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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	Hedley Donovan to HJ (2 pp.) OPENED 3/12/97	2/15/80	A
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embtel	931 from Bern	2/19/80	A
embtel	5136 from Paris OPENED 9/17/97	2/14/80	A
embtel	5241 from Paris OPENED 9/17/97	2/14/80	A
memo	Points to Cover (4 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/15/80	A
draft	from Harold Saunders (2 pp.) OPENED 3/19/97	2/12/80	A
draft	from Harold Saunders (1 p.) OPENED 3/19/97	2/12/80	A
embtel	5284 from Paris OPENED 9/17/97	2/15/80	A
embtel	5048 from Paris SANITIZED 9/17/97	2/13/80	A
report	via H. Precht (6 pp.)	2/7/80	A
memo	JC to HJ (1 p.) 2 copies OPENED 9/16/97	2/15/80	A
draft	Iran (1 p.) OPENED 3/19/97	2/15/80	A
message	from Lang (5pp.)	2/6/80	A
draft	Iran (1 p.)	n.d.	A
draft	to Lang OPENED 9/17/97	2/3/80	A
corrsp.	A. Hanisadre to Christian Bourguet & Hector Villalon OPENED 9/17/97	2/8/80	A
corrsp.	Sadegh Ghorbani to Messieurs Bourguet & Villalon OPENED 9/17/97	2/8/80	A
memo	to HJ 2 copies (1 p.) SANITIZED 3/9/00	2/22/80	A
draft	HJ (2 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/22/80	A
draft	Iran (8pp.)	2/15/80	A
draft	Iran (2 pp.) 4 copies OPENED 3/19/97	n.d.	A
report	to HJ (8 pp.) SANITIZED 3/10/00	2/6/80	A
report	to HJ (11 pp.)	2/15/80	A

FILE LOCATION

Confidential File
Chief of Staff (Jordan) / Box 6 of 8 (orig.) / Iran-Feb. 1980

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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cable	to White House (4 pp.)	4/12/80	A
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cable	to White House (3 pp.)	2/21/80	A
cable	to White House (4 pp.) 2 copies	2/20/80	A
report	Iran (1 p.) <i>OPENED 7/19/97</i>	n.d.	A
cable	to White House (2 pp.)	2/21/80	A
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cable	to White House (2 pp.)	2/22/80	A
cable	to White House (2 pp.)	2/22/80	A
cable	to White House (2 pp.)	2/22/80	A
report	to HJ (9 pp.)	2/21/80	A
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cable	to HJ (4 pp.)	2/8/80	A
cable	to White House (4 pp.)	2/26/80	A

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memo	HJ to JC (6 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/24/80	A
memo	NEA/RWG (1 p.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/4/80	A
MEMO	HJ to JC (14 pp.) OPENED 9/16/97	2/6/80	A
memo	HJ to JC (3 pp.) OPENED 9/16/97	2/8/80	A
memo	to Lang (2 pp.)	2/5/80	A
briefing paper	Iran (2 pp.) OPENED 9/16/97	2/3/80	A
draft statement	Iran (2 PP.)	2/13/80	A
message	Tehran to Ambassadors (1 pp.)	2/28/80	A
message	from Ruegg (1 p.)	2/29/80	A
message	from Lang (1 p)	2/29/80	A
report	RWG (2 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/28/80	A
memcon	Nector Villalon & Stephanie van Reigersberg (2 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	2/28/80	A
message	from Lang (2 pp.)	2/27/80	A
memo	Harold H. Saunders to Cyrus Vance (12 pp.) SANITIZED 9/16/97	2/27/80	A
message	from Lang? (9 pp.)	2/27/80	A
message	from Lang (4 pp.)	2/26/80	A
cable	British Embassy Washington to Sec. State (2 pp.)	2/26/80	A
memo	Harold Saunders to Cyrus Vance <u>et al</u> (2 pp.) SANITIZED 9/16/97	2/23/80	A
message	to Lang (3 pp.)	2/6/80	A
memo	Talking Points (2 pp.) OPENED 9/17/97	n.d.	A
Cable	FBI to White House (1 p.)	2/22/80	A
memo	Saunders (for the record) (4 pp.) 2 copies SANITIZED 9/17/97	2/19/80	A

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~~SECRET~~

NODIS

TALKING POINTS

-- The President has asked me to share with you our understanding of where matters stand regarding the American hostages in Tehran.

-- As you know, the UN Commission of Inquiry departed for Tehran Saturday noon. Its mandate is two-fold: (1) to hear whatever concerns the Iranians wish to bring before it and (2) to bring about an early resolution of the crisis between the US and Iran, which requires the release of our hostages.

-- The President wants you to have the very sensitive information that we agreed to the Commission's going to Tehran only with the understanding that the Iranians agree to the principle that the hostages should be released in connection with the work of the Commission. We do not expect the period when the Commission is working to go smoothly, and it may produce some unpleasant publicity from Tehran, but we believe the members of the Commission are all men of stature and integrity in their own right and will handle the situation wisely.

-- President Carter also expects our country and himself to be publicly criticized in various statements during this period. As abusive as these statements may be, we will carefully modulate our public comments in order to give the Commission maximum opportunity to create a situation in which the hostages may be released.

-- The President deeply appreciates the restraint you have shown in your own statements to date. He hopes you will be able to continue your forbearance during this delicate period which is so critical for our people. We will have an opportunity to answer these abusive charges soon.

-- We also understand that a Panamanian lawyer, hired by the Iranian authorities, is now in Tehran and plans to hold a press conference Sunday about the Iranian case for extradition so there may be some publicity on this in the next day or two.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 6/14/97 ~~SECRET~~ RE NLC-97-22

BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 8/29/97

~~SECRET~~

-2-

-- We know how unpleasant this subject is for you. We continue to receive assurances from our Panamanian colleagues that extradition is out of the question. We believe that the key authorities in Tehran need to be on record with the people of Iran as pursuing the subject.

-- On the question of extradition, the President has asked that I state the following:

- I met last night with General Torrijos who unequivocally reaffirmed the Panamanian position that you will not be extradited. We have full confidence in General Torrijos' assurances. The President has dealt with Torrijos on many difficult subjects, and he has never violated a commitment.

- Our policy remains firm and unchanging: that you should not be extradited; that the Panamanian position that you will not be extradited is fully accepted by both the US and Panama; and that if you do make any plans for onward travel, they should be based completely on your own decision without any outside coercion. We do hope that any move might be deferred until after our hostages are out.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT STATEMENT

The fifty Americans held hostage in Tehran since November 4 have now been placed in the care of the Government of Iran. The time has come to bring this crisis to an end and look to the future.

The objective of the United States is to develop peaceful relations with all nations on the basis of mutual respect. Unfortunately, our relations with Iran have deteriorated over the past year. That deterioration has culminated in the act of taking our people hostage. It has not served the interests of either country.

The United States respects the integrity and independence of Iran. The preservation of Iran's integrity and independence is in the interest of the United States and the Free World. Iran has experienced a revolution, but it is in the interest of all that the people of Iran have the opportunity to build a stable future free of outside interference.

We understand the grievances felt by the people of Iran. They have had the opportunity to present their concerns to the Commission of Inquiry appointed by Secretary General Waldheim. We regret that some Iranians feel that the U.S. is partly responsible for those grievances. We regret that some Iranians feel that the United States has interfered in Iran's internal affairs. We respect the right of the people of Iran to determine their own form of government and to build their own future.

The United States recognizes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the legal government of Iran and President Bani Sadr as its duly elected President. We believe the time has come to resolve the differences between us and to look to the future. We want a good relationship with the people and government of Iran based on equality, mutual respect, and the principles of international law. We are prepared to appoint representatives to discuss and resolve our outstanding differences once our hostages are safely released.

As Iran seeks satisfaction for past grievances, the United States recognizes the right of Iran to pursue legal action in courts of the United States to account for assets that may be judged to belong to the national treasury of Iran or to file suits on the basis of the presumption of serious crimes committed in the past.

We believe the time has come to look to the future. The United States and Iran share common interests in building a peaceful world. It is time to turn to them again.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

As we have all seen, there have been some encouraging signs in connection with the possible release of our hostages.

However, after 102 days of captivity and many false hopes, I do not need to caution you against ~~rate~~ over-optimism.

