

Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files

Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files

Folder: Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77

Container: 34a

Folder Citation:

Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files,
Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77, Container 34a

Subject Terms:

Foreign Policy



Jimmy Carter Library

441 Freedom Parkway Atlanta GA 30307-1

ARCHIVAL NOTE

The pages of this memo were originally unnumbered, then became out of order. The correct order and page numbers were then determined by comparison with an early photocopy of the document which retained the original correct order. The pencilled in numbers in brackets at the bottom of the pages represents the correct original order. During the time the pages were out of order, the page numbers were off by as much as 10 pages.

The correct order was restored in September, 2008
ADN

June 1977

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ.*

I have attempted in this memorandum to measure the domestic political implications of your foreign policy and outline a comprehensive approach for winning public and Congressional support for specific foreign policy initiatives.

As this is highly sensitive subject matter, I typed this memorandum myself and the one other copy is in my office safe.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, FEB. 24, 1983
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE *6/12/90*

[P 1]

FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives

The Need for a Political Plan

- A. Consultation with Congress on Foreign Policy Initiatives
- B. The Role of the American Jewish Community in the Middle East
- Introduction
 - Voting History
 - Political Contributions
 - The Jewish Lobby
 - The Present Situation with the Jewish Community
 - Taking the Initiative with the American Jewish Community
 - Appendix

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

Because you have chosen to be active in many areas of foreign policy during your first year in office, there will evolve in the near future a number of critical decisions that will have to be made. And each of these decisions will be difficult politically and will have domestic implications that will require the support and understanding of the American people and the Congress.

The most significant of these decisions relate to specific countries and/or areas of the world. As best I can determine, those decisions which will require action on our part and/or the political support of the people and Congress are:

- The Middle East
- SALT II
- AFRICA

- Normalization of relations with Cuba and Vietnam
- Treaty with Panama
- Withdrawal of troops from Korea

It is my own contention that this confluence of foreign policy initiatives and decisions will require a comprehensive and well coordinated domestic political strategy if our policies are to gain the understanding and support of the American people and the Congress.

It is important that we understand the political dimensions of the challenges we face on these specific issues:

1. There is a limited public understanding of most foreign policy issues. This is certainly the case with SALT II and the Middle East. This is not altogether bad as it provides us an opportunity to present these issues to the public in an politically advantageous way. At the same time, most of these issues assume a simplistic political coloration. If you favor normalization of relations with Cuba or Vietnam, you are

a "liberal"; if you oppose normalization with these same countries, you are "conservative".

2. To the extent that the issues we are dealing with have a "liberal" or "conservative" connotation, our position on these particular issues is consistently "liberal". We must do what we can to present these issues to the public in a non-ideological way and not allow them to undermine your own image as a moderate-conservative.

To Challenge Soviets for influence is "conservative"

3. Congressional support in some form is needed to accomplish most of your foreign policy objectives.

A modest amount of time invested in consultation with key members of Congress will go a long way toward winning the support of Congress on many issues. Whereas members of Congress do not mind - and sometimes relish - a confrontation with the President on some local project or matter of obvious direct benefit to their district or state, very few wish to differ publicly with the President on a foreign policy matter.

4. We have very little control over the schedule and time-frame in which most of these foreign policy issues will be resolved. Consequently, a continuing problem and challenge will be to attempt to separate out the key foreign policy issues from domestic programs so the two will not become politically entwined in the Congress. This dictates a continuing focus on the historical bipartisan nature of U.S. foreign policy so the Republican members of Congress will be less tempted to demagogue these issues during the 1978 elections.

5. Conservatives are much better organized than liberals and will generally oppose our foreign policy initiatives. To effectively counter conservative opposition, we will have to take the initiative in providing coordination of our resources and political leadership. Our resources at present are considerable, but they are scattered among a variety of groups and institutions. To the extent our policy goals are being pursued, they are being pursued unilaterally by groups and people and without coordination.

THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL PLAN

The very fact that your administration is active simultaneously in many areas of foreign policy dictates a comprehensive, long-range political strategy for winning the support of the American people and the Congress. To accomplish this goal, I would recommend a three step process:

- I. CONSULTATION. Early consultation with Congress and interested/affected constituent groups is critical to the political success of these policies. In almost every instances, Senate ratification of a treaty and/or military and economic support which requires the support of Congress will be required to accomplish these foreign policy objectives. Consequently, it is important that we invest a small amount of time on a continuing basis in consultation with members of Congress and groups/organizations.

Meeting this week

[P 8]

II. PUBLIC EDUCATION. Public understanding of most of these issues is very limited. To the extent these issues are understood and/or perceived by the general public, they are viewed in very simplistic terms. This is a mixed blessing. On one hand, it becomes necessary to explain complex issues to the American people. On the other hand, because these issues are not well understood, a tremendous opportunity exists to educate the public to a certain point of view. In the final analysis, I suspect that we could demonstrate a direct correlation between the trust the American people have for their President and the degree to which they are willing to trust that President's judgement on complex issues of foreign policy.

In terms of public education, we have a tremendous number of resources. They include:

- Fireside chats
- Town meetings
- Speaking opportunities for President, Vice-President, First Family, Cabinet, etc.

[P 9]

- Public service media opportunities
- Groups outside government who support particular policies
- Democratic National Committee
- Mailing lists
- Etc.

III. POLITICAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION. Once foreign policy goals are established, it is critical that political strategies in support of those goals be developed and implemented. And it is important that the resources available to the Administration - both inside and outside of government - be coordinated and used in a way that is supportive of these objectives.

I have attempted in this memorandum to outline the first step in this process - consultation - as relates to foreign policy generally and the Middle East specifically. Steps II and III - public education and political planning and coordination - are the subject of a separate memorandum.

[P 10]

A. CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS ON
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

[114]

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS ON FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

With many complex foreign policy issues surfacing in the near future and the need for some form of Congressional support for these policies, I believe that it is important that we take the initiative in consulting with Congress.

The consultation that has taken place to date has been extremely beneficial, but one of the inherent problems is that the same people (bipartisan leadership, Foreign Relations Committee, etc.) are briefed time and again; and little is done to increase the general understanding of our policies among the general membership of the House and Senate.

I would recommend that we begin a comprehensive consultation program with members of the Senate which

R12

will allow you and several other key members of the Administration to meet with individual members of the Senate and review with them our progress and problems on each of the following subjects:

-Middle East

-Africa

-Panama

-Cuba

-SALT II

-Vietnam

This will not only result in an increased understanding of and support for our policies, but it will allow us to identify Congressional support and opposition. With a Panama Canal Treaty imminent, SALT II negotiations ongoing and the Mideast situation fluid as a result of the recent Israeli elections, I believe that it is important that we begin this process at the earliest possible date.

I have attempted to outline in the following pages the manner in which this consultation could take place. There are five persons in the Administration

who are well enough informed and sufficiently involved in these issues that they could contribute to this process. They are:

President
Vice-President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
National Security Adviser

As demonstrated in the following chart, if each of these persons would contribute an hour each week to a luncheon meeting or briefing with two senators, we could complete the entire process in ten weeks.

President	Vice President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Advisor
-----------	----------------	--------------------	----------------------	-------------

Week 1	Nunn	Moynihan	Bentsen Ford	Glenn Chafee	Abourezk Bumpers
Week 2	Stennis Talmadge	Hart Culver	Church Kennedy	Inouye Hollings	Griffin Domenici
Week 3	Sparkman Eastland	Leahy Matsunaga	Muskie	Eagleton Clark	Durkin Danforth
Week 4	Ribicoff Long	Sarbanes Nelson	Case Bayh	Zorinsky Hathaway	Gravel Schweicker
Week 5	McClellan Cannon	Percy Heinz	Burdick Hatfield	Stafford Lugar	Roth Young
Week 6	Morgan Sasser	Anderson Brooke	Mathias Stevenson	Magnuson Randolph	Goldwater Curtis
Week 7	Johnston Stone	Williams DeConcini	Biden McGovern	Packwood Pearson	Hayakawa Wallop
Week 8	Chiles Huddleston	Melcher Metcalf		Allen Byrd, H.	Schmitt Hansen
Week 9	McIntyre Haskell	Proxmire Weicker		Stevens Laxalt	
Week 10	Javits Metzenbaum	Reigle Pell		Tower Thrumond	

[P15]

Rationale for Assignments

The assignments made were arbitrary on my part, but basically reflected the following thinking:

President - Assigned key committee chairmen, Southern senators and senators who are up for re-election in 1978 and will be politically concerned and/or affected by foreign policy decisions made in the next eighteen months.

