negotiate a treaty that would eventually end U.S. control of Panama Canal.

- b) Common Situs Picketing - Throughout most of 1975, Ford had assured Labor Secretary Dunlop and labor leaders that he would sign the common situs picketing bill; when Reagan began attacking the bill and saying he would veto it, Ford reversed his position and vetoed it in December, 1975.
- c) Detente without the word - Since Ford became President, he often praised, and pledged a continuation of, the Nixon-Kissinger detente policy. When Reagan began continuously criticizing the policy early this year, Ford stopped his frequent praise of the policy and announced, in March, that while the policy would continue he would no longer use the word "detente."
- d) Cuban Policy - Early in his Administration, Ford had U.S. vote to lift OAS sanctions against Cuba and ordered the lifting of U.S. trading sanctions against Cuba. In the Florida primary, when Reagan began attacking Ford's softness on Cuba, Ford reversed course and declared Castro an "international outlaw"; he also said the Pentagon was reviewing contingency plans for military action against Cuba.
- e) African Policy - Ford agreed to Kissinger's trip to Africa in spring of '76 and cleared the texts of Kissinger's remarks. Those texts supported "self-determination" in Rhodesia and South Africa (which is to say eventual black

majority rule). When news of Kissinger's delivering those texts reached Texas in the middle of the primary campaign, and were criticized by Reagan, Ford acted as if he had never heard of Kissinger or Africa. Although Ford did not directly disavow Kissinger's statements, he did not endorse them; he did not publicly meet with Kissinger upon his return; and he did nothing to implement the policy enunciated by Kissinger.

- f) Dropping of Nelson Rockefeller as Running Mate - Until Reagan entered the race, Ford had nothing but praise for Rockefeller; and he indicated in August, 1975 that he would not want to break up the Ford-Rockefeller team in '76. However, as Reagan's strength became apparent and Rockefeller's liberal reputation became a liability, Ford allowed Callaway and Rumsfeld to make public and private statements about Rockefeller's political harm to Ford. When Rockefeller took the hint and withdrew, Ford did not use a word trying to change Rockefeller's mind.

5. Delay in Appointing Commissioners to Reconstituted FEC

- a) When the bill amending the Federal Election Law, and reconstituting the FEC, was passed by Congress on May 4, '76, Ford delayed its implementation - and thereby the return of matching funds to Presidential candidates - beyond any reasonable period. He waited one week to sign the new law and two weeks to appoint the new commissioners (though all but the chairmen were re-appointees).

- b) The obvious purpose of such a delay was to prevent Reagan, who at that point was far more cash-starved than Ford,

from competing effectively in the important May primaries, and to some extent the June primaries (most of the money for which had to be committed in early and mid-May).

6. Use of Government Resources to Help Ford's Campaign (and to escape from having Ford's campaign committee exceed permissible spending limits)

-- Ford has repeatedly shown an insensitivity to the spirit and letter of the Federal campaign finance laws by using government resources to enhance his campaign; this insensitivity transcends any normal difficulty of separating an officeholder's resources and functions from those of a candidate, and it is particularly incongruous in light of Ford's claim of integrity.

Examples:

- a) Placing of Rogers Morton on White House payroll, solely to serve as liaison with Ford's campaign committee.
- b) Allowing Richard Cherey, White House Chief of Staff, to assume clearly political tasks, such as trying to convince uncommitted delegates to support Ford or working on campaign strategy for Ford. This has been done while Cherey has been on the White House payroll and while his expenses have been paid by the government.
- c) Use of White House staff to prepare position papers for Ford's campaign committee
- d) Use of the resources of the traditionally non-political State Department.
 - 1) ~~Trips by Kissinger throughout the country defending Ford's foreign policy and attacking Reagan's foreign~~

policy; Kissinger has refused to admit the trips are political and they have thus been paid for by State Department; Reagan's general counsel to FEC: "If an incumbent is to be able to use individuals like Dr. Kissinger, paid for by the public, for campaign purposes, while these individual expenses are not charged against the incumbent's campaign limits, then the limitations in the law are a mere mockery."

- 2) Use of State Department staff to prepare rebuttal to Reagan's statement criticizing Ford foreign policy.
- 3) Use of Cabinet officials without proper allocation of costs to Ford's campaign committee:

- 1) Simon

- a) trip to Raleigh - January 20, 1976; Chamber of Commerce speech; Ford campaign speech; cost to taxpayers: \$2,310; to Ford: \$17.49.
- b) trips through Mississippi and Florida in February; two interviews praising Ford, two campaign dinners; two other campaign functions; cost to taxpayers: \$5,352.36; to Ford: \$243.43.
- c) Trips through Alabama and Texas in February; addresses at two Ford functions; cost to taxpayers: \$7,023; cost to Ford: \$201.16.

