

## **Vice-Presidents Candidates**

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# Report of the Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection

Institute of Politics  
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June 14, 1976

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NOTE: Summary Press Release of June 14 is inserted in the front of the report.

# I. Introduction

As the 1976 election approaches, a paradoxical feature of American Presidential politics deserves our attention. On the one hand, we select our Presidential nominees by a process of exposure and deliberation that grows ever more tortuous and grueling. On the other hand, we continue to leave the designation of the Vice-Presidential contender largely to the personal judgment of the nominee, a judgment often exercised rapidly and in confusion in the small hours of the morning after the endorsement of the party convention.

Although this "system" of Vice-Presidential selection has not served the nation badly, it has been too prone to error. Two facts stand out:

- First, the Vice-Presidency today is a major avenue to the Presidency itself. Of the 38 American Presidents, 13 (more than a third) were Vice Presidents first. Of the 13 Presidents in this century, six were first Vice President, and they have been President for 34 of 76 years (45 per cent). The odds are now about one to two that the Vice President will one day become President.

- Second, recent events in both parties -- specifically the resignation of Senator Eagleton from the Democratic ticket in 1972 and the resignation of Vice President Agnew from office in 1973 -- suggest that present selection practices contain an inherent and unacceptable degree of risk.

The present method of handpicking running mates after nomination has not always been the norm in the United States. The original system gave the office to the candidate who ran second in the Presidential contest. Each Presidential elector cast two ballots; the runner-up became Vice-President. This system brought some excellent men to the Vice-Presidency -- Adams, Jefferson, and Burr. However, the top two contenders tended to be political rivals before -- and after -- the election. In 1804, the 12th Amendment changed the system by providing for separate balloting for President and Vice President. As political parties gained strength (especially after 1831, when nomination by party conventions replaced selection by Congressional caucuses), Vice Presidents became genuine running mates. Although this system has tended to produce Vice-Presidential nominees who are personally and ideologically compatible with the head of the ticket, it has also caused an emphasis on balancing and short-run electoral calculations, rather than on the Presidential qualities of the Vice President.

Between 1972 and 1974 an intense and thorough exploration of alternative methods of Vice-Presidential selection took place. At this time, members of the press, television, academia, and the parties discussed in detail the merits and limitations of such proposals as separate primaries (or even separate elections) for Vice-Presidential candidates; announcement of possible Vice-Presidential choices by Presidential contenders early in their campaign for nomination; selection of Vice-Presidential nominees by the party conventions themselves; selection by the conventions (or by "mini-conventions" established by them) from lists submitted by Presidential contenders or by the nominee; rearrangement of the convention's order of business to allow more time for deliberation about the Vice-Presidential choice; abolition of the Vice-Presidency itself; and more.

For a time, alternative approaches to Vice-Presidential selection received sustained and careful consideration. Hearings and discussions were conducted by the Democratic Party's Commission on Vice-Presidential Selection, chaired by Senator Humphrey, and by Subcommittee 2 of the Rule 29 Committee of the Republican National Committee. Unfortunately, interest in the question has gradually subsided, and the momentum for change appears to have been lost.

Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss recently explained to reporters that:

"We have a very poor system for choosing our Vice-Presidents. I regret we didn't do something about it. We're not going to do a damn thing to avoid it (another Eagleton affair) except a wing and a prayer."

Similarly, Kent B. McGough, Chairman of the Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee, said:

"We've received a large number of letters indicating concern that changes in the selection process be made. And we intend to discuss it fully. But it's going to be very difficult to make any changes for this year. Maybe 1980."

We do not believe that this state of affairs is inevitable. We take the view that rational discussion and exploration of alternatives should be continued, and that increased public attention to methods of Vice-Presidential selection is itself a necessary first step toward improvement. This report does not attempt a thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of the wide range of proposals that have been endorsed in one quarter or another. Instead, having considered these proposals in some detail and having interviewed many experts and key actors, we set forth and defend those proposals that we think most worthy of adoption, in hopes of influencing the way the

Vice-Presidential nominees are selected in 1976 and of improving the process further before 1980. We explicitly avoid, at this stage, suggestions involving constitutional amendment, change in the electoral system, or a redefinition of the responsibilities of a Vice President.

Our general objective is to suggest a set of procedures more likely than the present ones to assure selection of Vice Presidents competent to assume the Presidency itself. Our point of departure is not that the present approach has worked poorly on the whole, but rather that it is inherently risky. We grant that no Presidential nominee would knowingly choose a running mate unfit to hold the highest office. However, we are skeptical that the present system is adequately self-correcting or that we can simply trust future Presidential nominees to exercise "exquisite care" in choosing running mates in the absence of procedural reform.

The key fact, we think, is that under present arrangements, information about prospective running mates has been, and is likely to continue to be, far too limited. By "information" we mean both factual details about the background, activities, and pronouncements of contenders, and political evaluations from the perspective of major elements of party and public. The premise of our recommendations is that the volume of factual and political information about potential Vice Presidents, and the opportunities available to public, media, candidates, and parties to deliberate upon this information, should be increased. Attaining this goal calls for procedural and institutional change which goes beyond the Presidential nominees' own exquisite care. In short, we believe that the selection of Vice Presidents should receive a higher priority and should be more open and responsive to the public. Such change will tend to counter the waning public confidence in the political process and to affirm the belief of the American people in their governmental leadership.

The recommendations advanced in this report are complementary and mutually reinforcing, dependent upon various sets of participants in the process fulfilling key roles on a largely voluntary basis by assuming responsibilities which we believe are both sensible and feasible. We have attempted to define the process as an integrated whole. No single mechanism can be designed or imposed to rationalize the process of Vice-Presidential selection by itself. No single organization or set of actors can complete the task. We do not believe that radical changes are desirable or workable; our analysis has led us to the conclusion that many proposals which look attractive in the abstract upon close perusal add significant liabilities to the process. We feel strongly, for instance, that the predominant role of the Presidential candidate in the selection of a running mate should be protected.

We address, therefore, the practical roles which the parties, the candidates themselves, and the media can usefully and quickly play. Our recommendations recognize the inherently pluralistic and democratic character of the process, and we believe their non-dramatic nature makes them more rather than less compelling.

## II. Standards for Selection

President Ford said in May that "...It is traditional in America that the two parties try to balance a ticket for President and Vice President as to geography, as to philosophy, as to personality," and he also stated the need for "some personal compatibility, a comfortable relationship" in his running mate. In March, Jimmy Carter included compatibility and balancing in listing criteria for selecting his Vice-Presidential nominee, and claimed the first and most important requirement "is who would be the best person to lead this country if something should happen to me."

We suspect that most Americans would agree to both of two simple propositions: 1) that the primary standard in selecting a Vice President should be competence to be President; and 2) that the standard more often employed in selection is some form of political balancing -- geographical, religious, ideological, etc. Some would argue that because the first duty of a politician is to get elected, competence in a Vice-Presidential nominee is bound to be considered only within constraints imposed by short-term electoral reality; and that the running mate is above all a political instrument selected with the purpose of countering or avoiding potential deficiencies in the ticket.

We believe that neither of these propositions is as straightforward as it appears at first glance; nor do we find competence and electoral utility as incompatible as is sometimes suggested. We recognize that strong short-term political needs -- for regional balance, to heal party divisions, to prevent the Presidential nominee from being upstaged, and

the like -- may detract from competence as the main criterion.

However, the selection of a running mate with the purpose of maximizing the popular vote, securing key blocs in the electoral college and creating a sense of representation and legitimacy among various population elements -- therefore enabling an administration to govern effectively, is a valuable aspect of the political process. We doubt, moreover, that close inspection of recent cases of Vice-Presidential selection would support the contention that "balancing" was determinative of the choice, and that considerations of competence were set aside.

Recommendation:

1. Competence in Vice-Presidential selection should be the primary standard and balancing can be a secondary factor -- the two are neither naturally exclusive nor naturally contradictory.

The universe of prominent American politicians is, like the American population it represents, large and heterogeneous. It is implausible that the dictates of short-term political balance are so compelling, and the available set of high-quality political figures so limited, that a Presidential nominee need be forced to sacrifice competency to campaign victory in a possible successor. Moreover, the way in which a Presidential nominee responds in naming a running mate will depend in large part on how the question is posed by the public, the media, and the parties. If these participants insist on a concentration on competence, on extensive information, and on careful deliberation by themselves and by the candidate -- and if they take procedural steps to secure this approach -- the political utility of a concern with the Presidential qualifications of Vice-Presidential nominees is bound to increase.

### III. Parties

The political parties are capable of an essential role they are not now filling in the reform of Vice-Presidential selection procedures. A set of simple and practical changes in the nominating process could be made by the parties which would strengthen the chances of informed and responsible choice. By undertaking modest but useful reforms, the national parties can not only improve Vice-Presidential selection, but also strengthen their own relevance and influence in a period unhappily marked by party decline.

As it is now, both parties treat Vice-Presidential selection as a low-priority matter, an afterthought unworthy of serious preparation. Both parties have considered ways to improve selection methods since the 1972 conventions, but neither has actually changed its procedures. Their attitude now seems to be either that time has run out for 1976, or that the need for change has subsided-- even though, as Senator Humphrey said in 1973, "...the interests of the people of the United States require reform in this field by both parties before the 1976 conventions."

Two options for party change that we considered carefully but rejected are proposals for an open convention, where the convention chooses the nominee by itself; and a "partially open" convention, with the decision made by the convention from a short list of preferred choices provided by the nominee. Both of these proposals mean an increased role for the convention delegates and a decreased role for the Presidential candidate. Neither assures reduced risks of faulty selection. A selection by open

convention does not mean that more care is spent in selection. Yet there is a better chance that this method would choose a Vice President incompatible with the Presidential nominee, and would increase party factionalism rather than serve as a means of party unity. A "partially open" convention avoids incompatibility, but limits the flexibility of the nominee, invites party factionalism, and denies the convention full freedom of choice. This is clearly the worst of both worlds.

Another device for selecting the Vice-Presidential nominee that has received attention is for a "mini-convention", constituted by the National Committee membership, to be held perhaps two weeks after the national convention adjourns. The Democrats used this method in 1972 to designate Sargent Shriver after the resignation of Senator Eagleton from the ticket, and there are advantages to it. Delaying the choice provides plenty of time for consultation, background checks, and priority deliberation. On balance, however, we are more persuaded by the disadvantages of a mini-convention approach. The choice has less legitimacy if it is ratified by a smaller representative group; the function of the Vice-Presidential nomination at the convention as a conciliatory and rallying point for the various factions is diluted; and the ticket's chances might be hurt by a delayed beginning and a decreased media impact for the campaign itself.

The recommendations we are making require action by both parties at the 1976 conventions. They involve 1) changes that can be made in time to affect this year's choices, and 2) changes to be mandated this year

to take effect in 1980.\* In the first category, we propose procedural changes to take effect at the 1976 conventions in the form of amendments to the temporary rules of the convention: adoption of general resolutions stating the importance of Vice-Presidential selection and the necessity of change; amendments to the convention rules rearranging the convention schedule to provide more time for selection; and formation of an advisory group to contribute formally to the consultative process. In the second category, we propose changes which would be mandated for 1980 by resolutions adopted at the 1976 conventions: the rearrangement of the convention schedule and the establishment of a formal advisory committee, again, and, in addition, the adoption of a resolution urging specific action for Presidential candidates before the next convention.

Recommendations:

2. The conventions of both the Democratic and Republican Parties should adopt resolutions which state the importance of Vice-Presidential selection, encourage the candidates and parties to give the process the time and care needed for responsible selection, and affirm an intention to improve the selection process.
  
3. The parties should rearrange the convention schedule, placing Credentials and Rules Committees' reports in the first session, Presidential nomination in the second, consideration of the Platform in the third, and Vice-Presidential nomination in the final session.

\* Under party rules the process for change--for 1976 and for 1980--begins in the Rules Committees of their National Committees, which meet before the conventions and make recommendations on the rules. In the Democratic Party, these recommendations are made directly to the Convention. In the Republican Party, they are made to the National Committee, then to the Convention Rules Committee, which then presents recommendations to the Convention.

The purpose of this change is to increase the time between the nomination of the Presidential nominee and the selection of a Vice-Presidential choice. More time would allow the nominees and their staffs to put more care and deliberation into the final choice, with opportunity for more thorough and extensive consultation.

Arguments against rearrangement of the convention schedule focus on movement of the platform debates to the day following the Presidential nomination. Some assert that the conciliatory function of the platform decisions may be impaired if they occur after the Presidential nomination, and that the platform might reflect the nominee more than the broad-based party, conceivably making it more difficult for some factions to support. On the other hand, equally plausible is the argument that the first instinct of a successful candidate upon receiving the nomination is to move toward unifying the party. By this logic the platform would become an instrument of conciliation rather than of division, an effect which frequently occurs when platform issues become a pre-nomination test of strength. Furthermore, it might well be advantageous for the platform to be approved after the nomination because it would better reflect the nominee's position and thus be taken more seriously. The public tends to be skeptical of all platforms; rearrangement might give the platform greater credibility.

It is also argued that this schedule change would be anti-climactic, increasing the difficulty of retaining an interested television audience. We do not feel that this argument is strong enough to outweigh the advantages of a shift in schedule. Indeed, since the major thrust of our recommendations is to place more emphasis upon Vice-Presidential selection, one concomitant of rearranging the convention schedule could be the building of suspense by the national media around the Vice-Presidential nomination.

4. The parties should each establish a formal party consultative mechanism, an advisory committee, to assist the party and the Presidential candidate in the selection of the Vice-Presidential candidate.

The purposes of an advisory mechanism are to insure that there is preparation and deliberation on the subject of Vice-Presidential choice before the convention, to widen the process of consultation that the nominee employs, and to provide information and advice on potential Vice-Presidential candidates to the nominee. A consultative process conducted by a party advisory committee can strengthen the party role while retaining the Presidential nominee's dominance in selection. Such a committee would be formed and begin meeting with appropriate staff and resources before the convention. It would compile a list of possible Vice-Presidential candidates, and conduct research into backgrounds and issue positions. After nomination of the Presidential candidate, the group would be available immediately to meet with the nominee and to share the results of its work. Its advice would in no way be binding, but the participation of a formal consultative group would increase discussion of Vice-Presidential possibilities among representatives of major party elements.

5. The party advisory committees should request a list of preferred Vice-Presidential running mates from serious contenders for the Presidential nomination.

By combining the lists from several prospective nominees, the advisory committee would generate an extensive group of potential Vice-Presidential candidates, drawn from all segments of the party. The breadth of pre-convention consideration undertaken by the advisory committee might pay special dividends should the advance planning of the eventual nominee prove to be inadequate or mooted by events at the convention itself. This

recommendation also encourages the Presidential candidates to begin serious staff work on Vice-Presidential selection before the conventions. To make it effective, the parties should encourage their candidates to produce a meaningful list and to make their final choice from it.

## IV. Presidential Candidates

Traditionally, the Presidential nominees make the actual designation of a Vice-Presidential nominee. The nominees are the crucial factor in the selection process; their choices may be brilliant or potentially disastrous, not only for the political chances of the ticket, but for the country. The Presidential candidates should therefore take the initiative for procedural change, especially if effective action is to take place in the short time before the 1976 conventions. The candidates are in the best position to give the process the priority and care that it deserves, and should be held accountable for the choice of a Vice-Presidential candidate.

In urging special responsibilities in Vice-Presidential selection on the Presidential candidate, along with recommendations affecting other participants in the process, we seek to strengthen and protect their role rather than to diminish it. If their responsibility is to remain a commanding one, however, it should be carried out with a greater commitment of time and effort than has generally characterized past behavior, beginning well before nomination rather than immediately following it.

### Recommendations:

6. The Presidential candidates should have their staffs begin work on Vice-Presidential selection as early as possible in their campaigns and no later than the final round of primaries: developing lists of potential candidates, conducting background research, and consulting broadly for suggestions.

7. The candidates should discuss publicly the criteria to be used in the selection of a running mate, and are urged to emphasize competence to be President as the primary factor.
  
8. The candidates should make public a list of serious preferences for the Vice-Presidency before the convention, in order to facilitate media and public examination; and they are encouraged to initiate direct contact and staff liaison with potential running mates.

The greatest weakness in the present system is the fact that whereas the Presidential candidates go through months of exposure and arduous campaign work before coming to the convention, the Vice-Presidential candidate is often unknown, both to the public and to the nominee. When the Vice-Presidential candidate happens to be chosen from the ranks of candidates actively contesting the primaries, there is much less of a problem, but this cannot be guaranteed. This recommendation is an attempt to correct this weakness in the system without challenging the nominee's prerogative to make the choice.

There are disadvantages to making up preferential lists prior to the convention. Such a list is likely to involve tactical inconveniences for the candidate, and to promote political balancing of an opportunistic sort as names are included from various constituencies simply in order to garner electoral support, not because they are likely to be chosen. List-making before the convention can also limit flexibility by committing the candidate to certain choices before the events of the convention unfold. But we feel these difficulties do not compete with the benefits of opening up the process to the public and the media.

9. The candidates should help develop party reform of Vice-Presidential selection, be ready to support a party consultative process, and recommend a change in the convention schedule.

## V. Background Checks

The question of background checks on prospective Vice-Presidential candidates is characterized by uncertainty and controversy. Many believe that they would not be worth the risks involved, including possible violation of privacy, abuse of confidential information, lack of credibility, and misrepresentation.

The study group believes that a thorough examination of a Vice-Presidential candidate's personal and political background, now lacking, is a desirable component of the overall process. Informal research and exposure by the press, advance investigation by the Presidential candidate's staff, and the considerations of a party advisory committee prior to the convention are all essential functions. But by themselves they do not insure adequate efficiency and objectivity. The media may do a spotty job, or may be unable to commit enough resources to insure thorough coverage of the candidate eventually selected. As a practical matter the Presidential candidate's staff may not have adequate time or freedom to penetrate deeply enough in its investigation. A party consultative committee is likely at some point to encounter doubts about how much potentially unflattering material it wants to gather on leaders from within its own ranks. These difficulties lead us to conclude that something more is needed.

The F.B.I. undertakes background investigations on a continuing basis to provide information regarding Presidential appointments, and prior to the granting of clearances to permit access by public officials to class-

ified information. The F.B.I. conducted background investigations for the two Congressional Committees responsible under the XXV Amendment for recommending to the House and Senate the nominations of Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller to the Vice-Presidency. In these cases, controls were set up to assure the confidentiality of the information gathered, which proved effective. It may be that under the existing statutory authority a system could be established for an F.B.I. background investigation of potential Vice-Presidential candidates, similar to those completed for hundreds of appointed public officials. Such information checks would not involve screening, ranking or judgments of the candidates on the part of the F.B.I. The results of the investigations could be made available under careful controls to the Presidential nominee only. There are various ways to design a workable system, assuming adequate lead-time, the willingness of the prospective Presidential candidates to provide lists of preferred running mates, the permission of the prospective Vice-Presidential candidates themselves to be investigated, and the cooperation of the President and/or the Attorney General. Thus, immediately after nomination, the Presidential nominee could be provided with useful material to help in selection.

Yet there are a number of legitimate questions about such an arrangement: Isn't this too much of a "political " burden to be placed on the F.B.I.? Should the F.B.I. be invited into the electoral process? Is there a danger that too much might be expected of the F.B.I. check in terms of "clearing" a potential candidate? Why shouldn't Presidential candidates likewise be checked out? What real guarantees are there against abuse of confidential information? These questions are valid, and any process of background checks must be accomplished with a maximum of understanding, support, and credibility. Otherwise the cost will be greater than the

benefit, and we would be better off without it. It is this belief that leads us to the conclusion that a systematic check for Vice-Presidential candidates should not be undertaken by administrative action and loose agreement among the interested parties, but only by way of the legislative process. This would assure adequate deliberation -- solicitation of views through public hearings, careful analysis by Committee staff, open debate in both houses of Congress, and the chance for Presidential approval of a new statute.

Recommendation:

10. The House and Senate bipartisan leadership should set as a high priority consideration of legislation authorizing appropriate background investigations to be conducted by the F.B.I. on prospective Vice-Presidential candidates, under timely and fair arrangements and with effective controls against violations of privacy and misuse of sensitive information. \*

\*One version of legislation seeking to accomplish these goals is S.2741, originally introduced in the 93rd Congress, on November 26, 1973, by Senator William Brock (R-Tenn.)

## VI. Media

If the Vice-Presidential selection process is awkward, fragile, and perilous, to what extent can the media, in its various roles as reporter, investigator, and opinion leader, improve this unsatisfactory situation?

In reporting and analyzing the words and actions of Vice-Presidential candidates, the press in recent years has done a creditable job. Often it has been a story in search of a reader, overshadowed by the excitement of the Presidential race. There also has been a remarkable amount of attention paid to Vice-Presidential selection reform. Understandably, much of this coverage has surfaced in the aftermath of crisis. A number of stories and at least one television documentary analyzing the hazards of the current selection procedures appeared in the days following the resignation of Senator Thomas Eagleton as Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate in 1972 and the resignation of Vice President Agnew in 1973, but such coverage tends to be after the fact and to die out.

In 1976, coverage of national candidates has been the most comprehensive ever. With a mindboggling 30 Presidential primaries and more than 20 candidates with a potential national constituency, more reporters have been assigned, more television specials aired, and more money spent by news organizations in following the races than ever before. That professional and financial commitment will continue through the fall. But coverage of the campaign itself -- the politics and personalities -- is not enough. The press should earmark a substantial slice of its resources toward calling attention to the inequities and foibles of the present selection

system and toward covering prospective Vice-Presidential candidates. The candidates and the political parties have the major responsibility and power to effect the desired changes. But columnists and editorial writers should recommend reforms, and call on the candidates themselves to support the improvements.

As a practical matter, many of the needed reforms will take time to carry out. The urgency of the ongoing campaigns and the uncertainty of the outcome leaves the unfortunate possibility that, once again, the selection of running mates will be a last-minute decision. In that event, it will be more crucial than ever for reporters to dig deeply into the backgrounds and public records of the candidates, acting as a supplement to a highly imperfect selection procedure. To the extent that potential contenders for the second slot can be identified and examined in advance, the process will be improved.

Recommendations:

11. The press should remind the public of the past failings of the Vice-Presidential selection process and encourage candidates and parties to make changes.
12. The media should persistently question candidates about their plans and preparation for selecting running mates, encouraging sufficient advance work and discussion of the standards on which their choice of a running mate will be based.
13. On the assumption that the Vice-Presidential candidates may again result from a helter-skelter eleventh hour selection process, the press should commit reporters, time, and funds to extensive coverage

and investigation of potential running mates before the convention, including interviews plus in-depth reporting on issues and backgrounds.

14. The networks ought to prepare now for a "special" or series of programs on "The Vice-Presidential Candidates, 1976".

15. The media should plan comprehensive coverage of the Vice-Presidential nominees after the conventions.

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Description of  
The Institute of Politics  
Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection

Faculty Study Groups of the Institute of Politics, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, are organized to examine applied problems in government and politics. They are comprised both of academic faculty and practitioners, and are designed to make their analysis and recommendations available to public officials to whom such information might be helpful.

The Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection was set up in February of 1976 to examine process and standards in Vice-Presidential selection, in order to develop recommendations for improvement affecting the decisions in 1976 and including changes to be put into effect for 1980. The group explicitly did not address long-term changes which would involve major electoral reform or Constitutional amendment, nor did it study the nature of the job of Vice President.

Four formal meetings were held, and research, interviewing, and drafting assignments were undertaken individually and in smaller groups throughout the four-month period. The group began its work by reviewing and analyzing extensive literature on the subject including a wide range of proposals for reform; continued by interviewing academic experts on the subject, individuals with significant past experience, and principal actors in current electoral effort; and concluded with the preparation of its own analysis and recommendations.

The study group's report will be distributed among the media, party and campaign officials, and political scientists as an agent itself for higher priority, public exposure, and constructive change in Vice-Presidential selection.

June, 1976

Appendix B

Members of the Institute of Politics Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection

Christopher Arterton	Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University
Timothy A. Barrow	Fellow, Institute of Politics; formerly Major of Phoenix, Arizona
Lawrence D. Brown	Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University
Eugene Carlson	Fellow, Nieman Foundation, Harvard University; formerly Economics Reporter, U.P.I. Washington Bureau; Vice-President Humphrey's 1968 Campaign Staff.
Barney Frank	State Representative, Boston, Massachusetts
K. Dun Gifford	Vice President for Urban Affairs, Cabot, Cabot and Forbes; formerly Chairman of Common Cause/Massachusetts; formerly Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy.
Elizabeth Goddard (Rapporteur of the Study Group)	Staff, Institute of Politics.
Charles Greenleaf	MPA Program, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government; formerly Legislative Assistant to Governor Milliken of Michigan.
Ira Jackson	Special Assistant to the Director, Institute of Politics; formerly Administrative Assistant to Major Kevin White of Boston
Jonathan Moore (Chairman of the Study Group)	Director, Institute of Politics

1976-71

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Mrs. Deane W. Lord, Director

May 18, 1976

FOR RELEASE: Friday, May 21, 1976

Harvard University's Institute of Politics announced today that its Study Group on Vice-Presidential Selection will release "practical recommendations" for selecting this year's Vice-Presidential candidates shortly after the June 8 state primary elections.

Jonathan Moore, Director of the Institute and Chairman of the Study Group, stated, "We will be making some formal proposals involving changes in party role and convention rules affecting the 1976-80 period. The basic thrust of our work, however, is to determine what can be done to encourage a more responsible process in the selection of the Democratic and Republican Vice-Presidential candidates in the current year."

Mr. Moore added, "The group was set up under the assumption that the current system for choosing Vice-Presidents is not deliberate, reliable, or efficient enough. It is too prone to error."

The project was announced on February 11. In addition to Mr. Moore, the group includes: Christopher Arterton, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University; Timothy A. Barrow, Fellow, Institute of Politics, Formerly Mayor of Phoenix, Arizona; Lawrence D. Brown, Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University; Eugene Carlson, Fellow, Nieman Foundation, Economics reporter, United Press International; Barney Frank, Massachusetts State Representative; K. Dun Gifford, Vice-President for Urban Affairs, Cabot, Cabot, & Forbes, formerly Chairman of Common Cause/Massachusetts and Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy; Charles Greenleaf, MPA Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, formerly Legislative Assistant to Governor Milliken of Michigan; Ira Jackson, Special Assistant to the Institute Director, formerly Special Assistant to Mayor Kevin White of Boston. Elizabeth Goddard, of the Institute staff, is the group's reporter.

The Study Group on Vice-Presidential selection reviewed and analyzed earlier studies, recommendations, and other literature on the subject. Members of the group interviewed numerous party officials, 1976 potential Presidential candidates, and staff, political scientists, and media specialists in the course of their work.

"Despite the strong possibility that the Vice-President will someday become President and the great need for him or her to be competent to fill the responsibilities of the office, there is too little priority given to how we make the choice," Mr. Moore said.

"Yet workable alternatives to the present system are difficult to come by, and many ideas for change carry greater costs than benefits. We have been concentrating on designing roles for the parties, for the candidates, and for the media.

Basically, we seek workable ways to improve the process, including greater consultation and more thorough background information. At least at this stage, our group is not examining the kind of long-term reform that would involve either Constitutional or statutory change."

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Appendix E

Partial List of Persons Contacted by Study Group

Professor Phillip E. Areeda (Harvard Law School)  
Peter Bourne (Carter Campaign)  
David S. Broder  
Philip W. Buchen (The White House)  
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
David Cohen (Common Cause)  
Peter Curtin (Church Campaign)  
John Elliff (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)  
Stephen B. Farber (National Governors' Conference)  
James Farrington (Deputy Assistant Director, F.B.I.)  
Saul Friedman (Knight Newspapers)  
James L. George (Staff Assistant, Office of Senator William Brock)  
Senator Barry Goldwater  
Joseph Gorman (Congressional Research Service)  
Stephen H. Hess (Brookings Institution)  
John Hotis (Office of Legal Counsel, F.B.I.)  
Edward H. Mahe (Republican National Committee)  
Colin Matthews (Udall Campaign)  
Kent B. McGough (Chairman, Rules Committee, Republican National Committee)  
Richard Moe (Administrative Assistant to Senator Mondale)  
Sterling Munro (Administrative Assistant to Senator Jackson)

Professor Richard E. Neustadt (John F. Kennedy School of Government)

Dean Don K. Price (John F. Kennedy School of Government)

James H. Rowe, Jr.

Andrea Rosen (Democratic National Committee)

William D. Ruckelshaus

James Schoener (Senate Rules Committee)

John P. Sears (Reagan Campaign)

Mark A. Siegel (Democratic National Committee)

Fredric W. Slight (Ford Campaign)

Sanford J. Ungar (author of FBI)

Ted VanDyk (former aide to Vice President Humphrey)

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Questions on Vice-Presidential Selection for Presidential Candidates

- 1) Do you perceive a need for change in the Vice-Presidential selection process?
- 2) How are you now approaching Vice-Presidential selection? Are you developing lists of potential candidates? Is any background work on potential running-mates being done now or is any planned? Do you anticipate communicating directly with the potential candidates, in advance of the convention?
- 3) Would you agree that competency to be President should be the main criterion in the selection of a running-mate? To what extent can competency be combined with balancing factors (geographic, ideological, religious, political, etc.) as criteria? Of these balancing factors, which are most important: how would you prioritize them? How important do you think compatibility between President and Vice-President (personality, issues orientation, etc.) is as a criterion for choice of a running-mate?
- 4) What do you think of the following proposals for change:
  - a) Making public a list of potential Vice-Presidential candidates before the convention.
  - b) Institution of a consultative process (such as by party committee) to help in the development of a list of potential candidates, or to give advice or screening of the candidates proposed by the Presidential candidates.
  - c) A partially open convention procedure, with the convention choosing the Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided by the Presidential nominee.
  - d) Background investigation of potential Vice-Presidential candidates by the F.B.I., with an emphasis on the privacy rights of the potential candidates (requiring their permission, and limiting the availability of the report).
  - e) Rearrangement of the convention schedule (with Presidential nomination first, platform second, then Vice-Presidential nomination) to provide more time for consideration of the choice for Vice President.
  - f) Postponement of the selection of the Vice President to a time after the convention; making the selection in a mini-convention representative of the full convention.

Appendix G1  
Lawrence D. Brown

BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM ON  
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION

This memo briefly describes some problems with the open and partially open convention approaches to Vice-Presidential selection and sketches an outline of my own thinking on how we might proceed.

First, three definitions. By the "present system" I mean that the Presidential nominee suggests his own choice for Vice-President, and the party convention then accepts or rejects it. An "open convention" means one in which delegates themselves nominate Vice-Presidential candidates and the convention itself makes the decision, weighing the Presidential nominee's preference as it sees fit. A "partially open convention" means one in which the Presidential contenders narrow their Vice-Presidential lists to a certain number (say five) either before the convention or after it (in which case the nominee does the narrowing) and the convention then selects the Vice-Presidential nominee from among those listed.

We seem to agree that the main general objective of changes in the system should be to move toward procedures more likely than the present ones to assure selection of men who would make worthy Presidents should that need arise. At a less general level, we also seem to agree that new procedures should provide 1) more time for deliberation about potential Vice-Presidents, and 2) more scope for deliberation (usually referred to as "greater participation" by those seeking a larger role for the convention itself, that is, the rank and file delegates, and "more extensive consultation" by those favoring a larger role for prominent party figures). Presumably, the greater the time allowed for deliberation, the less important it becomes to deal explicitly with the scope of participation, because, given time, opinions will out. However, the reverse does not also hold. For example, chapter two of the Ripon Society's The Lessons of Victory (New York: Dial Press, Inc., 1969) describes the selection of Spiro Agnew, which consisted of a rapid and superficial process of rather extensive consultation. Nevertheless, the time dimension is much more troublesome than appears at first glance. Every step toward preconvention specificity diminishes the Presidential contenders' flexibility, and responsiveness to emerging trends. Every step toward post convention delay violates the candidate's (and the party's) desire to get a team together and off and running.

To my mind, the major problem with the open and partially open convention approach is that it does not directly address either of the objectives mentioned above. Enlarging the convention role in Vice-Presidential selection does not inherently extend or deepen the deliberative process, and thus does not go to the heart of the problem. To the degree, then, that improved deliberation can be accommodated within the present system, the advantages of this system, and the disadvantages of the open convention approach, appear more compelling.

The best succinct discussion I know of the advantages and of the open and partially open convention approach (and others) is contained in a memo from Stu Eisenstat to the Democrats' Vice-Presidential Selection Commission (the so-called "Humphrey Commission")\*. What I have to say here is nothing new, but let me list briefly, in no particular order, what I consider to be the major disadvantages of the open and partially open convention approaches.

1. An open convention could exacerbate party factionalism. Any appearance of party unity might break down, and, depending upon the balance of power within the convention, the Presidential nominee might get saddled with a Vice-President who is incompatible. This would be offset by partial openness (selection from the nominee's list) but this has its problems too. If the change is billed as a step toward "openness" (as it is bound to be), then explicit statements of preference from the nominee will make it appear a mockery in some eyes. If, on the other hand, the nominee is prevented from expressing his first choice (which is practically impossible), he may either not get his man, or may list his man and four throwaways. The point of making changes, it seems to me, should be to equip the convention (or some subdivision of it) to evaluate the nominee's choice in the context of other contenders, and to provide information and advice to Presidential contenders (and the nominee) as their decision-making processes unfold. "Openness" reforms do not address this point straightforwardly.

2. Openness enhances the deliberative process only if the delegates know the candidates' Vice-Presidential choices far enough in advance of the convention to give them time to deliberate. But advance listing (unless limited to one or two Vice-Presidential choices apiece) may lead to extreme ticket-balancing, as the obligatory blacks, women, religious and regional figures, and so forth appear on the lists to win factional support. Even if the number of preconvention choices is limited (which is probably infeasible), the prime concern will be short-term coalition-building.

3. Openness could lead to complex and probably undesirable factional patterns, as state delegations bargain support for A for President in exchange for support for B for Vice-President. It's far from clear that the result would be to accentuate quality.

\* This memo is reprinted in the Congressional Record, 16 October 1973.

4. Although it is true that the President is tortuously selected, and that the Vice-President must be worthy to become President, it is probably also true that there is strong sentiment among party and public for letting the President name his man. There are many reasons for this. The first is the need for flexibility. Granting that quality should come first, the need to balance ideological, regional, and other appeals within the set of high-quality contenders varies from one time and situation to another. The nominee -- the party's leader -- can assuage party splits when in the nature of the case a (split) convention cannot. The Vice-President is bound to remain the nominee's major, short-term political instrument in trying to do so.

Second, selection of a Vice-President is a Presidential nominee's first and most prominent exercise of discretion and judgment. Taking the choice away from him may diminish his public legitimacy (the top man is supposed to be "responsible" and "accountable"). It may be too that people like to think of the ticket as a "team", not a juxtaposition.

Third, as Hans Linde has pointed out, unless the President finds his running-mate personally and ideologically compatible (which he alone can decide), he may not keep him informed about and included in what's going on. This would reduce the Vice-President's capacity to assume the Presidency.

These points seem to me to argue rather strongly that the costs of the open and partially open approaches are likely to outweigh the benefits. Now I want to set down a few vague thoughts explaining the rudiments of what I consider a sensible approach to procedural change.

As I said above, I think that the major emphasis should be on Vice-Presidential quality. (By "quality" I mean selection of a Vice-President whom large numbers of people other than the Presidential nominee would be content to see occupy the highest office if the major pertinent facts were known, and if the need arose.) In arguing the need for change, there are basically two different approaches. One is to argue that the present system (and the Vice-Presidents and Vice-Presidential nominees it produces) are simply not very good. I am not convinced that this is true. The second line of argument is that the system is basically sound, but unacceptably risky. I believe that Vice-Presidents in general, and Vice-Presidents who became President, have been, on the whole, of high quality. I believe too that the system is to some degree self-correcting. (As Stephen K. Bailey said it in a statement to the Humphrey Commission in November 1973, after the Eagleton and Agnew affairs, nominees are likely to exercise "exquisite care" in selecting running-mates even without procedural changes. Nor do I believe that Presidential nominees do -- or would -- knowingly choose flawed men.

Having granted all this, however, the key fact remains that information (broadly defined) has been and remains too limited. In selecting men for high office, "political" information (insights of knowledgeable politicians and party notables about contender's style and performance) and "factual" information (data about personal honesty, background, and the like) are equally valuable and perhaps inextricable.

Moreover, the Eagleton and Agnew cases suggest that under some conditions, the logic of party unity may lead not to nomination of major party figures but rather to inoffensive and little-known individuals. These facts, it seems to me, argue for explicit procedural change; it is not prudent to leave the choice almost wholly to the personal judgment of the nominees' and their top aides. In short: we should look to modest procedural innovations which might reduce the risk of seriously flawed candidates by enhancing the time and scope for deliberations.

If we accept this general orientation, then it seems to me that we come down to three basic questions:

1. What should be the mechanics of deliberation? -- in particular, do we want to argue for an institutionalized party role (beyond the delegates themselves), or leave it mainly to contenders, press, and public?
2. What should be the timing of the deliberative process? -- in particular, should it fall mainly before the convention or after it?
3. What should be the extent of the process? -- in particular, do we want to leave it to the contenders and their staffs, the parties, the press, and the public; or do we want to consider FBI checks?

These three questions comprise the heart of the matter, in my view. Let me set down quickly my tentative thoughts on these three questions, and suggest the implications of these thoughts.

1. I think that there should be some sort of institutionalized party role in Vice-Presidential selection, beyond convention ratification of the Presidential nominee's personal choice. I take this view for three reasons. First, I share the position of many political scientists (some of whom discussed this and related points before the Humphrey Commission) that the apparent decline of national party organization is something to worry over. I do not believe that we should encourage the increasingly popular view that the candidate is everything and the party is nothing; nor do I think that we should recommend changes that work in that direction. If possible, I would like to see the institutional role of the parties strengthened.

Second, I believe that some party role is needed to fill information gaps that would inevitably remain if consultation were left mainly to the contenders, their staffs, the press, and the public. The viewpoint of party officials may be distinctive and valuable; it should be built into the process.

Third, I agree with Charles Hyneman's observation to the Humphrey Commission that "Proof that well known men and women are involved in the selection and that deliberation is going on" would lend legitimacy to the Vice-Presidential selection process and increase public confidence in it. These "well known men and women" should come from the ranks of the parties.

2. I believe that a pre convention deliberative process is preferable to a post convention process. As James I. Loeb remarked in reference to arguments in favor of the 1972 Democratic "mini-convention" (held after the convention itself had adjourned):

...if it were adopted as a regular device, it would mainly serve three purposes: to underscore the indecisiveness of the presidential nominee to weaken any semblance of party unity and to establish an all-time record for anticlimax.\*

Moreover, as Congressman Marvin Esch of Michigan has pointed out, a delayed Vice-Presidential nomination would give an appearance of "smoke-filled-room-politics," "secret deals" and "power brokers." \*\* Also, might not unit-rule problems in weighting delegate votes arise under such procedures? All post-convention processes with which I am familiar run up against problems such as these.

3. I would refrain from recommending new forms of FBI checks on Vice-Presidential contenders. On the one hand, the possible costs of such checks -- in terms of loosely-controlled investigations, violations of privacy, abuse of confidential data, and others -- are unclear but potentially great. On the other hand, I am not convinced that the benefits to be gained from such checks are sizeable, let alone large enough to outweigh the potential costs. I would want to think long and hard before endorsing an expanded, institutionalized FBI role in electoral politics. To my mind, a workable system of party consultation, and an expanded dialogue among political actors -- party, candidates, press, and public -- ought to do the job.

Following these observations where they seem to lead, I would incline to favor a process something like this: the parties should establish some sort of committee on Vice-Presidential selection, with appropriate staff, which would go to work a month or two before the convention. The committee should contact active Presidential candidates (somehow defined) and solicit from them lists (of some reasonable length ) of persons whom they (the contenders) think should be considered as potential Vice-Presidential nominees. The committee would then compile and make public one general list of contenders for Vice-President. Those listed could remove themselves from consideration if they wished. The committee would carry out staff work and consult widely with various party elements about the respective merits or limitations of those listed. Discussion would proceed among media and public. The big problem is, how deep would the committee dig, and how public would this "dossier" become? One report noted that the Democratic Commission

\* Washington Post, 27 January 1974

\*\* Congressional Record, 2 August 1974

on Vice-Presidential Selection, faced with similar proposals, "was reluctant to get into 'screening' or 'digging up dirt', and made it clear the advisory panel it recommended would compile publicly available information only."\* Even a consultation process limited in this way need not be superficial, however. Such a panel might go a long way toward increasing the store of factual information and considered opinion of which candidates and delegates might avail themselves in reaching their decisions.

At the convention the order of business might well be changed to place platform adoption between the selection of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees. This suggestion would seem to run counter to the concern for party prerogatives expressed above, but several considerations persuade me that this is not the case. A platform adopted after, and guided by, the Presidential nominee would enjoy a closer link in the public's mind with the head of the ticket. A platform, after all, is not only a declaration of general party position, but also -- even more so -- a statement of goals a new administration would attempt to pursue. Nor would rearrangement of the schedule necessarily impair the platform's role as party unifier; the nominee's need to unite the party behind him and to heal convention wounds would probably lead him to strengthen the platform's traditional reconciliation functions.

After the nominee had been selected, and while the platform was under consideration, the nominee would consult with the advisory committee about his preferred choices, would avail himself of the information and opinions compiled, and would then name one individual. The convention would then vote. The nominee would retain the option of naming a running mate not on the committee's list, but if he did so, it might be agreed that the convention adjourn and vote by "mini-convention" a week or so later in order to allow time for research and consultation.

This approach strikes me as a fairly sensible extrapolation from the observations presented above. Whether it is feasible in practice is another matter however.

\* Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 January 1974, pg. 49

Appendix G2  
Elizabeth Goddard

PARTY OPTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCEDURES

Technically it is possible for the parties to make changes this year which would affect Vice-Presidential selection. These, for reasons of time, would probably be procedural changes, such as a rearrangement of the order of business. It would be very difficult at this point to enact changes which would influence the behavior of the potential candidates, such as requiring them to provide lists of potential running-mates, although it would be possible to institute some form of consultative process on a short notice.

Realistically, it is not likely that a sitting convention is going to make changes which would take effect immediately. We should make recommendations for immediate action at this convention, but realizing that changes will probably not be made for 1976, we should stress two things: 1) the importance and priority that should be given to Vice-Presidential selection, 2) the necessity for making the rule changes in this convention for effect in 1980 (not the formation of more committees to study the question, but the actual enactment of the changes themselves).

Selective Listing of Party Options for Change

- 1) Rearrangement of convention schedule (Presidential nomination, platform, then Vice-Presidential nomination).
- 2) Institution of a formal consultative process (party committee to be a screening committee, or simply an advisory group).
- 3) Open convention - choice left entirely up to delegates.
- 4) Presidential nominee makes public a list of potential running-mates after nomination, and the convention chooses from this list.
- 5) The Presidential candidates make public lists of potential running-mates before the nomination;

- a) the convention chooses from the list (allowing for inclusion of names of defeated Presidential candidates.
  - b) the Presidential nominee indicates a preference before the convention selects the Vice-Presidential nominee, (allowing for the inclusion of names of defeated Presidential candidates).
- 6) Convention chooses Vice-Presidential nominee from a list provided by a party committee, or other criteria.
- 7) Post-convention choice of the Vice-Presidential nominee:
- a) by committee, or mini-convention
  - b) by the Presidential candidate

#### Analysis of Selected Options

1) If other reforms in the Vice-Presidential selection process have been made, such as a pre-convention listing of potential running-mates, a provision for background investigation and institution of a consultative process, then the proposal for a rearrangement of the convention schedule is not as important, because these measures would mean that care and deliberation in the choice were taking place even before the convention. But in the situation that will probably exist this year, with none of these reforms taking place, the rearrangement of the convention schedule becomes an important and necessary change. It would provide time, which is crucial, for the nominees and their staffs to regroup and proceed in some orderly fashion, and for a more extensive consultative process to insure party acceptance, and to do the checking that is needed.

2) Consultative process. The institution of a consultative process is an important reform, as it is a way to increase input into the selection process while retaining the candidate's dominance in the choice. A consultative mechanism could begin at this convention although there would be logistical problems, mainly of time, since the consulting would probably be taking place at the convention rather than before. This is a process that should be suggested for 1976 but recommended strongly for 1980. The best proposal seems to be for a consultative committee, or advisory group, which meets before the convention (and possibly holds hearings) discusses and does research into potential Vice-Presidential prospects; then at the convention, is available to the nominee in an advisory capacity.

3) Open convention. This is the most readily available option since it already exists in fact though not in practice. There are merits to such a system, but it does not guarantee an improvement in the Vice-Presidential selection process, and is not the best vehicle for change.

4) Presidential nominee makes public a list after nomination, and the convention chooses from this list. This is not an ideal solution, as it does nothing to insure that time has been spent in the choice, and it does not provide time for checking of the choices.

5) Presidential candidates make available lists before the convention. This option is the most promising. It provides for several things which are desirable:

- 1) It insures that the Presidential candidates begin thinking about, and actively working on, Vice-Presidential selection before the convention.
- 2) It makes the potential candidates known and available for public and media exposure, background checking, etc.
- 3) It retains candidate control over the process (especially if the nominee makes a preference known) while allowing more participation from public and party.

It is not very likely that such a system could be instituted this year, unless done voluntarily by the candidates. It should be strongly recommended as a change to be made for 1980, however. The party could make it a requirement for candidates with a certain number of delegates or whatever. There are potential problems however, such as the possibility of a drafted nominee who would not have made a list public.

#### Recommendations

1) That the parties adopt general resolutions stating that Vice-Presidential selection deserves more care than it presently receives, and urging that, especially this year, the Presidential candidates do their homework before the convention, and give Vice-Presidential selection priority.

2) For 1976, changes be made in the rules to allow:

- A) rearrangement of the convention schedule
- B) consultative mechanism

3) For 1980: At this convention changes be made in the rules to require in 1980:

- A) That the candidates announce a list of potential running-mates before the convention (allowing the candidate to make preference known at the convention)
- B) That a party advisory group be formed to serve in a consultative capacity.

- C) That the convention schedule be rearranged (to allow time for the candidate to choose from the list and from the unsuccessful Presidential candidates, and time for consultations with party elements to take place.

A Resolution to be adopted, which recommends the careful use of FBI background investigation, stressing the need to respect the individual's privacy and the need to have the individual's permission.

#### Description of Rules Committee Procedures

##### FOR THE DEMOCRATS:

The Rules Committee of the National Committee meets before the Convention (June 19, 20, and possibly the 21st). Only the members of the committee are present. Any member of the Committee can bring up any resolution for change. The Rules Committee then makes its recommendations to the Convention directly (each delegate receives a copy of their report), and the Convention votes on the recommendations.

#### Possible Means of Change in the Rules For 1976 = Amendment to Rules

At the Rules Committee meeting, it will be moved to adopt the temporary Rules in the Convention Call as the Permanent Rules. At this point, there will be attempts to amend these rules, rule by rule. Vice-Presidential selection amendments could be proposed at this time, by a member of the committee.

#### Other Ways

The Convention can enact changes that have not been accepted by the Rules Committee:

- 1) By minority report of the Rules Committee (25%)
- 2) By suspension of the Rules of the Convention
- 3) Also any delegate can request a special order of business (the Rules Committee has to agree before this is done)

#### Changes for 1980

These would come up at a different time in the Rules Committee meeting. They could be proposed as a simple resolution, or as a charter amendment.

FOR THE REPUBLICANS

The Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee meets before the convention. It makes recommendations to the National Committee, which makes recommendations to the Convention Rules Committee, which begins meeting several days before the convention. The Convention Rules Committee makes recommendations to the full Convention.

The Chairman of the Rules Committee of the National Committee, Kent B. McGough, has indicated that input from interested parties is welcome. The best time for this would be the June 24 meeting of the Rules Committee, at which time they will hold a hearing on Vice-Presidential selection.

Attachments to Party Options Paper: Summary of Republican Party Actions  
on Vice-Presidential Selection

Summary of Democratic Party Actions  
on Vice-Presidential Selection

REPUBLICAN PARTY ACTIONS  
ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION

Subcommittee 2 of the Republican National Committee's reform group, the Rule 29 Committee, considered the question of changes in Vice-Presidential selection methods. They held hearings and solicited recommendations in the spring of 1974.

The preliminary report of the Rule 29 Committee was submitted to the Republican National Committee by June 30, 1974. The final report was presented by January 1, 1975. The Republican National Committee acted upon this report on March 5-6, 1975.

There is one section in the Rule 29 Committee report which deals with Vice-Presidential selection. It is a resolution which recommends that the Republican National Committee continue to review proposals to improve the Vice-Presidential nominating process at the national convention, emphasizing the need for more time for the selection of the nominee.

Before the 1976 convention, the Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee will meet and consider the recommendations of the Rule 29 Committee. The Rules Committee then makes recommendations to the Convention Rules Committee, which makes recommendations to the convention as a whole. On June 24, the Rules Committee of the Republican National Committee will hold a hearing to consider further proposals regarding Vice-Presidential selection. In the words of the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Mary Louise Smith, "Because of the great amount of interest in this subject, our pre-convention Rules Committee will devote considerable time to the matter during its June meeting.

For the convention this year, the Republican National Committee has no plans to make changes in their Vice-Presidential selection process; the actions of the Rules Committee are aimed at the 1980 convention.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY ACTIONS  
ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION

At the miniconvention to select a Vice-Presidential nominee in August, 1972, the Democratic National Committee established a commission to study Vice-Presidential selection with the purpose of recommending changes in the selection procedures of the party convention. Under rules adopted in 1972, the commission had until January 1, 1974, to make a report to the National Committee.

The first meeting of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission was held June 20, 1973, in Washington, D.C. The chairman of the Commission was Senator Hubert Humphrey. At this meeting, the full commission of seventy-five people established an eighteen person executive committee, which then scheduled a meeting in Washington on July 23-24 to discuss means of gathering information and suggestions.

The executive committee held hearings in the fall of 1973 and solicited written opinions on the subject of Vice-Presidential selection.

Several recommendations were produced by the executive committee, which, after slight alteration, were accepted on December 13, 1973, by the full commission. The proposals called for the formation of a screening committee, the lengthening of the convention by one day, and the option of postponing the choice of a Vice-President to a mini-convention twenty-one days after the national convention.

The proposals of the Commission on Vice-Presidential Selection were presented to the Democratic National Committee. The Committee removed the section suggesting the formation of a screening committee, but took no further action on the proposals. None of the proposals were included in the Charter which was adopted at the 1974 miniconvention in Kansas City.

As it stands now, the Democratic National Committee has no plans to change the Vice-Presidential selection process, and they have no plans for any action on the Report of the Vice-Presidential Selection Commission.

Appendix G3  
Charles Greenleaf

### Background Checks of Possible Vice-Presidential Nominees

This paper preliminarily reviews the major considerations in conducting a background investigation of possible Vice-Presidential candidates and outlines proposals for consideration by the study group.

#### Pro-Con

Virtually everyone admits that the Presidential candidates should have more information about the potential running mates than has been available in the past. The choice of Thomas Eagleton in 1972 and of Spiro Agnew in 1968 are illustrations of the need for more information.

However, there are strong arguments that background checks by the FBI are an invasion of privacy. Furthermore, any screening process or information gathering effort by a political party will be criticized as an attempt at "backroom" influence of the selection process.

#### Major Considerations

Who should conduct the background checks and political screening?

The FBI is the only organization equipped to do an extensive personal background investigation. Outside the government, investigative journalists, such as Jack Anderson, will conduct inquiries without much encouragement.

Political screening of a Vice-Presidential prospect's public record could be done by the Presidential candidates or by the party organizations. The press and various interest groups will also have a major role in publicizing the record of leading Vice-Presidential contenders.

What should be checked?

An FBI check, if authorized, would probably be in the nature of a "full field investigation," not as massively detailed as the checks of Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller when they were Vice-Presidential nominees.

Aside from an FBI check of personal information, there should be a review of the public record of the potential Vice-Presidents. Positions taken throughout his political career should be documented. Material on

Congressional service is relatively easy to collect, compared with information about a person's record at the state or local level.

When should the checks be made?

The information should be collected prior to the nominating conventions. Sanford Ungar's recent book, The FBI, indicates that it normally takes fifteen days to investigate a Presidential appointment. The background check on Nelson Rockefeller used 350 agents and took a total of 1,400 interviews. A pre-nomination investigation of several possible candidates would not be as extensive, but it would require a week or two at least.

A comprehensive review of the political record of possible nominees would take longer, whether done by the staff of a Presidential candidate or by a political party committee.

#### Action by the Study Group

I submit two proposals for consideration by the study group: 1) an FBI check mechanism and 2) a research process by the party organizations.

1) FBI Check. Any study group recommendation for FBI background checks depends upon further study by us of existing practices and authorities. If statutory authorization is not required for an investigation, the President could ask the FBI to conduct a "top secret" security clearance for potential Vice-Presidential choices in the following manner:

\*Presidential candidates with a reasonable chance of getting the nomination would be allowed to submit to the FBI up to 10 possibilities for Vice-President.

\*The Presidential candidates should inform their choices of the pending background check and give them a chance to decline being investigated.

\*The results of the FBI check would be available only to the winner of the nomination. Unused data would be destroyed.

(This concept is similar to the bill introduced in 1973 by Senator William Brock. The bill has not been introduced in the current Congress, nor has any bill pertaining to FBI checks of Vice-Presidential candidates.)

2) Research on Candidates by the Party Organizations. One would hope that Presidential candidates would direct campaign staffers to scrutinize the public records of possible Vice-Presidential nominees, but it is unlikely that the candidates have the money or the time to accomplish this project adequately, particularly when the pre-convention campaigns are closely contested.

Instead of just relying upon Presidential candidates to do research about their choices for running-mate, the party organizations should help do the job of screening in a formal role.

In 1973 the Humphrey Commission proposed that the Democratic National Committee establish an Advisory Committee on the Vice-Presidential nomination. The Advisory Committee of 7-10 members could be selected after consultation with all Presidential candidates in the party. The Committee would collect information from public records about all potential Vice-Presidential nominees. Its work would not in any way be binding, the Committee should make no recommendations whatsoever, and it should submit its information to the nominee at the convention.

These two proposals, the FBI checks and the candidate research by the party, are examples of specific actions that the study group must produce, if we are to have any impact on reforming the Vice-Presidential selection process.

Attachments: excerpt from the Congressional Record, November 26, 1973  
a bill, S.2741, 93d Congress, November 26, 1973



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93<sup>d</sup> CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 119

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1973

No. 181

## Senate

By Mr. BROCK:

S. 2741. A bill to provide for an investigation of the character and past activities of potential Vice-Presidential nominees by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, as everyone knows, we will soon be voting on the confirmation of a new Vice President. Events of the past 15 months amply demonstrate the need to take a hard look at the methods by which a Vice President is chosen.

When we examine both history and current events, we see that there is a vast difference between the scrutiny that a potential President and a potential Vice President receives. Normally, a man who desires the office of President of the United States must receive a great deal of publicity if he hopes to even have a chance of being elected. During the time period between a potential President's name being mentioned as a possible candidate and his actual nomination, the candidate is subjected to intense examination by the press and the general public. This examination keeps a Presidential candidate constantly in the public eye. Such scrutiny has often resulted in a candidate's withdrawing from the Presidential race.

This is not true of a potential Vice President, however. Under the present method of choosing the Vice President, the candidate who is selected is more often than not relatively unknown to the public. This means that a Vice-Presidential candidate virtually never receives the scrutiny that a Presidential candidate receives. Often, less than 24 hours passes between the time of a Presidential candidate's nomination and a Vice-Presidential candidate's nomination. Adequate investigation is impossible under such circumstances.

Today, I would like to introduce a bill which will eliminate many of the problems created by the present system of choosing the Vice President. This bill would allow, but not require, Presidential candidates with a reasonable chance of winning the nomination to submit the names of up to 10 possibilities for Vice President to the FBI. Reasonable chance of winning means that a candidate either has 10 percent of the delegate votes, or is among the top three contenders.

The investigation of the contenders shall consist of the normal procedures used for a top-secret clearance. The results of the investigations shall be re-

leased only to the winner of the Presidential nomination and only with the written consent of the person investigated. Also, only the Presidential candidate himself and one other staff member chosen by the Presidential candidate may view the records at all times.

An FBI agent would serve as custodian of the records. After the selection of the Vice President by the party convention, all investigation reports including the investigation of the Vice-Presidential candidate shall be destroyed. It will be a Federal offense of up to 5 years imprisonment and a \$50,000 fine for unlawful disclosure of the results of any investigation.

