MEMORANDUM

TO: Jack Watson
FROM: Harrison Wellford
SUBJECT: Appendix to the Government Organization Options Memorandum
DATE: November 16, 1976

The attached document is the briefing/options paper prepared by the pre-election Policy Planning Office on the Agency for Consumer Advocacy, similar to what has been prepared for each major regulatory agency.

I thought it would serve as a useful appendix to the materials on Government Organization because creation of the Agency for Consumer Advocacy is one of the major regulatory issues ripe for immediate action.
ENSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION FOR THE PUBLIC
THE AGENCY FOR CONSUMER ADVOCACY
AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

A Briefing/Options Paper
Prepared for
President-Elect Carter
By
Carter-Mondale Policy Planning

Atlanta
November, 1976
This briefing/options book is designed to help the President-elect, his staff, and his appointees understand the options available for the creation of an Agency for Consumer Advocacy. It outlines its objectives, potential resources and methods of operation; describes the chief options available to the Carter Administration and their chief advantages and disadvantages; and briefly outlines the Agency's consequent staffing needs.

This document presents a wide range of opinions and possible options for consideration by the new Administration. Prepared by Carter-Mondale Policy Planning, it is the work of a good many people who were asked to participate both because of their expertise and the different perspectives and opinions they brought to the task. The ideas in this book do not represent President-elect Carter's positions or those of his administration. Similarly, none of these ideas should be attributed to individual contributors.

The following people contributed importantly to the development of this book: Joan Claybrook, Philip Schrag (synthesizer), Peter Schuck (editor/reviewer) and Carol Foreman Tucker. John Harmon and Curt Hessler initiated and Bill Drayton, assisted by Debbie Gottheil, directed Policy Planning's Regulation Project.
# THE AGENCY FOR CONSUMER ADVOCACY

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INTRODUCTION
Consumers and other diffuse interests have long been seriously underrepresented in Federal decision-making, most especially in the regulatory process that so critically if invisibly affects their interests. Organized interests have too often been able to bend national policy to suit their narrow purposes rather than the broad public interest because only they participated routinely in the process.

This briefing/options paper reviews what has been and what might be done to ensure adequate public representation.

Most of the regulatory agencies were created to an important degree in order to protect the public's interests. However, this generation has learned that such bodies are likely to be ineffective or perhaps to fall captive to those they were intended to control if left unsupervised and, at least as important, unsupported by representatives of their public constituency.

A decade of experimentation and extensive legislative consideration has suggested four chief methods of ensuring that diffuse public interests are effectively represented in Federal regulatory decision-making:
1. **In-house Advocates.** Each agency would appoint in-house Counsel to represent underrepresented and especially consumer interests in its proceedings. This option promises expertise and staying power, but such representation may not long remain independent. Congress has recently created such an office at the ICC.

2. **Agency Reimbursement of Private Participants.** Although problems of cooption remain, this approach encourages greater independence. The FTC and CPSC have recently begun to provide such support.

3. **The Agency for Consumer Advocacy (ACA).** This proposed Federal agency would represent consumer interests in carefully selected proceedings (and appeals therefrom) held by others, chiefly regulatory agencies. Both houses of Congress passed such legislation last year, but a threatened Ford veto blocked its enactment. President-elect Carter and the Democratic platform have both endorsed the ACA.

4. **Tax Credits for Advocacy Contribution.** Giving individual citizens a tax credit for contributing up to $2.00 or $5.00 to the accredited advocacy fund of their choice would (1) give public advocates an entirely independent financial base and (2) make them serve their clients (the public's changing felt needs sufficiently well to win their continuing support.
These four options are more likely to be complements than alternatives to one another.

Of these options, the ACA requires the new Administration's most immediate attention - given the President-elect's campaign commitments, the extensive consideration already given the idea, its legislative ripeness, and its potential value as an early and continuing signal of the Carter Administration's commitment to ensuring that government serves the people's interests first. Consequently this memorandum focuses first and primarily on the choices available to the Administration in creating an ACA. It concludes with relatively brief consideration of the other options.

Assuming that the President-elect continues to support creation of an ACA, the principal decisions that must be made during the transition relate to (1) the timing and priority of the effort to establish the ACA, (2) the design of the ACA legislation, and (3) the selection of an eventual Administrator and perhaps interrelated allocation of responsibility for accomplishing these tasks.

