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FILE LOCATION

Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File/~~Box 6 of 8 (orig.)~~/Iran-March 1980

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Memo	MJ to E opened 3/17/99	3/80?	A
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HJ

FROM HENRY PRECHT

HAD A CALL FROM VILLALON THAT THE HOSTAGES
WILL BE TRANSFERRED TOMORROW..SOUND LIKE TO
THE PROMISES OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, BUT
THAT IS NOT PRECISELY CLEAR. THIS IS BEING
DONE ACCORDING TO VILLALON AS A PERSONAL
GESTURE FROM GHOTBZADEH TO JORDAN. THERE
WILL BE A MESSAGE COMING FROM THE SWISS
WITH FURTHER DETAILS, BUT IT HASN'T ARRIVED YET.

E.
3.7
10:15 am

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 1/14/98 BY RE NCL-99-26
BY A NARS. DATE 2/11/98

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hector

- Council, Inman + students → model cities
- Lang saw BS at 10:45 → left to go to Embassy
- Art mess really tomorrow?
- Doctors, etc to compound

*encouraging developments

Christie

Lang → BS to decide whether to take over compound or let them have just custody;

Budget

- Day or so → revisions/prepared → Appropriation
- trying to help
- Defer A7K / Rescind → H. Brown unaware of political limitations;
- pre-inaugural meeting with President; (Blanch + Teague); HB said thought it time to cut off procurement companies;
- anti-Voigt attitude/second direct in the nation; most of any for it to see;
- take it personally → flying in face;

Important announcements made tomorrow

POSSIBLE DRAFT

Dear Mr. Bourguet and Mr. Villalon:

First, let me say that I have both enjoyed and benefitted from the four different meetings that we have had over the past two weeks in Washington and London. Because they were informal and conducted privately, these meetings were helpful to me in understanding the situation that presently exists in Iran.

As friends and supporters of the Revolutionary Movement in Iran, you have been forceful and effective in outlining to me the concerns and grievances of the Iranian people. Based on your presentation and these discussions, I have come to understand the depth of the concerns of the Iranian people.

At the same time, you have both been patient and attentive as we presented the views of our own country.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 9/14/98 NSC FILE 111-97-24
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 2/11/99

I believe you to be men of great integrity and intellect whose only interest in this matter is to see the present problems between Iran and the United States peacefully resolved. On behalf of our government, I would be pleased if you could continue and expand on this informal dialogue.

(See Optional Closings on following pages with different objectives)

Option 1:

When you return to Iran, I hope that you will convey to President-Elect Bani-Sadr our congratulations on his election victory, and tell him that we look forward to the time beyond the present difficulties when Iran and the United States can have a relationship based on equality and mutual respect.

Hamilton Jordan

Option 2:

~~When~~ **WHEN** you return to Iran, I hope that you will convey to President-Elect Bani-Sadr these new ideas that we discussed on resolving the present difficulties and let him know that we look forward to the day when we can have a new relationship with his government based on equality and mutual respect.

Hamilton Jordan

Option 3:

When you return to Iran, I hope that you will convey to President-Elect Bani-Sadr and the Foreign Minister the new ideas that we discussed for resolving the present difficulties and let them know that we look forward to the day when we can have a new relationship with their government based on equality and mutual respect.

Hamilton Jordan

Secret

To: President Carter
From: Hamilton-Goode

I will try to divide this report into several sections:

- 1) Meeting with Mr. S
- 2) Future Relations with Iran
- 3) Report On Scenario/Implementation
- 4) Draft Statement
- 5) When do we go (from here?)

Meeting with Mr. S.

Prior to my meeting, I asked that our French contacts meet with me to discuss how to handle Mr. S. We spent a couple of hours on this subject. Then your recommendation was that I should regard his desire for such a meeting as an opportunity for Mr. S. to convey directly to the President the thoughts and feelings of the Imam. He said that Mr. S's presumption was that Carter did not understand the meaning of their revolution and that

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his meeting with me was a way to penetrate the "wall of people" responsible for the past 30 years of U.S. policy. Conversely, they suggested to me that I convey a message to the Imam that this man is a source of understanding and a desire to have a better relationship.

I showed them the letter addressed to me from the President containing the assurance on the scenario and said that this would be very helpful with Beni-Sadr as Mr. S. as it could be used as a written promise to follow the scenario if an early release seemed desirable/possible.

I met alone with Mr. S. for 3 1/2 hours, during which we had a lengthy dinner. We started off by exchanging pleasantries, I kidded him that his face was better known in the United States than Walter Cronkite. He laughed and responded that while his face was well known, he was unable to accomplish anything. "You situation is the opposite, Mr. Jordan, you are never seen publicly, but everyone knows that you guide the President

in every decision.

I quickly got at ease with him. I told him that I was honored to be able to meet with him and that I recognized the risk that he was taking.

He said, "if this meeting is known to the Communists in Iran, I will lose my job at least and possibly my head."

I told him that while great difficulties remained between our two countries, that I thought that it was important that we look to the future to determine how and when the U.S. and Iran could begin to build a new relationship based on the "new realities" of Iran and a better understanding of the past.

I told him that it would be terribly helpful for me and President Carter to understand better the ~~the~~ origins of the revolution and the present situation. That while we had the desire to learn and to understand, we lacked a clear and direct

presentation of their case and their view
of U.S.-Iranian relations in a historical
context.

This approach hit a responsive cord.

Mr. S. said, "Mr. Doherty, for the past

three months and the past three days (his
trip to Greece, Italy and France) all that I
have heard about is the American hostages.

I realize that the talking of the hostages
was both a mistake for Iran and a

violation of international law, but the
great frustration of my people is that

no one cares to investigate the circumstances
leading to that act. I know

that the hostages are of great personal

concern to you and your country, but
your desire to understand our negotiation

and grievances is a very encouraging
sign to me and will be conveyed by

me to the Imam.

He then, encouraged by me, denounced
into a 45 minute review of the history
of U.S.-Iranian relations. He divided his

discuss into three periods: 1900-1953, 1953 to 1978 and from Khomeini's landing in Tehran to the present.

Although certain things that he said were satirical and/or amusing, his biting allegations were predictable. I was impressed by both the passion & his presentation and the sincerity with which he spoke, both about "the revolution" and the "Imam". His dedication to the Imam exceeds loyalty and approaches a mystical reverence difficult for me to comprehend. There is no question ~~in~~ in my mind that it is noble.

~~He was neither~~ He was neither abusive or accusatory in his recital of Imam's grievances, but said it with a sense of sadness and regret that things between us had gone so far and were in such a mess.

At one point in the conversation, I asked him, "How do you evaluate President Carter? Do you see him in the tradition of American Presidents anxious to intervene in the affairs of

Other countries?"

(He responded, "I believe that President Carter is a good man and well intentioned President who does not understand our history or our revolution. His sending you ~~to~~ here is the just indication we have had that he wants to understand."

I then presented our case. I said that President Carter is the just American President in a generation who understands both the influence we have in the world, but also understands ~~the~~ our country's limitations. I said that he was not an "interventionist" in the worst sense of that word, indeed, that he had resisted intervention of military action both during the time of the revolution and since the signing of the Embassy. I told him that there was many people inside and outside of government who wanted the President to take unilateral action in late '78 and early '79, negotiating from ~~beginning~~ urging the State to ~~intervention~~ "crack down" to direct U.S. military intervention. I told him that you

rejected such ideas.

I told him that at the time of the capture of the embassy, public opinion supported extreme measures, including punitive military action, but that you had shaped and sustained a mood of restraint.

He acknowledged that there was sound

arguments and said that as counterproductive as the sanctions had been, any type of military action a blockade would

have resulted in the death of our people.

He then said, "Now, let's talk about the hostages, and I'm in a better

mood to talk about them since you have heard our case."

He went on to say "President Carter wants the hostages out for the sake of

these people and so that he can be

re-elected - I want them out so

that we can turn our Gulf anger

and attention toward the ~~the~~

Soviet Union.

He then made some philosophical comments about the United States and Soviet Union.

"While you have a better country, with certain values and a democratic system for your people, the Soviet Union does a much better job of marketing their ideology. I oppose Communism because it is an ideology that ~~is~~ lacks a moral basis. But the bottom line for them is that we will not be the pawn of the U.S. or the Soviet Union. If I am killed fighting for my country, I do not care whether it is a communist bullet or a capitalist bullet - either way I am dead. More on this in person.

Was there any discussion of the scenario for purposes of the hostages.

Point #1 I'll tell you about in person

#2 He believes that if we follow the scenario, they should be out in 2-3 weeks. More on this later.

#6 We talked at length about the problem of obtaining release of the hostages from the compound. He said that he at Bani-Sada "had a plan" which would work, but would probably have to involve

one alive. I questioned him specifically about Mr. M. He claimed no knowledge of this particular person but said that "All are alive". More on this in person.

#5 He claims that all 50 ~~are~~ are alive. He has "complete faith" in our French contacts. They have his "power of attorney" in this matter although they would dispute that as overstating their influence.

#3 He went into great detail describing for me all the work that he would have to do with Bani-Sada, the Imam and the Revolutionary Council to obtain their release.

I gave him the letter (which he asked me to entrust to Bouguet) and passed him an early version of the hostages. He told me that he would "go back to Takhar, see the Imam and negotiate his efforts" but that he thought it was more realistic to expedite the agreed upon plan than to hope to short-circuit it. He said that should they decide to move early on the hostages, they were "equipped"

I passed him to explain, but he would not talk about it anymore.

the Imam personally. I told him that we had heard very specific rumors about suicide parts among the militants which were of great concern to us. I asked him how he aware of those rumors and plans, and he laughed and said, "Mr. Jordan, don't worry. We will get every one of your people out safely - we have more guards - the compound than you realize."

with President Carter's written promise.
He said, "tell President Carter that I
will do my best"

Future Relations with United States

As directed, I raised the subject of an
relationship beyond the crisis. I told
him that we would be anxious to try
to build a new relationship but that
the evaluation of that relationship would
be largely determined by Inon's
attitude. I told him after our
hostages were released, that we could
move quickly to solve problems such
as freezing of assets, etc., but what
kind of relationship did he envisage
and at what speed could it evolve?

He replied that he had personally
persuaded the Imam not to break
diplomatic relations with the US.
He said that it is easy to break
relations, but very, very difficult to
re-establish them. He mentioned
Cuba as an example.

He talked about an future relationship almost exclusively in the context of the U.S. counterbalancing Soviet presence in Iran. At some point I gave him (on a plane while short of paper) an most recent summary of Soviet building on the NW Iranian border. He loved it. He said "I will write this paper at the next meeting of the Council and also everyone to get off their ~~asses~~ asses

He said that within 6-9 months after the hostages are released, he would hope that a small group of U.S. diplomats could return to Iran. I mentioned here that it was going to be a very difficult decision for us to send people back to Iran given the present crisis. He said that he understood, but that on political presence was needed to counter Soviet activities. He said that he was anxious to use the excuse of a small US diplomatic presence to reduce the Soviet embassy to a comparable size.

and propose for attempted Soviet
domination of Iran.

I made mistakes of the points
in the paper proposed for me by
Her. I will report orally on
them.

To summarize, M.I.S.'s attitude
in talking with me about future
U.S.-Iranian negotiations seemed to
be that now they have proven the
~~great~~ strength of the Revolution
to the United States, they are willing
and anxious to talk to Soviet
Union a lesson. He said that the
Soviet Ambassador complained to his
nephew about his anti-Soviet
statements and that he told him,
"Don't complain to me while you have
troops on our own borders. You will
not have to fight us on the borders,
but in every house and in every street
in Iran, and we will prevail."