Mr. President, this bill I am introducing will provide the means to prevent the recurrence of events such as the ones of this past 15 months. The investigations provided for by this bill should determine the fitness of the man who, if elected, would be a heartbeat away from the Presidency. At the same time, this bill forbids the leaking of information about the people being investigated, and thus it safeguards their rights of privacy.

### SALIENT POINTS OF BILL

First. At the conclusion of the final Presidential primary of final nominating convention, but in any case at least 1 month prior to the party convention, those candidates with at least 10 percent committed delegates at that time, or the top three contenders, shall have the right to submit to the FBI the names of not more than 10 persons to be investigated for the office of Vice President.

Second. The investigation shall consist of the normal procedures used for a top secret clearance.

Third. These investigations shall be released only to the winner of the Presidential nomination, and only with the written consent of the person investigated. Also, only the Presidential candidate himself and one other staff member chosen by the Presidential candidate may view the records, and at all times, there shall be an FBI agent present as custodian of records.

Fourth. After selection of the Vice President by the party convention, all investigation reports including the investigation on the Vice-Presidential candidate shall be destroyed.

Fifth. It shall be a Federal offense of up to 5 years imprisonment and a \$50,000 fine for unlawful disclosure.

93<sup>d</sup> CONGRESS  
1<sup>st</sup> SESSION

# S. 2741

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 26, 1973

Mr. BROCK introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

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## A BILL

To provide for an investigation of the character and past activities of potential Vice-Presidential nominees by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That, for purposes of this Act, the term—

4               (1) "Presidential primary" means any election  
5       held for the expression of a preference by the voters of  
6       a State for the nomination of a candidate for election  
7       to the office of President;

8               (2) "political party" means any political party  
9       whose candidate for election to the office of President in  
10       the most recently conducted Presidential election received

1 more than 10 per centum of the total number of votes  
2 cast throughout the United States for all such candidates,  
3 treating votes cast for the election of Presidential and  
4 Vice-Presidential electors who are affiliated with a  
5 political party as votes cast for the Presidential candidate  
6 of that party;

7 (3) "national nominating convention" means a  
8 convention held by a political party for the purpose of  
9 nominating the candidate of that party for the office of  
10 President; and

11 (4) "Presidential candidate" means an individual  
12 who—

13 (A) is qualified under the Constitution to serve  
14 as President if elected to that office, and

15 (B) files with the Attorney General, not later  
16 than thirty days before the date on which the na-  
17 tional nominating convention of a political party is  
18 scheduled to begin—

19 (i) a statement in writing personally  
20 signed by him stating that he is a candidate for  
21 the nomination of that party for election to the  
22 office of President; and

23 (ii) statements in writing personally  
24 signed by a substantial number of delegates who  
25 are entitled to vote in such convention for the

1 selection of the candidate of that party for elec-  
2 tion to the office of President stating that they  
3 intend to vote for the nomination of that individ-  
4 ual as the candidate of that party for election to  
5 the office of President when the convention is  
6 held.

7 For purposes of clause (ii), an individual shall be  
8 considered to have furnished statements from a sub-  
9 stantial number of delegates to the national nomi-  
10 nating convention of a political party if he has fur-  
11 nished the greatest, next greatest, or third greatest  
12 number of statements from such delegates, or if he  
13 has furnished statements from 10 per centum of  
14 such delegates.

15 SEC. 2. (a) The Attorney General upon receiving a  
16 written request from a Presidential candidate shall conduct  
17 an investigation through the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
18 of not more than ten individuals listed in that request by the  
19 Presidential candidate as potential Vice-Presidential nom-  
20 inees. The investigation shall be of the same nature, extent,  
21 and scope as an investigation conducted by the Federal  
22 Bureau of Investigation in connection with the granting of  
23 a top secret security clearance to any individual employed  
24 by the United States.

1 (b) No evidence or information obtained by an investi-  
2 gation conducted under subsection (a) shall be released to  
3 any person without the written consent of the individual who  
4 is the subject of the investigation.

5 (c) If an individual investigated under subsection (a)  
6 consents in writing under subsection (b) to the disclosure of  
7 the evidence and information obtained in that investigation,  
8 the Attorney General shall permit inspection of such evi-  
9 dence and information by the Presidential candidate who re-  
10 quested the investigation together with one other person des-  
11 ignated by the candidate, if such candidate has been nomi-  
12 nated by the national nominating convention of the political  
13 party with which he is affiliated. Any such inspection shall  
14 be carried out on premises designated by the Attorney Gen-  
15 eral in the presence of an employee of the Federal Bureau  
16 of Investigation, who shall be custodian of such evidence  
17 and information. No copy, record, or memorandum of any  
18 matter contained in such evidence and information shall be  
19 made by the candidate or the person designated by the candi-  
20 date to inspect the evidence and information with him, and no  
21 piece of such evidence or information shall be removed from  
22 the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

23 SEC. 3. Upon the nomination a candidate for election  
24 to the office of Vice President by the national nominating  
25 convention of a political party all evidence and information

5

1 obtained under section 2 relating to potential Vice-Presi-  
2 dential nominees of that party shall be destroyed and no  
3 memorandum, copy, or other record of such evidence or  
4 information shall be retained.

5       SEC. 4. No evidence or information obtained under or in  
6 connection with an investigation carried out under this Act  
7 shall be admissible in any proceeding before any court of the  
8 United States or of any State.

9       SEC. 5. The disclosure, release, or retention of evidence  
10 or information in violation of the provisions of this Act shall  
11 be punishable by a fine not to exceed \$50,000, imprison-  
12 ment for not to exceed five years, or both.

Appendix H

SELECTED COMMENT ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION

Each Presidential election year brings, with measured regularity, a rising chorus of complaints about how Vice Presidents are selected. Solemn pledges "to do something" about the selection process ring through political party caucuses, and the heavy artillery of the political pundits thunders in at just the right moment, for effect.

It was all well said in 1906 by Finley Peter Dunne:

"It's sthrange about th' vice prisidincy," said Mr. Dooley. "The prisidincy is th' highest office in th' gift iv th' people. Th' vice prisidincy is th' next highest an' th' lowest. It isn't a crime exactly. Ye can't be sint to jail f'r it, but it's a kind iv a disgrace. It's like writin' anonymous letters. At a convintion nearly all th' dillygates lave as soon as they've nomynated th' prisidint f'r fear wan iv them will be nomynated f'r vice prisidint."

Mr. Dooley would, however, be suprised at the recent history of Vice-Presidential selection, during which the Vice Presidency has become more and more of a sought-after prize. Being Vice President is inescapably the best way to become President.

Of the 38 American Presidents, 13 (or more than a third) were Vice Presidents first. These 13 have been President for more than a third of the nation's 200 years. The figures for this century are even more startling. Of the 13 Twentieth Century American Presidents,

6 were first Vice President, and they have been President for 34 of the 76 years (45 per cent). Putting it another way, in this century the odds are about one to two that the Vice President will one day become President.

Whether or not changing the way Vice Presidents are selected is an idea whose time has finally arrived is a good question. It may simply be that the Vice Presidency is like the weather: everyone complains about it, but no one can change it.

The following excerpts from editorials, columns, and so forth are illustrative of the thousands of pages written on this subject--- and they reveal the near-unity of judgement that it is, indeed, time for a change in how we select Vice Presidents.

-- K. Dun Gifford

Endicott Peabody, Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1972

We cannot have a Vice President, a potential President, who has been chosen by anything less than a deliberative and collective decision by a free and open convention.

Milton Viorst, Washington Star, July 24, 1972

I am convinced that one of the reforms both parties should have high on the agenda for 1976 is a procedure for choosing the vice presidential candidate as openly as the Democrats this year chose their presidential candidate.

Courtenay R. Sheldon, Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1972

A simple switch in the order of business at political conventions could help avoid another "agony over Eagleton". The Democrats are already thinking about such a plan, says Joseph A. Califano, Jr., general counsel of the Democratic National Committee.

Clayton Fritchey, Washington Post, August 5, 1972

Every four years there is a new round of hand wringing over the way American Vice Presidents are chosen. The only difference is that, in the wake of the Eagleton crisis, the wails are even louder.

Admittedly, our hit-and-miss way of selecting vice-presidential nominees leaves a great deal to be desired, but in practice it hasn't worked too badly.

Erwin D. Canham, Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1972

The Eagleton mess could easily have been avoided. But total reform of the process by which vice-presidential candidates are chosen is more complicated. It ought to be done.

To have the vice-presidential candidate designated by a weary presidential nominee, under the worst of circumstances, is an intolerable risk.

Alan L. Otten, Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1972

At the moment all public attention is still focused on better methods for picking a vice presidential nominee. The Democratic disaster over the dropping of Senator Eagleton and the embarrassingly prolonged pursuit of a substitute has touched off an avalanche of proposals for improving the process.

Richard L. Strout, Christian Science Monitor, August 18, 1972

Vice presidents can be fun. Without them how could we idle away the time agreeing that there ought to be a better way of picking vice presidents? Then we go on to something else.

Five presidents in office since 1900 were at one time or another targets of assassins. In all, eight vice presidents have filled vacancies. Six of these eight were chosen without much more thought of their qualities than a city political machine gives to picking a candidate for coroner.

Editorial, Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1972

The selection process used by both parties in respect to vice presidential candidates is out of date and defective... there must be a more responsible way than the present system. The parties won't face the problem again until 1976. That should be enough time to find an alternative.

Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1972

The traumatic problems which Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern has just undergone in choosing a running mate have sharply spotlighted the weaknesses in the American system of selecting and electing a vice president.

Any new system that is worked out should at the least allow for a broader and more representative group of selectors for the nominee, and aim to bring in the strongest possible candidate on the basis of merit.

Editorial, Chicago Tribune, August 12, 1972

What the authors of these and other proposals overlook is that the present system is workable and is probably the most sensible in sight. It occasionally flounders because the delegates have traditionally voted for the man chosen by the Presidential nominee, and that Presidential nominee can sometimes be an amateurish bumbler.

Such was the case in the Eagleton affair. The reformers' complaint is not with the system, but with the bad judgement of one George S. McGovern.

Editorial, Washington Star, August 18, 1972

The short sojourn of Senator Thomas Eagleton on the Democratic national ticket ought to have the one salutary effect of getting people to think about how we choose vice presidential candidates. There must be a better way.

Editorial, Chicago Tribune, November 12, 1972

In any event, we see no reason to junk the present system and resort to experimentation. What is needed is to let the system work as intended.

New York Times, December 15, 1972

Spurred by memories of the 1972 Eagleton case, a Democratic party commission has proposed creation of a screening committee to check the background of future Vice Presidential possibilities.

New York Times, December 16, 1972

A Democratic party commission has agreed on a series of proposals to provide more careful selection of Vice Presidential nominees. The commission recommended creation of an advisory commission to check the backgrounds of possible nominees... It also adopted a procedure that would insure at least 48 hours between the selection of the Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees.

Theodore H. White, "The Making of the President 1972"

The way Americans choose vice presidents has always been absurd, but never quite so absurd as in the Democratic exercise of 1972...No one had been assigned to do any kind of background check (on Eagleton).

(In contrast), Nixon thought that Agnew's speech nominating Nixon was the best. Nixon was enormously impressed by the man with the square-cut jaw, the athletic frame, the commanding presence on the screen...

James Reston, New York Times, October 12, 1973

The Agnew Affair, following on the Eagleton Affair, suggests again that the normal procedures for selecting vice presidential candidates in America have been almost criminally negligent, so maybe they should be examined before President Nixon picks a successor for Spiro Agnew.

Lawrence Meyer, Washington Post, October 13, 1973

One of the obvious pitfalls in selecting a vice presidential candidate--made painfully obvious by events over the last 15 months--is how a hastily made choice of running mate can come back to haunt the presidential nominee.

Paul Hope, Washington Star, October 15, 1973

Most other presidential candidates probably have used equally slipshod procedures in selecting their running mates, but the cases of Eagleton and Agnew make a pressing case for finding a better way.

David S. Broder, Washington Post, October 21, 1973

(The parties) pick their vice presidential candidates overnight... in a frantic, disorganized and essentially closed series of meetings with an exhausted, distracted presidential nominee.

New York Times, November 8, 1973

Two top Democrats (Hubert H. Humphrey and Robert S. Strauss) indicated support today for a proposal to remove the selection of future Vice Presidential nominees from the Presidential nominating conventions.

Marquis Childs, Washington Post, November 13, 1973

One good thing that can come out of all this grisly business is some hard thinking about how we choose our Vice Presidents. This has been a form of political Russian roulette with luck more often than not against the first party pulling the trigger.

Surely never again can a weary political convention allow the presidential candidate to pick an unknown, out of the hat.

David S. Broder, Washington Post, December 14, 1973

A Democratic Party commission yesterday recommended giving future presidential nominees better information and more time to pick their running mates...The Commission recommended that an advisory panel of party "wise men" assemble all available information about prospective vice presidential candidates....

Editorial, Washington Star, October 15, 1973

The Republican and Democratic parties should give serious consideration to the matter before the 1976 conventions. At the very least, more time for investigation and contemplation should be given between the time the presidential nominee is selected and the deadline for his choosing a running mate.

Editorial, Washington Star, December 31, 1973

It appears that the Democratic party might be getting around to changing the haphazard and hazardous method of choosing vice presidential nominees. It's high time.

Lou Cannon, Washington Post, April 28, 1974

Strong Republican sentiment for changing the way in which the GOP chooses its vice presidential nominee became apparent yesterday at a meeting of the party's reform committee.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., letter to the Editor, Washington Post, December 3, 1974

Recent events have evoked considerable agreement that something is amiss with the existing methods of choosing Vice Presidents...The (Democratic) party conference this weekend should explore ways to moving in the direction of a more democratic selection of the Vice President.

James Reston, New York Times, May 19, 1976

Reporter...are usually accused of being too nose in their questions to Presidential candidates..., but on the problem of picking Vice Presidents, they have probably been too casual and even indifferent.

We need to take a hard look at the problem of selection now, and at least between the end of the primaries in early June and the opening of the conventions in July, insist on asking the leaders not only where they are going but who's going with them.

John Adams, first American Vice President

My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived.

I am vice president. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything.

Daniel Webster, in rejecting the Vice Presidential nomination in 1848

No, thank you. I do not propose to be buried until I am really dead and in my coffin.

Harry Truman

Look at all the Vice Presidents in history. Where are they? They were about as useful as a cow's fifth teat.

John Nance Garner, to Lyndon B. Johnson at the 1960 Convention

I'll tell you, Lyndon, the vice presidency isn't worth a pitcher of warm spit.

Richard M. Nixon, before being elected President

(The Vice Presidency is a) hollow shell--the most ill-conceived, poorly defined position in the American political system.

Spiro T. Agnew, New York Times, August 23, 1972

The very nature of the democratic system in itself precludes any guarantee that a Vice Presidential nominee will conform to some platonic idea of who is "perfect" for the job. It is also the fact that, whatever its imperfections, our present system has passed the pragmatic test time and again. By this standard alone, it is immeasurably superior to the retrogressive "reform" proposals which some critics are now advancing.

Presidential nominee Richard Monckton (a fictional character in John Erlichman's novel, The Company), talking about his running mate to an aide just after having received the nomination:

"Having him spend his television time doing a lead into my taking the stage here. What do you think of that?"

"That's great, if he'll do it," said Flaherty.

Monckton compressed his lips in anger. "Why the hell shouldn't he do it, if we tell him to?"

"He's a pretty proud man; a former Governor and all that. He may want to do his own statement."

"Wait, Frank. Let's settle that one thing right now. He's Vice-President for only one reason: I picked him and put him there. Doesn't he know that, Frank?"

"Yes, sir, I'm sure he does."

"Then there should be no problem. Just tell him that's what I've decided, Frank. Cold turkey. He'd better begin to get used to instructions. Right?"

"Yes, sir."

# CAMPAIGN

## RECOMMENDATIONS TO MEMBER FIRMS

### CANDIDATES FOR THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

#### OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT PARTIES

HEED, Inc.

"Helping Enterprise and Economic Development"

The Political Action Committee  
of the  
Rochester Area Chamber of Commerce

"Businessmen deserve the lousy government they're always griping about. They talk a lot about getting good men elected, but when it comes to working in a campaign, they're always busy. When it comes to writing a check, they develop palsy. A bit harsh? Perhaps, but the same story is heard all over the country from political aspirants dedicated to the free enterprise system who feel deserted by those who would benefit most from their election."

Former Congressman Larry Hogan

\* \* \*

Recent changes in the federal election laws now permit the business community to get more involved politically. Three key elements of the new law drive this involvement:

1. Business enterprises are now permitted to form political action committees (PACs) and spend company resources (within certain limits) in support of specific candidates. This permits equity with the labor unions which have been permitted to form PACs for many years.
2. The new law also limits direct individual contributions to \$1000 per candidate. Large contributions from a small number of affluent supporters are no longer possible. Thus, we must mobilize many small contributions from a large number of business executives and managers.
3. The recent Supreme Court interpretation of the law allows individuals to get together in support of the candidate of their choice and spend unlimited amounts, provided their efforts are not directly coordinated with the candidate's.

These new developments open the door to active and positive involvement by the business community in our national political process.

That's one of the purposes of this paper. At the request of the Chamber executives, the Political Action Committee has developed evaluations of candidates of both major parties. This document will discuss (1) the background of this paper (2) the approach taken and (3) our recommendations.

Based on a long standing chamber policy, though, we leave it to each of you as individuals to review this material, reach your own conclusions, and support the candidate of your choice.

#### BACKGROUND

Late in 1975, key members of the Chamber of Commerce concluded that the Chamber should take a more active role in the caucuses and primaries leading up to the party nomination of both major political parties. To make intelligent recommendations, though, we required hard information on the positions of all candidates on major issues of interest to the business community. We decided that: (1) our recommendations should focus on issues rather than personalities (2) that we should keep an open mind by allowing all candidates to make their case and (3) we would restrict ourselves to business issues and not attempt to cover the waterfront in other admittedly important areas such as detente, Middle East Policy, civil right, abortion or nuclear disarmament.

Toward this end, a letter was sent to all major announced candidates of both political parties. In it, we asked each for his positions on the following issues:

1. Economic growth
2. Tax reform
3. Business reporting and paperwork to government agencies
4. International trade
5. Federal role in R & D funding
6. Consumer Affairs
7. Energy policy
8. Anti-Trust Enforcement
9. FTC and ICC regulations, and trade regulation reform
10. Federal government reorganization
11. Banking and Securities regulation
12. Federal Labor Law (Taft Hartley, Landrum Griffin, ERISA)
13. Any other matters of pertinent interest to the business sector.

Responses were received from Birch Bayh, Frank Church, Morris Udall, Jimmy Carter, and Henry Jackson (all Democrats); as well as Gerald Ford (Republican). Where responses were not received, we utilized whatever quoted information was available in the press and other media, as well as the candidates' prior track record in public office.

#### APPROACH

We consolidated all replies received with other available information, seeking to determine which candidates merit business support. Toward that end we:

1. Abstracted the candidates' positions on the 12 key issues.
2. Reduced the issues to 6 (economic growth, tax reform, government bureaucracy and reporting, energy, labor law and trade regulation). The other 7 were dropped because virtually all candidates have no well-developed positions in these critical business areas. (This shortfall underscores a need for our active involvement.)
3. Summarized the positions of those 5 candidates (Ford, Reagan, Carter, Jackson and Udall) who are considered serious contenders as of April 1. These summaries are attached for your review. Other candidates' positions will be completed shortly.
4. We also developed stack-ranked point scores on most major candidates who provided fairly complete positions. Logan Cheek, Co-Chairman of the PAC will be glad to discuss these rankings with you if you wish. He can be reached at (716) 422-8316 (office) or 223-3393 (home).

We invite you to review the attached summaries and reach your own conclusions. Both Republican Candidates have requested donations or inquiries to go through their national offices, while all Democratic contenders have asked that you contact their local office. We also have available copies of all documentation provided by each candidate. It may provide you with additional insights and is available on request.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

We urge each Chamber member to take any or all the following actions:

1. If your firm has a Political Action Committee, support your chosen candidates financially. You may provide PAC support up to \$5000 per candidate. Send all contributions directly to the candidate's campaign headquarters.
2. Contribute individually to all recommended candidates. In this regard, contributions of up to \$100 are tax deductible (\$200 on joint entries), but you are permitted to contribute up to \$1000 to each candidate and up to \$25,000 to all candidates. If you contribute more than \$100, Federal Election Law requires you state your name, address, occupation and principal employer.
3. Talk up the qualifications and positions of your candidate(s) among your business associates and friends and urge their financial and volunteer support.
4. Volunteer your own time for your candidate or any others you choose to support. For further information, contact the local campaign headquarters of the candidate of your choice.
5. If you would like to substantially support any candidate as an individual above the \$1000 limit, contact any member of the Political Action Committee listed below. We may be able to steer you toward like-minded businessmen.

Thanks, in advance, for your time and support in this important effort.

Respectfully submitted,

HEED, Inc.

"Helping Enterprise and Economic Development"

The Political Action Committee  
of the Rochester Area Chamber of Commerce

*Logan M. Cheek*

Logan M. Cheek, Co-Chairman  
Xerox Corporation (716) 422-8316

Peter Allan, Co-Chairman  
Association Management Services (716) 546-7241

Kevin J. Kelley, Secretary  
Rochester Chamber of Commerce (716) 454-2220

# Action Call

## ISSUE:

1976 Presidential contenders of Democratic and Republican parties.

## ACTION NEEDED:

Support for candidates of your choice.

April 7, 1976

### BACKGROUND

The Chamber's Political Action Committee recently completed an analysis of the campaign positions of all major contenders of both parties. The analysis was based on materials supplied by candidates' campaign staffs as well as information on public record. Their positions, along with the Chamber's, are enclosed on the following issues: Economic Growth, Tax Reform, Regulations on Business, and Energy.

### WHO CARES?

We hope you do. Read on. "Businessmen deserve the lousy government they're always griping about. They talk a lot about getting good men elected, but when it comes to working in a campaign, they're always busy. When it comes to writing a check, they develop palsy. A bit harsh? Perhaps, but the same story is heard all over the country from political aspirants dedicated to the free enterprise system who feel deserted by those who would benefit most from their election." Former Congressman Larry Hogan (Maryland).

### YOUR ROLE

Get involved by supporting the candidate of your choice as Larry Hogan suggests. So if you think business needs better representation in government, remember: "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem!" For further information on how to support the candidate of your choice, contact the listed campaign headquarters on the reverse side.

Enc.

CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS

for

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

President Gerald R. Ford  
The President Ford Committee  
1828 L Street, N.W., Room 250  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Governor Jimmy Carter  
Carter Campaign Committee  
112 Powers Building  
Rochester, New York 14614

Governor George Wallace  
The Wallace Campaign  
P.O. Box 1976  
Montgomery, Alabama 36103

Rep. Morris Udall  
Udall '76 Committee  
401 C Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Ronald Reagan  
Citizens for Reagan  
2021 L Street, N.W., Suite 340  
Washington, D.C. 20026

Senator Henry Jackson  
Jackson for President Committee  
511 Second Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

Senator Birch Bayh  
Birch Bayh in '76  
P.O. Box 1500  
Washington, D.C. 20013

Senator Fred Harris  
Fred Harris Presidential Campaign  
1412 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

No response/Insufficient Data/Withdrawn

Governor Jerry Brown  
Senator Frank Church  
R. Sargent Shriver  
Ellen McCormack  
Governor Milton Shapp

ECONOMIC GROWTHTAX REFORMREGULATIONS ON BUSINESSENERGYRochester Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. Policy and Objectives

Develop a long-range economic growth program that will consider tax structure, business regulations, financial resources, and other factors to reduce the cost of doing business.

Reduce taxes on business to allow business to accumulate and allocate more income for investment in new facilities and equipment.

Reduce the number of excessive regulations on business.

Encourage offshore drilling for the immediate development of oil and gas.

Henry Jackson

First priority is full employment. Cannot afford not to have it. Must sharply increase housing production, rebuild railroads, build parks and recreation areas.

Close tax loopholes on multinational companies.

No position provided.

Promote energy independence. Stand up to big oil companies. Must put lid on oil prices, which are responsible for one half of current inflation. Establish Energy Development Board.

Morris Udall

Expand money supply. Decrease interest rates. Enact Humphrey-Hawkins bill to expand public works, add 400,000 construction workers to rehabilitable railroads, and provide low interest loans to stimulate construction. Institute a broad program of public service jobs. Put lid on increases in food and energy prices.

Extend tax cuts through 1977. Plug all loopholes. Evaluate capital gains preference. Tap large businesses same as small businesses. Increase taxes on multinational corporations. Help states control exploding property taxes. Make social security taxes less regressive.

No position on business reporting to government which is one of the outgrowths of regulation.

Full funding of energy research, prime focus on non-nuclear sources and conservation. Force realistic utility pricing. No pass through of increased fuel or advertising costs to the consumer. Deconcentrate energy industry horizontally and vertically. Prevent new energy monopolies. Create federal yardstick corporation for fossil fuel development. Increase natural gas prices.

Ronald Reagan

Inflation is the prime cause of unemployment and slow growth. We will never build a lasting economic recovery by going into debt at a faster rate we ever have before.

Reform social security, particularly to allow retirees who have returned to work to collect benefits and to allow married women to collect from their contributions.

Harassing regulations of business and society must be eliminated.

Ford's energy bill is a disaster. Project independence has become project dependence.

Gerald Ford

Advocates holding down federal spending and national debt. Reducing unemployment is the job of the private sector. The government should not provide extensive public works jobs to solve unemployment.

Proposed tax cuts effective July 1, 1976, where the American taxpayer and business would have a 28 billion dollar reduction.

Has set up Commission on Federal paperwork to make recommendations on reductions of paperwork. Advocates reduction of government regulations and paperwork on business by 10%.

Advocates development of nuclear power. Advocates deregulation of natural gas. Proposes production of oil from naval petroleum reserves. Advocates increase in domestic production.

Jimmy Carter

The most important economic thrust should be toward employment . . . (particularly in) energy, transportation, health care, education, and housing. Most costs can be absorbed within present budget allocations through businesslike planning and budgeting. We also need an aggressive sale of American products overseas. Only . . . as a last resort should we create public employment jobs.

"I do not favor a tax cut in 1976. I believe most Americans would much rather see some control over excessive spending. I do, however, favor a grossly simplified tax system that eliminates most deductions and drops sharply the marginal tax rate."

Government reporting requirements on business should be reduced, simplified or abolished where possible.

We must rapidly finalize and implement a national energy policy. Prime attention must be given to coal and solar power, and toward mandatory conservation efforts. Nuclear power plant design must be standardized.

NOTE: Fred Harris - No response; Birch Bayh - Dropped out; George Wallace - No response; Edmund G. Brown - No response; Frank Church - No response to questions asked.

POINT EVALUATION RANKINGS OF MAJOR CANDIDATES

	Economic Growth	Tax Reform	Business Reporting	International Trade	R&D Funding	Consumer Affairs	Energy	Anti-trust	Trade Regulation	Federal Govt Reorgan'n	Banking Regulation	Labor Law	TOTAL
FORD	+2	+2	0	+2	0	+3	+3	+1	+3	0	+2	+3	+22
REAGAN	0	+2	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+3	0	+3	+12
CARTER	+2	-3	+5	+1	+1	+1	+4	+1	+3	+5	0	+1	+21
JACKSON	+1	+2	0	-1	0	-1	+5	0	0	-2	0	-3	+4
UDALL	-3	-2	0	-1	+1	-2	+2	-4	-3	+2	0	-3	-13
WALLACE	+1	-2	0	?	0	-1	+2	-1	-1	+2	0	-2	-2
HARRIS	-4	-4	0	-1	0	-2	-2	-5	-3	-3	-2	-2	-28
BAYH	-3	+2	0	+1	0	-1	+1	-3	0	-2	0	-3	-8

NO RESPONSE: Church, Brown, McCormack, Byrd, Hayes

Political Action Committee  
Rochester Area Chamber of Commerce  
April 5, 1976

GERALD FORD

Economic Growth: Aim for long-term, permanent results by curbing inflation and stimulating private industry. Bring a halt to the momentous growth of government. Authorized subsidized construction of 250,000 single family low to moderate income homes.

Tax Reform: Balance future tax cuts with dollar-for-dollar federal spending cuts.

Government Bureaucracy and Reporting: Reduce reporting requirements 10%

Energy: Stabilize gasoline prices; increase domestic oil production; develop emergency energy reserves; promote conservation; impose mandatory auto efficiency standards; permit production from Naval reserves; deregulate natural gas.

Labor Law: No position provided, but no significant unfavorable changes expected.

Trade Regulation: Stop unnecessary and unjustified harrassment by OSHA and other regulatory agencies. Strictly enforce anti-trust laws. Deregulate and foster competition in airlines, trucking, railroads, and financial institutions.

RONALD REAGAN

Economic Growth: Inflation is the prime cause of unemployment and slow growth.  
"We will never build a lasting economic recovery by going into debt at a faster rate than we ever have before."

Tax Reform: Reform social security, particularly to allow older workers to work and collect benefits, and to allow married women to collect from their contributions.

Government Bureaucracy and Reporting: Cut bureaucracies, with assistance of independent volunteer citizen study groups. Cut business reporting, currently estimated at 10 billion annual submissions costing over \$50 billion to compile.

Energy: Energy bill is a disaster. "Project Independence has become Project Dependence." "Drilling rigs all over this land have closed down."

Labor Law: No position provided, but no significant unfavorable changes are expected.

Trade Regulation: Harrassing regulations of business and society must be eliminated.

JIMMY CARTER

Economic Growth: "The most important economic thrust should be toward employment ... (particularly in) ... energy, transportation, health care, education, and housing. Most costs can be absorbed within present budget allocations through businesslike planning and budgeting." "We also need aggressive sale of American products abroad. Only as a last resort should we create public employment jobs."

Tax Reform: "I do not favor a tax cut in 1976. I believe most Americans would much rather see some control over excessive spending. I do, however, favor a grossly simplified tax system that eliminates most deductions and drops sharply the marginal tax rate. "

Government Bureaucracy and Reporting: "The first piece of legislation I will send to Congress will initiate a complete overhaul of our Federal bureaucracy and budgeting systems. By executive order, I will require zero-base budgeting for all Federal departments, bureaus and boards. " " I believe the present 1900 Federal departments can be reduced to 200." Government reporting requirements on business must be simplified, reduced, or abolished where possible."

Energy: "We must rapidly finalize and implement a national energy policy. Prime attention must be given to coal and solar power, and toward mandatory conservation efforts. Nuclear power plant design must be standardized. "

Labor Law: Would sign the repeal of 14B of the Taft Hartley Law (Right to Work), but will not fight for repeal. No other significant positions.

Trade Regulation: No significant positions, but position on government reorganization and bureaucracy suggests major simplification.

HENRY JACKSON

Economic Growth: First priority is full employment. Cannot afford not to have it. Must sharply increase housing production, rebuild railroads, build parks and recreation areas, and move to energy independence. Must pass Humphrey-Hawkins Bill to guarantee full employment. Must institute "National Planning Board" of public and private members. Legislate credit to stimulate depressed areas.

Tax Reform: Close tax loopholes on multinational companies. No other position provided.

Government Bureaucracy and Reporting: No position provided on reorganization. Supports ERISA reporting as presently constituted.

Energy: Promote energy independence. Stand up to big oil companies. Must put lid on oil prices, which are responsible for 1/2 of current inflation. Establish Energy Development Board.

Labor Law: Will lead fight to repeal 14B of Taft Hartley Law (Right to Work). "I am proud of my high COPE rating."

Trade Regulation: No position provided.

MORRIS UDALL

Economic Growth: "Expand money supply." "Decrease interest rates." "Enact Humphrey Hawkins Bill." "Expand public works, add 400,000 construction workers to rehabilitate railroads, and provide low interest loans to stimulate construction." Institute a broad program of labor intensive public service jobs. Put lid on increases in food and energy prices."

Tax Reform: Extend tax cuts through 1977. Plug all tax loopholes. Eliminate capital gains preference. Tax large businesses the same as small businesses. Increase taxes on multinationals. Help states control exploding property taxes. Make social security taxes less regressive.

Government Bureaucracy and Reporting: Military is top heavy. Drop duplicate weapons systems. Drop three ground divisions for the Army. No position on business reporting to government.

Energy: Full funding of Federal energy research program. Prime focus on non-nuclear sources and conservation. Force realistic utility pricing. Forbid pass-through of increased fuel and advertising costs. Deconcentrate energy industry horizontally and vertically. Prevent new energy monopolies. Create Federal yardstick corporation for fossil fuel development. Increase natural gas prices.

Labor Law: Will lead fight to repeal 14B of Taft Hartley. Need Federal minimum on unemployment payments equal to 2/3 of the average weekly wage. Upgrade and extend workmen's compensation. Extend jurisdiction of the NLRB to public employees and large farm workers. Increase penalties for labor law violations and speed up cases.

Trade Regulation: No significant position provided. (Editors note: After enacting all those labor law changes, there probably won't be any trade to regulate !)

OTHERS

LLOYD BENTSEN

No Response

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR.

No Response

FRED HARRIS

No Response

HUBERT HUMPHREY

No Response

ELLEN McCORMICK

No Response

WALTER MONDALE

No Response

ROBERT F. BYRD

No Response

ALAN MCGREGOR CRANSTON

Alan Cranston was born on June 19, 1914, in Palo Alto California, a fairly wealthy suburb of San Francisco. He went to college briefly at Pomona College in Southern California, and graduated from Stanford University in 1936. Over the next twelve years, Cranston travelled in pre-war England, Germany, Italy and Ethiopia for the now defunct International News Service, served as Chief of the Foreign Language Division of the Office of War Information and shortly after the outbreak of the war, joined the Army as a private. He left in 1945 as a sergeant. During these twelve years, Cranston wrote The Killing of the Peace, a journalistic novel describing the United States Senate's struggle over entry into the League of Nations. He was indirectly sued by Hitler's publishing agents in the U.S. courts when he published an abridged anti-Nazi version in English of Mein Kampf, including the German dictator's anti-Jewish diatribes and exposing details of his "master plan" which were concealed in the official version sold in the U.S.

When the war was over, Cranston returned to California and began a successful business career in real estate and land investment.

In 1953 Cranston founded and became the first president of the California Democratic Council, a liberal group. In 1958, Cranston became the first Democrat in 72 years to be elected state comptroller, the state's chief financial officer. He was reelected in 1962, but defeated in 1966 in the Reagan landslide.

Cranston then chose to move south to Los Angeles. (In California politics, traditionally no state-wide candidate can win without strong support from the southern part of the states.) In 1968, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, defeating Max Rafferty, then California's Superintendent of Schools. During the campaign, Rafferty openly suggested that Cranston was encouraging treason in his opposition to the Vietnam war. Cranston, in return, strongly hinted that Rafferty was a draft dodger when news stories surfaced showing that Rafferty had pleaded a foot injury during the war, then thrown away his cane on V-J Day.

While painting Rafferty into an extremist corner, Cranston became the consensus candidate, winning the support of the state's black and Mexican-American minorities, the more progressive UAW and the more conservative statewide AFL-CIO, the traditional Democratic politicians and the liberal anti-war adherents of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. Cranston won by 350,000 votes.

Cranston and the state. Because California is such a diverse state, Cranston must be sensitive to a wide range of often conflicting issues, interests and groups. Because he lacks the kind of personal popularity with the voters which is useful at election time, he has, according to the Nader Congressional Report, attempted to do something for everyone in his state.

Nader's assessment is borne out by Cranston's voting record. The Senator is a member of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and the chairman of the subcommittee on Production and Stabilization. He is also a member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and chairman of the special subcommittees on Human Resources and Railroad

Retirement and sits on the special subcommittee on the National Science Foundation. He is also a member of the Veterans Affairs Committee and the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.

Cranston was an active opponent of the Vietnam war, arguing vigorously for a cut-off in funds. He also opposed governmental funding of the SST -- a vote that put him in trouble with both labor and the financially plagued aerospace industry. On the other hand, Cranston played a crucial role in getting the \$250 million Lockheed loan guarantee through the Senate, and actively lobbied for the space shuttle contract for California, thus redeeming himself with the aerospace industry.

Cranston angered California's agribusiness interests when he backed a move by the UFW to bring farm labor under the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. But he pleased the farmers by helping defeat efforts to lower the annual ceiling on federal price supports to \$20,000 per person.

Cranston irritated oil companies in 1971 with his legislation of ban oil drilling permanently from the Santa Barbara Channel. But in 1969, while opposing moves to restore the controversial oil depletion allowance to 27½%, Cranston helped defeat a motion to lower it from 23% to 20%.

Cranston introduced legislation through the Senate Banking Committee's housing subcommittee to help individuals recoup their losses on homes not properly inspected by the FHA, and to reduce down payments on FHA loans.

Cranston helped lead the fight against the Agnes Recovery Act and blocked action on the Small Business Administration loan program because, as it was written, it did nothing to close up the loopholes that had led to abuses of the Earthquake Loan Program, and did not include victims of the 1970 San Fernando Valley Earthquake.

Cranston was the author of an amendment which, had it passed, would have obligated the president to spend \$10 billion for mass transit over the twelve years following passage.

Cranston's record on banking bills is mixed. On most issues, however, he has voted with the conservative bloc of the Banking Committee.

Cranston strongly supported the Kennedy initiated health insurance bill in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

Cranston authored the Veterans' Housing Act of 1970 in the Senate to expand entitlement to VA home loans and to establish new housing loan programs for veterans. He coauthored bills to increase GI bill rates by 43%, to provide for a program of drug and alcohol treatment for veterans, and to add \$450 million for workers and equipment at veterans' hospitals above the level originally requested by the President.

Cranston is on record as favoring child care development, legal services for the poor, and increases in food stamps and unemployment compensation for migrant farm workers. He voted for the ERA.

Cranston is well-respected on the Hill as a hard worker, as a very effective vote-counter, and as a vote-swinging with a soft touch.

He is considered a fairly uncharismatic campaigner.

Cranston has been the recipient of strong backing from the California Jewish community, but he has not been a leader in pro-Israel legislation. He is not well known outside of the California Jewish Community.

OK

THOMAS BRADLEY

Thomas Bradley was born on Dec. 29, 1917, the second child of six born to sharecroppers on a cotton plantation in Calvert, Texas. Bradley's family later moved to Los Angeles, where he attended high school, and won an athletic scholarship to UCLA.

Bradley joined the Los Angeles Police Department in 1940. While on the job, he attended Southwest University Law School at night, receiving his LL. B. in 1956. He left the police force in 1962, after 21 years service, with the rank of lieutenant, the first black man at reach that rank.

In 1963 he became Los Angeles' first black City Councilman. He represented his own, racially integrated district. ~~He served~~ until 1973.  
FOR TWO TERMS

Bradley's 1969 campaign for Mayor was marked by then-Mayor Yorty's exploitation of racial fears of Los Angeles' white community. Bradley started his campaign from scratch. (According to Newsweek, he had "10,000 volunteers" working for him.) He won the primary with 42% of the vote to Yorty's 28%. Yorty responded to Bradley's primary victory by exploiting the white community's memory of the Watts riots, and their fear of the student rebellions the year before. He claimed that Bradley would bring black and white radicals and militants into office and would allow law and order in the city to break down. Bradley responded by denouncing all forms of bigotry (including Black anti-Semitism), and pointing to his 21 years of service with the Los Angeles Police Force. Yorty's tactics prevailed, and he won the election with 53% of the vote.

The 1973 campaign. Again, Bradley won the primary, with 36% of the vote compared to Yorty's 29%. During the general election, Yorty again tried to appeal to the white community's fear of blacks and radicals, but by this time, memories of the Watts riots and the 1968 student unrest had faded, and the tactics were unsuccessful. Bradley won the election with 56% of the vote. He received 92% of the black vote, 51% of the Mexican-American vote (which had previously gone to Yorty) and 50% of the white vote. Bradley was helped by a Watergate-like scandal in the Yorty organization in which some of Yorty's aides were accused of having bought a \$50,000 life insurance policy for Yorty out of campaign funds.

Some of Bradley's major campaign issues: He called for limiting Los Angeles' population to four million (it was three million at the time.) He said that a mass transport system for Los Angeles would be "a top priority of his administration." He favored a moratorium on highway building in the city and a ban on oil drilling off the Los Angeles coast.

In his first months in office, Bradley slashed \$10 million from the budget he had inherited from Yorty. He revamped Los Angeles' Model Cities Program to enable Los Angeles regain federal funds. The money was to be used for child-care facilities, services for the elderly, and for rehabilitation of the more than 10,000 homes repossessed by the Federal government in poverty areas.

Bradley has balanced the budget for the last two years without resorting to new taxes. It is partly to Bradley's credit that Los Angeles has the best credit rating available. However, Bradley admits that the balanced budget and no new taxes are possible to a great extent because Los Angeles has "postponed major capital projects and needed improvements that will certainly have to be carried out."

A project to establish a rapid rail network for Los Angeles, pushed by Bradley, was defeated in an initiative during the June 8 primary.

### Personality

The general consensus of the press is that Bradley is a pretty uncharismatic person. Steven Roberts, in a "New York Times Magazine" article, described him as having a "quiet, almost dull demeanor", and said that people find him "too buttoned-up, an unexciting plodder with a charisma quotient approaching Calvin Coolidge." Another "New York Times" article described him as "understated, self-contained, almost stolid. He makes one feel, at times, that small talk is a luxury he cannot afford." As to his administrative abilities, the "Times" reports that he "seldom takes days off, and protests when staff outlines a light schedule." Roberts, the "Times Magazine" reports that "he has yet to master the art of delegating responsibility" and that he "has a tendency to name 'blue ribbon' committees and 'ad hoc task forces' at the drop of an interoffice memo."

There has been one minor scandal in Bradley's administration. Deputy Mayor Maurice Weiner resigned in 1975 after his conviction on lewd conduct charges.

Bradley has two daughters. One is a school teacher. The other has had occasional brushes with the law over possession of marijuana. She is a beautician.

In general, it is felt that most Los Angelesans have come to accept Bradley and to judge him on his abilities as mayor, rather than on his race. As the "New York Times Magazine" put it, the average people of Los Angeles feel they can identify with Bradley, who still lives in the modest home he bought on a policeman's salary.

Subject: Wendell Anderson, (DFL), Governor of Minnesota

Biographical Data: b. February 1, 1933, in St. Paul; U. of Minn. B.A. 1954, L.L.B. 1960.

Career: Army 1956-57; Minn. House of Reps. 1959-1963; Minn. Senate 1963-1971; Practicing atty., 1960-1970

Election Results:

Won in 1974 with 65%  
Won in 1970 with 54%  
Term expires Jan. 1979

Record: no-fault auto insurance, a minimum wage law, a family farm act, and campaign finance reform.

Political background in Minnesota

The Democratic Farmer Labor Party (DFL) was formed in the forties with the leadership of Hubert Humphrey. Originally the Farmer Labor Party was a third party developed during the Populist era. FLP was dominant in Minn. politics in 1930's. DFL is now among the leading state political party organizations. Minn. gave George McGovern 47% of its vote in 1972 - only trailing MA and D.C.

Anderson is the grandson of Swedish immigrants. In 1950 he ran against Douglas Head, a liberal Republican and Attorney General.

Anderson was said to have two surprising assets in 1970. First was his effectiveness as a TV performer and tireless campaigner.

Second, he campaigned with a promise for tax reform, which called for the state to take over a large share of the school financing burden from local districts; this mandated a huge increase in the state budget.

Though some Republicans thought this a fatal blunder, Minnesota voters proved sophisticated - they elected a man who promised a larger overall gain in ~~reform~~<sup>reform</sup> for a tax increase.

When he entered office, Anderson proposed a \$762 million boost in state taxes - roughly a 30% increase in the biennial budget. An increase of \$588 million was approved, with large increases in liquor and cigarette taxes, an increase in corporate and personal income taxes, and a 1¢ rise in sales taxes. With these state revenues he increased state aid to education from 43% to 63% in the first year, 1973, and to education was 70% of total. The real estate tax burden fell 11.5%

The result was virtually to equalize rural and metropolitan education.

Anderson led the way to open all legislative meetings; placed an ombudsman in the corrections department; reorganization of executive branch began in 1973.

PETER WALLACE RODINO, JR.

Peter Rodino was born in Newark, New Jersey, on June 7, 1909. He has lived in Newark all his life. He graduated from New Jersey Law School (now part of Rutgers) in 1937, opened his own law firm in 1938 and continued to practice until he became Judiciary Committee Chairman in 1973.

In 1940, he ran for the state legislature and lost. In 1941, he joined the Army, participating in the North African and Italian campaigns and receiving numerous decorations. He returned to Newark in 1946. Since his first election to Congress in 1948, he has slipped below 60% of the vote only twice in twelve elections.

Rodino's District. Rodino represents New Jersey's 10th Congressional District, a district which is 52% black, 6% Spanish-surname, and 7% Italian American. However, Rodino was able to win 57% of the total vote in 1972, and after serving as chairman of the Judiciary Committee that paved the way for Richard Nixon's impeachment, he won 81% of the vote in 1974. The Almanac of American Politics feels that Rodino will continue to win in his district, despite its increasingly black population, through the seventies.

Newark is afflicted by high rates of unemployment, crime, disease, and racial tension between militant whites and the growing black population. White exodus continues to grow. The venereal disease and tuberculosis rates are the highest in the nation, and Newark vies with Baltimore for the highest crime rate among large cities.

Rodino and his district. Rodino spends nearly 200 days a year in his district holding public office hours and speaking before civic and political groups. Rodino, who owes much of his political career to the powerful Essex County Democratic machine (according to the Ralph Nader Congress Project), retains the image of an urban populist, that is, an old-school party politician whose success is based on his ability to do favors for people. Instead of writing, calling, or visiting the district office, (which is open 48 hours a week), many people prefer to call Rodino's home.

Legislative Record. Rodino was chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1 until 1973 when he succeeded Emmanuel Celler, who was defeated in his primary election. Rodino's positions as a ranking member have made him an influential man in many matters that come before the Judiciary Committee such as immigration, crime, drug prevention and control, and civil rights enforcement.

In 1965 Rodino played an instrumental part in eliminating the national origins quotas provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which delineates American immigration policy.

Rodino voted with a 15-14 majority to retain an internal committee rule permitting the holder of a proxy vote (given him by an absent member) unlimited discretion in its use. The reform proposal would have limited proxies to those matters where absent members specifically authorized their use.

He voted against an amendment to House Joint Resolution 208 (the Women's Rights Amendment) that would have retained certain discriminatory laws, such as those dealing with military draft.

He has testified in Congress to support resolutions banning the use of ethnic slurs from the airways, to curtail drug abuse, to reduce the unemployment rate by instituting public works projects, and to alleviate the housing crisis facing cities such as Newark.

Rodino has an extremely good attendance record in Congress. In 1971, for example he voted 88 percent of the time,

Rodino was an ardent supporter of House efforts to legislate an end to U. S. involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. Rodino was one of a band of about 150 to 175 members who supported proposals that would have cut off funds several months after U.S. prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam.

Rodino voted against moves to import sugar from South Africa and chrome from Rhodesia. He also voted against import quotas for shoes and textiles to aid those ailing U. S. industries.

He voted against efforts to cut U.S. aid to the International Development Association and voted to permit financing by the Export-Import Bank of trade with eastern European countries. He also voted against an effort to reduce funds for the Arms Control Agency, which has been engaged in strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union.

Although he has voted against two efforts to reduce the entire defense budget by 5% and 2%, he did vote for elimination of funds for the B-1 bomber and for limitations of the antiballistic missile program to two sites. But he voted against an amendment to eliminate money for the Navy's F-11 aircraft.

Rodino has a very strong record of support for social welfare programs. He has supported organized labor on several key votes, including the 1965 attempt to repeal section 14-B of the Taft-Hartley Act. According to the League of Conservation Voters, Rodino has a fairly good record on environmental issues.

Rodino has an "airtight" record on civil rights measures. He supported the Philadelphia Plan, which set minority hiring quotas for exclusionary construction unions for federal projects. Many of these unions had contributed to Rodino's campaigns in the past. He wrote the majority report on all but one of the landmark Civil Rights bills that the Judiciary Committee voted out in the 60's. He was floor manager for one of those major bills which among other things decreed open housing. He voted for attempts to strengthen the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with cease and desist order power, and voted against several efforts to restrict the use of federal funds for busing of school children to achieve racial balance.

Personality. Rodino is a family man, very religious, who devotes his Sundays to mass and his family and relatives. He plays paddle-ball regularly to keep fit. He still lives today in an "unpretentious" frame house not far from where he was born in the part of Newark's North Ward known as "Little Italy". He read a lot as a child and today is considered a good wordsmith.

Rodino's efforts in 1948 in Italy to prevent a communist takeover, his NATO work, his efforts to ease American immigration structures, and his travel around the globe with various members of the Judiciary Committee (47 days at government expense of over \$7,500 since 1970, according to Nader's Congres-

sional Report) have made him an important man overseas. He has been decorated by the governments of Italy and San Marino and by groups representing Iron Curtain countries as well as numerous Italian, veterans, and civic groups in America. In 1970, he was awarded the "Knight of the Grand Cross" medal, the highest decoration that Italy bestows on non-citizens.

Before the Watergate hearings, there were stories that some White House people had been sifting Rodino's background in Newark to see if they could dig up something to discredit him. But Federal Judge Herbert Stern, the former U.S. attorney who successfully prosecuted some of Rodino's colleagues, said: "There has never been an inquiry about Rodino, never the slightest anything. In my opinion he is an honest man and a fine public servant."

There have been rumors that he has received money for helping to pass special immigration laws to permit aliens into the United States.

Rodino has been a consistent supporter of Israel in Congress. He has not taken a leading role in promoting pro-Israel legislation. He is, however, a sponsor of the Rodino-Holtzman bill to prohibit honoring of the Arab boycott by imposing criminal and civil penalties against violators. He does not have strong Jewish connections nationally, but he does have a good general image and his Watergate activity could help with Jews.

PETER F. "PETE" FLAHERTY - MAYOR OF PITTSBURGH, PA.

In his first four years as Mayor, Peter F. Flaherty managed to alienate city employees, labor unions, bankers and big business in Pittsburgh. He was reelected in 1974 without opposition. The usual reason given is "nobody likes Pete except the people". In 1974, he was the mayoral candidate on both the Democratic and Republican tickets, having beaten off a costly and energetic challenge by city councilman Richard S. Caliguiri and having been written in by so many Republicans that he won over the party's official challenger by a 3 to 1 margin.

Upon taking office in 1968, after running under the slogan "He's nobody's boy", Flaherty began immediately making cuts in personnel and expenditures. In his first four years in office, he cut the city's work force by 15 percent, ending 35 years of excess staff-building by Pittsburg's Democratic machine. He also lowered the city's real estate tax twice, abolished the city's one percent wage tax and announced two budget surpluses. Inflation, however, has brought Flaherty's cost-cutting to a halt. This year, he was forced to increase the real estate tax to meet expenses.

During the first four years he was in office, not a single policeman was hired, yet crime fell every year. Flaherty forced the department to become more efficient with fewer personnel. The number of people employed by the city fell from 7,000 to 5,000 in the same four years. However, despite cuts in personnel and taxes (about \$20 million in real estate tax, approximately one-fifth or one-sixth of the city budget, and the wage tax, which was worth \$13 million a year) more garbage was

picked up, more roads paved and more streets lit than in the previous four years.

Flaherty set the tone for his administration soon after taking office. He discovered that the city's water meter installers were being taken from job to job by Teamster drivers. Flaherty discharged the drivers and the Teamsters called a strike. When the Sanitation union honored the Teamster picket line, Flaherty and some of his new, young cadre of officials went out on garbage trucks and collected the garbage. Flaherty's refusal to compromise and the public's growing animosity toward the striking unions finally broke the strike. Afterward, Flaherty began making his wholesale personnel cuts.

He fired the police chief, who had been in office 20 years and brought in a large number of young department heads. He also made an extensive examination of the city's governmental structure, later eliminating a number of agencies, including a Civil Defense Bureau which was spending \$50,000 a year. Now, whenever a job becomes vacant, Flaherty and the Department head who has that job review the job to see if it can be eliminated.

When Flaherty noticed that the city was doing business with just one paving contractor, and that there were often jobs advertized for which the company was the sole bidder, he ordered the city's moribund paving plant reactivated, thus saving the taxpayers money while infuriating a large segment of the business community. He has also alienated the local

construction industry and unions, as well as the local bankers, by opposing the mass-transit "Skybus" project, estimated at \$221.5 million, for the residents of suburban South Hills. "Skybus" was to have run for 10 miles in South Hills. For obvious reasons, he is not popular with the unions. He is also not popular among Blacks, who resent his opposition to busing and his refusal to spend money on social programs.

In his last mayoral election, Flaherty spent about \$40,000, compared to his Democratic primary opponent's \$500,000. He has always relied on basically volunteer and amateur-oriented campaigns. Yet, he does have some flair for publicity. In 1975, he became a regular on the 7:30 to 8:30 a.m. drive-time segment of the Bob DeCarlo Show, Monday through Friday. Flaherty dutifully joined AFTRA, the American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, AFL-CIO, and was paid about \$300 a week for his efforts. According to news accounts, he was happy to get the money, in spite of the fact that he is paid a \$35,000 a year salary as mayor. He shops around for bargains, clothes, mows his own lawn, has a vegetable garden and has disposed of the chauffeured mayoral Cadillac and drives a stripped-down police sedan himself.

Flaherty's affinity for amateur-style campaigns probably did not help him in his 1974 campaign for the Senate seat of Republican Richard Schweiker. He beat popular Insurance Commissioner and consumer advocate Herbert S. Denenberg in the Democratic Primary by 40,000 votes, mostly due to his following in the Pittsburgh media area, which covers about one-fourth of the state's voters. Furthermore, there was a poor turnout in eastern Pennsylvania for the primary, while there was a home rule

referendum on the ballot in Pittsburgh, which brought out extra voters.

In the general election, Schweiker, a liberal who was on Richard Nixon's "enemies list", beat Flaherty 54 to 46 percent. Schweiker was aided by the endorsement of the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, whose leaders stated (as a slap at Flaherty) "our endorsement is not owned by any party." Flaherty carried southwest Pennsylvania heavily, carried Philadelphia by less than 5000 votes, and lost most of the rest of the state.

When he began his first term in office, Flaherty frequently traveled to Washington to lobby for Pittsburgh. However, he soon grew impatient with the legislative process in Congress, and not long afterward, he began to curtail his travel. He now seldom even attends functions for mayors and travels little. During his Senate campaign, he did not even appear frequently in eastern Pennsylvania. There are reports that his relations with the Governor and the legislature in Harrisburg are strained, and those who have dealt with him complain that he is excessively abrasive in his relations with everyone, and that he has little understanding of the give-and-take process which is common in legislatures, including Congress.

Flaherty is 50 years old, a Roman Catholic, and he has 5 children.

July 6, 1976

TO: STUART EIZENSTAT

FROM: STEVE TRAVIS

SUBJECT: ADA AND COPE RATINGS, VICE-PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS

I called both ADA and the AFL-CIO today and they were able to give me their ratings for 1975 (94th Congress, 1st Session) for our candidates. The COPE percentage figures are based on number of times voting only. They did not have this as a per cent figure, so I figured it out, but I have included the entire vote record for the Cope issues.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADA Rating</u>	<u>COPE Record</u>			
		<u>Vote Right</u>	<u>Vote Wrong</u>	<u>Abs.</u>	<u>%</u>
BAYH	72	16	1	5	94.1
CHURCH	78	16	5	1	76.2
CRANSTON	89	19	2	1	95.3
GLENN	50	14	6	2	70
JACKSON	61	20	1	0	95.3
JORDAN	89	22	1	0	95.6
KENNEDY	89	17	2	3	89.5
MONDALE	94	21	1	0	95.4
MUSKIE	89	17	4	1	80.9
RODINO	84	21	1	1	95.5
STEVENSON	72	18	4	0	81.8
UDALL	47	11	1	11	91.7

Senate COPE ratings are based on 22 votes, House ratings on 23 votes. ADA counts absences as votes against, which accounts for Udall's score in part.



Gov. Michael S. Dukakis (D)

Elected 1974, term expires 1979; b. 1933, Brookline;  
Swarthmore College B.A. 1955, Harvard U. L.L.B. 1960.

Career: Army, Korea; Practicing atty.; Mass. House of Reps. 1963-71;  
Dem. nominee for Lt. Gov. 1970; Moderator, "The Advocate", National  
TV show.

Dukakis authored no-fault auto insurance law in Massachusetts  
when he was a representative.

He mounted an "insurgent" campaign in 1974, capitalizing on  
Francis Sargent's being connected in the voters' eyes with Watergate  
and busing. Dukakis presented himself as an efficient manager, and  
criticized Sargent as the opposite.

Dukakis has been characterized as a sort of East Coast Jerry  
Brown by the Almanac of American Politics 1976. Although he  
promised no tax increase, he was forced to raise taxes because of  
fiscal problems.