Having said that, I am sure the

TELEGRAM TO SWISS AMBASSADOR LANG

1. WE WOULD WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF AMBASSADOR LANG COULD DELIVER THE TWO SEPARATE MESSAGES CONTAINED IN THIS TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHOTBZADEH AND TO PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR OR HIS ASSOCIATE, SALAMATIAN. WE VERY MUCH HOPE THIS WILL GIVE AMBASSADOR LANG OCCASION FOR DIRECT MEETING WITH BANI-SADR HIMSELF.
2. THE FIRST MESSAGE IS A STATEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM/ FOR AMBASSADOR FARHANG EARLY IN JANUARY. WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE STATEMENT REACHED TEHRAN. THE LAST POINT IN THE STATEMENT WOULD APPEAR TO BE RESPONSIVE TO IRANIAN DESIRES FOR AN EXPRESSION OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. TOWARDS THE ROVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. {IN THE MEETING WITH BANI-SADR, AMBASSADOR LANG MIGHT MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 6 IN RELATION TO BANI-SADR'S CALL FOR A U.S. EXPRESSION OF VIEWS TOWARDS IRAN DURING HIS AMERICAN TV INTERVIEW ON FEBRUARY 3.} BEING TEXT: {INSERT FROM ATTACHMENT} END TEXT.
3. THE SECOND MESSAGE PRESENTS INFORMATION ON SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS RELATING TO IRAN. BEGIN TEXT: IN THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND COMBAT IN AFGHANISTAN, THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO KEEP THOROUGHLY ABREAST OF THE DISPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE REGION. BESIDES FOLLOWING SOVIET MOVES RELATED TO AFGHANISTAN, THERE HAS BEEN HIGH INTEREST IN THE STATUS OF SOVIET GROUND AND AIR FORCES ADJACENT TO TURKEY AND IRAN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 6/18/01 Sdk Hbr NLC-97-22
BY 9 NARS. DATE 8/29/07

~~SECRET~~

UNTIL JANUARY, SOVIET UNITS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS WERE ESSENTIALLY QUIET WITH NO CHANGE IN THEIR NORMAL STATE OF VERY LOW READINESS FOR ACTION. DURING JANUARY, THIS CHANGED.

STEPS HAVE BEEN STARTED TO RAISE MANPOWER AND READINESS LEVELS FOR ALL OF THE APPROXIMATELY ONE DOZEN SOVIET DIVISIONS STRETCHED OUT BETWEEN TBILISI AND BAKU. A NUMBER OF THESE UNITS HAVE BEGUN TRAINING EXERCISES AND ELEMENTS OF ALMOST ALL OF THEM SEEM TO BE OUT OF THEIR REGULAR GARRISON AREAS. AIR FORCE UNITS AND THE ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS SEEM TO BE IN A NORMAL STATE. THE SAME APPEARS TRUE FOR NAVAL UNITS IN THE CASPIAN SEA.

THESE SOVIET MOVES SHOULD PROBABLY BE INTERPRETED AS PREPARATIONS FOR CONTINGENCIES, RATHER THAN AS SIGNS OF ANY DECISION IN MOSCOW TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS IN THE NEXT MONTHS AGAINST IRAN. HOWEVER, THE USSR REMAINS WORRIED ABOUT INSTABILITY ON ITS BORDERS, ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN IT IS ENGAGED IN WAR IN NEARBY AFGHANISTAN. IT PROBABLY WANTS TO BE READY TO TAKE ANY ACTION THAT IT DEEMS NECESSARY IN THE LIGHT OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRAN OR IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT IRAN'S RENUNCIATION OF THOSE PARTS OF THE 1921 IRAN-USSR TREATY WHICH GIVE TO THE USSR CERTAIN RIGHTS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAN. CAN THE GOI CONFIRM THESE REPORTS, AND IF SO, HOW DOES IRAN INTERPRET THE SOVIET POSITION? END TEXT

4. WE WOULD LIKE AMBASSADOR LANG TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TWO-POINT MESSAGE ONLY TO BANI-SADR, OR, IF IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE HIM, SALAMATIAN. FIRST, WE HAVE SEEN THE RECENT ARTICLE BY THE EGYPTIAN JOURNALIST HEIKEL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER BANI-SADR HAS BEEN IN RECENT TOUCH WITH HEIKEL AND WHETHER WHAT HEIKEL HAS TO SAY COINCIDES WITH BANI-SADR'S VIEWS. SECOND, WE LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO THE BANI-SADR TELEVISION INTERVIEW.

WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT WE CAN MOVE WITH GREAT SPEED TO RESOLVE IT; FURTHER DELAY SERVES THE INTERESTS OF NEITHER IRAN NOR THE UNITED STATES AND WILL MAKE A SOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT.

US POSITION

1). The safe and immediate departure from Iran of all US employees of the Embassy in Tehran and other Americans held hostage is essential to a resolution of other issues.

2). The US understands and sympathizes with the grievances felt by many Iranian citizens concerning the practices of the former regime. The US is prepared to work out in advance firm understandings on a forum in which those grievances may subsequently be aired, so that the hostages could be released with confidence that those grievances will be heard in an appropriate forum after the release has taken place. The US will not concur in any hearing that involves the hostages. The US is prepared to cooperate in seeking through the auspices of the UN to establish such a forum or commission to hear Iran's grievances and to produce a report on them. The USG will cooperate with such a group in accordance with its laws, international law and the Charter of the UN.

3). The US Government will facilitate any legal action brought by the Government of Iran in courts of the United States to account for assets within the custody or control of the former Shah that may be judged to belong to the national treasury of Iran by advising the courts, and other interested parties, that the US Government recognizes the right of the Government of Iran to bring such claims before the courts and to request the courts' assistance in obtaining information about such assets from financial institutions and other parties.

4) Once the hostages are safely released, the US is prepared to lift the freeze of Iranian assets and to facilitate normal commercial relations between the two countries, on the understanding that Iran will meet its financial obligations to US nationals and that the arrangements to be worked out will protect the legitimate interests of US banks and other claimants. The US is prepared to appoint members of a working group to reach agreement on those arrangements.

5.) The United States is prepared to appoint a representative to discuss with Iranian representatives the current threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to recommend to their government steps that the US and Iran might take in order to enhance the security of Iran, including the resumption of the supply of military spare parts by the United States to Iran.

6.) The US Administration is prepared to make a statement at an appropriate moment that it understands the grievances felt by the people of Iran, and that it respects the integrity of Iran, and the right of the people of Iran to choose their own form of government. The United States Government recognizes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the legal government of Iran. The US reaffirms that the people of Iran have the right to determine their own form of government.

~~SECRET~~

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M002

IRANIAN

BY THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

IRAN HAS AGREED TO SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION THAT WILL CONSIDER ALLEGED CRIMES OF THE DEPOSED SHAH AND WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN SOLVING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, A FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SAID SUNDAY.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION, PROPOSED BY U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM, HAS BEEN APPROVED BY IRANIAN LEADER AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI AS WELL AS THE RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN, NASSIROSDAT SALAMI.

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MILITANTS, REACHED BY TELEPHONE AT THE EMBASSY, SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THE COUNCIL'S DECISION, ANNOUNCED SATURDAY NIGHT, BUT DECLINED IMMEDIATE COMMENT. A STATEMENT MIGHT BE ISSUED LATER, THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE MILITANTS SAID.

SUNDAY WAS THE 92ND DAY OF CAPTIVITY FOR APPROXIMATELY 50 AMERICANS HELD BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY SINCE IT WAS SEIZED NOV. 4. THREE OTHER U.S. DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN HELD SINCE THEN UNDER VIRTUAL HOUSE ARREST AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

THE MILITANTS HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THEY WILL NOT RELEASE THE HOSTAGES UNTIL DEPOSED SHAH MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI, LIVING IN PANAMA, IS RETURNED BY THE UNITED STATES TO STAND TRIAL ON CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AND MASS MURDER.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DID NOT SAY WHEN THE COMMISSION WOULD COME TO TEHRAN NOR WHEN HEARINGS WOULD BEGIN. ITS MEMBERS WOULD BE SELECTED BY WALDHEIM AND WOULD INCLUDE IRANIAN AND FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES, SALAMI SAID.

HE SAID IT WOULD BE WALDHEIM'S DECISION WHETHER TO INCLUDE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AMONG THE GROUP. HE REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY REPORTS THAT WALDHEIM SOON WOULD VISIT IRAN.

ADDED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN SOLVING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.

NEWS OF THE COMMISSION CAME LATE SATURDAY FOLLOWING A LENGTHY MEETING OF IRAN'S RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. AFTER THE SESSION, COUNCIL SPOKESMAN HASSAN HABIBI SAID THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION WILL CONSIDER THE SHAH'S CRIMES, HIS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RETURN OF HIS WEALTH TO IRAN.

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Briefing Paper -- Iran

Today, for at least the third straight day, the Revolutionary Council remained in prolonged session. Richard Cottam tried to reach Ghotbzadeh from midnight until 1530 today. Finally, he was told that the meeting was continuing and he should call back at 0830 Tehran time (midnight EST). It seems probable that the Council is considering the Iranian response to the scenario conveyed by the two French lawyers. The Council is also preoccupied with setting procedures and dates for the parliamentary elections now set for February 15. Almost certainly at the crux of the debate is bargaining between Bani-Sadr on the one hand and Ghotbzadeh and Beheshti on the other as to how the power will be shared and deals that will give maximum protection to either side in the elections.