With respect to timing and priority, the President can either take the initiative and, working with Congress and others interested in the idea, push for his own strong version of the legislation early in the new session of Congress (the "high priority option") or he can permit Congressional supporters of the ACA to advance their own versions while providing moderate
White House support and input during the session (the "moderate priority option"). The advantages of the high priority option are principally the brighter prospects for enactment during the initial "honeymoon", the political benefits of an early victory, and the sensitizing of a new Administration to the values implicit in the ACA concept. On the other hand, the slower, moderate priority option would (1) allow Congressional backers greater credit and (2) give the Administration more time to develop legislation it was sure it would like.

The policy options available in designing the ACA relate to whether or not the ACA should also try to handle consumer complaints; the degree of its independence from the President; its relationship to state and local consumer protection functions and whether or not it can assist them with grants in aid; the disposition of the large number of consumer offices President Ford created in other agencies as a means of combatting ACA legislation; the extent of exemptions from the ACA's intervention power; and the size of the ACA's budget.

Deciding among some of these options will affect the balance of the ACA's political costs and benefits to the Administration, the ability of the ACA to function effectively, the ability of the President to influence the agency, and the reorganization of the government's other consumer protection functions.
The final set of options concerns the choice of a person to shepherd the ACA legislation through Congress and to speak for the President on consumer affairs during the pre-enactment period (probably extending at least until July, 1977) and (depending upon the degree of the ACA's independence) thereafter as well. Since such a person may well be the appropriate nominee as the eventual ACA Administrator (and may in any event anticipate such a designation), the Administration should probably begin to search for a possible Administrator during the transition period.
TRANSITION
PERSONNEL
CARTER'S VIEWS
PRESIDENT ELECT CARTER'S VIEWS ON THE AGENCY FOR
CONSUMER ADVOCACY

"We also need to have within the government structure itself a competent group who can speak for consumers. Senator Magnuson and Congressman Brooks have thus far been successful in getting this legislation passed - Consumer Protection Agency or Agency for Consumer Advocacy. I am strongly opposed to the proliferation of new agencies, departments, bureaus, boards and commissions because they add more to an already confused federal bureaucratic structure. This agency, in my opinion, is different. If I am elected President, I would look on this group - a very small group by the way - to help me probe constantly, to discover agencies or functions which ought to be eliminated, to publicly reveal inadequacies and inaccuracies that exist within the people's own government, the agency would more than pay for itself. There would also be a very low operating cost - I think $10, $11, $12 million each year. This is about the amount of money HEW spends every hour. So I strongly favor this legislation. I hope the conference committee will pass it quickly and that it will be adopted. I hope that President Ford will sign it into law; if he should veto it, I hope that Congress can override his veto. If the veto should be sustained, I will continue to make it a major issue in the campaign this fall. If I am elected President, I hope it will be one of the first bills passed during the next administration."

Public Citizen Forum, Washington, D.C.
August 9, 1976
ISSUES/OPTIONS
This section describes the existing Office of Consumer Affairs in the Department of HEW, the genesis of the proposed Agency for Consumer Advocacy (ACA) and the versions of the ACA which passed in the last Congress. It then reviews the arguments for and against the creation of a strong ACA. Finally, it discusses the most important design and policy issues concerning the ACA that must still be resolved before enactment.

The Office of Consumer Affairs in HEW

Apart from the Federal Trade Commission*, the government's principal agency for analyzing and developing consumer issues is the Office of Consumer Affairs, headed by the Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs. In the Johnson Administration, the Office was located in the Executive Office of the President, but President Nixon downgraded the agency to an office within the Department of HEW. The office exists by virtue of an Executive Order, not by statute.

*Discussed in a separate briefing/options paper
The FTC focuses on private sector consumer protection.
The Office has only 55 employees and a budget of $1,581,000. Its duties are prescribed by Executive Order 11583 (May 26, 1971): it advises the federal agencies and the President with respect to consumer issues, receives complaints from the public and refers them to other agencies, and encourages other agencies to establish consumer-oriented programs.

