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GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-92)
1. The US-Soviet text is not a full statement of US policy toward the Middle East. It does not foreshadow any US-Soviet attempt to impose a settlement. It does reflect areas of agreement between the US and Soviet Union, who as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference have tried to highlight issues that the parties will have to resolve through negotiations.

2. The United States has not changed any of its positions on the nature of an Arab-Israeli peace.

--- Negotiations should be based on UNSC Resolutions 242-338.

--- No settlement should be imposed.

--- The parties should directly negotiate to resolve differences.

--- Agreements should be embodied in peace treaties.

--- The Palestinian question should be resolved, and Palestinian rights should be taken into account, but this does not imply a PLO-led Palestinian state. Indeed, our preference is for a Palestinian entity under moderate leadership to Jordan.

--- The question of final borders has not been agreed between the US and Soviet Union, and the US still believes that mutually accepted minor adjustments in borders could be negotiated.

3. The US has not accepted, and the Soviets were not able to include in this joint statement, their previously stated positions on:

--- national rights for the Palestinians, including an independent state.

--- the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. In fact, no mention is made of the PLO.

--- withdrawal to the 1967 lines.

--- merely terminating the state of war.
4. The Soviets have agreed to, and this marks a positive step, the following:

- normal peaceful relations
- legal and contractual formalization of decisions reached at Geneva.
- international guarantees, if the parties to the agreement want them.

5. The joint statement draws liberally on UNSC Resolution 242, especially on the sensitive territory question. The Soviets wanted to refer to "all appropriate UN resolutions;" we refused, and therefore no mention was made of any resolutions, although all of the key points of 242 are included.

6. The phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" has not been defined, and the US position remains that this is an issue to be resolved by the parties.

7. No commitments to Israel made in December 1973 or in September 1975 have been violated by the issuance of the joint statement.
NOTES ON US - SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT

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On October 1, the United States and the USSR issued a joint statement on the Middle East. That statement has raised serious questions about the direction of American policy and the chances for a successful Geneva Peace Conference.

The joint statement, seen in the context of Administration actions during the last eight months, strongly suggests that the U.S. is devaluing certain principles and commitments which have guided U.S. Mideast policy during the last six Administrations. This can be seen in both the wording of the joint statement, its omissions and new elements, and in the manner in which the statement was promulgated:

--- Nowhere in the joint statement is there a mention of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the only universally accepted framework for a Middle East peace. Past Administrations have made adherence to these resolutions the cornerstone of American policy. This was not accidental, for 242 calls for "a just and lasting peace" for every state in the area, withdrawal from territories and a simultaneous termination of belligerency, recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state in the area, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. Resolution 338 mandates that a settlement should be achieved through direct negotiation.

--- The joint statement fails to mention the necessity of a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states. Pursuit of such a treaty has been an American goal since 1948, and was identified as such in memoranda of agreement between the U.S. and Israel (September 1, 1975).

--- The joint statement asserts that recognition must be made of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians." The United States has never accepted this formula before, insisting instead on assurance of Palestinian "interests." The distinction was deliberate, for "interests" included a resolution of the refugee problem (as specified in 242), while at the same time asserting implicitly that the core issue of the conflict is the Arab refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist.
The "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians have been used by the Arab states and the USSR as a propaganda tool to mask the open-ended demands of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO's 1968 National Covenant asserts that Israel's establishment is null and void, that the Jews are not a people, that Israel must be conquered by armed force and that the PLO seeks an Arab state in all of pre-1947 Palestine.

Arab leaders have always refused to define the term "legitimate rights of the Palestinians," preferring to leave that to the PLO. Thus Pres. Sadat of Egypt told Cairo Radio on February 2, 1975: "Egypt has proclaimed the following Arab strategy: the need for the return of all the occupied territory, and the realization of the Palestinians' rights, which only the Palestinians themselves are authorized to define." The very same day, the PLO's official journal Falastrn al-Thawrah provided a definition: "...a nationalist base from which our revolution and people "will surge forward to continue the war of liberation and armed struggle, until the racist Zionist base falls and the democratic state of Palestine is established."

As part of the Sinai II agreement, the United States and Israel signed a memorandum of agreement obligating both parties to certain standards in their relationship and to coordination of their diplomacy. The October 1 joint statement reflects an apparent disregard for a number of American commitments made to Israel 25 months ago:

-- According to the 1975 agreement, the U.S. pledged to "concert action" with Israel to assure that the Geneva conference "will be conducted in a manner consonant with declared purpose of the conference." But there was no preconsultation with Israel about the joint Soviet-American statement. Indeed, Israel was not even informed of the text until the day before its release.

-- According to the agreement, the U.S. "will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states," and that the participation of any "additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants" at the Geneva conference. Yet there was no consultation with Israel on the joint statement's insistence that "representatives... of the Palestinian people" participate in the Geneva Conference. Israel's right of veto has apparently been dismissed out of hand.
THE JOINT STATEMENT INDICATES THAT THE AMERICAN DEFINITION HAS CHANGED

THE JOINT STATEMENT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

CARTER AND VANCE INDICATED THAT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF 242 BY THE PLO WOULD BE SUFFICIENT

THE RECENT STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE DAMAGED THE CREDIBILITY OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND ENCOURAGE ARAB MISPERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. CAN OR WILL IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT

— The United States committed itself to oppose changes in the "terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference". Yet the joint statement indicates that the American definition has changed: in terms of participants, in terms of matters to be discussed.

— The U.S.-Israel agreement committed the U.S. to support 242 and 338 as the basis of a final settlement. But the joint statement makes no reference to those resolutions. And though the agreement states that Geneva talks should be reconvened at a time coordinated between the U.S. and Israel, the joint statement says "not later than December, 1977".

In addition, recent American actions separate from the Oct. 1 joint statement have been at variance with commitments made to Israel as part of the Sinai II agreement:

— The call for a unified Arab delegation at the Geneva conference erodes the American pledge that "all substantive negotiations" at the Geneva conference "will be on a bilateral basis".

— The memorandum of agreement committed the U.S. not to deal with the PLO so long as it "does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". But Pres. Carter and Secretary of State Vance indicated recently that a conditional acceptance of 242 by the PLO would be sufficient for the United States, and that the U.S. would then begin contacts with the leaders of the PLO.

The durability of America's commitments to Israel plays a crucial role in Arab-Israel affairs. In the largest sense, the U.S. has been committed since 1948 to Israel's survival and security, and to the achievement of reconciliation and normalized relations through a process of direct negotiation, compromise and recognition. But the recent statements of Administration officials have damaged the credibility of America's commitments. In the short run, calls for a near-total Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian homeland can only undermine the chances for meaningful Arab-Israel negotiations. Such pre-definitions remove from the Arab states any incentive to bargain or compromise with Israel. Moreover, such statements encourage the Arab misperception that the U.S. can or will impose a settlement and satisfy Arab demands without insisting on a genuine peace guaranteed by bilateral assurances between Arabs and Israelis. In the long run, the apparent devaluation by the United States of its past commitments may provide a rationale to those Arabs who would disregard any future settlement in order to war once again on Israel.
THE INCLUSION OF THE USSR IS LIKELY TO DAMAGE THE CHANCES FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT

THE USSR BEGAN THE ARMS RACE IN THE REGION

THE USSR CONSPIRED IN THE 1973 ATTACK ON ISRAEL

THE USSR ENCOURAGED QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES

THE USSR HAS BEEN THE MAJOR SUPPORTER OF THE PLO

THE USSR HAS NO RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

THE USSR BACKED THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH ASSERTED THAT ZIONISM IS RACISM

THE USSR HAS BACKED ARAB DEMANDS

A SOVIET ROLE?

No single act is more likely to damage the chances for a lasting settlement than the sudden inclusion of the USSR in the peace process. For many years, American diplomacy in the region has been designed to minimize Soviet influence, and thus lessen the chance for Soviet disruption of the peace process. Indeed, the physical presence and political influence of the USSR has recently shrunk to its lowest level in years.

Both Arabs and Israelis appreciate that the Soviet Union has never had a national interest in the establishment of a lasting Arab-Israel peace. The Soviet record makes this clear:

— The USSR began the arms race in the region by a massive deal to Egypt in 1955. It provided the armaments for Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the last three wars, and remains the largest arms supplier in the Middle East. Continued tensions allow the Soviet to sell more arms and generate more badly-needed hard currency.

— The USSR actively conspired with Egypt and Syria in the planning of the 1973 Yom Kippur attack on Israel — a direct violation of the Soviet Union’s own commitments to the U.S.

— The USSR encouraged the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC and the embargoing of oil by the Arab oil states against the U.S. The USSR moved quickly to exploit the economic and political chaos in the West caused by economic salients of the 1973 War.

— The USSR has been the major supporter of the PLO, arming and training its constituent groups and providing diplomatic shelter for its terrorist acts.

— The USSR has no relations with Israel, and has backed the claims of the PLO to achievement of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians".

— The USSR backed the odious UN General Assembly resolution which asserted that Zionism is a form of racism. In international organizations, the USSR has joined with the Arab bloc to condemn and isolate Israel from the world community.

— Though a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, the USSR has backed Arab demands to the limit, refusing to perceive the Geneva talks as anything except as a means to achieve total withdrawal and flimsy guarantees which Israel would be forced to accept.
Despite claims to the contrary, the USSR did not substantively compromise on any issue by its acceptance of the October 1 joint statement. The claim that the USSR has now embraced the necessity of a genuine peace for the first time can not be sustained for as co-sponsor of resolution 242 in 1967, the Soviets committed themselves to the "need to work for" and the "establishment of" a "just and lasting peace". The very inclusion of the USSR at a time when the U.S. appears to be exerting strong leverage against Israel must be interpreted by the Arabs as a signal that an imposed settlement may now be in store.