Vice-President - Assigned generally liberal Democrats and Republicans on the assumption that most of these people will support our policies but cannot be taken for granted.

Secretary of State - Assigned key Democrats and Republicans who would be flattered to have the Secretary of State take the initiative to consult with them.

Secretary of Defense - Assigned conservative Democrats and Republicans who are likely to be concerned with the military dimensions of the foreign policy decisions we will make in the next couple of years.

National Security Adviser - Assigned a mix of the above.

Lp 67

There is certainly nothing sacred in these assignments,
and I would expect Frank Moore to have ultimate respon-
sibility for matching senators with the appropriate
briefers.

[217]

INTRODUCTION

As we go into the Summer with the prospect of a visit from the new Israeli head of state and the possibility of a new Vance mission to the Middle East, I think that it is important that we appreciate and understand the special and potentially constructive role that the American Jewish community can play in this process.

I would compare our present understanding of the American Jewish lobby (vis-a-vis Israel) to our understanding of the American labor movement four years ago. We are aware of its strength and influence, but don't understand the basis for that strength nor the way that it is used politically. It is something that was not a part of our Georgia and Southern political experience and consequently not well understood.

27¹⁸

I have attempted in the following pages to do several things:

- 1) Outline the reasons and the basis for the influence of the American Jewish community in the political life of our country;
- 2) Define and describe the mechanism through which this influence is used;
- 3) Describe - as I understand it - the present mood and situation in the American Jewish community as relates to you and your policies; and
- 4) Define a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community with the ultimate goal of gaining their understanding and/or support for our efforts to bring peace to the Middle East.

B. THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

VOTING HISTORY

To appreciate the direct influence of American Jews on the political processes of our country, it is useful and instructive to review their extraordinary voting habits.

1. Of all measurable subgroups in the voting population, Jews vote in greater proportion to their actual numbers than any other group. In the recent Presidential election, for example, American Jews - who comprise less than 3% of the population - cast almost 5% of the total vote.

2. Of all subgroups in the voting population, Jews register and vote in larger numbers than any other group. Voter turnout among Jewish voters measures close to 90% in most elections.

3. Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic. Heavy support for the Democratic Party and its candidates was founded in the immigrant tradition of the second and

third generation of American Jews and reinforced by the policies and programs of Wilson and Roosevelt. Harry Truman's role in the establishment of Israel cemented this party identification. And despite an occasional deviation, Jewish identification with the Democratic Party has remained intact and generally stable despite economic and educational pressures which have traditionally undermined party identification.

In recent national elections, Jewish voters have given the Democratic candidates the bulk of their vote, ranging from the low received by McGovern (65%) to the high received by Humphrey (90%). You received approximately 75% of the Jewish vote nationwide.

4. As Jewish voters are predominantly Democratic and turn out in large numbers, their influence in primaries is often decisive. In New York State, Jews comprise 12% of the population but traditionally cast about 28% of the votes in Democratic statewide primaries. In New York City, the Jewish population is 20% but Jews cast

about 55% of the votes in the citwide Democratic
primaries.

?

5. The variance in turnout between Jewish voters and other important subgroups in the voting population is staggering and serves to inflate the importance of the Jewish voter. Again, New York State is the best case in point. In New York, Jews and blacks comprise about the same percentage of the state's population. Whereas the turnout in the black community was 35% in the recent Presidential election, the turnout in the Jewish community was over 85%. This means that about 500,000 blacks voted in this election and about 1,200,000 Jews voted. You received 94% of the black vote and 75% of the Jewish vote. This means that for every black vote you received in the election, you received almost two Jewish votes.

[p. 23]

POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Nowhere in American politics is Jewish participation more obvious and disproportionate than in the area of financial support for political candidates and political parties. But it is a mistake to take note of Jewish contributions to political campaigns without seeing this in the larger context of the Jewish tradition of using one's material wealth for the benefit of others.

The amount of money the American Jewish community contributes to political campaigns is slight when compared to the monies contributed to favorite charities. In 1976, the American Red Cross raised approximately \$200 million. In that same year, Jewish charities raised \$3.6 billion. In the two week period following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the American Jewish community raised over one billion dollars.

112-241

Whereas disproportionate Jewish voting is only politically significant in areas where Jewish voters are concentrated, Jewish contributions to political campaigns are disproportionate nationally and in almost every area of the country.

Some facts that confirm this premise:

- Out of 125 members of the Democratic National Finance Council, over 70 are Jewish;
- In 1976, over 60% of the large donors to the Democratic Party were Jewish;
- Over 60% of the monies raised by Nixon in 1972 was from Jewish contributors;
- Over 75% of the monies raised in Humphrey's 1968 campaign was from Jewish contributors;
- Over 90% of the monies raised by Scoop Jackson in the Democratic primaries was from Jewish contributors;
- In spite of the fact that you were a long shot and came from an area of the country where there is a smaller Jewish community, approximately 35% of our primary funds were from Jewish supporters.

Wherever there is major political fundraising in this country, you will find American Jews playing a signif-

icant role. As a result, Bob Dole is particularly sensitive to the tiny Jewish community in Kansas because it is not so small in terms of his campaign contributions.

THE JEWISH LOBBY

Having previously discussed and established the great influence that American Jews have on the political processes of our country, it is equally important to understand the mechanism through which much of this influence is wielded.

When people talk about the "Jewish lobby" as relates to Israel, they are referring to American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). AIPAC is an aggregate of leaders from 32 separate organizations which was formed in 1956 in response to John Foster Dulles' complaint that he did not know which of the many Jewish groups to deal with.

The leaders from member organizations of AIPAC, although active on behalf of their own organizations on domestic issues, have ceded to AIPAC overall responsibility for representing their collective interests on foreign policy (Israel) to the Congress.

120

It is important to understand that AIPAC has one continuing priority - the welfare of the state of Israel as perceived by the American Jewish community. AIPAC has wisely resisted efforts to broaden their scope and has continually concentrated on the issues that relate to Israel.

Leadership/Organization

AIPAC is headed by Executive Director Morris Amitay and Legislative Director Ken Wollack. As an umbrella organization, AIPAC is composed of leaders from major Jewish groups in the United States, including:

- American Jewish Congress
- American Mizrachi Women
- American Zionist Federation
- Anti Defamation League
- B'nai B'rith
- B'nai B'rith Women
- B'nai Zion

- Central Conference of American Rabbis
- Hadassah
- Jewish Labor Committee
- Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation
- Jewish War Veterans
- Labor Zionist Alliance
- National Committee for Labor-Israel
- National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods
- National Jewish Community Relations Council
- National Jewish Welfare Board
- North American Jewish Youth Council
- Pioneer Women
- Rabbinical Council of America
- Rabbinical Assembly
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations
- Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
- United Synagogue of America
- Womens' League for Conservative Judaism
- World Zionist Organization
- Zionist Organization of America
- Council of Jewish Federation and Welfare Funds

Although the combined membership of these organizations is only several million, their collective mobilizing ability is unsurpassed in terms of the quality and quantity of political communications that can be triggered on specific issues perceived to be critical to Israel. When AIPAC feels that the interests of Israel might be affected by a legislative or executive action, their target lists are mailgrammed.

Several thousand mailgrams to the leadership of the member organizations can be counted on to generate thousands of telegrams, letters and telephone calls for pivotal Congressman and/or Senators. As vote counts are developed, targeted efforts by AIPAC are accelerated. Key Jewish leaders and/or financial contributors are encouraged to visit personally the wavering legislator.

Qualitatively, the principal contacts are articulate, bright and well informed on issues related to Israel. They do not have to be briefed, and many have visited Israel and speak with first-hand knowledge of the

[]

issues they are lobbying on. The organizations and people represented by the AIPAC umbrella are the most motivated and skilled primary contact group in the country. They have good relations with other important political constituencies (labor groups, civil rights organizations, etc.) and will not hesitate to use the pulpit to generate support for those issues perceived as being critical to Israel.

The cumulative impact of the Jewish lobby is even greater when one considers the fact that their political objectives are pursued in a vacuum. There does not exist in this country a political counterforce that opposes the specific goals of the Jewish lobby. Some would argue that even the potential for such a counterforce does not exist. It is even questionable whether a major shift in American public opinion on the issue of Israel would be sufficient to effectively counter the political clout of AIPAC.