The New Republic, in discussing possible Vice Presidential  
candidates, called Dukakis a failure.

Because he is a first term governor there is little more  
readily available information on Dukakis.

MEMORANDUM

TO: GOVERNOR CARTER, CHARLES KIRBO, HAMILTON JORDAN, JODY POWELL

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT

RE: SEN. STEVENSON

ENCLOSED HEREWITH IS A MEMO FROM TED VAN DYKE, A CLOSE FRIEND OF SEN. STEVENSON'S, WITH MATERIAL ON THE JEWISH QUESTION.

TED VAN DYK ASSOCIATES, INC.  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Public and Governmental Affairs

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005  
(202) 296-6450

Personal

June 21, 1976

TO: Stu Eizenstat

FROM: Ted Van Dyk 

RE: Stevenson

Please see the attached file on Adlai and the Jewish community.

1. An item from Near East Report which caused the trouble.
2. A response by Phil Klutznick, active and prominent in the Chicago Jewish community and a Stevenson supporter.
3. Stevenson's response.
4. Press comment from Illinois.
5. Stevenson's anti-boycott legislation (Adlai's statement in Record of 6/17) and press comment.

Stevenson is in close contact with all major Jewish organizations re this anti-boycott legislation. All should be repaired within a week or two. I'll keep you posted.

Enclosures

# NEAR EAST REPORT

Washington letter on  
American policy in the Near East

Vol. XX, No. 9, March 3, 1976

## Delay in Anti-Discrimination Bill

Senator ADLAI E. STEVENSON III (D-III.) last week asked that the Senate delay final consideration of his anti-boycott bill, jointly introduced by Senator HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR. (D-N.J.). Stevenson told reporters that he hoped to attach the bill—already approved by the Banking and Currency Committee—to the Export Administration Act, which will be taken up in late March or April. He explained that this would lessen chances of a possible Presidential veto.

## An Innocent Abroad

This past week also saw published reports of a so-called "peace offer" made by PLO Leader Yassir Arafat during a meeting in Beirut with visiting Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III (D-III.). But only hours after the Senator told newsmen of the plan, the PLO predictably labeled Stevenson's version of the discussion "a deliberate distortion" containing "no truth whatsoever." (The Arafat scheme supposedly called upon Israel to hand over the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the UN. Afterwards, the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist.)

Unfortunately, Stevenson, only the third U. S. senator to have honored Arafat with a meeting, appears to have joined the ranks of other well-intentioned but dangerously naive individuals who have been misled by Arafat's doubletalk. No serious observer can expect Israel to withdraw unilaterally from such strategic areas, only on the mere hope that the PLO will eventually agree to accept Israel's existence.

bcc: The Honorable Charles H. Percy  
The Honorable ~~Adlai E.~~ Stevenson III ✓  
Mr. James P. Rice  
Mr. Maynard Wishner

Philip M. Klutznick

875 North Michigan Avenue • Suite 4044 • Chicago, Illinois 60611

March 16, 1976

Mr. Morris J. Amitay  
American Israel Public  
Affairs Committee  
1341 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

My dear Morrie:

Thank you for your note of March 5th and the enclosed report on trends in American public opinion toward Israel. I have very little to comment on the report. I am the regular recipient of the Cambridge Reports quarterly as well as special reports through the Harris Survey. The analysis seems to confirm a trend which in depth should be very disturbing. I am not impressed by momentary exterior reports unless they are extraordinarily significant. We have not had any of this sort for a year or more.

Incidentally, while I am writing you, I must say that I am shocked by the constant use of the word, "naive," in attempting to evaluate the judgments of Senators like Stevenson and Percy. I have been the doubtful beneficiary of similar descriptions, including the latest when I served on the Brookings Institution panel. People with good voting records, like Senators Percy and Stevenson, are entitled to have their judgments taken as the judgments of honest men. One can disagree with them without attempting to depreciate the stature of the man himself. This is a good way to lose friends and make enemies. I hope someone will re-think this protest.

Sincerely,

*Phil Klutznick*  
mlk

Philip M. Klutznick

PMK:mlk

(dictated but not read)

FR 132

March 12, 1976

Near East Report  
1341 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Gentlemen:

The comment "An Innocent Abroad" in your March 3 edition was inaccurate.

Mr. Arafat made me no "peace offer." I did not tell any newsmen of the "plan" -- partly because I knew it would then be repudiated by the PLO. The plan did not call upon Israel to "hand over the West Bank and Gaza Strip" to the U.N. -- nor did Mr. Arafat say "afterwards" the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist.

The comment is accurate in one respect. No "serious observer" can expect Israel to withdraw unilaterally from strategic areas on the mere hope that the PLO will eventually agree to accept Israel's existence -- and, so far as I can tell, no one, serious or otherwise, has suggested that.

Sincerely,

AES/pg

bc: A. Abbot Rosen      In AES handwriting on Rosen copy:  
Milton Fisher      Many thanks, Ab, for the intelligence. Ad  
Maynard Wishner

7501  
AAS

# Pro-Israeli newsletter hits Stevenson PLO view

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Democrat Adlai E. Stevenson III appears to have joined his fellow senator from Illinois, Republican Charles H. Percy, in Israel's doghouse.

The current issue of Near East Report, a weekly newsletter that closely follows the Israeli line, denounces Stevenson as "dangerously naive" for his recent meeting with and comments about Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In a front-page article entitled "An Innocent Abroad,"

the report criticizes Stevenson as only the third U.S. senator to have honored Arafat with a meeting during his tour of the Middle East last month.

It also accuses Stevenson of being "misled by Arafat's doubletalk" in declaring on his return here that the PLO was prepared to recognize Israel's right to exist.

Stevenson replied that the article misquoted him and twisted the content of Arafat's proposal. He contrasted the bitter reaction in the newsletter to his "frank and cordial" closed-door meeting with prominent members of the Jewish community in Chicago March 1.

The Near East Report, which circulates widely in the Jewish community, often reflects the attitude of the Israeli Embassy here. It mounted a sharp attack on Percy when he proposed just a year ago, upon his return from the Middle East, that Israel negotiate with the PLO.

In contrast to the low-key reaction to Stevenson's remarks, Percy was forcefully cross-examined in a confrontation with Jewish leaders in Chicago.

The different response may reflect a change in mood with-

in the Jewish community or could be accounted for by the fact that Stevenson, unlike Percy, arranged his meeting in Chicago before he spoke to the press.

Stevenson's Chicago meeting was supposed to have been off the record but a report leaked out to the Israeli press. Stevenson was said to have expressed alarm about the deep divisions in the Israeli government and among the Israeli people.

The leaders reportedly were much more open to new ideas than they had seemed in the confrontation with Percy.

In his public remarks, Stevenson called Arafat "less intransigent, less uncompromising" than other Arab leaders he met during the trip. Percy had described Arafat as "relatively speaking, a moderate."

Percy called for direct talks between Israel and the PLO while Stevenson proposed only "unofficial contacts" between the United States and the PLO.

Percy urged an Israeli withdrawal "essentially" to its 1967 borders while Stevenson recommended only that Israel consider the PLO offer as part of general Middle East negotiations.

S. Times 3-15-76 Pg 47  
Stevenson aids Mideast debate

Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) is undergoing the same kind of understandable but excessive criticism that greeted his colleague, Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), who last year described Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat as "relatively speaking, a moderate."

During a recent trip to the Middle East, Stevenson met for two hours with Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He later said Arafat "was less intransigent, less uncompromising, than others I spoke with in the Middle East, most particularly in Iraq and Syria."

For this, Stevenson was called "dangerously naive" and "an innocent abroad" by a newsletter that often reflects Israeli government thinking. Last year, the publication

made a similar attack on Percy's remarks.

Official PLO policy, fully supported by public statements of Arafat, is anything but moderate. It calls for the abolition of Israel. But in private talks, Arafat takes a milder line. By any reasonable standards, he is "less intransigent, less uncompromising" than Palestinian "rejection front" leaders like George Habash, Nayef Hawatmeh and Ahmad Jibril, or the radical Ba'athists in Iraq and Syria.

Stevenson and Percy, who are courageous enough to say publicly what many other senators are saying only privately, are contributing to discussion and understanding on the Mideast. The area's problems are unlikely to be solved unless they are discussed and understood in their total reality.

ARGUS  
Rock Island, IL  
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MAY -14-76

## Israel's friends worried

Sen. Adlai Stevenson, addressing the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in Chicago, issued a warning about Israel's sharp decline in prestige in the Western World, and of the diminishing chance for peace caused by Israeli settlements in occupied territory.

"Two months ago Israeli officials spoke to me with pride of the trusting relationship between Jew and Arab in Israel and the tranquil Arab acceptance of the military occupation of the West Bank," he said.

"Why has peace been put at risk by the continued establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that 'the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies'?"

"Why provide agitators with a tailor-made issue with which to incite riots in the streets of Nazareth by confiscating Arab-owned land?"

He said he saw many signs of a desire for peace on both sides, and found in Israel a strong recognition of the right of Palestinians to a home of their own, but warned of danger in continued stalemate.

The Rabin government has certainly been delinquent in not restraining the most

*file*  
nationalistic elements in Israel, and this week was even reported ready to approve more settlements.

Friends of Israel who issue warnings of this kind have only one purpose — to safeguard Israel's future. To scorn such warnings is to invite disaster.

4

# Editorials Our Opinions

Decatur Herald 5-13-74

## Stevenson Offers Constructive Ideas

"BECAUSE of unique ties, the tiny beleaguered, courageous state of Israel has enjoyed a generation of unquestioning support from the United States. But we do not know the Arab world."

The quotation is from Sen. Adlai Stevenson's 25-page report to the U.S. Senate on his study mission to the Middle East last Feb. 10-25.

His observations are a welcome update on the tangle of problems related to race, religion, energy and economics — that continue to make the Middle East the most likely ignition point for a World War III.

Except for civil strife in Lebanon, the Middle East has faded from headlines in recent months. But Sen. Stevenson stresses that time for a Middle East solution is short. "The impasse has resumed. Each of the parties assumes that time is on its side. Each is probably wrong. A continued impasse favors radical elements and increases the opportunity for Soviet exploitation of a mounting crisis."

That is a sensible warning.

One of Sen. Stevenson's themes is that peace is in the interest of each of the Middle East parties, all of whom fear Russian imperialism and need time for internal development. A long-term political settlement can be engineered with some imaginative diplomacy. But to do so requires careful examination of the circumstances of each country. The Arab world is not homogeneous, he aptly observes.

Egypt, for example, has lost authority in the Arab world because of moderate President Anwar Sadat's willingness to go along with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Sinai accord,

thereby "putting all his eggs in an American basket," Sen. Stevenson said.

Now that the Soviet Union has cut ties with Egypt, President Sadat depends for his political survival on arms from the United States and on progress toward a Middle East settlement.

Syrian President Hafaz Assad "holds many of the cards in the game at the moment. Questions of war or peace will depend upon how he plays them during the coming months," Sen. Stevenson says.

Hafaz Assad wants to regain territory lost to Israel in the Golan Heights, and will decide soon whether to allow continuation of the United Nations buffer zone there. Should the Syrian leader decide not to renew the U.N. mandate, war with Israel could erupt soon.

The Palestinian problem is the most vexing.

"It should not be beyond the wit of man to devise a formula by which Israel might withdraw to its pre-1967 frontiers with appropriate adjustments, provided this could be done on the basis of acceptable guarantees to Israeli security," Sen. Stevenson says. "But when one comes to the Palestinians, the imagination falters."

Finding a homeland for the Palestinians is complicated by disagreement over who should represent the Palestinians in negotiations. Pragmatically, Sen. Stevenson would have them represented by the notorious Palestine Liberation Organization because "it has no rival organization among Palestinians." But if the problem of who should represent the Palestinians blocks multilateral peace talks, the issue of representation could simply be made a subject of

negotiation between the remaining parties," he suggests. That is at least a suggestion for a way out of a difficult diplomatic riddle.

Sen. Stevenson stresses his distrust of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. He said Middle East leaders were disturbed by U.S. failure to act against what they saw as Soviet aggression in Angola. They fear the same thing could happen to their countries.

But he rightly is seeking to encourage more responsible Soviet behaviour.

Critical of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's insistence on a "virtuoso role" in the Sinai negotiations, he would bring the Russians into the spotlight by including them in a Geneva conference with all the Middle East parties. The Soviet Union "can enjoy the benefits of detente if it begins in this part of the world to accept the responsibilities of detente," he reasons. That, of course, is not without risk. But it is better than simply giving up on the Soviets.

The stakes, after all, are high.

Despite the Sinai accord, there has been little progress toward lasting Middle East peace. Without progress soon, war is inevitable, and war "virtually assures a depression in the West," Sen. Stevenson rightly warns.

"War in the Middle East is easier than peace," he writes.

That is why taking difficult diplomatic steps is the best approach available to the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

Sen. Stevenson's report and its constructive proposals could help the United States move toward new diplomatic initiatives soon, before war erupts again.

AES  
TW  
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News 3.6.75 (early, p. 29)

# Adlai bills would ban U.S.-foreign boycotts

By Robert Gruenberg  
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Measures to prevent U.S. companies from participating in foreign boycotts, such as the Arab blacklist of 1,500 firms with reported commercial connections to Israel, have been introduced by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson (D-Ill.).

Stevenson said the amendments to the Export Administration Act are needed because U.S. trade policy "carries a very small stick" not only against the sponsors of such boycotts but co-operating U.S. companies as well.

Documents required by the Commerce Department under the trade act "explicitly" inform U.S. businessmen that they are not legally prohibited from taking any action that would further a boycott, Ste-

venson said in a Senate statement Wednesday.

ALTHOUGH American firms are asked whether they have complied, or intend to comply, with foreign boycotts, they are told at the same time that answers are "not mandatory," he said.

"Such statements leave no doubt in the minds of U.S. companies that U.S. antiboycott policy carries a very small stick, indeed," said Stevenson, who added that last year more than half of all American firms who were asked to comply with the Arab boycott did so.

STEVENSON, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee's panel on international finance, proposes giving the President power to order export controls, including curtailment of shipments to, and investments in, nations that impose boycotts.

Another proposal would require U.S. trade policy to state that boycotts directed at U.S. businesses — whether a part of an action against another country or based on race or religion — are contrary to American views.

Two more amendments would require disclosure by



Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson

U.S. firms of "all requests for action of any kind" that furthers boycotts, as well as disclosure of an intention to co-operate.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Fri., Mar. 7, 1975

# Adlai bill hits at Arab boycott

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) has introduced legislation that would require businesses to disclose whether they intend to comply with boycotts such as those imposed on some companies doing business with Israel.

The proposed legislation, which would amend the Export Administration Act, would also give a President power "to counter foreign boycotts and restrictive trade practices

through controls of U.S. exports."

In addition, the measure would clarify existing law, Stevenson said.

In a statement, Stevenson said: "Taken together, these provisions will make it clear that the United States has no intention of supinely submitting to foreign economic threats or racial or religious discrimination. They will greatly strengthen the ability of the United States to respond to such boycotts."



## They want to hear Ford

Students and officials of Chicago State University in Washington Thursday, display for Illinois Senators Charles H. Percy (R) (3d from right) and Adlai E. Stevenson III (D) (right) a scroll signed by more than 4,000 students inviting President Ford to deliver their commencement address in July. Benjamin Alexander, university president, is at left. (UPI)

51- 3-7-75

## BAYH: THE COURTSHIP OF LABOR AND THE LEFT

In a Democratic campaign year with an abundance of liberal candidates, each one must go to some pains to distinguish himself from the others if he expects his chances to last beyond the spring. Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana is attempting to prove that he is the candidate best able to reestablish the coalition of divergent interests that carried the Democratic Party to its greatest power, during the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Bayh believes that the old concert of interests can be rebuilt. His supporters insist that his legislative record and his established vote-gathering ability in Indiana amply prove that he is the man who can bring it about. One adviser distinguished Bayh from the other liberals in these words: "The difference with guys like [Fred R.] Harris and [Rep. Morris K.] Udall is that Birch Bayh has actually been in leadership positions in struggles that have been of immense importance to these groups, rather than simply being able to show up and say that he voted right. That makes for a very different relationship with these groups, especially with their leaders."

### Both Sides Now

Particularly important to the Bayh campaign theory is his cozy relationship with the old guard of union leadership. Since the reported disaffection of AFL-CIO President George Meany and other labor leaders with Washington Sen. Henry M. Jackson, formerly their favorite contender, over his support of the 1974 trade bill, Bayh's stock appears to have risen. He was the only candidate who attended the regional conferences of liberal Democrats in the fall of 1975 who also was invited to an AFL-CIO gathering in San Francisco in October.

Nor is Bayh's relationship with labor a recent one. From his earliest days in the Senate, he has received strong labor support. He has been graced by healthy contributions from union-affiliated political action groups.

Perhaps the most prominent role ever played by Bayh, one that pleased labor as well as blacks and other minorities, was his leadership of the Senate's rejection of two Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court. Both were federal judges from the South, Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. of South Carolina and G. Harrold Carswell of Florida. Both failed to win Senate confirmation after bitter battles that Bayh spearheaded, against Haynsworth in 1969 and against Carswell in 1970.

As he led the attack on Haynsworth's sense of propriety, the White House countered with charges against Bayh for taking union contributions and then voting for legislation benefiting the unions. Had more members of the Senate been free of the same alleged conflict, the criticism might have been more telling. As it was, Bayh was unhurt by the charges, and he has seldom been inclined to apologize for his labor support.

Equally important to the Bayh strategy is the belief that he can retain that strong labor support and still attract other elements of the venerated coalition, many of whom



have been visibly disaffected from labor over the last fifteen years. Bayh justifiably contends that he has been able to do that in the past. For example, despite his alliance with labor, Bayh has deftly retained his ideological freedom of movement. His position on the Vietnam war was in dovish contrast to the "hard hat" approach. Like many other ultimate doves, Bayh stood by the Kennedy and Johnson policies in the early years. But in 1968, he returned from a Vietnam inspection tour clearly opposed to the war effort.

He was then active in the prolonged struggle by Congress to reassert control over the warring powers. He sponsored amendments that established Congress' power to review and reduce the manpower levels of the military, and supported the 1970 Cooper-Church amendment to curtail the use of American ground forces. He now states his belief that "Vietnam ranks among this country's greatest and most tragic mistakes."

That record, and that language, preserved Bayh's credibility and acceptability to the anti-war faction in the Democratic Party.

Bayh also manages to balance the conflicting positions of labor and blacks in some instances. The controversial "Philadelphia plan," which set black employment quotas on federally contracted construction, was opposed by the unions but supported by Bayh. He has also differed with the unions by giving support to Richard Hatcher, the black mayor of Gary.

Bayh's support for black causes has been consistent. He has supported the major civil rights bills throughout his Senate tenure, including the voting rights, public accommodations and fair housing laws. He has been an advocate of federal funding of community and urban development programs and other efforts to relieve inner-city distress.

Still another group with whom Bayh has political credit is women. Bayh floor-managed the Equal Rights Amendment in the Senate and successfully fended off the attempts by Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D N.C. 1954-75) to dilute the constitutional proposal. He also headed the fight for the prohibition of sex discrimination in educational establishments, including military installations, receiving federal funds.

The recent recession has placed additional strains on the relationship between organized labor and minorities as firms lay off those most recently hired—often women and blacks. Yet Bayh aides insist that this is not a dangerous problem for their candidate.

Deputy campaign manager Ann Lewis argues that "the fight is not over seniority. We women and blacks know that we will always come out last under any system so long as there is unemployment. The real fight is between unemployment and full employment." Bayh supports the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, and argues that full national employment is the answer to these problems raised by the recession.

Bayh has cultivated other groups who have felt dispossessed by the society and call the Democratic Party their political home. That includes the Hispanic population. He fought for the 1975 expansion of the Voting Rights Act

### Bayh's Interest-Group Ratings

**Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)**—ADA ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the ADA position on selected issues.

**National Farmers Union (NFU)**—NFU ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the NFU position.

**AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)**—COPE ratings reflect the percentage of the time a senator voted in accordance with or was paired in favor of the COPE position.

**Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)**—ACA ratings record the percentage of the time a senator voted in accordance with the ACA position.

Following are Bayh's ratings since he entered the Senate in 1963:

	ADA <sup>1</sup>	COPE <sup>3</sup>	NFU <sup>3</sup>	ACA
1974	62	100	100	6
1973	85	91	100	4
1972	80	88	100	6
1971	96	80	90	14
1970	72 <sup>4</sup>	100	100	11
1969	78	100	94	7
1968	50	100	50	38
1967	62	90	89	4
1966	80	92 <sup>2</sup>	93	11
1965	94	92 <sup>2</sup>	85	8
1964	86 <sup>2</sup>	80 <sup>2</sup>	76 <sup>2</sup>	3 <sup>2</sup>
1963	86 <sup>2</sup>	80 <sup>2</sup>	76 <sup>2</sup>	3 <sup>2</sup>

1. Failure to vote lowers score.

2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.

3. Percentages compiled by CQ from information provided by groups.

4. ADA score includes some votes from December 1969.

to embrace non-English-speaking minorities such as Spanish-Americans. He has cosponsored a proposal for more bilingual proceedings in federal district courts.

Bayh predictably has a record of support for farmers, hailing as he does from farm country in central Indiana. (His brochures have long claimed that Bayh is the "only dirt farmer in the U.S. Senate"). Yet he has fought hard for a limitation on government subsidies to agribusiness, fighting in particular to limit the total amount of crop subsidies which can be received by any one farmer in a year.

Finally, Bayh has been more outspoken than possibly any other candidate in espousing the full civil rights of homosexuals. He insists that declared homosexuality cannot constitutionally be a basis for job discrimination, any more than sex itself. This is Bayh's most evident flirtation with the kind of "social issue" liberalism that contributed to the McGovern fundering. It remains to be seen whether Bayh is vulnerable in that same way.

### The Primary Strategy

The test of Bayh's strength with the coalition will be in the early primaries. His strategists readily concede that those elections will be crucial, for it is their contention that one candidate will emerge from the liberal cluster and develop the momentum to become the party nominee. As Bayh's press secretary, Bill Wise, stated it, "By the time we reach the New York primary [April 6], the field should be narrowed to one liberal candidate. The others aren't going to disappear, but in terms of real effect, only one will be important. He will face Jackson and [Alabama Gov. George C.] Wallace for the nomination."

Wise, reflecting the thinking of his boss, is confident of the hypothetical liberal leader's prospects at that point, for he feels the hawkish record of Jackson on Vietnam will irrevocably hurt him with the 1972 McGovern element still influential in the party. He views Wallace as out of the question for the Democratic nomination.

Thus, Bayh's plan is to become the front-runner before the New York primary. To achieve this, the campaign is concentrating on New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York and Iowa. In each of those states, Bayh has what his staff calls broad-based steering committees studded with experienced local politicians. Wise suggests that they learned from the abbreviated Bayh campaign in 1971 that less staffing at the national level and more work at the state level is a better tactic. That is how the effort is being structured, with the small Washington staff not yet complete.

Bayh's strategy has been praised by one veteran New Hampshire politician who feels that the Bayh organization was the best of all at the national level in 1971, but that it did not have the field workers in the states to cash in on its sophisticated media efforts in Washington.

In his 1971 campaign, the junior senator from Indiana was still relatively little known and had to convince the press and others that he was a serious candidate. Now his name recognition is comparatively high, and he is viewed by most observers as a serious contender.

Bayh's strategy produced a near-success in New York Dec. 6, when the liberal New Democratic Coalition (NDC) came within a fraction of a vote of awarding him its endorsement. Resistance from Harris supporters kept Bayh below the 60 per cent figure needed for formal endorsement, but he emerged with a clear majority of the vote and the psychological boost of first place among a cadre of activists on the party's left.

Bayh did not do well at a similar meeting in Massachusetts, drawing only 4.4 per cent of the vote. There was some consolation in the failure of both Udall and Harris to win a majority, but the mixed result from the two states led many observers to discount the significance of the entire weekend.

## Closer to God

A serious potential problem is that, in several campaign appearances before sophisticated audiences, Bayh has received low marks from some listeners for his casual, down-home style. Others who have met him during his campaign travels have complained of his failure to deal with the complexities of some issues. Still others were critical of the sanctimonious tone they perceived in Bayh's Oct. 21, 1975, announcement of candidacy in his hometown of Shirkieville, Ind., where he said: "Those of you who have known me the longest know I have never had a burning desire to be President of the United States. You know I feel closer to my God right here." Such pious declamations are surprising in a man who has shown a strong instinct for tough political fighting and who is a veteran campaigner presenting himself for national office for the second time.

Another potential problem is simply timing. Bayh did not enter the race until comparatively late in the year, and admittedly he has to play catch-up with the earlier contestants. His staff is confident that he can do so, pointing to the rapidity with which he qualified for federal matching funds under the new election law as proof of the range of his support and his ability to tap it.

If the new election law is not overturned by the Supreme Court, however, money could prove to be an obstacle for Bayh over the long stretch of primary fights, since he has not accumulated a war chest in advance, as did Jackson. Only the early victories which he seeks are apt to allay the money problem.

## Senate Elections

One way of assessing Bayh's potential for reaching the voters is to look at his past campaign successes. His first campaign for the Senate, in 1962, was against a three-term Republican incumbent, Homer E. Capehart (1945-63), and Bayh was given little chance. A former speaker of the Indiana House, Bayh was then obscure enough that one of the principal features of the Bayh campaign was a radio jingle that explained how to pronounce his name ("bye"). Capehart presented a bellicose image during the Cuban missile crisis that overshadowed the 1962 election season, while Bayh ran a campaign marked for its energy and for his willingness to meet the people. Bayh won his upset, 50.3 to 49.7 per cent, and went to the Senate at age 34.

In 1968, Bayh was challenged by Republican William D. Ruckelshaus. Despite Ruckelshaus' later familiarity as a result of his role in the 1973 "Saturday night massacre" of Watergate, he was the one who had the obscurity problem in 1968. Ruckelshaus was helped by presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon, who carried Indiana that year by more than a quarter million votes, his largest plurality in any state. Still, Bayh escaped the coattails and won a second term, 51.7 to 48.1 per cent.

In 1974, Bayh's Republican challenger was Indianapolis Mayor Richard Lugar. At one time, Lugar was seen as a substantial threat to Bayh, but then the title accorded Lugar of being the Watergate-damaged Nixon's favorite

## Bayh's Background

**Profession:** Attorney, farmer.

**Born:** Jan. 22, 1928, Terre Haute, Ind.

**Home:** Shirkieville, Ind.

**Religion:** Methodist.

**Education:** Purdue University, B.S., 1951; Indiana State College; Indiana University Law School, J.D., 1960.

**Offices:** Indiana General Assembly, 1955-63; minority leader for four years, and speaker for two years; Senate since 1963.

**Military:** Army, 1946-48.

**Memberships:** Junior Chamber of Commerce; American Farm Bureau Federation; National Farmers Union; American, Indiana and Vigo County (Indiana) Bar Associations.

**Family:** Wife, Marvella Hern; one son.

**Committees:** Appropriations: chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies; Subcommittees on Agriculture, Labor-HEW, Treasury and HUD and Independent Agencies; Judiciary: chairman, Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee; chairman, Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency; Subcommittees on Administrative Practice and Procedures, Antitrust and Monopoly, Constitutional Rights, Internal Security, and Penitentiaries.

mayor began to lose its appeal. Bayh again won, 50.7 to 46.4 per cent.

Those results, although all close, generally are read as an indication of Bayh's campaigning ability; he is widely regarded as an anomaly because he is so much more liberal than his Indiana constituency. Yet Bayh runs successfully in Indiana because he is careful to serve the state well in traditional ways that are outside ideological categories.

As a member of the Public Works Committee during his earlier days in the Senate, he was successful in significantly enlarging the amount of "pork barrel" public works funds that came Indiana's way. He worked for relief, in Indiana and elsewhere, in the wake of natural disasters. He successfully fought to have the Indiana Dunes area designated as a national lakeshore. When traumas to the economy, such as the closing of factories, have occurred, he has attempted to reach solutions that moderate the impact on his constituents.

Bayh is also widely credited with doing solid "constituent work," the basic chores of any elected representative—answering letters and helping individual Indianans solve the myriad problems of dealing with the Federal and local governments. Some critics have seen a darker side to Bayh's agility at this work, claiming that he has been prepared on occasion to slant his responses to mesh with the attitudes of an irate constituent whether or not those responses reflected his voting positions.

The key question that emerges from the Bayh campaign record is whether or not his successful Indiana mix of folksy handshaking, good constituent service, and hometown boy image can be converted to a national campaign format. If so, then Bayh may indeed be able to keep the old coalition wired together.

## Personal Background

Bayh, still boyish-looking at age 47—he will be 48 on Jan. 22—is very much an Indiana product. Born near Terre Haute, he comes from German stock. He grew up on a farm and attended the Purdue University School of Agriculture, where he demonstrated his athletic ability by becoming the

## Bayh's CQ Vote Study Scores\*

	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	1964	1963
<b>Presidential support</b>	28 <sup>1</sup> /26 <sup>2</sup>	30	30	22	26	47	45	64	64	70	59	76
<b>Presidential opposition</b>	42 <sup>1</sup> /28 <sup>2</sup>	53	54	46	33	35	24	17	15	14	7	6
<b>Voting Participation</b>	69	86	83	59	68	77	64	75	80	84	79	82
<b>Party unity</b>	61	81	71	58	65	73	60	65	74	73	68	70
<b>Party opposition</b>	8	5	8	5	5	9	7	14	8	8	6	5
<b>Conservative Coalition support</b>	13	7	7	2	3	9	20	16	14	10	12	9
<b>Conservative Coalition opposition</b>	58	83	76	63	60	71	49	57	74	74	65	56
<b>Bipartisan support</b>	59	77	70	37	55	62	51	59	69	73	59	78
<b>Bipartisan opposition</b>	9	9	16	19	11	12	13	14	9	13	8	9

1. During President Nixon's tenure in 1974.  
 2. During President Ford's tenure in 1974.

\* Explanation of studies, Weekly Report p. 107.

state Golden Gloves light-heavyweight champion. He had been too young for the wartime Army, but served in the U.S. occupation forces in Europe after high school, in 1946-48, before settling in for his Purdue degree.

In 1955, at age 27, Bayh began eight years of service in the Indiana Assembly. He gained the esteem of his party colleagues, who made him minority leader in two sessions, and he was assembly speaker for one term when the party obtained temporary dominance. His relations with the press in those days were sufficiently solid for newsmen to vote him Indiana's "most able representative" in 1961.

Bayh's success in the legislature did not come at the expense of his other development. He also was working during this period to obtain his law degree. He received it from Indiana University in 1960. A little more than two years later, he abandoned private practice to run for the Senate.

Bayh's wife, formerly Marvella Hern, is one of the more visible Senate wives. No Bayh anecdote is more familiar than the one about how he met his wife—in a national debate contest in which she defeated him. That incident is perhaps illustrative, since ambition on her part is said to be one of the factors in his own electoral strivings. Bayh dropped his exploratory bid for the 1972 nomination after she was operated on for cancer in 1971.

### Positions on Issues

Bayh's best-publicized and most substantive legislative work has been related to his chairmanship of the Constitutional Amendments and Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

#### Constitution

He has shown a gift for identifying issues on which a positive contribution can be made without alienating any particular interest group. His involvement with constitutional amendments is the most significant example of this. Bayh has led the battles for several amendments since

he came to the Senate and took his place on the Judiciary Committee. He has made his chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments an important post. The proudest Bayh achievement in the constitutional realm is his authorship of the 25th Amendment, which spells out procedures for dealing with presidential disability.

Bayh and many others had been led by the illnesses that afflicted President Eisenhower, and much more by the assassination of President Kennedy, to have strong concern over the mechanism of succession to the presidency in the event of temporary disability or death. Bayh raised the Senate's awareness of the issue, pushed his bill through Congress and ultimately saw it ratified and added to the Constitution in 1967. Since then, the amendment has been brought into use twice—first in the appointment of Gerald R. Ford as Vice President and then in Ford's choice of Nelson Rockefeller to succeed him.

Bayh's subcommittee work also involved him in the move to extend the vote to 18-year-olds. Voting studies since have indicated that the young do not vote in a significantly different ideological pattern from other voters. Whatever its impact, the franchise extension allows Bayh to present himself as being concerned with allowing youth a fair share of the political process.

The Equal Rights Amendment has met stiff opposition and has not yet been ratified. Another proposed constitutional amendment of substantial concern to Bayh has not met with legislative success. Since 1966, he has been convinced that the electoral college method of electing Presidents should be replaced by direct election.

#### Youth and Crime

The second area to which Bayh has devoted a large amount of his energies is juvenile crime. His record for legislation here is impressive; the record on results is not, and the blame in the eyes of Bayh's committee aides belongs squarely on the Republican administrations of Nixon

and Ford. Bayh juxtaposes two figures: the percentage of crimes committed by juveniles and the proportion of federal crime money being spent on juveniles. He finds the divergence between the two—far more crime than money—most disturbing.

Bayh had fought for more than a year to create a special federal office designed to address the problems of juvenile offenders and to administer the flow of federal funds to programs dealing with those problems when he finally saw a bill signed into law, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (PL 93-415), in 1974. Even then, the bill had been badly pared down. There were further delays in funding the program, for which he blames Ford. Bayh thus can be expected to dwell on the failure of "law and order" advocates to finance and implement legislation aimed at curbing a significant portion of the crime problem.

Other Bayh efforts in the youth and crime area have included:

- Sponsoring, in 1974, a runaway youth program, which provides funds for the sheltering and counseling of runaways.
- Highlighting the problem of school vandalism and violent assault within schools by holding subcommittee hearings in the summer of 1975 and sponsoring legislation to respond to the problem.
- Working to curtail the diversion of legitimately manufactured drugs to illicit users by placing tighter controls on the production of amphetamines and barbiturates.
- Supporting a number of measures to curb drug abuse and to provide more adequate and accessible treatment for drug offenders.
- Sponsoring a successful proposal to ban the incarceration of youthful offenders with hardened criminals.

Bayh has been particularly active in the movement for gun control, having sponsored a ban on the sale of "Saturday night specials" and having proposed a Violent Crime and Repeat Offender Act which would feature stiff, mandatory punishment for a variety of crimes related to the possession or use of a weapon.

Bayh has suffered one embarrassment lately in this legislative area. The controversial Senate bill (S 1) designed to codify the entire Federal criminal law has been stridently opposed by civil libertarians who see numerous insidious provisions within its raft of pages. Bayh, to his current chagrin, was originally a cosponsor. On September 10, before his announcement for the Presidency, he withdrew his name as a cosponsor and now says he will not vote for the bill unless it contains a number of amendments which he has proposed or supports. He contends that his only intention in having cosponsored the bill was to work from within in amending it. Aides now admit that was a political mistake even if it was a good strategy legislatively; some critics go further and dismiss that explanation as a rationalization for an outright misapprehension of the bill when it first appeared.

## Energy

Bayh's committee work has not led him into the energy field to the extent that he would like as a candidate, and he is moving into that area aggressively. His principal effort is his bill (S 2387) to end the vertical integration of the major oil companies. Bayh aides say there is a good chance that his bill will pass.

The thrust of the bill is to break the control that oil companies now have over all aspects of oil production, from

## Bayh Staff, Advisers

**Chairman, Committee for Birch Bayh in 1976:** Matthew E. Welsh, Indianapolis attorney and former governor of Indiana (D 1961-65).

**Campaign manager:** James Friedman, a Cleveland attorney and chief of staff for former Gov. John J. Gilligan (D Ohio 1971-75).

**Deputy campaign manager:** Ann Lewis, a former aide to Mayor Kevin White of Boston.

**Press secretary:** Bill Wise, a former journalist (*Life* magazine) who has been Bayh's Senate press secretary for six years.

**Issues Adviser:** Jason Berman, a 10-year veteran of Bayh's staff.

**Finance chairman:** Myer Feldman, an attorney and former White House counsel to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

wellhead to automobile tank. The assumption behind the bill is the classic antitrust belief that such vertical integration is anti-competitive and hence raises prices.

Bayh has shown particular interest in the need for adequate funding of research into ways in which sulfur can be removed from coal so that the country's most abundant fossil fuel can be used in an environmentally satisfactory way. He also embraced the goal of U.S. energy self-sufficiency within a decade back in 1973 by cosponsoring a bill allocating \$2-billion a year for 10 years for energy research and development.

## Economy

Bayh has highlighted the economy as a fundamental issue. If unemployment figures remain high, he can be expected to hit hard on the failure of the Republican administration to give the working man a job. Bayh has acted in the past to cushion the impact of hard times by drafting legislation extending the scope and length of unemployment benefits. He favors a more aggressive federal role as a public service employer in order to reduce unemployment.

Bayh has joined numerous other critics of the policies of the Federal Reserve Board. He has argued that the high interest rates and the tight money policies of the Republican administration and the Federal Reserve are responsible for the inflation and unemployment the economy has suffered. He has also made other fiscal recommendations, including his support of countercyclical revenue-sharing to cities hit by particularly high levels of unemployment. Bayh has cosponsored legislation to create an economic planning board.

Tax reform is also a priority for Bayh. He has supported tax relief for small taxpayers and for the elimination of loopholes for preferred incomes, exporters, business depreciation and the oil depletion allowance.

## Environment

Bayh has been concerned with noise pollution. He has opposed the supersonic transport for that reason as well as for its possible impact on the ozone layer. He supported the Environmental Noise Control Act.

Bayh drafted legislation opposing the use of pesticides on wild animals on public lands. He sponsored legislation banning the use of such allegedly cruel trapping devices as the leghold trap in hunting done on public lands.

## Health Care

Bayh supports the principal of a comprehensive national health insurance program. He has favored additional funding for maternal and child health programs, for nutritional programs for the elderly, nurse training, home health care and hospital modernization. He cosponsored the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (PL 92-303). He also cosponsored a bill to provide for coverage of one preventive checkup a year for Medicare recipients.

## Defense, Foreign Policy

Bayh has been a strong supporter of Israel, voting consistently for military aid to preserve the integrity of the nation. In his support for or opposition to other governments, Bayh invokes what he calls the requirement of mutuality of responsibility. Governments that the United States aids should, in those terms, recognize that they have the obligation to nurture democratic institutions and refrain from racial or religious discrimination. They should also contribute to their own defense in accordance with their means. In light of these general principles, Bayh has urged NATO to take over more of the U.S. defense burden in Europe, allowing the United States to reduce its troops there. He advocated cutoffs of aid to Sukarno's Indonesia and to the former junta in Greece. He opposed the importation of chrome from Rhodesia.

On "third world" issues, Bayh chides the Republican administrations for essentially ignoring the questions posed by the developing nations. He argues that "there can be no real long-term peace unless the United States joins in the effort to improve living conditions for all human beings."

Bayh has generally taken the stance that the limitation of the U.S. arms race with the Soviet Union is appropriate. He has, in the past, supported agreements between the two countries which would reduce the levels of armaments and curb the development of additional missile technology. However, he expresses some concern about what he has called the "tendency of two Republican Presidents and Secretary of State Kissinger to overstate the meaning of detente in its present context."

## Outlook

The pieces of Bayh's legislative record, taken together, are consistent with his coalition strategy. He has been steadily responsive to the petitions of the many groups whom he now hopes to galvanize in his support. And, as his aides emphasize, he has been visible in that responsiveness. The very breadth and consistency of his senatorial record, however, may be a source of vulnerability for him.

Most opinion analysts agree that voters no longer place much faith in the wisdom of a federal, "big-government" response to whatever ails the nation. Yet the unifying thread in Bayh's record has been the liberal Democratic credo that the federal government can and should act to solve problems brought to it by its citizens. This idea runs counter to the claims of several other presidential candidates—including Carter of Georgia on the Democratic side—that Washington must face up to reality and tone down its legislative largesse.

Bayh is engaged in an effort to prove that the old coalition majority is still a viable electoral entity, and that it is still possible to govern by being responsive at the federal level. As his own campaign strategy would have it, the first

and major test of that effort will lie in the early New England primaries.

—By Barry Hager

## CANDIDATES '76

### Texas

Rep. Alan Steelman announced Dec. 5 that he intends to seek the Republican nomination for the Senate seat held by Democrat Lloyd Bentsen. In a press release, the two-term representative from Dallas said that he would formally declare Jan. 5. Steelman, 33, was re-elected in 1974 by slightly more than 2,000 votes in a district that had been altered to make it more Democratic.

Bentsen is seeking a second Senate term and is also a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. Under Texas law, he can seek both offices simultaneously.

### Pennsylvania

Moving quickly following the announced retirement of incumbent Republican Hugh Scott, Rep. H. John Heinz III announced his candidacy Dec. 11 for the Republican Senate nomination. He joins three other candidates on the Republican side—former Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter, journalist George Packard and former State Rep. Francis Worley.

With Scott now officially out, the number of Democratic contenders is expected to increase. State Sen. Jeanette Reibman has announced; mentioned as possibilities to enter the race are Pittsburgh Mayor Pete Flaherty, the party's unsuccessful 1974 nominee, and Lieutenant Gov. Ernest P. Kline.

Heinz, 37, has been in the House since he won a special election in November, 1971. He is one of the most liberal Republicans in the House and was re-elected to a third term in 1974 with 72.1 per cent of the vote. (*Scott retirement, Weekly Report p. 2657*)

### Indiana

Former Secretary of State Charles Hendricks announced for the Republican Senate nomination Dec. 2. Hendricks, also a one-time state Republican chairman, enters a primary contest that is certain to include former Gov. Edgar D. Whitcomb (1969-73) and Indianapolis Mayor Richard G. Lugar, the 1974 Senate nominee.

Incumbent Democrat Vance Hartke is expected to seek a fourth term.

### Missouri

Former Jackson County Prosecutor Joseph P. Tewsdale announced in late November that he would drop out of the race for the Democratic Senate nomination and switch to the gubernatorial race. The major announced candidate for the Democratic nomination thus far is State Senate President Pro Tem William J. Cason. Other hopefuls are George Weber, a former unsuccessful candidate for state representative, and Byron Jim Sparks, a political unknown.

Incumbent Gov. Christopher S. Bond, a Republican elected in 1972, is seeking a second term. Teasdale unsuccessfully sought the Democratic nomination for governor that year; he finished third in a ten-candidate primary.

## *The Public Record*

of

## *Edmund S. Muskie*



The selection of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine) as the Democratic nominee for the Vice Presidency elevated to national prominence a self-effacing legislator who had suffered political defeat only once in his 22-year career and who quietly had become a party stalwart in the Senate.

His selection by the party's Presidential candidate, Hubert H. Humphrey, on Aug. 29 was greeted with little surprise and with muted reaction. Muskie generally was held in high respect by his colleagues in the Senate but was almost unheard of outside of Washington, D.C., and his home state.

His nomination received only token opposition from dissident factions of the party at the Democratic National Convention at Chicago. Antiwar and other liberal Democrats nominated Negro Georgia State Rep. Julian Bond as a Vice Presidential candidate. However, Bond quickly withdrew his name because he was under the legal age of 35 required for the Vice President; Bond received 48½ votes, nevertheless. Muskie received 1,944½ votes; even before the end of the balloting, the party accepted by voice vote a motion to make Muskie's nomination by acclamation.

In choosing Muskie, Humphrey selected a person who previously had been called a master at compromises "in the best meaning of the word." Muskie in the past had acquired a reputation as a liberal who strongly supported party stands but had avoided definite identification with either faction of the party over the divisive Vietnam war. He had been termed a moderate on the war who generally supported U.S. participation in the conflict, but he seemed opposed to an expansion of the fighting and had said a bombing halt should be considered if it might yield results in negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam.

**Political Background.** Muskie was elected in 1946 to the Maine legislature and in 1954 as governor -- the

first Democrat in the state house in 20 years and the first Catholic ever elected to the office in that predominantly Protestant state. After a two-term state administration generally regarded as sound and progressive by members of both parties, Muskie was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1958 and was re-elected in 1964.

In the decade since his arrival in the Senate, he earned a reputation as a conscientious legislative specialist in pollution, urban affairs and federal-state relations who also was a strong liberal and a party supporter. His quiet, painstaking approach to his job, his party loyalty and the consideration he displayed for his colleagues gained Muskie steadily increasing respect in the Senate.

In 1965 and 1967, Muskie stepped aside to allow other Senators to contend for Senate party posts he was seeking. Nevertheless, Muskie had been mentioned with increasing frequency in the past as the next Senate Democratic leader and as a possible Vice Presidential candidate in both 1964 and 1968.

**1968 Convention.** As the 1968 Democratic Convention neared, Muskie had appeared to be one of the leading potential Vice Presidential selections on a Humphrey ticket. Also in the running had been Sen. Fred R. Harris (D Okla.), Ambassador to France and former Peace Corps and poverty war director R. Sargent Shriver, New Jersey Gov. Richard J. Hughes, San Francisco Mayor Joseph L. Alioto, former Postmaster General and Presidential advisor Lawrence F. O'Brien and former North Carolina Gov. Terry Sanford. Humphrey said he had narrowed the field down to Muskie and two others a few hours before he announced his choice. He said he had spent hours on the telephone Aug. 29 conferring with political, business, church, civil rights and other figures throughout the country and had received favorable responses about Muskie.

Muskie, Vice President Humphrey said, would "bridge many a gap and many a gulf here in the party." Humphrey said the qualifications held by Muskie which he

thought a Vice President should have were knowledge of government, character, a sense of responsibility, education and experience. Humphrey said he also was attracted by Muskie's low-key, thoughtful manner. He called Muskie "a stable, reliable, judicious, thoughtful man." And Humphrey added, "America needs stability with a sense of social progress."

In his role as the Vice Presidential candidate, Muskie would handle a heavy share of the day-to-day campaigning before the November election, Humphrey said. As Vice President, Humphrey said, Muskie would "coordinate many domestic functions." He mentioned specifically urban programs.

Muskie was nominated before the convention by Sen. Harris; the nomination was seconded by Gov. Hughes. Also making seconding speeches were Maine Gov. Kenneth Curtis and Sen. Philip A. Hart (D Mich.).

In his acceptance speech, Muskie expressed his "acute awareness of the work we have to do. To build a peace, to heal our country. To make a society such as ours work is not easy.... It means learning to trust each other, to work with each other, to think of each other as neighbors. It means diminishing our prerogatives by as much as is necessary to give others the same prerogatives. It means respect for the rule of law as a dispenser of justice as well as a maintainer of order."

**News Conference Views.** In news conferences following his nomination, Muskie elaborated on his views toward major problems and toward the Vice Presidency.

On a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, he said it was "very possible" he might differ from Humphrey in evaluating the risks of a unilateral cessation of the bombing.

On racial issues, Muskie said the problem was one of "engaging the confidence" of Negroes and the poor and of encouraging their "maximum participation" in society and of encouraging them to "acquire the skills of the political processes." He added that this probably would not gain instant success and he urged patience.

On youthful dissent, particularly the Chicago violence during the Convention between the city police and anti-

war demonstrators, Muskie said "dissent is a perfectly valid role in our society" and a decision to be made by every individual. But, he added, the Chicago clashes were the result of "excesses on both sides."

He also indicated that he might not always support the policies of the President if he were Vice President and that he felt he would have an opportunity to speak his mind.

## Biography

**Born:** March 28, 1914, Rumford, Maine.

**Education:** Rumford High School, Rumford, Maine, 1932; Bates College, Lewiston, Maine, A.B. cum laude, 1936; Cornell Law School, Ithaca, New York, LL.B., 1939.

**Military:** U.S. Navy, 1942-1945, discharged as lieutenant (junior grade).

**Family:** Married Jane F. Gray; five children: Stephen (1949), Ellen (1951), Melinda (1956), Martha (1958) and Edmund Jr. (1961).

**Religion:** Catholic

**Affiliations:** Lions International, Elks, AMVETS, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, State Grange.

**Profession:** Attorney.

**Offices:** Maine House of Representatives, 1947-1951; Maine Director of Office of Price Stabilization, 1951; Democratic National Committeeman, 1952; Governor of Maine, 1955-1959; U.S. Senate, 1959 to date.

## POLITICAL CAREER

On his first attempt at election to public office, Edmund Sixtus Muskie in 1946 was elected to the Maine House of Representatives by several hundred votes as one of two Democratic Representatives from Waterville.

Muskie's lone political setback occurred in 1947 when he lost a race for mayor of Waterville. He was re-elected to the legislature in 1948 and 1950, in 1948 becoming the floor leader of the small group of Democrats. He served on the judiciary, federal relations, military affairs, elections, election expenditures and special taxation committees. While he was a state Representative, Republican attempted unsuccessfully to lure him into the GOP.

In 1951 he resigned from the Maine legislature to accept appointment as state director of the Office of Price Stabilization. He left that position in 1952 to become Maine Democratic National Committeeman. In 1952 also he was approached by prominent Democrats to run for governor, but he declined because he felt the state party was too weak at that time to defeat the Republican incumbent. At the 1952 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, he strongly backed Adlai E. Stevenson for the Presidency. In 1953, a serious home repair injury hospitalized him and disabled him for months.

**Campaign for Governor.** In 1954, he became convinced that the Democratic Party could challenge seriously the long tenure of the GOP officeholders in the state. He agreed to run for the U.S. House of Representatives but then changed his mind to campaign for governor, "because," he commented, "they couldn't find anyone else."

His campaign slogan was "Maine Needs A Change." He logged 20,000 miles traveling all over the state, focusing on issues such as highway programs, unemployment and the closing of two state tuberculosis hospitals and the general industrial situation in the state. He claimed the

## Muskie Staff

The following are the key members of Sen. Muskie's staff:

Donald E. Nicoll, 41. Administrative assistant since 1962. Former executive secretary of the Maine Democratic Party (1954-56, during part of Muskie's term as governor). Former legislative assistant and press secretary for Muskie, also serves as secretary-treasurer of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.

John Whitelaw, 41. Executive assistant. Former personnel man, in charge of staff administration and coordination.

Robert C. Shepherd, 32. Press secretary, former reporter for Gannett newspapers.

Leon G. Billings, 30, Muskie's aide on the Public Works Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution.

Charles M. Smith. Muskie's aide on the Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations.

Miss Sandra J. Poulin, long-time secretary.

state GOP administration had lost touch with the people and asserted that Republican voters felt they had lost control of the party, which Muskie claimed had become the personal machine of the governor. Although a decisive underdog, Muskie defeated Gov. Burton M. Cross on a vote of 135,673 to 113,298, gaining 54.5 percent of the vote.

**Maine Governor.** In winning the election, Muskie became the first Democrat to be elected governor of Maine in 20 years, the fourth Democrat to hold the office since the Civil War and the first Catholic ever elected to the post. (A Catholic was appointed governor in 1843.)

He was re-elected governor in 1956 by a vote of 180,254 to 124,395 (59.2 percent), the largest vote ever given a Maine governor.

As governor, he embarked on a program of industrial expansion for the state, which had lost its vital textile industry to the South. He gained a reputation as one of the state's most progressive chief executives and received bipartisan support in his efforts. He established a Department of Economic Development to reverse the exodus of the textile mills and to attract new industry. He also increased state support of public schools, strengthened school faculties, broadened the state's water pollution control program, implemented a program aimed to aid the aged and disabled, and reorganized the state building program.

**Senate Campaign.** In 1958, Muskie decided to challenge Republican incumbent Frederick Payne for the U.S. Senate, rather than seek a third term as governor. Although a top vote-getter in the state, Muskie was rated as an underdog in the contest. He ran on a platform in which he criticized the Eisenhower Administration for "asking too much" of neutral nations, and argued for a shift from military aid to an increased emphasis on grants and loans for economic development.

But the foreign policy issue was overshadowed by the disclosure that Sen. Payne had accepted a loan from Bernard Goldfine, a Boston industrialist who at that time was the subject of a major White House scandal. Although Muskie never mentioned the loan, observers credited the magnitude of his victory to the unspoken issue of the scandal. He scored a 171,942 to 112,178 victory over Payne (60.5 percent of the vote).

**Senate Career.** Upon entering the Senate in 1959, Muskie said Maine voters expected him to be independent. This independent streak surfaced early—upon Muskie's first encounter with then Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. Muskie was asked by Johnson how he planned to vote on a change in the Senate rules to limit filibusters. The freshman Senator reportedly replied, "You'll know when I cast my vote," and then sided with Senate liberals against Johnson to limit debate. Muskie found that when committee assignments were handed out, he had been refused his first three choices of committee and instead given his fourth, fifth and sixth choices: the Banking and Currency, Public Works and Government Operations Committees. Although he had sought eagerly a seat on the Foreign Relations and other more prestigious committees, he remained on his original three groups despite later opportunities to accept more prestigious posts.

Since then, he achieved a sound reputation in matters coming before these committees. He was assigned the chairmanship of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommit-

tee of the Public Works Committee and the Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, two areas which have become his primary fields of interest. He became chairman of the Banking and Currency Subcommittee on International Finance and is on the Special Committee on Aging.

When he first became involved in pollution control and intergovernmental relations, areas he had dealt with in the Maine legislature and state house, they seemed of little importance. But since then, they have become subjects of growing public concern, and Muskie has been in the forefront of legislative discussion of them.

**Air Water Pollution Control**—He became the foremost Senate advocate of increased federal action in air and water pollution control. He led Congressional battles that resulted in the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Water Quality Act of 1965, giving the Federal Government funds and authority to begin combatting pollution. In 1967, he was the principal author of another air pollution control bill which, as passed, authorized \$428.3 million for U.S. pollution control efforts and expanded federal authority to deal with the problem when states failed to act. The bill, although it did not authorize federal uniform national emission standards on specific pollutants (as the Administration had sought), was considered nevertheless one of the major Congressional achievements of 1967. That year Muskie also supported research to reduce pollution by automobiles and chaired subcommittee hearings on the progress of federal water pollution control programs, many of which were enacted through his efforts.

**Federal-State Relations**—He displayed a continuing interest in improving federal-state relations and federal grant procedures. In his first months in the Senate, he helped manage a bill that established the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, a group composed of Cabinet members, Members of Congress, governors and mayors. His Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, which he helped establish in 1963, held lengthy hearings on "creative federalism" in 1966, 1967 and 1968. A measure he introduced, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, was passed by the Senate in 1968.

**Role in Model Cities Bill**—Another legislative milestone for Muskie came in August 1966 when the Senate passed the Administration's model cities program. Muskie originally had held reservations about the measure and had introduced amendments which clarified and added some provisions. He later, however, agreed to serve as floor manager of the bill.

Senate Republicans sought to whittle funds in the bill aimed at combating urban blight, arguing that the program was too costly in the face of Budget deficits and high Vietnam expenditures. Muskie countered that Republicans had invalidated their cost arguments by backing other inflationary, yet noncontroversial, bills such as aid for college housing. He urged their support to deal with "the most explosive domestic issue on the American scene today," swinging several Republicans behind the bill on crucial votes.

**Interest in Maine Affairs**—Muskie has struggled for years to gain Congressional acceptance of the Dickey-Lincoln School power project in Northern Maine. He repeatedly has been thwarted, however, in the House, after gaining Senate passage. The project would be the first federal power project authorized in Maine, but it has been violently attacked by private utilities.

Muskie has championed other regional interests. In 1963 he successfully added an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act which protected the shoe, textile and wood-working industries in Maine. In 1963 also, he wrote a letter to President Kennedy asking that restrictions on importing residual oil be lifted because it worked a hardship on the people of New England where oil was used as a domestic fuel. The matter was not acted upon by the President.

Muskie supported the Maine beet growers in their successful attempt to secure a federal loan for a study that showed that Maine was suitable for the growing of sugar beets.

Recently Muskie has sought to extend the three-mile territorial limit to 12 miles in an effort to help the U.S. fishing industry in its competition with the Russian and Japanese fishing fleets.

**Other Interests**—In 1962, as a member of the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee investigating the Department of Agriculture's activities in the operations of Texas financier Billie Sol Estes, Muskie defended the role of the Department. His defense of the Department led to some criticism.

He also was the subject of criticism in early 1968 when Rep. H.R. Gross (R Iowa) and Sen. John J. Williams (R Del.) asserted that some associates of Muskie in 1965 and 1966 were officers of firms seeking Government loans and guarantees and that others were officers of the Government agencies involved. Gross said the activities showed "a total lack of sensitivity on ethical questions." Muskie said that he was not personally involved in the activities and that only one of the persons named by Gross and Williams could be described as an "associate." The other persons involved stated that their participation in the transactions had long been a matter of public knowledge.

**Senate Leadership**—Like his quiet role in the legislative machinery of the Senate, Muskie's rise in its Democratic leadership also has won few headlines.