After our meeting, I commented to one of our French guards that while very pleased with the meeting, I was not certain that I had moved the process on time for release of the hostages forward at all. He said, "you are wrong. It is considered it a good meeting ^{with} it will help you more than you have known". He placed two interesting observations.

First, he said that Mr. S. will see and use this meeting as a ~~psychological~~ "psychological victory" with the Imam. He says that he will go to the Imam ~~at~~ of say, "I met one of Carter's top men. I convinced them of the evils of their past policies and taught them about our revolution. You have humbled the Americans". According to my friend, this will score points for Mr. S. with the Imam and also help soften his attitude.

Secondly, by having established a "secret" relationship with an American official, large ego will be nurtured. Also, he

is a "avg merchant" who loves
to bargain and trade. He says
if he wants to do something for
you, he will describe in great
detail how difficult it will be
to accomplish, then go all out
to do it quicker or better than you
had anticipated.

I hope this is true as negotiators
to the release of the hostages,
because he told me in great detail
all of the problems, but also
saying that "only I can solve
this" (Wald 500).

The first thing he told me was this:

"Please tell President Carter that I appreciate his sending you to meet with me. I will report to the Imam your attitude of friendship and your desire to build a new relationship."

Also, tell President Carter that I hope he understands that the things I have said personally about him were said after consultation with the U.S. and I hope domestic political purposes. I hope he understands.

Tell him that the strength and success of the Revolution will be a better ally against Soviet aggression than the Shah ever was.

And finally, tell him that I will return to Tehran and redouble my efforts to obtain a quick release of the hostages.

Conclusion

At best, Mr. S. is a deeply committed

revolutionary, dedicated to the survival

of that revolution and to the integrity

and independence of Iran. His ego

is enormous, but his devotion to

the Iran is genuine. His commitment

to the revolution makes the Soviet threat

the dominant political concern in his

life.

At worst, Mr. S. is a dubious person

whose ~~only source of power~~ only source of power

is the Imam. Now that the Imam's

health is in question, he is engaged

in a number of activities (hostage

negotiation, anti-Soviet rhetoric, etc.) that

he perceives as being in his own

self interest.

The truth about Mr. S. is probably

somewhere in between, but either

way, we should use his present attitudes

to our own benefit.

Report on Scenario Implementation

After four hours sleep, I awoke to what was supposed to be a brief review session with our French guards on the scenario.

It was the most difficult but also the most honest and possibly the most successful session that we have had to date.

I opened by saying that I had grown increasingly concerned during the work with some of Barni-Seda's claims that President Carter had to "apologize", "admit the mistakes of the past" and "order a period of "self-criticism".

I said that we were prepared to do what we had promised to do last week in Switzerland, nothing more and nothing less. I told them that President Carter had personally authorized that we supplement his statement with certain things

I told them that as much as we could about the hostages, the bond of our country was ~~more~~ more important. And that the hostages could stay in Iran

that he wanted to say, but I said that there should be no ~~other~~ discussions on any other part as to what we would say and would not say. I said that President Bani-Sadr should know that we would not "apologize", that we would not "admit mistakes" nor do other things which we would consider a violation of principle. I told our French guests that we had taken seriously Bani-Sadr's private statement that he had no desire to "humiliate us". I told our French guests to say the kinds of things he had been saying to publicly would be humiliating and would not be said by President Carter.

another ten months or ten years before we would agree to a statement "apologizing" or admitting "guilt".

Our French friends argued that Israeli-Sed, who ordering the scenario, had created a tremendous problem for himself and consequently for us all by claiming that the U.S. would apologize. They said that they just ~~could~~ contain that to would have to have some knowledge of what would be in the U.S.

statement before he moved to the hostages. We all agreed that exchange of statements in advance was a bad idea as was the deposit of advance statements with Wickham. A possible compromise would be an informal arrangement whereby our French friends informally covered the proposed statements by each side to ensure that they conformed with the principles agreed upon at Rome.

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PER gll/gk/MSR/HK RE ALLC-97-26
BY g
NARS DATE 2/11/99

Country will be
lead in Iran

I believe that we share a single objective: to put an end to the present crisis and to build a new relationship with your country and government based on equality and mutual respect. But quite frankly, the possibility of having such a relationship in the future will not be possible unless our hostages are returned to our country at an early date.

I was pleased to receive your message of March 10th that the 50 American hostages would be transferred to the custody of the Iranian government within fifteen days. I conveyed this message to President Carter, and he considered it an encouraging development.

Because we have reached a critical point in the process of trying to peacefully resolve the differences which face our countries, I thought it was important that I convey my thoughts to you personally and in complete frankness. I would welcome your frank reaction to these suggestions.

I am taking the liberty of sending you this personal and private message through an mutual friend, Mr. Hector Velazco. The only copy of this letter is in the possession of President Carter.

Dear Mr. President:

~~Confidential~~

14 Baulenstrasse
Bern, Switzerland
March 13, 1980

14 Caubenhaven
Bem. Feitgerland

From the outset, President Carter has pursued a policy of patience and restraint. He did this not only to insure the safe ultimate release of our hostages, but also to create an atmosphere of calm than release, which would allow an respective governments to build a new relationship which recognized the new realities, created by the Iranian revolution. This continues to be an objective and our hope.

[is under heart
mountain
criticism]

However, the atmosphere of restraint created and sustained by President Carter [cannot last forever] A growing number of political figures and journalists who have supported Carter's policy of restraint are now advocating extreme measures [of a result of the commission's departure from Tehran]. Despite this growing frustration, President Carter has not abandoned his policy of restraint. As soon as we learned of the commission's decision to leave Iran, President Carter called upon the American people and the Congress to be patient. He also conveyed to the UN Commission through Secretary-General Waldheim, and Secretary Vance his desire that the Commission not abandon their work and be prepared to return to Tehran under the proper circumstances.

We believe that the process negotiated by Mikhail Volodin and Bounguet represents an honorable way to resolve our problems. We are prepared to remain our commitment to that process, but must have evidence of your government's willingness and ability to abide by that process. The transfer of the hostages to the custody of the government would be an appropriate gesture.

bring out their commitments as
abide strictly by that process

important evidence
of Iranian goodwill.

14 Außenstrasse
Bonn, Deutschland

- 3 -

Beyond the present problems, I can assure you that our government will adopt a reasonable attitude in resolving the numerous bilateral issues that we face.

Finally, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to communicate directly with you. Plans know that we will do everything possible to bring an early and honorable conclusion to the present crisis. I hope that you will accept my frank analysis that time is working against us.

I hope to have the honor of meeting you someday.

Sincerely,
~~Hamilton Ford~~
Craig G. Still to the President

President Barri-Seda

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Cable from Swiss Charge Kaiser

March 27, 1980

(Text of letter intended for Khomeini and attributed to President Carter)

Excellency:

I have read your message to the Iranian people dated March 21. I consider it to be a key document for the future of your country.

In that message you also defined your international policy choice. This concerns us. I agree that the peace of the world requires new relations between States, especially respect for the sovereignty of nations and the right of peoples to self-determination.

I wish to say to you that these two principles often expressed by you and by President Bani-Sadr are my principles, and we have proved to the world our decision to implement them, in Nicaragua, in Pakistan, and in the face of a probable threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. I wish to say to you that my Government inherited a very delicate international situation -- the product of another policy, of other circumstances which have led us all to commit errors in the past.

The great advantage of American democracy is that it has always been able to recognize or condemn its mistakes. We agreed to the Congressional Commission of Inquiry to clarify the truth of serious acts of American intervention such as in the case of Chile, and that Commission of Inquiry made very important decisions condemning that intervention and taking very important measures against those responsible for those acts. President Bani-Sadr has been informed by us that we are prepared to establish this Commission of Inquiry in the United States within the framework of a program which would allow the settlement of this crisis between our two nations.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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PER 2/15/97 *shk* / *hr* RE *NLC-97-24*
BY *[Signature]* NARS. DATE *1/26/98*

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We have also informed President Bani-Sadr of our great willingness to make a major effort and give the Iranian people the necessary satisfactions in order to solve peacefully the disputes between our two Governments. I can understand very well that the takeover of the Embassy of our country there could be an understandable reaction of the youth of Iran. But the situation has changed, and I have serious reasons to harbor doubts as to the true motivations of those who took over our Embassy.

Today this takeover is creating major problems for your Government and for mine. It has now become an element of discord which does not allow us to end the present crisis or to establish these new relations which you talk about and which we accept on the basis of equality of mutual respect. We are ready to recognize the new realities created by the Iranian revolution. This continues to be our objective and our hope, because in the final analysis I believe that we share a single objective--world peace and justice for all peoples. From the moment that the overthrown former Shah left the United States where he had been admitted for humanitarian reasons and for medical purposes, my Government decided not to intervene in these problems. The ex-Shah's departure from Panama was his own personal decision, and we were in no way involved with the negotiations he himself undertook with Sadat in order to find refuge in Egypt. We would like there to be no misunderstanding on that point: We opposed his return to the United States, we opposed his being treated in American hospitals and by American physicians. We conveyed to President Bani-Sadr all the information we had on the physical condition of the former Shah. I consider it to be essential to maintain the principle that these two problems should be kept totally separate. The crisis between our two countries must be resolved by the will and the capacity of our Governments to act in accordance with reality and in the interest of a serious future for our peoples. I wish to say to you that as soon as the immediate problem is resolved by the transfer of the hostages to the custody of the Iranian Government, we are ready to adopt a reasonable and friendly attitude in regard to our numerous bilateral problems. It has been recommended to us that

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- 3 -

there be established a Joint Commission as the instrument for dealing with those bilateral issues. We would be receptive to this approach and could see the Commission as the means for developing our future relationship. I would ask you to make a great effort to help me to resolve the crisis between our two countries in a manner which is fair and honorable for all. I am very grateful to you. Our peoples will be very grateful to you. I would note for you that in my humble opinion time and the true enemies of our respective political processes are working against us.

With my greatest respect,

signed: Jimmy Carter

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MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR LANG, MARCH 11, 1980

The hostages. Perhaps the State Department already has this information but it is interesting for you in any case.

1. By crosschecking, B believes that he has determined that of the fifty, thirty were held at the compound until recently. Bishop Capucci, highly revered by the students, only saw thirty of them and it is likely that he would have been shown more of them if they had been there.
2. Sahabi saw 49 of them last week.
3. Michael Metrisko was brought back by ambulance from the hospital on Saturday at 4:50 PM (the visit or transfer was to take place at 5:00 PM).
4. On Sunday Dr. Gharai of the Lion and the Sun visited the hostages at the compound (our source here is Schmid de Grunck of the International Red Cross) and saw 43 of them including Metrisko. According to him, all those he saw were in good physical condition.

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TELEGRAM FROM [REDACTED] prepared
RECEIVED 0730 HOURS, MARCH 8, 1980 (probably March 7)

1. B & V would like to meet in Switzerland with Jordan and Saunders. They intend to leave by Swissair Flight 363 from Tehran for Zurich, Monday, March 11. Please tell us urgently if Jordan and Saunders are in agreement. They could take Swissair Flight 111 or 101 from New York Sunday evening and arrive in Zurich about the same time that B & V do. We would meet everyone at Zurich and take them to Bern in the same manner and under the same conditions as the last time. Please telephone me either directly or c/o the Operations Center.
2. The Iranians seem to insist on establishing the joint American/Iranian Commission to address difficult problems very soon; that is, before the complete liberation of the hostages. They would like to establish the principles of this Commission and an outline of its work. As agreed at their last meeting in Bern by B & V and Saunders and Jordan, the Joint Commission would, in the Iranians view, meet in Switzerland. From the Iranian side one could expect to see Nobari, Governor of the Central Bank as Chief or Deputy Chief of the Commission. (In conveying this message, the Swiss Embassy officer said B & V would go to Panama from Zurich.)