Support for Israel in the Senate

The following is a brief analysis of the support for

Israel in the United States Senate. On a given issue where the interests of Israel are clear and directly involved, AIPAC can usually count on 65-75 votes. Their breakdown of support in the Senate follows:

Hard Support/Will Take Initiative

Anderson
Bayh
Brooke
Bentsen
Case*
Church*
Cranston
Danforth
DeConcini
Dole
Eagleton
Glenn*
Heinz
Humphrey*
Inouye
Jackson
Javitz*
McIntyre
Matsunaga
Metzenbaum
Moynihan
Morgan
Packwood
Ribicoff
Riegle
Sarbanes*
Schweiker
Stone*
Zorinsky
Williams

*Member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Sympathetic/Can Be Counted On In Showdown

Allen
Baker
Bumpers
Byrd, H.
Byrd, R.
Cannon
Chiles
Curtis
Biden
Chafee
Clark
Culver
Domenici
Durkin
Ford
Gravel
Hart
Haskell
Hathaway
Hayakawa
Huddleston
Johnston
Kennedy
Laxalt
Leahy
Lugar
Magnuson
Mathias
Muskie
Nelson
Nunn
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Roth
Sasser
Stafford
Stevens
Talmadge
Tower
Weicker

Questionable/Depends on Issue

Bartlett
Bellmon
Burdick
Eastland
Garn
Goldwater
Griffin
Hansen
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Long
McClellan
McGovern
Melcher
Metcalf
Schmidt
Scott
Stennis
Sparkman
Thurmond
Wallop
Young

Generally Negative

Abourezk
McClure
Hatfield

Summary

31	Hard Votes
43	Sympathetic/Count On In Showdown
23	Depends on Issue
<u>3</u>	Generally Negative
100	

To gain a majority on any issue before the Senate, the Jewish lobby has only to get its "hard" votes and half of the votes of those that are "sympathetic". This would concede all of the votes of those in third category.

THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

For many years, the American Jewish community has basically reflected the attitudes and goals of the government of Israel. The American Jewish community has seldom questioned - or had reason to question - the wisdom of the policies advocated by the Israeli government. The tremendous financial and political support provided to Israel by the American Jewish community has been given with "no strings attached."

One of the potential benefits of the recent Israeli elections is that it has caused many leaders in the American Jewish community to ponder the course the Israeli people have taken and question the wisdom of that policy. As a result, I think there is a good chance that the American Jewish community will

be less passive and more inclined to provide the new government advice as well as support.

This new situation provides us with the potential for additional influence with the Israeli government through the American Jewish community, but at present we are in a poor position to take advantage of it.

The American Jewish community is very nervous now for a combination of internal and external reasons.

It is important that we understand the reasons for their apprehension.

1. The election of a new President whose policies have been developed and presented in a manner different from previous Administrations. It is not so much what you have said as the fact that the things you have said ("defensible borders", "homeland for the Palestinians", etc.) have been publicly discussed. The leadership of the American Jewish community has heard

these things before, but they were always said privately with ample reassurances provided.

2. You are not known personally to most of the national Jewish leaders. And even those that know you have not worked with you over a long period of time at the national level on matters of direct interest to Israel. Whereas they know and instinctively trust a Humphrey or a Jackson, you are less well known and more unpredictable.

3. The cumulative effect of your statements on the Middle East and the various bilateral meetings with the heads of state has been generally pleasing to the Arabs and displeasing to the Israelis and the American Jewish community. You have discussed publicly things that have only been said before privately to the Israelis with reassurances. Press reports of your meetings with the Arabs were always

134

very positive while your meeting with Rabin was described as being "very cool". The simple fact that there were four Arab heads of state to meet with - and each meeting was perceived accurately as being positive and constructive - and only one meeting with the Israeli head of state - which was widely reported as being unsuccessful - added to this perception problem.

4) The election of Begin has resulted in widespread uncertainty among the Jewish community in this country. The leadership of the American Jewish community has had close personal relationships with the leadership of the Labor Party since the creation of the state of Israel. They do not have the same close relationship with the leaders of the Likud Party and are suddenly dealing with new and unpredictable leadership in both countries.

5) With the election of Begin, the American Jewish community sees for the first time the possibility of

losing American public support for Israel if the new
government and its leaders prove to be unreasonable
in its positions and attitudes. This would put the
American Jewish community in the terrible position of
seeing its emotional and political investment in
Israel over the past 30 years rapidly eroded.

TAKING THE INITIATIVE WITH THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

I think it is accurate to say that the American Jewish community is extremely nervous at present. And although their fears and concerns about you and your attitude toward Israel might be unjustified, they do exist. In the absence of immediate action on our part, I fear that these tentative feelings in the Jewish community about you (as relates to Israel) might solidify, leaving us in an adversary posture with the American Jewish community.

If the American Jewish community openly opposed your approach and policy toward a Middle East settlement, you would lack the flexibility and credibility you will need to play a constructive role in bringing the Israelis and the Arabs together. I am sure you are familiar with Kissinger's experience in the Spring of 1975, when the Jewish lobby circulated a letter which had the names of

76 senators which reaffirmed U. S. support for Israel in a way that completely undermined the Ford-Kissinger hope for a new and comprehensive U.S. peace initiative.*

It would be a great mistake to spend most of our time and energies persuading the Israelis to accept a certain plan for peace and neglect a similar effort with the American Jewish community since lack of support for such a plan from the American Jewish community could undermine our efforts with the Israelis. Our efforts to consult and communicate must be directed in tandem at the Israeli government and the American Jewish community.

I would advocate that we begin immediately with an ex-

* The Washington Post said, "The Senatorial letter makes Kissinger nothing more than an errand boy and assures the Arab states that he is powerless to arrange a deal..... Kissinger might as well stay home.....Under the terms the Senate has laid down, it could send one of its pages to handle the negotiations." From Sheehan in The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger, "Obviously, the (Senate) letter was a stunning triumph for the (Jewish) lobby, a capital rebuke for Kissinger in Congress. Whatever resentment many congressmen may inwardly entertain about the unrelenting pressures of the lobby, the American system predestines them to yield. Israel possesses a powerful American constituency; the Arabs do not..."

tensive consultation program with the American Jewish community. This program would focus on:

The Process - Review of what has taken place to date (bilateral with heads of state) and what is planned for the future (probable Begin visit, possible Vance mission, etc.). Also, a definition of the U.S. role. We should stress that we are not trying to "impose a U.S. settlement" nor attempting any "quick fix solution". We are being widely criticized in the Jewish press for these things.

The Principles - Review of the key items which are being discussed as the basis for a settlement: 1) the nature of peace; 2) the question of borders and security for Israel; and 3) the Palestinian question.

The Prospects - A vision of what Israel could be if peace were permanent and political stability came to the Middle East. Outline of the U.S. belief that Israel would serve as the model of democratic government in the Middle East and become the center of regional trade and finance.

In addition to reviewing these topics, I believe that the American Jewish community should be encouraged - for the first time - to take an active role in analyzing the obstacles to peace and advising the Israeli government on these matters. Any thoughtful analysis of the situation would lead to the conclusion that concessions on both sides are necessary for peace.

To develop a comprehensive plan for consultation with the American Jewish community, it is first necessary to develop a list of individuals, groups and institutions who should be reached.

They include:

Key members of the U.S. Senate - Senators like Humphrey, Jackson, Ribicoff and Church who have been close to Israel and supported it in the Congress.

Key members of the U.S. House - A comparable group in the House who have been close to Israel.

Jewish members of the House - There are 22 members of the House who are Jewish (See attached listing).

Senate Foreign Relations Committee - It is important to keep them informed and involved.

House International Affairs Committee - It is important to keep them informed and involved.

The American Jewish Press - The American Jewish Press is a powerful instrument for pro-Israeli statements, news and solicitations. These papers - collectively - provide the main analysis of American policy vis-a-vis Israel to the American Jewish Community.

Leaders of National Jewish Organizations - The lay, political and religious leadership of the Jewish community.

Local Leaders from Key Communities - About 80% of the American Jews are situated in ten cities and/or areas (See attached listing).