In 1964, he was mentioned frequently as a Vice Presidential possibility, but Sen. Humphrey had such a decisive edge that the Muskie candidacy never reached significant proportions. Also in 1964 he defeated Clifford G. McIntire (R) for a second term in the Senate by a vote of 253,511 to 127,040 (66.6 percent). In that election Muskie's Republican opponent was a staunch conservative who failed to overcome Muskie's popularity in a campaign that focused mainly on state issues.

In 1966, Muskie became an assistant whip of the party, one of the regional aides to the Majority Leader whose function was to assure attendance and votes on legislation. In addition, in 1967 he became chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.

However, he passed up two other chances since 1965 to advance in the party leadership, because of his deference to the wishes of other Senators. In January 1965 when Senate Democrats chose a successor to Assistant Majority Leader Humphrey, Muskie was reportedly the choice of many Senators. Muskie, however, deferred to John O. Pastore (D R.I.), who had more seniority and had expressed an interest in the post. And Pastore was defeated by Russell B. Long (D La.), despite Long's failure to support the Administration on some key bills.

In 1967, George A. Smathers (D Fla.) announced he would relinquish the third position in the Senate party leadership: Secretary of the Democratic Conference. Mus-

kie, along with Philip A. Hart (D Mich.) seemed to be the leading liberal contenders. However, Joseph S. Clark (I Pa.), maverick liberal who had been a severe critic of the Senate establishment, sought the post, and again Muskie stepped aside. Clark lost to Southern conservative Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.).

Nevertheless, Muskie was held in such high esteem that he frequently was felt to be the most likely successor as the Senate Democratic Leader.

**Vietnam**—In 1965, Muskie accompanied Mansfield on a trip to 15 European, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern nations primarily to gauge opinion about the Vietnam war. Muskie, generally considered a moderate backer of the Administration's Vietnam policy, reported to his constituents, "We found uneasiness about the uncertainties of the Vietnam conflict and its possible escalation in all the countries we visited." He said that the United States should strive to improve the prospects for a just settlement by negotiations and to avoid a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland.

Muskie served as an observer named by President Johnson to examine the conduct of the 1967 South Vietnamese elections. He reported, "We found no evidence suggesting widespread fraud or irregularity, and to my knowledge none has been reported by the other foreign observers or the 600 newsmen who watched the elections.... I found the election to be a stimulating and indeed, an inspiring experience."

## National Policy Stands

Muskie has been a strong Administration backer on legislative issues, a position which has earned for him a general reputation as a liberal Senator. Following is a summary of his views on domestic and foreign issues.

### DOMESTIC ISSUES

**Civil Rights.** In a statement during Investigation Subcommittee hearings into riots in 1967: "It is my impression that a substantial majority of the white people in this country recognize the injustice that the Negro has suffered and still is suffering; that a substantial majority of them want to correct these injustices; (and) that a substantial majority of them will support public policies and programs which are directed toward that objective...."

**Law and Order.** When questioned Aug. 25, 1968, on "Meet the Press" (NBC-TV): "I think that the use of force obviously, in the police work, at times is essential, but I think it ought to be held in reserve and that more human policies ought to be applied. Now you can speak in generalities much more easily than you can apply them but I think there ought to be a policy of restraint. Not that we ought not to use force when it is necessary, and the point of necessity is the difficult one to spell."

**Kerner Commission-Racism.** When asked on the Aug. 25 Meet the Press program whether he agreed with the Commission's views that white racism was at the root of civil disturbances: "Well, I might not necessarily phrase my analysis of the situation in the same way, but I think that basically it is correct in saying that we have out of our policies over the period of our occupation of this continent, developed policies toward the Negro people that have built a divided society."

**Education.** In a 1960 Senate address: "Personally, I believe that our education gap is, in the long run, more serious than the so-called missile gap. It is our brainpower which is the single most important key to the long-range victory of freedom, democracy and peace."

**Urban Problems.** In a 1966 Senate debate on the inner cities program: "We have learned from the shortcomings of the past, (that) fragmented, uncoordinated combinations of individual programs—however desirable and of themselves—will not correct the spiralling crisis in our cities."

"The housing, education, job opportunity, physical and social needs of men and women are part of the total environment of the cities. They should be treated as such."

**Open Housing.** In a Senate speech on Feb. 16, 1966: "The time is now for Congress to pass a law insuring all Americans an equal choice in the selection of housing.... We have at hand the means to make an immediate demonstration of faith to the Negro. It is we in the Congress who should take the lead in securing the fundamental right of fair housing for the Negro in 1968."

**Supreme Court.** During his 1967 Law Day speech: "The decisions of the United States Supreme Court during the past decade on equal opportunity, on the protection of the accused, on the right to speak out, and more recently on reapportionment, stand out as a monument to the preservation of freedom."

**Pollution.** In a 1963 Senate debate on an air pollution control bill: "Our population is increasing and the standard of living is going up. Our industries, homes, office buildings and motor vehicles take the air, combine it with fuels and return the air-polluting compounds to the air. The more we prosper, the more we pollute the air we breathe."

**Federal-State Relations.** In a 1966 speech before the American Assembly on State Legislatures: "In this era of creative federalism, the Federal Government is completely sympathetic to strengthening the states generally and the state legislatures in particular. But no matter how much the federal partner provides, no federal action, no executive order, no administrative establishment can get to the heart of most of the basic problems confronting the state governments today."

**Youth.** In his acceptance speech Aug. 29: "Such a force as this generated by these young people should be harnessed to those who believe in freedom as the most creative expression of the human spirit. But there are some quieting aspects to this force because it can be exercised, and often is, in unrestrained, irrational and explosive ways.... These may be the products of inexperience with results, of lack of confidence in our institutions, of lack of experience with the democratic process. They may also be the product of exploitation by opportunists whose motives are suspect.... We must learn to deal with these people, to insure their continued and meaningful participation in the democratic process."

## FOREIGN POLICY STANDS

**Vietnam.** Muskie in the past has not been readily identified with either the "doves" or the "hawks" in the debate concerning the conduct of the war.

In a Jan. 16, 1968, interview: "Two clear-cut issues involved in Vietnam—(1) the right of the South Viet-

namese people to determine their own destiny; (2) the use of the so-called national war of liberation as a technique of Communist expansion. To support the first and to resist the second, we are involved in a war of limited application of our military power.

"I think we recognize that, in a negotiated settlement, each side must take some risk that the other side may ultimately achieve its objective by nonviolent means, although each will seek to protect itself...."

In hearings on Vietnam before the Democratic Platform Committee Aug. 19: "...I think it is appropriate for us to call for (National Liberation Front) participation in the second stage of negotiations and in elections following the end of the conflict. I do not think it would be consistent with our objectives of free choice in Vietnam to insist that the present Vietnamese government be changed to include NLF participation prior to elections."

On the Aug. 25 Meet the Press program: The President "ought to be prepared to take some risks" in making the decision to halt bombing if diplomatic and intelligence sources indicated that such a move "could advance us one step further toward the negotiating table on substantive issues."

In supporting the majority plank on Vietnam before the Democratic National Convention Aug. 28: "The choice is this: a negotiated settlement with or a negotiated settlement without safeguards to protect free elections. A negotiated settlement which forces a coalition government on the South Vietnamese or one that supports their right to decide that question. A bombing halt with or a bombing halt without consideration of the air protection for our troops against military risks arising north of the demilitarized zone."

**Foreign Policy.** Before the Platform hearings Aug. 19: U.S. aims should be "to chart a new direction for our foreign policy to insure that our support of freedom and peace will be consistent with our objectives, commensurate with our capacities and appropriate to given circumstances."

**Foreign Trade.** In a March 1961 Senate speech: "I submit that neither extreme (of protectionism or free trade) will meet the interests of this nation or of the free world. The economies of nations are interrelated.... Trade between nations can no longer be left to chance.... Expanded opportunities for all countries in the free world depend on sensible and sensitive attention to the needs of all economies, and...planning in this area may well result in greater free trade." He advocated a sliding-scale import quota system through negotiated agreement to meet troublesome problems of import competition.

**East-West Trade**—During a 1963 discussion in the Senate: "On the balance therefore, it seems to me that it is in the national interest to have private traders sell wheat and wheat flour to the Soviet bloc—including either cash or short-terms or medium-term commercial credit terms. Yankee traders have always recognized that trade is a two-way proposition. We do not make one unless there is an advantage for us."

**Test-Ban Treaty.** "When I have voted for this treaty, I can say to my children 'I have tried to give a world in which you will not be poisoned by the silent, insidious hazards of nuclear fallout'; I can say to my constituents, 'I have voted for this treaty because it is a sensible step toward a rational world'; I can say to the critics of

(Continued on p. 2373)

# EDMUND MUSKIE'S KEY SENATE VOTES, 1959-1968

Edmund S. Muskie has served in the U.S. Senate since 1959. The following roll-call votes were picked by Congressional Quarterly as Key Votes of each year.

- 1968** **Tax Surcharge** (HR 15414). Amendment to impose a 10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate income taxes and require a \$6 billion reduction in Government spending. Accepted 53-35 (R 31-3; D 22-32), April 2, 1968. Muskie FOR.
- Gun Control** (S 917). Kennedy (Mass.) amendment to prohibit the interstate mail-order sale of rifles and shotguns (the Administration's proposal). Rejected 29-53 (R 9-22; D 20-31), May 16, 1968. Muskie AGAINST.
- Supreme Court Rulings** (S 917). Amendment to strike out Title II of the omnibus crime bill, which purported to override Supreme Court decisions on the rights of criminal suspects and restricted the Court's review powers. Amendment rejected 31-51 (R 7-24; D 24-27), May 21, 1968. Muskie FOR.
- Riots** (HR 2516). Amendment to add to the civil rights bill provisions making it a federal offense to travel in or use the facilities of interstate commerce to incite a riot. Accepted 82-13 (R 30-5; D 52-8), March 5, 1968. Muskie FOR.
- Open Housing** (HR 2516). Motion to table (kill) an amendment to add a strong open-housing provision to the civil rights bill. Motion rejected 34-58 (R 16-19; D 18-39), Feb. 21, 1968. Muskie AGAINST.
- Head Start Funds** (HR 15399). Amendment to provide a supplemental \$25 million for the Head Start program for needy children, bringing the total up to the full amount budgeted for fiscal 1968. Accepted 43-42 when Vice President Humphrey broke a tie by voting yea (R 12-21; D 30-21), March 11, 1968. Muskie FOR.
- Antiballistic Missile** (S 3293). Amendment to delay deployment of an ABM system until the Secretary of Defense certified it was "practicable" and that its costs were known with "reasonable accuracy." Rejected 28-31 (R 11-11; D 17-20), April 18, 1968. Muskie AGAINST.
- Textile Imports** (HR 15414). Amendment to impose a quota on all types of textile imports. Accepted 55-31 (R 20-14; D 35-17), March 27, 1968. Muskie FOR.
- 1967** **U.S.-Soviet Consular Convention** (Exec D). Adoption of the resolution consenting to the President's ratification of the Consular Convention, which provided ground rules for an exchange of consulates, complete immunity for consular officers and employees, and access and notification rights to a country in regard to citizens detained in the other country. Passed 66-28 (D 44-15; R 22-13), March 16, 1967. Muskie FOR.
- Dodd Censure** (S Res 112). Adoption of amended resolution censuring Sen. Dodd (D Conn.) for having used his office as U.S. Senator to obtain political funds for personal benefit. Adopted 92-5 (D 58-3; R 34-2), June 23, 1967. Muskie FOR.
- Railroad Strike** (S J Res 81). Amendment to add to the House version of the bill, which prohibited a railroad strike for 90 days, the original Senate language providing for an imposed settlement if no agreement was reached by the shopcraft unions and railroad management. Accepted 63-21 (D 36-20; R 32-1), July 17, 1967. Muskie FOR.
- Arms Sales** (S 1155). Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill, prohibiting the Bank from financing arms purchases by less developed countries. Rejected 40-49 (D 27-27; R 13-22), Aug. 9, 1967. Muskie AGAINST.
- Income Disclosure** (S 1880). Amendment to the Election Reform Act, requiring Members of Congress and candidates for Congress to disclose their assets, liabilities, securities, gifts and other outside income. Rejected 42-46 (D 29-24; R 13-22), Sept. 12, 1967. Muskie UNANNOUNCED.
- 1966** **Viet Nam War, Defense Authorizations** (S 2791). Motion to table (kill) an amendment to repeal the 1964 "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution, which authorized the President to help prevent aggression against South Viet Nam. Tabling motion adopted 92-5 (D 60-5; R 32-0), March 1, 1966. Muskie FOR.
- Airline Strike** (S J Res 186). Passage of the bill requiring striking airline machinists to return to work for up to 180 days while a Presidential special board mediated the dispute. Passed 54-33 (D 30-27; R 24-6), Aug. 4, 1966. Muskie AGAINST.

- 1966** **Model Cities** (S 3708). Amendment to delete from the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 the two-year authorization of \$900 million in grants "model cities," leaving for the program only \$24 million planning funds. Rejected 27-53 (D 10-43; R 17-10), Aug. 19, 1966. Muskie AGAINST.
- School Prayers** (S J Res 144). Passage of the bill proposing a constitutional amendment to permit voluntary prayer in public schools. Rejected (two-thirds majority required) 49-49 (D 22-34; R 27-3), Sept. 21, 1966. Muskie AGAINST.
- 1965** **Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965** (S 2362). Passage of the bill providing grants to states for allocation to school districts with large numbers of children from low-income families in public and private schools. Passed 78-17 (D 55-4; R 18-14), April 9, 1965. Muskie FOR.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1965** (S 1837). Amendment to reduce the fiscal 1966 and 1967 authorizations for foreign military assistance by \$115 million each year. Rejected 50-48 (D 28-25; R 10-18), June 11, 1965. Muskie UNANNOUNCED.
- Medicare** (HR 6675). Passage of the bill authorizing Medicare hospital insurance program for the aged. Passed 68-26 (D 55-7; R 13-14), July 9, 1965. Muskie FOR.
- Rent Supplements** (S 2213). Amendment to delete from the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 a provision authorizing a program of rent supplements for low-income families. Rejected 40-47 (D 16-42; R 24-5), July 15, 1965. Muskie AGAINST.
- State Legislative Apportionment** (S J Res 66). Passage of the bill proposing a constitutional amendment to permit the house of a state legislature to be apportioned on the basis of geography and political subdivisions as well as on the basis of population. Rejected (two-thirds majority required) 57-38 (D 28-36; R 29-3), Aug. 4, 1965. Muskie AGAINST.
- Right-to-Work Repeal** (HR 77). Motion to invoke cloture on debate to make the pending business of the Senate the repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act (which allows all states to enact laws banning union-shop agreements between labor and management). Rejected (two-thirds majority required) 45-47 (D 40-21; R 5-26), Oct. 11, 1965. Muskie FOR.

- 1964** **Oil Depletion** (HR 8363). Amendment to the Revenue Act of 1964 to reduce the 27 1/2 percent oil depletion allowance to 15 percent for companies with gross incomes above \$5 million and to 21 percent for companies with gross incomes between \$5 million and \$5 million. Rejected 35-57 (D 26-38; R 9-19), Feb. 6, 1964. Muskie FOR.
- Farm Bill** (HR 6196). Passage of the Administration farm bill, authorizing a voluntary wheat "certificate" program, a new cotton price support program and a Government subsidy for domestic cotton mills on each pound of domestically produced cotton, they purchased. Passed 53-35 (D 48-14; R 5-21), March 1964. Muskie FOR.
- Civil Rights** (HR 7152). Passage of the bill covering voting rights, equal access to public accommodations, desegregation of public facilities, public school desegregation, non-discrimination in federally aided programs and equal employment opportunity. Passed 73-27 (D 46-21; R 27-6), June 19, 1964. Muskie FOR.
- Economic Opportunity Act** (S 2642). Passage of the antipoverty program. Passed 61-34 (D 51-12; R 10-22), July 1964. Muskie FOR.

- 1963** **Mass Transportation Act of 1963** (S 6). Passage of the bill providing matching grants and other aid to local and State governments for the development of urban mass transit systems. Passed 52-41 (D 46-17; R 6-24), April 4, 1963. Muskie AGAINST.
- Youth Employment Act** (S 11). Passage of the bill establishing a Youth Conservation Corps and a "Home Town Corps" to provide useful work experience for and increase employability of unemployed youths. Passed 50-34 (D 40-7-20), April 10, 1963. Muskie FOR.
- Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty** (Exec M). Adoption of the resolution of ratification of the treaty, initiated in London on July 25, 1963, by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. Adopted 80-19 (D 53-11; R 25-8), Sept. 23, 1963. Muskie FOR.

62 **Civil Rights (S 2750).** Motion to invoke cloture on bill requiring that anyone with a sixth-grade education must be passed in a literacy test to vote in a federal election. Rejected 42-52 (D 31-30; R 11-22), May 14, 1962. Muskie FOR.

**Aid to Communist Countries (S 2996).** Amendment to prohibit the furnishing of aid under the act or the sale or gift of agricultural commodities under PL 430 to any country dominated by Communism or Marxism. Accepted 57-24 (D 34-18; R 23-6), June 6, 1962. Muskie AGAINST.

**Aid to Communist Countries (S 2996).** Amendment to permit the President under certain circumstances to sell or give surplus food under PL 480 to Communist countries. Accepted 56-34 (D 37-19; R 19-15), June 7, 1962. Muskie FOR.

**Medicare (HR 10606).** Motion to table (kill) provision to give medical care to the aged under Social Security. Adopted 52-48 (D 21-43; R 31-5), July 17, 1962. Muskie AGAINST.

**Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (HR 11040).** Motion to invoke cloture and limit debate. Adopted 63-27 (D 29-25; R 34-2), Aug. 14, 1962. Muskie FOR.

**'Peril Point' (HR 11970).** Amendment restoring "peril point" procedure, under which Tariff Commission advised President on a specific tariff level below which an industry would be hurt, and if he cut tariffs below that point, he would be required to explain his reasons to Congress. Rejected 38-40 (D 13-40; R 25-0), Sept. 18, 1962. Muskie AGAINST.

**Foreign Aid (HR 13175).** Amendment providing a \$785-million increase in foreign aid under the act. Accepted 47-28 (D 33-16; R 14-12), Oct. 1, 1962. Muskie FOR.

1961 **Revise Cloture Rule (S Res 4).** Motion to kill a proposal to revise Rule 22 to allow three-fifths of the Senators voting, instead of two-thirds, to invoke cloture. Adopted 50-46 (D 32-31; R 18-15), Jan. 11, 1961. Muskie AGAINST.

**School Aid (S 1021).** Passage of the bill authorizing \$2,550,000,000 in grants to states to be used for operation, maintenance, and construction of public schools and for teachers' salaries. Passed 49-34 (D 41-12; R 8-22), May 25, 1961. Muskie FOR.

**Housing Act of 1961 (S 1922).** Adoption of the conference report, authorizing \$4.88 billion in housing programs over four years. Adopted 53-38 (D 45-11; R 5-27), June 28, 1961. Muskie FOR.

**Mexican Workers Pay (HR 2010).** Amendment to require employers of Mexican farm laborers to pay them at least 90 percent of state or national average farm wage. Accepted 42-40 (D 34-20; R 8-20), Sept. 11, 1961. Muskie FOR.

**Impacted Areas Aid (S 2393).** Amendment to extend programs for one year instead of two. Rejected 40-45 (D 35-21; R 5-24), Sept. 12, 1961. Muskie FOR.

1960 **School Aid (S 8).** Table motion to reconsider vote rejecting amendment to authorize aid for school construction and teachers' salaries. Tabled 44-44 (Nixon voted to break tie) (D 16-40; R 28-4), Feb. 3, 1960. Muskie AGAINST.

**Civil Rights.** Motion to table amendment to pending Administration bill empowering the Attorney General to seek injunctions to protect any civil right. Adopted 55-38 (D 34-28; R 21-10), March 10, 1960. Muskie AGAINST.

**Area Redevelopment Act of 1960 (S 722).** Passage over President's veto. Rejected 45-39 (D 40-14; R 5-25), May 24, 1960. Muskie FOR.

**Minimum Wage Law (S 3758).** Amendment to reduce the number of new workers to be covered from 5 million to 280,000. Rejected 39-56 (D 19-44; R 20-12), Aug. 17, 1960. Muskie AGAINST.

**Medical Care for Aged (HR 12580).** Amendment to provide medical benefits for all Social Security retirees 68 and over, to be financed by an increase in the Social Security payroll tax. Rejected 44-51 (D 43-19; R 1-32), Aug. 23, 1960. Muskie FOR.

1959 **Labor 'Bill of Rights' (S 1555).** Amendment to add a "section providing a 'Bill of Rights' to protect union members against unfair actions by their unions. Accepted 47-46 (D 15-44; R 32-2), April 22, 1959. Muskie AGAINST.

**Labor Disputes (S 1555).** Amendment to permit state courts to handle labor disputes the NLRB declines to handle. Rejected 39-52 (D 16-43; R 23-9), April 23, 1959. Muskie AGAINST.

**Housing Act of 1959 (revised bill) (S 2539).** Passage of bill over the President's veto. Rejected 58-36 (D 52-9; R 6-27), Sept. 4, 1959. Muskie FOR.

## Voting Scores, 1959-67

The following Congressional Quarterly statistics, all in terms of percentages, measure Edmund Muskie's voting performance during his nine years in the Senate: how often he voted, how often he supported or opposed the Presidential position on roll-call votes, how often he joined or opposed the stand of Republicans and Southern Democrats when they formed a coalition against Northern Democrats on roll-call votes, how often he voted with and against the majority of his party against the majority of the other party, how often he voted with the majority when a majority of both parties took the same position.

The 86th Congress covered 1959-60; the 87th, 1961-62; the 88th, 1963-64; the 89th, 1965-66; the 90th, 1967-68 (however figures for the 90th Congress are for the 1967 session only).

For purposes of comparison, the average scores for all Senate Democrats are listed in parenthesis for each study.

Congress	Voting Participation	On The Record	Presidential		Conservative Coalition	
			Support	Opposition	Support	Opposition
86th	87 (87)	97 (96)	43 (57)	40 (43)	13* (13)*	67* (72)*
87th	89 (82)	98 (96)	87 (83)	4 (17)	11 (17)	76 (69)
88th	89 (85)	95 (93)	83 (87)	6 (13)	9 (17)	83 (70)
89th	76 (83)	83 (95)	70 (87)	6 (13)	8 (15)	73 (68)
90th- (1967)	82 (85)	88 (96)	76 (79)	6 (21)	9 (19)	75 (61)

Congress	Partisan Votes		Bipartisan Votes	
	Party Unity	Party Opposition	Bipartisan Support	Bipartisan Opposition
86th	67 (70)	17 (19)	80 (72)	10 (16)
87th	87 (70)	4 (17)	75 (74)†	11 (10)†
88th	81 (69)	4 (16)	80 (71)	7 (12)
89th	74 (67)	4 (17)	66 (66)	9 (15)
90th- (1967)	81 (66)	4 (20)	72 (69)	9 (13)

\*Average Coalition scores are for Northern Democrats only.

†During the 87th Congress, CQ scores in this category were based on a "nonpartisan" rather than a "bipartisan" study. The nonpartisan study was based on the number of roll-call votes on which a majority of Northern and Southern Democrats agreed with a majority of Republicans. The bipartisan study is based on a simple majority of Democrats agreeing with a majority of Republicans.

Muskie received a 100% rating from the Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO, in the 86th Congress. COPE gave him a rating of 91% in the 87th Congress, 100% in the 88th, 92% in the 89th, and 91% in 1967. The Americans for Democratic Action gave him a rating of 91% in the 86th Congress, 100% in the 87th Congress, 89% in the 88th Congress, 84% in the 89th Congress, and 62% in 1967. The Americans for Constitutional Action gave Muskie 12% in the 86th Congress, 0% in the 87th Congress, 7% in the 88th Congress, 6% in the 89th Congress, and 4% in 1967. The percentages are based on each group's selected roll-call votes.

(Continued from p. 2371)

this treaty, 'I have faith in the strength of America, in its institutions; in its leadership and in the wisdom of acting with your eyes open and your feet on the ground.'

**United Nations.** In a letter to constituents in 1962: "The fact that the United Nations has not proved to be a perfect instrument—and indeed it has been a very imperfect instrument—is not a reason to abandon it. Rather, we should continue to work at it...to define the means for meeting its objectives."

JOHN HERSCHEL GLENN - JUNIOR SENATOR FROM OHIO

John Glenn was the first American to orbit the Earth, and therefore, he is a hero (and will remain so) to an entire generation of Americans. Until he became an Astronaut, Glenn had been a 20-year-man in the Marines, and held the rank of Colonel at the time of his historic flight in 1962. Soon after his flight, he resigned from NASA, and in 1964, he ran for the Senate from his home State of Ohio. During the campaign, he slipped in his bathtub, damaging his inner ear. The injury was sufficient to take a year for Glenn's recovery, during which time the slightest motion was enough to cause pain and nausea.

In 1966, he became a Vice-President of the Royal Crown Cola Corporation of Columbus, Georgia. Since part of his hiring was due to the publicity value of his presence, the Royal Crown people made him President of their international marketing corporation in 1967. They also gave Glenn plenty of time off to pursue politics.

In 1968, he became a campaigner for and sometime traveling companion of Robert F. Kennedy, and he was a frequent guest on Kennedy's campaign trips. He was present when Kennedy was assassinated by Sirhan Sirhan. In 1970, Glenn took another shot at the Senate. His primary campaign was badly underfinanced, and industrialist Howard Metzenbaum beat him by outspending him. Glenn later stated that "I couldn't convince anyone that somebody as well-known as me needed money for a campaign."

William Saxbe, the Republican Attorney General of Ohio, who had been elected to the Senate in 1968, had announced that he did not intend to seek reelection in 1974. After the "Saturday-Night Massacre", Nixon appointed Saxbe Attorney General to defend against the attacks of Leon Jaworski and the Watergate Prosecutor's staff, and his seat was left vacant. In his place, Democratic Governor John Gilligan appointed Howart Metzenbaum.

When 1974 came around, and the Saxbe-Metzenbaum seat had to be filled by popular election, Glenn ran against Metzenbaum again. A couple of developments made this campaign an unusual one. The first was Watergate. The second was the revelation that Metzenbaum had paid \$118,000 in overdue taxes from 1967-68, (for which the IRS was suing) only when he was named to the Senate, several years later. Furthermore, it was revealed that Metzenbaum had paid no taxes on his \$240,000 income in 1969. Glenn lowered his sights on Metzenbaum's taxes and fired away. Metzenbaum accused Glenn, who had become quite wealthy in the meanwhile, of using tax shelters. (Glenn had an income of \$1,253,903 between 1965 and 1973, had acquired valuable real estate holdings- he was part owner of four Holiday Inns and other properties - owned part of a firm which aimed to apply scientific solutions to social problems, and had been a television producer. In 1973, his financial statement showed a net worth of \$767,800.) Glenn countered Metzenbaum's charges with the accusation that he (Glenn) had paid more income tax on his \$295,300 income (about \$148,800) in 1973 than Metzenbaum did on a much higher income that year.

In his 1974 campaign, Glenn received \$16,000 from Mary C. Stranahan, a student at the University of Toledo. Glenn also received \$13,100 from Elizabeth B. Blossom, who was then a wealthy political activist student at Radcliffe. She now lives in Washington, D. C.

Glenn won the primary with 54 percent of the vote. Metzenbaum took only Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo and two small counties, while Glenn won the rest.

One of the problems with heroes is that no one is neutral about them. Everyone either loves or hates them. And those who like them try to cover honest criticism.

Those who like Glenn say that he is a shy, deferential man, who is trying hard to become a good Senator. They say that he spends excessive time making sure that he understands what is going on, and that he is a champion of the cause of alternative sources of energy, especially solar. They also point to his voting record, explaining that he is a true liberal, especially on social programs. He is often called one of the nicest, best-liked men in the Senate.

His detractors call him "the best Astronaut in the Senate" and say that although he is well-liked, his is not respected by his colleagues. He is said to suffer from "terminal indecision", and that he has to study everything "to death" before he makes a decision on it. Glenn himself admits that he has trouble in this area. In an interview with the Milwaukee Journal in 1975, he admitted that he agonized at length before voting against the confirmation of Stanley Hathaway as Interior Secretary,

and he stated that "When it comes to some of these complex pieces of legislation, I wish that we didn't just have a choice of saying 'yes' or 'no'. I often wish that we had a (voting) column marked 'maybe'".

In a generally sympathetic article in the New York Times, in February of this year, Marjorie Hunter quotes an experienced Senate observer who watched Glenn in action on subcommittees dealing with nuclear energy and oversight of the CIA, as being critical of Glenn's failure to vigorously question witnesses at hearings. "He doesn't seem to know how to get information out of a witness," said the observer, "He doesn't follow through with the right questions."

On several occasions during the 1974 campaign against Metzenbaum, he was overheard referring to "Zionist influences" in the campaign, apparently referring to the strong support of Ohio's Jews for Metzenbaum. These remarks received wide circulation over the leadership of American Jewry. He has been a supporter of all legislation on Israel since, but he has not been a "visible supporter", and he does not have strong Jewish connections in or out of Ohio.

Finally, one source mentioned that his indecision on some issues has cost him the time to pay attention to others. At a question-and-answer session with 800 UAW leaders last year, Glenn was asked what he thought of HR22, the Health Security Act. This bill was one of the most important to the late Walter Reuther, and is referred to by UAW insiders as "The Reuther Memorial". Glenn replied that he did not know the legislation, and that he did not want to comment on it until he had studied it.

On the other hand, he is a champion of applying technology to our

John Glenn  
Page 5

problems and is one of the pushers for doing some long-range planning and priority-setting in the Senate.

Glenn is 54 (55 in July) and is a Presbyterian.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON III - Senator from Illinois

Adlai Stevenson III has a lot going for him. He is the son of one of the most intelligent men ever produced by the American political system. His father, Adlai Stevenson, twice Democratic nominee for President, was the darling of liberals and intellectuals in the 1950s, and was the symbol of the resistance to the "let it ride" and "brinkmanship" philosophies of the Eisenhower administrations.

As a successful young lawyer in Chicago, he ran for the Illinois House of Representatives in 1964. He had three things going for him: Instant name recognition, the same backing his father had enjoyed from Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, and the fact he was running in a lopsided "Democratic year". He won with a massive majority.

In 1966, he ran for state Treasurer and also won. Then, in 1970, he ran for the U.S. Senate seat of the late Everett Dirksen, the long-time Senate Minority Leader, and won.

Although Stevenson is possessed of a quick wit and a good mind, he is subject to personality quirks which partially negate his value as anything other than a man with a good voting record. He is an unimpressive and dull campaigner, who hates the rituals of the campaign even more than his father. One of Stevenson's political workers once decried the fact "that you have to literally push him out of the car to get him to shake hands or give a speech."

While he understands the workings of the Senate quite well, he authors little legislation, preferring to co-sponsor bills drawn up by other members on some occasions. He likes to devote his time and the time of his staff to obtaining federal grants for projects in Illinois, which has long been below the national average in per capita federal expenditures. Stevenson's voting record has been highly-rated by ADA and COPE, but he prefers to stay with the moderates, and there has been a perceptible creep to the right in his voting every year.

Stevenson has been generally supportive of legislation to tighten up conflicts-of-

interests of Members of Congress. On one occasion, he voted against his own interests to make this point. He is one of the few national officials to acknowledge openly that the perception of a conflict of interest by the public on the part of a legislator is as bad for the reputation of Congress as an actual conflict. He was a supporter of Senator Birch Bayh's bill to require financial reports from every federal official making \$18,000 a year or more, and while in the Illinois House, was co-sponsor (along with Representative Abner Mikva) of a well-thought-out conflict of interest bill. Every year since he took office, Stevenson has made a full financial statement in the Congressional Record.

Stevenson has also been a supporter of legislation to improve campaign finance, reporting, expenditure and advertising. In 1970, he was the target of an advertising campaign which tried to link him with hippies, revolutionaries, draft-dodgers and protesters. Stevenson has suggested, perhaps sarcastically, that all political advertisements be at least five minutes long by law so that sloganeering cannot dominate an election contest. Stevenson's largest contribution in the 1974 Senatorial election - \$9000, came from John P., Helen P., and Jack Daros, owners of Passengers Restaurant in Chicago. Each gave \$3000.

Stevenson was quite alarmed at the possibility that American presence during the 1971 South Vietnamese elections would influence the outcome, and he introduced an amendment to the 1971 Military Procurement Bill to require a bipartisan Congressional commission to oversee American conduct during the election. At that time, the Senate had just passed the Mansfield Amendment, which called for an end to the war within nine months. The question on Stevenson's amendment was called before he had a chance to explain it, and one Republican member suggested a bill to assure oversight of elections in Cook County (Chicago). The measure was handily defeated, and most of the members of the Senate had a good laugh at Stevenson's expense.

In other measures, notably dealing with the expulsion of Taiwan from the U.N. and the use of torture in Brazil, he lectured the Senate's conservatives so haughtily that he lowered his already poor image in the Senate.

On the nomination of Richard Kliendeinst as Attorney General, Stevenson wanted to start an investigation of the ITT affair so badly, that he was forced into a legislative contortionist's act, entering two diametrically opposed sets of votes in two go-arounds.

Stevenson has also opposed the SST, military spending and the Lockheed loan. In each case, he delivered a lecture stating that budget choices are too much in the hands of the Executive Office and that the money would be better spent on social programs. On busing, Stevenson tried to chart a quiet, middle-of-the-road course, which is probably more liberal than a cross-section of his constituents would be. He has also been a supporter of handgun controls.

In 1974, Stevenson wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in which he warned of the dangers of giving peaceful nuclear reactors to foreign nations, since the materials within could be converted to wartime use. He argued that an alliance to crush any nation which made noises that it would use the materials for uses other than those originally intended was necessary. One of the main problem areas for nuclear reactors he pointed to was the Middle East.

✓ In March, 1976, Stevenson went on a 16-day junket through the Middle East. While there, he met with Yassir Arafat, and Arafat sold him on the idea that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the true representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat made some quite vague (and obviously non-binding) proposals that if the Israelis withdrew to their pre-1967 boundaries, including leaving the old city of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and supported the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza, that the PLO might consider recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Stevenson carried this conversation to the Israeli leaders, and became quite insistent that they accept it. The Israelis refused, and although they were shocked, since they thought of Stevenson as a firm supporter of Israel, they made some effort to explain their refusal to accept such a vague offer, especially from the PLO, which has always refused to acknowledge the right of Israel to exist. His insistence was

even harder to understand, in light of the fact that he had called Arafat's outline a "proposal and not a hard offer" in conversations with the press.

Later, at a party in Cairo, Stevenson went on a tirade against the Israeli leaders. In front of Egyptian diplomatic officials and other Arab leaders, Stevenson called the Israeli leadership "liars" and described them as being "insolent", "unintelligible" and "unintelligent".

Upon his return to New York, Stevenson got drunk at a meeting of the heads of major Jewish organizations and repeated his accusations against the Israeli leaders and spoke of the Arabs' desire for peace and of the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. The leaders probably overreacted to this display, and in a mass fit of rage issued a public statement condemning Stevenson.

The last straw came in an address by Stevenson to the Anti-Defamation League in Chicago on May 7. In the speech, which was announced as a criticism of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic moves in the Middle East, Stevenson again launched his tirade against the Israelis. In the speech, he implied that he thought American support of Israel should be withdrawn if the Israelis were not more flexible. Stevenson also attacked Israel's Labor Party, which leads the present government coalition, as desiring only to subjugate the Arabs militarily. He stated that the Arabs wanted only peace, and that Israel must negotiate with them no matter what the cost. Needless to say, the crowd was left speechless.

Persons who have talked to Stevenson since say that he will not bend from his present position, and that he is convinced that he is an even-handed, just peacemaker. There is discussion in the Illinois Democratic Party of how to shut Stevenson up before he alienates the entire Illinois Jewish community, and the ancillary loss of funds from such alienation.

This situation is very hot, and it would be a major obstacle to national Jewish support if Stevenson is the nominee.

Stevenson also attended a reception for PLO representatives to the UN sponsored by Senator James Abourezk (D-S.D.), a Lebanese-American, on June 26. Observers

said he was quite friendly with the PLO members.

His nomination would be a great detriment to Jewish support in key states.

WALTER F. MONDALE - Senator from Minnesota

In 1960, the Attorney General of Minnesota decided to retire with almost four years left on his term. The Governor appointed Mondale. When Hubert Humphrey was elected Vice-President in 1964 with two years left on his term, the Governor appointed Mondale. Both of his subsequent campaigns for the Senate have produced easy wins, and Mondale has never had to get down to really campaign hard.

A number of Mondale's colleagues say that they admire his legislation and the fact that he never does a second-rate job on anything. Others say that he is tough, a great self-promoter and a good Senate politician who learned from the mistakes of his mentor Hubert Humphrey: In the Senate the way you say something can be more important than what you say.

Mondale is the son of a socially-conscious Methodist minister. His father was sent only to small communities because he had an unimpressive pulpit delivery. Mondale grew up poor, but not impoverished. He has been active in politics since 1948, when he stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Hubert Humphrey, Orville Freeman and Eugene McCarthy in purging the newly-formed Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party of leftists.

Mondale inherited his father's concern for social issues. His maiden speech in the Senate was on the problem of world hunger.

Mondale's efforts in the Senate have been devoted to social issues: consumer protection, migrant labor, the elderly, child care and the schools, and public legal services.

As a freshman Senator, Mondale introduced the Fair Warning Bill, which requires that auto manufacturers inform owners of potentially dangerous defects in their cars. Although Mondale was not a member of the Commerce Committee, which is responsible for legislation on cars, but Mondale's persistence resulted in it being included in a traffic safety package which passed Congress in September, 1966.

In 1967, Mondale was responsible for the passage of the Wholesome Meat Act. Through hearings and through secret Agriculture Department reports made public through

Harry Helzer, Chairman of IM, made on October 26, 1972, does appear.

Mondale may have received some milk producers' funds.

He would probably help more than any other Vice-Presidential candidate

with the liberal community. It is difficult to know whether his strong

liberal record would reduce your support in the South or in the con-

servative areas.

Edmund S. Muskie (D) Senator from Maine

Biographical Data: b. March 28, 1914; home, Waterville, Maine; Bates College, B.A. 1936, Cornell L.L.B. 1939; Catholic.

Career: Practicing Atty.; Navy WWII; Maine House of Reps. 1947-51; Minority Leader 1949-51; Dir. Maine Office of Price Stabilization, 1951-52; Governor of Maine 1955-59; Dem. nominee for V.P. 1968

Committees

Budget (Chairman)

Government Operations (4th) Subcommittees: Intergovernmental Relations (Chairman); Reports, Accounting and Management; Oversight Procedures.

Public Works (2d) Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution (Chairman); Economic Development; Transportation.

<u>Ratings:</u>	ADA	COPE	ACA
1974	100	73	0

Muskie has been characterized as a thorough, thoughtful Senator. He is known to be very uncomfortable with the press; to have an explosive temper; to work his staff very hard. He insists on thorough research on every proposal he backs.

Muskie is the son of a Polish immigrant, a tailor. He was a good student, and entered politics early. As Governor of Maine Muskie tried valiantly to cure his state's chronically high unemployment rate -- but with little success. Its geographic location, its weather, and the environmental consciousness of its citizens make Maine one of the poorest states outside the South.

Muskie became a focus of the environmental movement when he became chairman of the Environmental Pollution Subcommittee of the

Public Works Committee. Some have given him high marks -- the Water Quality Bill and the Air Quality Act of 1967. His subcommittee is very liberal; to get legislation through the more conservative larger bodies of Congress Muskie sought general consent on basic issues and stuck with them.

A Nader task force called Muskie's Air Quality Act "disastrous". The major criticism was that the difficult and divisive issues relating to pollution were avoided in the debate. Muskie reacted to the attack by stating his preference for developing clear ideas and for being effective.

Muskie's relations with the press have been poor -- he feels that they cannot appreciate the complexity of the issues a Senator has to deal with. Beyond that, some of the events of the 1972 campaign seemed to reinforce this feeling, especially the attacks for lack of "fire in the belly" in failing to take the offensive on certain issues. The celebrated "crying incident", his attack on Wallace in Florida, all contributed to his downfall. A definite problem of Muskie's own making was the leisurely schedule he kept in 1972, often starting at 9 A.M. and ending at 6 P.M. Perhaps he, like Mondale, did not "want it" enough.

Muskie has a big job in the Senate now. As a result of Congressional displeasure at impoundments and lack of competitiveness with OMB, Congress has created the Congressional Budget Committees. Muskie is the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. He is well qualified to make it a powerful policy-making force. His cautious, competent and thorough style, coupled with Congress' apparent commitment to assert a budgetary role, make this committee a new focus of leadership on Capitol Hill.

Muskie has generally supported Israel and has initiated certain assistance programs. However, he recently criticized the Jackson-Vanik Freedom of Immigration Amendment and made the statement "there is no blank check for Israel in Congress"; this statement may have referred more to budgetary, rather than international, matters. His Polish heritage is a minus with Jews.

# Muskie: Presidency Still Appealing

Sketch by  
BIOGRAPHY NEWS



By Jack W. Germond  
Star-News Staff Writer

Just two years ago Ed Muskie's presidential campaign went up in the smoke of the Wisconsin primary. Today he sits in the Senate and muses about the possibility of another try.

He is not, he makes an emphatic point of saying, "doing anything about it" at this point. "I don't plan," he stresses, "to pursue it like I did the last time."

But the desire is still there, roosting on the shoulder of his Maine-manufactured Hathaway shirt.

"I don't think it's likely I'll run in 1976," he says, leaning back in a green leather chair, "but I don't foreclose it."

A MOMENT later, puffing on a long, even-burning cigar, he adds: "It's a chal-

lenge that still appeals to me."

Considering his reputation as the terrible-tempered Mr. Bangs of politics, the senior senator from Maine is remarkably philosophical about what happened last time around. He blames "my own mistakes" — rather than William Loeb or the Committee to Re-elect the President — for his failure.

He also has persuaded himself — and he concedes it may be only a rationalization of his own disappointment — that "there was no way" he could win in 1972 because the time was not right for what he had to offer the electorate.

His slogan then, he recalls ruefully, was "trust and confidence" and he presented himself as a "trustworthy father figure" trying to serve as a healing force when the voters were in the mood for protest.

Primary voters, Muskie says, "know they're not electing a President," and in 1972 they wanted someone who would "spit in the eye of the establishment" — meaning, as it turned out, George McGovern and George Wallace. "I think we read it wrong," he says.

MUSKIE believes, and many astute analysts of 1972 agree, that his root problem was that he lacked a clearly defined constituency at which to direct his appeal in the way that McGovern appealed to the Democratic left and Wallace to the blue-collar workers.

And to the extent that Muskie had a constituency in the center, he had to share it with Hubert Humphrey. With several of those blocs — blacks, Jews, union leaders — Muskie's share was the small one.

But Muskie also concedes that he allowed himself "to be twisted out of shape" by the pressures of being the

Biography  
News

MUSKIE, Edmund  
(Senator—Maine)  
WASHINGTON  
STAR-NEWS  
(Washington, D.C.)  
Apr. 5, 1974

front-runner. It led him to believe that he had to fight in every primary, agonize publicly over every question, take up every challenge.

If he feels he was badly treated, it is solely on his conviction that he was the candidate best versed on the issues "but the way it emerged I didn't stand for anything."

When he travels now, lacking entourage and public focus on every word, he says, "I'm comfortable. I say what's on my mind. I don't worry about whether it's consistent with what I said two weeks ago."

"IT'S MORE natural," he says, puffing on the cigar, "than the cagy kind of attitude I developed" in the 1972 campaign.

Muskie has no illusions about the party coming to him. He says that sometime next year he will decide what to do, based principally on his estimate of "the mood of the country" and the kind of presidential nominee it would seem to require from the Democratic party in the aftermath of Watergate.

His perception of that mood now, based in part on a thorough public opinion poll done for a subcommittee on which he serves, is that the voters want candidates who "talk straight, talk direct," who stop "over-promising," who are not know-it-alls on every issue, who have character and integrity.

"Charisma definitely ain't one of those qualifications," he says. "People are looking for character, that's for damned sure," he adds a moment later.

If that description sounds like the image of Muskie before his 1972 campaign, meaning when he was at the peak of his strength, the man from Maine demurs at making the connection.

BUT THE problem for Muskie in looking at 1976 is that he is not a man starting from scratch. He is instead one badly tarnished by the spectacular quality of his failure two years ago.

After his election eve television broadcast of 1970, he shot to the top of the Democratic field. By late 1971 he dominated the opinion polls and the reckonings of party

professionals alike. Other Democrats were scrambling to get on board before they weren't needed.

Then it all went sour. He won less impressively than expected in New Hampshire, ran a dismal fourth in Florida, won against limited opposition in Illinois, then finished fourth in Wisconsin in April. He stayed in to compete once more, and to finish fourth again, in Pennsylvania, but it was all over.

What had been prized as his rationality in 1971 was perceived as wishy-washiness in the heat of a campaign. The celebrated "crying incident" when he attacked publisher William Loeb outside the Manchester Union Leader seemed proof of a lack of control. He was damned for intemperance in his attack on Wallace in Florida and for lacking "fire in his belly" for failing to seize the initiative on issues.

And his failures seem to have been all the more damaging because he fell so far. When you mention Muskie to many Democrats today, they hoot in derision at his potential for 1976, although they take quite seriously a more abject failure in 1972, Henry Jackson. It is as if there is nothing so offensive to politicians — and perhaps the press — than a front-runner who fails to meet their expectations.

MUSKIE IS aware of all this. But he believes that some of the turning points of 1972 — the crying incident, for example — might not have had such a lasting impact if he had been following a different strategy. What would have happened if, for instance, he had bypassed Florida to concentrate on New Hampshire and had won 55 percent of the vote? Who knows.

And Muskie is aware of other comebacks, of Richard Nixon in the White House six years after being written off as politically dead in California.

So he turns over in his mind different "sets of assumptions," as he puts it, on which he might run another campaign. It isn't likely, he insists, but smoking a late-afternoon cigar, it's still a challenge with some appeal.

FRANK CHURCH - SENATOR FROM OHIO

To understand Frank Church, it is important to have an understanding of Idaho.

The Idaho Territory was settled by Confederate refugees, who migrated there to escape Reconstruction and its companions, hunger and poverty. In its own way, Idaho is as southern as Alabama in its attitudes.

When Montana and Wyoming were created, the State of Idaho was left with some rivers and forests, and some mountain ranges. A large number of Mormons settled there, thinking they were in Utah. If Idaho had more than its present trace of a Black population, along with its southern and Mormon (26 percent of the population) heritage, the situation could be worse than in south Boston.

Politically, Idaho seems to vote contrary to the national trend, except in Presidential elections, where it almost always votes heavily Republican (although Lyndon Johnson took the 1964 election with 51 percent of the vote). In the 1950's, when the Republicans held their last majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and the White House, Idaho was going Democratic. As the Republicans lost power nationally, they gained power in Idaho. As the Republicans gained the White House again in 1968, Idaho began to swing back toward the Democrats.

Frank Church was brought up in a Republican house. As a teenager, he read books on the New Deal and decided that he would be a Democrat. After World War II service as a highly decorated intelligence officer in Asia, he attended and graduated from Stanford. He attended Harvard Law School for a

year and graduated from Stanford Law School. While in law school, he developed cancer, and had expected to die, but while he lived in fear of dying, Church kept on going to classes. The cancer responded to treatment, and Church became an Idaho lawyer. After six years' practice, Church ran for the Senate against Republican Herman Welker, a Republican who was a close ally of Joe McCarthy. When McCarthy's fortunes began to sag, Welker defended him on the basis that "McCarthy likes children". To get the nomination, Church had to defeat former Senator Glenn Taylor, the singing cowboy, who was Henry Wallace's running mate in 1948. Although they ran as Democrats, both Church and Taylor were descendants of a non-conformist streak which has its roots in the Progressive Republicans of the 1910's and 1920's. The best example of this was William E. Borah, who represented Idaho in the Senate from 1907 to 1940, was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and was widely admired for his progressive leadership in both domestic and foreign affairs. In fact, Borah was the pattern Church used for himself in his Senate career. Church beat Welker by a 14 percent margin. In 1962, Church had established a reputation as a maverick, had alienated a number of Idaho industrialists, and won reelection with 54 percent of the vote.

In 1967, the John Birch Society decided to have a go at Church, and tried to get a recall for the liberal Senator. Much of the manpower for the recall drive (it is not legally clear if a Senator can be recalled) came from new, right-wing immigrants from southern California, and some extra people came from the California Birch Society to help.

In time, it was revealed that most of the recall effort's money had come from right-wing California industrialist Patrick Frawley, the President of Technicolor, who made the mistake of telling the press that his money would

go a lot farther in Idaho than in a big State like California, and that Church's recall would send a message to other liberal politicians, especially those who opposed the Vietnam War (like Church). Frawley's remarks were given wide circulation in Idaho, and the people rebelled so strongly against the petitions that many Birchers were afraid to sign the petitions themselves. The petitioners collected only 135 signatures statewide, according to Church, and the drive fizzled.

Resentment over the recall drive carried over into Church's election the next year, and he won by his largest majority. In 1974, he was again elected, this time by a 57 percent margin. Church is the first Democrat in Idaho's history to be elected to a Senate seat more than once. Church's popularity probably helped Democrat Cecil Andrus get elected in 1970 and 1974.

When Church entered the Senate, he was placed on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, even though he had requested Foreign Relations. He then made the mistake of voting to liberalize the Senate's filibuster rule, against the orders of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Johnson did not speak to Church for six months. Then, Church redeemed himself in LBJ's eyes by adding a jury trial amendment to a pending civil rights bill, which enabled the bill to pass without a filibuster. Johnson took Church off the Post Office Committee and put him on the McClellan rackets committee, and as soon as an opening appeared, Church went onto the Foreign Relations Committee.

In 1965, Church changed his mind about the Vietnam War and began his opposition. This brought on another confrontation with LBJ, who warned Church

that Borah had made a mistake in predicting that World War II would not happen just weeks before Germany invaded Poland. LBJ also warned Church that new dam projects for Idaho would be cut off if he didn't change his mind. Church stuck to his guns, and eventually won back LBJ's friendship through his good humor.

In spite of Johnson's claims, Church says that Borah was misunderstood. Borah, he says, was against foreign entanglements in the same way George Washington was, that he was a great believer in international law as the best way to solve international conflicts, and that Borah was in favor of recognition of the Soviet Union long before FDR actually recognized that nation. Here, Church draws a parallel with his urgings for the recognition of Red China, which Nixon finally did.

In the spring of 1972, Church became, along with John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the sponsors of the Cooper-Church amendment, which would have cut off funds for the Vietnam War at the end of 1972. Church did not advocate that South Vietnam be abandoned, but he did push for the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, and from the sea around Vietnam and the sky above it. He did say that the U.S. should continue to give the same material aid to the south that the Russians and Chinese gave in the North.

In 1971, Church led the fight to reject the \$4.2 billion foreign aid appropriation requested by the Nixon Administration. To Nixon's embarrassment, the Senate cut \$1 billion off the appropriation, in the first time a foreign aid appropriation had been returned to the White House with a lower

figure than requested in 20 years. The Senate's rejection of the appropriation followed a speech by Church in which he argued that American foreign aid was doing considerable harm. He said that American foreign aid had been used to prop up dictators and enrich the already rich of recipient nations, while further impoverishing the already poor of those nations and suppressing revolutions that should have been permitted to explode. He criticized the foreign aid program as expensive and mismanaged, and the only real purpose of foreign aid was to further the interests of American overseas investors and suppliers.

He went on to criticize the programs of the Agency for International Development (AID) by recalling that AID's director had stated in hearings that 93 percent of the AID appropriation was spent with suppliers in the U.S., and that the countries which were receiving AID assistance were in debt by \$22 billion to the U.S. Church said that political stability, which is an AID criterion for assistance, had been promoted primarily to protect American investors, and that in Latin America, U.S. companies were taking out \$2 in dividends for each dollar of new investment. Worst of all, said Church, the American taxpayer is bearing the cost of investment abroad, since the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which is backed by the federal government, insures American companies abroad.

Church also stated that he opposed the military assistance program, and that it should be curtailed.

Church has constantly voted for reductions in domestic military spending. He voted in favor of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in favor of nonprolif-

eration in 1969, and in favor of ending military assistance to Greece. He also voted for the Hatfield amendment to end the draft, the Proxmire-Mathias amendment to place a \$68 billion defense spending ceiling in 1971, in favor of the Gravel amendment to cancel underground tests at Amchitka Island and against the Lockheed loan. Church voted to postpone the expenditure of funds for MIRV's, in favor of ending the Navy F-14 aircraft program, against increases in military aid and against the ABM. On conservation, Church has a good record. Environmental purists do not feel that he is one of them, since he tries to compromise at times, and he does not support them at every turn, preferring to take a practical view, since many of Idaho's jobs are oriented toward utilization of natural resources.

He was floor manager for the Wilderness Bill in 1961, which was bitterly opposed by Boise-Cascade and other Idaho industries. The bill, which set aside significant wilderness acreage for recreational use, passed, and Church was reelected.

Church had not decided what to do on the proposed Snake River dam when this information was published. The problem revolves around Hell's Canyon, the deepest gorge in North America, and a shrine to conservationists. A canyon as deep as Hells Canyon would be ideal for power generation and water storage, which is essential in arid Idaho.

Church's wife once owned half interest in a ranch in the Sawtooth-White Cloud range, but he sold his interest to avoid charges of conflict of interest. Although he realized that he could not get the area designated as a national park, he did move to block the creation of an open-pit mine in the range.

Church has also been criticized for his failure to act quickly on mine safety legislation after the 1972 Sunshine gold mine fire, which killed 91 men. Church's defense was that he wanted to see the results of the investigation of the disaster before making his move. Critics counter that a member of the law firm that represents the owners of the mines is a close political supporter and personal friend of Church's, and that he is afraid to take on the State's mining interests.

Lately, the collapse of the Teton Dam in eastern Idaho has caused some criticism of Church, since he was the Dam's major supporter in Congress. He is a strong opponent of gun control laws. Church is very concerned about the problems of the aged, and has authored several aid bills for the elderly.

While Church did not publish personal statements of assets for several years, he has published most of his contributor lists. In 1968, there was a \$50 a plate fundraiser for Church in Boise with Ted Kennedy and Jimmy Durante that brought out 800 paying guests. Poet Archibald McLeish made a major national mailing in behalf of Church and McGovern, which served as a major source of funds for Church, who says that the average contribution was less than \$12 (the names on this list are confidential, according to Church). The Church for Senate Committee raised a total of \$200,000 for his 1968 race, of which it is estimated that \$70,000 came from out-of-state peace groups. The average contribution was about \$1. About 15 percent of the total was supplied by union political action funds, although his COPE rating is often around 50 percent.

On May 22, 1974, three executives of the Charles E. Smith Co., a

Washington, D. C. real estate firm, which leases a large number of properties to the federal government, made contributions totaling \$2000 to Church. Robert Kogod gave \$580, Charles E. Smith gave \$1000 and Robert H. Smith gave \$500. Some charges have been made that the Smith firm, which is a partnership, is a government contractor, and is barred from making contributions in federal election campaigns by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 611. No indictments have been returned against any of the Smith executives.

On October 27, 1974, five executives of Food Fair Stores in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, gave \$500 each to Church's Senate campaign. While Church makes it a habit to solicit funds outside of Idaho, this is an extremely large contribution from one firm, and could attract press attention.

Church's financial statement in the Congressional Record in 1969 showed his assets to be mostly in cash and real estate. He listed their Bethesda home, a family home in Idaho, his wife's half-interest in a guest ranch in the Sawtooth range (since sold) and two cars. In a 1971 newsletter, he said that the major changes in his financial status were the cash from the sale of the ranch interest and the purchase of some municipal bonds. Church is a ramrod-straight, moral man, dedicated to his principles as he perceives them. That does not mean that he does not know how to compromise or bend when the occasion calls for it. When speaking, he has been called a lackluster campaigner, but his speeches get him elected and make a difference in the Senate.

It has been noted that his style has improved somewhat in recent years. Church has been supportive of Israel in the Senate, but has frequently voted

against blanket foreign aid bills which involve Israel. He has been supportive of pro-Israel programs, and he is admired for his role in exposing the oil companies' subservience to the Arab states as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. He could use more exposure in the Jewish community.

The CIA hearings.

On occasion, the material turned up by the Investigations Committee has been of good quality. However, a number of critics have stated that they feel that the Committee has only scratched the surface, and that they should have dug a lot deeper. Leaks from the Church Committee were viewed by many as harmful to the effectiveness of the CIA.

Church has authored a number of articles over the years, mostly for magazines like Nation and New Republic. His articles frequently explain his stands on various issues.

Church is 52. One of his two sons is a Presbyterian minister.

Many Senate watchers in Washington report that Church is not highly respected by his colleagues, is a shallow "boy orator", and that he will wear poorly over a long campaign.