The Office has been virtually dormant for years. Most consumers are unaware of its existence. It does help to coordinate the views of federal agencies on consumer legislation pending in Congress, but it rarely leads a battle. Much of its time is devoted to the making of speeches, the publication of press releases and other "consumer information", and the convening of consumer conferences around the nation. The Office has had some small success in encouraging the development of voluntary complaint handling mechanisms in a few industries. It has played almost no role in policy formation. The largest unit within the office is its internal management unit; the second largest is its public relations group. The agency is so ephemeral that it published an annual report last year for the first time, but it has not distributed that report to U.S. Depository libraries.
The Office has been hampered by the suspicion in which it is held by major consumer organizations. This frostiness is to a considerable extent a result of Ms. Knauer's on-again, off-again support for a strong ACA (depending upon instructions from the White House) and her strong support for Ford's plan to head off the ACA by creating consumer affairs offices in each agency. The Office has made grants to various consumer protection efforts, such as seed money for a magazine to rate services in the Washington, D.C. area. The Office does testify before Congress on proposed legislation, but the quality of its presentations has been rather low.

A large number of federal agencies have their own consumer affairs offices, many of them established recently by the Ford Administration to show that a new centralized consumer agency was not needed. These offices are poorly staffed and have little influence in their agencies. They do, however, play some role in keeping consumer groups aware of what issues are pending in their agencies, and in some cases they might be able to develop usefully.
History of the ACA Proposal

For six years, dissatisfaction with the low status and limited role of the Office, and, to an even greater extent, dissatisfaction with the degree to which consumer interests have been undervalued by federal regulatory agencies, has led a coalition of groups to work to replace the Office with a much more important Agency for Consumer Advocacy (ACA). The proposed Agency would take over the advisory functions of the Office (including its important legislative planning functions), but would accept, as well, the duty of representing the interests of consumers in selected rule-making federal agencies (called "host agencies" in this memorandum). The ACA legislation's history conjures the image of waves battering a shore. In 1970, a bill similar to the present version of the proposal passed the Senate by a vote of 74-4, but died on a tie vote in the House Rules Committee. In 1971-72, the House approved the bill by 344-44, but it was filibustered to death in the Senate. In 1974, another filibuster killed the bill--the final cloture vote was 64 to 34. In 1975, the legislation passed both Houses, but the Administration threatened to veto it, and the House margin was only nine votes. In view of the veto threat the Congressional leadership let the bill die in 1976 without convening a Conference Committee. This extended legislative process has produced numerous volumes of hearings and committee reports.
The core of the legislation enacted by both houses of the 94th Congress, Section 6 of S.200, gave the ACA the responsibility to perform as the consumers' advocate. This subsection describes only this core provision. Other controversial provisions are discussed in the subsequent section on Design Issues that follows.

Under S.200 the Administrator of the ACA is to be appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, for a term of four years, but the term expires along with that of the President. The Administrator has no regulatory or enforcement authority, but is given certain intervention powers to require host agencies to consider consumer perspectives. In formal proceedings affecting consumer interests, the Administrator may intervene as a party or may elect to participate but play a smaller role (e.g., amicus). The Administrator must conform, however, to the host agency's procedural rules.

In informal or unstructured host agency proceedings, the Administrator may make written or oral submissions. He or she may request an agency to initiate an administrative proceeding; and, if it fails to do so, the agency must make a written, public statement giving the reasons for its decision.
Finally, S.200 would give the Administrator the power to participate in and initiate judicial review of host agency decisions that affect consumers' interests.

The Arguments Pro and Con

This section lists the chief proponents and opponents and their chief arguments.

Those in Favor - Although Congressional mail has apparently run heavily against the ACA (in part because business groups have worked to stimulate such mail), the organizational support for a strong ACA among non-business groups is quite substantial. Proponents of the concept include: Common Cause, the Conference of Mayors, the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, The Democratic Party (the 1976 platform), Ralph Nader, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of District Attorneys, the National Consumers League, the National Consumer Congress, the National Governor's Conference, and a substantial number of business groups and corporations, including Montgomery Ward, Gulf and Western, Connecticut General Life Insurance, Atlantic-Richfield, Polaroid, Mobil Oil, J.C. Penney's, and many others. Nader and the Consumer Federation have made the issue their Number One priority.
The proponents' case for the bill is that business interests are well represented in the thousands of agency proceedings each year that affect consumer interests, but that the few consumer groups with a presence in Washington are unable to participate in more than a very few of these determinations. The agencies, charged with obtaining input from all sides, in fact hear almost exclusively from industries and industry groups, and they quite naturally turn to these groups, with whom they have established working relationships over the years, for technical advice as well as for suggestions on the wording of regulations. Moreover, the right to judicial review of agency actions is often a hollow one unless there is participation at the level of agency proceedings where the factual record is made. At present, industry interests utterly dominate this fact-finding process.