- 2) Richardson

- a) May 11 appearance in LA for oil industry meeting and two Ford meetings; cost to taxpayers: \$1,162.25; cost to Ford: \$57.
- b) ~~May 13 appearance in Detroit to rebut Reagan~~ charges at Economic Club: no cost to Ford because

Richardson happened to be in Detroit between planes.

- f) Daily Distribution of President Ford's Official News Summary, prepared by more than 20 government employees, to Ford's campaign committee
- g) Recent doubling of size of staff of White House Office of Communciations, whose task is, among other things, to distribute information about Ford Administration achievements
- h) Recent printing at government expense of 100 page book praising the accomplishments of Ford's two years in office.
- i) Distribution of brochures printed at government expense in mailings of Ford's campaign committee; example:
"The President's House," which describes, in part, Ford's record and family.
- j) Providing favors or other entertainment to uncommitted delegates while charging the cost for such to the government (A charge to this effect has been made by an FEC attorney to the Attorney General). Examples:
 - a) Invitations to White House State dinner for Queen Elizabeth
 - b) Invitations to view Operation Sail from the USS Forrestal

Failure to Restore Openness

Despite his repeated assertions, Ford has not brought openness to the Federal government; to the contrary, his actions have repeatedly been designed to limit the flow of information to the public.

1. Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments

- a) Ford vetoed the 1974 FOI Amendments, which were designed to plug the loopholes in the FOI Act and to thereby

increase public access to government information. Ford stated that the Amendments would make public U.S. Military, diplomatic or intelligence secrets.

- b) The veto was overridden and the Amendments became effective in 1975. Since then Ford has not indicated any military, diplomatic or intelligence secrets which have been made public.

2. Failure to Support Financial Disclosure for Executive Branch

- a) Ford has repeatedly refused the request of Common Cause to sign an Executive Order requiring major Federal officials to make an annual financial disclosure.
- b) Ford has introduced a financial disclosure bill as part of his Watergate Reform Act package. However, his lobbyists are now trying to keep the House of Representatives from acting on the bill.

3. Unwarranted Use of Executive Privilege

- a) For five months in 1975, Ford refused to allow Commerce Department to disclose to Congress copies of reports made by American business firms on the impact of the Arab boycott against companies dealing with Israel or controlled by Jewish interests. No reason beyond the arbitrary power of the Commerce Department to keep the reports secret -- in essence, executive privilege -- was ever given. Only after Commerce Secretary Morton was cited for contempt by a House Subcommittee did Ford relent and provide copies of the reports.
- b) In Fall of 1975, Ford ordered Kissinger to ignore subpoenas issues by the House Intelligence Committee for certain NSC

and State Department documents concerning covert operations and Soviet compliance with SALT. The express basis for Ford's order was executive privilege. Only after Kissinger was cited for contempt by the Committee did Ford relent and allow Kissinger to supply enough information to satisfy the needs of the Committee.

- c) In June '76, Ford invoked "executive privilege" on behalf of AT & T, so that AT & T would not have to honor a House Subcommittee subpoena seeking records of wiretap requests. That is the first time "executive privilege" has ever been used to shield non-governmental officials or bodies from Congressional disclosure of information. The matter is now being litigated.

4. Negotiation of Pardon and Watergate Tapes Agreement in Complete Secret

- a) Ford pardoned Nixon and agreed to surrender the Watergate tapes to Nixon after secret negotiations between Nixon's and Ford's staffs.
- b) Ford failed in both negotiations to consult with the Special Prosecutor's Office, Congressional leaders, or to let the public know in advance that he was considering such actions.

5. Suppression of information developed by Congressional Intelligence Committees

- a) Ford sought in 1975 to prevent the Senate Intelligence Committee (Church) from making public its report detailing CIA involvement in assassination attempts against five foreign leaders. The Senate voted to release the report

despite Ford's objections, and the American people were informed for the first time of the assassination attempts of its government. (Ford had earlier successfully suppressed the report of the Rockefeller Commission on Intelligence on CIA).

- b) Ford sought in early 1976 to prevent the House Intelligence Committee (Pike) from making public its final report. The House voted not to make the report public; when leaked and published, the report revealed the extent to which the Ford Administration refused to cooperate with the Committee. That refusal to cooperate, rather than intelligence secrets, was what Ford wanted to keep from the public.