Persons with Close Relationships with Israeli Government Officials - There are a number of persons who have unofficially represented Israeli interests in our country and have close ties to the leadership of the Israeli government. With the Labor Party out of power, this will change; but it is inevitable that the new government will develop close ties with some of the leadership of the American Jewish community. We should develop relationships with these people.

In the following pages, I have outlined a program that will allow us to take the initiative in dealing with the American Jewish community in a positive manner. Using very little of any one person's time, we could begin and complete this consultation process in the next eight weeks. This plan is targeted at the groups and individuals previously mentioned.

At the end of the process, I believe that we would have the good faith and trust of the American Jewish community going into the next stage of talks. It is difficult for me to envision a meaningful peace settlement without the support of the American Jewish community.

	President	Vice- President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Advisor	Su
Week 5	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #2 (30 minutes)	<u>Briefing Boston</u>	-	-	Coordinates briefing	<u>Brief Balti Lips Eizer</u>
Week 6	-	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #3	<u>Briefing Chicago</u>	-	Coordinates briefing	-
Week 7	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #4 (30 minutes)	-	-	<u>Briefing Detroit</u>	Coordinates briefing	<u>Brief Phila</u>
Week 8	-	<u>Briefing Cleveland</u>	-	-	<u>Briefing Washington</u>	-

	President	Vice-President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Adviser	Surrog
Week 1	Working session with key members of the United States Senate ¹ (1 hour)	Same as President	Briefing for House Committee on International Relations	-	-	-
Week 2	Briefing #1 for leaders of national Jewish organizations (1 hour)	Working session with key members of the House ²	-	-	Coordinates President's briefing	-
Week 3	Briefing #1 for key members of the Jewish press (1 hour)	Briefing #2 for leaders of national Jewish organizations	Briefing <u>New York City</u>	-	Coordinates briefings	Briefi <u>Miami</u> and <u>Fl</u>
Week 4	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #1 (30 minutes)	Briefing #2 for key members of the Jewish press	-	Briefing <u>Los Angeles</u>	Coordinates briefings	-

¹Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.

²Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jewish constituencies

APPENDIX

AIPAC's Unofficial Listing of Carter Actions/Statements
on Middle East Since Taking Office.

Jewish Members of the U.S. House

Major Centers of Jewish Population in the United States

1. Denial of CBUs.
2. Denial of Kfir sale to Equador.
3. Approval of HAWK and Maverick Missiles to Saudi Arabia.
4. Castigation of Israel over Gulf of Suez oil drilling.
5. Carter statement on "minor adjustments" during Rabin visit and retraction of statement on "defensible borders."
6. Carter leaks on nonproductivity of meeting with Rabin.
7. Carter remark on "Palestinian homeland" at Clinton Town Meeting.
8. Carter greets PLO representative at U.N. reception.
9. Vance statement that the U. S. would make its suggestions on all the core issues of the Middle East and that the difference between suggestions and a U.S. plan was only one of semantics.
10. Carter statement that he would "not hesitate...to use the full strength of our country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement."
11. Carter statement that "borders of Palestine" was a core issue of the conflict.
12. Excessive laudation by Carter of Sadat, Hussein, Fahd and particularly Assad.
13. PRM-12.
14. Powell statement on "recognized borders" of a Palestinian homeland.
15. May 26th Carter statement on Palestinian homeland and compensation and his suggestion that American Jews and the U. S. Congress moderate Begin.
16. Powell clarification of May 26th statement of Carter referring to U. S. support for U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 194.

(continued on next page)

* given to me by Morris Amitay

(APIC's Unofficial Listing of Carter Actions/Statements
on Middle East Since Taking Office - continued)

17. Delay of Israeli requests for coproduction agreements and advanced weapons, i.e., FLIRs, F-16, Grumman Hydrofoil patrol boats, Gabriel missile components.
18. Denial of Kfir sales to the Phillipines and Taiwan.
19. The paucity of statements by Carter since the March 16th Clinton Town Meeting on defining the nature of peace.
20. Private statements by Carter that the Arab leaders all desire peace and that Israel is less forthcoming.
21. Administration support for weakening amendments to anti-boycott legislation.

Jewish Members of the U. S. House of Representatives

Tony Bieleison, D.-Calif.
Dan Glickman, D-Kansas
Ted Weiss, D-NY
Marc Marks, R-Pa.
Elizabeth Holtzman, D-NY
Ed Koch, D-NY
Richard Ottinger, D-NY
Fred Richmond, D-NY
Ben Rosenthal, D-NY
Jim Scheuyer, D-NY
Stephen Solarz, D-NY
Lester Wolfe, D-NY
Ben Gilman, R-NY
Abner Mikva, D-Ill.
Sidney Yates, D-Ill. (Dean of Jewish Delegation)
Elliot Levitas, D-Ga.
John Krebs, D-Calif.
Henry Waxman, D-Calif.
Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa.
Willis Gardison, R-Ohio
Gladys Spellman, D-Md.
William Lehman, D-Fla.

MAJOR CENTERS OF JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

City/Area	Jewish Population	Percent of Total Jewish Population
1. New York - N.E. New Jersey	2,687,000	46.5
2. Los Angeles	500,000	8.7
3. Philadelphia	330,000	5.7
4. Chicago	269,000	4.7
5. Boston	208,000	3.6
6. Miami	130,000	2.2
7. Washington, D. C.	100,000	1.7
8. Baltimore	100,000	1.7
9. Cleveland	85,000	1.5
10. Detroit	85,000	1.5
<hr/> TOTAL:	4,500,000	77.8%

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

If you agree with the premises stated in this memorandum and the recommendations presented, I would recommend the following actions:

1. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig and Frank Moore to discuss the overall consultation process with the Congress.

I agree.

Lets talk first.

Include Cy

2. A meeting with you, the Vice-President, Zbig, Frank Moore, Bob Lipshutz and Stu to discuss the overall consultation process with the American Jewish community.

I agree.

Lets talk first.

3. That I undertake a planning process that attempts to: 1) inventory our political resources; 2) develop a specific workplan for each foreign policy initiative that focuses on public education; and 3) develop an informal mechanism for the overall

coordination of this process. I would plan to
work closely with Zbig on all of this.

✓
_____ I agree.

_____ Lets talk.

[11.51]

Jimmy Carter Library Staff Processing Note: (2/13/87)

Staff archivists have determined that Hamilton Jordan's office staff transferred these materials to Susan Clough, the President's secretary, sometime near the end of the administration. In June 1986, they were subsequently transferred to the Jimmy Carter Library by the Office of Jimmy Carter. The folder titles appear to have been created by Hamilton Jordan.

I. Jewish Identity, Zionism and Israel

"If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand be severed from my body."

Distinctions that are often made between Jewishness and Zionism are seen by Jews as a rationalization for anti-semitism. For Jews, and certainly the great majority of American Jews, there is no distinction. Zionism, the movement on behalf of a permanent Jewish homeland in what was once Palestine, is the heart of all Jewish consciousness. It is borne out of 5,000 years of history, and in particular, as a reaction to the Holocaust. It is rooted in fear and distrust, enlightened paranoia, a sense of total and justified insecurity. For thousands of years Jews have been pursued or pitied. The modern Jew wants neither, and the existence of Israel is the key to psychic liberation.

The strong identification for Israel which I have referred to cross-cuts all socio-economic divisions in the Jewish community, and cross-cuts the three basic sects of American Judaism - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Reform Jews, the most liberal of the group, are as outspoken on the Israel question as the others. According to the Director of the Religious Action Center, a Reform Jewish political committee, "For American Jews, Israel is not a foreign policy issue, but a domestic issue." The identity, the sense of community, is so deeply rooted in American Jewry that it cannot be expected to dissipate. The response of American Jewry to crises in Israel, has been so staggering that it clearly manifests the root of the identification. "The reaction of American Jewry took the Israelis by surprise. It even amazed American-Jewish leaders. Why was the response so extreme? The obvious explanation is that American Jews wanted to protect Israel. True enough. But the response becomes more understandable if we proceed on the assumption that the desire on the part of the American Jews to protect Israel was also a desire to protect themselves -- that is, to protect their sense of meaning, their feeling of the worthwhileness of life, and of the rightness of being Jewish. In sum, if Israel were to be destroyed the American Jew would fall prey to anomie -- the breakdown of social norms and values. By acting as he did the American Jew was not only assisting his fellow Jews abroad; he was also protecting himself from the bottomless pit of anomie." (Marshall Sklare, America's Jews).