This is not a charge of governmental corruption, nor do the proponents believe that the problem could be cured by higher ethical standards. Instead, it is a problem of structure—they argue that a new institution is needed to discover what proceedings are about to be initiated in host agencies, to determine consumer protection priorities, and to provide consumer input to regulators who in many cases would be delighted to hear more than one viewpoint.
Appendix A describes a number of examples of specific instances in which an ACA might have been able to influence an agency decision in a way helpful to consumers. One such example follows:

In August 1976, FEA proposed to ratify practices by refiners which FEA acknowledged to be illegal, whereby refiners have recovered more than $1.3 billion in costs in violation of FEA regulations. The refiners claimed that they had made a "good faith" error, and FEA accepted their arguments and initiated proceedings to grant a class exception to the regulation that had been violated. When a Congressional subcommittee protested and a consumer organization threatened suit, FEA decided to schedule individual proceedings to consider refiner "hardship" on a case-by-case basis, a procedure which effectively assures that no representatives of consumers can participate due to the expense and protracted nature of such proceedings.

Those Opposed - Organizations which testified in 1975 in opposition to the creation of an ACA included: the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Retail Federation, the Gas Appliances Manufacturers Association, Gulf Oil, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Milk Producers Federation. Clearly, many other business groups oppose the ACA idea as well.

Those opposed to the proposal tend to make the following arguments:

Contradictory Consumer Interests. It is argued that the concept of "the interests of consumers" is illusory and misleading because consumers may have opposing viewpoints (a classic example is the debate
over mandatory seat belts). Therefore, the ACA will inevitably speak in the name of "consumers", but will in fact oppose the views of some consumers.

Cost. After an initial startup period, most versions of the ACA proposal envision an annual appropriation of $30 million. Some oppose this expenditure; others oppose the creation of any new federal agency. Also, costs in host agencies may be increased as a result of additional input. Since an ACA would necessarily be staffed by relatively wellpaid professionals (primarily lawyers, economists and policy analysts), the projected level of authorizations would buy relatively few ACA interventions. This, it is argued, would lead to pressures for budgetary expansion and/or ACA interventions based upon inadequate expertise and technical competence.

Delay. Because contested proceedings tend to be more time-consuming than uncontested ones, the ACA would delay agency proceedings. Major investment projects would sometimes be held up, creating much additional expense. (A one-year delay in startup for a nuclear energy plant costs some $300 million.)

Further Unnecessary Bureaucracy. Existing regulatory agencies were designed to protect consumers,
and that is often their legal mandate. If they fail to do so, what reason is there to expect that the ACA will do any better? Since the new Administration is sympathetic to consumer interests, a more sensible approach is to make the existing agencies function better, rather than creating another bureaucracy.

Unfairness. It is unfair to a business defendant in a government proceeding to have both the regulatory agency and the ACA ganging up on that defendant, particularly if the two agencies take inconsistent positions. This unfairness is especially great where a small business is the defendant.

Consumers Are Already Represented. It is argued that consumer interests are indirectly represented in many or most agency proceedings by business interests which coincide with consumer interests (e.g., importers, in International Trade Commission proceedings).

DECIDING HOW TO CREATE THE ACA

How quickly and hard should the Administration press for the creation of the ACA?

Assuming that he has decided to create an ACA, the President-elect can either take the initiative and, working with Congress and
others interested in the idea, push for his own strong ACA legis­
lation early in the new session of Congress or he can permit
Congressional supporters of the ACA to advance their own versions
while providing moderate White House support and during the session
input. These might be called, respectively, the "high priority"
and "moderate priority" options.

The advantages of the high priority option are these:

--It would redeem a campaign promise to introduce
such a bill early in the Administration.

--It would give the administration a relatively
"safe" component for its first legislative program.
Since the bill has been under active consideration
for six years, it is unlikely that someone will
discover a major flaw that could embarrass the
Administration. Further, this is one of the few
highly visible new programs that the Administration
could sponsor at the very outset that does
not involve a large appropriation.

--The prospects for enactment of the bill are
brighter during the Administration's "honeymoon";
indeed, industry opponents of the bill will probably
be resigned to the bill's quick passage after the
election, but they might regroup for another battle
if substantial delay suggests ambivalence by the Administration.

--An early success here would help build political credibility and legislative momentum.

--The Administration may feel unable to press other consumer initiatives as long as it is negotiating for the passage of this legislation.