The Iranians are faced with the task of melding the differing approaches taken by Bani-Sadr (who places less emphasis on a U.N. commission and more on statements and actions by the U.S.) and Ghotbzadeh and the French lawyers' paper. A preliminary indication of the Council's thinking is contained in the press statement (attached) endorsing a U.N. Commission of Inquiry. While Bani-Sadr can promise (as he does in the message through Heikel) to end the crisis when he assumes power, Ghotbzadeh is hoping to resolve it before transfer of authority.

We are attempting to get a reading of the actual issues involved through a Cottam-Ghotbzadeh call tonight and to check out the Bani Sadr-Heikel channel via the Swiss Ambassador.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 8/20/97 NLS HRE NLS-97-21
BY NARS. DATE 8/28/97

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

DRAFT STATEMENT

The fifty Americans held hostage in Tehran since November 4 have now been placed in the care of the Government of Iran. The time has come to bring this crisis to an end and look to the future.

The objective of the United States is to develop peaceful relations with all nations on the basis of mutual respect. Unfortunately, our relations with Iran have deteriorated over the past year. That deterioration has culminated in the act of taking our people hostage. It has not served the interests of either country.

The United States respects the integrity and independence of Iran. The preservation of Iran's integrity and independence is in the interest of the United States and the Free World. Iran has experienced a revolution, but it is in the interest of all that the people of Iran have the opportunity to build a stable future free of outside interference.

We understand the grievances felt by the people of Iran. They have had the opportunity to present their concerns to the Commission of Inquiry appointed by Secretary General Waldheim. We regret that some Iranians feel that the U.S. is partly responsible for those grievances. We regret that some Iranians feel that the United States has interfered in Iran's internal affairs. We respect the right of the people of Iran to determine their own form of government and to build their own future.

The United States recognizes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the legal government of Iran and President Bani Sadr as its duly elected President. We believe the time has come to resolve the differences between us and to look to the future. We want a good relationship with the people and government of Iran based on equality, mutual respect, and the principles of international law. We are prepared to appoint representatives to discuss and resolve our outstanding differences once our hostages are safely released.

As Iran seeks satisfaction for past grievances, the United States recognizes the right of Iran to pursue legal action in courts of the United States to account for assets that may be judged to belong to the national treasury of Iran or to file suits on the basis of the presumption of serious crimes committed in the past.

We believe the time has come to look to the future. The United States and Iran share common interests in building a peaceful world. It is time to turn to them again.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: February 4, 1980

TIME: 1:00 A.M.

SUBJECT: Cottam-Ghotbzadeh Conversation on February 4

Cottam called Ghotbzadeh to ask if he could pass on any news of the discussions the French lawyers had had. Ghotbzadeh replied that things were going very well, but he gave no comment on the substance of the discussions, except to say that he thought he would be going to France and he might want someone from the "American team" to meet with him there.

Cottam asked Ghotbzadeh about the possibility of a leak in Tehran about the two lawyers. Ghotbzadeh said he did not think a leak was possible and we did not have to be concerned about that.

Ghotbzadeh indicated that he had no problem with Farhang's move to Geneva, indicating that he could go back to New York, if necessary.

When Cottam read Ghotbzadeh excerpts from the Haykal article and asked for comment, Ghotbzadeh just laughed. Cottam interpreted this to mean that Ghotbzadeh thought it was ridiculous that anybody could be passing messages to Khomeini now.

When Cottam asked about telephone calls to Bruce Laingen, Ghotbzadeh got angry saying he was under terrific pressure. Cottam concluded that part of the conversation, asking Ghotbzadeh if he meant that it would be alright to call Laingen in a short while. Ghotbzadeh replied that it would be OK in a while, not to worry.

Cottam said Ghotbzadeh, in a generally up-beat conversation, displayed the greatest anxiety when talking about the "students." In most of his conversations Ghotbzadeh has taken the attitude that he was fully able to manage or control the students. In today's conversation he told Cottam that they were more difficult than ever before.

Drafted: NEA/IWG:HPrecht:apr

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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BY

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NARS. DATE

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EYES ONLY

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*

I hope that you will have a chance to review this before our 2:00 meeting on the hostage situation. It may be a bit disjointed, but analyses frankly the situation that we face.

Our objective continues to be to get the hostages out safely at the earliest possible date without having to take risks that are unacceptable. If anything, our objective has been modified since the Afghanistan invasion to include, "and in a way that does not jeopardize the possibility of a reconciliation of US-Iranian relations". Politically, I believe that we continue to have some flexibility on what we are able to do in the course of working toward the release of the hostages. The American people will tolerate a good deal more now than they would have

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 9/20/97 NSC Hrc RE NLC-97-21
BY *[Signature]* NARS. DATE 8/28/97

before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan IF we have the successful resolution of the hostage situation.

Let me review briefly what we know for a fact and those things that we are not sure of:

1. That in the final analysis, only Khomeini can insure the safe release of the hostages. It is doubtful that Bani-Sadr can get the militants to release them and very, very doubtful that Ghotbzadeh can get them released.
2. That a large number of the Revolutionary Council - possibly all - see the need to resolve the hostage situation, and that this includes the clerics as well as the "European group".
3. That at least among the European group and other members of the Revolutionary Council, a clear concensus is emerging as to how the situation should be resolved. It recognizes that the Shah will not be returned, but places special emphasis on the international tribunal, the right of Iran to seek extradition of the Shah, to seek the legal recovery of his

"stolen monies" and public statements from the United States that suggest that we are willing to develop a relationship which acknowledges both the "equality" of Iran and is based on "mutual respect".

4. That political factors and personal animosity between Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr have possibly resulted in a situation whereby although there is general consensus as to "how", there is not a consensus as to "who" or "when". Ghotbzadeh wants to do it quickly and be personally involved for obvious reasons, and Bani-Sadr prefers to wait until after he takes power. (at least that is the message from the Egyptian which we need to confirm).

5. That although Ghotbzadeh is personally unpopular, he probably has the support of Behesti and other members of the Revolutionary Council who are against Bani-Sadr for other reasons. It is impossible to discern as to whether the support for Ghotbzadeh reflects a desire to resolve the situation quickly or whether they simply want to deprive Bani-Sadr of the personal satisfaction of resolving it when he takes over.

6. That while Bani-Sadr might not like Ghotbzadeh, he has let us know through two very direct channels - Mrs. Nobari and Ambassador Lang that we were to continue to deal with Ghotbzadeh, but that he wanted to be kept informed. He probably recognizes the reality of the situation, and while not liking it is reconciled to it.

7. That while the Foreign Minister is disliked by almost everyone, those same people recognize that he has a personal relationship with Khomeini that cannot be ignored or taken lightly.

It seems to me that the following is and should be our posture:

- That we should continue to pursue an early release of the hostages through Ghotbzadeh, but not at the expense of our relationship with Bani-Sadr.
- That we should keep Bani-Sadr informed of our activities.
- That if it ever became a choice of having to choose between Ghotbzadeh and Bani-Sadr, we would have to go with Bani-Sadr.
- That we should work to try to avoid that choice by a reconciliation of their views, in this respect the French contacts are invaluable.

-That to put Ghotbzadeh on "hold" now has a number of problems for us:

1. We cannot make a conscious decision to wait until after Bani-Sadr takes office in late February to try to resolve the present crisis.
2. The delay also risks the chance that something could happen to Khomeini, who by all accounts will have to be personally involved in freeing the hostages from the compound.
3. That Bani-Sadr does not know what the political situation will be when he takes office. It could very well be that resolving the hostage situation will be more difficult for him then than it is for Ghotbzadeh now.

It might be possible through the French contacts and the political leverage of the Revolutionary Council to create a situation where Bani-Sadr has no choice but to tolerate/actively cooperate in pursuing a strategy of early release. In fairness to Bani-Sadr, he may think that only he will have the muscle and the influence to resolve the crisis, and that it is less a matter of who gets the credit but more a matter of who can pull it off.

Finally, you should read the enclosed Memcon from Cottam. Cottam says that Ghotbzadeh could not risk direct contact with us without the knowledge of Bani-Sadr, the Revolutionary Council and even Khomeini. He says that if we had an opportunity for direct contact, we would have to take advantage of it.

One final comment about our French contacts, particularly Mr. B. They are not the stooges of Ghotbzadeh. One preferred Habibi for President and the other Bani-Sadr. They have been dealing with the Foreign Minister because they have been told to by the Revolutionary Council and by Ghotbzadeh. They told me last weekend that if Ghotbzadeh tried to block them from seeing Bani-Sadr or the other members of the Revolutionary Council, they would "wash their hands of this matter".

The Iranian experts at the State Department who have seen a flurry of stories and hints coming out of Tehran and the UN think strongly that the French proposal which we were involved in has been seen and is being discussed and debated by different members of the Revolutionary Council. They assume that Bani-Sadr would have to be a part of any such discussion. All of the various stories coming out which contain precise details are generally compatible with the scenario that we jointly evolved.