March 8, 1980

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BY [Signature] NARS DATE 1/23/98



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Conversation with Hector Villalon, 1600 March 3.

Mr. Villalon was reached at Ghotbzadeh's office. He had been trying for two hours to reach us without success.

He said that the "student" leader from the compound had told Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh that President Carter had made a statement that the UN Commission was intended to free the hostages. He asked whether this was true. I said it was not. U. S. officials had made very few statements recently. When they said anything, they adhered to the Waldheim line, that the Commission was intended to air Iran's grievances and end the crisis. Villalon asked us to confirm this with a cable to Lang, and we have done so.

Villalon described the great delicacy of the situation and the physical danger confronting the two lawyers and Ambassador Lang.

He said that they had worked all day to perfect the final stages of the scenario. Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh hoped to give it to the Imam tomorrow. I asked what modifications had been made. Villalon said the changes were minor and did not affect the United States. He said there were four variations on the final stage, depending on four possible evolutions of the situation. They would push one which promised the quickest release of the hostages.

Villalon said they had an idea for a step to be taken by Panama which could accelerate the release of the hostages. He would not describe the idea on the telephone.

Villalon said that the Commission should not insist on transfer of the hostages to a hospital. This must be

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an idea put forth by Iran. I told him that the scenario provided that the Commission would be instrumental in the transfer of the hostages. He said because of internal problems it was not possible to stick to the letter of the scenario. He said if the Commission insists on the transfer of the hostages, it could ruin everything. The Iranians could not be seen as complying with the demands of the Commission.

I said if he had departed from the original scenario, there would be serious problems here unless we were able to find a substitute arrangement that was equally satisfactory. I emphasized that delay was causing serious problems in this country. I pressed him for an early visit to the compound. He said it could come late tomorrow or the following day.

I asked how much time between the visit to the hostages and their transfer. He said a week might be required. I told him that the Commission would not be able to complete its work or issue its report while the hostages remained held. How would he deal with that? He said that the Co-chairmen should meet with him.

I asked him what his thoughts were about a meeting with us. He said he would let us know; perhaps we could get together in Switzerland on the weekend. But he needed to get Bani-Sadr's approval on the next steps on the scenario.

He would let us know tomorrow through his daughter when and where we should telephone him.


Henry Precht

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1980

MEMO FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FROM: GARY SICK

SUBJECT: Iran

I talked at some length today with two of my Iranian contacts. The following information was provided:

-- There was a "very bad conflict" today between Ghotbzadeh and the militants at the Embassy. Gh. went to the embassy and demanded that they permit the Commission to visit the hostages. They refused and "kicked him out" of the embassy. Talking to my contact later, Gh. suggested that he was concerned about his physical (not to speak of political) safety and he referred to the militants as "those idiot communists."

--According to Gh., Khomeini is 100% behind the idea of the Commission visit, but it is no longer clear whether the militants would obey even a direct order. If they did not, my contact fears "a tragedy

-- Reportedly, Gh. went to Khomeini to resign after the embassy incident, but Khomeini would not let him. (This sounds like Gh. posturing, and I take it with a large grain of salt.)

-- A different source told me, as a matter of interest, that the Iranian Ministry of Finance is providing very generous sums of money to finance the militant operation at the embassy. He commented that the very generous subsidy may provide an additional incentive for the militants to stay put.

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BY J NARS. DATE 2/11/99



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 6, 1980

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, March 6, 1980

PARTICIPANTS: M. Bourguet
Henry Precht

Bourguet said that the turnover of the hostages to the control of the Revolutionary Council would take place most likely on Sunday. We asked how we should react in the interim. He said we should await the official Iranian Government announcement this evening. He said the delay until Sunday was caused strictly by "technical factors" (we suspect that the Iranians may think the students may leave the premises booby trapped).

We asked about steps following the transfer on Sunday. He said he would send us a message through the Swiss. We asked about a meeting with the two of them. He said he would also discuss that in a communication through the Swiss. We asked about the morale of the Commission members and whether there was anything we should do in that regard. He said he is reviewing that and would be in touch with us on that subject.

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BY J NARS. DATE 1/26/98



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

March 6, 1980

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, 0845, March 6

PARTICIPANTS: Rafi Ahmed, Special Assistant to
Secretary General Waldheim
Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary
of State, NEA

According to his counterpart in Tehran, Ghotbzadeh after this morning's meeting with the UN Commission stated that the Commission had successfully completed its work on the first part of its mandate. The second part of the mandate requires a meeting with the hostages. Because the Government had met resistance on this point, Ghotbzadeh had asked the Commission to stay in Tehran another 2-3 days.

Ghotbzadeh at that point said he could say no more. Very privately, however, he must have briefed someone in the UN entourage along the following lines with strong emphasis on total secrecy: The hostages will remain where they are. The turnover will take place tonight. The Revolutionary Council will meet late today to discuss details.

Our two lawyers apparently told someone in the UN group that it would be better for the Commission not to go to the Compound before Sunday because the students might "leave something behind" (presumably booby traps). Nevertheless, the UN group is talking about a visit to the Compound on Sunday, partly because Pettiti is going to Paris and will be back Saturday. When and if they go to see the hostages, a team of doctors will accompany them.

Apparently Bani Sadr got approval from Khomeini for the Commission to visit the Compound. The reaction of the occupiers of the Compound was to issue this morning's statement.

Ahmed asked his counterpart how the U.S. should react publicly. The advice from Tehran was that the U.S. should not comment. The U.S. should avoid referring in any substantial way to the statement by the occupiers.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 9/15/97 State Dept. NLC-97-24
BY J NARS. DATE 1/26/98

From Hal Saunders 3/12

First, I do not believe Hamilton needs to consult with the President further on any new message for Bandi-Sadr. Our friends say that our willingness to manage public opinion calmly on our side is an adequate response for the moment to give them time to work things out themselves.

Two, Ghotzbadah asked our friend to tell Hamilton he is not sure but thinks it is very probable that the transfer of the hostages can be concluded within 7 days after the first ballot.

Three, on the development of the scenario, we can work on it here but will need to understand more about the possible future work of the commission. I will be talking with Secretary Vance in a couple of hours before he leaves for New York to tell him what information we need from his talks with Waldheim and with the commission. Also, before the scenario or variations of it can proceed, our friends believe the Iranians have to make up their own minds to transfer the hostages. Our friends do not see that any pressure from outside will help. This is now a domestic problem for the Iranians.

Four, there is a fundamental difference in the situation since the Iman's recent statement because that statement made clear, in the view of our friends, that the students will no longer be allowed to

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intervene in domestic politics.

Five, on Metrisko, we feel that we now have reasonably firm indications that he is alive and well and will be relaying our information directly to the State Department so that someone can call his family.

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J

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HENRY PRECHT AND HECTOR VILLALON:

P: Please convey to the members of the Commission our request that they remain in Tehran at least until Friday morning. Please ask Bani-Sadr to make the same request and to meet with the Commission members tomorrow to do so. The Secretary-General has already asked the Commission members to stay, but as of now they plan to leave at 3:00 p.m.

V: The Foreign Minister met with the Commission tonight in the hotel and made the same request. Bani-Sadr will meet with them tomorrow morning and will repeat the request to them to stay until Friday morning. Therefore, this request has already been made.

P: The problem is that two of the members, the French member and the Sri-Lankan, think that the Iranians really want the Commission to leave. Therefore, it is very important to communicate especially to the Frenchman what it is the locals really want and that they should not leave until

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 2/27/97 GSK/HRE FILE ALC-97-24
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Friday if at all possible.

V: We will call them in the morning. We will talk to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We are all working to solve this problem, but the [REDACTED]

P: Perhaps it is true that the Commission members are overreacting, but that is the situation and we have to work with it. We are sending you an extremely important message via the Swiss which we hope you will receive early tomorrow morning. Here the situation is extremely bleak. There is a great fear that when the Commission leaves, failure will be declared, thus destroying everything. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the visit to the hostages takes place tomorrow without fail. If not, I am afraid that there will no longer be a willingness on our side to proceed.

V: I have taken note of what you have said. Is there anything else?

P: Some of the Commission members have expressed a real

fear that the Government is going to provoke violence with the militants. Do you have any indication of such a possibility ?

V: It is very difficult for me to discuss this on the phone. You have no idea of everything that is involved here. It is much more serious and the problem will be solved here no matter what the price. Do you understand what I am saying? All of the efforts here tonight have been aimed at seeing to it that that cost is not too high.

P: We want you both to know that we have complete confidence in you both, more than confidence, real affection and appreciation for you. We leave to your discretion the way you use the information that you will receive thru the Swiss. We are doing the best we can to preserve opportunities, but it will be very, very difficult unless we see some results. I hate to be a bore, but I have to under these circumstances.

V: The situation is this: It is the equivalent of the situation on your side except that last night we went through some very serious moments. Bani-Sadr convoked the Armed Forces authorities, and all contingency measures have

been taken on that side so if there has been a delay of 24 or 30 hours, it has been in order to avoid intervention from those opposed to the government. (Not clear to us what this means h.j.)

P: I hope that you have a good breakfast.

V: Listen, if we get out of here alive, we can thank God.

P: What about the possibility of a meeting?

V: You know that the most urgent thing now is not the report of the Commission because if there is no solution reached on the level of the Commission, it is obvious that the scenario will be delayed. Therefore, we are aware that we cannot leave here without positive responses to all the rest of the points in the scenario. When we report to you tomorrow afternoon, we will not only report to you the solution on this phase, but will have an agreement on the next.

P: Very good.

V: By the way, did you receive the information that Metrinko has been accounted for? Apparently he was just sick.

P: How will you communicate tomorrow?

V: I don't know, but we will.

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CABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LANG (Cable #126)

We would appreciate it if Ambassador Lang would transmit the following information urgently to V with reference to his conversation March 3 with the Department of State.

1. We can assure the Iranian leadership that neither the President nor any other U.S. Government official has made a statement to the effect that the Commission was in Tehran to free the hostages. Virtually no public statements have been made in the last few days by American officials. The only references to the Commission's work have quoted the mandate established by the Secretary General, i.e., that the Commission would hear Iran's grievances and help to end the crisis.

2. V should also know that officials/in Washington are at the highest levels deeply concerned that there may be a departure from the agreed scenario without the substitution of steps that are equally acceptable to both sides. We had understood that the scenario was agreed on by all significant Iranian leaders. We therefore do not understand the departure from the plan to have the Commission remain in Iran as a form of pressure to secure the transfer of the hostages from the compound. If the transfer can be arranged by the Iranians shortly after the visit to the compound, that would be acceptable, but we need a clear commitment and knowledge of definite arrangements to that effect. In any event, no one in Tehran should be

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PER 9/15/97 [Signature] RE NLC-97-24
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 1/26/98

under any illusion that it will be possible for the Commission to complete its work (i.e., publication of a report) while the hostages remain in the custody of the students.