6. Weakening of Sunshine Legislation

- a) During the last two years, Ford has done nothing to push sunshine legislation that would open to the public the meetings of all federal regulatory agencies: Ford has not made such legislation a priority (despite his professed desire for "openness"); he has not urged its enactment; and he has allowed Administration appointees to lobby for a weaker bill.
- b) When the sunshine legislation was recently considered by a Senate-House conference, the Ford Administration sought to exempt financial regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Reserve Board and the Securities Exchange Commission, from its full coverage. Ford lobbyists threatened a veto unless the FRB was permitted to close its meetings and only keep minutes of what occurred.

7. Failure to Disclose Nixon China Report

When Nixon submitted the Report on his recent trip to China, Ford refused to acknowledge its receipt. Not until the report was returned to Nixon was Ford's press secretary informed and allowed to tell the public that the report had been received.

8. Sacking of Officials Deviating from Ford's Positions

- a) John Sawhill. In the fall of '74, John Sawhill, FEA Administrator, publicly suggested that one way of conserving energy would be an additional gasoline tax. Ford opposed such a tax, and he promptly fired Sawhill for publicly stating a different position. Sawhill: "I was very naive, I believed Nessen that day when he said it was an open administration."
- b) James Schlesinger. In the Sunday Morning Massacre of November '75, Ford fired his Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger. At the time of the firing, Ford said only that he wanted his "own team" and that "there were no basic differences." Subsequently, he admitted that Schlesinger did not agree with Ford's views on detente and the defense budget.
- c) Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan was technically not fired by Ford from his Ambassadorship at the UN. However, Moynihan was effectively forced to resign when Ford and Kissinger continued to tell reporters privately that Moynihan's vocal support for Israel at the UN was harmful to American interests. Although neither Ford nor Kissinger ~~would publicly repudiate Moynihan's statements on Israel and~~

the Third World, they indicated privately that such statements differed from the emphasis of Administration policies, and Moynihan would therefore have to leave.

MAJOR DOMESTIC THEMES -- GOVERNOR CARTER

Pat Caddell's survey research has indicated that the single most critical need for the Carter campaign is to take control of the definition of the general election of 1976. The debates are the principal opportunity to provide this definition.

The following major themes should be woven throughout the debate. They have been included as part of the recommended responses to the most likely questions.

I. NEW LEADERSHIP TO MOVE AMERICA FORWARD

- the country has stagnated with a drifting and tired Republican Administration still in place after eight years . . . in-bred leaders living in a bureaucratic world of their own making . . . out of touch with average working people.
- the country drifts . . . we react to problems, seldom seize the initiative.
- we must have new leaders who are competent, compassionate, strong and dedicated who have a clear vision of where the country should be headed . . . who care about the problems of people . . . who can unify the country . . . who can take charge and move America forward.

II. NEW LEADERSHIP TO MAKE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE

- responsive government requires new people and new perspectives to tackle the tough job of rooting out bureaucratic mismanagement, waste, inefficiency . . . not part of the Washington buddy system . . . no vested interests in defending and covering-up mistakes of the past.
- responsive government also requires leaders with vision and a sense of purpose . . . who understand the problems of average working Americans . . . who are prepared to take charge and move America forward.
- Jimmy Carter knows the seriousness of the Washington problem from first-hand experience, as a consumer of governmental services . . . Governor, state legislator, farmer, businessman.
- government must ^{limit} ~~deliver on~~ its promises. . . restore the people's trust . . . and this can never happen without needed reform and reorganization. *Men deliver on them . . .*

III. A NEW ADMINISTRATION COMMITTED TO MORE JOBS, LESS INFLATION, BALANCED BUDGETS

- the Republicans have created record peacetime deficits while failing to attack bureaucratic waste and mismanagement . . . at the same time record numbers of

Americans have lost their jobs . . . inflation has soared . . . the Republican Administration has achieved what most economists believed to be impossible: in-
high unemployment
flation, stagnation, and recession at the same time.

- a new Democratic Administration will lead us toward vigorous and sustained economic growth.
- will root out waste and inefficiency, will mean more jobs, stable prices, and a government that truly responds to the needs of average working people. Needed programs such as health insurance and welfare reform will be initiated as real growth makes revenues available for them. A balanced budget will be achieved by 1981.

IV. A NEW DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTED TO MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE AVERAGE FAMILY

- the Carter-Mondale ticket stands squarely in the Democratic tradition -- Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson -- of making government the servant of all the people, not just a privileged elite.
- the Ford-Dole ticket stands squarely in the Republican tradition of Coolidge, Hoover, Dewey and Nixon -- tight money, preference for big business, isolated from the average man.