The U.S.-Soviet Joint Agreement is only the latest in a series of one-sided pressures exerted recently against Israel by the Administration. In recent weeks, there have been numerous Administration press leaks, condemnations, and negative statements against Israel. These acts -- sometimes threatening -- spell real danger for the national interests which the U.S. and Israel have long shared: a lasting negotiated peace in the Middle East.
MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM:      MARK SIEGEL

SUBJECT:   MIDDLE EAST

The joint communique from the United States and the Soviet Union on the Middle East Conference at Geneva has had a devastating effect in the American Jewish community. It was an effect that could have been anticipated. It was an effect that could have been partially muted if we had been given adequate notice. The communique, coming on the back of the ambiguous U.S. statements on PLO - Palestinian representation at Geneva, have driven Jimmy Carter's stock in the American Jewish community substantially below any U.S. President since the creation of the State of Israel, and I'm including in that statement Eisenhower's stock after he forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1956.

I'm used to the role of loyal soldier, and will continue to speak out in support of the President in the American Jewish community, despite what it has done, and will continue to do, to my personal reputation. But even a good soldier can tell his general what is on his mind. At the very least, a good soldier can expect to see the battle plan before he is sent out as cannon fodder.

My problems with out policy can be broken down into two parts: (1) procedural, the lack of forewarning, the lack of opportunity to input into decisions, the lack of strategy or plan to put the President in his best light, and (2) substantive, the actual nature of the policy.

First, let me address the procedural problem. It is a matter between you and the President the degree to which you will be involved in foreign policy matters, especially that have a direct domestic political impact. You know my view on this subject -- that you should be in the Middle East decision making loop. It would be useful on two accounts: (1) you will
be able to anticipate consequences, and as such, inform the
President of implications of policy decisions, and (2) your
political judgment could be used to properly package and
publicly tailor decisions once those decisions have been agreed
to.

Let me elaborate on the second point stated above. The Geneva
formula and the joint Russian-American communique could have
been presented to the American people in the best possible
light. That is, a statement of how much we have moved other
parties, especially the Soviet Union and the Arabs, from hard
and entrenched positions. We could have stressed the "normaliza-
tion" aspects of the joint communique. We could have reiterated
that 242 and 338 still are the foundations on which subsequent
settlements must be built. This would not necessarily have
convinced American Jewry that we were on the right track. But
I'm sure it could have taken much of the sting out of the announce-
ments, and somewhat tempered the harsh reaction. What I think
I'm suggesting, in other words, is that this aspect of our
foreign policy has not been handled "diplomatically," in the lay
sense of the word. Tough decisions must be gracefully surfaced.
The President must always be put in the best light. This has
not been done.

Now to my substantive problems. I will not minimize them --
they are major. I think back to the President's speech in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, in June of 1976. This is the statement
that captured the imagination of American Jews toward Jimmy
Carter. It was interpreted as a pact between the future President
and an important block of his future constituents. It was
a strong statement, a powerful statement. And above all, it was
a moral statement. Let me recall for you some of the President's
commitments: "Those terrorists who wage war and deny the very
concept of Israeli nationhood only undermine their own people's
best interest. We must make it clear to the world that there
can be no reward for terrorism. . . I do not believe the road
to peace can be found by U.S.-Soviet imposition of a settlement...
For 2000 years, the Jewish people in century after century,
in country after country, have faced propaganda, attempts at
forced conversion, discrimination, pogroms, and death, until
the ultimate horror of the holocaust. Surely, the Jewish
people are entitled to one place on this earth where they can
have their own state on soil given them by God from time
immemorial. . . I want to say that there have been far too
many secret undertakings, overt assurances, contradictory
promises, and diplomatic sleights of hand. Maneuvers of this
kind are bound to produce, as they have produced, both failure in negotiations and suspicion among the participants. . . American policy toward the Middle East and toward every other part of the world should be shaped with the knowledge of the congress from the outset. . . Public understanding and support today are as vital to successful foreign policies as they are to any domestic policies.

I think back to the 75% of the Jewish vote that we received in the presidential election and why we received that kind of a mandate from American Jewry. I think back to the states that we won because of the strength of the Jewish support.

I think back to the President's statements on July 6 to the Jewish Presidents in the Cabinet Room: "I want to reiterate my unanswering commitment to the State of Israel. . . We don't have a settlement to impose, we will not impose, we will not force Israel to do anything that they believe is not in their best interests. . . Our commitment to Israel is part of our national consciousness, part of my personal religious beliefs, part of my responsibility as President of the United States. My commitment is shared by Congress and the American people. I campaigned for two years for the Presidency, and I traveled around the country all during that time and not once did I hear a voice that asked that we lessen our commitment to Israel. Israel is part of the totality of American life. . . I would never repeat what Sec. Kissinger and President Ford did by withholding support at times of crisis. I commit to you, on my word and honor as a man, that this will never happen as long as I am President of the United States. . . There is no question that we can't impose a settlement of these problems. I think a separate Palestinian nation would be a direct threat to the peace of the Middle East, and could as a constant source of turmoil, violence, terrorism and ultimately war. . . I don't have any specific goals in the Middle East, no borders, no Palestine, only the specifics concern the definition of genuine peace."

In light of all of this, I am somewhat baffled by our latest substantive moves. The Geneva formula that we now are asking Israel to accept is very different from the formula that Dayan sent back to the Cabinet, and which they accepted very reluctantly. Our new presentation strengthens the claims of the PLO as the only legitimate representatives of Palestinian nationalism. And most dangerously, our new initiatives severely decrease the likelihood of bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan, which many have always thought was the only way to insure a bilateral agreement between Israel and Syria.
The American-Russian communique is equally baffling to many, in that it reintroduces the Soviets into the situation in a very major way, and it fails to address 242 and 338 in a meaningful way. It also adopts a statement of "legitimate Palestinian rights" which goes far beyond anything our government has every said before. I don't understand this new policy; I don't understand why it was necessary; I don't understand what ends it accomplishes. And of course, I don't understand or appreciate the secret way it was agreed to, and dropped on the American people without warning.

The talk in the American Jewish community is getting very ugly. The word "betrayal" is being used more and more. I don't believe this for a second. I don't believe Jimmy Carter has lessend his commitment to the security of Israel. But I am confused by the policy, and certainly thinks we can do better in selling it to the American people. I am way out front in the Jewish community on all of this, and would thus appreciate some serious time to discuss the deteriorating situation.
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| 30         | 43         | 24         | 3         |
CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT (continued)

--Frank Moore reports that a number of Senators privately have told him that "the time has come to stand with the President on the Middle East."

--The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) can translate Jewish leadership consensus into an immediate major campaign of telegrams, telephone calls, and letters.

MIDDLE EAST CALENDAR

| June 27-30   | Possible Arab Summit to coordinate strategy. |
| July 5-7     | Begin visits Washington.                     |
| Mid-July     | OPEC Conference on oil prices in Stockholm. |
| July 18-22   | Vance visits Middle East.                    |
| August       | Possible pre-Geneva consultations in Washington or elsewhere. |
| Late September | UN General Assembly - Vance will meet Foreign Ministers of Middle East countries. |

In addition, there may be an Arab move to call for a United Nations Security Council debate on the Middle East in July.

POLITICAL AND PUBLIC EDUCATION PLAN

A clear political and public education strategy will probably not be discernible until after Begin's visit to the United States. In the interim, we should have the following two objectives:

--The President and Vice President should remain in constant personal contact with key Senators: Humphrey, Jackson, Muskie, Ribicoff, Case, Javits, Church and Stone.
POLITICAL AND PUBLIC EDUCATION PLAN (continued)

--A program of extensive consultation with Jewish leadership should be begun.

These objectives are discussed in more detail below.

Personal Contact with Key Senators

These meetings and discussions are underway.

Responsibility: Jordan

Consultation with Jewish Leadership

--Begin the Middle East Policy Consultation Program, which is attached.

Responsibility: Siegel

President's Decision:

Schedule Time as Shown _______

Other:

--Send Administration spokesperson to meetings shown on the attached Calendar of Jewish Events.

Responsibility: Siegel

--Centralize Jewish schedule requests and meeting assignments.

Responsibility: Siegel

--Brief the Jewish press periodically.

Responsibility: Wurfel

--Monitor coverage of Administration policy in the Jewish press, and respond to inaccurate coverage.

Responsibility: Wurfel, Siegel
Thank you very much.

Chairman Phil Klutznick and President Nahum Goldmann, members of the World Jewish Congress: As my friend Phil Klutznick pointed out, sometimes praise is not forthcoming for a Democratic President, and I want to thank you especially for that warm welcome, which I haven't heard in quite a long time. Thank you very, very much for it. (Applause)

I am deeply honored to receive this medal. I accept it with a sense of gratitude because of the organization from which it comes and because of the man for whom it is named. For more than half a century Dr. Nahum Goldmann has been a scholar and political leader and a fighter for the rights of all people. His career is proof that a man who is outspoken and sometimes controversial can still be a brilliant and an effective statesman. As the head of this organization and many others, he has played a more significant role in world affairs than have many heads of state.

He is stepping down now as President of the World Jewish Congress, but his presence will remain, for he is the kind of man whose moral authority transcends any title or any office. The World Jewish Congress has always sought to promote human rights in a universal way. In this, it is faithful to the ethical traditions from which it springs, for Jewish teaching has helped to shape the consciousness of human rights that is, I believe, now growing throughout the world.

In large measure, the beginnings of the modern concept of human rights go back to the laws and the prophets of the Judeo-Christian traditions. I have been steeped in the Bible since early childhood and I believe that anyone who reads the ancient words of the Old Testament with both sensitivity and care will find there the idea of government as something based on a voluntary covenant rather than force. The idea of equality before the law and the supremacy of law over the whims of any ruler;
the idea of the dignity of the individual human being and also of the individual conscience, the idea of service to the poor and to the oppressed; the idea of self-government and tolerance and of nations living together in peace, despite differences of belief. I know also the memory of Jewish persecution and especially of the holocaust lends a special quality and a heart lending sensitivity to your own commitments to human rights.