3. We reaffirm our great confidence in B and V and our deep appreciation for their continuing sacrifice in helping to resolve the crisis. The foregoing possible misunderstanding, however, emphasizes the urgent need for daily communications conducted as frankly and specifically as possible.

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Message for Ambassador Lang

We would appreciate it if Ambassador Lang could make the following points to Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh regarding the request of the Revolutionary prosecutor to involve Mr. Tomseth in the legal proceedings against the Forqan terrorist group.

(1) As the Minister is certainly aware, any violation of Mr. Tomseth's immunity to involve him in the legal proceedings against the Forqan terrorists could have serious consequences for the efforts now underway to resolve the crisis. We appreciate the sensitivity of the Minister's position on this matter and trust that he will be able to find a way to defuse public pressures.

(2) We can give the Minister absolute assurances that the United States had no knowing involvement of any kind with members of the Forqan organization. The terrorism practiced by the Forqan is abhorrent to American principles. Moreover, the Minister should know that when we said we were not intervening in Tehran's internal affairs, we meant that and we adhered scrupulously to that line.

(3) Any information on Forqan that the Embassy may have received was not requested and was volunteered by Iranian citizens. Reports were made to Washington of such unevaluated information for the purpose of better understanding the political situation in Tehran.

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(4) In addition, we hope that Ambassador Lang can use the opportunity of his meeting with the Minister to urge more rapid movement towards the resolution of the crisis. We have been patient and careful in following the scenario, but pressures are building both here and in Iran among those who would defeat a settlement. It is imperative that these persons not be given an opportunity and that we move quickly to resolve this crisis once and for all.

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(4) In addition, we hope that Ambassador Lang can use the opportunity of his meeting with the Minister to urge more rapid movement towards the resolution of the crisis. We have been patient and careful in following the scenario, but pressures are building both here and in Iran among those who would defeat a settlement. It is imperative that these persons not be given an opportunity and that we move quickly to resolve this crisis once and for all.

Drafted: NEA/IWG:HPrecht:apr
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early tomorrow morning. Here the situation is really extremely black. There is a great fear that when the Commission leaves, failure will be declared, thus destroying everything. Therefore it is absolutely essential that ~~this famous~~ ^{to take place to go on} visit take place tomorrow without fail. If not, I am very much afraid that there will no longer be any willingness on this side to go ahead with the project.

Villalon: I have taken note of what you have just said. Is there anything else?

Precht: Some of the Commission members have expressed a real fear that the Government is going to provoke violence with the ~~kids~~ ^{young people}. Do you have any indication of such a possibility?

Villalon: It is very difficult for me to discuss this on the telephone. You have no idea of everything that is involved here. It is much more serious and the problem will be solved no matter what the price.

(Do you understand what I am saying?) All of the efforts which have been made here all day and tonight have been aimed at seeing to it that that cost is not too high.

Precht: We want you to know that we have complete confidence in you both, more than confidence, real ~~love~~ ^{affection} for you. We leave to your discretion the ^{use} ~~use that you wish to make~~ of the information you will receive through the Swiss. I am doing my best to preserve opportunities, but it will be very, very difficult unless we see some results. I hate to be a bore, but I guess I have no choice but to be a bore under these circumstances.

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Villalon: In general terms the situation is this: It is the equivalent of the situation on your side except that last night we lived through very serious moments, even more than serious.

Bani-Sadr convoked the Armed Forces authorities and all contingency measures have been taken on that side so if there has been a delay of 24 or 30 hours, it has been in order to avoid intervention from that side.

Precht: I hope you have a good breakfast.

Villalon: Listen, if we get out of here alive, we can thank God.

Precht: What about the possibility of a meeting?

Villalon: You know the most urgent thing now is not the report of the ~~wise men~~^{Commission} because if there is no solution reached on the level of the Commission, it is obvious that the scenario will be delayed. Therefore, we are aware that we cannot leave here without positive responses to all the rest of the points in the scenario. When we contact you tomorrow afternoon we will not only report to you the solution on this phase but will have an agreement on the next.

Precht: Very good.

Villalon: By the way, did you receive the information that Metrinko has been accounted for? Apparently he was just sick.

Precht: How will you communicate tomorrow?

Villalon: I don't know how we will do it, but we will.

- END -

3/5/80

We (understand) (^{have seen} ~~are aware of~~ the reports) that the fact-finding Commission of Inquiry is departing (will depart) Thursday without completing its mission. As the situation evolved, we have been aware of this possibility. Since the Commission has not been allowed to fulfill its mandate as stated by the Secretary General on February 20 and agreed to directly by the Governments of Iran and the United States, ~~their~~ decision to suspend [their] activities and return to New York ^{is} [was] fully justified.

Q

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

IRAN WORKING GROUP

DATE: March 6, 1980

TIME: 1:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Hector Villalon

Villalon telephoned at 1:00 P.M.. He said his message was in two parts. One part official and one part personal.

In the official message he confirmed that a statement would be issued by the Revolutionary Council tonight. It was also possible that the Council would take control of the hostages during the night. The visit of the Commission to the compound would probably occur on Sunday. After the Commission had completed its visit, a team of medical personnel would visit. The doctors would continue to see the hostages to assure complete medical care.

After visiting the compound, the Commission would make a publicized visit on the three officers in the Foreign Ministry.

Sometime soon there would be a change in the lodging arrangements for the hostages. They would not go to a hospital, but perhaps would go to a government guest house.

Villalon suggested that President Carter might wish to cut a tape which could be telephoned by the UN to the Commission at the Hilton Hotel. The taped message would be played to the hostages by the Commission to boost their morale. Villalon would also give to Aguilar the "Paris letter" which would help improve the morale of the hostages.

The Commission would probably leave Tehran on Monday. Everything was going as planned. The two lawyers hoped to compress the final stages as they had the intermediate stages.

Villalon suggested the following text as a rough model for a statement we could make following the statement tonight by the Revolutionary Council:

"Respectful of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Iran, the U.S. Government states that it does not wish to make any comment on the manner in which the Government of Iran has resolved the matter of the control and protection of the U.S. citizens detained in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by the group of students.

Drafted: NEA/IWG:HPrecht:apr

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PER 8/15/97 Gak/HRE NUC-47-24
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 1/26/98

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"The U.S. Government states its satisfaction with this gesture which could allow serious progress to be made toward a peaceful settlement of the existing crisis between the two countries."

In the informal part of his conversation Villalon concentrated with great feeling on the blackmail he felt we had threatened in saying we might make the record of our dealings with Iran public. The UN had communicated this threat to the Commission which had spread it around Tehran. As a result, the lawyers felt obliged to inform Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh. Both men felt that the U.S. has no confidence in them and seriously questioned whether they should have confidence in us. The Iranians and the lawyers felt that their lives had been placed in jeopardy. After considerable counter-argument from me, Villalon somewhat calmed down, but still insisted that we might have a new crisis with the Iranians and the two of them might resign.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Henry Precht, NEA/IRN
Conversation with Christine, daughter of Hector Villadon
at 0915 March 8, 1980

Christine has spoken to her father in Tehran and had the following message for us. The situation was extremely complicated and delicate. At 1800 Tehran time the Revolutionary Council was to meet and would take certain unspecified initiatives.

The group opposed to Bani-Sadr had organized huge demonstrations which blocked the transfer of the hostages.

In these circumstances it was essential that everyone act prudently in order to avoid unfortunate repercussions.

Villadon said it would not be possible to have a conversation with us today, but he would try to communicate through the Swiss Ambassador. That would be difficult, however. Christine said she would have another conversation with her father later in the evening. I said we might have a message for her to pass to him.

HP
NEA/IWG:HPrecht:sal
3/8/80

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for Preservation Purposes**

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 9/15/97 GAB/HR RE ALC-97-24
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 1/26/98

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
(IRAN WORKING GROUP)

DATE: March 11, 1980
TIME: Early Morning
PARTICIPANTS: Sadegh GHOTBZADEH, Iranian Foreign Minister
Richard Cottam

On March 10 I asked Cottam to telephone Ghotbzadeh to make the following points:

-- The most recent Khomeini statement had been viewed with great seriousness in Washington. On the morning of March 10 there had been a meeting of the senior levels of Government to consider whether we should continue to pursue the negotiating track utilizing the UN Commission. The mood was very pessimistic.

-- In the afternoon there had been a meeting with the senior leadership of the Congress and further discussions in the Executive Branch.

-- At the end of the day the decision was reached to continue to pursue negotiations and to attempt to keep the UN Commission in being. There was general recognition of the serious political problem the Iranians face prior to the March 14 elections.

-- We were attempting to persuade the UN to handle its press statement in a way that would preserve options for the Commission. This would be our posture with the press as well. We hoped that the Iranians would not make any statements that would complicate efforts to keep the Commission going.

Ghotbzadeh was pleased with this message and said he shared that point of view. He said he would follow the same line in Iran.

Ghotbzadeh said Khomeini had "blundered" with his most recent statement. He tried to please both the religious hardliners and the Revolutionary Council. Khomeini's statement had not been an attack on Ghotbzadeh. In fact Ghotbzadeh was receiving widespread praise for his critical statement against the militants.

Cottam asked Ghotbzadeh whether Bani-Sadr was playing an active role on the hostage issue. Cottam said our impression was that he was not meeting his responsibilities. Ghotbzadeh replied, "He doesn't have the guts for it." Cottam tried unsuccessfully to extract from Ghotbzadeh the names of the religious figures who were backing the students.

Drafted: NEA/IWG:HP:echt:sw
3/11/80, x26610

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~ C

CABLE FROM DANISH AMBASSADOR MUNK IN TEHRAN (8 MAR 1980)

Bruce Laingen today got through to me with a message that he was received last night (Friday) by the Foreign Minister, who -- in extraordinarily polite terms -- assured him that the leadership was making the greatest efforts to bring about the transfer of the hostages to the Revolutionary Council, and that he expected it to take place on the eighth of March, probably during the evening hours.

He (Laingen) realized that delays of one or several days were possible, but the serious nature of the pledge to a transfer of all hostages was apparent from the physical preparations going on in the relevant rooms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finally he said that when all hostages came under the Ministry's roof, it would probably be more difficult for him to get new messages through.

~~SECRET~~

March 8, 1980

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BY J NARS. DATE 11/26/98

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NARS, DATE 1/26/98
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PERSONNEL FILE RE NRC-97-24
BY *[Signature]*
MARS, DATE 12/1/98

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


March 12, 1980

To Christian Bourguet

I hope you will accept my personal thanks and appreciation for your untiring efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis which presently exists between the United States and Iran. The personal courage and perseverance that you have demonstrated in this effort have been an inspiration to everyone here.

We share your own disappointment that our recent efforts were not successful, but I believe that we have made progress. I will not rest until our hostages are released and this crisis resolved, and I hope that you will continue to be a partner in this effort.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Dr. Christian Bourguet

ps I look forward to an opportunity to thank you personally.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


March 12, 1980

To Hector Villalon

I hope you will accept my personal thanks and appreciation for your untiring efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis which presently exists between the United States and Iran. The personal courage and perseverance that you have demonstrated in this effort have been an inspiration to everyone here.

We share your own disappointment that our recent efforts were not successful, but I believe that we have made progress. I will not rest until our hostages are released and this crisis resolved, and I hope that you will continue to be a partner in this effort.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

Mr. Hector Villalon

p.s. I look forward to an opportunity to thank you personally.