- the Republican Administration's record is timid and negative . . . eight years of drift, stagnation, and stalemate . . . eight years of ignoring the problems of average men and women while looking out for the big shots and special interests.
- Democratic Presidents have always fought for the people . . . worked to solve the problems of families, neighborhoods, the little guy . . . jobs, stable prices, and the chance to get ahead.

V. A NEW ADMINISTRATION TO UNIFY THE NATION, A FRESH START AFTER THE TRAUMA OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE

- national unity and a common sense of purpose is vital in everything we hope to do in America . . . healing the wounds of Vietnam and Watergate . . . rebuilding the people's trust in their government and in their national leaders.

- the Republican Administration is out of touch with the people . . . tied to the tragedies of past years . . . lacking vision, a sense of direction, and the capacity to make government responsive to people.

The same people and policies remain from eight years ago, who can't make government programs work because *their ideology has committed them to making them fail.*

- Jimmy Carter has the vision, personal qualities, and background to heal regional divisions . . . to reach

out to the American people in their diversity . . .
across racial, ethnic, and economic lines.

-- Jimmy Carter campaigned in every primary, in every
section of the country . . . he won the nomination
without being captured by any special interest group
. . . he will go to the White House obligated to no
one, except the people.

-- as a leader not connected with mistakes of the past,
and with a vision of where America must head in the
future, Jimmy Carter will move America forward . . .
make government responsive to the people . . . restore
the people's trust in government . . . these are the
essential elements in unifying the country, healing
its division -- a fresh start after the trauma of
Watergate and Vietnam.

- Prior to his election as President, Lincoln had served a single term in the House of Representatives, plus service on the state level. ~~and Woodrow Wilson~~ *FDR four years as Governor.*
- Carter brings new vision, new perspectives, a fresh approach, not linked to mistakes of the past, free of the Washington establishment. Republicans have had their chance for the past eight years and failed . . . time for a change . . . time for new leaders to move America forward.
- Carter's record as Governor: positive action and leadership in the common interest; reform and re-organization, tight management, balanced budgets, new vision and leadership that transformed State government; standing up to the special interests.
- Carter campaigned in all sections of the country, urban ghettos and suburban shopping centers, farms and factories . . . out with the people, learning their problems.
- years of reading, study, and travel on foreign policy issues, membership on the Tri-lateral Commission, personal knowledge of nuclear weapons and their dangers; careful assessment of foreign policy mistakes of the past eight years, specific proposals to get our foreign and defense policies back on the right track, to be explored in detail in the second debate.

II. IN TUNE WITH THE PEOPLE

President Ford reflects the thinking and attitudes of an overwhelming majority of Americans. He is open, honest, straightforward, a moderate conservative, opposed to excessive government spending, successfully leading the country back to economic health, securing the peace abroad. By comparison, Carter is ruthless, devious, fuzzy on the issues, inexperienced, a closet liberal who supports the big-spending, over-promising schemes of Congress and the Democratic Platform. Carter is out of step with the country on social issues, such as abortion, amnesty, busing, marijuana, and gay rights. His proposals for national health insurance, welfare reform, and the Humphrey-Hawkins bill would bankrupt the federal treasury, trigger a new round of inflation, and destroy all hopes for a sound and sustained economic recovery.

CARTER RESPONSE

- people are tired of political labels and they're out of date. I believe in compassionate and efficient government.

- Mr. Ford spent 25 years representing one Congressional District before moving directly to the White House Carter has been gaining experience in the country in a series of responsible positions.

- the Republican record flatly contradicts this picture of the nation: record peacetime deficits, high and continuing unemployment, high inflation . . . coupled with a failure to control the Washington bureaucracy . . . no vision or plan to set things right . . . reacting to problems rather than seizing the initiative to solve them . . . defender of special interests and big shots, part of the Washington establishment.

- the choice is between drift, stagnation, and defense of the status quo and new leaders with new perspectives to attack these problems . . . with a specific strategy to move America forward, including vigorous economic growth, an anti-inflation strategy, government reorganization and reform, and a pledge to begin new programs only as we can afford them.

- moving the country forward along these lines means more jobs, stable prices, and government able to respond to people's needs . . . the Democrats promised such a program in the early 1960s and they delivered . . . the Carter-Mondale Administration can do it again.

- lead the nation back on the path of morality, traditional values, the work ethic . . . people are properly appalled

by the corruption and deception of past years . . . the answer is to find new leaders, not part of the system, not committed to defense of the establishment . . . who can bring to Washington the same common sense, decency, and moral values that motivate most Americans . . . coupled with a new toughness and determination to make government work in the common interest.