This organization has made a major contribution to ensuring that human rights became part of the charter of the United Nations as one of its three basic purposes along with the preservation of peace and social and economic progress. The principal authors of universal covenant on human rights were Eleanor Roosevelt, an American Protestant; Charles Jolik, a Lebanese Catholic; and Rene. Cassin, a French Jew. Because of their work and the work of others, no government can now pretend that its mistreatment of its own citizens is merely an internal affair. These accomplishments have helped start a process by which governments can be moved forward, exemplifying the ideals which they publicly profess. Our own actions in the field of human rights must vary according to the appropriateness and effectiveness of one kind or another, but our judgments must be made according to a single standard. For oppression is reprehensible, whether its victims are blacks in South Africa or American Indians in the Western Hemisphere or Jews in the Soviet Union or political dissidents in Chile or Czechoslovakia.

The public demonstration of our own government's commitment to human rights is one of the major goals that my Administration has set for United States foreign policy. The emphasis on human rights has raised the level of consciousness around the world and is already beginning to help overcome the crisis of spirit which recently has afflicted the nations of the West. (Applause)

We are also trying to build a more cooperative international system. We are consulting more closely with our own allies, and we place special emphasis on better relations with people in South America and in Asia and in Africa. And we are searching for new areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union, especially in the area which we and the Soviet most intensely compete, the race for nuclear weapons.

We must halt that race. In the last few months, we have tried to work closely with the Soviets to eliminate the testing of peaceful nuclear explosives. And just in the last 24 hours, Mr. Brezhnev, President Brezhnev, has announced the Soviets are finally coming to agreement with us. And we have good hopes that we might without too much delay reach a comprehensive test ban that will eliminate nuclear weapons from the earth. We hope so. (Applause)

But at the same time we seek cooperation, we recognize that competition is also part of international life and we will always remain capable of defending the
legitimate interests of our people. We are addressing other
global problems which threaten the well-being and the
security of people everywhere. They include nuclear
proliferation, the excessive sales of conventional arms,
food supplies and energy and the quality of the environment.
These things affect all nations of the world. And we are
also seeking solutions to regional conflicts that could do
incalculable damage, if not resolved.

Our efforts toward a new treaty with Panama
are one example. Bringing about peaceful change in
Africa is another. But none is more important than finding
peace in the Middle East. (Applause)

Sixty years ago today, November 2, 1917, the
greatest Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour --
(At this point the President was interrupted)

One of the basic human rights that we cherish
in our country is the right to speak, and I have no
objection to it.

As I was saying, exactly 60 years ago today,
November 2, 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Balfour, informed Lord Rothschild of his government's
support for the establishment of a national home
for the Jewish people in Palestine. (Applause)

At that time the idea seemed visionary
and few dared to believe that it could be translated
into reality. But today Israel is a vital force,
an independent and Democratic state whose national
existence is accepted and whose security is stronger
today than ever before. (Applause)

We are proud to be Israel's firm friend and
closest partner. We shall stand by Israel always.
(Applause)

I doubt that anyone in the history of our
country has traveled more than I have in my campaign for
President, nor talked to more groups, nor listened to
more questions nor heard more comments. And when I say
we will always stand with Israel, I speak not only for
myself as President, not only for our government, all three
of its branches, but I speak not just for American Jews,
but for all Americans.

This is one of our deepest-felt commitments, and
I have no doubt I speak accurately for the overwhelming
portion of the American people now and forever. (Applause)

Despite its great accomplishments, however,
Israel has yet to realize the cherished goal of living
in peace with its neighbors. Some would say that peace can-
not be achieved because of the accumulated mistrust
and the deep emotions which divide Israelis from Arabs.
Some will say we must realistically resign ourselves to the prospect of unending struggle and conflict in the Middle East. With such an attitude of resignation, Israel would never have been created. And with such an attitude, peace will never be achieved. What is needed is both vision and realism so that strong leadership can transform the hostility of the past into a peaceful and constructive future.

This was a vision of the Zionist movement in the first generation after the Balfour declaration, and it can be the achievement of Israel in its second generation as an independent state. (Applause)

Since becoming President I have spent much of my time in trying to promote a peace settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors. All Americans know that peace in the Middle East is of vital concern to our own country. We cannot merely be idle bystanders. Our friendships and our interests require that we continue to devote ourselves to the cause of peace in this most dangerous region of the world.

Earlier this year I outlined the elements of a comprehensive peace—not in order to impose our views on the parties concerned, but rather as a way of defining some of the elements of an overall settlement which would have to be achieved through detailed negotiations.

I continue to believe that the three key issues are, first, the obligations of real peace, including the full normalization of political, economic and cultural relations; second, the establishment of effective security measures, coupled to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and agreement on final, recognized and secure borders; and third, the resolution of the Palestinian question.

These issues are interrelated in complex ways. And for peace to be achieved that is permanent and real, all of them will have to be resolved. Recently our diplomatic efforts have focused on establishing a framework for negotiations so that the parties themselves will become engaged in the resolution of the many substantive issues that have divided them so long. We can offer our good offices as mediators. We can make suggestions, but we cannot do the negotiating.

For serious peace talks to begin, a reconvening of the Geneva Conference has become essential. All the parties have accepted the idea of comprehensive negotiations at Geneva. An agreement has already been reached on several of the important procedural arrangements. Israel has accepted for Geneva the idea of a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinians, and has agreed to discuss the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Jordan, Egypt and with Palestinian Arabs. This can provide the opportunity for a Palestinian voice to be heard...
in the shaping of a Middle Eastern peace and this represents a positive and a very constructive step.

Israel has also repeated its willingness to negotiate without preconditions and has stressed that all issues are negotiable. This is an attitude that others must accept, if peace talks are to succeed.

For their part, the Arab states have accepted Israel's status as a nation. They are increasingly willing to work toward peace treaties and to form individual working groups to negotiate settlement of border issues and other disputes. No longer do they refuse to sit down at the negotiating table with Israel, nor do they dispute Israel's right to live within secure and recognized borders.

That must be taken as a measure of how far we have come from the intransigent positions of the past. The procedural arrangements hammered out at the 1973 Geneva Conference can provide a good basis for a reconvened conference. Even a year ago—just think back—the notion of Israelis and Arabs engaging in face-to-face negotiations about real peace, a peace embodied in signed, binding treaties, seemed like an illusion. Yet, today, such negotiations are within reach and I am proud of the progress that has been achieved by all nations concerned to make this dream at least possible.

But to improve the atmosphere for serious negotiations, mutual suspicions must be further reduced.

One source of Arab concern about Israeli intentions has been the establishment of civilian settlements of territories currently under occupation, which we consider to be a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. On the Arab side, much still needs to be done to remove the suspicion in Israel about Arab intentions. It was not so long ago, after all, that Arab demands were often expressed in extreme and sometimes violent ways. Israel's existence was constantly called into question. The continuing refusal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to accept United Nations Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist, along with the resort to violence and terror by some groups, provides Israelis with tangible evidence that their worst fears may in fact be justified.

Differences naturally exist, not only between Arabs and Israelis, but among the Arab parties themselves. And we are actively engaged in an effort, a very difficult effort to narrow these differences so that Geneva can be reconvened. And we have called on the other cochairman of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union, to use its influence constructively.

We will continue to encourage a solution to the Palestinian question in a framework which does not threaten
the interests of any of the concerned parties, yet respects
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The nations
involved must negotiate the settlement, but we ourselves
do not prefer an independent Palestinian state
on the West Bank. (Applause)

Negotiations will no doubt be prolonged and
often very difficult. But we are in this to stay. I will
personally be prepared to use the influence of the United
States to help the negotiations succeed. We will not impose
our will on any party, but we will constantly encourage
and try to assist the process of conciliation. Our
relations with Israel will remain strong. Since the war in
1973, we have provided $10 billion in military and
economic aid to Israel, about two-thirds of which was
direct grants or concessional loans. The magnitude of
this assistance is unprecedented in history. It has greatly
enhanced Israel's economic and military strength. Our aid
will continue. (Applause)

As difficult as peace through negotiations will
be in the Middle East, the alternative of stalemate
and war is infinitely worse. The cost of another war would
be staggering in both human and economic terms. Peace,
by contrast, offers great hopes to the people of the Middle
East who have already contributed so much to civilization.

Peace, which must include a permanent and
secure Jewish state of Israel, has a compelling logic for
the Middle East. It would begin to bring Arabs and Israelis
together in creative ways to create a prosperous and stable
region. And a prospect of coexistence and cooperation
would revive the spirits of those who for so long
thought only of violence and of struggle for survival itself.

Peace would lift some of the enormous
burden of defense and uplift the people's quality of
life. The idea of peace in the Middle East today is no more
of a dream than was the idea of a national home for the
Jews in 1917. But it will require the same dedication
that made Israel a reality and has permitted it to grow
and to prosper.

We may be facing now the best opportunity
for a permanent Middle East peace settlement in our
lifetime. We must not let it slip away. Well-meaning
leaders in Israel and in the Arab nations -- African,
European, South American, North American, all over the
world -- are making an unprecedented and concerted effort
to resolve the deep-seated differences in the Middle East.

This is not a time for intemperance or partisanshipe. It is a time for strong and responsible leadership
and a willingness to explore carefully, perhaps for the
first time, the intentions of others. It is a time to
use the mutual strength and the unique friendship and partnership between Israel and the United States and the influence of you and others who have a deep interest and concern to guarantee a strong and permanently free and secure Israel, at peace with her neighbors, and able to contribute her tremendous human resources toward the realization of human rights and a better and more peaceful life throughout the world.

The Old Testament offers a vision of what that kind of peace might mean in its deepest sense. I leave you with these lines of the Prophet Micah, who is still one of my favorites, lines and words which no summary or paraphrase could possibly do justice. It is from the Fourth Chapter, and the first five verses:

"But in the last days, it shall come to pass, that the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above the hills; and people shall flow unto it.