--Getting the ACA in place quickly would help to establish a proconsumer tone for the administration and a sensitivity on the part of its appointees and other officials to consumer interests.

--The President will gain more public "credit" if the Administration presses the bill actively instead of simply responding to Congressional initiatives. At the same time, it is essential to be sensitive to the fact that this legislation has been entirely a Congress-initiated project since its inception in the late 1960's. A number of Congressional figures, such as Senators Ribicoff and Percy and Congressman Rosenthal, have devoted an enormous amount of time and resources to the bill. Unless the Administration is careful to share both initiative and credit with Congress, enactment of an Administration ACA bill could leave a residue of bruised feelings.
It is unlikely (under either option) that the Carter Administration will want simply to reintroduce the legislation developed in the 94th Congress—for three reasons. First, the Administration will have its own position on the current policy controversies, and it may want to add an entirely new section or two to the basic legislation (see the section of this memorandum on Design Issues, below). Second, the bill was watered down in the 94th Congress in order to obtain every possible vote so that a veto could be overridden in the House (e.g., the Department of Agriculture was partly exempted); the change in Administrations should occasion reconsideration of these decisions. Third, the Administration will surely want to make its own decisions on some of the interstitial, low-level policy concerns that were resolved by particular language in the draft of the 1976 version of the bill. Developing the Administration's own version (including obtaining as much consensus as possible from legislative sponsors and constituency groups) will take several months, the exact number depending on how many stages of review the Administration desires and how much discretion it is willing to delegate to the person principally responsible for the task.
There are several advantages to letting this work proceed less rapidly than would be possible under the high priority approach:

--Having legislation ready by January or February would mean that at least the early negotiations and drafting would have to proceed without the participation of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs (and/or ACA Administrator-designate?). The President-elect could assign this preliminary work to his transition staff and/or to a special appointee, who might or might not be the Special Assistant-designate. Such a special appointee would be the Administrator-Apparent unless this possibility were explicitly ruled out.

--The Administration might want to postpone action on the ACA until it had decided how best to organize the government's several consumer agencies. (However, since the ACA's core role as outside advocate suggests that it should be independent, this may not be a serious problem.)

--The Administration will want to work closely with the ACA's Congressional sponsors in developing this legislation. This is more difficult when Congress is in recess. Even once Congress reconvenes, given the strong leadership Congress has provided on this issue, the Administration might decide to leave certain decisions entirely to its legislative sponsors.
Whether the President-elect decides to proceed rapidly or slowly, he should take care not to over-sell the ACA. The ACA's small staff can only argue and litigate; it will have no direct power to change anything. It will have to face long complex proceedings in a wide range of areas, and it may not always attract only rare first class talent.

Appendix B lists the Congressional Committees that have been handling the ACA legislation and their chairpersons, key members and key staff.

DESIGN ISSUES

This section discusses the major policy choices which must be made in drafting/negotiating the Administration's ACA legislation. The issues covered include: the degree of independence appropriate for the ACA; the ACA's power to seek judicial review of agency decisions; its information-gathering powers; its power to disclose information to the public; the extent of its jurisdiction; grants-in-aid to state and local governments by the ACA; the possible introduction of complimentary ombudsmen; whether the ACA should handle consumer complaints; the treatment of President Ford's recently established alternative consumer offices; the ACA's budget; and a possible "sunset" provision for the new agency.
Independence

The bills are not clear on the extent to which the ACA would be independent of the President. The Senate bill gives the Administrator a 4-year term coterminous with that of the President; the House bill simply states that he or she shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Neither discusses whether he or she merely serves at the pleasure of the President or may be discharged only for cause, but the Senate's formulation is thought by some to limit the President's power to fire. Both bills describe the ACA as an "independent agency" in the executive branch.

Some argue that "independence" would encourage the ACA to drift, to find political support elsewhere (as in the Congress or among the more influential consumer advocates), and to be unaccountable to any political authority. Since much of the problem which gave rise to the ACA has resulted from the "independence" of the major regulatory agencies from political control, it might compound the problem by setting one of the solutions to the problem (the ACA) adrift as well. Since the President tends to be held accountable by the public for the performance of the agencies anyway, the argument runs, he should be able to exercise control over those agencies; responsibility and accountability should not be divided.
Others (particularly Ralph Nader) argue that the ACA should not represent the views of the President (except insofar as the President selects the Administrator), but should represent the views of "consumers" which, unlike the President's views, are not adequately brought before the agencies. Some also argue that the more independent an agency is from the President, the more he can immunize himself from criticism for its performance, much as Ford has attempted to do regarding the "independents."