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SUBJECT

Iran

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<u>Send To</u>	<u>Deliver To</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room</u>
<i>WHSR</i>	<i>ATTN: Ham Jordan</i>		

REMARKS

8/20/89 CIA

*NLC-17-19
1/13/00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 February 1980

Note For: White House Situation Room
Attn: Hamilton Jordan

From : 
Chief, Iran Task Force

Just a reminder that while Bani-Sadr may be helpful with the hostages, in the long term, he will not be a great friend with the US.



g/b/99 CIA NLC-97-19
1/13/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 February 1980

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Iran: Bani-Sadr's Foreign Policy Views

Summary

President Bani-Sadr appears determined to play a major role in determining Iranian foreign policy. Although he is generally considered to favor some settlement of the hostage crisis short of the return of the Shah to Iran, his views on other issues important to the US are less accomodating. This memorandum examines his past comments on foreign policy issues.

(e)

Bani-Sadr is a long-time advocate of a non-aligned foreign policy and is not likely to revive close ties with the US. He opposes any increase in US military presence in the Persian Gulf region, rejects mutual security arrangements with US allies in the area including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and favors exporting Iran's revolution to the countries in the region. (e)

At the same time, Bani-Sadr has been a frequent critic of the Soviet Union, especially since its invasion of Afghanistan. He appears genuinely committed to supporting the Afghan insurgent movement. (e)

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Iran Task Force, Office of Political Analysis. Questions and queries may be addressed to Chief, Iran Task Force

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The 47-year-old Bani-Sadr has spent virtually his entire adult life in the opposition movement against the Shah and his views on foreign policy have been heavily influenced by his years of resistance to the Shah's pro-US policies. Bani-Sadr considers himself one of the leading ideological thinkers of the Iranian revolution and is likely to inject his ideological views into Tehran's relations with the US and the rest of the world. (S)

Bani-Sadr has little practical experience in diplomacy. He served as Foreign Minister for two weeks in mid-November 1979 before resigning because of differences with Ayatollah Khomeini over the hostage crisis. The young, Western-educated technocrats who advise Bani-Sadr share his lack of diplomatic experience. (S)

A Radical Environment

Born into an affluent, landowning religious family in 1933, Bani-Sadr first became involved in the anti-Shah movement in the 1950's when he was a militant follower of former Prime Minister Mossadegh. The early association with the virulently, anti-British Mossadegh probably encouraged Bani-Sadr's conversion to a non-aligned foreign policy. In 1963, he was arrested for anti-government activities, spent four months in jail and was exiled to Paris. During the next fifteen years in France he came into contact with a broad range of Middle Eastern radicals including Palestinian activists and the Lebanese Shia leader Musa Sadr. He first contacted Ayatollah Khomeini in 1966, visited Khomeini in Iraq during the Ayatollah's fourteen year exile in the holy city of Najaf, and became one of his most active advisers during Khomeini's short exile in Paris in 1978-79. (S)

While in France, Bani-Sadr wrote over 20 books and articles on Iran and Islam. Most deal with the relationship between Islam and economics, setting forth his basic contention that Islam offers a viable alternative to both communism and capitalism. He has argued that rather than developing the nation, the Shah used its oil wealth to make Iran dependent on the West. Bani-Sadr's principal objective in his writings is to make the country economically independent of both East and West by reducing reliance on oil revenues. He also urged self-sufficiency in food production. (S)

Views on the US and USSR

There is no reason to doubt that Bani-Sadr shares the deep suspicion and animosity that most Iranian revolutionaries feel toward the US. Nonetheless, he has been a critic of the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran at least since his brief days as

Foreign Minister. Bani-Sadr's argument has been that the Embassy occupation damages Iran's international image and diverts the country's attention from its pressing internal problems. (C)

In his recent comments on the hostage issue, he has stressed that the US must take the first step towards a resolution of the problem. He has repeatedly stated that the problem can be solved only when there is a change in the US attitude toward Iran away from "interference" in Iran's internal affairs and towards a recognition of the independence of the country and the permanency of the Islamic revolution. He has also suggested that the US help Iran seize the Shah's wealth and allow Iran to initiate legal proceedings against the Shah. (C)

Despite his relatively moderate attitude on the hostage issue, Bani-Sadr has made clear that he has no intention of reviving anything approaching the close ties the Shah had with the US. He has repeatedly stated that he does not believe Iran needs a close relationship with the US to deter any potential Soviet aggression against Iran. He has rejected the possibility of US military aid to Iran in the future. A frequent Bani-Sadr argument is that "we do not intend to liberate ourselves from the hegemony of one of the two superpowers only to fall under the yoke of the other." (C)

At the same time, Bani-Sadr has been one of the most vocal and persistent Iranian critics of the Soviet Union, especially for its invasion of Afghanistan. His criticism of the Soviets is consistent with both his deeply Islamic view of the world and his pursuit of a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy. Rather than turning to either superpower for outside support, Bani-Sadr has argued that Iran can get whatever economic and military aid it requires from Western Europe and Japan. (C)

Even if Bani-Sadr should become more concerned about the Soviet threat to Iran in the future, it is unlikely that he could openly align Iran with the US without facing major domestic criticism. Anti-Americanism is likely to remain a fundamental aspect of Iranian internal politics for some time and one that can easily be manipulated by Bani-Sadr's rivals against him. Moreover, Khomeini seems certain to continue to view the US as the greatest enemy of his vision of an Islamic Republic. The Ayatollah can remove Bani-Sadr from power at any time. (C)

Afghanistan

Both during his election campaign and since his landslide victory, Bani-Sadr has been an outspoken supporter of the Afghan insurgent movement against the Soviets. In several

statements he has promised to give the Afghans political and financial support and has also stated that Iran will provide military training and weapons to the rebels. In one statement he also indicated that Iranian volunteers--but not the regular military--will be allowed to fight with the rebels. (S)

[REDACTED] at least some Iranian leaders, especially religious figures and tribal groups along the Afghan border, are already giving aid to the insurgents. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, thousands of Afghan refugees have crossed the border--one estimate runs as high as 100,000--and these refugees are a fertile recruiting ground for the Afghan resistance. (S)

Bani-Sadr does not appear to be concerned that Iranian support for the rebels may ultimately lead to Soviet moves against Tehran, possibly in the form of cross border incursions. He has argued that any Soviet military move against Iran can be deterred by the threat of guerrilla warfare--"a people fighting for its survival" will cause "the Russians not to dare to attack us." [REDACTED] this perception is widely shared among the Iranian revolutionary leadership who calculate that invading Soviet forces would face heavy casualties from Iran's numerous paramilitary groups and massive civil unrest from a population versed in the tactics of mass protest. (C/NF)

Exporting the Revolution

Since the revolution, Iran has become a focal point for Middle Eastern radicals eager to secure backing for their own revolutionary objectives. Tehran has provided some limited support for various dissident groups, usually without the direct involvement of the Iranian Government. Tehran radio has been a vocal proponent of revolutionary change throughout the Islamic world and especially among Iran's Persian Gulf neighbors including Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Shia committees in those countries have been able to get aid from Iran for their dissident movements. Some of these groups--including Iraqi and Saudi dissidents--have openly welcomed Bani-Sadr's election. (S)

In his inaugural address on 4 February, Bani-Sadr made clear his support for other revolutionary movements in the Islamic world. He said that--

Our revolution will not win unless it is exported. We are going to create a new order in which deprived people will not always be deprived. We Iranians, as long as our brothers in Palestine, Afghanistan, the Phillipines and all over the world have not been

liberated, will not put down our arms. We give our hand to deprived people all over the world.