Moreover, he adds little to the ticket. He is from a small state, and helps little with blacks or ethnics. He does have good Jewish ties in the West and since 1962 he has been strident in his opposition to multinationals and American companies in underdeveloped countries.

EDWARD M. "TED" KENNEDY - U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

He is charismatic, good-looking, hard-working and intelligent. No one is more written about or talked about.

In 1962, when he was 30 and an unpaid assistant county Attorney General in Boston, Ted Kennedy, at the urging of his father and his brother, the President, ran to fill out the last two years of JFK's Senate term. His Republican opponent was George Lodge, son of Henry Cabot Lodge. Kennedy was elected with 55.4 percent of the vote. In 1964 he won with 75 percent of the vote, and in 1970, one year after Chappaquiddick, he won another term with 63 percent. In his first two years, he impressed his seniors with his good-humored way of eagerly handling the chores given to junior Senators. He was also careful to take care of his constituents, and he did his homework.

After JFK's death, he began to devote himself to more substantive issues.

Kennedy is adept at becoming an expert on certain subjects in a very short time. This "quick study" facility is enhanced by the fact that he, by use of both his charisma, money and his name, has been able to attract expert and well-qualified members to his staff. At times, when Kennedy felt it was required, he has dug into his own deep pocket to pay for extra staff.

By the late 1960's, he was the leading Senate expert on the problems of Vietnamese refugees and on America's system of health care. On the subject of federally-financed comprehensive health care, he has also been the driving legislative force. In 1972, he wrote a book, In Critical Condition: The Crisis in America's Health Care, in which he extensively

reviews the problems of health care delivery, and outlines his program for universal health care. Essential to Kennedy's conception of public health care is a public-financing arrangement, and he proposes that the Social Security system be used for this purpose.

After the death of RFK in 1968, Ted Kennedy became heir to the Kennedy legacy: the dreams of Camelot and the restoration of the "New Frontier". The possibility of a Ted Kennedy candidacy for President has haunted almost every aspirant for that office from either party.

In early 1969, Kennedy mounted a surprise campaign and won the post of Majority Whip away from Senator Russell Long of Louisiana. Then, in July, 1969, the roof fell in. Depending on which theory you listen to, these common elements stand out: Mary Jo Kopechne, 28, a former aide to RFK, was drowned when Kennedy's car went off a bridge on Chappaquiddick Island, Massachusetts. Kennedy did not report the accident until the next morning, having spent a fitful night in bed in the Shiretown Inn in Edgartown after a number of attempts to rescue her by diving.

Whatever the true story is, Kennedy never came out with it. The inquest held on the matter did not result in indictment. Kennedy later issued a carefully worded 240 word "apology" to the people of Massachusetts (after consultation with top aides) in which he denied the innuendo that he was having sexual relations with Ms. Kopechne (rumors of his being a sexual libertine have been around for some time) and denied that he was drunk when the accident happened. There is little doubt that this unsatisfactory explanation cost Kennedy votes in his 1970 Senate race.

There have been any number of books on the subject of the Chappaquiddick incident. In The Bridge at Chappaquiddick, Jack Olsen, a former Time writer, theorizes that Kennedy wasn't even in the car when it went off Dike Bridge. Olsen says that Kennedy, drunk, had spotted a police car, and hoping to avoid getting caught in that condition by the police, had gotten out of the car and given the wheel over to Ms. Kopechne and told her he would meet her later. According to Olsen, Ms. Kopechne then took a wrong turn and drove the car off the bridge, and that Kennedy did not know about it until a member of his party told him later, upon which he ran to the spot and jumped in the water after her.

Zad Rust, the author of Teddy Bare, is a pseudonym for a man who was the last head of the fascist secret police in Bulgaria during World War II, while Bulgaria was a member of the Axis. It comes close to accusing Kennedy of the murder of Mary Jo Kopechne, and is full of invented "facts" about all the Kennedys' sex lives and their presumed susceptibility to the Communist line. If it were not for the case of Sullivan v. New York Times, this scurrilous trash would be regarded as libel, and both "Rust" and the publisher, Island Press, which is closely allied with the John Birch Society, would be in hot water.

Probably the most damaging but responsible book on the subject is Robert Sherrill's The Last Kennedy. The book is an expansion of an article by Sherrill in the New York Times Magazine in July, 1974, titled "Chappaquiddick Plus 5" (herewith attached). Sherrill is a vicious journalist, but he is a competent one. In The Accidental President, he virtually accused

Lyndon Johnson of complicity in John Kennedy's death. His slim book on Hubert Humphrey, The Drugstore Liberal, has been called "the journalistic equivalent of assault with a deadly weapon."

Sherill's view of Kennedy is not all one-sided. He claims to admire Kennedy's intelligence and his courage to stand up for what he believes. He speaks of "Kennedy's guts . . . enough to stand up in front of a mob of egg-throwing shanty Irish and tell them to go home and obey the school busing laws."

Brushing aside the more assinine rumors (ex.: Mary Jo Kopeczne was pregnant with Kennedy's baby and was murdered), Sherrill asks some probing questions: How much had Kennedy drunk? Why did he make a wrong turn? What did he really do to try to rescue Ms. Kopeczne (and, conversely, would she have been saved if Kennedy had called for professional rescue teams?) What accounts for Kennedy's strange behavior after the rescue attempts? Why was the inquest closed, and the testimony kept under wraps? And finally, why won't Kennedy talk about the incident? If Kennedy were to run for President or Vice-President, he might be obligated to answer some of these questions.

Polls often accurately or not show that Kennedy could have the nomination if he wanted it. His appeal is across the board, concentrated in the young and in minority voters. Every time his name is mentioned, the Republicans print up more "Nobody Drowned at Watergate" bumper strips.

In 1971, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia turned the tables on Kennedy, taking away his Majority Whip's post. Byrd's plan caught Kennedy flatfooted, but he had not been reacting well since Chappaquiddick.

Kennedy took his medicine and buckled down to work, again becoming a more-than-valuable member of the Senate. However, his grief was not to subside. His wife, Joan, a shy, former fashion model, had become an alleged alcoholic, and it was bandied about that she had taken to drinking because of the rumors of Ted's infidelity. (He has been linked with socialite Amanda Burden, former wife of New York City Councilman Carter Burden and at least one other woman). In 1973, his son, Ted Jr., developed a juvenile bone cancer and his leg was amputated. The boy, now 14, is still undergoing treatment, in spite of a courageous adjustment. Then, too, he must serve as a substitute father for the eleven children of his late brother, Bobby.

In spite of his personal burdens, Kennedy does a good job in the Senate. His legislation is well-drawn and he floor-manages a large number of bills. Despite a grueling personal appearance schedule, his attendance record is one of the Senate's best. His ADA and COPE ratings are consistently high.

He has one of the most competent staffs on the Hill. To many, he still appears bigger-than-life. His carefully maintained appearance and his speeches, which are fine-tailored to his audiences (but are not always what they want to hear), along with his excellent voice and quick mind, make him an unexcelled campaigner. He is a true star, but those

who feel that their concerns are more important than the other items on Kennedy's daily agenda think that his "star quality" enables him to give their affairs only cursory investigation (as well as the staff), using time and workload as an excuse. Because of this, the Jewish community tends to view him with some disfavor, and this is compounded by their memories of his father's pro-Nazi statements just before World War II. Older Jews are especially resentful of this. In short, Kennedy is probably as valuable as possible in the Senate.

Kennedy has written two books: In Critical Condition and Decisions for a Decade: Policies and Programs for the 1970's. Decisions is an "aspiration piece", published about the time of RFK's death.

Books about Kennedy include (in addition to those on Chappaquiddick already summarized and The Inspector's Opinion: The Chappaquiddick Incident, an acknowledged fiction work by Malcolm Reybold): Ted Kennedy: Triumphs and Tragedies, by David Lester, a modest biography; Senator Ted Kennedy, by Theo Lippman (a former Atlanta Journal reporter), a dull, if honest appraisal of Kennedy's life; Edward Kennedy and the Camelot Legacy, by James McGregor Burns, an estimate of Kennedy's past life, including sins and successes, and the author's hopes for the future, by an unconstructed New Frontiersman and biographer of FDR and JFK; A People of Compassion: The Concerns of Edward Kennedy, edited by Thomas P. Collins, a collection of Kennedy quotes; Joan: The Reluctant Kennedy, a sensational "biography"; the most interesting, The Education of Edward Kennedy: A Family Biography, by Burton Hersh, which explains that Kennedy's

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upbringing is largely responsible for what he became, and how the transition took place; and finally, Ted Kennedy: Portrait of a Survivor, by William Honan, a sharp, but journalistically sound examination of Kennedy's modus operandi.

These can be provided to you and/or summarized, if you wish.

PETER F. "PETE" FLAHERTY - MAYOR OF PITTSBURGH, PA.

In his first four years as Mayor, Peter F. Flaherty managed to alienate city employees, labor unions, bankers and big business in Pittsburgh. He was reelected in 1974 without opposition. The usual reason given is "nobody likes Pete except the people". In 1974, he was the mayoral candidate on both the Democratic and Republican tickets, having beaten off a costly and energetic challenge by city councilman Richard S. Caliguiri and having been written in by so many Republicans that he won over the party's official challenger by a 3 to 1 margin.

Upon taking office in 1968, after running under the slogan "He's nobody's boy", Flaherty began immediately making cuts in personnel and expenditures. In his first four years in office, he cut the city's work force by 15 percent, ending 35 years of excess staff-building by Pittsburg's Democratic machine. He also lowered the city's real estate tax twice, abolished the city's one percent wage tax and announced two budget surpluses. Inflation, however, has brought Flaherty's cost-cutting to a halt. This year, he was forced to increase the real estate tax to meet expenses.

During the first four years he was in office, not a single policeman was hired, yet crime fell every year. Flaherty forced the department to become more efficient with fewer personnel. The number of people employed by the city fell from 7,000 to 5,000 in the same four years. However, despite cuts in personnel and taxes (about \$20 million in real estate tax, approximately one-fifth or one-sixth of the city budget, and the wage tax, which was worth \$13 million a year) more garbage was

picked up, more roads paved and more streets lit than in the previous four years.

Flaherty set the tone for his administration soon after taking office. He discovered that the city's water meter installers were being taken from job to job by Teamster drivers. Flaherty discharged the drivers and the Teamsters called a strike. When the Sanitation union honored the Teamster picket line, Flaherty and some of his new, young cadre of officials went out on garbage trucks and collected the garbage. Flaherty's refusal to compromise and the public's growing animosity toward the striking unions finally broke the strike. Afterward, Flaherty began making his wholesale personnel cuts.

He fired the police chief, who had been in office 20 years and brought in a large number of young department heads. He also made an extensive examination of the city's governmental structure, later eliminating a number of agencies, including a Civil Defense Bureau which was spending \$50,000 a year. Now, whenever a job becomes vacant, Flaherty and the Department head who has that job review the job to see if it can be eliminated.

When Flaherty noticed that the city was doing business with just one paving contractor, and that there were often jobs advertized for which the company was the sole bidder, he ordered the city's moribund paving plant reactivated, thus saving the taxpayers money while infuriating a large segment of the business community. He has also alienated the local

construction industry and unions, as well as the local bankers, by opposing the mass-transit "Skybus" project, estimated at \$221.5 million, for the residents of suburban South Hills. "Skybus" was to have run for 10 miles in South Hills. For obvious reasons, he is not popular with the unions. He is also not popular among Blacks, who resent his opposition to busing and his refusal to spend money on social programs.

In his last mayoral election, Flaherty spent about \$40,000, compared to his Democratic primary opponent's \$500,000. He has always relied on basically volunteer and amateur-oriented campaigns. Yet, he does have some flair for publicity. In 1975, he became a regular on the 7:30 to 8:30 a.m. drive-time segment of the Bob DeCarlo Show, Monday through Friday. Flaherty dutifully joined AFTRA, the American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, AFL-CIO, and was paid about \$300 a week for his efforts. According to news accounts, he was happy to get the money, in spite of the fact that he is paid a \$35,000 a year salary as mayor. He shops around for bargains, clothes, mows his own lawn, has a vegetable garden and has disposed of the chauffeured mayoral Cadillac and drives a stripped-down police sedan himself.

Flaherty's affinity for amateur-style campaigns probably did not help him in his 1974 campaign for the Senate seat of Republican Richard Schweiker. He beat popular Insurance Commissioner and consumer advocate Herbert S. Denenberg in the Democratic Primary by 40,000 votes, mostly due to his following in the Pittsburgh media area, which covers about one-fourth of the state's voters. Furthermore, there was a poor turnout in eastern Pennsylvania for the primary, while there was a home rule

referendum on the ballot in Pittsburgh, which brought out extra voters.

In the general election, Schweiker, a liberal who was on Richard Nixon's "enemies list", beat Flaherty 54 to 46 percent. Schweiker was aided by the endorsement of the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, whose leaders stated (as a slap at Flaherty) "our endorsement is not owned by any party." Flaherty carried southwest Pennsylvania heavily, carried Philadelphia by less than 5000 votes, and lost most of the rest of the state.

When he began his first term in office, Flaherty frequently traveled to Washington to lobby for Pittsburgh. However, he soon grew impatient with the legislative process in Congress, and not long afterward, he began to curtail his travel. He now seldom even attends functions for mayors and travels little. During his Senate campaign, he did not even appear frequently in eastern Pennsylvania. There are reports that his relations with the Governor and the legislature in Harrisburg are strained, and those who have dealt with him complain that he is excessively abrasive in his relations with everyone, and that he has little understanding of the give-and-take process which is common in legislatures, including Congress.

Flaherty is 50 years old, a Roman Catholic, and he has 5 children.

BIRCH BAYH - U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Birch Bayh was first elected to the Indiana House of Representatives at the age of 27. Within two years, he had become minority leader. When the Democrats won a majority two years later, he became Speaker, a job he lost two years later when the Republicans took the majority again.

In 1962, he ran for U.S. Senate. He was 35, and he won by 11,000 votes. Many observers say that his victory was due to his use of a ditty "Hey, Look me over" (with Bayh's name and verses put in) from the Broadway show "Wildcat".

Bayh flooded the Indiana airwaves with the catchy song, and it so scared his 1968 opponent, William Ruckelshaus, that Ruckelshaus spent valuable campaign dollars to buy the copyright to the song so that Bayh couldn't use it.

Bayh says that he had no intention of using a ditty to win in the somber, Vietnam War year of 1968. Bayh, who had previously supported the War, was in full opposition by then. Furthermore, Bayh had assembled a crack campaign team by 1968, headed by Bob Keefe, who was finance chairman. Indiana usually votes Republican in Presidential elections, and the massive win in the state by Nixon in 1968 should have pulled Ruckelshaus into office, but Bayh won by about 72,000 votes.

At this point, Bayh became one of the most legislatively prolific members of the Senate. First, he authored the 25th Amendment, which established the machinery for Presidential succession. Then, he authored the 26th Amendment, which gave 18 year olds the vote. In 1969,

as a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he led the battles against the confirmations of Richard Nixon's appointments to the Supreme Court - Clement Haynsworth and Harold Carswell.

The fight against Haynsworth and Carswell brought Bayh into the national spotlight and created demand for Bayh as a speaker. Prior to the enactment of laws preventing the acceptance of honoraria fees by Members of Congress, Bayh led all Senators in fees from speeches.

Bayh sought to use his new-found fame by pushing through a constitutional amendment to eliminate the electoral college and begin electing the President and Vice President by popular vote. Rankled by the filibustering tactics of the amendment's opponents, Bayh used parliamentary tactics to bring all business in the Senate to a halt and force a showdown. At the end, a cloture vote failed, and the measure was pidgeonholed.

As a result of his speaking schedule, Bayh's attendance in the Senate fell off. After the ending of honoraria, Bayh cut his schedule somewhat, but he is still one of the Senate's more prolific speakers. He is extremely popular on the United Jewish Appeal Circuit, where his record and his speeches make him popular with Jews in all sections of America.

Among his other accomplishments are: the introduction and passage by the Senate of the Equal Rights Amendment; the Citizens' Privacy Act, which requires government agencies make their records on private individuals available to the person named in the record;

amendments to the Higher Education Act which prevent discrimination against women students or faculty members; universal and childcare legislation, consumer class action legislation, and a bill to require a two year study of the effects of the SST on the stratosphere before licensing it to fly in the U.S. (not all of these passed).

As Chairman of the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, he authored a bill to require the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to control amphetamines; the Runaway Youth Act, authorizing grants to localities for temporary housing and counseling facilities for runaways, and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1973, which would have set up an apparatus to coordinate all federal programs on juvenile delinquency.

While Bayh is not a really strong advocate of gun controls, he has introduced two bills to end sales of cheap handguns in the U.S.

In 1966, he introduced the Dunes National Lakeshore Act, which gave his Indiana constituents both a national park and a deep-water port.

Bayh has run for the Presidency twice. In 1972, he had a well-oiled machine, greased with plenty of money and a staff as large as Ed Muskie's (and probably more professional). Somehow, perhaps because Bayh and his staff misjudged the electorate and the time, it did not mesh. Adding the "coup de grace" was the discovery of his wife's breast cancer. On the campaign trail, Marvella Bayh, who had been a champion orator in high school, was a marvelous asset. Bayh withdrew from the race. In 1976,

Bayh made up his mind late. By then he had lost a large number of possible staff to other candidates (Bob Keefe to Jackson, for example). He never got it together. Moreover, the big money from rich contributors like Milton Gilbert of Gilbert Flexi-Vans and Spartans Industries Chairman Charles Bassine was not available under the new campaign rules.

Staff members, although talented, do not stay with Bayh very long. Rumors say that part of the trouble is Mrs. Bayh: that she treats the staff like dirt, capriciously ordering them to run errands for her. Then, too, Bayh has had some hard luck. Marvella's cancer, the suicide of Marvella's stepfather and his own father's protracted illness have taken their toll from Bayh at times. Bayh has also been accused of having narrow sights. When he was first elected to the Senate, he was a member of the Public Works Committee. He later gave up that seat for a position on the Appropriations Committee, and his output of public works bills dropped drastically. Others have complained that Bayh had to be kept from going on counterproductive tangents during the Haynsworth and Carswell hearings, as well as at other times. Bayh has the ability to resolve differences between widely-diverse groups, such as the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but this ability to do this is limited to legislation, and not his national candidacies. He is an excellent campaigner in person, but he cannot find a national constituency.

Although Bayh is generally regarded as a liberal, pro-labor man, he had ADA and COPE ratings of about 50 in 1962. In recent years,

these ratings have been much higher and although he still bucks the unions when he wants to, as he did with the Philadelphia Plan, he always has union support in his Senate races and has gotten considerable union help for his Presidential candidacies.

In 1974, despite the Watergate scandal, the Republicans threw their best at him - Richard Lugar, Mayor of Indianapolis. Lugar was quite popular in Indianapolis, where a big majority had previously been an integral part of Bayh's two previous wins. Bayh won in Indianapolis, and beat Lugar ("Nixon's favorite Mayor") in the election.

After the 1968 election, the Dayton (Ohio) Journal-Herald revealed that two friends of Bayh's were appointed by a Bayh-Sponsored federal judge to manage some bankrupt trusts. The Journal-Herald had obtained their information from the former officers of the trust, who were later convicted of mail fraud. The Journal-Herald also discovered some errors in Bayh's filings on his post-election campaign funds in 1968. Bayh did little to dispel the rumors.

In April, 1972, the Journal-Herald series was inserted into the Congressional Record. On April 30, 1972, Bayh was the guest on CBS' "Face the Nation". The reporters were merciless with Bayh, and he was noticeably rattled. On May 4, he inserted a 14 page list of post-election contributors, apologizing to the Republicans whose names he was forced to publish.

As an addendum, it should be noted that Bayh has published a personal statement of worth and income in the Record every year since 1969, and

is a supporter of legislation requiring revelation by all members of Congress and top-salary Federal employees.

Several years ago, when Barbara Howar wrote her biography Laughing All the Way, she described a protracted sexual affair with an unnamed U.S. Senator. For a while, there was a cocktail circuit guessing game about his identity. The name most often heard was Birch Bayh, and knowledgeable sources confirm it. This story has widespread credence among political types and gossips from coast to coast.

Bayh has written one book, A Heartbeat Away, about the writing and passage of the 25th Amendment.

Bayh is 48, has one son, and is a Lutheran. He lists his occupation as "dirt farmer".



# NEW SOLIDARITY International Press Service

P. O. Box 1972, G. P. O.  
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## Adlai Stevenson III: 'Kissinger's Step by Step Diplomacy is Ended'

CHICAGO, May 7 (IPS) — Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill) delivered a major policy speech on the Middle East here last night at the Ritz Carlton Hotel to the annual dinner of the Anti-Defamation League. Prior notice of the address was kept out of the press. This morning's edition of the Chicago Tribune carries a brief article on the speech, but deleted the most significant portions.

The following are excerpts from the full text, obtained this morning from the Senator's office. The Senator had just returned from a tour of the Mideast.

"I am not an outspoken admirer of Secretary Kissinger's style or policies. His step-by-step diplomacy in the Mideast delayed progress toward an overall settlement. . . . Whatever else might be said about it, the step-by-step diplomacy of Secretary Kissinger has run its course. It is ended. The deadly impasse has resumed. . . . The U.S. has no policy in the Middle East. . . . Unless there is movement toward peace, there is movement toward war. . . . The nuclear threshold has now been reached in the Middle East. . . ."

"I am not here tonight to say what I would like to say — and what you would like to hear. There has been too much of that. Now American support for Israel depends on Israel. It is no longer automatic. America will not abandon Israel; but it will ask if Israel has abandoned itself. . . ."

"Why has peace been put at risk by the continued establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention which states that 'the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies?' . . . Israel has not been well served by those who hide from reality, nor by those who, perceiving the truth, have whispered their warnings. Now the hour is late. . . . Israel must respect minority opinion and minority rights, or Israel will have abandoned itself. . . ."

"Many within the governing Israeli Labor Party recognize that the continued military administration of a million restless Arabs is not in Israel's strategic interest. Many in Israel believe it is time for the Israeli government to recognize that the Palestinian people have a right to national self-expression in the West Bank and in Gaza, either with a State of their own or with a semi-autonomous State within Jordan. The dangers of irredentism are real; but the dangers of continued stalemate, they realize, are greater. Of what avail, after all, are nuclear weapons and 'defensible' boundaries when the enemy is within. Demilitarized territories and internationally guaranteed boundaries offer Israel greater security. Brave voices in Israel are raised in favor of accommodating legitimate Palestinian interests. They do not suggest — nor do I — any move which would endanger Israel's future. . . . Any settlement must provide for security guarantees of undoubted validity. . . ."

### Want Development

"The common interests of Arabs and Israelis alike are often imperceived. Communication proceeds on separate public and private planes. . . . In private one hears at the

highest levels of Arab leadership that Arab governments accept, with a condition, the continued existence of the State of Israel. Arab leaders reaffirm their commitment to Security Council Resolution 242; compliance with that Resolution is their condition for recognition of Israel. That Resolution itself accepts the right of an Israeli State to exist. . . ."

"For all the publicly expressed stubbornness and belligerence, most Israeli and Arab leaders want peace. The Arab states, like Israel, set a high priority on internal development. They would like to use their new-found oil wealth to raise their people from centuries of malnutrition, inadequate housing and lack of education. Most Arabs — like Israelis — are weary of the burdens of an armed camp. . . ."

"A way must be found to overcome the provocations on all sides, and it could be. If a direct Arab-Israeli negotiation is not feasible. . . . then outside powers with important stakes in Middle Eastern peace must facilitate negotiation, at Geneva or in another forum. . . . They could establish the principles to guide a settlement and initiate the process by which it is reached. Only outside powers can appeal to the common interests in peace and overcome the widening gulf of self-inflicted fear and suspicion which divides the warring parties. . . ."

### Kissinger's Nuclear Threat

"In all of this the Soviet Union has a potential to foster peace — or to block it. . . . It may see a Middle East settlement as serving its interests. Recent statements from Moscow indicate as much. But the obsequious pursuit of detente by Secretary Kissinger and the presidents who have served under him has produced the reverse of detente — tension. . . ."

"Russian participation in a common effort to bring about a settlement would be welcome proof that detente has some meaning to the Soviet leadership. . . ."

"There are those who believe that it is too late for peace in the Middle East. Some respected authorities say the conflict must move to war and to the brink of the nuclear exchange. Then, so the theory goes, the superpowers will be forced to intervene; to impose a settlement and save themselves. I disagree. I do not believe it is too late; certainly not too late to try. Continued stalemate in the Middle East sooner or later will lead to another outbreak of war. It will be a war in which there will be no winners. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would win a nuclear confrontation. . . . Peace requires Israel to act greatly. . . . Peace requires leadership in America and Israel which acts from a recognition of moral obligations, true self-interest — and from a perception of reality. The elements of a lasting settlement are there — waiting to be put together by men brave enough to make peace, instead of war. So let us be brave — and then we will look back to this as the time when the process of peace was started; when the walls began to topple; when men learned again to esteem brotherhood and truth — and the honor of a generation was saved. Let us pray, in the words of the Young Solomon, 'Lord, give thy servant an understanding heart.' Shalom. . . ."

## MUSKIE CAMPAIGN: CAUTIOUS PACE BY THE MAN IN FRONT

For Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine), 1971 is a year of political groundwork, legislative chores and a sharply reduced profile.

This middle phase in the campaign of the Democrats' acknowledged front-runner for the presidential nomination follows a year in which frequent travel and speeches on national topics brought him heavy television and newspaper coverage throughout the country. And it precedes the final phase, a formal bid for the nomination in 1972. The decision to shift into the middle phase came after Muskie's well-received election-eve television broadcast to the nation Nov. 2, 1970.

"In 1969," said staff director Berl Bernhard, "it was a matter of getting the country to see who Ed Muskie was." He said the need for this kind of exposure

declined in 1970 and ended after the election-eve broadcast. "We were flooded with requests for things after that," said Bernhard.

**Organization.** The first major step in the new phase of operations was the arrival of Bernhard in February as director of the campaign, replacing longtime Muskie aide Donald Nicoll, who became the Senator's director of policy development and research. (Box p. 857)

Bernhard, 41, is a Washington attorney who served as staff director of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in the Kennedy Administration. He was counsel to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1967 and 1968, when Muskie was the committee's chairman. During Muskie's campaign for the Vice Presidency in 1968, Bernhard served as an adviser and speechwriter. And when the Muskie Elections Committee opened an office in downtown Washington early in 1970, the space was convenient to Bernhard's law firm, one floor above.

Six full-time staffers manned the office when it opened, under the direction of Nicoll and Robert Nelson, a lawyer who worked under Bernhard at the Civil Rights Commission and later was executive director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

By late August, the downtown staff had grown to 12 full-time employees and 10 summer interns. And by late March 1971, there were 40 full-time staffers and about 50 volunteers. The committee had expanded to suites on three floors, including rooms in the law office from which Bernhard is on leave. Next door to one of the suites is the private office of the Communication Company, headed by Robert Squier, Muskie's media consultant.

Published reports at the time Bernhard became staff director indicated that Muskie was seeking to tighten up scheduling and political and press operations. Muskie said the appointment would "assure effective coordination of the activities of the men and women who work for me."

**Finances.** In 1970, the Muskie Elections Committee filed financial reports with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, even though this was not legally required. On Oct. 30, 1970, the committee reported receiving \$182,893.14 and spending \$205,870.63.

Expenses for 1970 activities have been estimated at \$1-million to \$1.5-million, and Bernhard said as much as \$8-million may be required for the primaries and other efforts leading up to the national convention in the summer of 1972.

Of the money received by the committee in its first six months of operation, a large proportion was contributed by executives in the motion picture and entertainment industries. The largest single contributor, Mr. and Mrs. Arnold Picker of New York City, gave \$10,000. Picker is chairman of the executive committee of United Artists Corporation. Several relatives of Picker, officials of United Artists and executives

### Muskie's Background

**Profession:** Attorney.

**Born:** March 28, 1914, Rumford, Maine.

**Home:** Waterville, Maine.

**Religion:** Roman Catholic.

**Education:** Bates College, A.B., 1936; Cornell University, LL.B., 1939.

**Offices:** Maine House of Representatives, 1947-53; Governor, 1955-59; Senate since 1959.

**Military:** Navy, 1942-45; discharged as lieutenant.

**Memberships:** Waterville Club, Lions, AMVETS, American Legion, VFW, Grange, Kennebec County and Maine Bar Associations.

**Family:** Wife, Jane; five children.

**Committees:** Public Works; chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution; Government Operations; chairman, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations; Foreign Relations.

**Career Highlights.** Throughout his political career in Maine, Muskie has been a Democrat among Republicans, a Catholic among Protestants and a Polish-American among Yankees.

After winning election to the state house of representatives in 1946, he ran for mayor of Waterville the next year and lost—his only defeat until he ran for the Vice Presidency in 1968. He remained in the legislature and was house minority leader in 1949 and 1950.

In 1951, he resigned from the legislature to become Maine director of the Office of Price Stabilization. He declined an invitation to be the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1952, but accepted in 1954 and defeated incumbent Republican Burton M. Cross (1952-55) to become the state's first Democratic Governor in 20 years and its first Catholic Governor ever.

After serving two two-year terms, Muskie became Maine's first popularly elected Democratic Senator, unseating incumbent Frederick G. Payne (R 1953-59) with 60.8 percent of the vote. He was re-elected in 1964, defeating Rep. Clifford McIntyre (R 1952-65) with 66.6 percent of the vote, and in 1970, defeating Republican Neil S. Bishop with 61.7 percent.

Other entertainment firms also gave contributions of \$500 or more. In early April 1971, Muskie named Edward L. Schuman, 54, of Detroit, a vice president of Walter Reade Theaters Inc., as national coordinator of fund-raising. Some sources indicated that Picker suggested Schuman for the job and that Schuman would serve as Picker's representative in the campaign.

Schuman said there had been no coordinated effort in the motion picture industry to underwrite the Muskie campaign. "I know Picker," he said, "but we're not close friends." Schuman said Muskie "has really no great business support in the country." Schuman supported Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn. 1959-71) for President in 1968 and New York Mayor John V. Lindsay, a Republican, for re-election in 1969.

Bernhard said much of the Muskie fund-raising in 1971 would center on banquets, direct mail appeals and the setting of financial quotas for groups that have offered to assist the Muskie campaign in key states.

Muskie staffers expect organized labor to be a major financial and organizational element of the campaign, even though Muskie, as a Senator from a largely rural state, is not as closely associated with labor interests as are several other potential Democratic candidates. Bernhard said of the unions, "They've made it clear that Muskie is totally acceptable." But he listed no specific unions or labor leaders as Muskie backers. Of the early contributions to the Muskie Elections Committee, a \$2,000 donation was made by the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.

**Youth Support.** Another factor in the Muskie drive will be students, although Muskie youth organizer

### Muskie Staff, Advisers

These are some of the chief members of the Muskie campaign organization:

Staff director: Berl L. Bernhard, 41, a Washington attorney and former staff director of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

Deputy staff director: Robert L. Nelson, 39, an attorney who was Bernhard's deputy at the Civil Rights Commission and later was executive director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law.

Director of Policy Development: Donald E. Nicoll, 43, administrative assistant to Sen. Muskie from 1962 to 1970 and manager of Muskie's vice presidential campaign in 1968.

Press secretary: Richard H. Stewart, 39, former congressional correspondent for the *Boston Globe*.

Media consultant: Robert Squier, 36, president of the Communications Company, Washington, D.C., and an adviser to Hubert H. Humphrey's presidential campaign in 1968.

Speechwriter: Jack S. Sando, 30, a Washington attorney.

Domestic policy adviser: James Campbell, 32, Washington attorney and former consultant to the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Foreign policy adviser: Tony Lake, 32, a former assistant to Nixon adviser Henry Kissinger.

Lannie Davis conceded in March that Sen. George McGovern (D S.D.) "has picked up many of the best people." Davis, 26, is a Yale Law School graduate who worked in the 1968 McCarthy campaign and in Emilio Q. Daddario's unsuccessful race for Governor of Connecticut in 1970. (*McGovern campaign story, Weekly Report p. 759*)

Bernhard promised that "we're really going to work on the younger people," adding that students would be used as an important source of new ideas and policies, not just as volunteer campaigners.

**Policy Experts.** Muskie drew national attention in August 1969, when he announced that he was assembling a "brain trust" of policy experts to brief him on national issues. According to policy chief Nicoll, the size of this informal group has grown to more than 100, about 60 percent from academic ranks and 40 percent from law, business and public service. Nicoll said their advice comes in the form of private conversations, lengthy memos and drafts of speeches for Muskie.

Nicoll did not discuss individuals in the brain trust, but those linked with it have included former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, former Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Warnke, former presidential economic advisers Arthur Okun and Walter Heller and Harry McPherson, Bernhard's law partner and a former speechwriter for President Johnson.

**Issues.** Even though his is the largest staff any contender has assembled more than a year before the 1972 presidential election, Muskie in April 1971 was many months away from becoming an announced candidate. "There's no real necessity to do it," said Bernhard. "When you do it, you should be ready to do a bit more than just announce. You do it to maximize your position; you don't do it just for the ritual. The announcement is the clarion call to people who want to work for you to get ready. The most important thing Ed Muskie can do right now, rather than announce, is talk about the substantive issues."

The forum for Muskie's discussion of the issues in 1971 is the Senate. Legislative initiative is the second major feature of the middle phase of the campaign.

"You're going to see him back here in Washington, because he's facing an awful lot of legislation," said media consultant Robert Squier. "And because most of the contenders come from the Senate, that's an appropriate stage for the thing to be played out on."

This attention to chores would mean fewer trips of the type Muskie made in 1970, when public exposure was still a key element of strategy. Deputy staff director Robert Nelson explained that Muskie would continue to make public appearances in 1971, but that scheduling would be aggressive rather than reactive—the Senator would choose the appearances he wanted to make instead of depending on offers from outsiders. Nelson said this was one of the advantages of the front-runner.

One area of speculation concerned the ways Muskie's Vietnam policy differed from that of McGovern, the only announced candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination and a long-standing Senate opponent of U.S. war policies. Muskie did not support expansion of the war in its early years, and in 1971 he said he had private doubts about it as early as 1965. But he backed Johnson Administration policy into 1968.

## Ratings in Congressional Quarterly Vote Studies †

	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	1964	1963	1962	1961	1960	1959
<b>Presidential support</b>	40	51	60	76	68	71	78	88	83	75	44	41
<b>opposition</b>	44	42	12	9	13	7	6	6	9	15	35	44
<b>Voting Participation</b>	74	89	65	82	76	77	90	88	88	90	87	87
<b>Party unity</b>	71	79	52	81	71	77	86	75	90	85	62	71
<b>opposition</b>	5	11	11	4	3	5	4	5	1	6	20	15
<b>Conservative Coalition support</b>	4	9	16	9	1	15	2	16	18	8	15	10
<b>opposition</b>	78	81	49	75	74	72	90	74	68	80	61	75
<b>Bipartisan support</b>	61	69	54	72	62	69	72	88	71	84	79	80
<b>opposition</b>	13	20	12	9	15	5	9	5	14	5	11	9

†Explanation of studies, 1969 Almanac p. 1034

"We believe that freedom is at stake," he said in March 1966. "We believe that the right of small nations to work out their own destiny in their own way is at stake. We believe that containment of expansionist Communism regrettably involves direct confrontation from time to time and that to retreat from it is to undermine the prospects for stability and peace."

Muskie expressed reservations to President Johnson about the bombing of North Vietnam in January 1968, but he did not make his views public at that time. At the 1968 Democratic national convention, he spoke against an unconditional halt to the bombing but phrased his opposition in a moderate, relatively conciliatory tone. He said he would be prepared to accept a bombing halt if the President "has reason to believe—and I think he ought to be prepared to take some risks—that this could advance us one step further toward the negotiating table on substantive issues." (*Muskie vice presidential nomination, 1968 Almanac p. 1016*)

Early in 1969, Muskie called for a standstill cease-fire by both sides in Vietnam, breaking with Nixon Administration policy. And he called the moratorium demonstration Oct. 15, 1969, "just what the country needs." He expressed doubts, however, about the plan offered by Sen. Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y. 1968-71) to set a date for U.S. withdrawal.

Muskie's estrangement from the war deepened in 1970, as he sharply criticized the allied incursion into Cambodia and backed the unsuccessful Hatfield-McGovern resolution authorizing withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam by Dec. 31, 1971. (*1970 Weekly Report p. 2173*)

"It should be clear to all of us by now," he said in February 1971, "that this war is essentially a war fought among the Vietnamese people for political ends. And therein lies a lesson of this tragedy. We cannot

substitute our will and our political system for theirs. We cannot write the social contract for another people."

In domestic legislation, Muskie's chief interests have flowed from the committee assignments he has held since he entered the Senate in January 1959. Muskie has dealt with environmental problems as chairman of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the Public Works Committee. And his chairmanship of the Government Operations Committee's Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee has led to a concern with improving communications between the states and the federal government.

Muskie is the author of the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Water Quality Act of 1965, both of which expanded federal standards and participation in pollution control. Muskie's Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, passed over the strenuous opposition of the auto industry, set a 1975 deadline for the production of a virtually pollution-free car.

Another domestic quarrel likely to be played out in the Senate in 1971 involves revenue sharing and President Nixon's attempt to relieve the states' financial burdens with grants to be used for virtually any purposes the states choose. (*Weekly Report p. 213*)

Muskie strongly opposes this plan. He provoked an angry reaction from several big-city mayors when he said so in an address to the National League of Cities March 22. Muskie said the President's plan would destroy effective specific aid programs that already exist, give too much money to localities that do not need it and fail to provide adequate safeguards against discriminatory allocation of money. "Under the Administration's general revenue-sharing bill," argued Muskie, "Beverly Hills would be entitled to twice as much per capita as New York and four times as much as Cleveland."

This position has deep roots in Muskie's Senate career. He has consistently opposed federal legislation that does not take into account the differing needs of each state or that fails to impose responsibilities on states that wish to qualify for federal aid.

Muskie's 1967 Clean Air Act, for example, established air quality control regions to set standards for pollution levels in different areas of the country. The Johnson Administration preferred national standards for major polluters. (1967 Almanac p. 875)

In 1970, Muskie's approach drew an angry reaction from a task force sponsored by consumer crusader Ralph Nader. According to the task force, "Senator Muskie has never seemed inclined toward taking a tough stand toward private industry." But Muskie backers claimed national standards would amount to dangerous oversimplification.

As early as 1966, in criticizing tax inequities in a majority of American states, Muskie said, "Until these imbalances are corrected, it is meaningless to talk about federal revenue sharing...or other unrestricted block grant schemes which could provide windfalls to some states and inequities to others."

Instead of general revenue sharing, Muskie supports federalization of the welfare system, which he has called "another form of revenue sharing, and a good one." He planned to introduce his own revenue-sharing bill, which he said would be similar to one he introduced in the 91st Congress. He said it would allocate money to states and cities on the basis of relative need.

**Personality.** Muskie's personality and style will be the subject of increasingly frequent assessments as he heads into the 1972 primary season as the front-runner. Some evaluations have dealt with Muskie's deliberate, cautious approach to making judgments about national problems.

Media consultant Squier sees Muskie's New England roots as an outstanding asset. "The sense of place doesn't have to be spoken," said Squier, "because it's there, it's already inferred. It's look and accent and style and the way he is."

Squier helped to produce the election-eve broadcast, in which Muskie's deliberate tone and affection for his home state were major themes. Muskie accused the Nixon Administration of lying to the American people. Squier argued that only a politician such as Muskie, with his reputation for caution and fairness, could have used those words without seeming to make a personal attack.

But others have pointed to these same qualities as weak spots. One 1970 article quoted a leader in the peace movement as saying of Muskie, "I just don't know where he's really at. He doesn't move me. He doesn't give me any feeling of hope." And a fellow Senator was quoted as complaining that Muskie "never gets into the thick of things, always seems to pull his punches."

"It's interesting to watch the press painting this portrait of me," Muskie said on television March 31. "You never really know how it's going to come out. Some of them say I'm a volcano; others say I'm an iceberg. And the truth probably is that I'm a human being, with quite a range of emotions."

## Key Legislation Sponsored

Sen. Muskie's staff included the following bills in a list of major legislation sponsored by Muskie during his 12 years in the Senate:

**Environment.** 1963: Clean Air Act, authorizing federal research and technical aid to states to create or improve regulatory programs for curbing air pollution. Passed (PL 88-206). (1963 Almanac p. 236)

1965: Water Quality Act, establishing the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and a water quality standards program and reorganizing the federal water pollution control program. Passed (PL 89-234). (1969 Almanac p. 743)

1970: Clean Air Act amendments, establishing national air quality standards and setting a 1975 deadline for production of virtually emission-free automobiles. Passed (PL 91-604). (Weekly Report p. 42)

1970: Water Quality Improvement Act, strengthening the federal government's authority to clean up oil spills and to recover the cost of cleanup from polluters, as well as to control sewage discharge from vessels and water pollution from federal activities. Passed (PL 91-224). (Weekly Report p. 42)

1971: National Water Quality Standards Act (S 523) to revise the water pollution control program, extend the water quality standards program to all navigable U.S. waters, authorize \$12.5-billion in federal construction grants for waste treatment facilities over the next five years and require all new plants discharging wastes into navigable waters to use the best available pollution control technology. Pending. (Weekly Report p. 749)

**Economy.** 1969: Export Administration Act, expanding opportunities for American business to engage in East-West trade. Passed (PL 91-184). (1969 Almanac p. 499)

1970: Securities Investor Protection Corporation Act, establishing a private corporation to administer an insurance fund to protect investors from broker-dealer failures. Passed (PL 91-598). (Weekly Report p. 48)

1971: Transportation Research and Development Act (S 1382) to channel federal money proposed for the supersonic transport plane into research and development in aviation safety, into aviation systems serving areas of concentrated population and into urban mass transit systems. Pending. (Weekly Report p. 794)

**Federal-State Relations.** 1969: Intergovernmental Revenue Act (S 2483) to provide a federal revenue-sharing plan for states and localities based on need and tax effort and to establish federal tax credits for state and local income and estate taxes. Did not pass. (1969 Almanac p. 961)

**Urban Problems.** 1966: Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, establishing the Model Cities program to renew urban neighborhoods through a broad range of programs, including new housing, experimental schools, health care centers and recreational facilities. Passed (PL 89-754). (1966 Almanac p. 210)

## Muskie on the Issues: Responses to CQ Questions

Muskie was interviewed March 31 by two members of the Congressional Quarterly editorial staff. Verbatim excerpts of his comments on a number of major issues follow.

### Foreign Policy

*If the United States pulled out of Vietnam this year, do you think the (American) people would be prepared to see the Viet Cong take over South Vietnam?*

I don't know of any way that the American intervention in Southeast Asia can guarantee a pre-ordained and blueprinted result for any government in South Vietnam, and I take it that this was not our objective from the beginning. As I understand our objective...it was to buy the South Vietnamese time to shape their own future in accordance with their own wishes. I suppose at the outset we had no clear concept as to how much of an effort on our part this would involve or what it would cost us. But in any case, it's cost us a great deal by any standard of measurement that one wants to use, and I think it's cost us all we can afford to pay by any standard—moral, material—that one might wish to use. So my view is that we have bought and paid for as much time as we can for the South Vietnamese. They have had the opportunity to build what I gather, outside of our forces, is the largest army in Southeast Asia, equipped by us and trained by us. And they will have had, with the elections next fall, the opportunity to hold two successive elections. We have bought for them all we can afford to pay. That the election results will be guaranteed, no....

*What sort of policy would you like to see this country adopt, based on the lessons we have learned in Indochina, toward future commitments overseas?*

I suspect that a lot of the lessons we have learned may not need conscious implementation. I'm sure we've learned that Communism is no longer an international monolith and that's, I hope, a useful lesson to learn. Secondly, I hope we've learned that the policy of confrontation with Communism in any of its forms isn't the best way necessarily to deal with it. I hope we've learned that allowing ourselves to get involved in a guerrilla war with a small country on the other side of the world is a misuse of our military power—if it is not any moral failure on our part. Inescapably, it involves the killing of a lot of innocent people and civilians, women, children, whether it's down on the ground or from the air, and I hope we've learned that.

If we've learned that much, it still is going to take some time and rather painful...reappraisal of our national interests to define with precision what our role should be in the world. I don't think the majority of Americans want an isolationist America or would consider that an isolationist America would be serving our best interests. We can't escape having an influence in the world. The question is, "What kind?" It's still a hostile world in many senses.

I think that our responsibility for trying to make it into a rational world is very heavy, and I think we'll sense that increasingly as we react to our experience in Indochina. I think we ought to see more clearly the need to communicate with the Soviet Union and with Red China, with hostile countries as well as friendly countries and

neutral countries, in order to create a climate in the world which will make it possible for us to serve the needs of the deprived and backward peoples of the world and at the same time recognize the legitimate aspirations of other developed and industrialized nations which will differ from our own—recognize that people are going to choose different forms of government and different kinds of societies—and the fact that they are different than our own should not precipitate alarm on our part or a disposition to try to get involved and intervene....

### The Environment

*As the cost of cleaning up the environment becomes more clear, is it possible that this will become less of a motherhood issue and that there might be a backlash? What can we do to clean up the environment and yet prevent a decline in the economy?*

The problem of dealing with the environment is clearly something more than a motherhood issue, because it involves tough decisions that have economic consequences as well as environmental consequences. For the last year or so, we have concentrated so upon the desirability of a clean environment that I suspect many people haven't taken into their calculation the economic costs....What we are talking about is regulating economic activities, and that regulation involves technology. It involves effort, and this involves money, and so it involves the economic viability of the polluters involved. It involves the economic health of communities and regions, and it involves the problem of utilization of resources.

And it is out of these tough kinds of decisions which will necessitate a balance of environmental values against other costs, economic costs to the community, that political issues will arise—locally, in many, many instances, because most of these decisions are local decisions; but nationally, occasionally, as in the case of the SST, because a national decision is involved. Nationally also with respect to such things as the automobile, because only national policy can deal with it. So, yes, it's going to be a painful process, it's going to be a costly one and it's going to develop a lot of political issues and backlashes.

### Civil Rights

*Do you see any need at this time for additional legislation on civil rights, or do you think the problem could be handled in the executive branch?*

Well, if one thinks of civil rights in the narrow sense of legislation mandating an end to discrimination or a denial of civil liberties or citizens' prerogatives or freedom of choice or so on, I suppose that we have done a great deal here, much of which isn't being effectively implemented or enforced; and one thinks, of course, of the problem of school integration and of voting rights and so on, where a great deal of work still needs to be done. But if one thinks of civil rights in the sense that there are other forces which limit the opportunities and the mobility of blacks and other minorities—economic forces, housing patterns, residential patterns, community development patterns—then a great deal needs to be done.

The school integration problem, for example, with respect to large metropolitan areas, north and south, has

not been effectively dealt with; and I don't know that it can be effectively dealt with, with any of the tools that are represented by court decisions up to this point. We don't have adequate guidelines or instruments for implementing them. The Mondale Committee (the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity) has been studying this area, and again we are dealing with housing patterns, residential patterns, transportation patterns, local and political jurisdictional lines. These are frustrating, not only with respect to racial questions but a lot of others. And so this is the toughest part of it, because, in effect, in order to bring...real freedom of choice within the reach of all Americans, including blacks and other deprived minorities, there's going to have to be a restructuring of the country and the cities in these terms, and that is major surgery. And it is going to involve legislation. It will require changes in attitudes. It will require effective action on all three levels of government.

## The Economy

*If wage and price controls seemed to work as means of temporarily controlling inflation, would you have some fears or reluctance to see a long-term period of controls? Would these interfere with a free economy to the extent that they would be something you wouldn't want to get into?*

There are those, Professor Galbraith notably, who think that we must have these kinds of controls permanently. I must say I don't accept that—not at this point at least. But I think we may need wage-price controls for their psychological value in order to end this game of catch-up, which is really what the principal inflationary force is at the present time—the game of catch-up which just stimulates this spiraling price and wage increase. I would like to see an incomes policy in the sense of a wage and price advisory board, which I have been advocating for a long time. The idea did not originate with me, obviously. But it increasingly has been recommended and urged by people on both sides of the political aisle and by the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the present and past (chairman), and I think that this could be structured in a way that's worth trying as an alternative to wage-price controls....

## Welfare

*How far do you think federal control should extend in social programs such as minimum income, federalized welfare and health insurance, and how much responsibility should be at the state and local levels?*

I think all three of these areas are areas in which the federal involvement must be greater, because they deal with problems that aren't going to be dealt with effectively unless the federal resources are applied to them. The problem of health insurance and health delivery systems (and) facilities are two escalating problems that affect the ability of almost all Americans—poor, lower middle income, middle income—to meet the costs of serious illness. And the costs are escalating....In part this is traceable to the fact that when we enacted Medicare, increasing the demand for health facilities, we didn't do anything about increasing the facilities. And so the pressure upon existing doctors, nurses, hospitals, nursing homes, increased

to the point where costs escalated, wiping out some of the benefits of the Medicare program and also putting the cost of adequate care beyond the reach of more and more Americans who weren't quite the beneficiaries of Medicare. This time,...as we deal with the problem, for which health insurance proposals have been advanced (and I cosponsored those), I hope we focus on the need for meaningful programs. And these will not be created without the federal government's presence to deal with the hospital shortage, the medical school shortage, the nursing shortage.

Welfare reform, of course, is a question that I think is answered by people all across the ideological spectrum in about the same way. Whether we talk of beneficiaries or of administrators or the taxpayer, everyone is agreed that this system doesn't work, and what we are talking about in part, at least, is not new governmental costs, but a more equitable carrying of present costs that are paid for by government at one or another level. In addition to that, of course, we must provide decent income levels for those who are on welfare....

## Crime and Justice

*Do you think the crisis in crime in this country has reached the point where it might be necessary to accept some kind of restriction on civil liberties in order to reduce the crime rate?*

No. Preventive detention and the so-called no-knock provision are the two...most visible evidences of this approach to dealing with the crime problem. They do not get at the cause, and so we're paying too high a price, and we shouldn't pay any in terms of civil liberty for a solution that isn't a solution. There are a number of points at which we have failed to act adequately—the drug problem, for example, which pervades not only the question of crime, but almost every other social problem that afflicts our cities—housing, schools, race relations. You go through the whole catalog of social ills and crimes and problems which afflict America today, and they cannot be dealt with effectively unless we deal effectively with the drug problem. And we haven't done that. We've done less than we should have to deal with the international traffic in drugs, which is a real point of control....And then, of course, we have to deal here at home with the addict and with the pusher of drugs—and we haven't done that effectively—as well as education of the young and eliminating some of the frustrations of life which prompt people to turn to drugs. I speak not only of the young, but also the deprived, the poor and the blacks.

If we turn our attention to the question of law enforcement itself, and what you do with the violator, first, you have to apprehend him and punish him; but even more importantly, to free the innocent and to rehabilitate those who are found guilty. We've done almost nothing nationally to deal with these problems: the problems of the courts; the problems of the penal institutions—for example, probation and parole systems, social services of all kinds; the court problem alone, the overcrowding of the courts, the overcrowding of calendars, the inadequacy of the probation and parole services available to judges; the speedy administration of justice. If we could deal with this alone, we'd go a long way to dealing certainly with the habitual offender and dealing with first offenders as well....

## SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTION

The name and memory of the late Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D S.C. 1941-70) should provide an easy victory for his godson, Mendel J. Davis, in a special election April 27 to fill Rivers' unexpired term. (*Rivers obituary, Weekly Report p. 26*)

Davis, 28, surprised three rivals to win the Democratic nomination for the 1st District seat in a primary Feb. 23. Three days earlier, Republicans gave their party's nomination to James B. Edwards, 44, a Mount Pleasant dentist and an outspoken conservative. A third candidate on the ballot will be Negro civil rights leader Victoria DeLee, 45, of Ridgeville, representing the United Citizens party. (*Primary results, Weekly Report p. 448*)

**Davis Campaign.** Davis is basing virtually all of his campaign on his ties to Rivers, and this appears to be enough in a district made prosperous by the numerous military installations Rivers obtained for the Charleston area through his House Armed Services Committee chairmanship.

In addition to being a close friend of the Rivers family, Davis served on Rivers' staff. Exactly how much work Davis did for Rivers is not certain. Davis claims to have been his aide for 10 years, but South Carolina newspapermen examined congressional records and found that he was on the Rivers payroll only 20 months during the last 10 years of Rivers' life. According to the newspapers, Davis was not on the payroll at all between 1967 and July 1970.

But the issue appears to have made little difference, especially in view of the strong support Davis has won from Mrs. Rivers and her late husband's organization. "No one can fill Mendel's shoes," Mrs. Rivers said when Davis announced. "But Mendel Davis can follow in his footsteps." State Rep. F. Julian Leamond, a veteran legislator and Rivers ally, is helping to manage the Davis campaign.

So far, that campaign has been relatively cautious. As the clear front-runner, Davis has made relatively few public appearances or controversial statements. He has promised to try to maintain for Charleston the economically crucial naval industry that Rivers brought, but he also has called for diversified industrialization to lessen the region's dependence on defense contracts.

On racial and domestic matters, local observers say the Davis campaign has been moderate. Shortly after his nomination, Davis attended an AFL-CIO dinner in Columbia, a relatively liberal gesture for a South Carolina Democrat. He has attracted the support of James Clyburn, the highest-ranked Negro in the administration of Democratic Gov. John C. West.

**Edwards Campaign.** Edwards has been rated an underdog following a Republican primary that produced a disappointing turnout and a divisive outcome. Fewer than 8,000 Republicans turned out in the primary, compared with more than 49,000 Democrats. Republicans rarely have run congressional candidates in the past. But the district went for President Nixon in 1968, and Republican leaders had hoped for a greater show of interest this time.

In addition, the primary pitted the conservative faction led by Edwards against a moderate group that sup-

ported Arthur Ravenel Jr. of Charleston. The Ravenel supporters argued that the South Carolina Republican party could win elections only by broadening its base to include the state's growing number of black voters. Edwards backers rejected this sort of move, although Edwards termed his philosophy "conservatism without racism." He headed Sen. Barry M. Goldwater's campaign in Charleston in 1964 and ran this time on his close association with South Carolina's Republican Senator Strom Thurmond.

**Negro Vote.** Blacks are estimated to make up as much as one-third of the registered voters in the district and this would be a formidable base for Mrs. DeLee's candidacy if it were mobilized in her behalf. But Davis ran well in the black areas of Charleston in the primary and the decision of Clyburn and other Negro leaders to support him will hurt Mrs. DeLee. Democrats say that even if Mrs. DeLee were to win half the black vote, Davis still would have enough strength to come in ahead of Edwards, who is expected to attract only a tiny number of black votes.

Most of the Republican support is expected to come from the Charleston suburbs, with pockets in prosperous sections of Charleston and in some rural areas. North Charleston, which ordinarily might provide a fair number of Republican votes, is expected to be strongly for Davis because it is his hometown.

## MARYLAND PRIMARY RESULTS

Voters in Maryland's 1st Congressional District (Eastern and Western Shores—Annapolis, Salisbury) April 13 elected William O. Mills, 46, as the Republican nominee and State Sen. Elroy G. Boyer, 59, as the Democratic nominee for a special election May 25.

The winner will succeed former Rep. Rogers C. Morton (R 1963-71), who resigned to become Secretary of the Interior.

Mills, a former administrative assistant to Morton, easily defeated State Sen. Robert E. Bauman, 34, and Marvin O. Morris, 38, of Annapolis, in the Republican primary. Unofficial returns from 194 of 195 precincts:

Mills	6,462	60.4%
Bauman	3,893	36.4
Morris	337	3.2

In the Democratic primary, Boyer defeated Worcester County Commissioner Mark O. Pilchard, 47, and King Burnett, 35, a Salisbury attorney. Other Democrats in the race were David S. Aland, 42, an Annapolis engineer, Jerry A. Berardi, 26, a Severna Park accountant, and Shelton H. Skolnick, 27, a Bethesda contract specialist. Unofficial returns from 194 of 195 precincts:

Boyer	7,208	36.3%
Pilchard	4,557	22.9
Burnett	4,532	22.8
Aland	2,969	14.9
Berardi	393	2.0
Skolnick	221	1.1

New Presidential Candidate:

# Church: Counting on Democratic Stalemate

Hoping to take advantage of the still unsettled state of Democratic presidential politics, Idaho Sen. Frank Church launched a campaign bid March 18 that will concentrate on late spring primaries, particularly those in western states. Church has had a campaign finance committee in operation since December and has already qualified for federal matching funds.

Church had told aides early in 1975 that he wanted to run, but suspended plans after he was named to head the Select Committee on Governmental Intelligence Gathering Activities. "He didn't want to blow his biggest assignment yet in the Senate," press aide Bill Hall told Congressional Quarterly.