"And many nations shall come, and say, 'Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for the law shall go forth of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.

"And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks; nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.

"But they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree; and none shall make them afraid: for the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it.

"For all people will walk, everyone in the name of his God, and we will walk in the name of the Lord our God forever and ever."

However, we may falter -- however difficult the path -- it is our duty to walk together toward the fulfillment of this majestic prophesy.

Thank you very much.

END (AT 9:20 P.M. EST)
(TEXT) (ANNOUNCER) WE SHALL NOW HEAR THE REACTION OF THE OPPOSITION (TO THE U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT--FBIS). ON THE OTHER END OF THE TELEPHONE LINE IS KNESSET MEMBER YIZHAQ RABIN: (BEGIN LIVE INTERVIEW)

(QUESTION) GOOD MORNING TO YOU, SIR.

(ANSWER) GOOD MORNING.

(QUESTION) MR RABIN, HOW DO YOU VIEW THIS STATEMENT?

QUESTION: Mr. Rabin, what will happen, in your opinion, as a result of this statement. Your remarks indicate the possibility of an imposed solution. You said that the statement marks the beginning of a process of coercion. Do you mean an imposed solution?

ANSWER: I mean what I said. I said the beginning of a process aimed at bringing about solution imposed by the great powers. I want to add, without going into the other details of the joint statement, that this is the result of the policy of the Carter Administration. The Carter Administration changed the U.S. policy which most of the previous administrations had followed since the end of the 6-day War. This is the result of the abortive and miserable policy of the Likud Government. During the 3 months it has been in office with its policy the government managed to destroy all that has been accomplished in 10 years of efforts to nurture U.S.-Israeli relations. The conclusion, in my opinion, is that today, before we fall into the traps being set for us by the two powers, we must first get up and say: on the basis of this statement, Israel will not go to Geneva. There is no sense in arguing about procedural problems today when the substantive problem is defined in a clear and unequivocal manner. The second thing is that Israel must launch a comprehensive information campaign deploring the policy of the Carter Administration and explaining the serious changes this Administration has made in the U.S. position toward Israel.

QUESTION: Mr. Rabin, it is acceptable in serious moments like this--I assume I am not exaggerating when I say this is a serious moment--that there should be unity between the coalition and opposition parties for a joint action. Do you think that this will happen now?

ANSWER: The question is what the policy of the present government will be. If the government maintains its present policy, disregarding political reality, arguing about procedural problems, seating arrangement and the opening ceremonies of the conference, instead of seeing the substantive problems, what can be achieved and what cannot be achieved--only then it would be possible to decide whether it is possible to support the policy of the government.

QUESTION: Mr. Rabin, thank you very much. (End live interview).

2 Oct 1014Z MJ0/MC
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: HAMILTON JORDAN
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Tomorrow's Meeting with Jewish Leaders

As I understand it, the format will be as follows:

The Vice President, the Secretary of State, and I will open with brief five-minute statements each, covering the following:

1. The Vice President - the general approach, its philosophy, our commitment to Israel, etc.;

2. The Secretary of State - the negotiating process: procedures and central issues (including the three key ones);

3. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - the international context: stalemate vs settlement.

The foregoing will be followed by the President's appearance. It is expected the President will speak for about 5-10 minutes, then listen to comments and questions for 10-15 minutes, and then make a generalized concluding statement.

In relationship to the foregoing, I wish to flag the following points which he may wish to keep in mind:

1. The Palestinian homeland: the word "homeland" is a red flag, because of its association with the Balfour Declaration. It might be better if the President referred to a home for the Palestinians, noting that we would prefer it to be linked with Jordan. It can even be described as a political home, though avoiding the implication that we have in mind a PLO-controlled independent state.
2. It would be good if the President stressed our determination to obtain for Israel secure borders, which can be made defensible through a variety of additional arrangements. However, the phrase "defensible borders" is a code-phrase, anathema to the Arabs because it does imply incorporation of most of the presently occupied territory. This is why it would be wise to avoid using the latter phrase, while stressing that the borders which we hope to accomplish for Israel would be mutually recognized, and thereby made more secure through such recognition, in addition to further security arrangements.

3. It would be useful for the President to stress that our flexible framework for negotiating the settlement, which the President has shaped through his public statements, implies major concessions by the Arabs themselves. I showed the President an article by Terrence Smith which appeared in this Sunday's New York Times; it makes that case very well, by stressing that every one of the three key propositions (on peace, on territory/security, and on the Palestinians) implies major concessions by the Arabs.

4. In speaking of minor modifications in the '67 lines, it might be useful for the President to emphasize that "major" changes are unlikely to be accepted as the basis for negotiations by the Arabs. The actual scope of what is "minor" is left to negotiations and, given the size of the territory, it is still likely to prove a very difficult issue to negotiate. Nonetheless, advance understanding that the changes are likely to be minor will facilitate these negotiations but without prejudicing their actual outcome on the territorial issue.

5. The President might be asked why not "direct negotiations without preconditions"? Our position is that such negotiations are likely to break down and this is why some prior understanding concerning the underlying principles for a settlement is needed. Our hope is to stimulate some sort of an informal process, designed to obtain some mutual understanding, prior to the convening of the Geneva conference itself. Indeed, this spring has already involved a search for such mutually shared understanding and the present discussion in that respect has in fact proven quite useful.
6. It might be useful for the President to add that we do not take the Arabs at face value, that we concede that some of them may be entertaining dreams of "a second stage," but we hope to help shape a peace which will make the attainment of that second stage impossible. This is why we put so much emphasis not only on a comprehensive peace but also on a peace that is reinforced by needed security arrangements.

Please add to the foregoing the text of the Clinton speech and of last year's New Jersey speech (April).

Stu has them.
Telegram

For Immediate Action

Recent Carter Administration pronouncements on US-Middle East policy are cause for increasing concern and represent a drift in US-Middle East policy.

President Carter has repeated his call for creation of a Palestinian "homeland" advocated only "minor adjustments" in 1967 borders and more recently discussed "compensation" for Arab refugees.

These statements: 1) undermine goal of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations 2) obscure the basic Middle East problem -- lack of Arab acceptance of the state of Israel and 3) run counter to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which call for secure and recognized boundaries and direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis.

Important that White House receive letters and telegrams asking Presidents to uphold his earlier call for a full peace based on normalized relations.

Lawrence WEinberg, President

Morris J. Amitay, Executive Director

2 Jun 77
GENERAL POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

-- The President's public position on the Middle East contains elements which previously had been discussed only privately.

-- Until the Vice President spoke in San Francisco, the President had been out front alone on the Middle East issue.

-- There is widespread concern in the American Jewish community over the President's positions on Israel.

-- For many intellectual, financial, and political reasons, the Jewish community enjoys a special position of influence and respect in the American political system.

-- The "Jewish lobby" has unsurpassed ability in Congress, and has no political counterforce.

-- Our political position in relation to the American Jewish community and the Israeli government is now fluid (some say turbulent); it is likely to remain that way until Begin's visit here, probably in mid-July.

-- We should not expect the American Jewish community to urge the Begin government to moderate its positions.

-- An "unreasonable" Begin government could jeopardize public support for Israel.

CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT

-- Mark Siegel's assessment of the Senate attitudes is shown on the following page. The assessment shows:

| Hard Support/Leadership | 30 |
| Role                   |    |
| Very Sympathetic       | 43 |
| Questionable           | 24 |
| Negative               | 3  |

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes
Mr. President:

On that morning, your schedule is as follows:

8:15 -- Brzezinski

8:45 -- Moore

8:55 -- photo session with Bob Bergland and Senator Huddleston

9:30 -- Califano meeting, for 40 minutes on elementary and secondary re-authorization decisions

you are free for lunch, although you have McIntyre from 1:30 till 5:00.

To

We asked for this follow-up meeting, which will be attended by the three of us, as well as Bill Quandt of the National Security Council.

If you have an opportunity to meet with us, at least for part of the time, we believe that you will find it to be time well-spent. We are having breakfast in the staff mess at 8:00 a.m. and probably will be there until 9:00 or 9:30 a.m.

We also have invited the Vice President to attend.

These are two stimulating people, particularly Cutthal on Arab attitudes and economic conditions. You should end up this if you want to be exposed to some new ideas on perspective.
HJ:

I gave a copy of this to Brzezinski.

E.

7/13
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<th>Week</th>
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<th>Secretary of Defense</th>
<th>NSC Adviser</th>
<th>Surrogate</th>
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<td>Week 1</td>
<td>Working session with key members of the United States Senate</td>
<td>Same as President</td>
<td>Briefing for House Committee on International Relations</td>
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| Week 2 | Briefing #1 for leaders of national Jewish organizations (1 hour) | Working session with key members of the House | - | - | Coordinates President's briefing | - |

| Week 3 | Briefing #1 for key members of the Jewish press (1 hour) | Briefing #2 for leaders of national Jewish organizations | Briefing New York City | - | Coordinates briefings | Briefing Miami and Fizer |

| Week 4 | Drop-in meeting with lay leaders | Briefing #2 for key members of the Jewish press | - | Briefing Los Angeles | Coordinates briefings | - |

1. Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.
2. Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jewish constituencies
<table>
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<th>Week 5</th>
<th>Drop-in meeting with lay leaders Group #2 (30 minutes)</th>
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TEXT) FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON HAS EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT IS SUPERFLUOUS AND IS LIKELY TO UNDERMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PROGRAM, ANDREW MEISELS, ALLON SAID THAT THE STATEMENT DOES NOT MENTION AT ALL UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 333 WHICH ALSO COMMITTED THE ARABS TO REACHING A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL.

KNESSET MEMBER ALLON LEFT THIS MORNING ON A LECTURE TOUR OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE ZIONIST LABOR MOVEMENT, THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL AND THE BONDS ORGANIZATION.