It may be impossible for a Gentile to fully understand the pride and also the fear that is inherent in being a Jew. I am enclosing a copy of essays on the Holocaust, written by survivors, which you and the President might skim in an attempt to understand the depth of the problem. When you read it, do not pity us, just try

to understand where our heads are coming from. Try to understand the psychic effects on a five year-old boy, me in this case, being told by his father, himself a victim of Russian pogroms, to try to accumulate jewelry and diamonds instead of bank accounts, because "when you have to run, you can only take what you can put in your pockets." The Jew grows up with a sense of distrust for all but fellow Jews. There is always the sense that when it comes down to it, you can only count on your own people. A Gentile can never tell a Jew what is best for him and for Israel. We have heard "final solutions" before.

Review 9

II. Jewish Participation in the Political Process ~~Voting~~

"Pray for the welfare of the government, since but for the awe thereof men would swallow each other alive." Rabbi Hanina, 1st Century, AD.

So much has been written about Jewish hyperactivity in politics, that there exists a whole body on this subject alone. Every book on voting behavior in America, from the classic The American Voter on, has isolated the extraordinary level of Jewish involvement in the political system. This hyperactivity can be traced to a number of correlates, including education and income. But the tradition goes back thousands of years, to places where Jews were a minute portion of the composition of a nation. This may be another manifestation of Jewish insecurity and fear -- the belief that to protect oneself, one has to become totally involved in national decision making. Milton Himmelfarb of the American Jewish Committee has written, "the zeal of untraditional Jews for politics is their de facto religion. With all they've gone through, those Jews are still messianic, and their religion is politics."

Studies have shown that between 10 and 20 percent of those actively involved in Democratic Party politics are Jewish. (Isaacs, Jews and American Politics.) The astounding level of high involvement has its own risks. Of the 20 people on Nixon's enemies list, seven of the first eight were Jews. Since a very great proportion of those actively involved in politics are highly educated and lawyers, it is not surprising that we find that fully 20% of America's lawyers have Jewish backgrounds, and that over 80% of Jewish children go on to college, and 45% go on to graduate degrees.

Although Jews comprise somewhat less than 3% of the Nation's population, they cast upwards of 4.5% of the votes in a Presidential election. Jewish turnout invariably registers 90% or more in all surveys. Participation in primary elections is even more disproportionate. In New York State, for example, where approximately 12% of the population is Jewish, Jews cast approximately 28% of the vote in Democratic state-wide primaries. In New York City, where the Jewish population is 20%, Jews cast over 55% of the vote in city-wide primaries.

Jewish voting is concentrated in ten strategic states: California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio and Michigan. Not only do Jews vote heavily, but they block vote, regardless of socio-economic status. Jews are the only voting group where religion, and not income or profession, is the best predictor of vote. Although wealthier Jews vote somewhat less Democratic than low income or middle income Jews, the difference is marginal. In presidential

elections, Democratic candidates can count on between 65% and 90% Jewish support (McGovern the low figure, Humphrey the higher figure, Carter at approximately 75% nationwide). Their impact on the electoral college is often decisive, and apparently was so in 1976. Caddell estimates that the Jewish block vote was decisive in Wisconsin (11 electoral votes), Ohio (25 electoral votes), New York (41 electoral votes), Pennsylvania (27 electoral votes) and Delaware (3 electoral votes), for a total of 107 electoral votes. Caddell estimates that in California, where our margin of defeat is now less than 40,000 votes, the loss can be attributed to a lower than national average Jewish Democratic vote (60% in California compared to 75% nationwide). If Jews had voted as heavily Democratic as their co-religionists in other states, Caddell estimates that we would have carried California and New Jersey, and possibly Virginia.

sub + to population

The variance in turnout between Jews and other groups is staggering, and tends to inflate Jewish impact in the electoral process. New York is the best case in point. In New York, Jews and blacks comprise about the same percentage of the state population -- 2,150,000. It is estimated that approximately 35% of the black voting age population actually voted, compared to over 85% for the Jewish population. Thus, 525,000 blacks voted in New York state in the 1976 presidential election, while 1,275,000 Jews voted. With 94% of the black vote going for Carter, and 75% of the Jewish vote, the differential is 495,000 black Carter voters to 955,000 Jewish Carter voters, a difference of 2 to 1. You will recall that on election night, with about 70% of the vote in and Carter trailing Ford in New York by over 100,000 votes, you called me, with a bit of frantic in your voice, and demanded to know what the hell was going on. After a quick check on which counties were still out, I reported back that we had won New York by 250,000 votes -- the outstanding votes were from Kings County (Brooklyn) and Queens County (Queens). You questioned my estimate and I told you, "Hamilton, those are my people." I was not just speaking as a New Yorker -- by "my people" I meant that they were heavily Jewish. Carter-Mondale ended up carrying New York State by 271,000 votes.

New that we have demonstrated that Jews vote heavily, and heavily Democratic, let's make no mistake about the most salient voting issue for American Jews - Israel. To American Jews, the question of Israel is the most salient and determining voting issue, foreign or domestic. If ever there was a choice between a candidate who was perceived as pro-Israel running against a candidate who was perceived as anti-Israel, the Jewish vote would swing heavily behind their "friend". This is not predicated on party-identification. Heavy Democratic Jewish voting is founded in the immigrant tradition of second and third generation American Jews, and the socio-

$$\begin{array}{r} 1,200 \\ 75 \\ \hline 84,000 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 94 \\ 47 \\ \hline 47 \end{array}$$

III. Jewish Participation in American Politics - Political Contributions

Nowhere is Jewish participation in American politics more obvious, and more disproportionate, than in the area of financial contributions to political candidates and political parties.

But political contributions should not be isolated from charitable contributions in general, for therein lies the roots of Jewish political largesse. The Hebrew/Yiddish word which translates roughly as "charity" is not charity at all. "Sedukah" means righteousness and social justice, not charity, and it is stressed from a Jewish child's first days in Sunday school. American Jewish political contributions pall by comparison to Jewish charitable contributions. It is estimated that in 1976, 3.6 billion dollars was raised by Jewish charitable institutions in the United States (there are over 800 separate Jewish charitable foundations, located in every state including Hawaii and Alaska). Some examples are illuminating. In 1972, the Israeli Bond Drive and the United Jewish Appeal raised over 600 million dollars. In the same year, the American National Red Cross raised 132 million dollars. In the first three days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, over \$100 million was raised by American Jews; at the end of that 17-day war, over one billion dollars had been contributed. "Jews give like no other group in society." (Isaacs)

Jewish contributions in politics are even more disproportionate than their giving to charities. It is estimated that over 50% of the money in support of the Democratic Party over the last two decades has been Jewish money, principally from New York and California. The overlap of actors (those involved in Israeli-Jewish fundraising and party and candidate fundraising) is very high. The same people that are giving to the United Jewish Appeal in huge quantities are giving to Democratic candidates and the state and national Democratic parties. Even in Republican campaigns we find the overlap - Jewish Republican donors are very generous on their side of the street.

Here are some examples, based on estimates from the Finance Division of the Democratic National Committee, and several books on Jewish money in politics, on the extent of the Jewish influence in fundraising in political campaigns in America:

1976 Democratic National Committee

- 1) 1976 money raised from large donors....\$3,966,000.00
- 2) Out of 125 National Finance Council members 70 were Jewish
- 3) 56% of large donor money raised was from the Jewish community

1977 Democratic National Committee

- 1) 1977 money raised to date from large donors....
\$776,344.00
- 2) Out of 476 National Finance Council members 170 are Jewish
- 3) Jewish contributions to date total \$307,850.00;
so 40% of large donor money raised is from the Jewish community

Individual Races

- 1) Jackson Presidential (1976)
Total of 60,000 contributors
91% were Jewish contributors
- 2) Nixon Presidential (1972)
60% of the \$62 million was from Jewish contributors
(Sam Schulman contributed \$350,000

Humphrey opposition raised \$3-4 million and 75% was Jewish
- 3) Humphrey Presidential (1968)
Total of 10.3 million dollars: \$4.9 million raised,
\$6.2 million borrowed
75% of contributions from Jewish community
- 4) McGovern Presidential (1972)
Total of \$30 million raised
Slightly over 50% from Jewish community
- 5) Bill Green Senate (1976)
\$1.4 million raised
30% from Jewish community
- 6) Pat Moynihan Senate (1976)
\$1.5 million raised
60% from Jewish community

- 7) Rizzo Mayor, Philadelphia, PA (1975)
\$100,000 raised in general (50% from Jewish community)
\$800,000 raised in primary (50% from Jewish community)
- 8) Tom Bradley Mayor, Los Angeles, CA (1973, 1977)
60-70% Jewish contributors
- 9) Burt Pines, Los Angeles City Attorney (1973, 1977)
Total of 1500 contributors
70% Jewish contributors

Carter Campaign Primary

- 1) Pennsylvania
Major contributors totaling 136 (56 from Jewish community)
\$101,612.82 was raised (45% from Jewish community)
- 2) Florida
Major contributors totaling 270 (87 Jewish)
\$240,334.66 was raised (30% from Jewish community)
- 3) Illinois
Major contributors totaling 325 (105 Jewish)
\$229,087.50 was raised (35% from Jewish community)
- 4) California
Major contributors totaling 448 (107 Jewish)
\$392,325.88 was raised (25% from Jewish community)
- 5) New York
Major contributors totaling 578 (305 Jewish)
\$592,701.64 was raised (48% from Jewish community)

Let me restate -- wherever there is political fundraising, no matter what the community, there is major Jewish money.