But with the committee finally completing its work—albeit several months behind schedule—Church is finally free to devote himself full time to a race he thinks is still wide open. "We were hoping for a confused result in the early primaries, with no candidate breaking away," said Hall. "And that's what happened."

Church's entry despite urging by Rep. Morris K. Udall, the strongest liberal candidate up to now, will further fracture support in that wing of the party. But the Idaho senator is banking his strategy on attracting committed Democrats who were supporters of other liberals, like Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana, a casualty of the early primaries.

Church plans to compete in caucuses in Colorado May 3 and Utah May 17, but his first major effort in a primary state will be in Nebraska May 11, where 10 other Democrats—including non-candidates Edward M. Kennedy and Hubert H. Humphrey—also appear on the ballot. But perhaps his best opportunity to make himself a force in the contest, observers say, comes May 25 when Idaho, Nevada and Oregon hold a "regional primary" on the same day. Church is also planning to enter the Rhode Island and Montana primaries June 1 and California June 8.

Like Udall, Jackson and other candidates from Congress, Church will try to use his long legislative record to promote his cause. He is currently serving his fourth term in the Senate. Only 51 years old, he is already one of that body's senior Democrats and occupies key seats on committees that influence national policy in a wide variety of fields. Besides chairing the CIA probe, Church heads the Select Committee on Aging and cochairs (with Maryland



Republican Charles McC. Mathias Jr.) the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers. Church is the third-ranking Democrat on Foreign Relations and second-ranking on Interior and Insular Affairs, which is important to his electoral security in Idaho.

## Political Career

One of Church's earliest interests, which later proved useful in politics, was debating. He built up his skills in high school in his hometown of Boise, Idaho, where his father operated a sporting goods store. In his third year at Boise High, Frank won the American Legion national oratorical contest. He used the \$4,000 prize to attend Stanford University.

In 1948, while studying law at Harvard, Church became seriously ill with what was later diagnosed as cancer. The prognosis was grave, but radical surgery and an intensive series of X-ray treatments resulted in a complete cure. He recovered in time to receive a law degree from Stanford in 1950.

Returning to Idaho, Church briefly taught public speaking before taking a job as legal counsel for the Idaho Office of Price Stabilization. From 1951 to 1956, he practiced law in Boise, taking time out for periodic forays into local politics. From 1952 to 1954, Church was state president of the Idaho Young Democratic Clubs. He keynoted the 1952 state Democratic convention. The same year, he sought elective office for the first time, running for the Idaho House of Representatives; he was defeated by about 12,000 votes.

## Senate Victory

In 1956, Church set his sights on national office and took on Republican Sen. Herman Welker, who was seeking a second term. Welker had a conservative voting record and

## Church's Background

**Profession:** Attorney.

**Born:** July 25, 1924, Boise, Idaho.

**Home:** Boise.

**Religion:** Presbyterian.

**Education:** Stanford University, A.B., 1947; LL.B., 1950.

**Offices:** Senate since 1957.

**Military:** Army, 1942-46; discharged as 1st lieutenant; Bronze Star.

**Memberships:** American Legion, VFW, Phi Beta Kappa, Mayflower Society, American Bar Association.

**Family:** Wife, Bethine Clark; two children.

## Congressional Quarterly Vote Study Scores . . .

	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967
<b>Presidential</b>									
support	41	27 <sup>1</sup> /25 <sup>2</sup>	28	28	33	41	44	29	53
opposition	39	47 <sup>1</sup> /56 <sup>2</sup>	59	63	50	41	44	29	31
<b>Voting Participation</b>	81	71	85	85	81	76	91	54	81
<b>Party</b>									
unity	73	58	81	76	81	65	79	32	58
opposition	10	13	7	7	7	5	11	21	28
<b>Conservative Coalition</b>									
support	17	14	11	13	12	14	14	24	16
opposition	69	55	82	72	71	58	77	24	64
<b>Bipartisan</b>									
support	73	59	74	74	56	67	75	47	64
opposition	7	11	9	12	19	12	17	8	15

1. During President Nixon's tenure in 1974.  
2. During President Ford's tenure in 1974.

had been a strong defender of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R Wis. 1947-57).

A political unknown outside Boise, Church began an extensive series of automobile trips to increase his visibility around the state. His travels paid off with a Democratic primary victory over former Sen. Glen H. Taylor (D 1945-51). Taylor was an entertainer, a former singer and one of the most colorful figures in Idaho politics. But his campaign for Vice President in 1948 on the ticket of Progressive Party nominee Henry Wallace made him anathema to Idaho Democrats, who dumped him in the 1950 primary. He became the party's Senate nominee again in 1954, but lost overwhelmingly.

The 1956 primary campaign was bitter, with Taylor accusing Church of being a "captive candidate of corporation politicians." In disputed returns, the political newcomer won the Democratic nomination by 200 votes. Taylor refused to accept the result and sought evidence of fraud or error in the tally, meanwhile preparing for an independent campaign for the seat.

In the general election, Church effectively attacked Welker's conservative voting record and opposition to the proposed Hells Canyon dam. Other major issues were development of industry in Idaho, reclamation projects for desert lands and aid to the aged. Welker had won only a minority of the vote in the Republican Senate primary, and his belated attempts to portray himself as a moderate Eisenhower Republican failed to convince party loyalists.

On election day, the voters split their tickets in record numbers as Church won with a 46,315-vote plurality, even though President Eisenhower was carrying Idaho. Church became, at 32, the Senate's youngest member.

Church's initial Senate committee assignments were modest ones—Post Office and Civil Service, Interior and Insular Affairs and Public Works. He gave up the Post Office and Public Works positions in 1959 in a move to the more prestigious Foreign Relations Committee, an honor for such a junior member.

But the post on the Interior Committee, which has jurisdiction over federal lands, mining, water policy and

other issues vital to Idaho, was the forum Church used for strengthening himself politically during his early years in the Senate. His maiden speech, six months after taking office, was a detailed and impassioned plea for federal construction of the Hells Canyon dam.

In 1962, Church won favorable publicity back home for his defense of Bruce Eddy, a \$186-million dam project on the Clearwater River in Idaho. He fought for it strongly in the Senate, only to see it threatened in conference as House conferees sought to delete funds from an appropriations bill. To discourage them, Church threatened to tie up the entire bill in a filibuster. "If they strike out Bruce Eddy," he warned, "I shall hold the Senate floor as long as God gives me the strength to stand."

### Keynoter

Because of his speaking ability and the party's desire to show off a promising newcomer, Church was chosen as the keynoter of the 1960 Democratic national convention. It was his first national exposure, and he planned carefully for it. Before the convention, Church informed reporters that he would deliver "a fighting speech directed at the appalling failures of the Republican administration, at home and abroad."

The speech itself, however, demonstrated a potential weakness in Church's speaking skills—a capacity for verbal overkill and rhetorical flourishes at the expense of substance. It did not live up to advance expectations. Recalling it in a 1975 interview, Church said that "all I can say in my defense is—I didn't know any better."

### Later Campaigns

In 1962, Church faced his most serious electoral threat in Idaho from Republican Jack Hawley, the same candidate who had beaten him in 1952 in the state house race. Hawley employed the themes Republicans were to use repeatedly and unsuccessfully against Church in future elections—that he did not care about local problems and was too involved in foreign affairs. But Church defeated Hawley with almost 55

## ... Covering Church's 19 Years in Senate†

	1966	1965	1964	1963	1962	1961	1960	1959	1958	1957
<b>Presidential</b>										
support	46	55	63	69	62	77	48	33	50	63
opposition	17	16	24	15	18	18	43	45	42	26
<b>Voting Participation</b>	65	69	91	85	78	94	90	79	92	88
<b>Party</b>										
unity	54	58	71	80	66	79	78	69	89	61
opposition	13	9	22	8	12	13	13	10	5	21
<b>Conservative Coalition</b>										
support	20	11	22	19	24	26	13	12	*	*
opposition	57	46	73	70	68	63	70	55	*	*
<b>Bipartisan</b>										
support	51	54	59	70	64	83	81	72	81	81
opposition	12	15	25	12	13	12	9	7	10	10

† Explanation of studies, p. 107.  
\* No ratings in those years.

per cent of the vote and became the first Democrat ever re-elected to the Senate from Idaho.

His races in 1968 and 1974 were easier, as his seniority grew more important to Idaho and Republicans had increasing difficulty finding strong candidates to run against him. In 1967, as he was preparing to run for a third term, Church faced a bizarre "recall" petition campaign supported by extreme conservatives incensed over his dovish views on the war. Even though members of the Senate cannot be voted out of office before the end of their terms, the organizers thought the effort would help mobilize opposition to Church for the benefit of a conservative candidate. But it had just the opposite effect, garnering sympathy for the senator and bringing in campaign funds and support from around the nation. The recall bid collapsed quickly after it was discovered that it was financed by a right-wing California millionaire.

In 1968, the Republican nominee was Rep. George V. Hansen (R Idaho 1965-69, 1975-), who based his campaign on accusations that Church was giving aid to the North Vietnamese through his votes in the Senate. The effort proved much too shrill for Idaho voters, who re-elected Church by 59,000 votes, the largest margin received by an Idaho senator except for Republican William E. Borah in 1924.

Church's fourth-term victory in 1974 was by a more modest 36,068 votes over Bob Smith, a former aide to Rep. Steven D. Symms (R Idaho), who campaigned on the general theme of opposition to "big government."

### Senate Record

Idaho voters have allowed their senators to pursue a broad range of interests—so long as local problems receive prompt attention. Church has been able to take advantage of this freedom to exert influence in many policy areas.

#### Foreign Affairs

His best known work in the Senate has been in foreign affairs, which had been the special interest of his old idol,

Borah, one of the leading isolationists of the 1920s. A major reason for Church's influence is his seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Church has been consistently skeptical about the effectiveness of the foreign aid program and has frequently offered amendments to reduce or restrict the scope of authorizations or appropriations. His activity in this area has caused him no problems in fiscally conservative Idaho.

Church's views on most foreign policy issues have been broadly internationalist. He was a strong supporter of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and advocated strengthening American ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Church has favored use of American military power in specific instances in which he thought the national interest was clearly at stake, but he has argued for regular re-examination of foreign policy and against excessive commitments abroad. He voted for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing President Johnson to take action against the North Vietnamese and made a speech in favor of the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. He voted for funds for military operations in South Vietnam in 1965, but cautioned that his vote could not be construed as support for the use of American ground forces.

By 1966, Church had moved into a position of general opposition to Johnson administration policy in South Vietnam. He urged a bombing halt and cautioned the President against over-extending American commitment to the Saigon regime. "No nation—not even our own—possesses an arsenal so large, or a treasury so rich, as to damp down the fires of smoldering revolution throughout the whole of the awakening world," he said.

During the Nixon administration, Church was a cosponsor of the most significant anti-war amendments of the period.

In 1970, he and Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) sponsored an amendment to prohibit the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia. Introduced in the wake of the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops, the amendment touched off a six-month debate over whether

Congress could use its budget authority to limit the President's war-making powers. It finally became law in revised form late that year.

In 1972, an amendment by Church and Sen. Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) was the vehicle for an attempt to terminate American military activities throughout Southeast Asia. It was defeated after intensive debate. Both proposals, however, identified Church with the anti-war movement and gained him wide respect among liberals.

**The Aged**

As chairman of the Select Committee on Aging since 1971, Church has been active in the Senate on behalf of senior citizens. Although the committee does not have the authority to report legislation, it conducts investigations and makes recommendations. Church has played a significant role in pushing through legislation extending Social Security and Medicaid benefits and keeping them in step with increases in the cost of living.

**Investigations**

Church's principal efforts on Foreign Relations in the past three years have been as chairman of the Multinational Corporations Subcommittee, which was created in 1972. In 1973, Church conducted widely publicized hearings into the role of the CIA in its efforts to block the election of Marxist Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The subcommittee called for a more active oversight role by Congress in supervising the CIA. Church's performance in the hearings reportedly was a factor in his being considered for the chairmanship of the 1975 Senate CIA probe.

In 1974, Church took after the multi-national oil corporations and their Arab clients. He sponsored an amendment to the 1974 trade act requiring the government to gather more information on the foreign activities of the multi-nationals.

Church's conduct of the CIA inquiry has been cautious, an indication of his concern over future legislation that could come out of the probe rather than in using it as a launching pad for the presidency. He compromised with committee Republicans and strove to avoid confrontation with President Ford, but vehemently resisted White House attempts to prevent a probe of possible CIA involvement in assassinations. After Ford juggled personnel in the country's defense and intelligence agencies in November 1975, Church led the opposition to the confirmation of former Rep. George Bush (R Texas 1967-71) as director of the CIA, but Bush was confirmed Jan. 27.

**Candidacy**

Beginning his campaign effort in Idaho City, Idaho, March 18, Church denounced the "leadership of weakness

**Church Staff, Advisers**

**National chairman:** Carl Burke, a Boise lawyer who managed Church's four successful Senate races.

**Special assistant:** Verda Barnes, Church's former administrative assistant.

**Campaign organization:** Peter Curtin.

**Press secretary:** Bill Hall.

**Church's Interest-Group Ratings**

**Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)**—ADA ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the ADA position on selected issues.

**National Farmers Union (NFU)**—NFU ratings are based on the number of times a senator voted, was paired for or announced for the NFU position.

**AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)**—COPE ratings reflect the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with or was paired in favor of the COPE position.

**Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)**—ACA ratings record the percentage of the times a senator voted in accordance with the ACA position.

Following are Church's ratings since Congressional Quarterly began publishing them in 1960, plus a composite ACA score for 1957-59:

	ADA <sup>1</sup>	COPE <sup>3</sup>	NFU <sup>3</sup>	ACA
1975	78	76	100	9
1974	71	56	88	23
1973	70	78	100	22
1972	70	80	88	17
1971	93	83	100	17
1970	75 <sup>4</sup>	100	100	11
1969	78	90	75	29
1968	43	75	43	68
1967	92	70	100	20
1966	55	75 <sup>2</sup>	79	22
1965	88	75 <sup>2</sup>	77	22
1964	86	80 <sup>2</sup>	68 <sup>2</sup>	7
1963	83	80 <sup>2</sup>	68 <sup>2</sup>	0
1962	75	73 <sup>2</sup>	75 <sup>2</sup>	4 <sup>2</sup>
1961	100	73 <sup>2</sup>	75 <sup>2</sup>	4 <sup>2</sup>
1960	92	80 <sup>2</sup>	100 <sup>2</sup>	6 <sup>5</sup>
1959	77	80 <sup>2</sup>	100 <sup>2</sup>	6 <sup>5</sup>

1. Failure to vote lowers score.  
 2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.  
 3. Percentages compiled by CQ from information provided by groups.  
 4. ADA score includes some votes from December 1969.  
 5. Score for votes on selected issues since 1957.


and fear" of the Ford administration and promised that "the first priority on our political agenda is the restoration of the federal government to legitimacy in the eyes of the people."

Citing the "twenty years of training" in national issues he had accumulated in the Senate, Church discussed his service on that chamber's Foreign Relations, Interior and Aging panels. He called for a "crash program" on energy problems and denounced "the siege mentality that kept us locked so long in the straitjacket of the Cold War."


Noting his campaign's delayed start, Church said he felt that "it's never too late—nor are the odds too great—to try. In that spirit the West was won, and in that spirit I now declare my candidacy...."

—By Matt Pinkus

## EDWARD M. KENNEDY



1. The ferry channel.




2. The party cottage.



3. Mary Jo Kopechne.



4. The Dike Bridge.



5. Retrieving the car.



6. Facing charges in Edgartown.

A tragedy, an enigma, a political Achilles heel.

# Chappaquiddick + 5

By Robert Sherrill

Five years ago, around midnight of July 18, 1969, a black four-door Oldsmobile 58 owned by Senator Edward Kennedy was driven off a bridge on Chappaquiddick island, Mass., and it landed upside down in eight feet of water. About 9 o'clock the next morning a scuba diver entered the car and recovered the body of Mary Jo Kopechne, 28, one of the dozens of young women who in those days looked upon themselves as followers of the Kennedy clan.

Shortly after 10 o'clock Senator Kennedy was confessing to Police Chief Dominick Arena in Edgartown, a small village on the eastern shore of Martha's Vineyard, just across the channel from Chappaquiddick, that he had been driving the Oldsmobile at the time of its plunge.

That confession was the first in a series of statements by Kennedy and by others that turned what at first seemed a simple automobile accident into a multilayered complex mystery that remains just as baffling today as it was five years ago.

If there is any one aspect more mysterious than

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others, it is that despite the enormous and permanent damage the unexplained portions of the incident have done to his reputation (and to Miss Kopechne's), Kennedy has from the beginning refused to clear the air. His reputation as a wild driver and his reputation as a ladies' man provided a marvelous culture for growing virulent rumors. There were whispers that Miss Kopechne was pregnant and that her death was no accident. When her parents later moved into a much more expensive home, it was hinted that Kennedy had paid them for silence. (Shortly after the accident, the Kopechnes were complaining about the way they had been treated. But recently they said that if Kennedy were to run for President he would have their support.) The most common assumption, registering rather high on an opinion poll commissioned after the accident, was that he was inebriated when he drove off the bridge and that he had been speeding Miss Kopechne to an outing on the deserted beach at the end of the road.

Rumors of this kind ate great holes through his image and chipped away at his following. Whereas five years before Chappaquiddick Kennedy had won re-election to the Senate with an awesome 75 per cent of the vote, 15 months after Chappaquiddick he was re-elected with only 64 per cent of the total vote—still a cushy margin, to be sure, but when a

Kennedy drops 11 percentage points in Massachusetts, something dramatic has happened. Before Chappaquiddick, Kennedy's national popularity seemed to offer him the Presidency for the asking. Today he still could undoubtedly have the Democratic Presidential nomination for the asking, but beyond that Kennedy may now be vulnerable; this is an assumption that surfaced when Republicans, preparing for the possibility of Kennedy's nomination in 1972, dispatched one of the White House "plumbers" to Chappaquiddick to start digging for dirt on the very day Miss Kopechne's body was pulled from the car's wreckage and, according to staff members of the Senate Watergate Committee, put a telephone tap on the women who had shared a house with Miss Kopechne in Washington.

If nothing came of the partisan snooping, Kennedy was still left to contend with snickers and nudges. At the 1973 Gridiron dinner, the famous annual affair at which a group of Washington journalists twit the powerful of government and business, one newsman posing as Kennedy sang to the tune of "As Time Goes By":

*It's still the same old story,*

*A lust for fame and glory.*

*A taste for flying high.*

*But still the nagging question comes—*

*Can I get by?*



Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 1974.

Painful as the slippage in popularity and the raw jokes must have been for him, he apparently preferred them to making a full disclosure. The "Kennedy story"—that is, the account supplied by Kennedy and his companions of the evening—did not come out immediately or smoothly or voluntarily. It came out in jerks, in bits and pieces, always incomplete, grudgingly, loaded with contradictions and inconsistencies.

Kennedy's first explanation, the morning after the accident, was a 240-word written statement to police that omitted any mention of half the activities he listed a week later in his television "talk to the people of Massachusetts," when once again he gave only the barest sketch of what had happened.

To many observers, the television appearance came across not so much as an explanation as a public-relations pitch, aimed at turning the public's mind from curiosity to sympathy—a pitch made with all the craftsmanship that half a dozen top Democratic advisers and speechwriters (the likes of Robert McNamara, Ted Sorensen, Richard Goodwin, Kenneth O'Donnell) could muster, employing the rhetoric of candor ("Tonight I am free to tell you what happened") without actually giving away many details of the accident.

After that, virtually nothing was added to the Kennedy story for another six months. Then he and his friends appeared for testimony behind locked doors at an inconclusive inquest. This hearing was so loaded with trivial and irrelevant testimony that, according to one of his aides, Kennedy would later, privately, laugh about some of it.

Never has Kennedy, or any of those who were with him on the night of the accident, been put to the rigors of cross-examination in court; never have they submitted to hard questioning by the press. Newsmen are virtually never allowed to interview him on the topic of Chappaquiddick except as an auxiliary line of questioning and in some featherbed situation like "Face the Nation," the television show, when a panelist has time only

to lob a few soft generalized questions at him about whether Chappaquiddick shows a defect in his character, and he can easily turn the questions aside with equally generalized answers about how "it's all in the record," and "the public will have to decide." But sitting down with newsmen for a couple of hours of mean, relentless grilling on nothing but the shadowy details of the accident—that's something Kennedy has never done. "And it's something I wouldn't recommend his doing," says one of his top aides, "unless he wants to have it interpreted that he is running for President. I think there are better ways to make the announcement."

He has a point, of sorts. If Kennedy, who is now obviously making tentative runs at the Democratic Presidential nomination for 1976, should officially announce his candidacy, then the post-Watergate press would be obliged to subject him to the same demands for a clean breast that it has subjected Nixon to. But the press may not get what it wants. If Kennedy can get by on charisma, will he be any more willing to play by the rules of candor?

Walter Pincus, executive editor of The New Republic, who has worked for and mingled with the Kennedy crowd for years, recently reported that because of the enthusiasm with which Kennedy is greeted these days in "selected" public appearances, his closest aides and supporters are convinced that Watergate has obscured the public's memory of Chappaquiddick and that the ghost of Miss Kopechne will not again be raised in a serious way. "They seem to see Chappaquiddick as a public-relations obstacle," says Pincus, "but not as barring the way to the Presidency. The Senator, apparently, sees it the same way."

**W**hich means, if that is an accurate appraisal of thinking within the Kennedy court, that the public will have to continue coping indefinitely with the old Kennedy story, which goes like this:

Senator Kennedy invited six women who had worked for his late brother Robert to attend, as a sort of reunion, the Edgartown Yacht Club Regatta on July 18-19. The six, all veterans of Robert Kennedy's 1968 campaign "boiler room," were Rosemary Keough, 23, Susan Tannenbaum, 24, Esther Newberg, 26, sisters Maryellen, 27, and Nance, 26, Lyons, and the oldest of the group, Miss Kopechne, one week short of her 29th birthday. They were put up at the Katama Shores Motor Inn near Edgartown. Kennedy and his men were at Edgartown's Shiretown Inn. That evening about 8:30, the Kennedy crowd gathered for a cook-out at a rented cottage on Chappaquiddick, which is usually reached by riding from Edgartown on a two-car ferry across a channel about 500 feet wide.

With the six women were Kennedy and five other men. Charles Tretter, a Boston attorney; Ray LaRosa, a Massachusetts civil defense official; Jack Crimmins, a legal aide and investigator serving as Kennedy's chauffeur; Paul Markham, a former United States Attorney turned bank president; Joseph Gargan, Kennedy's cousin and factotum. Gargan and Markham, long-time intimate friends of Kennedy, would be called upon that evening to play a role almost as baffling as Kennedy's own.

At first blush, it might not have seemed the best grouping for social purposes. All of the women were under 30, most of them well under. All of the men were over 30, most of them well over; one was 63. None of the women were married. All but one of the men were married.

But drinks were poured and steaks were served, and the evening seemed to be going pretty well. Old campaign stories were told and retold, songs were sung, a radio was borrowed from a motel on the mainland and for a while there was dancing.

Then, at 11:15 P.M., Kennedy decided he would like to go back to the Shiretown Inn and turn in to get a good rest for the next day's races. Mary Jo Kopechne told Kennedy

# Chappaquiddick

she was feeling ill and asked if she could ride along to Edgartown with him.

There is only one paved road on Chappaquiddick Island. It goes past the cook-out cottage and continues for about half a mile before turning left, toward the ferry, at a 90-degree angle. This is a "T" intersection. Going off to the right is a dirt lane called Dike Road. When Kennedy came to the intersection, he turned right by mistake, drove on down Dike Road for about seven-tenths of a mile, and that's where he went off the bridge. He did not see in time that the bridge was set obliquely to the road.

After Kennedy escaped from the car, he made seven or eight dives in an attempt to rescue Miss Kopechne (this, by Kennedy's reckoning, took about 15 or 20 minutes). Exhausted, he rested on the bank of the pond (he says another 15 or 20 minutes), then struck out to get help at the cottage, "walking, trotting, jogging, stumbling" 1.2 miles through the inky blackness (Kennedy estimates this trip took 15 minutes, but reporters who later made the trek by daylight needed between 20 and 25 minutes). Spotting LaRosa outside the cottage, Kennedy told him to summon Markham and Gargan; while he waited for them, Kennedy sprawled in the back seat of the group's other car, a rented Valiant, and rested.

Back at the accident site, Gargan and Markham undressed and spent 45 minutes (their estimate) diving. They were unable to get in a position to see Miss Kopechne, much less rescue her or recover her body. Giving up, they drove Kennedy to the ferry landing, where they sat and talked with him for 10 minutes (their estimate). Suddenly Kennedy bolted from the car and jumped into the channel before they could stop him. They watched him until he had swum about half way across (or, according to another version, jumped in and swam a little way with him) and then they returned to the cottage.

The women met them with questions — what had they been doing? where was Kennedy? where was Miss Kopechne? — that Gargan and Markham brushed aside with easy assurances: They had been hunting for a boat, Kennedy and Kopechne were at

their respective motels, everything was O.K., go to sleep.

Meanwhile, Kennedy, struggling against the tide, had almost drowned in the channel. En route back to his motel, staggering up dark streets, he paused once to lean against a tree and rest before going on, arriving at the Shiretown Inn about 2 A.M. He shed his wet clothing, lay down on the bed, contemplated his troubles for a while, fell asleep, was awakened by noises from the motel next door, got up and dressed (including a jacket) and went downstairs where he had a conversation with the innkeeper. In the course of their brief exchange, Kennedy said that he had misplaced his watch and asked the innkeeper the time. It was exactly 2:25.

Kennedy spent the rest of the night alternately sleeping fitfully and pacing the floor. His head ached, his neck throbbled. Sometime between 7:30 and 8 o'clock the next morning Kennedy, out for a stroll, ran into Ross W. Richards, who had won the yacht race the day before. Richards was going back to the Shiretown Inn and Kennedy walked along with him. Their conversation, about the weather and sailboat racing, was interrupted by the appearance of Gargan and Markham.

Kennedy, Gargan and Markham went off to Kennedy's room to confer. About a half

hour later Kennedy turned up in the lobby to place an order for The New York Times and The Boston Globe. He also borrowed a dime from the receptionist to try to make a long distance phone call at a pay booth. When Gargan and Markham discovered Kennedy hadn't notified the police about the accident, as he had assured them he would when he left them at the ferry landing the night before, they once again told him he must do it. Kennedy said he wanted to call his friend and sometime attorney, Burke Marshall, for advice, and he wanted to make the call from a booth that assured privacy. Gargan suggested a phone on the Chappaquiddick side of the ferry passage, and they went there sometime between 9 and 9:30, remaining 20 minutes or so. Then they were told by the ferryman that the wrecked auto had been spotted and Miss Kopechne's body recovered. Now that the word was out, Kennedy rode the ferry back to Edgartown and trotted off to turn himself in to Chief Arena.

The Kennedy account of the evening is not a pretty one—it portrays the Senator, after the accident, as either slightly crazy or calloused in the extreme, spending the next 10 hours, as he says he spent them, while a young friend's body washed around

inside a crushed auto. But before settling for Kennedy's own harsh judgment of his actions — "indefensible" — a number of questions would have to be answered.

Q: Where was Kennedy heading, and in what condition?

A disproportionate amount of the questioning at the inquest was aimed at two targets, sex and booze, which, put in question form, come to this: Was Kennedy drunk when he drove away with Miss Kopechne? Was he lying when he said he aimed for the ferry and got on the beach road by mistake?

In a way, as they apply to the generic friskiness of politicians on the loose, these are the most trivial questions of the whole tragedy. But they also happen to offer the most convenient measure of the credibility of Kennedy and his friends.

The cook-out crowd describes the evening as one of comparative abstinence. If you go through the testimony at the inquest carefully, you will find the 11 survivors admitting to the consumption of only 16 drinks, total, during a party that stretched over at least four hours. This, however, is difficult to balance with other testimony about the liquor supply and usage.

Crimmins says he stocked the cottage with 3 half-gallons of vodka, 4 fifths of Scotch, 2 bottles of rum (unspecified size), and a couple of cases of beer. After the party, says Crimmins, he took away 2 bottles of vodka, 3 bottles of Scotch,

and the beer. That leaves 1 half-gallon of vodka, 1 fifth of Scotch, and the 2 bottles of rum to be accounted for. Crimmins claims there was "very little" drinking at the party and others who were there made the same claim; but the liquor went somewhere.


Kennedy says he drank only two rum and Cokes on the evening of the tragedy. Crimmins was the only other person at the party who drank rum. He says he had "a couple" that evening and that he had been drinking from the rum supply the night before, but not much. He said his usual quota was three drinks for an evening. But perhaps Crimmins polished off more the night before than he remembered; Markham recalls that when Kennedy was getting his first drink of the evening he said to Crimmins, in a kidding way, "Who has been drinking all the rum, there is hardly any left?... Gee, you didn't leave me any rum, you didn't get any rum for me." In any event, at the conclusion of the cook-out, the two bottles of rum were gone and the only members of the party who said they had drunk from the supply were Kennedy and Crimmins.

One fifth of Scotch disappeared; but only two of the survivors said they drank Scotch (LaRosa, one drink; Rosemary Keough, two drinks).

One half-gallon of vodka was used up in some way, but the survivors said they consumed only nine vodka drinks (Newberg, two; Maryellen Lyons, one; Nance Lyons, two or three; Tannenbaum, two; Markham, one). Even if they had dealt generously with themselves and had put in two ounces per drink, this would have left 46 ounces of the used half-gallon unaccounted for.

Gargan said he drank only Cokes, four. Tretter did not specify how much he drank except that it was just a "social" amount.

That leaves only Miss Kopechne. Massachusetts State Police claim that an analysis of her blood showed the alcoholic content at nine-tenths of 1 per cent, which is the equivalent of 3½ to 5 ounces of 80- to 90-proof liquor consumed by a person of 110 pounds within an hour—or more liquor than that if the drinking was stretched over a longer period. At that rate, Miss Kopechne would appear to be perhaps the heaviest drinker at the party—assuming that the others were telling the truth about their own alcoholic consumption. And



Two who attended the Chappaquiddick cookout—Joseph Gargan, left, and Paul Markham—arrive at the inquest into Mary Jo Kopechne's death at Edgartown in January, 1970.

yet all who knew her well said that she was not anything remotely resembling a two-fisted drinker, and all who had seen Miss Kopechne just before she left the party said that she gave every appearance of being sober.

Were they telling the truth about Kennedy's and Miss Kopechne's apparent sobriety on that occasion? Were they telling the truth about their own moderation? If so, where did the liquor go?

As for Kennedy's claim to have been on Dike Road by mistake, almost nobody—certainly not the judge at the inquest, nor reporters who scouted the area—believes that. Where the asphalt road, marked with a center line, turns left toward the ferry, it is banked slightly to help swing a car in that direction. There is a left-turn sign with an arrow made of reflecting glass. To make the mistake Kennedy says he made, he would have had to ignore all those helps and drive past the curve before he could find, hidden by bushes, the narrow dirt road to the beach. Later he said that he had become aware he was driving on dirt "sometime" after he turned to the right. Actually, the washboard surface grips a car and begins shaking it immediately. And the dirt looks like any other dirt, even under a car's lights. Markham says that Kennedy explained to him that after he discovered he had taken a wrong turn "he couldn't turn around." There are at least half a dozen driveways leading off Dike Road that are available for turning around, and they are easily seen.

If Kennedy left the cottage at 11:15, as he said he did, and was going to the ferry, why hadn't he asked the other women if they wanted to go along? The last scheduled ferry was at midnight and the women all say it was clearly understood that they wanted to return to their motel. By pulling out with only Miss Kopechne, Kennedy left five women and five men stranded with only a small Valiant. And if Miss Kopechne was ill, as Kennedy informed Crimmins she was, why hadn't she mentioned it to some of her close friends? More to the point, if she was going back to her motel, why did she leave her purse in the cottage?

Q: Did Kennedy lie about the time he left the party?

Sylvia Malm, home from college, was in Dyke House, about 150 yards from the bridge. Until midnight, when she turned out the light and

went to sleep, she was reading. Her window, which faces the bridge, was open. The night was so still that fishermen, they say, could hear fish jumping half a mile down the lagoon. When Kennedy's car left the bridge, its momentum carried it 36 feet through the air and it fell several feet before hitting the surface of the water with such impact as to cave in the roof, blow out both windows on the passenger side, and splinter the windshield. Though Miss Malm, and her mother, thought they heard a car pass by shortly before midnight, wouldn't they have heard the splash of the Kennedy car?

The most fascinating contradiction of Kennedy's claimed schedule comes from Deputy Sheriff Christopher Look Jr., who says he was driving home from work that night and, about 12:45 A.M., saw a large black auto pause at the ferry road-Dike Road intersection. The uniformed deputy stopped and stepped out, meaning to ask if the driver needed help or directions. The other car whished off down Dike Road. Look noticed that the license plate numbers started with L7 and ended with another 7. It was the sort of thing he would remember, he said, because seven was the number he had worn on his high school jersey and it had always been his favorite number. He was on hand the next morning when the Kennedy car (license L78207) was fished from the lagoon. Look immediately identified it as the car he had seen the night before. He was positive of the time because within five minutes he was home and, as he shucked his shoes and leaned back to watch television, he noticed that the time was 12:58.

Look has not budged from that story (he has since become sheriff). Most police officials and newsmen who know Look, or who met him during the Chappaquiddick investigation, are convinced his memory is accurate and that he is completely honest. That's his reputation in the community, too.

If Deputy Sheriff Look did spot Kennedy's car at 12:45, 45 minutes beyond the last scheduled ferry departure, it does much more than throw doubt upon the purity of the Senator's intentions. It also casts doubt on the entire schedule that he claimed for the rest of the night. If you add up all the things that Kennedy says he and Gargan

and Markham did, the elapsed time comes to two hours at least and more reasonably, two and a half hours. That's using their own time estimates. Two and a half hours would nearly fill the time between his claimed departure from the cottage (11:15) and his claimed arrival at his motel (about 2 o'clock).

But if Look is correct, an hour and a half would be lopped from the clock, and there simply would be no way Kennedy, or Gargan and Markham, would have had time to make the rescue efforts they claimed to have made.

But having twice claimed 11:15 as his hour of departure (once in his police statement, once in his television address), Kennedy was stuck with it, accurate or not. Thus, it was of paramount importance for Kennedy to hammer 11:15 (or thereabouts) into the record, and to get support from others at the party on this point when they testified at the inquest.

It is interesting to see, therefore, what the five surviving women had to say. (The men at the party, except for Crimmins—who claims he looked at his watch—were all very vague about it.)

Between the time of the accident and the inquest six months later, only Esther Newberg allowed herself to be openly interviewed by the press. Her most notable interview was on July 23, five days after the accident and before Kennedy finished working up his television speech in which he for the first time told about the long rescue search by Gargan and Markham, which he said he had encouraged.

In that interview, Miss Newberg was asked what time Kennedy and Miss Kopechne left the cottage. Warren Weaver Jr., who reported the interview for The New York Times, wrote: "Miss Newberg described it as an informal group, with no one keeping particular track of who was there or who wasn't there at any given time. Thus, she said, no one specifically missed either the Senator or Miss Kopechne or noticed what time they had left." Chicago Tribune reporters gave other details of her response: "Miss Newberg said she was very vague about time during the evening partly because her watch was a psychedelic one and 'you couldn't read it' and because no one was sitting around watching the clock. . . . 'At no time were we aware of time,' she ex-

plained. . . ." The reporter for The Worcester (Mass.) Evening Gazette, wrote: "Miss Newberg said she did not notice when Senator Kennedy and Miss Kopechne left the party. . . . She said she did not know the time accurately because her Mickey Mouse watch—which had been a topic of joking conversation—was not working properly."

Except for some variations in the description of her watch, all reporters seem to have heard Miss Newberg the same way: Nobody was paying any attention to time, and she had a special reason for not checking the time of the Kennedy-Kopechne departure because her watch was not working right.

By the time of the inquest, however, Miss Newberg had radically changed her story. Now, when the assistant district attorney asked her if "prior to his leaving did you become aware that Mr. Kennedy left at a certain time," she answered yes, it was about 11:30, and she was certain of it because "I have a rather large watch that I wear all the time and I looked at it." At some time and for some reason between the interview and the inquest Miss Newberg was transformed from an easy-going partygoer to a clock-watcher. Moreover, the six months between interview and inquest also incubated not only an "awareness" that Kennedy and Miss Kopechne had left but an actual remembrance of the act—"I saw them walk out of the cottage. . . . I saw him walk out. . . . Miss Kopechne was directly behind him."

In her newfound certainty of the time, Miss Newberg was in total harmony with the other four women. Although Maryellen Lyons had to acknowledge that the party was not exactly a timekeeping situation—"I mean, people were going into the cottage and out of the cottage all night. I didn't know at any particular time that anybody was leaving"—yet she was somehow aware with strange precision, "about 11:15 or 11:20," that Kennedy and Miss Kopechne were no longer around. Likewise her sister, Nance Lyons—amidst all the coming and going, the singing, the drinking, the storytelling—happened to turn at exactly the right moment and her eyes fell upon Kennedy and Miss Kopechne just as they walked out the door; and, looking back at it, she would place the time at "11, 11:15." Miss Keough was another

'A simple auto accident became a multilayered mystery that remains as baffling today as it was five years ago.'

who, despite the confusion of the party, noticed her friend Mary Jo leaving the house at "approximately 11:20" and Miss Keough furthermore distinctly remembers "she was followed by Senator Kennedy." (A slight variation there; Miss Newberg had seen Mary Jo go last through the door.) Miss Tannenbaum's memory gave just the needed piquancy of a few minutes' difference, though she was another who conveniently fixed her departure with a timepiece: "I just turned around and saw the door slam and Mary Jo leave. . . . I remember looking at my watch at 25 to 12 and Mary Jo, Miss Kopechne had left," and she hadn't been gone long.

Considering the profound vagueness that seized their memories on most of the other episodes of the evening, it is indeed remarkable that among the 10 who remained in and around the cottage, six could substantiate Kennedy's general time of departure (though he told only one of the group that he was leaving) and three of them could pinpoint it with the aid of watches. And what makes it even odder, though these six were apparently very interested in the movements of Kennedy and Miss Kopechne, not one of the observers—except Crimmins—heard the car start up or saw them drive away. Their support of the Kennedy departure ends at the doorway.

A possible challenge to Kennedy's claimed schedule comes from another source. Shortly after the accident, Time magazine quoted Dr. Donald R. Mills, the county's associate medical examiner, as saying that Miss Kopechne could have died anywhere from five to eight hours—and at the very outside, nine hours—before he looked at her body, around 9:30 A.M. Even using his maximum count, that would put her death—and Kennedy's departure from the cottage—at no earlier than 12:30. However, at the

quest. His asserted that she had been dead "six or more hours," giving no outside time limit for the moment of her death.

**Q: How come Gargan and Markham didn't show signs of their ordeal?**

They say that, while Kennedy stood on the bank encouraging them, they spent 45 minutes thrashing around in an impossibly strong tidal current trying to rescue Miss Kopechne. Gargan adds specific details to the claim, saying that at one point he pushed partway through a window of the submerged car and got momentarily stuck, bruising and "badly" (his word) scraping his chest, arm and back. Kennedy goes farther, saying that Gargan "was scraped all the way from his elbow, underneath his arm was all bruised and bloodied." Markham claims that he, too, suffered in a dive, banging a knee against the submerged car so hard that it throbbed for hours.

Following that exhausting exertion, Gargan and Markham (they say) drove Kennedy to the ferry landing and discussed for 10 minutes what he should do to save his reputation. Then when Kennedy dove into the channel, Gargan and Markham dived in after him (at least this is what they told some of the women, but they didn't mention it at the inquest) with the intention of swimming along with Kennedy, but changed their minds.

So here were two men who had allegedly spent the previous hour or so fighting swift currents, risking their lives looking around a submerged car, their nerves strung out with the knowledge that somewhere under there was an unwelcome corpse; or jumping into another swift current in pursuit of a friend and potential President who was obviously beside himself in danger of drowning; or getting with him what course to follow to save his political career. They had not towed themselves off before putting their clothes at the accident site; they had presumably jumped into the furry channel clothed, as they say Kennedy had done. And yet they ended up at the cottage a few minutes later without appearing so wet and bedraggled and frantic and excited as to arouse curiosity or special notice, or to prompt questions. Was that possible?

Only one person in the cottage claims to have noticed



Senator Kennedy and his wife, Joan, at the Kopechne funeral in Plymouth, Pa., four days after her death at Chappaquiddick.



Mary Joe Kopechne's parents visit her grave a year later.

anything odd about either man. Esther Newberg, the young lady with the rejuvenated memory, told officials at the inquest (she had apparently forgotten to tell reporters six months earlier) that Gargan appeared "red in the face and exhausted"; she said she didn't remember anything about Markham's appearance. She quotes Gargan as asking her to move off the couch and let him lie down because "I am exhausted. . . . If you knew what I have been through you would let me lie there." (Markham says he's the one who made that remark to Miss Newberg.) Susan Tannenbaum says she "overheard" Markham say he was tired but that he did not seem excited; she says she paid no special attention to Gargan. Tretter says he saw nothing unusual about Gargan's appearance (he didn't recall seeing Markham). The red face Miss Newberg interpreted as a sign of exhaustion was seen by Tretter as nothing but sunburn. Four others who talked to Gargan after his return to the cottage (Crimmins, Miss Keough and the two Lyons sisters) saw nothing strange in Gargan's apparel or demeanor. In fact, Nance Lyons says that, in retrospect, comparing Gargan's attitude at 2 A.M. to his

appearance the next morning around 10 o'clock when he broke the news of Miss Kopechne's death, "it appeared when he returned [at 2 A.M.] that he had no knowledge of what had actually transpired," that is, no knowledge of her death.

**Q: Why did Kennedy wait so long to report the accident?**

Kennedy blamed it on head injuries and shock. Shock, no doubt, there was. But his head injuries were not enough to greatly impress even his own doctor, who diagnosed the damage as a "slight" concussion. Kennedy showed up at Miss Kopechne's funeral, his first public appearance after the accident, wearing a neck brace, but he was not seen wearing it very often thereafter.

While Kennedy and his doctors claim he suffered enough to impair his judgment, the suffering apparently did not interfere with other mental operations. He observed clearly at the time, and his observations were made so coolly that he remembered them later. Just before being engulfed in water, says Kennedy, he remembers getting "half a gulp of air." He says he immediately realized he was upside down in the water; he says

he remembers distinctly his futile efforts to reach the handle and open the door; he says he remembers Miss Kopechne's movements; he says he remembers the feel of the water as it rushed in, the feel of his lungs "partially filling with water." He can recall virtually every moment from the time the car left the bridge until he popped to the surface, except, regrettably, the very moment that raises the big question of the crash: How did he get out? He doesn't remember, which is a pity, for it would be marvelous to know exactly how it occurred.

There he was, his big-boned, 6-foot, 2-inch frame, his 220 pounds of muscle and fat (he lost 20 pounds shortly after the accident) squeezed under the steering wheel, his movements partially restricted by the plastic brace that he has worn around his middle since an almost-fatal air crash in 1964; there he was, stunned, upside down, water pounding in from both sides, wrestling with the door, groping around to find an open window—all this on that precious "half a gulp" of air—then inhaling water, being overcome by a sense of defeat—"Then I gave up, I thought that was it and I gave up, I just gave up, and the next thing I

knew I was out." Somehow he had slipped right through the window: a miracle denied Miss Kopechne, although she was a slender woman, half Kennedy's corpulence and she was unhampered by the steering wheel; she was a good swimmer; she was still conscious (according to Kennedy's story), struggling beside him, seeming almost to be fighting to be free of him—"perhaps hitting or kicking me," is the way Kennedy says he remembers her exertions. But somehow, out of their mutual struggle for room to twist and turn and feel one's way out of the car, he miraculously emerged and she did not, though the crash had left two open windows on her side of the car and only one on his.

If Kennedy's awareness of details deserted him just at the wrong moment, it apparently came back almost immediately and stayed with him for the rest of the night. When he and Gargan and Markham returned to the accident scene later that night, for example, Kennedy says he recalls the clock on the Valiant's dashboard reading 12:20.

So his mind was obviously not fogged by panic. Nor, for that matter, did outsiders who saw him later in the morning (before the accident came to light) observe anything unusual about him. When he sat and chatted about boating and the weather with Richards, he seemed in a pleasant mood; he did not seem distracted by inner turmoil. If "overcome," as he later claimed to have been at the time, with "grief, fear, doubt, exhaustion, panic, confusion and shock," it did not show through to the receptionist when he ordered the morning papers with the same easy air of any man arising for an ordinary day. These things were occurring eight hours or so after the alleged time of the accident. Could such "irrational" (Kennedy's word) callousness be accounted for simply by a bump on the head and a bad night's sleep? Could the bump and the shock of the accident result, as Kennedy claimed, in hallucinations that the accident had never happened at all or, at the very least, that the accident had happened but that Miss Kopechne had survived it and was still alive "somewhere"? None who talked to him the next morning, several hours before he turned himself in to the police, spotted these signs of temporary madness.

The discrepancies between what Kennedy and Gargan and Markham say they went through, and their appearance, are so startling as to have prompted several fascinating theories. Columnist Jack Anderson, citing sources close to Kennedy, says the Senator did not report the accident until mid-morning and appeared calm and natural to those who saw him at the breakfast hour because he had arranged for his cousin Gargan to take the rap and admit driving the car. At the last minute, according to Anderson, Kennedy decided to put aside this sleazy plot.

Time-Life Inc. editor Jack Olsen, in his book "The Bridge at Chappaquiddick," theorizes that the reason Kennedy, Gargan and Markham didn't show signs of strain was that they didn't know Miss Kopechne was dead and they hadn't been diving to hunt for her. Olsen speculates that when Deputy Sheriff Look hailed them, Kennedy, fearing scandal, panicked and got out of the car and hid in the bushes, sending Miss Kopechne down the road with instructions to double back in a little while and pick him up. Flustered, unfamiliar with the car (she normally drove a Volkswagen), and too short to see over the dashboard sufficiently, she didn't spot the angle of the upcoming bridge and drove off it without even slowing down. It would take all these handicaps and more to explain why this was the first time in 20 years that anybody had managed to drive off Dike Bridge. Not until the next morning, along with everyone else, Olsen argues, did Kennedy find out what had happened to the woman he had sent away to distract the law.

**Q.: Could Miss Kopechne have been saved?**

If Kennedy and his friends hadn't wasted time with amateur heroics and if Kennedy, instead, had gone directly to the Dyke House and called for professional help, what would have been the result?

Police and firemen with rescue equipment would have been on hand within half an hour, as they were the next morning, and Miss Kopechne would have been out of the car within another half hour. John N. Farrar, captain of the

Edgartown Fire Department's Scuba Search and Rescue Division, says he found Miss Kopechne's "head cocked back, face pressed into the foot well, hand holding onto the front edge of the back seat. By holding herself in a position such as this, she could avail herself of the last remaining air in the car." Farrar believes "she died of asphyxiation in her own air void. But it took her at least three or four hours to die."

Dr. Mills, the local medical examiner who gave her body a 10-minute examination on the spot, disagrees. He insists that not only did Miss Kopechne drown but that she was "the most drowned person I've ever seen." He says her lungs must have been full of water because when he made "just light pressure on the chest wall . . . water would simply pour out of the nose and mouth."

But a pouring forth is not what Eugene Frieh, the undertaker, saw, and he was right there looking over Dr. Mills's shoulder. Frieh says that when Dr. Mills manipulated the thoracic region, it produced some water; asked if it produced "a flow of water," he replied with a more moderate description: "It produced some water flow, water and foam, mostly foam." On another occasion Frieh said, "Very little water was expelled from the lungs. I raised my eyebrows because I expected much more water."

There would be no question about how Miss Kopechne died if Dr. Mills had ordered an autopsy; he didn't, because he was satisfied that it was a death by drowning, and also perhaps because he got no encouragement from the district attorney's office.

A Massachusetts police lab analysis discovered evidence of blood on Miss Kopechne's white blouse. Dr. Mills tried to explain this as "consistent" with drowning; people who struggle desperately for air, he said, often are found with some show of blood in the mouth and nose. But if the blood came from Miss Kopechne's nose and mouth, why did most traces of it wind up on the back of her blouse and the back of her collar and the back of both sleeves?

**W**hat was Miss Keough's purse doing in Kennedy's car when it was recovered from the lagoon? Was it physically

possible for Kennedy to swim the ferry channel? How did Gargan and Markham get to Edgartown the next morning? (The ferryman was reported as saying he didn't remember taking them.) Why did Kennedy recruit Gargan and Markham for the rescue effort when he could have used LaRosa, a professional fireman who was well trained in rescue work? Was Kennedy trying to establish an alibi when he asked the innkeeper for the time?

The questions are endless, and most of them seem not at all to have stirred the curiosity of officialdom, which from the very beginning was much more interested in protecting Senator Kennedy.

Police Chief Arena allowed Kennedy and all other cook-out witnesses to leave the island without being questioned and—at Kennedy's request—he withheld the Senator's statement from the press for three hours, a statement which, when it was released, did not even include the dead woman's name. No judicial decision was given on the request for an autopsy until three months after she was embalmed and in her Pennsylvania grave. The inquest, which was supposed to be open to the public and press, was delayed six months and then held in secret, at Kennedy's request. The questioning of witnesses at the inquest was singularly gentle, though presiding Judge James A. Boyle did finally conclude that Kennedy was not telling the truth on two key points: "I infer . . . that Kennedy and Kopechne did not intend to return to Edgartown at that time; that Kennedy did not intend to drive to the ferry slip, and his turn onto Dike Road was intentional. [Emphasis from the judge's report]." No effort was made to resolve the numerous contradictions in testimony. The record of the inquest testimony was withheld from public inspection for nine months. A grand jury that cranked up to re-open the investigation was cranked down again after only three hours of testimony.

Nevertheless, Senator Kennedy feels enough has been told. "The facts of this incident," Kennedy said five years ago, "are now fully public and eventual judgment and understanding rests where it belongs. For myself, I plan no further statement on this tragic matter." ■

July 14, 1974



Confrontation at the Cathedral: After mass on a recent Sunday, the candidates meet outside St. Patrick's with Archbishop John J. Maguire.

# Carey vs. Wilson

## And in each corner—Nelson Rockefeller

By Richard Reeves

**J**immy's is a restaurant on West 52d Street that specializes in lousy food, good drinks and better conversation, if you like better political conversation. People do say the damndest things there. One night—it was March 18, 1973—a bunch of overaged adolescents who practice or observe the political arts were there laughing about Nelson Rockefeller's latest, his attempt to resurrect Robert F. Wagner as Mayor of New York City. One guy even cracked up everyone by saying, "He's already planned the next election

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for Governor—Malcolm Wilson against Hugh Carey."

One thing has to be remembered about the recent politics of the Empire State: Nelson A. Rockefeller. Political New York could be viewed as a circle with Rockefeller at its center. The web radiating from Rockefeller is tangled, bipartisan and sometimes barely visible, but it is there, woven through the fiber of the state's four parties—Republican, Democratic, Liberal and Conservative—and their public minions. "People will think someday it was an exaggeration to say Nelson Rockefeller owned New York," said Russell Hemenway, the national director of the National Committee for an Effective Congress and a very sophisticated practitioner and observer of state politics. "But he owned the Republican party and he owned the Democratic party. You simply could not touch the man in New York."

The outsiders might not think it's an exaggeration. Consider what has happened to the six most dangerous politicians outside the Rockefeller circle since the death of Robert F. Kennedy in 1968: Mayor John Lindsay was replaced by Abe Beame, a regular Democrat elected with undisguised Rockefeller help; State Senator John Marchi, the official Republican candidate for Mayor in 1973, was demolished by the Beame alliance; Senator Charles Goodell, the Republican-Liberal candidate for the Senate in 1970, was jettisoned for an unofficial Rockefeller-James Buckley ticket in 1970; Representative Mario Biaggi, a onetime Rockefeller aide, had a real shot at the Democratic nomination for Mayor in 1973, before grand jury testimony about his personal finances mysteriously began appearing on the front pages of city newspapers; Assembly Speaker Perry Duryea, a potentially strong candidate for the

Republican gubernatorial nomination this year, was indicted for violation of a state law that had twice been declared unconstitutional; Howard Samuels, an erratic and untrusting Democrat who seemed close to the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, was wiped out by Carey, who has been Rockefeller's favorite Congressman for 10 years.

So, with Rockefeller in Washington nervously awaiting confirmation as Vice-President—nervously, because some of the invisible power lines are coming into focus—and maneuvering toward his last shot at the Presidency, his circle still seems secure at home. Beame, an insider, is ensconced in City Hall and the next Governor will be Malcolm Wilson, a Rockefeller invention, or Hugh Carey, a Rockefeller friend and insider of good standing.

Not that it makes no difference whether Wilson, the Republican-Conservative incumbent, or Carey, the Democrat-Liberal candidate, wins on Nov. 5. It does make a difference, but it also means that Nelson Rockefeller's works and reputation will not be torn apart by an outsider. And his most magnificent work is not a building; it's a system of radially distributed power and favors to people and institutions that sometimes look as if they are fighting a lot harder than they are. Over the years, with Rockefeller as the stabilizing, generous center, they have all survived in prosperous balance—Rocky's trained Republican leaders and the Democratic "bosses," the big banks and the big unions, people who seem as far apart as Alex Rose of the Liberal Party and James Buckley of the Conservative party.

The center is holding. And from the center this seems like a safe election between Wilson, dull beyond description, the Lamont Cranston of politics with power to cloud men's minds, and Carey, a dependable, lively piece of proof that only the Irish should be allowed in politics.

Wilson was elected Lieutenant Governor with Rockefeller back in 1958, which gives him the distinction, in the words of Albany Mayor Erastus Coming, "of spending 15 years playing second fiddle in a one-man band." The Rockefeller-Wilson ticket was consciously designed as a moderate-conservative duplicate of the successful Eisenhower-Nixon team. Some state

Republicans, however, thought "reactionary" was a better description for Wilson, who in the State Assembly had earned a reputation as a superb legislative technician, debater and representative of Francis Cardinal Spellman.

Wilson, who became Governor when Rockefeller resigned last Dec. 15, describes himself as "a fiscal conservative and a human-rights liberal." He is also boring—when you ask him what time it is, he not only tells you how to build a watch but also recites the history of chronology—and one recent night in Lake Placid he greeted a friendly crowd with: "It's been a very interesting day for me. Under the felicitous concatenation of circumstances I've had a day where I've seen the microcosm of all New York State—what makes the state tick."

My favorite Wilson campaign stop came that same day at the 41st annual convention of the New York State Conservation Council—a euphemism for the state organization of 250,000 rod and gun club members—at the Stevensville Country Club hotel, 100 miles north of New York City. The Governor spent two hours there demonstrating why he probably will not be the Governor after Jan. 1.

First, he spent 10 minutes in the hotel lobby chatting and whispering — he whispers a lot — with two aides. Then it was on to the Carnival Lounge, and Wilson began by saying, "I know most of the people in this room"—which was apparently true, because he introduced or reminisced about almost every one of the 150 people there. He took six minutes introducing the seven council officers and legislators sitting at the head table. He saw someone from Shirburne and told about the time "Janet Hill Gordon took me up to see Mr. Gaines and the factory where he makes 'Burger Bits.'" Then he talked about how Mike Petruska had died, and how, in memory, he had held up appointing a replacement for Mike on the New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission for five months, but today he was naming "one of your own, he's right here, Stan Spisiak." Then he began a roll call of "those who aren't with us today" . . . "gone on to his reward" . . . "left us" . . . "called away" . . . "on to another and, we hope, better

world than this vale of tears in which we live."

"Malcolm Wilson sure is close to a lot of dead people," said Jack Kole of The Milwaukee Journal, as Wilson got down to the business of saying he would reduce the minimum age for free senior-citizen hunting and fishing licenses from 70 to 62, and he would never make sportsmen line up to register their rifles and shotguns like common criminals. It was smoky and surreal in the lounge, and things seemed to happen in slow motion, but finally the Governor accepted a gold medal, spoke a couple of minutes about it and went on to a press conference under the heads of the state record black bear (469 pounds) and white-tailed deer (248 pounds).

It was not a happy meeting of candidate and reporters—Wilson does not enjoy the game, and he avoided eye contact with his questioners. He was testy when pressed and took up a good part of the 45 minutes rummaging through his pockets for three-by-five file cards noting things like the fact that the state's share of Federal jobs decreased from 8.1 to 6.6 per cent during the 14 years Hugh Carey has been in Congress. "It's all right; we believe you," said Judith Michaelson of The New York Post, as he flipped through the cards for a number. "No," Wilson said, "it's important that you get it right."