2 OCT 1224Z RSS/GS

TEXT) LABOR PARTY LEADER SHIMON PERES SAID THAT AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, ISRAEL FINDS ITSELF IN UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. PERES REMARKED THAT THE WORDING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE GOES AGAINST ALL RULES OF THE GAME AND AGAINST UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THESE RESOLUTIONS NOT ONLY DO NOT CALL FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BUT SURELY DO NOT TALK OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE; NOR HAS THE UNITED NATIONS EVER AUTHORIZED THE SUPERPOWERS TO CHANGE THEM. PERES ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE STRATEGY REGARDING PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WILL NOT RUN COUNTER TO ISRAEL’S OPINION.


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MR. PRESIDENT-

AN INTERESTING ARTICLE AND ANALYSIS. DON'T KNOW IF YOU SAW IT OR NOT.

219.
Z in 'THE MOUNTAINS'

Shmuel Katz, right, with Israel's Chief Rabbi Schlomo Goren at a salute to Israeli parade in New York.

But the question remained—who would decide when it became necessary, Israel or the American Jews? The next morning, in the rear acreage of Grossinger's vast dining room, a group of rabbis listened intently as a visiting scholar voiced thoughts that had been unspoken. Shmuel Katz would consider unspeakable. His emotional conflict was obvious, but his points were bluntly made: that American Jews had a responsibility to assess for themselves Menahem Begin's past and present views as well as the Carter proposals and that after 20 years of one-manship, they were failing to do so. He himself, the scholar said, believed the Carter approach to be reasonable, and that American Jews had to find a way to say this to the Israelis. However, he wasn't prepared to say it publicly, not yet. A senior rabbi then rose to rebuke him gently for voicing such thoughts even in private, even if he was right.

Shmuel Katz's assessment had evidently been accurate: that the misgivings of American Jews would not soon amount to much, that those who could not support Israeli positions would mostly keep their doubts to themselves, counting on Menahem Begin to resolve them. The appearance, if not the reality, would still be a near-solid support.

Thus some Jews who six months ago would have shuddered at the thought of Menahem Begin as Israel's Prime Minister will welcome him to America next week in the hope that he will break the impasse with the Arabs the way de Gaulle did in Algeria. Like Nixon in his opening to China, they are saying, he enjoys a freedom of action his more moderate predecessors lacked. I tried that line on my emissary, "I know," Shmuel Katz replied sarcastically, "de Gaulle made peace in Algeria, Nixon went to China, so Begin is the man to commit suicide—he'll give the country away, Never!"

"Never" is slow when the Arabs will accept Israel. The flimsy hope is that these "nevers" can begin to cancel out, but that hope begs numberless questions: among them, whether Menahem Begin, in a lifetime devoted to militant principles, has allowed himself any vision of peace. Those stewards of Israel who ask that question are more worried than they admit, for they have no answer.  

GROSSINGER, N.Y. Shmuel Katz was on his 11th visit to America but his first to that state of mind, rather than to that state of being. The car from the Israeli Consulate passed the billboards on Route 17, his eye fell on one that wasn’t pressing an invitation to glutiosity. “Keep Israel Safe!” it urged. Enemy territory “the Mountains” weren’t.

Katz was on a mission, as he had been on his first American visit back in 1948, the month before Israel came into existence as an independent state. Then he was trying to buy arms for the Irgun, the force of Jewish irregulars in Palestine who were commonly described in those days as terrorists. That very month, April 1948, they were being condemned—not only by the Arabs, British and Red Cross but by David Ben-Gurion and the chief rabbis—for the destruction of a village called Deir Yassin, where 290 Arabs, women and children included, were killed in an Irgun assault. Katz, an expatriated South African, was a member of the Irgun high command.

Half a lifetime later, he was again an emissary from Menahem Begin, the dominant figure in the Irgun, and now unexpectedly, Israel’s Prime Minister. Katz’s mission was to ease American misgivings—in particular, American Jewish misgivings—which had been aroused by journalistic excavations from Begin’s underground past as well as by the perception of him, as a Middle Eastern in the white house in Washington and the newer administration in Jerusalem. Since the Six-Day War in 1967, the word “terrorist” has again been part of the usage and group experience of the Middle East, and no political figure has been so publicly branded a terrorist as Menahem Begin, former leader of the Irgun, as Israel’s Prime Minister.

Shmuel Katz, a man of scholarly mien and diction who, like Begin, didn’t bother the Irgun veteran. Then he was in a reform rabbinate, as he is today. He was here to present Menahem Begin as a man of humane principle and reason, to demand that he be shunted to a harder line than he was prepared to say it piquant. he said. But the epithet “terrorist” had again been part of the usage and group experience of the Middle East, and no political figure has been so publicly branded a terrorist as Menahem Begin, former leader of the Irgun, as Israel’s Prime Minister.

Katz was on a mission, as he had been on his first American visit back in 1948, the month before Israel came into existence as an independent state. Then he was trying to buy arms for the Irgun, the force of Jewish irregulars in Palestine who were commonly described in those days as terrorists. That very month, April 1948, they were being condemned—not only by the Arabs, British and Red Cross but by David Ben-Gurion and the chief rabbis—for the destruction of a village called Deir Yassin, where 290 Arabs, women and children included, were killed in an Irgun assault. Katz, an expatriated South African, was a member of the Irgun high command.

Shmuel Katz’s right, with Israel’s Chief Rabbi Schneur Zalman at a Solelone to Israel
WASHINGTON (UPI) - THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO INVOLVE THE SOVIET UNION IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS WAS CRITICIZED SUNDAY BY TWO KEY SENATORS.


SEN. ROBERT DOLE, R-KAN., DESCRIBED THE MOVE AS "FRAUGHT WITH DANGER."

"IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS AN ABDICATION OF MIDDLE EAST LEADERSHIP BY PRESIDENT CARTER," SAID THE 1976 REPUBLICAN VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE IN A PREPARED STATEMENT.

"SECONDLY IT IS ANOTHER UNWISE EFFORT TO FORCE ISRAEL TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. IT APPEARS PRESIDENT CARTER IS SO DETERMINED TO HOLD A GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1977 THAT HE WILL RISK PERMANENT RUPTURED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL TO ACHIEVE IT."

JACKSON WAS INTERVIEWED ON NBC'S MEET THE PRESS. HE SAID RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT "SIT WELL WITH EGYPT," A COUNTRY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A "KEY FACTOR" IN ANY MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

"IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE ELEVATED THE RUSSIANS INTO A POSTURE THEY HADN'T DREAMED OF BEING PLACED IN," HE ADDED.

UPI 10-03 09:17 AED
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 5, 1977

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
New York, New York

THE WHITE HOUSE

BRIEFING BY
MOSHE DAYAN
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER

PRESS FILING CENTER
UN PLAZA HOTEL

2:05 AM EDT

MR. POWELL: I have a brief joint statement to read for you this evening, and then Foreign Minister Dayan will have some comments for you and be available to respond to some of your questions.

Q Can we file before the end?

MR. POWELL: No, I think this will not take long and I think we will keep the normal briefing rules in force.

The United States and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference and that all understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force.

Proposals for removing remaining obstacles to reconvening the Geneva Conference were developed. Foreign Minister Dayan will consult his government on the results of these discussions. Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the other parties.

Acceptance of the joint United States -- excuse me. Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the other parties to the Geneva Conference.

Acceptance of the joint United States-USSR statement of October 1, 1977, by the parties is not a prerequisite for the reconvening and conduct of the Geneva Conference.

I will make copies of this available to you by the end of the briefing.

Q Mr. Minister, what does that mean, acceptance of the U.S.-Soviet agreement by the parties? Has Israel accepted the agreement?

MINISTER DAYAN: No, on the contrary. We explained our reservation about this statement and we are assured by the President that this should not be, and this is not the basis for the participation or for the conduct of the Geneva Peace Conference. That is to say that the Arab Government does not accept and reject this statement.

MORE
We can still go to Geneva because the sole basis for the Geneva Peace Conference is the 338 Resolution and 242, and all the other elements of the agreement.

Q. What have you agreed to that is new in the meeting tonight? Have you agreed to anything new?

MINISTER DAYAN: Yes. We have agreed about the working paper that I will send, not only tonight; I have to sum up what I have been doing for two weeks or so. So at this hour, I can say positively that we have reached an agreement about the kind of working paper that has just been described or defined here by the spokesman and that I will sign this working paper for the Israeli government and recommend them to approve it and that the Secretary of State will deal with that with the other parties at the Geneva Peace Conference.
Q What is in the working paper?

MINISTER DAYAN: Well, that is not for you.

(Laughter)

No, we did not come here to say what is in the working paper. We have agreed that we should not release to you the working paper. Otherwise, I would have read the working paper.

Q How would you have to characterize the progress that you made this evening?

MINISTER DAYAN: I should say on two levels. The first is about the issues of principle that were mentioned in the release just made by the joint statement about the basic policy of the Geneva Peace Conference and about the joint statement.

This is an agreement and understanding about some of the major principles. I appreciate it very much.

The other part is the working paper that you must have a start and a great working paper with one of the parties in order to go on with the other parties and finally to reach an agreement about the procedure of the Geneva Peace Conference -- not the substance but the procedure in order to start a Geneva Peace Conference.

If eventually this paper, after -- would be that it would be discussed and probably will be changed, too, but -- we have reached the end of the discussions with all the parties, would become the final and agreed one, then we would have the agreed procedure for the Geneva Peace Conference. I think from that point of view the Geneva Peace Conference can be convened.

Q What is your agreement with the United States on the participation by the Palestinians?

MINISTER DAYAN: I said I shall not go into the working paper. I can repeat not about the agreement with the United States -- and I am sorry, but I have to make it clear, ladies and gentlemen, I am not going to say --

Q Mr. Foreign Minister, --

MINISTER DAYAN: Wait a minute. I haven't answered yet. I am sorry. I will not leave this room before we agree that I have -- now, what I want to tell you, sir -- I am sorry, but we have agreed, and I think it is correct that I shall not go and release what is in the paper. Therefore, I shall not say what has been agreed.