-- Republican argument is same old line as it has been since days Hoover opposed FDR, Dewey opposed Truman, and Nixon opposed JFK. These great Democratic leaders have shown we can have social and economic progress.

III. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

You can trust President Ford. You know where he stands. You cannot trust Jimmy Carter. He shifts positions and trims his sails according to the political winds. In his 1970 campaign, during the Democratic primaries this year, and since his nomination, Carter has either refused to address the tough issues, such as the cost of national health insurance, or he has been on both sides of controversial issues, such as abortion. Just who is Jimmy Carter and what does he believe? Is he a populist advocate for the little guy or a friend of big businessmen lunching at the 21 Club? Is he an efficiency and management expert or a politician who won't identify a single government

agency that would be abolished . . . or a single tax loophole that would be eliminated? Is he an advocate of a balanced budget or a politician who refuses to put price tags on his wild spending programs? Is he in favor of abortion or against it?

other side
NA

CARTER RESPONSE

-- the lack of any clear sense of direction or purpose in the ^(White House) ~~Republican Administration~~ has led to a continuing series of policy ~~flip-flops~~ ^{(confusion) drift, stumbling} by the ~~President~~ ^(Republican Administration).

the Nixon pardon, anti-abortion amendments, tax increase or tax cut, common situs picketing, parks and recreational areas, aid for New York City, Watergate reform legislation, anti-trust legislation, raising false hopes on busing, and the like.

-- the debate provides a platform for straightforward and concrete Carter statements in key policy areas: economic growth, inflation controls, new programs and the goal of a balanced budget, abortion, tax reform, government reorganization, and defense cuts.

-- willingness to stand up for unpopular positions, as in the pardon speech before the American Legion and restatement of the abortion position before those who disagree. "Politicians who say only what the audience wants to hear are guaranteed a favorable reaction every time."

Insert (1A)

-- From the start of my campaign I have set forth the goals to which my administration would be dedicated in a clear and meaningful terms — reorganizing, restoration of full + employment without inflation; adequate affordable health care for all Americans and an end to the welfare mess (phased in) to permit a balanced budget by end of my first term. The people cannot judge, as they have judged throughout the campaign, the firmness and depth of my commitment to these goals

IV. ARBITRARY ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT

We need a Republican President to keep the lid on big spending Democrats in Congress. "The sickness in Washington" is really the irresponsible Democratic Congress. They have been in power for 40 of the past 44 years. In addition, our experience of the past few years has demonstrated why it is very dangerous to permit unchecked authority in the White House . . . Vietnam and Watergate were direct products of excessive Presidential power. Our revolutionary founders understood the need for checks and balances. One-party government can only result in our tax money being squandered and our personal liberties being subverted.

CARTER RESPONSE

- Richard Nixon tried to make the same point against JFK, and the Republicans against Roosevelt.
- the present stagnation has not resulted in economic security for the average family or a government truly responsive to the needs of people . . . instead, we have a nation drifting aimlessly, no sense of direction or purpose, a stalemate between Congress and the Executive, an Administration that has failed to check the waste of taxpayers' money in the Executive branch . . . coupled with tax giveaways to special interest groups and big shots . . . the voter has to decide

whether this is the kind of government he or she wants for the next four years.

-- we can do better . . . we can move the country forward. Fresh, new leadership, with a sense of purpose can end not only the waste and mismanagement in the Executive branch but give Congress the direction it has lacked for the past eight years. Continued stalemate is no answer . . . because this strategy only means four more years of stagnation and drift.

-- never doubt Jimmy Carter's capacity to oppose legislation not in the public interest . . . as Governor he won passage of numerous bills that served the needs of the public at large . . . but he also vetoed bills that served only narrow special interests . . . and he would follow exactly the same course as President.

-- as for uncontrolled spending, a specific pledge not to begin new programs until money is available to pay for them, toward the goal of a balanced budget by the end of 1980. The key is more vigorous economic growth and rooting out needless waste of the taxpayers' money in inefficient, outmoded, or overlapping executive programs. If Congress moves beyond these guidelines, offending legislation will be vetoed . . . just as Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt occasionally had to knock

*9/87?
Sunset
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Zero Budget*

down unwise legislation (but not bills to provide jobs, help our veterans, and train our nurses).

- the Carter-Mondale Administration will move swiftly to provide an open administration . . . with procedures to guarantee a check on the arbitrary exercise of executive power, quite apart from the concurrent check of Congress.

- Jimmy Carter comes to Washington free of any obligation to any political group or special interest, in Congress or elsewhere. Given the nature of his campaign for the nomination and his campaign in the general election, he is obligated only to the people.