Carey, as fate would have it, visited the Conservation Council the next day. For him, the hunters and fishermen were unmoved, a Grant Wood group picture. The man from Brooklyn was desperate to make some connection with these people—he is essentially a small-time Hubert Humphrey, very anxious to please—but he never had a chance after telling some bad duck-hunting stories and ending, gamely and lamely, with, "I'll tell you, nothing compares to being in this state in the autumn . . . Smokey the Bear can't do it all himself, he needs your help."

The Democrat was more in his element, and more himself, a few nights earlier at a party rally in Tonawanda, near Buffalo. There were only a hundred people in Carey headquarters, a storefront on South Main Street, but five of them were "The Tamburitzan Boys—Music for all Occasions," pounding out "Happy Days Are Here Again" and

"The Sidewalks of New York." With "Matt Murphy for Assembly" balloons dancing over his head, town Democratic chairman George Hanratty exuberantly kicked off the festivities by introducing candidate Robert Abrams as "the next Attorney Gentleman of the state of New York."

Carey was introduced by Assemblyman John LaFalce, a candidate for Congress with a perpetual Jaycee grin and a habit of greeting people with "H-e-e-e-y!" and leaving them with "O-k-a-a-a-y!" "A guy named Carey," LaFalce began in a hushed tone which quickly escalated into hysteria. "Names. When you read the history books certain names make you tingle. Put chills in your spine. Goose-pimples. Al Smith. Herbert Lehman. Franklin Roosevelt. Bobby Kennedy . . . We have got it back again! We have a great man! Hugh Carey!"

"I came in here tonight wondering whether it was the appropriate time to endorse John LaFalce," Carey began. "I've decided. I'll endorse him. I'll endorse his mother. His uncle. Anyone who has anything to do with John LaFalce, I'll endorse."

The guy's a pro, and he has a sense of humor. The rest of the speech was nonsense, of course, but politicians and political reporters are among the chosen few who spend their adult years going to pep rallies. Later on in the Tonawanda speech, Carey showed that he had mastered a basic Humphreyism—realizing that you've gone too far or said the wrong thing, then turning a thought around and loading it with hyperbole to try to bury the original sin. This time Carey began talking about Ramsey Clark, his Senate running mate, by saying, "He came to New York from another state"—oh, oh, shouldn't say that!—"He lives here with his wife and child. He has a sister in Amherst. He's a real New Yorker in heart and spirit. Remember the only original New Yorker was the brother of the king, the Duke of York."

Carey should be considered in detail before Wilson not only because he's a more interesting man, but because he's probably going to win, and his links to Rockefeller are more complex and more illustrative—and more vulnerable. He is, after all, the Democratic candidate and has finally stopped saying that he

thinks Rockefeller was "a good, if not great Governor." Now he says, as Frank Skeffington might have, that all along he meant "all human beings are good."

Hugh Leo Carey was a good Congressman who was also smart enough to be bored in Washington—"It was drudgery, and I wasn't about to sit there and vegetate for the rest of my life"—and he became the "independent" candidate for Governor in a rather traditional and fortuitous way: He was rejected by "the bosses." The Democratic leaders of New York

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**Wilson was elected Lieutenant Governor in 1958, which gives him the distinction, one observer says, 'of spending 15 years playing second fiddle in a one-man band.'**

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City's four largest counties endorsed the unpredictable Howard Samuels because they miscalculated — they thought Samuels's visibility ("Howie the Horse") as the city's Off-Track Betting chief made him unbeatable in the Democratic primary.

In many ways, the bosses are a pathetic bunch who for 15 years have done more following than leading, more guessing than bossing. The seemingly Byzantine patterns of New York politics have often been nothing more than their twisting efforts to keep their small duchies within the Rockefeller empire while trying to appear to be part of potential rebellions. Anyway, Carey did want their shaky anointment, and before Samuels got it, the Congressman consulted daily with Brooklyn leader Meade Esposito, Bronx leader Patrick Cunningham and even with the old Tammany Hall boss, Carmine De Sapio, whose public bossing was cut short by a term in the Federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pa. (New York reform Democrats, the kind who believed George McGovern was right from the start, are institutional outsiders who can be charmed by a Carey and ignored by a Rockefeller.)

Not enough people outside (Continued on Page 116)

suggesting that the modern drift from the country to the towns—or to the cities of Western Europe, where a half-million Turks are now at work—is having the same effect as in many other developing countries of raising expectations and heightening political awareness.

So Ecevit may calculate that he is riding a rising national tide which will continue to favor those principles of modernization and reform that Atatürk inaugurated. But Turkish emotion over Cyprus is of a totally different order, confirming the emergence of a specifically Turkish nation-

and as the possessor of the largest NATO standing army after the United States, it also enhances the Turkish bargaining position both with her allies and the Soviet Union.

This, in turn, suggests a fatal weakness in the latest United States Congressional threats to suspend military aid to Turkey because of its use in Cyprus. The last such threat, over the opium poppy issue, really had no perceptible effect except to inflame Turkish feelings. This new one may appease American politicians who see yet another former client state behaving in ways they do not

'Visitors to Ankara or Istanbul may be impressed by the veneer of urban sophistication. But veneer is all it is. Behind the new cars and hotels, the chic boutiques and sidewalk cafes lie a thousand unpaved alleys and a million homes without piped water or sanitation.'

alist renaissance in which the country's older, instinctive loyalties are sometimes united with and sometimes opposed to Ecevit's own rational formulations. Even if Ecevit does secure an undisputed majority in the new elections, he cannot ignore such deep emotions. Nor, probably, will he want to, for in the current era of détente and superpower stand-off, nationalism for Turkey has growing attractions—and other countries nearby have already shown how it may be exploited. There is no doubt, for example, that Turkish actions in Cyprus have been influenced both by Israel's past success in ignoring external pressures in her dealings with the Arabs and by the Arab demonstration in last October's war of how a long and frustrating diplomatic deadlock may be broken by bold military action in defiance of the superpowers.

The Greek gesture in leaving NATO in disgust over America's alleged partiality for Turkey is also relevant. By underlining Turkey's superior strategic value to the alliance, both as the sovereign power of the Black Sea straits

approve, but it is hardly calculated to change Turkish policies—except perhaps in the direction of greater independence and closer relations with the neighboring Arab world, and possibly with the Soviet Union.

A deep suspicion of the Soviet Union remains in many Turkish quarters, from the peasantry to the senior ranks of the armed forces. But there is also an awareness that the Soviet Union needs Turkey's acquiescence, if not her friendship, to maintain passage for her ships through the straits to the Mediterranean—easily the most important of her seaborne outlets.

At the same time, the value to the Western powers of Turkish bases may be diminishing. There is a growing belief that permanently sited, land-based nuclear weapons, for instance, are a military nonsense as well as a political liability and in the event of full-scale nuclear war few strategists would expect to see the U.S. Sixth Fleet left in the Mediterranean for longer than it takes to steam through The Straits of Gibraltar into



Under their own new flag: Turkish-Cypriot girls in Nicosia.

the open waters of the Atlantic.

Nor does Turkey's role in NATO seem to have much significance for the possible "regional" conflicts of which Western, and especially American, military planners have made so much until now. Cyprus was a regional conflict par excellence, but there was nothing NATO could do to prevent it. Nor was Turkey willing to be drawn into support of America's role last year in the equally regional conflict between Israel and the Arabs. After these two experiences, it is far more likely, if there are to be more regional conflicts of this kind, that they will be settled by the regional powers; and it is significant that Turkey has already begun to plan a separate national strike force outside NATO's framework.

With Arab power waxing steadily on the prospects of the Middle Eastern oil industry, the resurgence of Islamic feeling in Turkey will probably be maintained. Even before the Cyprus crisis, there were clear signs that the new Government was ready to follow the National Salvation party some of the way in this. For the first time in modern Turkish history, it sent a Cabinet minister to a summit meeting of Islamic countries

in Lahore. During the crisis, this new sympathy was extended to practical matters, through some quick horse-dealing with Turkey's Arab neighbors to ensure continuity of oil supplies in case the United States tried to cut off fuel. Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia all guaranteed oil and Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, enthused as ever by what he took to be an Islamic cause, is believed to have supplied ammunition and military spare parts as well.

In short, a sense of growing independence has already taken root in Turkey, and seems likely to grow, fed by opportunity as well as national instinct. At a superficial level, it may appear to be nothing more than a reflection of the instability common to many countries as they haul themselves out of traditional poverty toward the comparative affluence of our Western world. But in Turkey it goes deeper, to tap the roots of people's whole identity. "Barbarians" the Turks know very well they are not—at least, no more than most other people. But what are they? That's what the Turks are now trying to discover—and a disturbing process it may well be, to the Western world as well as to themselves, for many years to come. ■

## Carey vs. Wilson

Continued from Page 103

Bay Ridge and environs really knew much about Carey. At least professionals didn't know enough—their evaluation of him might have gone something like this a year ago: a smart, lace-curtain Irishman who was the class of the New York Congressional delegation, which isn't saying much; a buddy of House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills who got along with Rockefeller; a Kennedy liberal who had to hide it sometimes to survive in red-neck Brooklyn; a quitter who dropped out of the 1969 Mayoral race to support Robert F. Wagner and ended up losing his own primary for City Council president, and something of a dirty fighter. In sum, he was categorized as a talented regular who might end up as thorough president of Brooklyn or a senior Congressman. "Portly" was political reporters' favorite adjective for him—words like that don't attach to statesmen or comers.

All of that was true, but there was obviously much more. Most important, the "pros" didn't know that "Hughie" was very, very ambitious or that the Careys were Kennedy-rich. Carey politicized his way onto the House Ways and Means Committee, but once he had been blocked from the leadership ladder by the rise of another Eastern Catholic, Tip O'Neill of Massachusetts, he realized there was more to life than kissing Wilbur Mills's amendments—he was in a hurry, and when Rocky stepped out of Albany, Carey began looking into it.

Politicians were vaguely aware that the Careys were not poor—"They have an oil business, you know, delivery trucks." It's an oil business, all right. Edward M. Carey, Hugh's brother, is the sole owner of New England Petroleum Corp., one of the largest private companies in the world, grossing more than \$800-million a year—and that's only one of his 17 companies. Because NEPCO is not publicly owned, relatively little is known about it except for information required by Massachusetts corporate laws and Edward Carey's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this year after State Department objections to a \$40-million cash deal between NEPCO and the

Libyan Government during the Arab oil embargo. (Edward Carey refused to be interviewed about his business or his brother. Calls to his New York office—he is officially a resident of Puerto Rico—are accepted by a Mr. O'Hara, who said he had been authorized to say only: "We are a private company and it is our policy not to grant interviews.")

Brother Ed does own trucks, the Burns fleet that fills a lot of the fuel oil tanks in New York, and he owns ships, 30 tankers. NEPCO is an integrated oil company controlling crude oil from Arabian wellheads to its own refineries and on to its own gas stations, at least 250 in Canada alone, and to customers like Long Island Lighting Company, of which it is the sole oil supplier, and Consolidated Edison, which gets 45 per cent of its oil from NEPCO. Keeping things in the family, brother Hugh has been on the NEPCO payroll for years as a consultant, and his Brooklyn law firm is NEPCO's counsel.

Whatever it all adds up to, Edward Carey met last spring with David Garth, perhaps the best political media consultant in the country, to talk about making Hughie Governor. Garth asked how much money was available and Ed Carey answered, according to a witness: "Whatever it takes."

It took \$1,297,500 of Ed's money—and that figure may be on the low side. The brothers Carey drove their oil trucks around, under and through New York State's shiny new "campaign reform" law. Ed started by lending his brother's campaign \$950,000 before the law took effect on June 1. The money kept flowing after that until Samuels—whose biggest blunder was taking Carey lightly because he believed the Brooklyn Congressman could not raise enough money for a major campaign—began screaming that Ed Carey's post-June 1 contributions and loans were exceeding the law's \$105,000 limit on family contributions. O.K.—Hugh began paying back his brother with loans from his brother's business associates—\$250,000 worth miraculously came in one day. The new lender-contributors were such concerned New Yorkers as Pierre Senecal (\$31,500) of Chambly, Que., and the Quebec Oil Co., a unit of the Carey Energy Corp., and K. K. Tse (\$10,000) of Hong Kong.

It was a joke, but Samuels

was never really able to make it an issue, partly because he had put a lot of his own money (\$261,000) into his campaign and partly because Carey could talk circles around him. Samuels tried to make it "oil interests" and Carey said, "Stop picking on my family." When Samuels pointed out that Edward Carey was trying to build an oil pipeline across New York to carry foreign oil picked up in Rhode Island, Hugh Carey answered that was because "my brother so loves the state of New York that he's built the first refinery here in 15 years." Yeah, like Aristotle Onassis so loves the state of New Hampshire—that's what Samuels should have answered, but he didn't and, anyway, polls indicated that New York Democratic voters generally believe brothers should help each other. "What's a brother for?" was an answer regularly received by both Samuels and Carey pollsters. Perhaps New Yorkers have been conditioned by the way the Rockefellers financed campaigns for brother Nelson.

(Did Hugh Carey favor family oil interests as a Congressman? Hard to say. Until recent months, the interests of foreign oil importers and "good government" liberals were roughly the same. When Representative Carey voted to end the oil-depletion allowance for domestic producers, a "good" vote, he was also voting to improve the competitive position of his brother, a dealer in foreign oil. The same is true of "good" air pollution votes—clean air requires low-sulfur oil, which means Arab oil, which is what Ed Carey distributes. The one issue the Congressman may be vulnerable on is water pollution control—he has voted against controls, which might be interpreted as voting for oil slicks, an occupational hazard for tanker owners and offshore oil well advocates, and Ed Carey is both. But Hugh Carey personally opposes offshore drilling—advocating it on Long Island would be political death.)

Even with NEPCO employees now working at his headquarters as "volunteers," candidate Carey seems to have turned his campaign financing into a rhetorical asset: "New Yorkers have seen enough of the influence of private money over public policy—an influence that forces every major candidate, including myself, to reach out to sources of campaign fi-

nancing. . . . This will be the last campaign fought with private campaign funds. New York will have public financing of campaigns."

But this time, anyway, he could afford Garth—and Garth is both expensive and good. Carey paid him a \$10,000-a-month retainer for nine months, plus a 15 per cent agency commission on media buys, which totaled \$687,668 in the primary and will match that in the general, plus 17.62 per cent of production fees, plus two Garth employees on the Carey staff at more than \$1,000 a week.

He got his money's worth. He even looked better: Garth persuaded him to lose 30 pounds and a "new" Carey suddenly appeared around town with dyed hair, contact lenses, a Dunhill's wardrobe and no drinking except for a little wine with meals. He learned to walk with his chin up—hide the folds, good for lighting—and in eight brisk, newsy commercials, he was anything but portly. He was a vigorous 54-year-old man, an ex-war hero striding along with his 12 children.

"This year, before they tell you what they want to do . . . make them show you what they've done," was the message, and it got across as Carey outspent Samuels 8-to-1 on television. Maybe it got across too well—you sometimes think Dave Garth could take any of us (with a rich brother) off the streets and win a Democratic primary, especially since New York television news has downplayed political coverage because their viewer surveys tell them people prefer light news programs with teams of cute little Dick-and-Jane reporters. Newsday on Long Island quoted a voter, a Republican woman from Elmont who obviously gets her political news from Garth: "Carey's on television a lot. He's a man—so masculine and sincere. I don't know much about Wilson. I saw Carey working in his district, helping people. The publicity he gets is why I guess I like him."

When he's winning, as he has with John Tunney in California and Dan Walker in Illinois, Garth plays down his influence. He emphasizes that Carey is a good Congressman and a good personal campaigner; and that Samuels blew it. All true, although it's also true that Carey ran just as well in parts of the state he never visited as in the parts where he campaigned

heavily. "Television isn't that important," Garth said over and over again, but then, finally, he said, "Remember, Malcolm Wilson could still win this." How? "If we're off the tube another 10 days!"

Carey is good, not quite the combination of Henry Clay and Sam Rayburn that appeared in the commercials, but head and shoulders above most city Congressmen. He is bright and quick, glib and scattermouthed—"He's an encyclopedia without an index," one friend said—and he never, never stops talking, thinking, free-associating, insisting on dominating any conversational group that doesn't include Wilbur Mills or other senior Congressmen. "I finally figured it out," said Clay Felker, the publisher of New York magazine after a lunch with Carey. "He's reciting for the nuns; he has to get it all in before they call on someone else."

With Mills and the others who have outlived Congressional anonymity, Carey is deferential to the edge of obsequiousness. He's also deferential when it counts—he has voted against every effort to reform the House of Representatives by upsetting its hallowed seniority system. But that's the way Congress works, and Carey was effective because he played the game and worked for Hale Boggs and with worse men to angle his way from the Interior Committee up to the Education and Labor Committee and finally, in 1971, up to Ways and Means, the Mills committee that passes on all money matters and assigns House members to other committees.

Congressmen who have worked with Carey describe him as "well informed, a guy who knew what was going on" or "influential." There is a world of difference in those terms—friends use the latter, but both friends and enemies agreed that Carey was the fourth or fifth most effective member of Education and Labor, where he spent most of his Washington time. He was a principal author of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 and chaired the Subcommittee on Education for the Handicapped, which he practically created and which was responsible for a dozen laws making it possible, for instance, for deaf people to get the education and training to become working, productive citizens.

All of that was proclaimed

by the Garth commercials. They also announced that Carey "got" the Brooklyn Navy Yard reopened as an industrial park—he didn't do that, but he was one of the key New York figures fighting for the yard as far back as 1964. That was when he and Rockefeller began a relationship that sometimes included daily phone calls and meetings, especially when they worked effectively as a team to push for Federal Revenue Sharing with states and localities. It became law in 1972. (Rockefeller has said from the beginning that the original revenue-sharing idea came from Malcolm Wilson.)

The Rockefeller-Carey relationship was rarely publicized but was well known in their offices, and staff people on both sides characterized Carey as an important, if secret, advisor who would talk by telephone with Rockefeller or Rocky's political agent, James Cannon, on an almost daily basis over long periods of time. "It was a rather useful relationship on both sides," Carey says now. "I had a sense of the Congress and they had something I wanted: access to the White House. And, up until the end of 1972, Rockefeller wanted people to look upon him as much as a Roosevelt as a Rockefeller."

Except for their occasional mutual admiration, only one instance of Rockefeller help for Carey has ever been overt enough to be obvious. And that incident, shrouded to the point that it may be shady, was supposed to be covert.

In the 1972 election, Carey was in trouble in his own district against John Gangemi, who had the Republican nomination for Congress and whose name was already printed on Conservative party nominating petitions. But Gangemi never got the Conservative nomination—somebody named Jones was put on the ballot at the last minute, and Carey was re-elected with 52 per cent of the vote.

What happened? William Wells, then the Brooklyn Conservative leader, says his party got "certain promises" from Rockefeller's man Cannon, and from Carey. George Clark, then the local Republican leader and now the county chairman, was publicly backing Gangemi. But he says he agreed to set up a meeting between Carey and Wells, at Carey's request, and: "They met in my real-estate office and I was there. Carey told Wells that he wanted him to pull the Conservative backing of Gangemi. . . . 'We can't

do that. We can't back a liberal so-and-so like you, Wells said. Carey said he didn't want support, just another candidate to cut Gangemi's vote. 'Let's talk absolute specifics,' Carey said, and I knew they were going to talk money and I didn't want to be there. Carey came out smiling later and said Wells was 'reasonable.' . . . Wells told me later that Carey gave him \$10,000."

Wells, who is supporting Carey this year, says that Clark, who is close to Wilson, is lying. "I didn't get a dime," he said. "Rockefeller and Carey got what they wanted and I just don't want to say anymore." Carey says that it's true that Rockefeller helped him through Cannon and that Wells did ask him for money or for legal advertising for small newspapers Wells owned. "I gave him nothing," Carey said, "I don't handle money in my campaigns."

Stories and denials like that are the plasma of Brooklyn politics, and Hugh Carey has been in Brooklyn a long time. Phil Tracy, a Village Voice political writer who once worked for Carey, describes his ex-boss as: "A mean bastard who plays politics as dirty as anyone I've ever met in the profession, but don't deny Carey his streak of idealism. It's there and he honestly believes it." Carey charges in 1969 about New York Fire Department inefficiency — charges that the Congressman knew were untrue — particularly got to Tracy. According to Tracy, Carey told him: "What harm did it do? Who knows? Maybe the city really is burning up. Lindsay would never tell us. In the meantime, we get some publicity, and that's what counts in this game."

What counts most to Hugh Carey, I think, is the game itself. He loves running for Governor, but gives absolutely no indication of having thought much about being Governor. The Carey primary campaign against Samuels, in which Carey rolled up 61 per cent of the vote, consisted of little more than the quick candidate, the rich brother, the sage Wagner and the talented Garth. While Samuels ground out reams of detailed position papers and deployed hundreds of field workers, Carey went on television proclaiming "independence . . . independence . . . independence."

"I'll admit that I don't have an intimate knowledge of state government," Carey said. "I think I have a better grasp of how it should run, then of how it does run."

It is very possible that after Carey finds out how boringly it does run, he'll just keep campaigning. There is very little excitement in wrestling with a state budget that is about 95 per cent precommitted to community aid, debt service, salaries and pipeline projects.

Will he move into the national game, as candidate in 1976 or power broker? "I'm going to have a voice in 1976," he answered. "But mainly I'm going to work, to lead and stay close to my family. I'm not a Kennedy. I'm a guy who worked his way from the freshman team to the junior varsity to the scrubs. This is my big play."

Maybe. But what happens when Carey reads that he might be the stuff of the '76 All American team? There are two ways he could actually become "independent." He could go national, leaving New York power within the circle that has hardened during the Rockefeller years. Or, he could plug away at home, an ingrate insider remembering something that Fiorello LaGuardia once said: "The best guarantee of independence is monumental ingratitude."

**O**n paper at least, there are great similarities in the lives of Hugh Carey and Malcolm Wilson. Both are the products of middle-class Irish homes a few miles from Manhattan in the World War I era; both were educated only in Roman Catholic schools. Carey is from St. John's University and St. John's Law and Wilson is from Fordham and Fordham Law. (Both, incidentally, have spent a lot of their time amending bills to channel Government money to nonpublic schools.) Carey's father was in the coal and oil business in Brooklyn, and his mother was once Nellie Bly's secretary. Wilson's father was a patent attorney in Yonkers, and his mother was something of a power in local politics: She got her son his first Assembly nomination when he was just 24. Carey was a major in the infantry in Europe during World War II. Navy Lieutenant Wilson commanded a gun crew during the Normandy invasion.

The difference, according to men who know both of them, may be greater than the similarity. Both are serious Roman Catholics, but Carey is an anticlerical Irish Catholic. The Democrat, something of a Kennedy worshipper, has also had his share of tragedy—two of his 14 children, his oldest sons, were

killed in an automobile accident in 1969, and his wife, Helen, died of cancer earlier this year at the age of 49.

Wilson, who is half Irish, has boasted that he has never tasted whisky, wine or beer. Maybe he grew up too fast. He was a prodigy, graduating from college at 19 and going to Albany at 24. His religion and his politics have always been mixed—at least in the eyes of beholders—and in 1948 he was pushing legislation to ban "obscene movie advertising." Although he tells it differently now, he was often ignored, even forgotten, during his years as Lieutenant Governor, and Rockefeller affectionately called him "my hack." After Rockefeller prepared his first inaugural speech in 1959, someone remembered that no one had consulted Wilson. He was shown the speech just before Rockefeller gave it and panicked the second floor of the State Capitol by intoning: "The Governor cannot give this speech." What? "There is no mention of the Deity in this speech."

An "under God" was written in, and Wilson pronounced himself satisfied.

A couple of weeks ago when executives at WINS radio in New York City asked him about the major problems facing the community, he listed inflation, jobs and crime, then added: "A society that condones anything will soon believe in nothing. I'm talking about dirty pictures . . . I really get uptight . . . pornography . . . Forcing a school or a Boy Scout camp to hire sex deviates. I'm against that."

**I**f he was invisible as Lieutenant Governor, he seemed visibly indecisive after Rockefeller resigned last Dec. 15. His stewardship and election prospects got stuck almost immediately in the long gasoline station lines that clogged the grand roads Rockefeller had built all over the state. One of the reasons for the lines, a reason that never became public, was that Wilson did not understand that he had control over releasing and distributing millions of gallons of emergency state allocations held at refineries, awaiting his order. It waited 20 days until Federal officials asked him why he was letting the gas sit there.

What was public was that the new Governor wasn't doing anything, in fact had no intention of doing anything, even anything symbolic. Pressure mounted on him to institute mandatory odd-even

days for gasoline sales, especially after Governor Brendan Byrne instituted that system in New Jersey and it seemed to make life a little easier for drivers. Wilson's response: "I have a visceral reaction against Government directing people what to do."

Finally, The New York Daily News, the state's largest newspaper, published short profiles of Byrne and Wilson on the same page under the headlines: BITE THE BULLET BYRNE; WAIT AND SEE WILSON.

Wilson is a modest man, loyal and thoughtful to friends, but he is no campaigner. On the surface, his effort looks something like a Rockefeller campaign with familiar faces like state campaign director R. Burdell Bixby and press secretary Harry O'Donnell — capable men who began their careers with Thomas E. Dewey — and city campaign director Fiorvante Perrotta, who handled the five boroughs for both Rockefeller and Richard Nixon. But the difference is that there is no super-metabolic campaigner out front — "Let's cut this short, I want a nap," Wilson whispered to O'Donnell one 11 A.M.—and Wilson makes the decisions in the back room as well. There is also no \$7.2-million, the amount Rockefeller reported spending on his 1970 campaign, and many people believe the report fell about \$5-million short of what was actually spent. The former Governor has, however, contributed the legal individual limit of \$46,000 to his successor's campaign.

The fact is that despite his 35 years in public life, Wilson has no real public record since 1958 and has studiously avoided discussing the Rockefeller record, good and bad. "The people," he said in announcing his candidacy, "are looking for experience, calmness and a lack of confrontation."

Perhaps they are, but Wilson seems viscerally incapable of confronting the fact that he is running for his political life. Only his television commercials seem calculated to win votes and influence people and, perhaps because of the public barrenness of his recent years and the indecisiveness of his 10 months as Governor, those commercials seem shabbily deceptive. Wilson is not a bad television performer, coming across as low-key but sincere as he takes credit for "cutting your taxes by \$138-million" in his first year as Governor, taking credit for tougher rape


laws and for reinstating the death penalty for certain crimes.

Well, he didn't cut my taxes. Of that \$138-million, \$85-million is a one-year extension of the already-suspended state income tax surcharge and the rest was tax cuts for business. He did sign the rape and capital-punishment bills, but he also refused to discuss them while they were being debated in the Legislature—he just waited and saw.

**W**ilson is a very conservative man, and his conservatism goes much deeper than his teetotaling and the narrow, 20-year-old ties he wears with puritan determination. Before World War II, he was the favored speaker at Young Republican conventions that passed resolutions saying things like: "We shall fight with every means at our disposal the efforts of foreign agents to destroy our American way of life . . . but we are aware that the greatest threat to our liberties comes not from without but from the New Deal trend toward dictatorship."

Two years ago Wilson told me: "This is a conservative state. New York is a conservative city, except for some parts of Manhattan, that is . . . People have been going along with programs they didn't really like for a long time. They were only talking their true feelings in the golf club locker rooms, or on the street — wherever they talk. The conservative feeling broke into the open about June of 1970 — you could almost feel it — people could see what was happening in their own lives . . . Public housing was supposed to be 'pass-through' housing — a place for the deserving poor until they earned enough to afford some place else — but exemptions after exemptions were put in until working people could come and see the new cars around public housing projects. I think we need public housing, but for the deserving poor."

In 1974, of course, the deserving poor and a lot of the working class in New York are on unemployment insurance. Even though Wilson did raise those benefits this year, unemployment, inflation and Watergate make it just about the worst time for a Republican like Wilson to face the electorate. Each day, Carey and his Democratic running mates pound away at the fact



## The New York circle

The greatest work of Nelson Rockefeller (above right) is a system of power and favors to people and institutions "that sometimes look as if they are fighting a lot harder than they

are." Some of the people (clockwise, from above left), Alex Rose, Malcolm Wilson, Abraham Beame, Meade Esposito, Robert Wagner and Hugh Carey.



that 250,000 manufacturing jobs in New York have disappeared during the Rockefeller years. Wilson can only counter: Yes, but those jobs were all lost in New York City and crime is the reason—he favors phrases like "urban jungle."

But Carey isn't the easiest guy to run a law-and-order campaign against because, in the words of Frank Russo, a Democratic leader on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, "my people will never believe Carey is soft for a very simple reason: He looks like an Irish cop." In fact, Wilson never believed he would have to run against Carey—like almost everyone else he thought he would be facing Howard

Samuels, and had planned a campaign labeling him soft, permissive and a bit radical.

"We figured Malcolm had 3.2 million votes in his pocket and just had to add 400,000 to win," said a Rockefeller aide. "God, it looks like he can't even get the 400,000." The depression and panic of Republicans, particularly upstate Republicans, is reflected in an editorial in a Massena newspaper that Carey carries in his wallet—the newspaper warns that unless Wilson wins, Democrats will shift \$2-billion of state money from upstate to New York City and that in St. Lawrence County "not a highway will be repaired, snow-plowing will be suspended."

With visions of Massena abandoned under three feet of snow, the faithful follow their Malcolm. It may turn out like a scene at the state A.F.L.-C.I.O. convention in Kiamesha Lake: 50 leaders of construction unions, which support Wilson, closed ranks behind their candidate to escort him to the podium, then marched through the corridors of the Concord Hotel as Wilson confidently led the front ranks into a Men's Room.

For the Democrats, there are euphoric visions of state jobs and judgeships. At a party rally in Buffalo, Carey's running mate for Lieutenant Governor, State Senator Mary Anne Krupsak, straightened 200 spines with one oblique

reference to what politics is often about: "I'm thrilled when I look out and see the talent in this room."

Miss Krupsak, the first woman to run for statewide office since a female Secretary of State went to jail for misuse of public funds 40 years ago, is one of the stars of the interesting casts supporting Carey and Wilson. A serious, all-work-and-no-play liberal from the Schenectady area, she knocked off two male opponents in the Democratic primary and is getting inordinate media attention for a candidate for an office with few duties and less power. Wilson's Wilson is Ralph Caso, the county executive of Nassau County, who is noted

for total loyalty to the powerful Nassau Republican organization and for wearing white, patent-leather boots. (Lieutenant Governors, like Vice-Presidents, cannot be voted for separately in New York, and their primary function is in case of resignation, disability or death.)

**L**ieutenant Governors, and even U.S. Senators, have very little to do with power in New York. The two centers of political power in the state are the corner offices on the second floor of the State Capitol in Albany and the ground floor of City Hall in New York—the Governor and the Mayor.

Nelson Rockefeller made his first attempt to bond the two offices inside his circle in 1965 when he put up \$500,000 of his own money to start the campaign of a young Republican Congressman for Mayor. The Congressman, of course, was named John Lindsay, and he was so monumentally ungrateful as to deny that he ever got the money from Rockefeller—so the Governor lost half-a-million dollars and eight feuding years.

By 1973, Rockefeller was ready to try again, and by then, he had solidified his ties to regular Democratic leaders like Meade Esposito of Brooklyn and Patrick Cunningham of the Bronx the "boss" closest to Carey. Esposito, particularly, was proud of his relationship with Rockefeller, bragging about judgeships, clerkships and a Picasso etching the Governor had given him while Brooklyn Democrats were providing critical

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votes in the Legislature for the Governor's bills.

Suddenly, while Esposito was talking about a "one-shot Mayor," Rockefeller proposed the same thing under a different name: a "fusion Mayor." Esposito's choice for a one-term Mayor was Abe Beame—the Brooklyn leader has always had personal problems with Hugh Carey, who was the Governor's first choice for a save-the-city Mayor. Rockefeller, who realized a fusion Mayor would have to be a Democrat, let it be known that two other Democrats were acceptable to him—Beame and former Mayor Robert F. Wagner, who became a Rockefeller consultant on governmental relations.

"Saving the city" (and getting rid of Lindsay) was very much the mood of insiders in that spring of 1973. Leaders of the new Association for a Better New York, basically a coalition of the city's biggest landlords, were calling for a "four-year Mayor" to clean up crime and protect their investments—as business moved out of the city, the vacancy rate kept climbing in the city's commercial towers, including Rockefeller Center. In fact, the president of Rockefeller Center, Alton Marshall, former secretary to Governor Rockefeller, was a leading voice in A.B.N.Y. along with former Mayor Wagner and Howard Rubenstein, a public-relations man who became the *de facto* manager of the Beame Mayoral campaign.

Although events—including pressure on John Marchi not to run and the discrediting of Mario Biaggi—seemed to be leading inevitably to a Beame victory in November of 1973, Rockefeller made one more startling move: He proposed Bob Wagner, his onetime Democratic foe, for the Republican nomination for Mayor. If he had pulled that one off—Wagner backed out when conservative Republicans like George Clark rebelled—the Governor would have had the pleasure of sitting back and watching two friendly insiders contest for Mayoral power: Wagner vs. Beame.

It didn't happen, of course. Marchi, with the support of Clark and the Conservative party, won the Republican nomination without opposition. But without Rockefeller's support, Marchi was broke and hopeless—"I got nothing, absolutely nothing from the party," Marchi said. "It was very lonely." Beame was elected and he and Rockefeller immediately and publicly proclaimed an era of good feeling between Albany and City Hall.



David Garth: In his hands, Carey was anything but portly.

The emergence of Al Marshall, whom many people think is Rockefeller's most capable lieutenant, as a factor in city politics seemed to be a signal of just how concerned the Rockefellers were about the future of Manhattan Island—and their substantial investments from Hell Gate to the Battery. Marshall, with \$306,867, was the second biggest receiver on the Nelson Rockefeller gift list released by the Senate Rules Committee. William Ronan, chairman of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, who topped the list at \$625,000, is also directly involved in Manhattan development as landlord of the new World Trade Center, which happily dovetailed with David Rockefeller's master plan for the development of Lower Manhattan.

There is more to the gifts than meets the eye—money may not buy happiness, but it can buy silence. One reason Nelson Rockefeller's public reputation was so pretty was that no one who has ever served him has ever turned and attacked him or even provided unflattering anecdotes to nosy reporters. It would have been nice if someone had walked up to me in 1970 and said, "Hey, you know that book about Arthur Goldberg—the one that takes him apart? Why don't you check and see who paid for it?" Things like that happen in almost all other campaigns, but not when Laurance Rockefeller is paying for an unflattering biography of brother Nelson's opponent.

The power of the money can be irresistible—in Charles Goodell's case, for instance, Rockefeller was able to cut off Republican contributors during the 1970 campaign, and soon enough Goodell was out of the Senate and out of the way. And, after James Buckley had won, Rockefeller arranged the paying off of


hundreds of thousands of dollars of Goodell campaign debts.

Whether or not there really are conspiracies behind my theories, Wilson vs. Carey (with Wagner in the background) is the succession race that realizes Rockefeller's best fantasies. Duryea vs. Samuels, for instance, would have been a disaster for Nelson A. And the fact is that in New York, Rockefeller fantasies have a way of becoming reality for the rest of us.

"Hugh Carey was Nelson Rockefeller's man in Washington," said Russell Hemenway. Would he be a Rockefeller man in Albany? The answer is no, but . . . he would be a man the Rockefellers are comfortable with. It is not every Democrat who can go through a campaign for Governor without saying more than 10 bad words about a Republican who had just totally dominated a state for 15 years. The 10 bad words Carey occasionally uses, by the way, are: "Rockefeller spent our money as if we had his money."

Instead, Carey happily beats the drums of change, singing slogans: "The process of Government has been run behind closed doors; the people have been shut out, and behind those closed doors the forces of private wealth and political power have spun a web of privilege and are immune from accountability or challenge . . . I want the word to be heard loud and clear . . . New York's Government is not for sale."

New York's Government, it seems to me, hasn't been for sale for 16 years—it's been owned by Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller. And Hugh Carey was well within the web of privilege and influence. It all reminds me of a slogan I once heard: "This year, before they tell you what they want to do . . . make them show you what they've done." ■



## The tricycle grows up

Continued from Page 104

cheap transportation. But they're scared of learning how to ride the standard bike. Or maybe they know how to ride, but their balance is not as good as it used to be. The tricycle is the answer."

Although all trike manufacturers offer special features, the standard three-wheeler has 20-inch wheels and a seat which can be adjusted so the rider's legs will rest comfortably on the ground when he pauses to chat with a neighbor. A basket between the rear wheels is big enough to hold a couple of large grocery bags or a case of beer. Unlike the child's trike, which is pedaled by the front wheel, the adult tricycle operates more or less the same as the standard bicycle, its pedals connected to one of the rear wheels by a chain. Two-wheel-drive trikes are available, but they require a more elaborate mechanism, and most manufacturers feel the extra expense isn't worth it. Trike models are either standard, three speed or three speed with coaster brake (which is considered more reliable than a hand brake, especially in wet weather). Most trikes can be taken apart easily and packed in a car trunk. This makes them popular with people who live much of the time in mobile homes or campers attached to their cars or trucks and who need handy transportation for errands to the shopping center and post office. Trike prices range from \$125 to \$175.

The trike boom is part of the current bicycle boom. Today three times as many bikes are in use as there were 15 years ago; bike sales have more than doubled since 1970. Starting in 1972, Americans have been buying more bicycles than automobiles each year—if projections for 1974 hold up, 45 million bikes will have been sold in the three-

year period. By comparison, the 150,000 trike sales predicted for this year are small potatoes, but everybody in the industry assumes the boom is just beginning.

Adult tricycles were in use in both England and America in the 19th century. Today in the United States the greatest interest in them has been manifested in senior-citizen communities in Florida, Arizona and California. Now the boom is beginning in the North. Stuyvesant, a major New York City bicycle distributor, has sold 300 trikes so far this year. "I just had a retired doctor come in and buy a three-wheeler," a Stuyvesant official reported. "He told me, 'I need the exercise, and I don't have the balance anymore.' We've shipped a lot out to Fire Island, which is great for them because it's flat."

Old people aren't the only buyers of trikes. In New York City, a 33-year-old mother of four children explained her purchase of a trike recently. "I'm a separated parent," she said. "I have two boys, 8 and 10, and 4-year-old twins. My boys like to ride in Central Park, but I never like to have them out there unless I'm with them. What do I do with the twins? I went to five bike shops and finally was able to get one to fit me up with a special three-wheeler. It has little seats on either side of the big one. I can strap the twins in on each side of me where I can see them, and off we go. I can take the twins with me when I shop, and I use it to drop them at the day-care center, but mostly we use it for fun. We'll all bike down to the Natural History Museum—they let me bring it inside there—and in the summer the whole family bikes pretty nearly every day in the park. I love my trike. It's absolutely safe. The only problem I have with it is getting it into the house—it

Hugh L. Carey, (d), Governor of New York

Elected Governor of New York, 1974, term expires Jan. 1979, born April 11, 1919, Brooklyn; St. John's U. J.D. 1951; Catholic

Career: Army WWII; Family petroleum distribution business, 1947-51; Practicing atty, 1951-61; U.S House of Reps. 1961-75.

Carey was Congressman from the fifteenth district of New York, which lies in western Brooklyn: blacks, Irish, Norwegians, and Italians are all represented in the fifteenth.

He was assigned to the Ways and Means Committee in 1970, and was strongly associated with the Social Security Amendments of 1971, H.R. 1. He proposed, along with Edward Koch of New York, an alternative to Pres. Nixon's revenue sharing plan; their plan would have allocated funds on a "stress" or need basis, and would have required an audit on the use and implementation of the federal revenues and grants. He publicly supports national health insurance, and has spoken of the need to reorient the emphasis to preventive and outpatient care.

In 1974 Carey challenged Howard Samuels for the Democratic nomination for Governor. Bankrolled by his brother Ed, polished by David Garth and a "media blitz", Carey solidly defeated the "machine candidate" Samuels and went on to smash Malcolm Wilson, Rockefeller's Lieutenant Governor for 16 years, by a 58-42 margin. (See attached article by R. Reeves. NYT Mag. Oct. 26, 1974).

Carey was beset by problems from the start. He has valiantly kept New York City out of bankruptcy; but in so doing he has tied the state's future to the city's.

He has damaged his reputation by attempting to replace Maurice Nadjari in December, 1975, the N.Y.C. anti-corruption special prosecutor. Nadjari's record was not impressive; however, Attorney General Lefkowitz would not remove him. Nadjari responded to Carey's move with a blunt assertion that the Governor was seeking to avoid embarrassment - he later accused Carey's handpicked state party chairman, Patrick Cunningham, of various charges, including the selling of judgeships.

Nonetheless, Carey's record as a vote-getter is remarkable. His House district had been realigned time and again by the Republican legislature; he increased his margin every time until a particularly bitter battle in 1972. Carey was a liberal in Congress from a largely working-class district; he has been successful because he is honest, hardworking, and, some say, because "he looks like an Irish cop".

Two areas of possible trouble, Carey's 1972 campaign, and his 1974 financing, are covered in the attached Reeves article.

Carey was an active supporter of Israel in Congress with good ties to the New York Jewish community. He is a supporter of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to permit free emigration of Jews from Russia to Israel.

## ALAN MCGREGOR CRANSTON

Alan Cranston was born on June 19, 1914, in Palo Alto California, a fairly wealthy suburb of San Francisco. He went to college briefly at Pomona College in Southern California, and graduated from Stanford University in 1936. Over the next twelve years, Cranston travelled in pre-war England, Germany, Italy and Ethiopia for the now defunct International News Service, served as Chief of the Foreign Language Division of the Office of War Information and shortly after the outbreak of the war, joined the Army as a private. He left in 1945 as a sergeant. During these twelve years, Cranston wrote The Killing of the Peace, a journalistic novel describing the United States Senate's struggle over entry into the League of Nations. He was indirectly sued by Hitler's publishing agents in the U.S. courts when he published an abridged anti-Nazi version in English of Mein Kampf, including the German dictator's anti-Jewish diatribes and exposing details of his "master plan" which were concealed in the official version sold in the U.S.

When the war was over, Cranston returned to California and began a successful business career in real estate and land investment.

In 1953 Cranston founded and became the first president of the California Democratic Council, a liberal group. In 1958, Cranston became the first Democrat in 72 years to be elected state comptroller, the state's chief financial officer. He was reelected in 1962, but defeated in 1966 in the Reagan landslide.

Cranston then chose to move south to Los Angeles. (In California politics, traditionally no state-wide candidate can win without strong support from the southern part of the states.) In 1968, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, defeating Max Rafferty, then California's Superintendent of Schools. During the campaign, Rafferty openly suggested that Cranston was encouraging treason in his opposition to the Vietnam war. Cranston, in return, strongly hinted that Rafferty was a draft dodger when news stories surfaced showing that Rafferty had pleaded a foot injury during the war, then thrown away his cane on V-J Day.

While painting Rafferty into an extremist corner, Cranston became the consensus candidate, winning the support of the state's black and Mexican-American minorities, the more progressive UAW and the more conservative statewide AFL-CIO, the traditional Democratic politicians and the liberal anti-war adherents of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. Cranston won by 350,000 votes.

Cranston and the state. Because California is such a diverse state, Cranston must be sensitive to a wide range of often conflicting issues, interests and groups. Because he lacks the kind of personal popularity with the voters which is useful at election time, he has, according to the Nader Congressional Report, attempted to do something for everyone in his state.

Nader's assessment is borne out by Cranston's voting record. The Senator is a member of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and the chairman of the subcommittee on Production and Stabilization. He is also a member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and chairman of two special subcommittees on Human Resources and Railroad

Retirement and sits on the special subcommittee on the National Science Foundation. He is also a member of the Veterans Affairs Committee and the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.

Cranston was an active opponent of the Vietnam war, arguing vigorously for a cut-off in funds. He also opposed governmental funding of the SST -- a vote that put him in trouble with both labor and the financially plagued aerospace industry. On the other hand, Cranston played a crucial role in getting the \$250 million Lockheed loan guarantee through the Senate, and actively lobbied for the space shuttle contract for California, thus redeeming himself with the aerospace industry.

Cranston angered California's agribusiness interests when he backed a move by the UFW to bring farm labor under the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. But he pleased the farmers by helping defeat efforts to lower the annual ceiling on federal price supports to \$20,000 per person.

Cranston irritated oil companies in 1971 with his legislation of ban oil drilling permanently from the Santa Barbara Channel. But in 1969, while opposing moves to restore the controversial oil depletion allowance to 27½%, Cranston helped defeat a motion to lower it from 23% to 20%.

Cranston introduced legislation through the Senate Banking Committee's housing subcommittee to help individuals recoup their losses on homes not properly inspected by the FHA, and to reduce down payments on FHA loans.

Cranston helped lead the fight against the Agnes Recovery Act and blocked action on the Small Business Administration loan program because, as it was written, it did nothing to close up the loopholes that had led to abuses of the Earthquake Loan Program, and did not include victims of the 1970 San Fernando Valley Earthquake.

Cranston was the author of an amendment which, had it passed, would have obligated the president to spend \$10 billion for mass transit over the twelve years following passage.

Cranston's record on banking bills is mixed. On most issues, however, he has voted with the conservative bloc of the Banking Committee.

Cranston strongly supported the Kennedy initiated health insurance bill in the Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

Cranston authored the Veterans' Housing Act of 1970 in the Senate to expand entitlement to VA home loans and to establish new housing loan programs for veterans. He coauthored bills to increase GI bill rates by 43%, to provide for a program of drug and alcohol treatment for veterans, and to add \$450 million for workers and equipment at veterans' hospitals above the level originally requested by the President.

Cranston is on record as favoring child care development, legal services for the poor, and increases in food stamps and unemployment compensation for migrant farm workers. He voted for the ERA.

Cranston is well-respected on the Hill as a hard worker, as a very effective vote-counter, and as a vote-swinging with a soft touch.

He is considered a fairly uncharismatic campaigner.

Cranston has been the recipient of strong backing from the California Jewish community, but he has not been a leader in pro-Israel legislation. He is not well known outside of the California Jewish Community.

PETER WALLACE RODINO, JR.

Peter Rodino was born in Newark, New Jersey, on June 7, 1909. He has lived in Newark all his life. He graduated from New Jersey Law School (now part of Rutgers) in 1937, opened his own law firm in 1938 and continued to practice until he became Judiciary Committee Chairman in 1973.

In 1940, he ran for the state legislature and lost. In 1941, he joined the Army, participating in the North African and Italian campaigns and receiving numerous decorations. He returned to Newark in 1946. Since his first election to Congress in 1948, he has slipped below 60% of the vote only twice in twelve elections.

Rodino's District. Rodino represents New Jersey's 10th Congressional District, a district which is 52% black, 6% Spanish-surname, and 7% Italian American. However, Rodino was able to win 57% of the total vote in 1972, and after serving as chairman of the Judiciary Committee that paved the way for Richard Nixon's impeachment, he won 81% of the vote in 1974. The Almanac of American Politics feels that Rodino will continue to win in his district, despite its increasingly black population, through the seventies.

Newark is afflicted by high rates of unemployment, crime, disease, and racial tension between militant whites and the growing black population. White exodus continues to grow. The venereal disease and tuberculosis rates are the highest in the nation, and Newark vies with Baltimore for the highest crime rate among large cities.

Rodino and his district. Rodino spends nearly 200 days a year in his district holding public office hours and speaking before civic and political groups. Rodino, who owes much of his political career to the powerful Essex County Democratic machine (according to the Ralph Nader Congress Project), retains the image of an urban populist, that is, an old-school party politician whose success is based on his ability to do favors for people. Instead of writing, calling, or visiting the district office, (which is open 48 hours a week), many people prefer to call Rodino's home.

Legislative Record. Rodino was chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1 until 1973 when he succeeded Emmanuel Celler, who was defeated in his primary election. Rodino's positions as a ranking member have made him an influential man in many matters that come before the Judiciary Committee such as immigration, crime, drug prevention and control, and civil rights enforcement.

In 1965 Rodino played an instrumental part in eliminating the national origins quotas provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which delineates American immigration policy.

Rodino voted with a 15-14 majority to retain an internal committee rule permitting the holder of a proxy vote (given him by an absent member) unlimited discretion in its use. The reform proposal would have limited proxies to those matters where absent members specifically authorized their use.

He voted against an amendment to House Joint Resolution 208 (the Women's Rights Amendment) that would have retained certain discriminatory laws, such as those dealing with military draft.

He has testified in Congress to support resolutions banning the use of ethnic slurs from the airways, to curtail drug abuse, to reduce the unemployment rate by instituting public works projects, and to alleviate the housing crisis facing cities such as Newark.

Rodino has an extremely good attendance record in Congress. In 1971, for example he voted 88 percent of the time,

Rodino was an ardent supporter of House efforts to legislate an end to U. S. involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. Rodino was one of a band of about 150 to 175 members who supported proposals that would have cut off funds several months after U.S. prisoners of war were released by North Vietnam.

Rodino voted against moves to import sugar from South Africa and chrome from Rhodesia. He also voted against import quotas for shoes and textiles to aid those ailing U. S. industries.

He voted against efforts to cut U.S. aid to the International Development Association and voted to permit financing by the Export-Import Bank of trade with eastern European countries. He also voted against an effort to reduce funds for the Arms Control Agency, which has been engaged in strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union.

Although he has voted against two efforts to reduce the entire defense budget by 5% and 2%, he did vote for elimination of funds for the B-1 bomber and for limitations of the antiballistic missile program to two sites. But he voted against an amendment to eliminate money for the Navy's F-11 aircraft.

Rodino has a very strong record of support for social welfare programs. He has supported organized labor on several key votes, including the 1965 attempt to repeal section 14-B of the Taft-Hartley Act. According to the League of Conservation Voters, Rodino has a fairly good record on environmental issues.

Rodino has an "airtight" record on civil rights measures. He supported the Philadelphia Plan, which set minority hiring quotas for exclusionary construction unions for federal projects. Many of these unions had contributed to Rodino's campaigns in the past. He wrote the majority report on all but one of the landmark Civil Rights bills that the Judiciary Committee voted out in the 60's. He was floor manager for one of those major bills which among other things decreed open housing. He voted for attempts to strengthen the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with cease and desist order power, and voted against several efforts to restrict the use of federal funds for busing of school children to achieve racial balance.

Personality. Rodino is a family man, very religious, who devotes his Sundays to mass and his family and relatives. He plays paddle-ball regularly to keep fit. He still lives today in an "unpretentious" frame house not far from where he was born in the part of Newark's North Ward known as "Little Italy". He read a lot as a child and today is considered a good wordsmith.

Rodino's efforts in 1948 in Italy to prevent a communist takeover, his NATO work, his efforts to ease American immigration structures, and his travel around the globe with various members of the Judiciary Committee (47 days at government expense of over \$7,500 since 1970, according to Nader's Congres-

sional Report) have made him an important man overseas. He has been decorated by the governments of Italy and San Marino and by groups representing Iron Curtain countries as well as numerous Italian, veterans, and civic groups in America. In 1970, he was awarded the "Knight of the Grand Cross" medal, the highest decoration that Italy bestows on non-citizens.

Before the Watergate hearings, there were stories that some White House people had been sifting Rodino's background in Newark to see if they could dig up something to discredit him. But Federal Judge Herbert Stern, the former U.S. attorney who successfully prosecuted some of Rodino's colleagues, said: "There has never been an inquiry about Rodino, never the slightest anything. In my opinion he is an honest man and a fine public servant."

There have been rumors that he has received money for helping to pass special immigration laws to permit aliens into the United States.

Rodino has been a consistent supporter of Israel in Congress. He has not taken a leading role in promoting pro-Israel legislation. He is, however, a sponsor of the Rodino-Holtzman bill to prohibit honoring of the Arab boycott by imposing criminal and civil penalties against violators. He does not have strong Jewish connections nationally, but he does have a good general image and his Watergate activity could help with Jews.

BARBARA JORDAN - Member of Congress from Texas  
(District 18)

Barbara Jordan is a very eloquent and effective Congresswoman. Barbara Jordan is the daughter of a Baptist preacher who moonlighted as a warehouse clerk to support his family. She graduated from all-Black Texas Southern University magna cum laude and earned her law degree from Boston University. When she came home to Houston, she set up law practice in her parent's home.

She lost in two tries for the Texas House of Representatives, but was elected to the Texas Senate in 1966. At the time, the Texas Senate had 31 members. Thirty were male and white. At the time she was elected, there was a lot of murmuring about "the washer-woman" and worse in the Senate cloakrooms. Four years later, she was president pro tempore of the Senate and one of its most respected members. When Ms. Jordan made her impassioned speech during the Watergate hearings, almost all of the members of the Texas Senate crowded around a television set to cheer her on, according to Molly Ivins in an article in the Atlantic.

In the same special issue of the Atlantic, Congresswoman Jordan explains that she gained the respect of the Senators by hard work. She learned the rules, and she learned the way around the rules, a skill which earned her the respect of some of the masters of the parliamentary finesse. She also did favors in abundance, and called in her i.o.u.'s only rarely. When she did, she let the opposition know that she had them beat in advance and in private, to prevent their embarrassment on the floor of the Senate.

Her accomplishments in the Texas Senate included legislation on welfare reform, minimum-wage and voter registration. Lyndon Johnson, always quick to pick up on a likely protegee, took Jordan under his

wing. He frequently made her a guest at the White House, a rare occurrence for a state legislator. He also got together with his buddies in Houston and Austin to put Jordan on the Congressional redistricting committee after the 1970 Census to ensure that a district in Congress for her was created. In Congress she was to represent the "Houston oil crowd" as well as her mostly-Black and Chicano constituents. LBJ also pulled some arms and called in some old political dues to get Jordan appointed to the Judiciary Committee. A check of Jordan's voting record shows that she has taken care of the oil interests in Texas.

In Congress, Jordan has earned the respect of her colleagues by her precision - both in speaking and on legislative matters. She refuses to be tied down, and is sometimes at odds with both the Black and Women's Caucuses. She refused to sit with Bella Abzug during the discussion of important women's legislation, and announced that she would move if Abzug tried to sit by her. A member of Jordan's staff pointed out that "(she) is not a standard bearer . . . She knows how to make the important move. What she does as a legislator is more important to her than rhetoric or being considered a liberal."

Her ability is so respected that Representative Peter Rodino checked parliamentary and judicial procedure with her during the Watergate hearings, and conservatives consult on legislative matters with her because of her skills and honesty.

She is also known as a horse-trader. In 1970, she supported Lloyd Bentsen's bid for the Senate after he had run, and won, conservative campaign against liberal former Senator Ralph Yarborough. Texas liberals felt betrayed, but as her consistently - high ADA ratings prove, she does not let them down on legislation.

Jordan is unable to delegate much authority, and this has caused her some problems in dealing with the many issues which confront Members of Congress. Yet she insists upon getting involved with every one. Only her extraordinary energy and drive has enabled her to do this. She spends 14 to 18 hours a day at her job, but her preoccupation with her job has caused some of the people who come to see her to say that she is preoccupied and superficial. There is some truth in this, because she is spread so thin across the Congressional board, and she is unable to devote much time to every single matter that comes up. She really needs to learn to delegate authority. If she does, she could be a great Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, or better yet, with John Tower in disfavor, even among Texas Republicans, and with his seat open for election in 1978, Senator from Texas. In the meantime, Barbara Jordan will remain a rarity: a Member of Congress who knows how to get what she wants, both through legislative means and through legislative manipulation, a master of the Congressional process, and as stirring a speaker as she was on the day during the Watergate hearings when she spoke of the brilliance of the American Constitution, which originally protected only the white and free, and how it has expanded to become the protector of everyone in this country.

Jordan is 40, unmarried, and a Baptist.

MORRIS K. UDALL - Member of Congress from Arizona (2nd District)

Morris Udall is the descendant of a distinguished Arizona family. After graduation from law school, he went into practice with his brother, Stewart. In 1954, Stewart ran for Congress and won. Mo had originally wanted to run for Congress, but his first wife refused to go to Washington.

At the time, the Udalls' father was on the Arizona Supreme Court. The senior Udall had planned to step down at the end of his term so Mo could run for his seat. Instead, the elder Udall died in office, and the Governor appointed the Udalls' uncle, a Republican, to the seat. Since he did not want to run against his uncle, Morris Udall settled down to life as a lawyer. He even wrote a book on the Arizona law of evidence. In 1961, John Kennedy named Stewart Udall as Secretary of the Interior. Mo Udall ran for Stewart's seat and won. Mo Udall came to Congress ready for business. Unfortunately, he was unprepared to cope with the seniority system. In his frustration, he wrote a long, rambling letter to Speaker Sam Rayburn about the trouble with being a Freshman.