But I want to tell you about the Israeli position about it. That is, the Israeli position is that we shall not negotiate and have in Geneva the PLO. I am not talking about the agreement; I am talking about the Israeli position. And we shall not negotiate for a Palestinian state. Whatever conclusion you can draw from that, you would be correct.
Q Mr. Minister, 242 and 338 refer to the Palestinians solely as a refugee problem. Mr. Powell said that the United States and Israel agree that 242 and 338 is the only basis for Geneva. Does that mean that the United States now agrees with Israel that the Palestinians are entirely a refugee problem and nothing more?
MR. DAYAN: Whatever you have to ask about the United States position, it is better that you ask then. I want to say that we don't say that the Palestinian problem is only the problem of refugees. We don't say that. But if your question is about the American position, you better refer to them.

Q Mr. Foreign Minister, the U.S.-Soviet joint statement seems to have been shelved for the moment at least until you get to Geneva. Would it be accurate to infer that it has not been put out of the way altogether, that perhaps you might come back to that joint statement at Geneva?

MINISTER DAYAN: No, I don't think so. I think what can be said about this joint statement is that we criticize and we do not accept many of its provisions and it has been agreed, as was stated here, that this is not binding.

This is not the base to the Geneva Peace Conference or in other words, a party like Israel who does not accept this joint statement can go to Geneva without any reference to this joint statement.

Q Mr. Foreign Minister, if in fact one party to the negotiations does not accept this joint statement, in effect it has been scrapped, has it not?

MINISTER DAYAN: We are going to Geneva on the basis of 338, 242 and not on the basis of the joint statement. That has been accepted by the United States of America.

Q Would you then say in your negotiations with President Carter that you won your point today by having this scrapped? Do you regard it as a victory for your country?

MINISTER DAYAN: You never win with the President.

Q On the working paper that you are talking about, is this a working paper that was drafted tonight or is this one given to you a few days ago?

MINISTER DAYAN: It is something we have been working on for a long time, and not only between the United States and us, but I suppose between the Administration and the Arab parties to the Geneva Peace Conference. After two weeks or so we reached this point of agreement that was described by the spokesman.

Q Do I understand you correctly as saying that you are going to Geneva but not on the basis of the Soviet American statement, but you are going on the basis of 242 and 338?

MINISTER DAYAN: Yes. But let me divide the question and answer into two parts.

We are not really requested to accept the joint statement in order to go to Geneva. It is not anything
that must be accepted by all the parties. We do not accept it and we are still asked without it to go to Geneva. When we do go to Geneva—we want to go to Geneva—we want to go to Geneva on the basis of 338, 242 and all the others, but not the joint statement.

Q Tonight in these discussions did you agree with the American side that you will go to Geneva?

MINISTER DAYAN: We have to refer this so-called working paper to our government. They have either to accept it or to reject it. If they accept it, then as far as we are concerned, we are going to Geneva on the agreed procedure, but I want to make that clear, that has to be discussed with the Arab parties to the Geneva Peace Conference and maybe we will have to go and deal with it again.

But as far as we are concerned, once Israel will approve it, we are ready to go to Geneva.

Q What is the length of time that it will take Israel and the Arab governments?

MINISTER DAYAN: About the Arab government, I really don't know. Just a moment. I don't think the Israeli government will take too long to discuss it and to come to a decision whether they accept it, whether they demand or request some changes in it.

Q Is it possible in your view that the conference can begin within President Carter's time frame of December of this year?

MINISTER DAYAN: I don't know. I would like it to happen. As far as I personally am concerned, I am all for an immediate, early opening of the Geneva Peace Conference. If all the other parties would accept its working paper this way, or with some changes, and all the governments will approve it, then I can see no reason why it shouldn't.

Q Would you expect the Arab countries to go to Geneva if you don't support the joint Soviet-U.S. statement?

MINISTER DAYAN: How can I say anything about it? But I do believe that everybody, absolutely everybody realizes that when we talk about the resumption of a Geneva Peace Conference, it must be on the basis of 338 and 242 and nothing else. Anything else can be included there provided it is accepted and agreed to by all the parties. For instance, if Lebanon were asked to come in, we shall not object to it. We shall agree to it. This might be a new addition because Lebanon was not a participant in the Geneva Peace Conference in Paris.
But just such issues and provisions or whatever they are that would be agreed by all the parties can be concluded there. Or otherwise, it would be the 242 and the 338.

Q Were you in contact with your government tonight?

MINISTER DAYAN: Beg pardon?

Q Were you in contact with your government tonight?

MINISTER DAYAN: No. And in Israel now, what time is it now? No.

Q Mr. Minister, you said you excluded the possibility of negotiating about a Palestinian state at Geneva. Do you also exclude the possibility of negotiating about a Palestinian entity?

MINISTER DAYAN: I wish I knew what that is. What is entity?

Q You know what an entity is in a discussion.

MINISTER DAYAN: No. I know what we wouldn't do. We wouldn't negotiate over a Palestinian state.

Q You have already said that in the first day of the Geneva Conference an all-Arab delegation could include Palestinians in the first day and then you would like to divide up, negotiate only with states.

My question is, have you found some way where in the negotiations after the first day's ceremony, the Palestinians might also be included?

MINISTER DAYAN: I can say we have reached an agreement, a tentative agreement, a provisional agreement, a draft agreement with you people about this question, too, provided that the Arab parties for the Geneva Peace Conference and the Israeli government will enforce it.

Q Is it the position of Israel now that you are willing to negotiate a number of subjects on a multilateral basis or do you still feel that it all should be on a bilateral basis with individual Arab states?

MINISTER DAYAN: This is the position of our government.

Q I am sorry, which is the position?

MINISTER DAYAN: That we should negotiate peace treaties on a bilateral level, one between us and Egypt and the other one between us and Syria and Jordan and Lebanon.
Q Are there now some questions you would negotiate on a multilateral level?

MINISTER DAYAN: I wouldn't go into that. What I am saying is what the position of our government is, and that is about the main -- really this is the main issue to get peace treaties with the Arab countries.

I should say this is the main issue and this is the position of our government.

Q Mr. Minister, on the basis of your talks with President Carter and what he was able to tell you about the Arab positions, do you feel that both sides now are closer to reconvening the Geneva Conference?

MINISTER DAYAN: I don't know. President Carter really didn't tell me much about the Arab countries' position. He didn't.

Q Did you feel that you were pressured into accepting the agreement that you say you agreed to?

MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all.

Q Not at all?

MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all. You mean the joint statement?

Q Yes, the statement that you have just made with the United States.

MINISTER DAYAN: The one that was read here?

Q Yes.

MINISTER DAYAN: No. I don't think that we agreed to it due to any pressure put on us. But I wanted to tell you this agreement still has to be confirmed by the Israeli Cabinet.

Q Mr. Minister, you have frankly left us very much in the dark as to whether Israel and the United States have actually narrowed their positions at all here. Can you possibly clarify that basic point for us?

MINISTER DAYAN: No. I don't think you are in the dark. We have reached an agreement about this working paper and the way, or the exact wording that was expressed by the spokesman.

Q You had an agreement two weeks ago on a working paper, also.

MINISTER DAYAN: No, we had not. I wish we had. We had not. No, this is the first time -- I am sorry about the situation, but this is the first time on the same subject or a similar one in a Geneva Peace Conference, at this hour, 2:00 o'clock in the morning that we could have come out with a joint statement in the words that were expressed here; but never before. I wish we got such an agreement before. Maybe by now we would have had a further progress.

MORE
Mr. Minister, was the joint statement in any sense an obstacle to reaching an agreement?

MINISTER DAYAN: Once we agreed that as far as the Geneva Peace Conference was concerned this joint statement is not binding, then we could have our criticism about it. But it is not an obstacle as far as the Geneva Peace Conference is concerned.

Q Is it an obstacle in any sense?

MINISTER DAYAN: I think politically it still will have its impact, still will have its impact. There are many provisions there that we think they are wrong. We are not happy about the actual fact there is such a joint statement by your government and the Soviet Russia. But I suppose that the Israeli Government's attitude and position about it was expressed by our Prime Minister and published, so I don't really have to go much into that.

Q Is it correct to say that Israel and the United States reached agreement tonight on how to go to Geneva -- simply that?

MINISTER DAYAN: This is too simple to be correct.

Q There is nothing simple in this world, but I mean --

MINISTER DAYAN: No, I won't say, alter any words. Do you want to read again the sophisticated whatever was said about it?

We worked hard on this formulation. I wouldn't have tried to simplify it. Really, if you are not clear about it, can we hear it again?

Q Has the United States and Israel agreed on a formulation --

MR. DAYAN. Here is the spokesman for the United States of America.

MR. POWELL: We have agreed upon what I said we agreed upon, which you will have in writing in your own little hands as soon as the Foreign Minister gets a thank you. That in fact is what we have agreed upon.

MINISTER DAYAN: Don't look that disappointed. Let me tell you in basic English,...

The fact that I am sending this working paper to the Israeli Government and asking or commanding them to approve it means that I think that the Israeli Government should go along with this paper.

On the other hand, the Secretary of State is going to take this working paper and deal with it with the Arab parties participating in the Geneva Peace Conference. That, I think, is clear enough.
Q: Is that a procedural paper for going to Geneva? Can you at least say that?

MINISTER DAYAN: That is correct. That was the best question I was asked. (Laughter)

Q: In view of reassurances that President Carter gave you this evening, is it possible your government overreacted to that joint U.S.-Soviet statement, given the assurances you got this evening?

MINISTER DAYAN: No. I still, after all of the explanation and clarification and justification that I heard about the joint statement, I still think that the Israeli government's reaction and statement about this joint session and criticism is correct.

Q: Mr. Minister, is there any problem with Israel not having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; is that any problem at all with the Geneva Conference?

MINISTER DAYAN: There are problems but not in this concern. I don't think this will be an obstacle or a special obstacle for participating in the Geneva Peace Conference. We would have been better off having a diplomatic relationship with Soviet Russia. But just the way that we participated in Geneva in the past, we shall go on and do it this time, too.