/ Bob Dole is especially sensitive to the small Jewish community in Kansas, because it is not so small in terms of his campaign contributions. Jewish money goes to candidates who are good on the question of Israel, wherever and whenever such candidates can be found. Jewish contributions extend to all elements of American life, public, political and private. Charity is a "Mitzvah" -- a good deed that is inherent in the definition of a good Jew. But the Mitzvah does indeed win friends, and the friends are all over this Nation, on the Hill and in every industry. As Rabbi Hillel said in the 11th century: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am only for myself, then what am I? and if not now, when?"

V. Carter Commitments/Statements on Middle East and Israel

President Jimmy Carter, Press Conference, May 12, 1977:

"We have a special relationship with Israel. It is absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It is a special relationship. Although I have met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and had long hours of discussion, I never found any of those Arab leaders objecting to that special commitment of our to the protection of the integrity of Israel. And, obviously, part of that is to make sure that Israel has adequate means to protect themselves without military involvement with the United States. I have no objection about this arrangement. I am proud of it. And it will be permanent as long as I am in office."

Because of the nature of the Democratic primary electorate, the President devoted considerable time, and made a number of very specific commitments, during the course of the nominating campaign on the question of Israel. During the general election campaign, he appeared before predominantly Jewish groups on several occasions, and restated those themes and commitments. The following represent Jimmy Carter's commitments to the people of the United States on his policies toward Israel and the Middle East, including the Middle East plank from the 1976 Democratic National Convention platform (which Stu Eisenstat approved, word for word, before it was adopted by the Platform Committee).

The National Democratic Platform 1976 - The Middle East

We shall continue to seek a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The cornerstone of our policy is a firm commitment to the independence and security of the State of Israel. This special relationship does not prejudice improved relations with other nations in the region. Real peace in the Middle East will permit Israel and her Arab neighbors to turn their energies to internal development, and will eliminate the threat of world conflict spreading from tensions there.

The Middle East conflict is complex, and a realistic, pragmatic approach is essential. Our policy must be based on firm adherence to these fundamental principles of Middle East policy:

We will continue our consistent support of Israel, including sufficient military and economic assistance to maintain Israel's deterrent strength in the region, and the maintenance of U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean adequate to deter military intervention by the Soviet Union.

We steadfastly oppose any move to isolate Israel in the international arena or suspend it from the United Nations or its constituent organizations.

We will avoid effort to impose on the region an externally devised formula for settlement, and will provide support for initiatives toward settlement, based on direct face-to-face negotiation between the parties and normalization of relations and a full peace within secure and defensible boundaries.

We vigorously support the free passage of shipping in the Middle East - especially in the Suez Canal.

We recognize that the solution to the problems of Arab and Jewish refugees must be among the factors taken into account in the course of continued progress toward peace. Such problems cannot be solved, however, by recognition of terrorist groups which refuse to acknowledge their adversary's right to exist, or groups which have no legitimate claim to represent the people for whom they purport to be speaking.

We support initiation of government enforcement action to insure that stated U.S. policy - in opposition to boycotts against friendly countries - is fully and vigorously implemented.

VI. The Concerns of the Jewish Community with respect to Administration and Israel -- The Parameters of the Issues

Xenophobia is permeating the Jewish community: 1) fear of this unknown Baptist named Jimmy Carter who has no public record on Israel to reassure them; 2) intense fear and distrust of the State Department-Foreign Service-Defense Department career establishment; 3) fear of "quick fix" solutions to the problems of the Middle East and 4) fear of imposed settlements on Israel by the government of the United States. In light of this fear, let's dissect the issues and the specific concerns:

1. The question of borders: The President's statements during the campaign on the Golan Heights could not have been clearer, and they were music to the Jewish community's ears. "I would never ask Israel to return the Golan Heights to Syria. If I were them, I never would. I would never ask Israel to relinquish control of the Jewish and Christian holy places of East Jerusalem." Then in the President's early press conference he talked about "defensible" borders (more music to their ears). There is great confusion about where the President is heading on the issues -- what he considers strategic and what he considers defensible. To the Jewish community, there appear to be certain points that will be very difficult to negotiate on borders:

a) With respect to the Golan, anyone who has been there says it would be suicide for Israel to let Syria return to the Golan Heights overlooking the settlements in the valley below. How much buffer is probably negotiable, but the concept of buffer is not.

b) No Israeli government could possibly agree to, nor could the American Jewish community ever accept, the return of East Jerusalem to Jordan. Here there is room for negotiation, whether it is in guaranteed access, or non-political administration of an East Jerusalem borough.

c) The right of the Palestinian people to a "Palestinian" homeland -- I know you've heard the arguments, that the partition of 1947 established both a Jewish and a Palestinian homeland, with the Palestinians to be settled in what was once Transjordan. The Jewish community here is in almost morbid fear of a separate, politically independent Palestinian entity on the West Bank of the Jordan River. The fear and disgust of the PLO reaches almost Nazi-hating quality of emotion. The American Jewish community was therefore terribly concerned by the President's reference to a Palestinian homeland. Here, too, there is room for negotiation. American Jews may be persuaded that a Palestinian homeland as part of the nation of Jordan on the West Bank may be acceptable, if the West Bank is demilitarized, and

that ultimate political control of the West Bank Palestinian "borough" remains in the hands of Jordan (I believe there is genuine trust in Hussein.) This appears to be an attempt to control the PLO, which to the Jewish community is terrorism and death. It is also a check on the pro-Russian orientation of the PLO leadership. I would think that this solution would be acceptable to Jordan, but would meet great resistance in the rest of the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia.

d) The Jewish community probably would agree to the return of the Sinai if the area was demilitarized and if there was a defensible land corridor to Sharm el Sheik overlooking the Straits of Tiran. This would also include returning the Gaza Strip to Israel control, again as long as it was demilitarized.

On all of the above issues, the American Jewish community probably thinks the President will be influenced by the State and Defense Departments, whom the Jews absolutely don't trust.

2. The question of U.S. arms to Israel: The Jewish community was really hyped-up by the PRM on tiers of defense. It should be made clear again, and I know the President has said it before, that Israel's defense is a top priority to the United States, and that we will arm Israel sufficiently to meet their military needs. This issue is far more important than you might know. Israel, and the American Jewish community, believe that if there is some agreement and Israel withdraws to anything approaching the 1967 borders, the Arabs will hold back for a couple of years until they reach military parity with Israel, and then begin first a war of attrition and then an all-out strike. If Israel sees its military dominance in danger they would almost assuredly conduct a preemptive strike against its Arab neighbors, again sending the great powers on the verge of war. Israel must feel secure in its relationship with the United States with respect to armaments before it could consider a peace agreement demanding major territorial concessions on their part. The position on co-production, and the implementation of the 1975 agreement on advance weaponry, have thrown the question of reliance on U.S. weaponry into a gray area. We must always remember that since we can never agree to any treaty which commits troops to Israel in case of war, Israel's defense rests in their own hands. If they ever are unable to defend themselves, and if the Arabs attack and are on the verge of overrunning the State of Israel, Israel will not go down alone. I know the "Never Again" philosophy of the Jewish people. There is no question in my mind that an Israel in danger of being totally overrun will go down only after it uses everything in its power, including the 20 to 25 strategically deliverable nuclear warheads that our government is fully aware that the Israelis possess and have deployed.