Although he constantly gets over 80 on the ADA and COPE ratings, and gets labor support in every election, his legislative record is limited.

One of the areas in which Udall made his mark is on Congressional procedure, performance and seniority. In 1969, when Joh McCormack retired in disgrace over the Voloshen affair and Carl Albert succeeded him, Udall ran for Majority Leader against Hale Boggs, who was later lost in a plane in Alaska, and lost 95 to 69.

Udall has also been one of the leaders in the fight for federal financing of elections and for stricter reporting standards. He once

made an extremely sarcastic speech on the ways a Member of Congress could lie on the disclosure of assets statement under the 1925 reporting act. He also wrote a strong article in Playboy in favor of public financing of elections.

Udall found himself in a complex situation in the case of the late Representative Adam Calyton Powell of New York, after it was discovered that Powell had kept his wife Yvette on the payroll while she had been spending most of the time in Puerto Rico. Somehow, this issue caught fire in Udall's home district, and he was bombarded with mail against Powell. He also get plenty of mail from other Members' constituents, too.

Udall put himself smack in the middle of the two Congressional factions in the Powell case. One side wanted to strip Powell of his seat (Wayne Hays was a prominent member of this faction), while the other wanted to do little. Udall suggested a compromise: that Powell would be stripped of his Chairmanship of the Education and Labor Committee, but keep his seat in Congress until an investigation could be made. Powell was kicked out of Congress (the Supreme Court later said that this action was wrong beyond the powers of the House under the rules in effect at that time) but he was unable to see Udall as anything but an enemy. From then on, Powell called Udall that "Racist Mormon". Udall is one of the members of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, was one of the ramrods for the changing of the Post Office from a public agency to a quasi-public corporation. He blames the failure on the two underwriters of Postal Service bonds, Dillon and Reed and Kidder, Peabody and Co., and the bond counsel (which brought the underwriters in), Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander-Mitchell and Nixon's old law firm. Bonds in the amount of \$250 million were issued, and Mudge, Rose collected commissions on the sale.

Udall concentrates much of his efforts on the environment. He was responsible for the passage of the federal pay raise bill, a very sensitive measure, since it involved a pay raise for Congressmen. He has also been one of the leaders in legislation to curb indiscriminate use of the Congressional frank, and has crusaded for limiting the ability of the Executive Office to create new government agencies.

Udall's Presidential bid came from several sources. Not since the election of James Garfield in 1880 has a Member of Congress been directly elected to the Presidency. Congressmen resent the attention given to Senators, and this seemed like a good opportunity to make some Senators, at least, eat some crow.

Congressmen David Obey and Henry Reuss of Wisconsin, who had been set to support Walter Mondale for President went to Udall, who they considered a better (and obviously wittier) speaker. After putting out some feelers, Udall got 29 commitments of support from his colleagues and announced.

It may be said that Udall is popular in the House. His dry wit amuses almost everyone. But his rather self-deprecating humor is a mask for ambition, not a coverup for feelings of inferiority. Many Representatives also know this, and therefore, Udall was not able to get much more support from Members outside of the original core of 29.

Through the years, Udall has helped literally hundreds of new Members to learn the ways of Congress. He was the first sponsor of seminars for new Members. His book, The Job of the Congressman, is both bible and roadmap for new Representatives. Many Representatives who should have been in Udall's debt did not support his candidacy. Udall is viewed favorably by the American Jewish community. They

acknowledge his lack of experience in foreign affairs, but say his votes have been supportive of Israel. He recently visited Israel and met with its leaders.

In 1966, Udall and his first wife were divorced. He later married a secretary on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee staff.

However, rumors of his promiscuity keep turning up. In the June 7, 1976 issue of New York Magazine, there is a story that Washington Post gossip columnist Maxine Chesire was ready to publish a story that Udall was enjoying "extracurricular activities" on the campaign trail, based on reports coming from Secret Service members, when Executive Editor Ben Bradlee killed the story. (See attached article). When confronted with this by New York gossip writer Nigel Dempster, Bradlee said "we could see no way that this (Udall's behavior) was interfering with his public functions. That is our rule. The story is reasonably well known in Washington. Maxine was in no hurry to print, and a decision was made after we talked it over." When confronted by Dempster, Ms. Chesire denied knowledge of Udall's misbehavior or Bradlee's statement.

**One From the House:****UDALL: A LONG CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION**

Morris K. Udall of Arizona would like to perform a feat accomplished by James A. Garfield in 1880—and by nobody else before or since. He wants to go straight from the House of Representatives to the presidency.

Udall, 52, has spent the past 15 years in the House. During those years he has developed a reputation as one of the chamber's most thoughtful liberal Democrats, a serious legislator free with suggestions for change but ready to revise them when compromise is politically necessary. Udall's career in the House is more than incidental to his campaign for President; his political life and growth have been grounded in the complexities of the legislative process.

Despite the admiration Udall has won from colleagues in both parties, his House career has been marked as much by failure as by success. He sought to become majority leader in 1971—and was beaten decisively. He has spent more than five years working for strip mine control and land use planning legislation—and neither has become law. He was instrumental in the passage of a 1971 bill creating a Postal Service Corporation—but concedes now that the plan has not worked.

After every legislative or leadership defeat, Udall has plunged back in with a new bill or a new proposal for reform. The years after his loss for majority leader were among his most productive. But some observers feel the mounting frustration of his setbacks helped turn his attention away from the politics of the House—and toward national office.

**The Campaign**

When Udall announced for the presidency in 1974, skeptics said that, too, was certain to end in disappointment. Udall entered the campaign without a national reputation, a middle-level member of a legislative body that provides few big names and less presidential speculation.

A year after the announcement, Udall's campaign still stood somewhere between success and failure. The Arizona Democrat was still the choice of only a small fraction of his party's voters, and money was short, but there was at least an element of hope that one early primary would give Udall the momentum that would carry him to the nomination.

Udall often has focused his self-deprecating style of wit on the long-shot image of his candidacy. He has told audiences of the time he entered a New Hampshire barbershop, announced who he was and what he was running for, and was told by a customer, "Yep, we were just laughing about that yesterday."

But much of Udall's campaign is dead serious. He has approached outright anger when it comes to the subject of George C. Wallace, Alabama governor and competing candidate for the Democratic nomination.

In June 1975, Udall devoted an entire speech before a union audience to his denunciations of Wallace. Calling him the "politician of negativism," Udall said he would not serve on any ticket with Wallace, would not support a ticket with Wallace on it and would not deal with Wallace to win the nomination for himself. In October, Udall went to Birmingham, in Wallace's home state, to repeat many of the same attacks.



Udall's anti-Wallace views brought him some badly needed national attention in 1975. But the Udall campaign was concentrating most of its effort on a quieter job, organizing for the first primaries: In New Hampshire, site of the first primary Feb. 24, Udall's organization "is unquestionably the best and is in place," boasted Jack Quinn, the candidate's political director. The campaign also has targeted primaries in Massachusetts, Wisconsin, New York and Ohio.

Udall has three offices in Iowa, where delegates will be selected at party caucuses starting in January. He expects to do well there, although he fared poorly in a straw poll taken at an Iowa Democratic fund-raiser Oct. 27. Jimmy Carter, former governor of Georgia (D 1971-75), came in first in that survey, with 23 per cent of the vote. Udall finished a distant fifth. His aides disputed the significance of the non-scientific sampling.

During the early delegate-selection process, Udall does not plan a major effort in the South. He is almost certain to stay out of the Florida primary, said Quinn, because he feels that Carter should be given a chance to show his strength against Wallace there.

Udall has a paid staff of 32, half of them in his national headquarters in Washington, with the rest in offices in New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Iowa. He is operating on a monthly campaign budget of \$50,000. At the start of the election year, he will count on

matching funds made available by the campaign finance reform act of 1974 to keep him going. In October 1975, he was running a deficit of \$80,000, but aides explained that these were obligations not due for payment until after the matching funds were awarded in January. Meanwhile, they said that he had raised about \$600,000 since the inception of the campaign and that between 85 and 90 per cent of the dollars would be eligible for matching funds.

There is irony to the idea of the campaign finance act bailing Udall out, because Udall played a key role in its passage. He helped originally to draft the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (PL 92-225), the first substantial revision of campaign finance laws since 1925.

That law required candidates for federal office to file detailed reports on the money they raised and spent, and limited amounts that could be used for political advertising. Its disclosure provisions helped expose the Watergate scandal in 1973.

After Watergate broke, Udall joined in the chorus of complaints that the 1971 law was not enough. He and Republican Rep. John B. Anderson of Illinois drafted a

proposal to use public funds to help pay election expenses for both Congress and the presidency. "Surely today," Udall argued, "the American people are ready to put up a dollar or two a year to have a clean, decent, brand-new system of House and Senate [publicly funded] elections in this country."

The proposal to use federal money for congressional elections did not survive on the House floor, but the Udall idea of "matching grants" was implemented for presidential candidates during the pre-nomination period.

### The Leadership Challenges

Udall's role in the campaign finance debate reflected a style that his supporters see as one of his strongest assets—a willingness to go beyond protest and criticism and into the patient search for constructive legislative solutions. But he has also been willing, on occasion, to buck the entrenched ways of doing House business.

Udall was an early advocate of a stronger House Democratic caucus and a consistent opponent of the seniority system. On both fronts, he won a victory in 1967 as the House Democrat who introduced the caucus resolution that stripped Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D N.Y. 1945-71) of his chairmanship of the Education and Labor Committee. But Udall opposed the successful House vote to deny Powell his seat.

In a far more brash challenge of the House Democratic leadership, Udall defied custom and ran for the speakership at the start of the 91st Congress in 1969 against John W. McCormack (D Mass. 1928-71). McCormack, then age 77, had been speaker for seven years, nearly as long as Udall had been in Congress.

In a letter to his House colleagues before the vote, Udall offered himself as a replacement for the aged McCormack, a symbol of the old guard, because of "an overriding need for new directions and new leadership."

He also said that if he beat McCormack on the first ballot, he would move to reopen nominations for speaker "so that other candidates can be considered with me on the final balloting."

That strategy failed. In the Democratic caucus, McCormack defeated Udall 178-58 on a secret ballot. But the challenge was not without impact. After his easy victory, McCormack endorsed a proposal for monthly caucus meetings at which all Democratic members could speak freely on party procedures and public issues, a pet proposition of the liberal Democratic Study Group (DSG), of which Udall was a leader.

Six years later, Terry Bracy, Udall's legislative aide, told Congressional Quarterly that Udall had made the challenge "because nobody else would take on John McCormack and because young Democrats had no influence in the House, and yet they had to go home and campaign as Democrats." The aide further described the challenge as "symbolic" and another attack on the House's "system of feudal fiefdoms" that precluded a representative from making his mark "unless he was 70 years old and had 30 years of service."

When McCormack retired from Congress in 1971, Rep. Carl Albert (D Okla.), the House majority leader, offered himself for speaker and drew no opposition. Rep. Hale Boggs (D La. 1941-43, 1947-72), who had served nine years as majority whip by appointment of McCormack and Albert, announced for Albert's job. Udall and three others entered the lists against Boggs.

### Udall's Interest-Group Ratings

**Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)**—ADA ratings are based on the number of times a representative voted, was paired for or announced for the ADA position on selected issues.

**National Farmers Union (NFU)**—NFU ratings are based on the number of times a representative voted, was paired for or announced for the NFU position.

**AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE)**—COPE ratings reflect the percentage of the times a representative voted in accordance with or was paired in favor of the COPE position.

**Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)**—ACA ratings record the percentage of times a representative voted in accordance with the ACA position.

Following are Udall's ratings since he entered the House in 1961:

	ADA <sup>1</sup>	COPE <sup>3</sup>	NFU <sup>2</sup>	ACA
1974	65	100	100	8
1973	84	82	90	8
1972	100	100	86	0
1971	81	82	100	4
1970	76 <sup>4</sup>	83	100	0
1969	67	80	93	0
1968	92	100	93	0
1967	93	100	85	4
1966	82	85 <sup>2</sup>	90	8
1965	74	85 <sup>2</sup>	88	12
1964	100	82 <sup>2</sup>	100	0
1963	75	82 <sup>2</sup>	94	6
1962	62	88 <sup>2</sup>	93	18
1961 <sup>5</sup>	100	88 <sup>2</sup>	50	0

1. Failure to vote lowers ADA score.
2. Scores listed twice indicate rating compiled for entire Congress.
3. Percentages compiled by CQ from information provided by groups.
4. ADA score includes some votes from December 1969.
5. Udall did not serve the full year, taking office May 17, 1961.

Despite his reformist reputation, Udall courted votes by playing down the idea that he would radically alter the House seniority system if he gained power, saying rather that he would support "significant but not drastic reforms." His hard core of support was again in the DSG.

Boggs' candidacy, based on House business as usual, was appreciated by the more conservative southerners and old-line Democrats. Although no Dixiecrat himself (he had supported the national Democratic Party on most major issues in recent years), Boggs made no commitment to reforming the procedures and the distribution of power in the House.

On the second ballot in the caucus, the traditionalists won, giving Boggs 140 votes to 88 for Udall and 17 for Rep. B. F. Sisk (Calif.). The other two Democrats had dropped out after the first round.

Udall analyzed the collapse of his drive as resulting from a combination of defecting freshmen, pro-labor members and liberals with 10 to 15 years of service in the House—in effect, those moving into senior seats on committees. He also ran into lingering bitterness over his challenge to McCormack two years earlier, especially among New England representatives. A magazine article quoted Udall as saying, "The leadership ladder bit—tradition, promotion, seniority—was stronger medicine than I originally thought. This House apparently just insists on people getting in line, serving time."

### Personal Background

Until the 1976 campaign, Udall's search for votes had been limited to his 2nd Congressional District in southern Arizona. But his political experience in his home state dates back to the 1950s, and the Udalls are one of Arizona's best-known political families.

Udall was born June 15, 1922, in St. Johns, Ariz., a remote county seat located between the Petrified Forest and the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. His father, Levi S. Udall, the son of Mormon pioneers who founded St. Johns, was a farmer and lawyer, a believer in the frontier ethic of hard work. The father became a justice of the Arizona State Supreme Court, serving on the tribunal for 16 years until his death in 1960. Morris' mother, Louise, a civic affairs activist, became interested in Indian life and culture. In 1970, she published a book, *Mine and Me*, the story of a Hopi woman's life.

When he was 6, Morris Udall lost his right eye in an accident, and it was replaced with a glass eye. He was salutatorian of his St. Johns High School class and entered the University of Arizona in 1940. World War II interrupted his studies. He entered the Army Air Corps in 1942 as a private and was separated as a captain in 1946 after serving as an intelligence and personnel officer in the Pacific.

Back at the university, Udall was president of Associated Students, captain of the Arizona basketball team and an all-Border Conference forward. He played one season of professional basketball with the Denver Nuggets. He passed the state bar exams with the highest grade scored in January 1949 and entered private practice with his older brother, Stewart.

Morris served as chief deputy attorney of Pima County, Arizona, for two years, then was elected county attorney for another two. Brother Stewart was elected to the U.S. House in 1954, resigning from the post in 1961 when President Kennedy appointed him secretary of the interior, a post he held for eight years.

## Udall's Background

**Profession:** Attorney.

**Born:** June 15, 1922, St. Johns, Ariz.

**Home:** Tucson, Ariz.

**Religion:** Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormon).

**Education:** University of Arizona, LL.B., 1949.

**Offices:** Chief deputy Pima County (Arizona) attorney, 1950-52; Pima County attorney, 1952-54; U.S. House since May 17, 1961.

**Military:** Army Air Corps, 1942-46; discharged as captain.

**Memberships:** Arizona State Bar Association, American Bar Association, American Judicature Society, American Legion.

**Family:** Married Ella Royston Ward, 1968; six children by his first marriage, which ended in divorce in 1966.

**Committees:** Interior and Insular Affairs; chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment; Post Office and Civil Service; Democratic Steering and Policy Committee.

Morris ran for Stewart's House seat in a special election which drew national attention. Some interpreted the race as a test of Kennedy's first 100 days in the White House, with Udall campaigning for such Kennedy programs as federal aid to education, medical care for the aged and an increased minimum wage.

Udall won with only 51 per cent of the vote. At the time, he said a statement by Stewart nearly cost him the election—that farmers squatting on federal lands along the Colorado River would have to be evacuated. The statement was less than popular in Arizona's Yuma Valley.

Since that close contest, Morris Udall has been returned to the House seven times by solid majorities. His victories over Republican opponents have ranged from 58 per cent to nearly 71 per cent in a state that has swung sharply rightward since the 1950s. In response to skepticism among some urban Democrats about whether Udall would be tough enough to win the presidency, one of his aides said: "Udall has won consistently in a state as conservative as any in the country, and that is tough." He has been helped, however, by having the University of Arizona in his district.

### Positions on Issues

Udall's campaign has emphasized the "three E's"—energy, environment and economy—as the issues of greatest importance.

Udall has been a member of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee since 1963, and this has shaped much of his legislative concern. It is an assignment well suited to his district, the desert country of southwestern Arizona, in which politics is largely a matter of land and water. Udall is chairman of the Interior Committee's Energy and Environment Subcommittee, and he has been at the center of nearly all recent House debate on these issues. Often, however, the final decision has not gone his way.

### Energy

Udall's advisers describe strip-mining legislation as the centerpiece of his energy proposals. The Arizonan was in the forefront of that effort in the House for four years, only to see President Ford pocket-veto one bill (S 245) in 1974 and veto another (HR 25) in May 1975.

## Udall's CQ Vote Study Scores\*

	1974	1973	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968	1967	1966	1965	1964	1963	1962	1961 <sup>3</sup>
<b>Presidential support</b>	42 <sup>1</sup> /46 <sup>2</sup>	38	43	23	62	64	83	76	81	80	88	96	90	89
<b>opposition</b>	45 <sup>1</sup> /39 <sup>2</sup>	57	41	63	26	34	6	9	6	9	2	3	7	7
<b>Voting Participation</b>	85	91	85	85	89	92	87	82	84	90	88	98	96	94
<b>Party unity</b>	78	82	85	85	75	85	79	82	90	85	90	93	84	90
<b>opposition</b>	7	12	7	3	14	13	5	4	1	7	5	5	14	7
<b>Conservative Coalition support</b>	9	19	5	5	11	11	8	7	3	10	8	13	25	12
<b>opposition</b>	70	74	88	82	77	82	78	81	84	86	92	87	75	82
<b>Bipartisan support</b>	77	82	70	69	84	80	84	69	74	81	76	85	88	84
<b>opposition</b>	8	7	12	13	6	8	4	12	5	6	4	13	5	5

\* Explanation of studies, p. 107.

1. During President Nixon's tenure in 1974.

2. During President Ford's tenure in 1974.

3. Includes only part of the 1961 session; Udall was seated May 17 after special election.

"The history of this thing is that nothing satisfies him [Ford] unless the coal industry writes it," said Udall during debate on the 1975 bill.

In an address to the National Press Club in Washington April 22, 1975, he detailed a six-point proposal for restructuring the energy industry. Posing the "naked question of who will determine America's energy future," he made it clear that a President Udall would challenge energy decisions in the corporate boardrooms of New York, Pittsburgh and Houston.

"By any reasonable criteria of what constitutes a concentrated industry—high prices, inefficiency, lack of innovation and exploration, bloated profits and the power to control and direct the economy—the energy industry qualifies and is in clear violation of the intent of antitrust laws," he said.

Asserting that conventional antitrust proceedings are too slow with so much at stake, he called for legislation that would break up the energy conglomerates so that separate companies would explore, produce, transport, refine and market oil.

### Environment

The strip-mining bills dealt primarily with preventing waste and repairing damage to the land caused by landslides, erosion and water pollution. Another energy-environment battle on which Udall was on the losing side was over the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. "The issue here," he said during floor debate in August 1973, "is whether we are going to cave in on the demands of the big oil companies or whether we are going to give due process to the environment." The final bill granting the pipeline construction permit did not incorporate Udall's environmental concerns.

Land-use planning has been another favored Udall legislative target. He has introduced bills that would make

federal grants to states that establish land planning agencies to guide the use of lands, with special attention given to areas of critical environmental concern. Udall broadly defines those lands as ones where uncontrolled or incompatible development could harm long-range water conservation, food and fiber production, wildlife habitats, scenic values or scientific, historical and educational values. Also included are needs for housing, highways, airports and recreational and industrial development that is related to energy resources.

In 1974, Udall's land-use bill (HR 10294) lost by seven votes on a procedural step on the House floor. He fared no better in 1975, after the Ford administration stated that overriding economic and budget problems had forced a reconsideration of earlier support. Udall commented, "The administration evidently believes it is too costly to do something about the cost of sprawl, urban blight and the increasing misuse of our urban lands." The 1975 land-use bill (HR 3510) died in the House Interior Committee. Udall blamed intense lobbying by groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

For his militant support of environmental protection and various national parks bills, Udall was named legislator of the year in 1973 by the National Wildlife Federation. In a friendly-warning address to the federation in Denver March 30, 1974, Udall said environmentalists must rid themselves of "elitism" and learn the art of "hard-headed compromise."

On occasion, Udall has broken with the environmentalists. One such occasion was the fight over the Lower Colorado River project, vital to Arizona. The Sierra Club, an influential conservation organization, waged an intensive campaign against the building of two hydroelectric dams near the Grand Canyon, claiming they would back up water 130 miles into the canyon gorge. In a House floor speech, Udall accused the Sierra Club of a "flagrant hatchet

job." The dams were dropped from the legislation (PL 90-537).

### Economy

Udall's positions on energy and the environment are inextricably linked with his economic proposals. As early as 1963, he cosponsored a major tax-reform bill calling for adjustment in taxes and exemptions. He has supported Internal Revenue Service amendments to double the "inadequate" personal exemptions allowed each taxpayer.

As a member of the special House task force to produce a Democratic alternative energy-economy program, Udall, in addition to restructuring the energy industry, would urge strong domestic energy conservation measures. He would seek a mechanism to limit oil imports in order to break cartel prices and stem the "petrodollar" drain; make a commitment to a 2 per cent energy growth rate, compared with the 4.5 per cent figure of recent years, and levy special taxes on "inefficient" automobiles.

### Postal Legislation

Assigned to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee after his first election to the House in 1961, Udall chafed under the chairmanship of Tom Murray (D Tenn. 1943-66), who called meetings infrequently and ruled without rules. Udall and other younger liberals fought for and won regular meetings and orderly procedures on the committee.

After a few years, Udall began to use the seemingly innocuous committee as a vehicle for advancing his own ideas about subjects as important as postal service, congressional pay and the use of the frank.

A Udall-sponsored bill to reform the congressional franking (free mailing) privilege became law (PL 93-191) in 1973 after he had introduced it in three sessions of Congress. The law was the first modification of the mailing privilege in the 20th century. One provision prohibited mailings of more than 500 pieces of identical franked mail during the 28-day period before an election by incumbents seeking another term.

Through the Post Office Committee, Udall has been involved in the perennial debate over salaries and pensions. He has generally backed efforts to take the congressional pay raise issue out of the hands of the members, giving it to a federal commission that could deal with the issue outside the political pressures that members face.

Udall has also been involved in the issue of the pensions under which members retire. Critics have argued that Udall always has made his pension proposals excessively generous in order to extract retirements from members he considers to be deadwood littering the House. Udall allies never have denied this.

In 1970, Udall wrote the bill that created a new Postal Service Corporation in place of the financially ailing Post Office Department. In the bitter battle over the measure in Congress, he was allied with the Nixon administration, which wanted an independent postal service, supposedly free from congressional and other political influence.

Soon after the new system went into being in 1971, Udall broke with the administration's implementation of the bill. The Postal Service marketed a \$250-million bond issue, hiring Nixon's former New York law firm, which specializes in bonds counseling, to handle the issue. Five underwriting firms were given the bond business. Udall, chairman of the Postal Service Subcommittee, made public

## Udall Staff, Advisers

**Campaign manager:** Stewart L. Udall, Washington attorney and former secretary of the interior and Morris Udall's brother.

**Financial director and treasurer:** Stanley Kurz, a New York City lawyer and certified public accountant.

**Legislative assistant:** Terry Bracy, eight years on Udall congressional staff, and his major speechwriter.

**Political director:** Jack Quinn, a former staff member for Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn. 1959-71) and for the Democratic National Committee.

**Campaign administrative director:** Ed Coyle, who worked in the 1972 presidential campaign of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine) and later in the vice presidential campaign of Sargent Shriver.

**Fund-raising coordinator:** Marcie Kripke, who served as an aide in the successful Senate campaigns of Colorado Democrats Floyd K. Haskell in 1972 and Gary Hart in 1974.

**Press secretary:** Bob Neuman, former press and legislative aide to Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D Calif. 1966-75).

**Issues coordinator:** Jessica Tuchman, who worked on Udall's Energy and Environment Subcommittee.

**Director of scheduling and advance:** Ron Pettine, who worked for the national Humphrey-Muskie staff in 1968 and for Gov. Milton J. Shapp of Pennsylvania.

**Primary states field coordinator:** Ken Bode, who worked for the delegate-selection commission of the Democratic National Committee, headed by Sen. George McGovern, and in the South Dakotan's 1972 presidential campaign.

an investigative report Sept. 21, 1971, which questioned the qualifications of two of the bond underwriters and the propriety of engaging the President's onetime law partners.

By the fall of 1975, the Postal Service had lost \$2.9-billion over the preceding three years. There was a strong movement in Congress, highly critical of the service, which sought to revoke its financial independence and require it to go before Congress each year for appropriations—a partial reversal of the clock.

An aide said Udall now favors another restructuring, because he feels that the corporation has become part of the White House patronage system. "Udall believes the whole thing was fouled up by the Nixon White House," the aide said.

### Labor

Organized labor has not always bestowed its unqualified blessing on Udall. In 1965, he voted against repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act section that permits state right-to-work laws. Repeal of those laws has long been a cherished labor objective.

His vote was cast on the grounds of political survival. Udall explained his 1965 position to two dozen labor leaders at a luncheon in Cleveland April 12, 1975. He said he had fought in Arizona to repeal its right-to-work act, but that after repeal failed twice, he and Arizona labor leaders agreed that he would not be bound to vote for repeal of the Taft-Hartley proviso while in Congress.

In 1965, Udall explained, he was seeking to consolidate his congressional constituency in a state that was becoming increasingly conservative. "But if I'm President, I'll be leading the fight with labor to repeal it," he told the Ohio leaders.

**Civil Rights**

Udall's Mormon religion has raised questions in the presidential campaign, as it did for Republican George Romney, also a Mormon, in 1968. The church prohibits blacks from entering its priesthood.

Udall has issued a brief position paper on the subject.

Since World War II he has not been active in the Mormon church. "For more than 25 years I have held and expressed a deep-seated and conscientious disagreement with the church doctrine on the role of blacks.... I continue to hope that in its own way in good time the Mormon church will find a way out of the dilemma which distresses me and many other Americans both in and out of the church."

**Defense, Foreign Policy**

In 1967, in the midst of the Vietnam war controversy, Udall went home to hawkish Arizona and declared that U.S. involvement was wrong and should be ended. In April 1975, as South Vietnam crumbled, Udall said, "There is no time for recrimination and bitterness about who lost Indochina. It wasn't ours to lose in the first place."

In a July 1975 position paper on the Middle East, Udall stated "that there is no more powerful imperative in American foreign policy than the need to do everything in our power to help build a stable framework for peace in the Middle East." He would base that policy on a firm commitment to the right of the Israeli people to live in peace in their homeland and to the right of the Palestinians to lead a "normal life" in the region, and to recognize "the understandable concern and self-interest" on the part of the Soviet Union in having some say in future crucial events in the Middle East.

—By Ed Johnson

**Reagan Declares**

Ronald Reagan made his presidential candidacy official Nov. 20, starting the day with a speech and press conference in Washington and following it up with repeat performances in the key primary states of Florida and New Hampshire.

In his Washington announcement, the former California governor repeated the anti-government message on which he has built much of his political career.

"It is difficult," he said, "to find leaders who are independent of the forces that have brought us our problems—the Congress, the bureaucracy, the lobbyists, big business and big labor."

Reagan criticized what he called the "buddy system," a partnership he said existed among the legislative and executive branches in Washington and the clients their programs create.

The 64-year-old candidate declined to criticize President Ford, saying such criticism violated the Republican "11th Commandment," which warns against speaking ill of any fellow party member.

The only signs of uncertainty came when Reagan was asked for specifics about his views on the defense budget. He said he did not have the information at hand, but would provide it during his campaign. (*Reagan Background, Weekly Report p. 2479*)

**CANDIDATES '76**

**Nebraska**

Rep. John Y. McCollister (R Neb.) formally announced Nov. 10 that he would abandon the House seat he has held since 1971 to seek the Senate seat of Republican Roman L. Hruska. Hruska, who has been in the Senate since 1954, announced earlier this year that he would not seek re-election in 1976. He endorsed McCollister's candidacy. McCollister, like Hruska, is from Omaha. He is likely to take advantage of the Nebraska tradition dictating that one senator represent Omaha and one the western part of the state.

**California**

The Republican Senate primary got a new entry Nov. 10 in former Rep. John G. Schmitz (R 1970-73), a colorful conservative and a member of the John Birch Society, who formally declared for the seat of Sen. John V. Tunney (D). Schmitz lost a bid for renomination to the House in 1972 from conservative Orange County. After losing the House primary, he accepted the nomination of the American Party as its presidential candidate and received over 1 million votes.

Already in the Republican race are Rep. Alphonzo Bell and former Lt. Gov. Robert Finch (1967-69). S. I. Hayakawa, a noted semanticist and former president of San Francisco State College (now San Francisco State University), stopped just short of a formal announcement of candidacy, indicating that he would declare in January. Rep. Barry M. Goldwater Jr. is also considered a possible candidate.

In the Democratic primary, Tunney faces opposition from Tom Hayden, a former antiwar activist and defendant in the Chicago 7 trial.

**Pennsylvania**

Arlen Specter, Philadelphia's Republican district attorney from 1966 to 1974, announced Nov. 17 that he would seek the Republican nomination for the Senate seat held by Hugh Scott (R), the Senate minority leader. Specter said he did not expect Scott, 75, to run for a fourth term in 1976. Scott is expected to reveal his plans Dec. 4.

Specter, 45, has often been mentioned as a statewide candidate in Pennsylvania, but his political fortunes have fallen in recent years. A strong candidate for Philadelphia's mayoralty in 1967, he lost to Mayor James Tate and lost his post as district attorney in 1973 to a virtually unknown Democrat, F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, despite a strong endorsement by the city's Democratic mayor, Frank Rizzo. The defeat derailed a potential Specter candidacy against Democratic Gov. Milton J. Shapp in 1974.

Other Republicans running in the race thus far are George Packard, former executive editor of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, and former State Rep. Francis Worley. Another possible entrant is Rep. H. John Heinz III.

The only announced Democrat is State Sen. Jeanette Reibman, 59, who entered the race Nov. 16. Reibman, the only woman in the Pennsylvania Senate, is currently serving her third four-year term.

"I am running for a simple reason," Reibman told an Allentown audience, "to help get government back to the basics."

### C. Group Ratings

You can tell a lot about a person from knowing who his or her friends and enemies are. Legislators are no exception, which is why we have compiled this section. The "rating groups" abbreviated ADA, ACA, COPE, and so forth, are all political interest groups of one sort or another. Some base their judgments on general ideology, liberal or conservative; others focus on the economic and political interests of the particular group they represent, such as farmers or consumers; still others are concerned with a single issue, like defense spending. In most cases, the groups lobby members of Congress throughout the year on the issues in which they have their major interests.

What they all have in common is sufficient interest in how Congressmen and Senators vote on certain issues to "grade" them on their performances. These ratings as a collection constitute an extremely informative legislative report card on each person in Congress. For getting a fix on a particular legislator, a glance at this section, followed by a perusal of the "Key Votes" which follow, is a way of getting an idea of each member's stand on issues as we know them. To aid quick comprehension, we have arranged our various groups on a rough spectrum—"liberals" on the left and "conservatives" on the right, with single issue groups in the middle.

Each group rates legislators by singling out a number of votes it deems crucial. The legislator's "score" for the year is calculated simply by dividing the number of "correct" votes by the total number of votes chosen, ignoring absences. In some cases the groups themselves publish the ratings as a percentage and we have transcribed them directly; in others, only the "rights" and "wrongs" are indicated, in which case we have calculated the percentages ourselves with the permission of the group. Certain groups issue ratings only every two years, which accounts for dashes in the tables. Ratings are presented for 1972, 1973, and 1974; however legislators elected in 1974 were not rated by any of the groups in time for publication here.

To interpret these ratings, it is necessary to have a general idea of each group's orientation, and the kinds of issues it bases its rating on. What follows is a brief description of each.

(1) ADA—Americans for Democratic Action, 1424 16th Street NW, Washington DC 20036; 202-265-5771. In its more than a quarter century of existence, ADA is known for a certain brand of liberalism at once too radical for conservatives and too conservative for radicals. Hubert Humphrey was an original member; Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser is now National Chairman. ADA members push for economic legislation designed to reduce inequality, curtail rising defense spending and prevent encroachments on civil liberties. It rates members on a broad spectrum of issues.

(2) COPE—AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education, 815 16th Street NW, Washington DC 20006; 202-637-5000. As the powerful and well-funded arm of the AFL-CIO, COPE keeps an alert eye on who is working for what it perceives to be the interests of the working man and woman. It is usually the most effective lobby on the Hill for the liberal side of issues. Its ratings cover a broad spectrum of issues, although it monitors few votes on foreign policy and defense spending.

(3) LWV—League of Women Voters, 1730 M Street NW, Washington DC 20036; 202-296-1770. The League of Women Voters has long been known as one of the most energetic, well-informed, and competent groups in the pursuit of good government. In 1971 the League began rating legislators for the first time, stressing issues as diverse as campaign finance reform, which it favors, and strip mining, which it opposes.

(4) Ripon—The Ripon Society, 1609 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009; 202-462-3277. Founded in 1962 by a group of young Republicans, the Ripon society has developed into an articulate and active progressive force in the Republican Party. Its basic policy thrust is libertarian: it is unfriendly not only to the big government inclinations of New Deal Democrats but to the overreaching powers of Nixon White House aides.

(5) NFU—National Farmers Union, 1012 14th Street NW, Washington DC 20005; 202-628-9774. NFU professes to represent the interests of small and middle-size farmers: it is inclined to favor policies producing higher farm supports. About half the votes on which its ratings are based are on farm issues; the other half are more general.

(6) LCV League of Conservation Voters, 324 C Street SE, Washington DC 20003; 202-547-7200. LCV is probably the most politically effective of the several groups which lobby for legislation and executive action to favor the environment and oppose those who despoil it. All the votes on which its ratings are based are on environmental issues.

(7) CFA—Consumer Federation of America, 1012 14th Street NW, Washington DC 20005; 202-737-3732. CFA is a group spawned in the mid-1960s as a pro-consumer counterweight to various business-oriented lobbies. The group presses for pro-consumer legislation and sometimes acts as a lobbying clearinghouse for consumer groups. Its ratings are based entirely on consumer issues.

(8) NAB—National Association of Businessmen, Inc., 1000 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20036; 202-296-5773. NAB believes strongly in economy in government and each year presents its "Watchdog of the Treasury" award to members of Congress who, in its opinion, work most effectively toward that goal. Most of the votes on which its ratings are based are on spending issues.

(9) NSI—National Security Index of the American Security Council, 1101 17th Street NW, Washington DC 20036; 202-296-4587. Founded in 1965, the Council feels that American security is best preserved by vigorous support for maintenance and development of large weapons systems. The Council enjoys support from a number of people prominent in business and the military.

(10) ACA—Americans for Constitutional Action, 955 L'Enfant Plaza SW, Suite 1000, Washington DC 20024; 202-484-5525. ACA stands against "the current movement of our Nation into Socialism and a regimented society," and rates legislators accordingly. Its ratings cover a broad range of issues.

RATINGS

	ADA	COPE	LWV	RIPON	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA	
BAYH	87	100	80	41	100	92	100	33	0	6	1974
	89	91	89	51	100	-	91	-	-	4	1973
	80	88	89	81	100	52	100	0	10	6	1972
CAREY	63	78	82	92	86	56	100	9	0	5	1972
	89	90	89	75	79	-	88	-	-	8	1971
	84	100	-	67	100	40	100	0	0	18	1970
CHURCH	83	56	90	33	88	86	77	45	0	23	1974
	82	73	78	50	100	-	100	-	-	23	1973
	70	80	90	72	88	78	90	33	0	17	1972
CRANSTON	100	91	100	70	100	93	77	40	11	0	"
	89	90	100	63	100	-	67	-	-	8	
	90	100	100	67	90	92	100	8	10	5	
GLENN	NEWLY ELECTED										
JACKSON	81	80	100	36	100	71	88	9	60	11	"
	76	100	80	40	100	-	100	-	-	13	
	60	100	91	56	100	42	100	40	50	19	
JORDAN	91	91	92	56	100	75	69	27	20	7	1974
	100	100	91	53	95	79	88	-	-	4	1973
KENNEDY	100	70	100	58	100	94	100	27	0	0	1974
	95	91	100	67	100	-	100	-	-	4	1973
	90	89	100	79	90	92	100	9	0	5	1972
MONDALE	100	82	100	65	100	88	88	40	0	0	"
	95	90	100	64	100	-	92	-	-	4	
	95	90	100	76	100	72	100	0	0	0	
MUSKIE	100	73	78	61	100	78	100	33	0	0	"
	95	82	100	75	100	-	91	-	-	0	
	70	86	100	64	80	85	100	0	11	0	
RODINO	91	100	92	63	85	76	92	17	0	7	"
	96	100	92	73	90	83	88	-	-	8	
	88	91	100	78	86	70	100	9	0	0	

RATINGS	ADA	COPE	LWV	RIPQN	NFU	LCV	CFA	NAB	NSI	ACA	
UDALL	83	100	100	57	100	88	82	10	38	8	1974
	84	82	100	71	90	71	75	-	-	8	1973
	100	100	100	71	86	80	100	0	0	0	1972

## HOUSE AND SENATE KEY VOTES FOR 1968

The editors of *Congressional Quarterly* annually select a series of "key votes" that represent major issues before Congress and also reflect both the mood of Congress and the impact constituent and other pressures can have on a Member's vote. In 1968 the major issues were open housing, the tax surcharge, budget cuts, crime in general and gun controls in particular, the massive new housing bill, foreign aid and funds for antipoverty programs. The "conservative coalition" of Republicans and Southern Democrats voting against Northern Democrats appeared on seven of the 13 key votes in the House and on five of the 12 in the Senate.

### House Key Votes

**1. TRUTH-IN-LENDING.** The President scored a victory early in the session when the House on Feb. 1 passed a strong truth-in-lending bill (HR 11601; S 5) by an overwhelming vote. The bill required lenders and retail creditors to disclose the annual percentage cost of credit and restricted garnishment of workers' wages. With unusual Republican support for such a measure, the vote was 383-4 (D 218-3; R 165-1). As finally enacted, the bill was still one of the toughest and most far-reaching consumer bills enacted by Congress in many years.

**2 and 3. OPEN HOUSING.** When the Senate returned the civil rights bill (HR 2516) to the House, it contained a controversial Administration-backed open housing provision banning racial discrimination. The showdown vote in the House was on April 10 on a motion to order the previous question on a resolution (H Res 1100) to accept the Senate version of the bill without change. The motion was adopted by a 229-195 vote in a defeat for the conservative coalition (ND 140-12; SD 12-77; R 77-106), which wanted the bill sent to conference with the Senate. With many Republicans switching, the House then adopted H Res 1100 (thus agreeing to Senate amendments to HR 2516) by a vote of 250-172 (D 150-88; R 100-84). (See *Senate key votes 1 and 2*.)

**4 and 5. CRIME.** When the Senate returned the omnibus crime bill (HR 5037) to the House, it contained controversial Administration-opposed provisions permitting widespread wiretapping and seeking to alter Supreme Court rulings on criminal procedural law. (See *Senate key votes 5 and 7*.) The showdown vote in the House on June 6 was on a motion to order the previous question on a resolution (H Res 1197) to accept the Senate version of the bill without change. The motion was adopted by a vote of 349-40 (D 180-34; R 169-6), with a small group of liberals voting "nay." A number then switched to support the bill, and the House adopted H Res 1197 (thus agreeing to Senate amendments to HR 5037) by a vote of 369-17 (D 197-16; R 172-1).

**6. TAX SURCHARGE, BUDGET CUTS.** The Administration's long-sought 10 percent surcharge on corporation and individual income taxes, which the House Ways and Means Committee had pigeonholed, was approved by the Senate as an amendment to the excise tax extension bill (HR 15414). Tied to cutbacks in federal spending and personnel, the surcharge was recommended in the conference report. The House on June 20 adopted the conference report by a vote of 268-150 (D 154-77; R 114-73). (See *Senate key vote 4*.)

**7. POVERTY FUNDS.** The House was in an economy mood when it considered the appropriations bill (HR 18037) for Labor-Health, Education and Welfare Departments and related agencies. Having cut \$307 million from the funds for the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the antipoverty agency, the House on June 26 considered an amendment cutting another \$100 million from that agency's funds. In a defeat for the conservative coalition and a victory for the Administration, the House rejected the amendment by a vote of 181-220 (ND 11-132; SD 60-23; R 110-64). The Senate restored \$215 million to the OEO. (See *Senate key vote 11*.)

**8. HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION.** One of the Administration's more controversial programs was to beautify the nation's highways by controlling billboards, hiding unsightly junkyards and adding landscaping. The program was a favorite of

the President's wife. The House on July 10 considered an amendment to the Federal Aid Highway Act (HR 17134) which struck out all funds for highway beautification projects. The House accepted the amendment by a 211-145 vote in a victory for the conservative coalition (ND 21-102; SD 46-27; R 144-16). The Senate restored a \$255-million, three-year program; but, as enacted, the measure (S 3418) contained only \$25 million for highway beautification for fiscal 1970.

**9. GUN CONTROLS.** Following the assassinations of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy (D N.Y.), the House on July 24 passed a bill (HR 17735) banning mail-order and most out-of-state purchases of rifles and shotguns and the interstate shipment of handgun ammunition. The House stopped short of including provisions requiring registration of firearms. The roll call was the first time in 30 years that House Members had taken a record vote on firearms legislation. The vote was 305-118 (D 158-79; R 147-39). The Senate passed a similar measure (S 3633) and the bill was cleared shortly before adjournment. (See *Senate key votes 5 and 6*.)

**10. CAMPUS RIOTERS.** The chief controversy in House consideration of the Higher Education Amendments (S 3769; HR 15067) centered on provisions requiring colleges to deny federal funds to students who participated in campus disorders. The bills extended authorizations for four major education programs. The House accepted the amendment on campus disorders on July 25 by a vote of 260-146. The vote was a victory for the conservative coalition (ND 50-98; SD 76-5; R 134-43). The President took no position on the amendment. The Senate version was somewhat milder and a compromise was agreed on in the final bill.

**11. HOUSING.** The House on July 26 adopted the conference report on the Administration-backed Housing and Urban Development Act (S 3497), the most far-reaching housing bill passed by Congress since 1949. The conference report deleted strict House limits on the income of families receiving aid to buy or rent homes, permitting more families to qualify than the House originally favored. The vote was 228-135 in a defeat for the conservative coalition (ND 124-2; SD 32-41; R 72-92). (See *Senate key vote 8*.)

**12. FOREIGN AID.** The House on Sept. 19 passed a \$1.6 billion foreign aid appropriations bill (HR 19908), the lowest amount in the history of the program. Even so, on the 174-138 vote the conservative coalition opposed passage (ND 96-9; SD 24-46; R 54-83). (See *Senate key vote 9*.)

**13. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION.** The House June 26 accepted amendments to Health, Education and Welfare Department (HEW) appropriations to cripple the Department's enforcement of school desegregation by permitting Southern "freedom-of-choice" desegregation plans. On Oct. 3, by a close vote, the House reversed itself by adding language to the amendments to retain HEW's power to withhold federal funds from school districts using "freedom-of-choice" plans which HEW considered ineffective in achieving desegregation. The 167-156 roll-call vote on Oct. 3 was a defeat for the conservative coalition (ND 96-12; SD 4-67; R 67-77).

Sen. Walter Mondale -- 1972 Campaign

Two groups of contributions received by Mondale appear to warrant inquiry:

1. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M) made illegal contributions of \$800 to the Mondale Dinner Committee in 1971 and \$1,000 to the Mondale Volunteer Committee in 1972. These contributions (and a \$300 contribution made to Mondale in 1966) are listed in a report 3M filed with the SEC.

Mondale reported to the Secretary of the Senate only contributions he received after April 7, 1972, which was the effective date of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. His reports, which now are on file at the FEC, do not appear to list the contributions from 3M, which probably were made before April 7, 1972. (In general, 3M made contributions either in cash or by having a company executive write a check and then reimbursing the executive for the contribution.) The only contribution from a 3M executive listed in Mondale's reports is \$300 given by Harry Heltzer, chairman of 3M, on Oct. 26, 1972.

I am not aware of any press reports about 3M's contributions to Mondale. Thus, "discovery" of these contributions might be treated as big news by the press.

2. Milt Gwartzman is reasonably certain that Mondale also received money from some of the milk producers' funds, and suggests that this be checked through the New York Times's files.

Sen. Frank Church -- 1974 Campaign

Two groups of contributions received by Church may warrant inquiry:

1. Three executives of Charles E. Smith Co., a D.C. real estate firm which leases numerous properties to the federal government, gave Church a total of \$2,000 on May 22, 1974. Robert Kogod gave \$500, Charles E. Smith gave \$1,000 and Robert H. Smith gave \$500. There has been some controversy over other contributions made by executives of the Smith firm. I believe the basis of that controversy is that the firm is a partnership, and some people have contended that the partners in the firm were government contractors and consequently were barred by 18 U.S.C. §611 from making political contributions in federal election campaigns. No indictments have been returned against Smith executives, though.
2. On Oct. 22, 1974, five executives of the home office of Food Fair Stores in Philadelphia each gave \$500 to Church. The coincidence of five executives of an out-of-state firm all making large contributions on the same date may attract press attention.

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If you have any questions about the foregoing, please let me know. I am making a few additional inquiries about Dandy, Daros, Chas. E. Smith Co. and Food Fair, and will call you if I obtain any further information.

July 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM

TO: Stu Elzenstat

FROM: Elliott Weiss *EW*

SUBJ: Campaign Finance Records

Scope of inquiry: I have reviewed the campaign finance records filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) by Senators Glenn, Stevenson, Mondale and Church. Those records go back to 1972. I also have reviewed my files and certain SEC files that relate to illegal corporate political contributions. The following is information concerning the campaign finances of the four Senators that may warrant further inquiry.

Sen. John Glenn -- 1974 Campaign

Three contributions received by Glenn may warrant inquiry:

1. Mary C. Strenahan, a student at the University of Toledo, gave \$16,000 to Glenn's primary campaign. This is one of the largest contributions Glenn received. (Glenn also received a total of \$13,100 from Elizabeth B. Blossom, a student at Radcliffe. I have determined that Blossom comes from a wealthy family and was politically active while at Radcliffe. She now is located in Washington, D.C.)
2. Alex Dandy, of the firm of Associated Developers International in Washington, D.C., gave Glenn \$3,000 and Lilah Dandy gave \$2,500.
3. Raymond C. Firestone, chairman of Firestone Tire, gave Glenn \$500 on Oct. 23, 1974. Mr. Firestone, other company officials and Firestone Tire recently entered a consent decree with the SEC, which charged that for a number of years the company made illegal political contributions from a corporate slush fund. The fund was terminated in May 1973--or 17 months before the contribution to Glenn--according to records in the case.

Sen. Adlai Stevenson -- 1974 Campaign

One group of contributions received by Stevenson may warrant inquiry. On Oct. 26, 1974, John P., Helen P. and Jack Daros, of Passengers Restaurants of Chicago, each gave \$3,000 to Stevenson's campaign. The total of \$9,000 was one of the largest contributions from individuals Stevenson received.

## MEMORANDUM

VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICES AND ACCEPTABILITY BY  
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITYPOSITIVE

## 1. WALTER MONDALE

Mondale has had an impeccable record in the Senate in support of Israel's security and economic needs and is well-known and respected in the Jewish community for his role. Not only has he supported all measures of benefit to Israel, he has on occasion taken a leadership role. Mondale's generally liberal record, as well as his close identification with Hubert Humphrey and labor, would add to his appeal in general.

## 2. BIRCH BAYH

Like Mondale, Bayh has supported all measures favorable to Israel in Congress and has helped initiate some, although, he has opposed foreign aid legislation because of assistance to other countries. Bayh has close ties to many Jews around the country, especially in New York, California, Florida, and Illinois, and has been a frequent speaker on the UJA circuit. Bayh's liberal and labor credentials would also be a plus.

## 3. FRANK CHURCH

Since his visit to Israel in 1972, Church has appreciably increased his support for Israel. Since that time he has strongly advocated all measures providing military, economic, and political support for Israel. Because of his vigorous opposition to America's involvement in Indochina, however, he has consistently voted against foreign aid bills. This year he broke with that tradition. Church's role (as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multi-national Corporations) in exposing the oil companies' subservience to the Arab oil states has won him favor in the Jewish community. Although he is now well-known to only the very liberal element in the Jewish community, his appeal is potentially greater.

4. PETER RODINO

Rodino has been a staunch and consistent supporter of Israel in the Congress. As Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, he naturally has not taken a leading role in legislation effecting Israel. However, he is a principal sponsor of the Rodino-Holtzman bill to prohibit Arab boycott coercion or acquiescence and to impose civil and criminal sanction against violators. Rodino, like almost all members of the House, does not have strong nation-wide links with the Jewish community. His visible Watergate role would also be a positive factor.

NEUTRAL

1. ALAN CRANSTON

Cranston has had a good record in the Senate on Israel-related issues -- primarily because of the support he has received from the Jewish community in California. Cranston has not taken an active role in the Senate on behalf of Israel, however, and the Jewish community in California has had to present its views forcefully. Cranston's liberal credentials would be an asset although he is well-known only within the California Jewish community.

2. GOVERNOR HUGH CAREY

While in Congress Carey was an active supporter of Israel and as a member of the House Ways and Means Committee a strong advocate of the Jackson-Vanik Freedom of Emigration Amendment. Carey received strong support within the Jewish community during his gubernatorial race, but like most Congressmen, he was an unknown outside the state.

3. EDMUND MUSKIE

Muskie has generally been a supporter of Israel and on several occasions has been an initiator of certain assistance programs. He is well-known in the Jewish community and has strong liberal credentials. There are two negative factors, however. First, Muskie recently made remarks that were critical of the Jackson-Vanik Freedom of Emigration Amendment. In addition, Muskie recently stated that "there isn't any blank check for Israel in Congress." These remarks may have been prompted by his new role of a fiscal conservative as Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee. Second, because Muskie is of Polish descent, it would be a liability among some Jews recalling Poland's historical violent anti-Semitism.

4. JOHN GLENN

Glenn has been a supporter of all legislation affecting Israel since he has entered the Senate, although he has not been visible on this issue. While he does have widespread name recognition, he does not have strong links within the Jewish community inside or outside Ohio. It should be noted that when Metzenbaum ran against Glenn in 1974 the Jewish community predominantly supported Metzenbaum. Glenn does not have strong liberal credentials and he once has made remarks about "Zionist influence" several years ago.

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5. JOHN GILLIGAN

Gilligan had a good record on Israel when he served in Congress and he did receive strong Jewish support in his gubernatorial races in Ohio. Gilligan has good liberal credentials but is an unknown outside the state. Since Gilligan lost his last bid for Governor and most likely would lose any future race, it may be unwise to choose somebody who has been pegged a loser.

NEGATIVE

1. ADLAI STEVENSON

Stevenson would be a definite liability. Although Stevenson has liberal credentials and name recognition, he would draw criticism within the Jewish community even in his home state. Since his return from the Middle East several months ago he has publicly been critical of Israeli policy and has spoken in glowing terms of the Arab's desire for peace and the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. Privately, Stevenson has gone so far as to call Israeli leaders "liars" and has described them as being "insolent", "unintelligible" and "unintelligent." The rift between the Jewish community in Illinois and Stevenson is growing and undoubtedly Stevenson's "new-found" position would become a major issue within the Jewish community nationally if he were on the ticket. In addition, Stevenson is known to be a lousy campaigner, and comes across as being unimpressive and dull. He is not highly regarded by his Senate colleagues.

2. EDWARD KENNEDY

Although Kennedy has taken public positions generally in support of Israel, primarily before Jewish audiences, he and his staff privately have been critical and unhelpful. Traditionally, there has not been good access to Kennedy from the Jewish community, and his presence on the ticket could create many doubts in the minds of the Jewish community, especially among its leadership. The memory of Joseph Kennedy's pro-Nazi sympathies remains with many older Jewish voters.

# NEW YORK INTELLIGENCER

By Nigel Dempster of the London Daily Mail

## Burton's Barmaid's Husband's Offer



Harmonizing: Suzy Hunt and friend.

With sometime model and onetime Marbella barmaid Suzy Hunt, 28, harmoniously billeted in Beverly Hills with Richard Burton—filming *The Heretic* at Warner Bros.—I have news of the divorce offer husband James Hunt made *before* she moved in with her superstar.

In January Suzy's brother-in-law Peter arrived in Marbella with a proposal. James wanted a divorce and was willing to pay her \$10,000 and an air ticket to "anywhere." Suzy, who had spent New Year's with her husband in Gstaad (where she

refused, naturally refused, no doubt feeling that the sum was insulting.

The reason for the timing of the curious offer—they had been going their own ways since last July—became apparent a few days later when James signed a \$200,000-a-year contract to drive for Marlboro-McLaren (for whom he won the Spanish Grand Prix last month, only to be disqualified). Any future divorce settlement will have to take into consideration his new financial status—say, \$150,000? Suzy is not talking.

## Powder Puff Parade: Raffin May Replace Hutton in Cosmetic Change

If Richard Avedon is anyone to go by, then Deborah Raffin is a shoo-in to be the Revlon girl to succeed Lauren Hutton, whom the company plans to phase out gradually.

Declining to comment on reports that the move follows his refusal to continue working with Lauren, Avedon is deep in negotiations with Deborah's husband, Michael Viner.

The problem with Lauren, a Revlon exec whispers to me, is that she has never bothered with the periphery business of factory tours and has also disdained interest in the corporate side.

Another problem is Lauren's age—32. Deborah, at 23, falls right into Revlon's "focus market" of 18 to 28.

The phaseout will have to be gradual, as Lauren has a clause in her \$200,000-per-year contract that if she is bounced, the company will be able to use her work for only a further 90 days.

DEREK HALBERGAD



## They Get a Thrill From Cocaine

The hottest film now on



## Udall Hanky-Panky Won't See Light Unless Washington 'Post' Says Go



No hurry: Morris Udall . . . Maxine Cheshire . . . Ben Bradlee.

A funny thing happened to Morris Udall along the campaign trail when the story of his extracurricular activities—based on Secret Service gossip—led to a high-level conference at the *Washington Post* between executive editor Benjamin C. Bradlee and columnist Maxine Cheshire.

In the event, a decision was made not to publish and when I called Bradlee, he explained: "It wasn't the fact that Udall was less of a front-runner than the others; it was that we could see no way that this [his behavior] was interfering with his public functions. This is our rule. The story is reasonably well known in Washington. Maxine was in no hurry to print, and a decision was made after we talked about it."

For an award-winning "investigative" reporter, Ms. Cheshire appears to have an appalling memory. When I asked her for her recollection of events, she told me: "I have never had any story about Mo Udall misbehaving on the campaign trail. I don't know what Bradlee is talking about."

Udall has six children by his first marriage to the former Patricia Emery, which took place in 1949 and was dissolved in 1965. She has subsequently married a further three times, without success, and now lives in Boulder, Colorado, with her younger children.

In 1968 Udall, who will be 54 on June 15, married Ella Royston—known as "Tiger"—who has a son by her previous marriage.

## Doc Hemingway's Montana Split

a showdown with his wife of ten years.

Irish-born Valerie Hemingway, who works in New York for brewer Arthur Guinness, is refusing to accompany her husband west and is determined to remain here with their four children.



## Barnes S... Weight and

The atmosphere in the pressroom at these days is strain the least, owing to domestic arrangements New York Times c Barnes.

After ditching h eighteen years, B moved in with fo producer Ene R daughter of an Es ueeja who arrived ica some fifteen ye

Meetings with Trish—they have dren, Chris, four twelve-year-old M now limited to room, which M uses as a writer fo azine *Dance and*

"The situation difficult, but so fa come across his an," Mrs. Barnes t know we'll have some time, but I confront her yet.

A waspish fr Trish has only blame for the defe put Clive on a and no sooner trimmed off 60 p he acquired a rov



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