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, in your view does the American statement that was read by Jody Powell a few minutes ago mean that the United States will oppose any effort by the UN Security Council or any other UN body to in any way affirm the rights of the Palestinian people as a supplement to 242 and 338? Is that your understanding that the United States will oppose any such effort?

MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all. My understanding is that it is up to all of the parties participating in Geneva, including Israel to agree to anything which would be new to the Geneva Peace Conference, the way it was conducted in the past.

That is to say that if a new participant would be asked to come into Geneva, they would have and everybody would have to get the agreement of all the parties including Israel. Then unless we agree to that they just can't come.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

MINISTER DAYAN: Thank you very much.

MR. POWELL: Let me deal with one clarification as Helen points out it might be necessary. There were several questions asked with regard to the scrapping of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement.

MORE
I believe if you read the joint statement, which I read and by the way, with regard -- the question was asked here -- it was not an American statement, it was a joint statement. But I believe if you refer to that statement it will be clear that this U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement was not intended as a statement that had to be or was expected to be accepted or agreed to in full by all of the parties to the Conference as a pre-condition for the convening of the conference.

It was and is a statement reflecting the views of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the core issues.

Do I need to go further, or have I made myself clear?

Q Therefore it still stands. Does it not?

MR. POWELL: It does indeed still stand. But I think what was done tonight is to make clear that it is not a statement to which we would expect that Israel or indeed other parties would necessarily agree to, certainly in toto -- and it is not a pre-condition and such agreement is not a pre-condition for the convening of this conference.

As you well know, other parties in addition to Israel have already expressed agreement or disagreement to a greater or lesser extent with certain provisions of this statement.

Q How about this working paper? I am asking does the U. S. Government have to take further action on the working paper or have they okayed it?

MR. POWELL: I think the statement I read speaks for itself. I am not going to get into a question and answer session this evening. We will have to deal with any additional questions from the United States side tomorrow.

Q Thank you, Jody.

MR. POWELL: But I did want to clarify that point.

END (AT 2:30 A.M. EDT)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OCTOBER 5, 1977

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

THE WHITE HOUSE

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

The U. S. and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference and that all the understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force.

Proposals for removing remaining obstacles to reconvening the Geneva Conference were developed. Foreign Minister Dayan will consult his Government on the results of these discussions. Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the other parties to the Geneva Conference.


# # #
DAVAR COMMENTS ON GROWING CRISIS IN U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS

TYPED BY TEL AVIV DAVAR IN HEBREW 2 OCT 77 P 7 TA

(EDITORIAL: "RED LIGHT IN RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON")

(TEXT) THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF CONVENING GENEVA -- A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL -- ARE VERY DISTRESSING. IT APPEARS THAT, AT LEAST, IT HAS RECEIVED CLUMSY TREATMENT BY ISRAEL, SOMETHING WHICH CERTAINLY DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARD OUR CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF OUR FRIENDS. WE SHOULD BE NO LESS DISTRESSED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE CABINET HAS, AT LEAST PARTLY, COMPLIED WITH THE CUSH EMUNIM DEMANDS: ALL THESE COMPROMISES IN CARRYING OUT SETTLEMENT IN THE HEART OF THE TERRITORIES AND THE UNAVOIDABLE PUBLICITY AROUND THEM, CAUSE US UNIMAGINABLE HARM IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION. THE DECISION BY THE NONALIGNED NATIONS WHO CALLED FOR A HALT OF ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL AND A BAN ON IMMIGRATION BECAUSE OF "BAD USE OF THE TERRITORIES," HINTS AT WHAT WE CAN EXPECT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN BOTH THE EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN PRESS A SEVERE CRITICAL NOTE IS HEARD ABOUT SETTLEMENT, WHICH IS BEING INTERPRETED AS CREEPING ANNEXATION, AND ALL THESE HAVE A DECIDEDLY POLITICAL INFLUENCE WHICH IT IS DOUBTFUL ISRAEL CAN PERMIT.


THERE IS NO ARGUMENT OVER THE FACT THAT THINGS OF THIS TYPE HARDEN THE POSITIONS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT UNITED AMONG THEMSELVES AS TO THE NATURE AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE. IT IS PRECISELY THE ISOLATION OF ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AND EVEN WITH THE USSR, WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO AGREE TO THE PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE LIKELY TO LEAD TO SEVERE COMPLICATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS WELL.

IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THINGS THAT ISRAEL IS NOW FACING AN URGENT TASK, THAT OF EXPLAINING ITS POSITION TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND, FIRST AND FOREMOST, TO ITS JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH FRIENDS. EVEN IF THIS IS NOT AN EASY TASK, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE BASIC FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING FOR US AMONG THE MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IN SPITE OF ALL THE EROSION. PERHAPS IT IS NOT TOO LATE EITHER TO GO BACK AND TRY TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT, TO RECONSIDER HIS APPROACH, WHICH IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE CONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR RUN IT INTO A SANDBANK IF IT IS INDEED CONVEYED WITH THE AID OF A SHORT-TERM PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE.

IT IS CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN ATTEMPT ALSO DEMANDS OF US POLITICAL REALISM AND WILLINGNESS FOR CONCESSIONS IN SPHERES WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE THE MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES. A "RED LIGHT" IS NOW BLINKING IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IT WOULD BE BEST TO SEE IT IN TIME.

3 OCT 2915Z MJQ/TM
This endorsement was the result of a ballot of its 10,000 convention delegates. Jimmy Carter received 81% of the delegate votes and Gerald Ford 19% of the delegate votes. Your commitment to support a separate department of education was a major factor in the decision of many delegates to support your candidacy.

3. The teachers groups - particularly the NEA - was one of the most active and effective groups in the general election. A post-election ballot showed that over 88% of the membership of the NEA voted.

4. Establishing the department is one of the few things that we can do for the teachers' organizations in the next few years as additional funds for education will be difficult with our goal of balancing the budget. If we renege on our campaign promise to establish a separate Department of Education and fail to give them the additional monies that they will inevitably want, I would predict that they will oppose us on other legislative programs where their support is critical.
"The borders on which we will reach an agreement with the Arab states are those which will decide the future and fate of the settlements, and it is not the settlements which will determine where the borders will be drawn. If the borders decided upon cut off Jewish settlements from Israel, the Government of Israel will have to decide whether to dismantle them or let them remain on the other side of the border, which will be based on treaties with the neighboring states."

"The U.S. is now to agree to PLO participation in Geneva, following their acceptance of Resolution 242. The presence of the PLO in Geneva means Israel's acceptance of a Palestinian state and the U.S. wants Israel to recognize the principle of this state. Israel objects and will not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state, because such a state will endanger its very existence."

Dayan mentioned that in talks with the Arab states Israel is ready to discuss the partition of the West Bank, but the Arabs demand that Israel give up all the territories to the Palestinian state and this cannot be considered. Israel prefers to object to a Palestinian state and risk a war now, rather than to accept a Palestinian state and risk a war in ten years when security conditions would be worse.
ISRAELI Spokesman's Reaction to U.S.-Soviet Statement

(from the morning newsreel)

(ITAL) Before going over the official statement, I have an unofficial reaction from an authoritative source in Jerusalem. The source told me, over an hour ago, that the U.S.-Soviet statement is a major departure from all that the United States promised us. The most important point is the one calling for the participation of the Palestinian people's representatives in Geneva without the United States obtaining Israel's consent for this. This comes after the United States promised us that if any change occurs in the original composition of the participants in the Geneva conference, and the original participants were states, then this would be done with the approval of all parties, including Israel. At present, feelings in Jerusalem are grave, even though we had received the contents of the statement several hours before its publication.

Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who is in the Ikhilov hospital, participated in formulating Israel's reaction and in the consultations. At the end of these consultations, the reaction was given by the Prime Minister's spokesman. It consists of five clauses:

1. The Soviet Union's demand for Israel's withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967, which contradicts the real meaning of Security Council Resolution 242, is known to all, says the statement.

2. Although the governments of the United States and Israel agreed during Prime Minister Begin's visit to the United States in July of this year that the purpose of the negotiations at Geneva is an overall peace settlement which would be expressed in a peace treaty, the expression "peace treaty" is not mentioned at all in the Soviet-American statement.

3. There is no reference in the statement to resolutions 242 and 338. Although the United States government has repeatedly stated until now that Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 constitute the sole basis for reconvening the Geneva conference.
4. There can be no doubt that this statement, issued at a time when consultations are being held for convening another session of the Geneva Conference, can only harden still further the Arab States' stands and make the attainment of peace in the Middle East still more difficult.

5. As the Prime Minister stated, Israel will continue to aspire to peace and free negotiations with her neighbors to sign peace treaties with them.

And so, the statement speaks for itself. Naturally, Israel rejects the U.S.-Soviet statement and this will come out in the weekly Cabinet Meeting today.

2 OCT 1941Z MJO/MC
WASHINGTON, OCT 2, REUTER - LARGEST AND INFLUENTIAL
AMERICAN JEWISH GROUPS REACTED ANGERLY TODAY TO A JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN
ATTEMPT TO PUSH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST
PEACE SETTLEMENT.

YESTERDAY, THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ISSUED A STATEMENT
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS CALLING FOR
PEACE TALKS IN GENEVA BY DECEMBER AT THE LATEST TO BREATHE ABOUT
A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

WHAT ANGERED THE POWERFUL JEWISH LOBBY WAS THE UNITED
STATES' FIRST FORMAL COMMITMENT IN THE STATEMENT THAT SUCH A
SETTLEMENT MUST INSURE "THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE."

THE PRESIDENTS OF 32 MAJOR JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, AMONG THEM
THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND B'NAI B'RITH, FIRED OFF A
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE EXPRESSING PROFOUND
DISTURBANCE AT THE STATEMENT 'WHICH ON ITS FACE REPRESENTS AN
ABANDONMENT OF AMERICA'S HISTORIC COMMITMENTS TO THE SECURITY
AND SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL.'