NOV 1979



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

BERN 01455 01 OF 02 131239Z

AS REFLECTING A DECISIVE TURN IN THE TIDE AGAINST THE MILITANTS, THEREBY SETTING THE STAGE FOR TRANSFER AS PART OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE REASONABLY FIRM INDICATION THAT METRINKO IS ALIVE AND PHYSICALLY SOUND. END SUMMARY.

4. DURING CONVERSATIONS FROM ROUGHLY NOON TO 8 P.M. WEDNESDAY B AND V APPEARED GENERALLY MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS OR THAN WOULD APPEAR TO US TO BE JUSTIFIED BY RECENT EVENTS. WHILE THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO CONCEDE CREDIT TO COMMISSION MEMBERS, IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT ANY CHANGE IN THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN TEHRAN RESULTS FROM THE CONTINUING PRESENCE AND PRESSURE OF THE COMMISSION IN IRAN. B AND V BELIEVE THE PUBLIC MOOD IS DEFINITELY TURNING AGAINST THE MILITANTS AND THEY CITE RECENT STATEMENTS BY GHOTBZADEH, BANI-SADR AND KHOMEINI'S ELDER BROTHER, AYATOLLAH PASANDIDEH, AS EVIDENCE THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS NOW WILLING TO ATTACK THE MILITANTS WITH KHOMEINI'S APPROVAL AND TO GUIDE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THEM. THEY GIVE A POSITIVE INTERPRETATION TO KHOMEINI'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 10, SUGGESTING THAT KHOMEINI WAS ATTEMPTING TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION--BUT COULD NOT APPEAR TO BE LESS ANTI-AMERICA THAN NORMAL IN DOING SO.

5. B AND V EXPECT POPULAR FEELING AGAINST THE MILITANTS TO RISE BECAUSE OF THEIR ATTACKS ON RESPECTED REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS, THEIR EFFORTS TO CONFRONT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF ONLY COMMUNISTS BENEFIT FROM MILITANT ATTACKS. KHOMEINI DOES NOT APPROVE SUCH TACTICS AND IS BOUND TO FIND WAYS TO UNDERCUT THE MILITANTS. B AND V THINK BANI-SADR WILL DO WELL IN THE MARCH 14 VOTING AND BELIEVE THIS IS THE BASIS FOR HIS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER THAT THE HOSTAGES WILL BE MOVED TO

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03

BERN 01455 01 OF 02 131239Z

GOVERNMENT CONTROL WITHIN 15 DAYS OF NOT SOONER AFTER THE ELECTION. LAST NIGHT GHOTBZADEH PRIVATELY TOLD B AND V THAT HE BELIEVED--BUT WAS NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE--THAT THE TRANSFER WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE WITHIN A WEEK AFTER MARCH 14 VOTE. THE MARGIN OF DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD NOT OCCUR WAS VERY SMALL. B AND V THINK GHOTBZADEH WAS COMPLETELY HONEST AND SINCERE IN THIS STATEMENT.

6. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OPTIMISM MAY REPRESENT LITTLE MORE THAN THE HOPE OF OUR DEEPLY COMMITTED FRIENDS AND BANI-SADR AND GHOTBZADEH. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHALL BE EXPLORING WAYS TO ATTEMPT TO BIND THE IRANIANS TO THE PREDICTIONS IN OUR CONVERSATIONS THAT FOLLOW. WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT A STEP-BY-STEP SCENARIO COVERING THE 7-14 DAYS AFTER THE ELECTIONS AS A BASIS FOR THINKING ABOUT WHERE WE GO FROM HERE IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW TIMETABLE.

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Department of State

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PAGE 02

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THAT TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES IS A PRECONDITION FOR THE COMMISSION'S RETURN. BOTH B AND V AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT TRANSFER IS, IN FACT, A PRECONDITION. THEY BELIEVE THE COMMISSION MUST FULFILL ITS MANDATE BY VISITING THE HOSTAGES AFTER THEIR TRANSFER BECAUSE THE VISIT IS IMPORTANT TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS GRIP ON THE SITUATION AND TO REDUCE THE POWER OF THE MILITANTS--BOTH MOVES ARE ESSENTIAL IN PAVING THE WAY FOR RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THEY ALSO URGE THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD AT LEAST BE ORGANIZING AND ASSEMBLING ELEMENTS OF ITS REPORT. THEY RECALL THAT THE ORIGINAL SCENARIO ENVISIONED THE COMMISSION TELLING THE COUNCIL THAT IT WAS READY TO REPORT BUT THAT NO REPORT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY WHILE THE HOSTAGES WERE BEING HELD IN INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS. B AND V FEEL THAT SOME SUCH STATEMENT--PERHAPS COUPLED WITH SOME COMMENTS ON THE GRIEVANCES THEY HAVE HEARD--WILL BE IMPORTANT IN STRENGTHENING THE HANDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AGAINST THOSE WHO MAY TRY TO BLOCK EVENTUAL RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

9. WHEN THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES OCCURS, THE CURRENT PLAN IS THAT THE SO WILL INITIALLY BE LOUGED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. AT THAT TIME THEY WILL NO LONGER BE KNOWN AS "HOSTAGES", BUT WILL BECOME "PERSONS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT". IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AFTER 5-6 DAYS THE SO MAY BE MOVED TO MORE SUITABLE QUARTERS, E.G., EITHER ON A MILITARY BASE OR IN A HOTEL. B AND V HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT AN IRANIAN GESTURE WHICH WOULD SEND LAINGEN AND TOMSETH HOME AT SOME EARLY POINT. THEY WERE NOT PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED IN THIS THOUGHT BY GHOTBZADEN.

10. WE SPENT SOME TIME DISCUSSING THE JOINT US-IRANIAN COMMISSION. B AND V HAVE NOT THOUGHT THROUGH NOW THIS

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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF THE 1980 TAX REFORMS

- 1. THE EFFECTS OF THE 1980 TAX REFORMS ON THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF Firms.
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Press Guidance

As we said yesterday, the report of the alleged message from President Carter to Ayatollah Khomeini is false. Neither the President nor any other American official authorized or sent any such message orally or in writing.

As we have said on a number of occasions, we have been working for some weeks with the authorities in Iran to work out ways of bringing the present crisis to an end. Government-to-government messages have been exchanged in that connection, but they were clearly different in tone and substance from the alleged message published yesterday.

Two such government-to-government messages were sent in this past week. Their purpose was to urge a prompt resolution of the crisis and to inform the Iranian Government that the United States would be taking certain steps this week if no progress were made toward a solution of the hostage crisis.

PM-IRAN-SADR ***** URGENT

PARIS, MARCH 14, REUTER - IRANIAN PRESIDENT PROHIBITION

BANI-SADR SAID IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED TODAY THAT THE

CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HOSTAGES WAS A

SOURCE OF WEAKNESS RATHER THAN A TRUMP CARD FOR IRAN.

INTERVIEWED BY THE TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT OF THE DAILY

NEWSPAPER LE FIGARO, PRESIDENT BANI-SADR SAID HE HOPED THE

IRANIAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE WOULD RISE WITH HIM THAT IRAN SHOULD

NOT EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY BY KEEPING THE HOSTAGES.

MORE 0510

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PM-IRAN-SADR 2 PARIS

SPEAKING ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY

ELECTIONS, MR BANI-SADR DESCRIBED THE DEPARTURE OF THE UNITED

NATIONS COMMISSION, WHICH MIGHT HAVE HELPED SOLVE THE HOSTAGE

CRISIS, AS A MISSED OPPORTUNITY, AND HE HOPED IT WOULD RETURN

AND RESUME ITS WORK.

THE FIVE-MAN COMMISSION WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE SEEN ALL THE

HOSTAGES BEFORE ISSUING A REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE

DEPOSED SHAH, THE COMMISSION LEFT LAST WEEK AFTER BAHLOLLAH

RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI REFUSED TO ALLOW IT TO VISIT ALL THE 50

HOSTAGES WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED SINCE NOVEMBER 4.

PRESIDENT BANI-SADR SAID: "FOR ME, THE DETENTION OF THE

AMERICAN HOSTAGES IS NOT A TRUMP CARD FOR IRAN, IT EVEN

CONSTITUTES A WEAKNESS, BECAUSE IT PREVENTS US FROM ACTING AT

THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL TO CREATE A CLIMATE ALLOWING US TO

PURSUDE A POLICY OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE WITH EUROPE AND ALL

COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A SUPERPOWER."

MORE 0543

OPERATIONS CENTER

IRAN WORKING GROUP

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Situation in Iran as of 0530 EST, March 16, 1980

(U) Iranian Elections: Islamic Republican Party Leading in Early Returns

Benefitting from better organization and pre-election publicity, and amid reports of vote fraud, the clergy-led Islamic Republican Party (IRP) was winning a majority of seats decided in yesterday's first round of Iran's parliamentary election, according to press reports. Limited returns thus far available indicated that 25 of 47 seats decided by clear first round majorities went to IRP candidates. A senior IRP official remarked that the party would be expected to act as a unit in Parliament and, should it win a majority in the election, President Bani-Sadr would be obliged to nominate as Prime Minister a member of the party or someone acceptable to it.

Tehran Radio reported last night that no more than 150 of the total 276 seats will be decided in the first round of voting. Interior Ministry officials have stated that, if around 180 seats are settled in the first round, Parliament could start work immediately. The government will announce final results from the first round in several days. The second round of voting will take place in about three weeks.

Meanwhile, in a Friday press interview, President Bani-Sadr has said he would personally ask the Parliament now being elected to order the release of the hostages when it convenes in May.

(U) Alleged Controversy Over Shah's Medical Treatment

Wire service reports state that the Panamanian medical team treating the Shah has refused to accept the "imposition" of Dr. Debakey and his team as observers and consultants. Discussions are said to be continuing.

CBS News has told us that it plans to run a story this morning asserting that the U.S. Government has refused medical treatment for the Shah at any U.S. medical facility in Panama, although the U.S. will permit equipment in such facilities to be used for any necessary medical tests which cannot be performed at Panamanian hospitals.

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(U) Italian Helicopter Parts

The Iranian Pars News Agency has reported that Italy has agreed to supply 10 U.S.-designed helicopters and a substantial amount of spare parts to Iran for humanitarian purposes. The report notes that the helicopters are built in Italy under U.S. license.