Khomeini's son, Ahmad, made a statement along similar lines during the inaugural ceremonies. (S)

Bani-Sadr is probably fairly sincere in his commitment to support other "liberation" movements. While he doubtless recognizes that revolutionary rhetoric is useful domestically, his years of contact with other radical groups in Paris has conditioned him to support their causes and he probably feels some obligation to repay past debts to them. (S)

Regional Security Issues

Given his outspoken support for revolutionary change along Islamic lines in the region, it is unlikely that Bani-Sadr will favor cooperative regional security measure in the Persian Gulf areas with US allies in the Middle East. In one recent interview, Bani-Sadr ruled out a mutual security arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, arguing that both regimes "are not representative" of their own people. (S)

On the other hand, Bani-Sadr has offered to improve relations with Turkey to form a "joint front" against the US and the Soviets. He has also suggested that Pakistan reject US military aid offers and instead rely on support from other Muslim countries including Iran. Bani-Sadr seems likely to try to develop a non-aligned bloc of regional countries interested in minimizing both US and Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf region. (S)

Bani-Sadr is also unlikely to view favorably US diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Arab-Israeli issue. In the past, he has been a consistent supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its Lebanese allies. He is likely to continue Khomeini's policy of expanding ties with the PLO and giving it diplomatic support. Bani-Sadr probably also shares Khomeini's unwillingness to give the PLO any major role inside Iran. (S)

Outlook

How much of a role in determining Iranian foreign policy Bani-Sadr will actually play is uncertain. He faces strong opposition from several groups including the clerical supporters of Ayatollah Beheshti and Iran's leftist parties. His relationship with Khomeini is ambivalent and subject to sudden change. In any case, as long as Khomeini is alive and fit, he will almost certainly continue to interfere in the government's actions and be the single most influential figure in the country. (S)

Bani-Sadr also faces enormous domestic problems and will have only limited means to secure foreign policy objectives. The Iranian military is much weaker now than it was under the Shah and some time will be necessary to redevelop it into a meaningful instrument of diplomacy. The foreign policy bureaucracy is in chaos and the diplomatic corps suffers from serious morale problems. Iran's reduced oil production also weakens its oil weapon clout. (C)

Nonetheless, Bani-Sadr has demonstrated a strong national following and seems determined to reorganize Iran's bureaucracy along revolutionary lines. If he can consolidate his hold on the country, there is a good chance that his foreign policy views will become increasingly influential. Under Iran's new constitution the president must approve all treaties and agreements with foreign powers. (C)

We cannot determine at this point how much influence Bani-Sadr's revolutionary past and rhetoric will have on his future policies. He may become more pragmatic or he is confronted with the reality of wielding power. Nonetheless, these past experiences are certain to play some role in determining his future decisions. (C)

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پرست

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

دولت موقت جمهوری اسلامی ایران
وزارت امور خارجه

TEHERAN, le 8 FEVRIER 1980

Messieurs Christian BOURGUET
et Hector VILLALON

Chers Amis,

Je tiens a vous remercier, au nom de notre Gouvernement, de tous les efforts amicaux que vous avez deja ete amenes a faire, tant aupres de la Republique de PANAMA et de ses dirigeants, que de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et de Mr WALDHEIM.

Il est en effet tres important pour nous, Iraniens, que soient enfin reconnus - ce a quoi contribue la procedure d'Extradition et ce que ne manquera pas de faire la Commission Internationale d'Enquete que Mr WALDHEIM se propose de creer - les crimes de Mohammed REZA PAHLEVI, ex-Shah d'IRAN.

Je vous prie, tant en mon nom personnel qu' au nom de notre Gouvernement et de notre pays, de poursuivre cet effort, et de croire que nous ferons, de notre cote, tout ce que nous pourrons pour vous aider a reussir et a permettre ainsi la fin de la crise actuelle.



Sadegh GHOBTZADEH
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
de la Republique Islamique d'IRAN

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BY Q NARS. DATE 9/24/67

M.M CHRISTIAN BOURGUET et
HECTOR VILLALON

J'ai examiné le memorandum que
m'avez soumis, et vous confirme mon
accord pour que vous continuiez à mettre
celui-ci au point, jusqu'à ce qu'il soit
finalement approuvé par l'ensemble des
parties

A. BANISADRS
8, 2, 80

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EYES ONLY

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*

Based on both events of the past three days and also the information that has been developed by our French friends, I believe that you can conclude that Bani-Sadr is taking on the militants for one or both of the following reasons:

- He cannot let their challenge to him go answered. If he did, whatever hope he has to be a strong and effective ruler of Iran would be sacrificed.
- "Taking on the students" has the support of the vast majority of the Iranian people. He probably considers his election victory a mandate for resolving the hostage crisis.

Because of political circumstances there and Bani-Sadr's own personality (he is known for being impetuous), it could easily develop that he would see an immediate need to resolve the hostage situation outside of the scenario that we have been working on and that is presently being

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negotiated. It would seem to be in our own interest in furthering that possibility to give him the assurances that the various steps of the scenario which are politically important to Iran would take place anyway and that we would be reasonable in dealing with our other bilateral problems.

For that reason, I have been searching for some way to reach out a friendly hand without either embarrassing him or compromising our own posture.

Possibly an oral message which could be given to him from you through the Swiss ambassador which would contain these elements or some combination of them:

- An expression of goodwill
- Mutual interest to resolve our differences
- We have agreed to reciprocal steps, but if the President ever decided to move unilaterally on resolving the hostage situation, we would proceed with the reciprocal steps agreed upon and be reasonable in resolving the other issues which are important to both countries
- If direct private contact with the President (Bani-Sadr) is ever desired, you would be willing to send an emissary to Tehran to meet secretly with him

There may be a different/better way to do this, but it seems that we need to reinforce whatever desire he may have to proceed to resolve the hostage situation.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ROGER CHANNEL

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EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS

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TAGS: OCON, OTRA, FR

SUBJ: VISIT TO PARIS (U)

L. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)


2. OUR FRIENDS PROPOSE A DINNER AT 8 P.M. ON SATURDAY NIGHT AT HECTOR'S APARTMENT. IT WOULD INCLUDE OUR NORMAL GROUP OF SIX PLUS THE VISITING IRANIAN. AT SOME POINT IN THE EVENING THERE MIGHT BE A PRIVATE SESSION, IF THAT SEEMED DESIRABLE. THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH

3. OUR TWO FRIENDS HAVE AGREED THAT THE EMBASSY SHOULD--IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION IN WASHINGTON--NOTIFY FRENCH AUTHORITIES THAT A SENIOR USG OFFICIAL WOULD VISIT PARIS DURING THE FH'S STAY HERE FOR A PRIVATE DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES. WE WOULD SUPPLY THE FRENCH WITH ADDITIONAL DETAILS LATER. THE AMBASSADOR FEELS STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE FRENCH AND THAT THEY WOULD HANDLE THE MATTER IN A DISCREET FASHION COOPERATING FULLY WITH US. IT IS VERY LIKELY THE FRENCH ARE ALREADY AWARE FROM OUR TRANSIT AT THE AIRPORT MONDAY AND FROM OUR TELEPHONE CALLS THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT INVOLVING OUR TWO FRIENDS HERE.

4. OUR TWO FRIENDS HAVE CONCEIVED THE IDEA OF HAVING THE FRENCH PROPOSE THE USE OF A CONCORDE TO FLY THE HOSTAGES FROM TEHRAN VIA PARIS FOR REFUELING TO WASHINGTON. THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOUR TRAVELING COMPANION COME TO PARIS TO JOIN JOIN THE PLANE DURING ITS STOP HERE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IDEA HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT FORWARD TO THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S STAFF AND THAT IT WILL GO TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL HERE IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. OUR FRIENDS ARE ANXIOUS THAT WE NOT HOLD THE HOSTAGES IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL IN EUROPE. THEY BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE PROBABLE BAD REACTION IN IRAN TO A STOP IN EUROPE, IRANIAN APPROVAL FOR RELEASE WOULD BE MORE EASILY OBTAINED IF THE HOSTAGES WERE TO BE MOVED DIRECTLY TO THE U.S. THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO THEIR BEING PLACED IN A HOSPITAL THERE.

5. THE TWO FRIENDS FULLY UNDERSTAND THE STRONG

DISTRUST AND DOUBT THAT EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES. THEY EARNESTLY HOPE THAT WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO DIMINISH SUCH FEELINGS BY NOT OBJECTING STRONGLY TO THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY WALDHEIM FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION.



(JORDAN)

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DRAFT STATEMENT

Following Waldheim's Friday Announcement

--
Secretary General Waldheim has announced the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to go to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States. He has stated that the Commission will speak ^{with} ~~to~~ each of our hostages.

Earlier this week, the United States concurred in the establishment of this Commission. In doing so, we made clear our understanding that the Commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran to hear the grievances of both sides, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report to the Secretary General. The United States has made clear its position that our hostages must under no circumstances be subjected to interrogation.

We have repeatedly stated our understanding that the Iranian people have grievances which they would like to air in an appropriate international forum. We have also stated our concern for the prompt release of our people now being held hostage in Iran. We hope that the Commission will, as the Secretary General has said, help achieve an early resolution of the crisis between our two countries.

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understand why I will not answer questions on this issue
this evening.

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~~SECRET~~

2/6/80

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EYES ONLY

TO: PRESIDENT CARTER
FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN *HJ*

Over ten days ago, you and Secretary Vance signed off on the proposal that we developed with our French friends. Based on all that we have seen in the past 48 hours, we have good reason to believe that Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council have accepted the bulk of our proposal. We are awaiting a response through the Swiss which we should get by mid-morning.

Once we agree to this scenario, we will have to live with it and had best all understand it and the accompanying risks.

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/20/97 NLS HRE NLC-97-21
BY 9 NARS. DATE 8/28/97

A few points that should be made:

1. This whole effort is foolish and suicidal unless you accept/believe that the leadership of Iran desires to resolve the hostage crisis peacefully. I believe that they do, although no one knows the real feelings of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The indications from Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, and the Revolutionary Council are certainly positive in this regard. I am assuming that they will inform Khomeini at some point of their intentions and he will avoid responsibility for the plan (which might be an admission of a mistake) by taking the position that it is a decision which will have to be made by the Revolutionary Council and the elected leadership of the country.