Thus Israel must remain secure in its conventional arsenal, and the PRM 15 was very damaging in this regard. Delivery of advanced weaponry, per the 1975 agreement, must be an integral pre-condition of any major territorial concessions.

3. The Israelis remain skeptical about third party assurances: The Israelis, and the Jewish community in the United States, seem certain that the Sinai accords have not been faithfully adhered to. They cite (a) the building of a tunnel under the Suez Canal; (b) the installation of SAM sites on the East Bank of the Canal; (c) over-deployment of troops in the limited forces zone on the West Bank area of the Canal; (d) increased levels of Egyptian propaganda which contravenes the agreement; (e) failure of Egypt to live by its pledge to the United States that it would not take an active role in removing Israel from international agreements and passing anti-Israel resolutions in International organizations (the UN Zionist is Racism resolution was passed with strong support from Egypt, as was the UNESCO ouster); (f) Egyptian ambassadorial obstructions of Israeli initiatives on diplomatic relations with black Africa (contravening Egyptian assurances to the United States that they would not stand in the way of such diplomatic overtures); (g) failure of the United States to live up to the 1975 agreement with Israel on advanced weaponry. The failure of the United States to even refer to these violations make the Israelis somewhat skeptical on U.S. assurances about guaranteeing the peace once an agreement is reached.

4. The American Jewish community has always distrusted the careerists at the State Department and Defense Department, who they believe are truly committed to General Brown's notion that Israel is a burden and liability in world affairs. They refer to these careerists as suffering from the "petro-diplomatic complex". The great fear among Jews is that the President will not be exposed to other voices than these, and they feel that they have no way currently to relate to either in the White House, the National Security Council or State, that will even be moderately sympathetic to their views.

5. The ultimate fear is of an imposed settlement by the United States, action contrary to the President's commitments and the Democratic Party Platform. President Carter's comments to European journalists that "I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the full strength of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement," aggravated the fear. They must be made to believe that a settlement is in their own best interests, and they must have some power to independently determine their interests from what the United States thinks is their interests.

6. There is a lot of what the President says that is very well received, especially in his definition of peace. They are most pleased about open borders and free trade. They believe that economic interdependence will ease the likelihood of war, and also teach people on both sides to get along civilly. These are points the President should continue to publicly stress.

All things considered, I think there is a feeling that true peace could be attained. But their fear is that the agreement will require Israel to withdraw to indefensible borders before the Arabs must implement the other areas of the treaty. Remember, Hamilton, these people are really scared. They have no confidence in anyone or anything other than themselves. They've been screwed too often to be very trusting, even of us.

VII. A Structural Prelude to a Settlement -- Easing of Tension, Opening up Communication

After giving this issue a lot of thought after our Friday talk, I have reached some tentative conclusions on where we go from here. Take them for whatever they're worth.

1. It is not enough for the Jewish community to be brought in to be sold. They have to be made to have a sense of what might happen, to be a sounding board for opinion.

2. In dealing with a strong but paranoid lobby, surprise is the worst form of communication. Surprises will trigger outrage, cries of sell-out, and the fullest use of the power of the lobby.

3. Some sense of countervailing sources of opinion must be restored to the State Department and the Defense Department.
4. We cannot proceed successfully if the feeling in the Jewish community that the State and Defense Departments are populated with anti-semitic Arabists is allowed to remain unchallenged.
5. A token of "objectivity" must be introduced into the departments, even if it is the placement of one obviously sympathetic, non-career person, in each. At the very least, this will give the lobby someone to bitch to that they feel will at least listen.

4. The sense that the White House is indifferent to their views must be attacked. They feel that they have no one here who is sympathetic and informed on the issue. Both Lipshutz and Eizenstat are seen to be busy with their own primary areas of concern and there is some feeling that Bob does not fully comprehend the issues involved. Bill Quant in NSC is suspected to be an Arabist, and David Aarons is not really thought to be committed. Someone should be added to the staff, preferably in NSC, whose primary responsibility would be the Middle East settlement, and who appears to be remotely sympathetic to the Israeli (and implicitly American Jewish) cause.

5. Once a person is designated in the White House, the Washington representatives of the Jewish groups should be brought in to discuss the situation and the issues. In the negative, these people can trigger a heavy lobbying effort from the field, but in a positive way they would really help us, or at least caution us on big mistakes. Above all, they must come to feel that their voices have been heard and that they have been part of the process. Only then could they be called on to help sell the result to their people and the Hill.

6. A person on Frank Moore's staff (preferably Cable who is quite extraordinary) should be designated as a contact point for the Jewish lobby. They should work with and through this person and this person alone. Hopefully, then we can avoid the introduction of destructive resolutions and amendments whose primary aim is to get our attention.

2 7. We should loosen up our people in State, Defense, CIA to speak to the various Jewish groups that are constantly in town. Remember, this is a very organized structure. Prominent members of many organization (including the Democratic Party and the National Finance Council) are simultaneously associated with the lobby. They could be massaged all during the process, not just at the end. I take it that they have had some problem getting appropriate speakers to explain our policies or at least answer some of their questions. This is dysfunctional to our ultimate goal.

2
2
? Let us, above all, always remember who we are dealing with. They are the children of the Holocaust, those that bear the psychic scars of the mass murders, and for having survived. I am attaching an article that appeared in Esquire, of all places entitled "All the World Wants the Jews Dead". I want you to understand the depth of the paranoia. If they are insecure, they have good reason. We must reassure them, again and again and again. If we succeed, it will be the foreign policy cornerstone of Jimmy Carter's presidency, an achievement far more difficult and far more important in terms of the stability of a region and the world than even Richard Nixon's heralded opening with China. All the little things I suggest are not only necessary, but very much worth the trouble.

	President	Vice President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Advisor
--	-----------	----------------	--------------------	----------------------	-------------

Week 1	Nunn	Moynihan	Bentsen Ford	Glenn Chafee	Abourezk Bumpers
Week 2	Stennis Talmadge	Hart Culver	Church Kennedy	Inouye Hollings	Griffin Domenici
Week 3	Sparkman Eastland	Leahy Matsunaga	Muskie	Eagleton Clark	Durkin Danforth
Week 4	Ribicoff Long	Sarbanes Nelson	Case Bayh	Zorinsky Hathaway	Gravel Schweicker
Week 5	McClellan Cannon	Percy Heinz	Burdick Hatfield	Stafford Lugar	Roth Young
Week 6	Morgan Sasser	Anderson Brooke	Mathias Stevenson	Magnuson Randolph	Goldwater Curtis
Week 7	Johnston Stone	Williams DeConcini	Biden McGovern	Packwood Pearson	Hayakawa Wallop
Week 8	Chiles Huddleston	Melcher Metcalf		Allen Byrd, H.	Schmitt Hansen
Week 9	McIntyre Haskell	Proxmire Weicker		Stevens Laxalt	
Week 10	Javits Metzenbaum	Reigle Pell		Tower Thrumond	

[P 45]

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

..... Surrogate(s)

	President	Vice-President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Adviser	Surrogate(s)
Week 1	Working session with key members of the United States Senate ¹ (1 hour)	Same as President	Briefing for House Committee on International Relations	-	-	-
Week 2	Briefing #1 for leaders of national Jewish organizations (1 hour)	Working session with key members of the House ²	-	-	Coordinates President's briefing	-
Week 3	Briefing #1 for key members of the Jewish press (1 hour)	Briefing #2 for leaders of national Jewish organizations	Briefing <u>New York City</u>	-	Coordinates briefings	Briefing in <u>Miami</u> - Lipsh and Fizenstat
Week 4	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders ? Group #1 (30 minutes)	Briefing #2 for key members of the Jewish press	-	Briefing <u>Los Angeles</u>	Coordinates briefings	-

¹Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.

²Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jewish constituencies

MIDEAST POLICY CONSULTATION

[P. 47]

	President	Vice-President	Secretary of State	Secretary of Defense	NSC Adviser Surrogate(s)
Week 5	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #2 (30 minutes)	<u>Briefing Boston</u>	-	-	Coordinates briefing	Briefing in Baltimore - <u>Lipshutz & Eizenstat</u>
Week 6	-	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #3	<u>Briefing Chicago</u>	-	Coordinates briefing	-
Week 7	Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #4 (30 minutes)	-	-	<u>Briefing Detroit</u>	Coordinates briefing	<u>Briefing in Philadelphia</u>
Week 8	-	<u>Briefing Cleveland</u>	-	-	<u>Briefing Washington</u>	-

Processing note for box 34, Jordan
Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo 6/77

The original 8 1/2 by 14 yellow sheets (15) with notes
were sent to Washington, DC for the EAP Project.