David Winn
Senior Officer
Iran Working Group



Seton Stapleton
Senior Watch Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

3/31/80

SCENARIO I -- Positive News from Iran

1. Brief, live announcement by President as soon as news confirmed; conference call to television network anchors following NSC meeting; select press briefing

2. NSC Meeting: 2:30 pm to begin consideration of elements in Iranian statement

3. Information Plan:
 - A. Congressional Leadership Briefing 3:30 pm (Cabinet Room)
 - B. Broader briefing on Hill 4:30 pm
 - C. Cabinet Conference Call 3:15 pm (to be set up immediately following NSC meeting)
 - D. Senior Staff Meeting 3:00 pm briefing
 - E. Public Liaison Groups beginning from 3:30 pm
 - F. Political Network beginning from 3:30 pm

4. Memorandum from President to Staff re public posture

3/31/80

SCENARIO II -- No Favorable News from Iran

(Lack of positive developments emphasize sense of crisis)

1. NSC Meeting -- 2:30 pm

2. Presidential Announcements/Messages
 - A. 5:00 pm - Live announcement outlining measures
 - B. 5:30/5:45 pm - Conference Call with television network anchors
 - C. Memorandum to staff re public posture
 - D. Jody to give complete background briefing to press (following Presidential announcement)

3. Briefings and Information
 - A. Congress
 1. Leadership 4:30 pm (Cabinet Room)
(Briefing to continue with President leaving directly to make his announcement, leaving them no opportunity to preempt his public statement on their departure)
 2. Hill briefing of broader group by Deputy Secretary Christopher 5:30 pm
 - B. Cabinet Conference Call from Watson's ofc. 4:30 pm
 - C. Senior Staff briefing 4:00 pm
 - D. Public Liaison Groups telephone calls from 4:30 pm
 - E. Political Network telephone calls from 4:30 pm

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

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MESSAGE NO. 121931 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 6

FROM: W.S. Butcher S/S-0 21512
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Panama 2433

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>White House</u>	<u>Eyes Only Hamilton Jordan</u>		
	<u>and Lloyd Cutler</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS:

S/S Officer:

W. S. Butcher

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

DATE 1/26/18

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Department of State
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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR HAMILTON JORDAN

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/16/80 (MOSS, AMBLER H., JR.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IR, PN, US

SUBJECT: THE SHAH'S OPERATION: WHERE WE ARE

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AS OF SATURDAY NIGHT, MARCH 15, ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE PATIENT, AGREED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH THE SPLENECTOMY AND THAT THE SHAH'S CONDITION WAS SUCH THAT HE COULD RETURN TO CONTADORON MARCH 16. IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH US AND PANAMANIAN DOCTORS WOULD MEET AT PAITILLA HOSPITAL AT 10:00 A.M., MARCH 16, AND THAT THE HOSPITAL SPOKESMAN WOULD ISSUE A SHORT BULLETIN STATING THAT ALL THE PHYSICIANS ATTENDING THE SHAH AGREED THAT THE OPERATION SHOULD BE POSTPONED. I WAS ABLE TO HAVE EXTENSIVE PRIVATE TALKS WITH DR. GASPAR GARCIA DE CAJEDAS, PAITILLA'S US-TRAINED CHIEF SURGEON, AND WITH DR. DEBAKEY, DURING SATURDAY AFTERNOON. IT WAS APPARENT THAT THERE WAS AMPLE COMMON GROUND FOR THEM TO ACHIEVE A MEETING OF THE MINDS WHEN NOT IN THE COMPANY OF THEIR HOTHEADED COLLEAGUES. THIS PROVE TO BE CASE WHEN THEY

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER 8/5/97 Sdk/Ar RE NLC-47-24

BY 9 NARS DATE 1/26/98



Department of State

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PAGE 02 PANAMA 02433 01 OF 02 161925Z

MET ABOUT 9:00 P.M., IN THE COMPANY OF MARCEL SALAMIN, THE DCM AND MYSELF. THE ACTION DURING THE COMING "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD WILL, IN MY OPINION, CONSIST OF LETTING THE DEBAKEY-GARCIA DE PAREDES CHANNEL DEVELOP WITH A VIEW TOWARD PREPARING FOR AN OPERATION IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. TO REACH THIS OBJECTIVE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP STORIES OUT OF THE PRESS, TO REBUILD THE SHAH'S CONFIDENCE, AND TO KEEP ARMAO AND KEAN FROM IRRITATING PANAMANIAN. ARMAO AND KEAN WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE USG FOR REMOVAL OF THE SHAH TO ANOTHER COUNTRY FOR THE OPERATION OR FOR THE USE OF GORGAS RATHER THAN TO HAVE IT DONE AT PAITILLA. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SATURDAY MORNING ERUPTION OF TEMPERS BETWEEN US AND PANAMANIAN DOCTORS WAS BROUGHT ON BY RATHER INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDES ON BOTH SIDES. THE WEEK-LONG SERIES OF PRESS LEAKS IN THE US AND PRESS STATEMENTS (SUCH AS DR. KEAN'S MEDICAL BULLETIN RELEASED BY ARMAO IN NEW YORK CITY ON MONDAY, AS WELL AS DEBAKEY'S REMARKS TO THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THURSDAY) CAUSED GREAT RESENTMENT AMONG PANAMA'S MEDICAL PROFESSION. PANAMANIAN DOCTORS HAD BEEN TAKING CARE OF THE SHAH SINCE DECEMBER AND FELT THEY WERE BEING BRUSHED ASIDE IN A CALLOUS MANNER. THEY REACTED BY PUSTURING AND BEING OBSTRUCTIONIST.

4. IT BECAME CLEAR TO THE SHAH AND TO EVERYONE ELSE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT RIGHT FOR THE OPERATION TO TAKE PLACE THIS WEEKEND. BOTH US AND PANAMANIAN DOCTORS AGREED THAT THE PATIENT'S CONDITION DID NOT REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE OPERATION AND THAT HE COULD RETURN TO CONTADORA. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE HOSPITAL WOULD ISSUE A SHORT PRESS RELEASE MARCH 16

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 PANAMA 02433 01 OF 02 161925Z

SAYING THAT THE OPERATION WOULD BE DEFERRED (STATEMENT TELEPHONED TO OPERATIONS CENTER AT 1230 HOURS MARCH 16; TEXT BELOW AT PARA 10).

5. IN SEPARATE, PRIVATE MEETINGS I HAD SATURDAY AFTERNOON WITH DR. GARCIA DE PAREDES AND WITH DR. DEBAKEY, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THEY HAD ENOUGH MUTUAL RESPECT AND COMMON GROUND THAT THEY COULD GET TOGETHER, APART FROM THEIR HOTHEADED COLLEAGUES AND BEGAN WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION. WHEN THEY DID MEET SATURDAY NIGHT, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RIGHT. DR. GARCIA DE PAREDES APOLOGIZED FOR HIS EARLIER BEHAVIOR, EXPRESSED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR DR. DEBAKEY AND SAID HE SINCERELY WANTED HIM TO JOIN THE TEAM AS THE SENIOR SURGEON AND TO INCLUDE HIS OWN PEOPLE (NURSE, ANESTHESIOLOGIST) ON THE TEAM. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION BUT THAT DEBAKEY'S ADVICE, IF GIVEN, WOULD BE ACCEPTED AS HE WAS THE RECOGNIZED MASTER IN HIS FIELD. DEBAKEY REPLIED IN VERY SENSITIVE STATEMANLIKE TERMS, SAYING THAT HE WOULD JOIN THE TEAM ONLY IF GARCIA DE BAKY PERSONALLY ASKED HIM TO, AND HE EXPRESSED RESPECT FOR THE PANAMANIAN DOCTORS. GARCIA DE PAREDES SAID THAT THEY SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE US EMBASSY, BUT NOT "THROUGH SOME NEW YORK BANK." AT THE END OF THE MEETING, MARCEL SALAMIN EXPRESSED GENERAL TURRIJUS' GREETINGS TO DEBAKEY AND SAID HOW MUCH THE GENERAL ADMIRED HIM. DEBAKEY RECIPROCATED THE GREETINGS AND AUTOGRAPHED A COPY OF HIS MOST RECENT BOOK, "THE LIVING HEART," FOR TURRIJUS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PANAMA 02433

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR HAMILTON JORDAN

6. WHERE DOES ALL THIS LEAD? THE OPENING OF THE DEBAKEY-GARCIA DE PAREDES CHANNEL IS ONLY A BEGINNING; IT WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED MUCH DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE OPERATION CAN TAKE PLACE. DEBAKEY IS NOT USED TO WORKING UNDER LESS-THAN-IDEAL CONDITIONS, AND HE HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF POST-OPERATIVE CARE IN PANAMA. WHEN HE AND GARCIA DE PAREDES BEGIN SERIOUS PLANNING, HE WILL NEED ASSURANCES IN THIS AREA. THE FACT IS THAT HE WOULD, AT THIS POINT, RATHER SEE THE OPERATION PERFORMED ELSEWHERE.

7. ADDITIONALLY, ALTHOUGH THE PANAMANIAN EGGS ARE TEMPORARILY SOOTHED, KEAN AND ARMAO ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF BRINGING THINGS BACK TO THE BREAKING POINT WITH AN ILL-DIRECTED WORD OR TWO, OR BY SPEAKING OR LEAKING TO THE PRESS. THEY DO NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF AN OPERATION AT PAITILLA TO BEGIN WITH. I HAVE TRIED TO GIVE THEM A BASIC LECTURE ON POLITICAL SENSITIVITY AND THE REAL PANAMANIAN SECURITY CONCERNS (I.E., EXTERNAL THREAT FROM IRAN AND INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY) OVER PAITILLA V. GORGAS AND THE APPEARANCE OF US CONTROL, BUT THEY ARE SLOW AND UNWILLING LEARNERS. IN MY OPINION, ANOTHER RATHER STERN APPROACH TO THEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 PANAMA 02433 02 OF 02 1619327

ON US INTERESTS, ETC. IS ADVISABLE. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS IN PUTTING THE OPERATION BACK TOGETHER WILL DEPEND UPON KEEPING STORIES OUT OF THE PRESS AND KEEPING KEAN/ARMAU AWAY FROM PANAMANIAN.

8. THE SHAH, ACCORDING TO ALL WHO HAVE SEEN HIM IS SICK, WEAK, AND NOW HE IS DEMORALIZED BY THE CONFUSION AS WELL. DR. GARCIA DE PAREDES VISITED HIM YESTERDAY, APOLOGIZED FOR THE FUROR, AND TRIED TO MAKE SOOTHING SOUNDS. HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE US-PANAMANIAN TEAM NEEDS TO BE REBUILT BEFORE HE FACES THE OPERATION.

9. IN A MEETING THE DCM AND I HAD WITH ARMAU AND THE US DOCTORS JUST PRIOR TO THE DEBAKEY-GARCIA DE PAREDES MEETING, ARMAU SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH JACKSON, WHO HAD TOLD LLOYD CUTLER THAT IT WAS THE SHAH'S DESIRE, AND THE MEDICAL ADVICE OF HIS US PHYSICIANS THAT HE BE TAKEN TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (ARMAU MENTIONED EGYPT) FOR THE OPERATION, OR, IF THAT WERE IMPOSSIBLE, THAT IT BE PERFORMED AT GORGAS ("IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LACKLAND AGREEMENT.") PAITILLA SHOULD BE ONLY A LAST RESORT. WE POINTED OUT THAT PANAMA'S OBJECTION TO GORGAS, AND THE GOP'S STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SHAH COULD NOT RETURN TO PANAMA IF HE WENT TO GORGAS WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE US OFFER OF THE USE OF GORGAS. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SHAH'S ENTRY INTO A US ARMY HOSPITAL AT A TIME WHEN IRAN WAS DEMANDING THE SHAH'S ARREST AND EXTRADITION WOULD BE POLITICALLY DAMAGING TO THE GOP AND THEREFORE COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT THE GOP WOULD AGREE TO GORGAS. ARMAU TOLD ME BY TELEPHONE TODAY THAT THE US DOCTORS, INCLUDING DEBAKEY, HAD PREPARED A "CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL REPORT" TO THE SHAH CONFIRMING LAST NIGHT'S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

SECRET



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03

PANAMA 02433 02 OF 02 161932Z

RECOMMENDATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE "PUBLIC POSTURE," HOWEVER, WOULD STILL BE THAT THEY WOULD PLAN TO GO AHEAD WITH THE OPERATION AT PAITILLA IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS.