2. While the scenario that has been developed is precise in terms of reciprocal steps, we have to realize the good possibility that Ghotbzadeh or Bani-Sadr will deviate from the scenario along the way for personal or political benefit. We should not forget that this whole thing will be played out at a time when the election of the constituent

assembly is taking place and while different forces in the country are vying for Cabinet positions, etc.

While I trust my French friends, there is no basis for trusting Ghotbzadeh or Bani-Sadr. Having sounded that caution, it is an encouraging sign that the early signals out of Tehran conform precisely with our plan - for example, the Revolutionary Council called for the establishment of a "commission" instead of a tribunal⁹. This was a point that we made strongly with our French friends and that seems to have been accepted by the Iranian leadership.

3. Because we have been dealing through a third party, it is difficult to have a precise understanding of what is and is not acceptable behavior by both parties. The French have done an excellent job in conveying the concerns and problems of both sides, but there is no substitute for direct contact and understanding. In this regard, I fully anticipate this thing falling apart a couple of times and having to be put ~~back~~ ^{BACK} together. Direct contact at that time (secretly) might be good and necessary.

4. We have to be firm from the outset in utilizing the leverage provided us in the reciprocal steps. Let me give you a specific and likely example. The political benefit to Bani-Sadr occurs on the front-end at the creation of the Commission and its travel to Tehran. The risk that we take is also on the front-end when we have to abandon the principle of "simultaneous action". The difficult part of the scenario for Bani-Sadr will be the removal of the hostages from the compound to the hospital. So, if we began the scenario without nailing down a time frame, the Commission could travel to Tehran, Bani-Sadr could reap the political benefit and because of circumstances that we can not foresee at this time, Bani-Sadr could get cold feet and either not remove the hostages to the hospital or let the thing drag on for weeks. The American people will tolerate us taking some risks and a change in our position as long as progress seems to be taking place, but they will not tolerate very long delays. For that reason, we need to use - through Waldheim - the date for the establishment of the Commission to insure a time frame for the release. We will also work this point with our French friends when we meet with them this weekend.

5. Quite frankly, the only two people now that understand both the scenario ^{IN DETAIL} and its problems/pitfalls are Hal Saunders and myself. We need for the Secretary, the Vice-President, Zbig, the First Lady and you ~~XXXX~~ to understand it in some detail. For that reason, I would recommend that we have a very private session for 30-45 minutes to walk through the scenario. Not only so everyone will understand it - which is important - but also so that we take the proper public posture that takes into account the risks that we are taking but also does not undermine or complicate the scenario that we agree upon.

Since so much is happening today which may prove important and relevant to that discussion, possibly tomorrow would be better for a meeting.

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PRESS GUIDANCE

Steps Toward Release of the Hostages

Present situation: Iranians State Decision to Form a Commission

Iran: Revolutionary Council has decided that a commission on inquiry should be formed.

NOTE: The scenario is not triggered until Iran sends pre-arranged request to SYG Waldheim. The SYG therefore has control over launching the scenario.

U.S.: -- No Iranian decision has been communicated to us nor, as far as we know, to the UN.

-- If a proposal is made, we will state our position.

U.N.: Provides no substantive response until a formal Iranian request along agreed lines is received.

* * *

Step II - 1 and 2: Iranian Request that a Commission be formed.

Iran Requests SYG Waldheim establish a Commission of Inquiry "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States" and states Iran's desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.

Alternatively: "... to investigate the grievances of both sides."

NOTE: This would trigger the scenario.

U.S.: -- The U.S. will discuss the Iranian request with the Secretary General. We will reserve our comments until we know what the terms of reference of the Commission will be.

-- You have heard our position many times before. I need not repeat it.

-- We support any steps by the UN that might lead to the release of the hostages while protecting essential international principles.

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Step II - 3: SYG Waldheim Announces Commission

UN: SYG Waldheim -- using good offices authority, recalling his talks in Tehran, and citing the Iranian request -- would announce formation of the Commission to hear (Iran's) grievances (of both sides) and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the U.S. (We will press strongly that the Commission be described as a "fact-finding" commission in all UN statements.)

Iran: The Commission will come to investigate the crimes of the Shah's regime. (Will see the hostages as part of its investigation into Iran's grievances.) Commission should conclude its work rapidly.

U.S.: Will have to answer why it has changed its position that the hostages should be released simultaneous with appointment of a Commission.

-- This is a fact-finding mission, not a tribunal with any judicial role. Its mission is to investigate the concerns of both sides in Tehran, including our concern that the hostages continue to be held and that they are held in inhumane conditions.

-- The United States is not on trial in this process and our diplomats are not on trial.

-- The U.S. continues to oppose any interrogation of people being held hostage and believes the world will reject the findings of any inquiry based on the statements of people held under duress.

-- When asked why we had not been willing to agree to this arrangement in the past, we would say there was no one in Iran with authority with whom we could deal.

Step III - 2: Commission Receives Evidence from Iranians

There is a high probability that there will be television coverage in Iran of Commission interviews with victims of the Shah's regime, etc. We will have to answer the question why this airing of Iranian grievances is permitted when the hostages have not been released.

- U.S.: -- We would reiterate that the purpose of the Commission is to look into the concerns of both sides.
- The Iranians should recognize that the world will pay little attention to their claims as long as the hostages are held.
- The public spectacle in Iran is nothing more than what Iran has been staging over the past three months for the world's press and every international visitor, including the Secretary General.
- (We would probably have to de-emphasize our interest in having the Commission see the hostages because delicate negotiations might be required in Tehran to get the Commission into the Embassy compound.)

Step III - 3: Commission Meets the Hostages

Iran: The Commission is investigating the activities of the Embassy.

U.S.: The Commission, in accordance with its mandate, is investigating the condition of the hostages. An inquiry into their duties or alleged spy charges would be a violation of the Commission's mandate.

Step IV: The Hostages are Transferred to a Hospital Under the Custody of the Iranian Government and the Commission and the Commission Departs for New York

- U.S.: We will have to answer the question why the hostages have not been allowed to return to the United States.
- The safety and well-being of the hostages is assured by the Iranian government and the UN. We are confident that they will be released in the very near future.

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-4-

Step V: The Commission Makes Its Report to SYG Waldheim
and the Hostages are Allowed to Leave

U.S.: We will face the questions of what kind of relation we want with Iran and whether we can confirm that the release scenario was a pre-arranged game plan.

-- U.S. and Iranian representatives will meet in an attempt to work out the many difficulties between us. It will be premature to describe the relationship that may develop.

-- We would withhold comment on how the release was arranged.

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A POSSIBLE SCENARIO

Two important steps have already been taken:

- 1) Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh has responded to the Jordan/Saunders trip to London by authorizing Messrs. Villalon and Bourguet to travel to Washington carrying tangible evidence of Iran's serious intentions and good will to discuss practical stages to end the crisis.
- 2) The United States has conveyed through private channels to the President-elect, Mr. Bani Sadr, and to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, a message confirming to them the importance which the United States attaches to our conversations.

I. Principles and Procedures

The United States and Iran agree:

- 1) to accept the principle of the establishment of a scenario, the first stages of which would be defined precisely, and the subsequent stages would be defined ^{in detail} as events evolve;
- 2) to manage this scenario with the help of persons agreed to by both sides;
- 3) to proceed, within the framework of this scenario, by stages each involving reciprocal actions to be defined in advance;

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BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 3/28/97

- 4) that these agreed points are intended to allow the earliest possible resolution of the present crisis by peaceful means.

II. Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry

- 1) Request by Iran that the Secretary-General of the United Nations establish a Commission of Inquiry "to hear Iran's grievances and to allow an early solution to the crisis between Iran and the United States." This request will state Iran's desire to have the Commission speak to each of the hostages.

- 2) Removal by the United States of its objections to the establishment of this Commission.

- 3) Mr. Waldheim's role:

- a) appointment of a chairman and members of this Commission;
- b) preparation of the terms of reference, which will state that the Commission will not be a tribunal but rather a fact-finding mission, and establishment of deadlines for the Commission's work;
- c) official announcement by Mr. Waldheim of the Commission's establishment and simultaneous publication by him of the Iranian request.

- 4) Public statement by the United States recalling that the Commission is going on a fact-finding mission to Tehran, to hear Iranian grievances, to meet with each of the hostages, and to report to the Secretary-General. The United States would

object publicly to having the Commission subject the hostages to interrogations in connection with its inquiry during any of its meetings with them. The United States would recall that it is important for it to ascertain the condition of each of the hostages. **B-5**

5) The Imam would present the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry as a success, would interpret the visit to the hostages as being one of the elements in the investigation into Iranian grievances, and would state his desire to see the Commission conclude its work rapidly.