JAY
7/13/98

	VISITS	TARGETED MAIL	TARGETED MEDIA
ARKANSAS			
FLORIDA	CARTER		
GEORGIA	CARTER/LANCE		
KENTUCKY	VANCE		
LOUISIANA	S. TURNER		
MISSISSIPPI	BELL/BROWN		
MONTANA			
WASHINGTON			
W. VA.			
VERMONT			
N.D.	BERGLAND		
—			
ALA.			
ALASKA			
ARIZONA			
CONN.	MONDALE		
CAL.	—		
DEL.			
IND.			
MICH	BLUMENTHAL		
KANSAS			
N.C.	KREPS		
NY.	MONDALE		
NEV.			
MO.			
ORE.			
PENN.			
S.C.			
TEXAS	STRAUSS/C. DUNCAN		
TENN.	BROWN		

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purpose

10	7	5
COE.	ARK.	MA.
HAWAII	FLA.	ALASKA
INDIA	GA.	ARIZONA
ILL.	KENT.	CONN.
MAINE	LA.	CAL.
MASS.	MISS.	DEL.
MD.	MONT.	IND.
N.J.	WASH	MICH
MISS.	W.V.	KANSAS
MINN	VETM.	N.C.
NH	N.D.	N.Y.
OHIO		NEV.
R.I.		MO.
S.D.		ORE.
MISS.		PENN.
WISC.		S.C.
		TEX.
		TENN.

VISITS

CONSULTATION

VISIT

- P. KP. SS. S.D. OTHER.
- DIRECT MAIL
- T.V.
- NATIONALLY
- TOWNHALL
- CONSULTATION

	2	(10)	(7)	(5)	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
	W	B.C. B.	BOTH UD	GOOD C. ONE	ONE UD	SOME C. BOTH	SOME C. ONE	N. CHARLLE	
NEB.	2				3				3
NH.	-	10							10
MONT.	-		7						7
OHIO	-	10							10
OKLA.	2					2			2
OREGON	1			5					5
PENNA.	2			5					5
R.I.	-	10							10
S.D.	-	10							10
S.C.	1			5					5
TEXAS	1			5					5
TENN.	1			5					5
UTAH	2					2			2
VT.	2	10							10
VA.	2					2			2
WASH.	2		7						7
W. VA.	-		7						7
WISC.	-	10							10
WYO.	2					2			2

VA
N.M.
WYOM.
VA.
OKL.
NEB

	(2) WARNKE	(10) GOOD CHANGE BOTH	(7) BOTH U.D.	(5) GOOD CHANGE ONE	(3) ONE U.D.	(2) SOME CHANGE BOTH	(1) SOME CHANGE ONE	(0) NO CHANGE ET AL	
ALA.	1			5				5	6
ALASKA	1			5				5	6
ARK.	1		7					7	8
ARIZONA	1			5				5	6
CAL.	-	10						10	10
CONN.	1			5				5	6
CAL.	1			5				5	6
DEL.	1			5				5	6
FLA.	2		7					7	9
GA.	2		7					7	9
HAWAII	-	10						10	10
IOWA	-	10						10	10
ILL.	-	10						10	10
IND.	1			5				5	6
IDAHO	1			5				5	6
KENT.	1		7					7	8
LA.	-		7					7	7
MAINE	-	10						10	10
MISS.	1		7					7	8
MASS.	-	10						10	10
MICH	1			5				5	6
KAN.	1			5				5	6
N.C.	1			5				5	6
N.Y.	1			5				5	6
N.M.	2					2		2	4
NEV.	1			5				5	6
MARYLAND	-	10						10	10
N.J.	-	10						10	10
N.D.	-	10	7					10	10
MINN.	-	10						10	10
MO.	1			5				5	6

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purpose

STATE

CHARGE CI
BOTH

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

6 5 4 3 2 1

<u>STATE</u>	<u>1 SOV</u>	<u>2 SOV</u>	<u>BOTH</u> <u>HR</u>	<u>ONE</u> <u>HR</u>	<u>BOTH</u> <u>CH.</u>	<u>ONE</u> <u>CH.</u>	<u>LITRE</u> <u>1</u>	<u>NO</u> <u>CHANGE</u>
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
ALABAMA	1			5				
ARK.	1		6					
ALASKA	1			5				
ARIZO	1			5				

2 1 2 1 2 1
10 6 5 4 3 1

* Premise is:

1) Pursuing large number of foreign policy objectives simultaneously - need to coordinate

2) Consultation needed + necessary

① Consultation Project

② Mid East - taking the initiative with the Jewish community;

* Mostly, we have enormous resources but need:

Charles Duvall

A) Inventory ^{political} resources

B) Target strategic sectors

C) Public understanding, limited / public education

D) Coordinating mechanism for application of resources to _____;


2 5 5
 5 5
Formula for Targeting States

5

IF ONE SIDE OPPOSED LAWNS (1 pt)	IF BOTH OPPOSED (2 pt)	IF BOTH TRULY UND (6 pt)	IF ONE TRULY UND (5 pt)	SOME CHANCE OF GETTING BOTH (4 pt)	SOME CHANCE OF GETTING ONE (3 pt)
---	------------------------------	-----------------------------------	----------------------------------	--	---

POSSIBILITY
 NO ~~CHANCE~~
 OF GETTING
 ONE SIDATOR
 (2 pt)

NO POSSIBILITY
 OF GETTING
 EITHER



2

2

2

2

2

I have attempted in this memorandum to review in comprehensive fashion the foreign policy questions/problems that confront your Administration at present ~~and reconcile the ^{the} ~~policy~~ with the political ~~and~~ ~~problems~~ ~~of~~ ~~opportunities~~ ~~the~~ ~~present~~.~~

and the domestic political ~~and~~ ~~problems~~, ~~and~~

5

TL

1. Have you heard of SALT? If yes, do you have favorable or unfavorable opinion of such talks?

SALT

April, 77

YES ← F 54
 UF 20
 NS 9
 +
 NO/DK 17

Since U.S. is piling up Soviet arms in military might, we should concentrate on building new weapons, not disarmament.

NAT AGREE 53
 DK 10
 DISAGREE 36

April, 77

S A. 62
 DK 9
 DIS 29

Would you favor or oppose establishing d.r. with Cuba?

CUBA

NAT SOVTEL
 F 59 54
 D 29 33
 DK 12

April, 77

Protectionism

<u>NAT</u>	<u>S</u>
F. 56	54
O. 36	40
DX 9	9

Can't go for or oppose crossing
tariffs or taxes on imported
goods to protect the American
steel industry from competition
even if it meant higher
prices here at home?

April, 77

TARGET STATES

1 SENATOR VISE
AGAINST
LAW

1 BOTH
SENATORS

GA.

FLA.

ALA

MISS.

S.C.

N.C.

TEX.

KENT.

VA.

ARK.

LA.

TEXAS

1 1 3

SOME
CHANGE

IF BOTH
SENATOR VIND.

IF ONE
SENATOR

IF CHANGE
OF GETTING
BOTH SEN.

IF
COAL
SEN

1 1 6

5

4

2

NO
CHANGE
OF
ETHNIC

NO CHANGE
OF ETHNIC

1 1 6 5 4 3 2 1

Jan. 11
Four or opposite being things how
from Korea?

KOREA

F 48
O 35
DK 16

S. AFRICA

Should vs actually provide black
majority ~~is~~ govt. in South Africa?

	NAT.	SOUTH
YES	35	33
NO	42	48
NS	22	19

~~Four or opposite being things~~

VIETNAM

Do you think U.S. should restore
diplomatic relations with Vietnam

YES 39
NO 41
NS 21

Question	+	-	DK
* SACT	F. 54	UF. 20	9
* CUBA	F. 59	O. 29	
* KOREA	F. 48	O. 35	16
* S.AFRICA	35	42	22
* VIETNAM	38	41	21
* PANAMA			

-
- * 2 of 5 are unpoplar
 - * Korea is close
 - * Cuba & SACT position favorable