10. TEXT OF MARCH 16 PRESS RELEASE IS AS FOLLOWS:

"REPORT NO. 1

THE PHYSICIANS WHO HAVE BEEN CALLED IN CONSULTATION TO TO SEE THE SHAH TOGETHER WITH THE PANAMANIAN PHYSICIANS WHO ARE CHARGED WITH HIS CARE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED AND ANALYZED ALL OF THE STUDIES THAT HAVE BEEN PERFORMED, AND ON THE BASIS OF THESE ANALYSES, IT WAS THE UNANIMOUS OPINION TO DEFER SURGERY WITH THE VIEW OF PREPARING HIM FOR THE OPERATION AT A LATER DATE WHEN HIS CONDITION IS OPTIMAL. THE CONSULTING PHYSICIANS WILL REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THEIR PANAMANIAN COLLEAGUES. CENTRO MEDICO PAITILLA"
MOSS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Op IMMED
STU482
DE RUEADRN #2113 0941643
O 261630Z MAR 82
FM BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON DC

TO SEC STATE WASH DC

UNCLASSIFIED UK UNCLASSIFIED

SIC
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO IRAN TASK FORCE, OPERATIONS CENTRE, STATE
DEPT. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BRITISH EMBASSY TEHRAN. BEGINS:
UNCLASSIFIED
FM TEHRAN 220035Z MAR 82
TO PRIORITY FOO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 256 OF 19 MARCH
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
US/IRAN

1. ACCORDING TO PARS NEWS AGENCY, THE PASDARAN HAVE ARRESTED
MRS VICTORIA BASSIRI, AN OFFICIAL OF THE MFA, AS AN AMERICAN
SPY. JUST AFTER THE REVOLUTION SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN
CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC ADVISER, AND MORE RECENTLY DEPUTY IN THE
PASSPORT BUREAU, AT A SALARY OF RS 100,000 A MONTH.

2. SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONFESSED TO PASSING INFORMATION
TO WILLIAM P COHERTY OF THE US EMBASSY, ON THE FOLLOWING
POINTS:
A. INFORMATION FROM THE CULTURAL AND ECONOMICS DEPUTY
B. THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE
C. IRANIAN STUDENTS IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
D. GENERAL POLICY OF THE MFA.

3. COHERTY IS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE IS SAID
TO HAVE CONFIRMED MRS BASSIRIS CONFESSIONS AND TO HAVE
SAID THAT SHE USED TO BE PAID 300 DOLLARS PER MONTH FOR THE
INFORMATION.

4. THE NEWSPAPER ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HAS COMMENTED THAT THE
PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN SPY IN THE MFA SHOWS THE LACK OF
PERCEPTION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS DEPUTIES, AND
INDECISIVENESS IN CARRYING OUT PURGES.

BT

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

DEW NR/PA SICK
EORISTCK

RECALLED
PAGE 01 TOR:080/19:23Z DTG:201430Z MAR 80

OP JMWG
DE RUEHL 2353 000017
O 2001277 RAA HQ ZFFA
FM SECRETARY RASHOC

TO AMEMBASSY PANAMA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0759
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3276

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 073883

E.O. 12958-02 3/19/86 (DUSHNELL, JOHN A.)

TAGSE PROR, RANT, RA, US, JA

SUBJECT: SEA LEVEL CANAL STUDY

REFS: A) PANAMA 1086
B) TOKYO 3884
C) PANAMA 2193
D) TOKYO 4368

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOR PANAMA: PLEASE COMMUNICATE ORALLY TO GABRIEL LEON
THAT, IN RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT
ROYO, PRESIDENT CARTER IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO UNITED
STATES PARTICIPATION IN A SEA LEVEL CANAL FEASIBILITY STUDY
INVOLVING PANAMA AND JAPAN. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT IT
WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES TO
BEGIN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SOON ON HOW ARTICLE 12 OF
PANAMA CANAL TREATY SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, INCLUDING AGREEMENT
THAT SUCH A STUDY WOULD FULFILL THE ARTICLE 12 COMMIT-
MENT REGARDING A JOINT STUDY.

3. FYI: IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SO LONG AS THE U.S. AND
PANAMA AGREE, THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN A FEASIBILITY
STUDY WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED BY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

AND A STUDY CONDUCTED IN SUCH A MANNER WOULD FULFILL THE
U.S. OBLIGATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT STUDY AS PRO-
VIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 12. WE ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO

RECALLED
P38:01277 PAGE 01 TOK:000703:107 16:23:00, 02 000000

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 9/15/97 466/RE NLC-47-24
BY NARS DATE 11/20/98

DELIBERATE THE TYPE OF APPROACH WHICH IT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT, COULD BE TRIED WITH DISCUSSIONS OF A STUDY MIGHT BE SCHEMATIC. WE DO APPRECIATE EMBASSY PANAMA'S VIEW -- WITHIN CONSULTING PANAMA -- OF HOLDING INITIAL BILATERAL MEETING WITH CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. THIS WOULD METHODOLOGICALLY START OFF PROPOSED PROJECT OF GREAT POTENTIAL FOR TALKS TO UNITED STATES AND PANAMA IN HIGH-LEVEL BODY BEING BY TREATY TO DEAL WITH GENERAL POLICY MATTERS IMPACTING PANAMA CANAL AND WOULD BE WITHIN CONTEXT OF EXISTING BILATERAL CANAL RELATIONSHIP. A RELATIONSHIP WHICH PANAMA APPARENTLY DOES NOT WANT TO EXTEND TO A NEW LEVEL CANAL. EEO FYI.

4. FOR TOKYO: PLEASE ADVISE APPROPRIATE JAPANESE OFFICIALS ALSO THAT PANAMA. AT THIS TIME, ARGENT A DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM PRIME MINISTER UNIKA, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED AGAINST A MESSAGE AS SUGGESTED REFS A AND C. IN VIEW OF BACKGROUND OF THIS PROPOSAL, WE PRESUME THAT OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH PANAMA WILL PRODUCE FORMAL AGREEMENT TO JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION. PLEASE CONVEY TO US OUR APPRECIATION FOR JAPAN'S JUDICIOUS APPROACH TOWARD PANAMA'S PROPOSITION OF N. HAGAN'S STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS WHEN PANAMA PROPOSED LEAVING CANAL. WHILE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE US INDICATING PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE IN PRINCIPLE TOWARD THE PROPOSAL AT THE TIME OF THE ROYAL VISIT TO JAPAN IN LATE MARCH, WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT PREFERRED TO MOVE IN COOPERATION WITH PANAMA AND REPEAT AND U.S. AS OUR THINKING ADVANCES ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT MATTER WE WILL SHARE OUR VIEWS WITH JAPANESE. (AS A START WE INTEND IMMEDIATELY WRITE JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE ON THIS MESSAGE.) WE RECOGNIZE THAT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PROJECT THAN SOME OF JAPAN'S CORPORATE LEADERS AND WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO TALK WITH PANAMA FIRST ABOUT PROPOSED STUDY IN CONTEXT OF EXISTING PANAMA CANAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND RELATIONSHIP.

5. FYI: OUR DTEL THIS WEEK HAS A COPY OF LIST OF APPRACH AIDED BY SENATOR STANLEY THAT JAPAN SHOULD FUND WHICH POSITION, IF AT ALL, IS ESTIMATED 20 MILLION DOLLAR COST OF STUDY OF THE AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. ALONG FUNDED 22 MILLION DOLLAR COST STUDY FROM WHICH NEW SURVEY IS TO BE MADE. IF ASKED, EMBASSY SHOULD STATE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF SUGGESTION THAT JAPANESE ENTIRELY FUND STUDY.

CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION AND THAT USE BUDGETS WILL TAKE

RECORDED PAGE 11 TOK: 507 310Z 10120 (7) 085 00

11/26/78
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~***** ORIGINAL *****~~

RECALLED PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:000/00:10Z DTG:000007Z MAR 80 PSN:0102050

6. GOD CONCRETE VANCE

IT VERY DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER ANY EARLY USG FUNDING FOR STUDY. END FYI.

~~***** ORIGINAL *****~~

JORDAN

March 22, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to apprise you of the fact that the families of the hostages in Iran have organized themselves into a group called Family Liaison Action Group (FLAG) and have met today. We are alarmed and outraged by the news reports of the United States Government's involvement once again with the former Shah in Panama and particularly with the fact that Hamilton Jordan, a member of the Administration, is there. We feel the United States Government should in no way be negotiating, publicly or privately, on behalf of the Shah.

If there is any indication that the United States is going to bring the Shah into this country or to put him in a United States military hospital facility, we will, as a group, object strongly and publicly, because we know such action will ruin what chances may be left for getting our people out of Iran.

We cannot stress enough to you how insensitive we feel our Government is to the feelings of the hostage families and to the American people, when the lives of our loved ones are still very much in jeopardy. We have been instrumental in keeping the American people calm and restrained these past difficult months in order to give our Government time to work through their delicate negotiations. We now question the wisdom of our restraint. The United States Government should have absolutely nothing to do with the ex-Shah!

Of forty-nine families we polled this afternoon, forty-seven support this statement. One family abstained, and one cast a negative vote. We were unable to reach four families for comment.

Sincerely,

Family Liaison Action Group

The President
The White House

Draft

Family Liaison Action Group
Washington, D.C.

Dear Family Members:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter which reached him this evening. He and I want you to know that we fully appreciate your concerns that nothing be done to delay or make more difficult the safe return of our people from Iran. That has been our overriding principle as we have faced the complex problem of the Shah's requirement for surgery in Panama. Those from the President's staff and mine have been involved in order to make certain that our deep concerns related to the situation in Iran are manifested in whatever action is taken.

The President and I deeply appreciate your patience and restraint which have been exemplary during this tense period. We hope that we can continue to count on your firm support as we work our way through the crisis in the days ahead.

Sincerely,

Cyrus Vance

Drafted:NEA/IWG:HPrecht:mar
3/22/80 ext 26610

Clearances:NEA:HHSaunders
P:DDNewsom

MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO BANI-SADR

(VIA FRENCH LAWYERS OR THE SWISS EMBASSY)

Please deliver the following message from the U.S. Government to
President Bani-Sadr:

Quote: Over the past four months, we have followed with great interest your statements to the Iranian people and in particular your principled position on the fundamental wrong involved in the holding of hostages. We noted your private personal assurance on March 10 that the hostages would be transferred to the control of the Iranian Government within fifteen days. We hope that the transfer can be accomplished within the next few days. It is essential to give a tangible sign to their families and to the American people of the improvement of the condition of the hostages and that there is real movement towards a prompt resolution of the crisis.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, we want you to know now that, in the absence of such transfer by Monday, we shall be taking additional non-belligerent measures that we have withheld until now.

Our quarrel is not with the Iranian people, but some will unavoidably suffer hardship if your Government is not able to take the requisite steps to release the hostages.

We remain ready to discuss a resolution of the crisis through any channel you choose. We must have tangible evidence, however, that Iran is prepared to move towards a resolution of the problem in order for us to explain to the American people why we are not taking additional measures.