(would ask government administrations to place their documents at the disposal of the Commission)

III. Work of the Commission

1) The Commission will not leave New York for Tehran until the announcement provided for in paragraph III 5) above has been made.

2) The Commission will hold its meetings in private and will receive evidence and documents to be submitted to it by Iranian authorities.

3) The Commission will visit the embassy as soon as possible to meet with the hostages.

4) As soon as the Commission has concluded its work and drafted its report, it:

- a) will announce that it is ready to return to New York to submit its report to the Secretary-General;

- b) will present to the Revolutionary Council (or to the new Government if it has come into being) the part of this report which concerns the conditions of confinement of the hostages; and if these conditions appear inadmissible, the Commission will state that its full report will not be submitted to the Secretary-General until the conditions of confinement have been changed and the hostages transferred elsewhere.

IV. Final Stages

- 1) The Revolutionary Council (or the Government) will submit to the Imam the section of the report referred to in part III 4) b) above.
- 2) The Imam, having taken cognizance of this report, will make a public statement on the hostages' actual conditions of confinement thus revealed to him and will order the transfer of the hostages to a hospital under the shared custody of the Iranian authority and the Commission.
- 3) The report of the Commission will be submitted to the Secretary-General on the occasion of the religious holidays celebrating the 1500th anniversary of the Hegira in Iran (planned for February 11).
- 4) The freeing of the hostages will take place on the same occasion.

5) The other elements in dispute between Iran and the United States will be studied and discussed by a joint commission formed by the two governments.

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 05241

ROGER CHANNEL

POLITICAL SITUATION WE WILL CONFRONT IN IRAN IN
THE MONTHS AHEAD.

6. OF COURSE, THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE A DISCUSSION
OF THE HOSTAGES AND THE REMAINING STEPS IN THE
SCENARIO. OUR FRIENDS FEEL THAT THEY HAVE GOTTEN
SEVERAL SIGNALS RECENTLY THAT INDICATE THE IRANIANS
ARE THINKING OF ACCELERATING THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES
WITHIN THE SCENARIO. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY RECEIVED A
CURIOUS TELEPHONE CALL FROM BANI SADR AT 10:00 P.M.
LAST NIGHT ASKING IF OUR FRIENDS WERE CONVINCED
WE WERE BOTH HONEST AND SERIOUS IN PURSUING THE
SCENARIO. TODAY SANJABI ASKED THEM IF WE COULD BE
COUNTED ON TO COMPLETE THE SCENARIO IF RELEASE WERE
MOVED UP. HE WAS GIVEN DEFINITE REASSURANCE ON THAT
POINT. AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD BE WISE NOT TO COUNT
TOO HEAVILY ON THESE EXAMPLES AS SIGNALING A CHANGE
IN THE IRANIAN POSITION.

7. WHILE WE WERE AT OUR FRIEND'S APARTMENT HE
RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PANAMANIAN
LAWYER VASQUEZ WHO WILL ARRIVE IN PARIS ON THE
22ND AND PROCEED TO TEHRAN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.
IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT ONE OF OUR TWO FRIENDS WILL
ALSO GO TO TEHRAN TO BE THERE DURING THE
COMMISSION'S WORK.

8. THE PRESS IS ALL OVER THE FRENCH LAWYER BUT
SO FAR HAS NOT BOTHERED ANYONE ELSE.

9. I MENTIONED MIKE METRINKO AND RECEIVED A
PROMISE THAT THEY WOULD LOOK INTO HIS CONDITION.
HARTMAN

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Department of State

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2912

4. CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO AN INTERVIEW WITH SEAN MCBRIDE IN WHICH HE SAYS HE AND PETTITI WILL PROBABLY SERVE ON COMMISSION. IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR SOMEONE FROM THE UN TO HAVE A WORD WITH HIM.
NARTHAN

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 05136

ROGER CHANNEL

GOOD LUNCH FOR A/S SAUNDERS FROM PRECHT

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 2/L4/0L (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A. (OR-M
TAGS: OCON, OTRA, FR
SUBJ: VISIT

REF: STATE 039977

SPECIAL HANDLING

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. WE ARE MEETING OUR FRIENDS THIS AFTERNOON AT 1530 TO WORK OUT DETAILS. AMBASSADOR PLANS TO SEE SECRETARY GENERAL WAHL OF ELYSEE AT 1630 TO INFORM HIM OF PLANS. AS OF NOW OUR TENTATIVE THOUGHTS INCLUDE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS.

-- YOU ARRIVE MILITARY AIRPORT (TO BE DISCUSSED). ALL AUTO TRAVEL IN FRENCH-PLATE CAR WITH AMERICAN DRIVER.

--ASSUMING YOU ARRIVE EARLY SATURDAY MORNING, YOU WOULD HAVE UNTIL MID-DAY TO REST AT AMBASSADOR'S OR CHAPMAN RESIDENCE. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU PREFER TO STAY WITH AMBASSADOR OR MINISTER. I BELIEVE THAT FROM BOTH PRACTICALITY AND SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO STAY AT CHAPMAN'S. IN ANY CASE, AMBASSADOR HOPES TO SEE YOU BEFORE YOUR MEETINGS AT YOUR CONVENIENCE, PERHAPS FOR LUNCH.

-- WE WOULD PROCEED TO VILLALON APARTMENT MID-AFTERNOON FOR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH LAWYERS PRIOR TO FM'S ARRIVAL TOWARDS 8:00 P.M.

-- IF DESIRABLE, THERE COULD BE A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH LAWYERS ON SUNDAY MORNING. IN THE INTERIM WE COULD CHECK ANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS WITH WASHINGTON.

-- RETURN TO WASHINGTON, LEAVING EARLY SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

2. SY FRANKFURT HAS BEEN ALERTED TO SEND ELECTRONIC TECHNICIAN FRIDAY FOR A SWEEP OF THE APARTMENT ON SATURDAY. PLEASE ADVISE WASHINGTON VIEWS WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THIS STEP. WE WILL ALSO ASSURE WITH OUR FRIENDS THAT IRANIANS ARE IN AGREEMENT.

3. WE WILL COMMUNICATE LATER AIR BASE SELECTED BY FRENCH FOR LANDING. PLEASE PROVIDE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE TAIL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT, ETA, ED-ETD, CALL SIGN AND NAMES TO BE USED BY TRAVELLERS. CREW LIST, FUEL AND AIRCRAFT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS CAN BE COMMUNICATED LATER THROUGH NORMAL MILITARY CHANNELS, IF YOU LIKE.

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S E C R E T PARIS 05284

RUGER CHANNEL

GOOD LUNCH FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS FROM
PRECHT

DELIVERY OPENING OF BUSINESS

E.O. L2065: RDS-3 2/L5/00 (CHAPMAN, CHRISTIAN A)OR-M
TAGS: OCON, UTKA, FR
SUBJECT: VISIT
REF: STATE 04LL93

USAF
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

L. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE FRENCH HAVE NOW DECIDED THAT IF REPEAT IF
YOUR AIRCRAFT HAS THE APPEARANCE OF A NORMAL USAF
PLANE AND WILL NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE WHITE
HOUSE FLEET, YOU SHOULD LAND AT LE BOURGUET MILITARY
AIRBASE. WE WOULD MEET YOU THERE FOR A 30-MINUTE
DRIVE TO CITY. IF I CONFIRM USAF TYPE OF AIRCRAFT WITH
LT COL GREEN, SUGGEST THAT TECHNICAL
ARRANGEMENTS BE HANDLED WITH AIR ATTACHE.

CARGO PLANE
FITTED
WITH BUNKS
+ JOHN

3. OUR FRIENDS WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL WITH
BANGLADESH. THEY ARE POISED TO HELP WITH THE IRANIAN
TELEX AS SOON AS WALDHEIM SENDS HIS MESSAGE ON
MEMBERSHIP. ALSO, IT SEEMS THAT GHOTBZADEH WILL MAKE

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PAGE 02

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THE PUBLIC STATEMENT OF PARA 0 SHORTLY AFTER
ARRIVING HERE, HE WILL DO SO IN ORDER TO TRY TO
THROW THE PRESS OFF THE TRAIL OF SUSPICION THAT HE
IS HERE TO NEGOTIATE WITH AMERICANS. BANI-SADR
MAY MAKE A COMPARABLE STATEMENT IN TEHRAN FOR
INTERNAL POLITICAL PURPOSES. WE ARE PROMISED
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON TIMING, CONTENT, ETC.

3. OUR FRIEND CALLED ATTENTION TO FOLLOWING ITEM
WHICH APPEARED IN TWO FRENCH PAPERS REPORTING
FROM WASHINGTON THIS MORNING: "IT APPEARS PLAUSIBLE
THAT THE OUTLINES OF A CONTRACT HAVE INDEED BEEN
DRAWN, THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED OVER
THE PAST TWO MONTHS IN PARIS BETWEEN HAROLD
SAUNDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
NEAR EAST, AND A TEAM OF FRENCH LAWYERS REPRESENTING
THE TEHRAN GOVERNMENT." YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE
SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS REGARDING YOUR ABSENCE FROM
WASHINGTON THIS WEEKEND.