MORE IN 1

MORE IN 2

WASHINGTON THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO CALL THE STATEMENT "A SHOCKING
ABOUT-FACE" OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S PUBLIC PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR
ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER BEFORE SPOKEN OF THE
"LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS, ONLY OF "LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS." BUT THE STATEMENT DID IN FACT ONLY CONFIRM WHAT HAS
BEEN THE U.S. POSITION FOR SOME MONTHS -- THAT THE PALESTINIAN
QUESTION WAS TO BE FACED UP TO AND THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE
TO HAVE SOME FORM OF HOMELAND OF THEIR OWN.

THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD GET TOGETHER IN THIS WAY,
WHILE STILL INTENSE RIVALS FOR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
FAR FROM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEMSELVES ON WHAT FORM A SETTLEMENT
SHOULD ULTIMATELY TAKE, WAS PROBABLY THE MOST SURPRISING FACET
OF THE STATEMENT.

THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST
PEACE CONFERENCE, WHICH MET BRIEFLY IN DECEMBER OF 1973.

THE INTENTION OF THE STATEMENT WAS TO GET MOVEMENT FROM
BOTH SIDES TOWARDS A COMPROMISE -- FROM ISRAEL THROUGH PRESSURE
FROM WASHINGTON AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S ARAB FRIENDS
THROUGH PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW.

MORE IN 3

MIDEAST - NIGHTLEAD AMERICAN 3 WASHINGTON

AS WELL AS THE CONCESSION FROM THE UNITED STATES ON THE
REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIANS, THE STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED A
CONCESSION FROM MOSCOW -- CALLING FOR THE "ESTABLISHMENT
OF NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB
NEIGHBORS AFTER THE TERMINATION OF "THE STATE OF WAR."

IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD COMMITTED
ITSELF TO SUCH A CONDITION.

BUT WHETHER OR NOT THE STATEMENT WILL PRODUCE MOVEMENT OR
REMAIN JUST ANOTHER EXHORTATION IN A LONG SERIES OF EFFORTS BY
OUTSIDE MEDIATORS TO END THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT REMAINS TO
BE SEEN.

REACHING THE DECEMBER DEADLINE FOR GENEVA TALKS WILL
REQUIRE SHIFTS IN ATTITUDE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN HAVE BEEN
SEEN SO FAR THIS YEAR.

THE MAJOR STICKING POINT IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) WILL TAKE PART, AS
MOST ARAB STATES INSIST. ISRAEL REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY
WITH THE PLO AND HOPES FOR SOME OTHER FORM OF PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION.

REUTER 1218
June 13, 1977

Dear Harold:

The President wanted you to see the attached. It is politically sensitive. The President has asked that no copies be made and that only four people read it.

I'd appreciate it if you would call my office when you have finished reading it, and we'll arrange to pick it up.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Hamilton Jordan

Assistant to the President

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1977

Dear CY:

The President wanted you to see the attached. It is politically sensitive. The President has asked that no copies be made and that only four people read it.

I'd appreciate it if you would call my office when you have finished reading it, and we'll arrange to pick it up.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Hamilton Jordan
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Cyrus Vance
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

HAMILTON JORDAN

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

BY MESSENGER ATTENTION: NANCY BRADY

Personal and Confidential
Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of the remarks you delivered before the American Jewish Congress in New York. I had seen reports in the media of your talk and found the excerpts they reported of great interest. A reading of the full text certainly confirms that impression.

On a more personal note, I am sorry I missed your call the other day. As my office informed yours, I was out of the city. I hope one of these days we will have the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Hamilton Jordan
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N. W.
Suite 520
Washington, D. C. 20006
November 14, 1977

Dear Mr. Jordan:

Enclosed is a copy of the remarks I delivered in New York on Sunday evening, which I thought you might be interested in seeing.

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
Hamilton Jordan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
We meet in the midst of another debate about peace in the Middle East. Given my own involvement in the conduct of foreign policy over eight years, I have thought it inappropriate since January to participate in a discussion of day-to-day tactics. But I would like to use this occasion to articulate a few general principles.

First, the desirability of peace can never be at issue. No people has suffered more from the absence of peace than the people of Israel, every square mile of whose country is drenched with the blood of its pioneers and whose existence has never been recognized by any of its neighbors. No people can be more aware of how fragile, and how precious, are the restraints that make men and nations civilized.

No people knows more vividly that morality must be more than a theory -- it must be a constant in human conduct. And no group of men and women understands more acutely that peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements but on the conscience of mankind. History is often cruel, and rarely logical and yet the wisest of realists are those who recognize that fate can indeed be shaped by human faith and courage. These qualities are what brought the state of Israel into being.
This spirit and pride must be nurtured by all friends of Israel for they are the ultimate guarantee of Israel's future.

But faith and courage are not enough. The people of Israel have learned of the transitoriness of human intentions to entrust the destiny of their nation entirely to professions and reassurances however sincere and honestly intended. A peace to be lasting must be founded on the self-interest of all the parties and for peace to be secure it must leave Israel strong enough to protect its future by its own efforts.

Second, the intentions or purposes of the government of the United States cannot be at issue. No President would knowingly risk the future of Israel. Nor would he make a deal to undermine Israel's future for some global considerations. My own acquaintance with President Carter, Secretary Vance and their senior advisors convinces me that this Administration would not deliberately put Israel's security at risk. But there is always the danger that actions undertaken in good faith may inadvertently produce unforeseen consequences. If such a miscalculation took place either Israel would become totally isolated or diplomacy would become abruptly deadlocked. The art of diplomacy is to move events carefully and shape them toward achievable ends so that neither the United States nor Israel ever face such a stark, impossible choice. A coordination of policies between Israel and the United States is therefore imperative.

Third, the perspective of a superpower and those of a small country may occasionally differ. The United States has enormous strength; Israel has a much narrower margin of safety. The United States can survive trial-and-error diplomacy, because we can always rectify mistakes by redoubling our efforts. But Israeli leaders cannot experiment; they have only one try. If they guess wrong they risk the survival of the nation. We therefore owe the people of Israel an understanding of its special circumstances -- all the more so as the country has known only war or the threat of war since its founding. At the same time, Israelis must understand the importance of Middle East peace to the global concerns of the United States and the Western world, which are indeed the essential underpinning of Israel's own security.

Fourth, an over-all solution is of course the ultimate prize. But realism forces us to recognize that to achieve it involves issues of enormous complexity and parties with an unequal commitment to peace. It also requires a process that is bound to be protracted. Thus while striving for an over-all settlement, we must take care not to foreclose other
opportunities that may arise to ease tensions and to enable the peoples of the area to build confidence. We must not give a veto to the most intransigent elements within the area. We must not permit outside powers to emerge as the advocates for a point of view that penalizes moderation.

Fifth, some structures develop their own momentum that cannot be judged by formal declarations or abstract blueprints. A Palestinian state on the West Bank is bound to be an element of instability both for Jordan and for Israel; it will compound the crisis not solve it. Such a state -- whatever the professions or guarantees -- must have objectives that cannot be compatible with the tranquility of the Middle East. It cannot be an accident that no attempt to create such a state was ever made during the twenty years of Arab rule in that territory.

Sixth, any peace settlement must of necessity involve guarantees. But they must be worked out with great care and with a sense for their limits. History should teach us that guarantees by themselves are not a substitute for security. No nation should be asked to abdicate its judgment of the requirements of its survival. Care must be taken that guarantees do not provide a pretext for an outside power to intervene constantly in the affairs of the area. With respect to bilateral US-Israeli treaty arrangements there is the danger that the ratification process may produce a debate that paradoxically hazards the friendship and close cooperation which has served so well for a generation. In short, guarantees require the most careful reflection and study; at best they reinforce, they can not bring about security.

Seventh, whatever the views about the desirability of beginning the process of negotiations with a Geneva conference, so much effort has been invested in it that it has become the touchstone of the prospects of peace. All parties therefore have a stake in bringing such a conference into being. At the same time we must recognize that when it is finally assembled Geneva will be an important achievement, but its primary significance will be procedural. Ahead of us will be complex negotiations about frontiers, commitments to peace, security arrangements, and other issues which will test the wisdom and commitment of the parties.
These issues cannot be left to the pressures of a conference; it is not too soon to explore them actively with the parties. We cannot wait for Geneva to resolve all the complexities that range from the relations of sub-groups to the main conference to the concrete outlines of a definition of peace. Especially as far as Israel is concerned it is incompatible with our historic relationship to deal with issues of such gravity in an atmosphere of self-imposed deadlines. And it does not help those Arab leaders who have had the wisdom and the courage to begin the journey towards peace to raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

Geneva will be successful to the extent that Israel and the United States end the cycle of fear and reassurance, of outraged protest and soothing generalities and turn to the elaboration of a common concrete approach. This requires a willingness on one side to give the benefit of the doubt and a readiness on the other to understand the anguish of a people whose historic suffering precludes the abdication of its own judgment, but whose martyrs guarantee that the search for peace, while painful, will be dedicated and committed.

I am convinced that the problems that form the headlines of the day are soluble. In all my efforts in the Middle East, whatever the temporary disagreements, we never failed to develop a common position with our friends in Israel. It was during Golda's term as Prime Minister and that of her distinguished successor, that the steps were taken that give us hope for even greater progress now. I have every confidence that the present Israeli government will do no less. And in my experience, at the end of the day, Israel has never rejected a chance to make progress towards a settlement, or to run risks for peace. I have no doubt that we will find a willing -- if complicated -- partner in a dialogue that emphasizes substance not procedure and in a quest that defines specific objectives, not theoretical blueprints. The Jewish people has not survived through the millennia by being found wanting of vision in its hours of need. And the American people have not been the hope of mankind through their history by subordinating moral values to tactical expedience.