Unquote.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 8/15/97 *slk* BY RE ALL-97-24
BY *J* NARS. DATE 1/20/98

ok
J

3/24

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

March 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY
MR. SAUNDERS

FROM: Arnie Raphael

SUBJECT: Behesti

Last week we had asked Ambassador Hermes whether the Chancellor or Foreign Minister Genscher had been able to find any useful information about Behesti's stay in Germany and whether there were any means to approach him through unofficial channels. Ambassador Hermes called today to say that he had heard from the Foreign Ministry. According to German records, Behesti was in Hamburg for five years from 1973-1978. While there he led a very secluded, introverted life and had only minimal contacts with anyone outside the small Iranian community in Hamburg. As a Mullah, he stayed within the community and spent a considerable amount of time in the Mosque in the city. The Germans are not aware of any German citizen, either in the academic world or elsewhere who would be a useful conduit to Behesti. Because of Hamilton Jordan's interest in this subject, I am sharing this memo with him.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 9/5/97 State HR NLC-97-24
BY J NARS. DATE 1/26/98



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 27, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Hamilton Jordan
The White House

FROM: R. G. H. Seitz ⁷
Deputy Executive Secretary

The enclosed sensitive messages from Cairo
will be of interest to you.

00/11/11
NLC-97-25

9/28/99
NLC-97-25



3. LIST OF MESSAGES: HAMILTON JORDAN SHOULD BE URGENTLY INFORMED THAT DANIEL HARRIS WAS ARRESTED AT CAIRO AIRPORT FIVE DAYS AGO AS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DEPART FOR LONDON. HE WAS ARRESTED ON THE BASIS OF ORDER OF PRESIDENT SHARAF. SERVICES CHARGES ARE BEING FURNISHED AGAINST HIM. MR. HARRIS SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HASSAN EL-TOHAMI WITHOUT MAKING ANY TELEPHONIC CONTACT. END LIST OF MESSAGES.

2. MORNING OF MARCH 28 TAFIK M. EL-TOHAMI CAME TO EMBASSY COMMERCIAL SECTION, SAYING HE HAD URGENT SECRET MESSAGE FOR MR. HARRIS FROM HIS SISTER, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HASSAN EL-TOHAMI. COMMERCIAL OFFICER ESCORTED HIM TO ROOM, WHO EXPLAINED THAT HASSAN EL-TOHAMI WAS IN ALEXANDRIA AND WOULD NOT RETURN UNTIL FRIDAY EVENING. TOHAMMI ASKED IF HE COULD SPEAK TO ROOM ALONE, AND COMMERCIAL OFFICER ACCORDINGLY LEFT. SPEAKING IN A VERY LOW VOICE, AND WITH OBVIOUS NERVOUSNESS, TOHAMMI TOLD ROOM OF FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HIS SISTER.

1. ENTIRE TEXT - CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM HASSAN EL-TOHAMI FOR HAMILTON JORDAN
ALEXANDRIA EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR ALMERON FROM ROOM

STATE EYES ONLY FOR HOST. SECRETARY SANDERS AND S/S PETER TANNOFF FROM ROOM MATTHEWS
S E C R E T I CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY CITE CAIRO 027

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TO STATE HQI
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1-4 CIS
S H L E
1-S/S-Turner
2-NEA-Sanders
3-INR/OB
4-CIS

8/c

NNNN

6. COMMENT: I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THIS IS ALL ABOUT
 BUT PASS IT ON IN CASE IT MAKES SENSE TO YOU OR HAMILTON
 JORDAN. HASSAN EL-TOMANI'S WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR
 *BOLD PROJECTS AND IDEAS IS WELL KNOWN, BUT IN TODAY'S
 SITUATION WOULD THERE BE SOME REAL IMPORTANCE TO THE
 MESSAGE TRANSMITTED THROUGH HIS PROJECT. PLEASE ADVISE
 IF YOU *ISH AMBASSADOR OR ME TO TAKE ANY ACTION AS A
 RESULT OF THIS MESSAGE.

#0627

HE LOOKS SOMEWHAT LIKE HIS BROTHER, WITHOUT THE BEARD,
 AND HAS THE SAME PIERCING EYES, BUT WITH AN OCCASIONAL
 NEWBORN TICK IN THE RIGHT ONE. NEITHER EMBASSY NOR JESS
 HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HIM OR DAMEL HASSAN, WHOSE NAME
 WAS SPELLED OUT BY TOMANI.

12-212-1
 12-212-1
 12-212-1

ZAKHA INTERNATIONAL TRADING
 COMMERCIAL AND TECHNICAL CONSULTANTS
 1, TALAHAT HANAB SHEH, CAIRO
 TELE: 52095 ZAKHA ON
 PHONE 752911 - 752682
 CABLE: ZAKHACOMEX

7. TAVFIK EL-TOMANI'S CARD READS AS FOLLOWS:

4. DON TRIED TO PROBE TAVFIK EL-TOMANI ABOUT THE MEANING
 OF HIS MESSAGE, BUT THE LATTER WOULD ONLY SAY THAT
 HAMILTON JORDAN KNOWS WHO DAMEL HASSAN IS AND WOULD
 UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THE MESSAGE. IT WAS URGENT
 THAT HAMILTON JORDAN, THROUGH THE EMBASSY, HELP RESOLVE
 THIS MATTER.

NNNNVZCZCKCA73925A791

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DE YEKRAS #0633 0870826
ZNY MMNSH
O 270806Z MAR 80 ZZK ZNZ1 ZYH ZFF-4

TO STATE RCI

ZEM

S E C R E T CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY CITE CAIRO 633

~~EYES ONLY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS AND S/S
PETER-TARNOFF~~

ALEXANDRIA EYES ONLY FOR AMB. ATHERTON FROM DCM MATTHEWS

SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR HAMILTON JORDAN FROM DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER HASSAN EL-TOHAMI

REF: SC CAIRO 627

1. CONF - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FURTHER TO REFTEL, A MOHAMMED OSMAN, WHO SAID HE WAS
A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HASSAN
TOHAMI, APPEARED AT THE CONSULAR SECTION MORNING MARCH 27
SAYING HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM TOHAMI TO BE DELIVERED TO AMB.
ATHERTON. CONSULAR OFFICER ESCORTED HIM TO DCM AND LEFT.
OSMAN THEN REPEATED THE SAME MESSAGE IN REFTEL. DCM DID NOT
LET ON THAT HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED THIS MESSAGE FROM
TOHAMI'S BROTHER YESTERDAY, IN EFFORT TO DRAW OUT ANY
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE SUBJECT. OSMAN ADDED THAT
HAMILTON JORDAN WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT "WE CANNOT AFFORD
TO HAVE JAMIL HABBAS UNDER INTERROGATION FOR A LONG TIME
OR THEY WOULD FABRICATE SOMETHING ABOUT HIM." HE ADDED
THAT JAMIL HABBAS WAS "NOT SO HEALTHY AND CANNOT STAND
INTERROGATION". OSMAN WOULD NOT REVEAL WHO JAMIL HABBAS
IS, SAYING ONLY THAT HE WAS "OPERATING AND TRAVELING"
AND THAT HAMILTON JORDAN KNEW HIM WELL.

3. AMB. ATHERTON TOLD ME OVER THE PHONE THIS MORNING
THAT HE HAD RECEIVED REFTEL AND COULD NOT FIGURE OUT WHAT
THESE CURIOUS MESSAGES WERE ALL ABOUT.
#0633

1-4
W.O.

9/28/99 State NLC-97-25
11/3/00

NEA/IWG:HPrecht:pw

3/29/80 x2660

Clearance: White House:HJordan
NEA:Hsaunders
S - The Secretary

~~SECRET~~

3/31

TO SWISS AMB. LANG

Please convey the following oral message to President Bani-Sadr and Prime Minister Ghotbzadeh from the United States Government.

We have followed with interest over the past several days efforts that have been made to arrange for the transfer of the hostages to the protection of the Iranian Government.

As you know, we have believe^d that progress toward that significant development would facilitate a final resolution of the crisis. Thus we would regard the transfer of the hostages to the full protection of the Iranian Government as a positive steps and would say so publicly when it happens.

Our overriding objective remains the earliest possible release of the hostages. We understand that the decision on their final release is to be made when the new Parli^oment is constituted. We are prepared to say publicly when the hostages are transferred to your full control, that we would hope that those necessary Parliamentary steps could be taken as soon as possible.

We have been informed that the Revolutionary Council and the Ayatollah Khomeini have agreed to the transfer of the hostages to the protection of the Iranian Government. We understand that a decision on the transfer may be announced on April 1.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6
PER 215 k17 G16 HRE NLC-97-24
BY J NARS. DATE 11/26/98

We have been informed, however, that consideration is also being given to allowing the captors to remain on the compound while the hostages are there. This would not accord with the assurances we have had from you and your commitment to the complete transfer of the hostages to government control. It is not clear what function the captors perform once the government has asserted its control.

In our view allowing the captives to remain in association with the hostages would not contribute to improvement in their condition and in fact could lead to difficult conflict which could endanger the hostages. Further, we would have no assurance that when the Assembly reached its decision regarding the release of the hostages that the captors would permit it to be carried out.

Because of popular pressures in the United States we trust that the announcement of the transfer and the transfer itself can be definitely completed on April 1 as previously scheduled. If in order to assure the security of the hostages, and to avoid a violent confrontation with the captors, it is necessary to allow them to remain on the compound for a brief period which would not exceed 48 hours, the United States would find that temporary arrangement acceptable but there would have to be a binding commitment that the captors would not remain beyond 48 hours for the United States.

to agree to that arrangement. It is clear that these issues will have to be discussed in some detail by you and your associates. We hope that this process can be expeditiously accomplished early tomorrow. We are sure that Mr. Villalon would be willing to be helpful in seeking a resolution of this issue

On another subject, we have been told that Mr. Sean McBride spoke of having the endorsement of his proposals from Secretary Vance when he was recently in Iran. The Secretary has not met with Mr. McBride in several months. He is not familiar with his proposal and certainly has not endorsed it.

~~SECRET~~

3/31

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cut
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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 8/15/97 *ak* RE NLC-97-24
NARS. DATE 1/26/98

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government control. *In our view, concern for the safety of the hostages requires either that either the captors or captors perform once the government has asserted its control.* ~~It is not clear what function the~~ ~~captors perform once the government has asserted its~~ ~~the hostages be removed from the compound.~~ ~~control.~~

cut
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Because of popular pressures in the United States we trust that the announcement of the transfer and the transfer itself can be definitely completed on April 1 as previously scheduled. If in order to assure the security of the hostages, and to avoid a violent confrontation with the captors, it is necessary to allow them to remain on the compound for a brief period which would not exceed 48 hours, the United States would find that temporary arrangement acceptable but there would have to be a binding commitment that the captors would not remain beyond 48 hours for the United States

to agree to that arrangement. It is clear that these issues will have to be discussed in some detail by you and your associates. We hope that this process can be expeditiously accomplished early tomorrow. We are sure that Mr. Villalon would be willing to be helpful in seeking a resolution of this issue

On another subject, we have been told that Mr. Sean McBride spoke of having the endorsement of his proposals from Secretary Vance when he was recently in Iran. The Secretary has not met with Mr. McBride in several months. He is not familiar with his proposal and certainly has not endorsed it.

If you should be aware that the following statement was issued by the White House Monday afternoon:

X X

In view of the President's decision to make a statement tomorrow morning that President Bani Sadr make a clear statement of his government's decision to transfer control of the hostages

3/31/80

The President met today with the National Security Council and the Congressional leadership of both parties to review the developments in Iran since the NSC meeting at Camp David on March 22.

The Revolutionary Council of Iran has been meeting in extended sessions over the last two days in Tehran. There are reports that the Revolutionary Council has addressed the question of the transfer of control of the hostages to the Government of Iran, and there are reports that President Bani-Sadr is scheduled to make a statement tomorrow.

President Carter will make an appropriate statement to the American people tomorrow (*Tuesday morning*).