4. C.V. UN PETTITI TO FOLLOW.
HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO COVER

1. The U.S. has a strong interest in the integrity of Iran. The breakup of Iran would lead to Soviet intervention and threaten the oil of the Persian Gulf. It would create a situation which the U.S. and the Free World could not ignore and increase the danger of U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

-- The U.S. has no interest in encouraging separatism in Iran.

2. The U.S. has a strong interest in the independence of Iran. This means Iran's independence of Soviet domination which would threaten the interests of the United States and the Free World. It also means that the U.S. has no interest in dominating Iran for any purpose of its own. We recognize that the present leaders of Iran have been engaged in an effort over the past three decades or more to assure Iran's genuine independence.

3. The U.S. would respect a genuinely non-aligned Iran. Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. respects diversity in the world and is prepared to deal with any nation provided that nation conducts its relations in accordance with international law and mutual respect.

4. The U.S. regards a good U.S.-Iranian relationship as important to U.S. interests. At present, it is difficult to

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know on what basis such a relationship could be conducted. We believe we understand many of the grievances which the leaders of the Iranian revolution feel against us. We are prepared to build a relationship based on mutual understanding and respect. To do that, we will have to put our mutual grievances behind us and find a basis for common understanding. We will also have to have confidence that our relationships will be conducted according to international law and common practices between nations. No step can be taken in this direction until all 53 Americans currently held in Tehran are released and permitted to depart from Iran safely.

5. The U.S. has concurred in the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry by the UN Secretary General so that Iran may have a [REDACTED] forum in which to air its grievances and so that there may be a vehicle for the release of our people. The U.S. will cooperate with such a group in accordance with its laws, international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

6. The U.S. will facilitate any legal action brought by the Government of Iran in courts of the United States to account for assets within the custody or control of the former Shah that may be judged to belong to the national treasury of Iran. We can do this by advising the courts and other interested parties that the U.S. Government recognizes the right of the Government of Iran to bring such

claims before the courts and to request the courts' assistance in obtaining information about such assets from financial institutions and other parties.

7. Once the hostages are safely released, the U.S. will be prepared to appoint members of a working group to reach agreement on arrangements for lifting the freeze of Iranian assets and facilitating normal commercial relations between the two countries, on the understanding that Iran will meet its financial obligations to U.S. nationals and that the arrangements to be worked out will protect the legitimate interests of U.S. banks and other claimants.

8. As part of the process of laying the foundation for a future relationship, the U.S. is prepared to appoint a representative to discuss with Iranian representatives the current security problems in the Middle East posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and other Soviet mobilization activity. If Iran wishes, the U.S. representatives would be prepared to recommend to their government steps that the U.S. and Iran might take to enhance the security of Iran, including the resumption of the supply of military spare parts by the U.S. to Iran.

9. It is essential when the Americans are released from Tehran that all 53 leave Tehran at the same time. We have been concerned in recent weeks about the whereabouts and well-being of Mike Metrinko.

10. We want to hear how Iran views the future of the U.S.-Iranian relationship and how the political dynamics

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- 4 -

within Iran will affect the evolution of that relationship.

11. We wish to discuss a number of questions about the remaining steps in the scenario:

- The timing of the release of the hostages.
- The sequence of the final steps, including the release of the Commission's report and the Presidential statements.
- The logistics of the departure of our people from Iran.

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February 15, 1980

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TO: MR. JORDAN

FROM: HEDLEY DONOVAN 

Possible Language for a Statement after the
Hostages are Released.

The United States hopes it will now be possible to move toward a constructive relationship with the government and people of Iran. Such a relationship must be based upon a mutual respect for the lawful rights and total independence of each state. The United States understands that the Iranian people are critical of past policies of the United States toward Iran, and we have cooperated with the Secretary General of the United Nations in his establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to hear these grievances. We have consistently indicated our willingness to have such grievances expressed before an appropriate international forum. We have consistently maintained that the detention of diplomatic personnel as hostages was not a legitimate expression of these grievances. We are devoutly thankful that the hostages are now free.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, FEB. 24, 1983
BY  NARS, DATE 2/5/97

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


February 15, 1980

To Hamilton Jordan

In your conversations this weekend with Messrs. Bourguet and Villalon, please ask them to convey to President Bani-Sadr and Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh the following message:

"If, at any time, the Government of Iran desires to release the American hostages at an earlier date than called for in the mutually agreed plan, the Government of Iran has my personal assurance that the United States will abide by all the terms of that plan."

Convey to Messrs. Bourguet and Villalon our continued appreciation for the useful role they have played in trying to resolve the differences between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.



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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/20/97 NSC BY RE NLG-97-21
BY JG NARS DATE 8/28/97

DRAFT STATEMENT

The 53 Americans held in Tehran since November 4 have now been placed in the care of the Government of Iran /have now been released/. The opportunity has come to /bring this crisis to an end and to/ look toward the future relationship between Iran and the United States.

The United States wants peaceful relations with all nations on the basis of mutual respect. The United States accepts that each nation has a special character and does not seek to impose its way on any nation. Just as our nation is built on respect for differences among our own people within the law, peace in the world depends on respect for equality among nations within the law.

Unfortunately, relations between Iran and the United States have deteriorated over the past year. That deterioration has not served the interests of either country. It is not yet clear what kind of relationship can develop between our two countries.

In turning to the future, each side must recognize the grievances of the other so we can build the future, to the extent possible, in a spirit of common understanding and mutual forgiveness. The purpose of airing our grievances is not to live in the past but to put those grievances behind us with a sense of honor on both sides and without humiliation to either.

The American people have felt sharp anger at the way our representatives have been treated in Iran in the past year. The United States has acted with great restraint, but the act of taking our people hostage and holding them after guaranteeing their protection despite our differences has raised fundamental questions about the conduct of our relationship.

Many Iranians have felt ~~sharp anger~~ ^{that U.S. policy} ~~at the role they~~ ^{has infringed on their independence} believe the United States has played in influencing their political evolution over the past three decades. Much of that anger stems from our support for the former Shah throughout the crisis of 1951-53. During that period, some of Iran's leaders sought to end Iran's dependence on foreign powers and to regenerate national self-confidence. Many leaders of the present Iranian revolution have their roots in that movement.

~~Those~~ ^{The leaders of the Iranian revolution} Iranian leaders feel that the United States over three decades has supported a regime which they found ~~re-~~ ~~pressive~~ unwilling to allow broad political participation and insensitive to ~~the impact of rapid modernization on~~ traditional Islamic values. They feel that, in our relationship with that government, we ignored the will of the Iranian people. They feel we sought a militarily strong and economically modern Iran primarily to serve our own interests against the Soviet Union. They feel we were not sufficiently concerned about the effect large expenditures on arms and

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^{recognition of}
The United States has...
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the Iranian leadership...

rapid industrialization might have on traditional social institutions and cultural values. They feel we did not make an effort to understand the central role that Shi'a religious precepts play in the lives of many Iranians.

~~We acknowledge these perceptions as part of the new reality in Iran.~~ Some of them may be justified; others are not. We regret that there is such a wide gulf between us today. We do not believe it is impossible to bridge with willingness on both sides, but it will not be bridged easily or quickly.

On our side, we will start from the belief that the people of each nation are entitled to live in dignity and freedom and to enjoy the basic human rights. That commitment to human rights is a cornerstone of American foreign policy today. The United States respects the right of the people of Iran to determine their own form of government and to build their own future. We have no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. At the same time, we believe that the conduct of relations between nations like the protection of basic human rights must be rooted in law if people are to live with hope and without fear.

is a fact. The United States recognizes that the Iranian revolution *is a fact.* *We acknowledge* The United States recognizes the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the legal government of Iran and President Bani Sadr as its duly elected President. We do

not seek to return the former Shah to Iran. We want a good relationship with the people and government of Iran based on equality, mutual respect, and the principles of international law. We are prepared to appoint representatives to discuss and resolve our outstanding differences once our hostages are safely released.

As Iran seeks satisfaction for past grievances, the United States will ~~facilitate~~ ^{NOT DISPOSE} legal action brought by the Government of Iran in courts of the United States to account for assets that may be judged to belong to the national treasury of Iran. The United States recognizes the right of Iran to file suits ^{alleging} ~~on the basis of the presumption of serious~~ crimes committed in the past.

The United States respects the integrity and independence of Iran. The preservation of Iran's integrity and independence is in the interest of the United States and the Free World. Iran has experienced a revolution, but it is in the interest of all that the people of Iran have the opportunity to build a stable future free of outside interference.

The United States and Iran share an interest in building a peaceful world. It is time to turn to that objective again.