The options, then, relate primarily to the duration of the Administrator's term, whether the term is coterminous with that of the President, whether he or she serves at the pleasure of the President or may be discharged only for cause, and whether the ACA may represent itself in court. It is likely in any event that Congress would insist upon submission of ACA budget requests and communications to the relevant committee, as well as to OMB.

Several other important considerations will flow from the "independence" decision. First, the more the ACA is structured as an agency independent of the President, the more the President will need to retain a consumer affairs spokesperson, however described. An independent ACA cannot speak for the President on the Hill, before other agencies, or to private sector organizations; indeed, the ACA may often take contrary positions on consumer issues. Second, the decision on independence may well determine the location of the ACA in the Federal establishment. If the ACA is to be an "independent agency", it cannot be located
within an existing department, and its intervention functions would appear to preclude locating it in the FTC or any other regulatory agency. No recent version of the legislation has located it within an existing agency.

The Power to Seek Judicial Review

There are a variety of issues relating to the circumstances under which the ACA can initiate or intervene in court proceedings involving agency actions or refusals to act. The Senate and House bills differed somewhat on these issues, and it may be that the Administration would wish to expand the powers of the ACA beyond those conferred in the House and Senate bills. To select one example, under the House bill, the ACA may not intervene in agency enforcement proceedings, while the Senate version permits such intervention as a matter of right.

The options here relate to various possible burdens of proof, procedural prerequisites, and the like which must be met before the ACA can go to court. These are not fundamental policy issues, but rather natural "trading points" which may help in winning needed legislative support.

Information Gathering Powers

Under both bills, the ACA could direct interrogatories to businesses above a certain size (the House bill defines "small
business" more narrowly) if no agency proceeding is pending; when a proceeding is pending and the ACA has intervened, the ACA can request the "host" agency to issue subpoenas and the host agency must ordinarily do so.

Since no one can reasonably dispute the ACA's need to obtain data from business if it is to perform its role, the only questions are whether it may do so directly or only through another agency, how its data requests are to be enforced, and whether and to what extent "small business" should be exempt from such requests. Again, the options are infinite and no fundamental policy issues are at stake, so long as the procedures are not too burdensome and the ACA's date requests are enforceable.

Information Disclosure By the ACA

Under the Freedom of Information Act, agencies generally have the power to disclose information that qualifies for an exemption from mandatory disclosure. The House bill would deny this discretion to the ACA. Business groups are particularly concerned about disclosure of trade secrets or other competitive information.

Exemption From the ACA's Jurisdiction

The number of exemptions of certain agencies and issues from being the subject of ACA intervention has risen and fallen as
political support for the ACA has waned and waxed. The Senate bill now exempts proceedings involving weapons, the Alaska pipeline, FCC license renewals, most labor disputes, agriculture, and fish. The House bill contains somewhat narrower agricultural exemptions, as well as one for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

With the possible exception of the exemption for labor disputes (about which consumer groups are not concerned and which is politically required), none of the present exemptions can really be justified in principle, and simply reflected political realities during the 94th Congress. The options in this regard are of course numerous, but consumer organizations feel strongly that the existing exemptions, particularly those relating to food policy, must be eliminated or narrowed. Each of the exemptions is politically sensitive and much negotiation will be required to effect changes in them.

Grants-in-Aid

Earlier versions of the ACA bill included a title under which the agency would administer a modest program of grants to state consumer protection agencies. This feature was deleted from the 94th Congress bill for political reasons. A Carter Administration, committed to reducing the distance between citizens and government, might wish to restore to the ACA legislation its now-deleted provisions for grants in-aid to state and local consumer protection agencies. The grants could give the recipients much freedom in
choosing the precise uses to which the money would be put; the old provisions permitted the money to be spent for study of existing consumer laws and programs, consumer law enforcement, consumer education, and the development of innovative consumer programs. Or the uses of the federal funds might be more limited. Senator Ribicoff's 1973 version of the ACA bill contemplated an authorization of twenty to forty million dollars per year for this grant program.

The argument in favor of such a grant program is that most consumer problems (other than those affected by national regulation) are local in nature, and are best handled at the local level. This is particularly true of law enforcement; violations of consumers' rights are investigated with far greater efficiency by most state agencies than by the Federal Trade Commission, with its cumbersome procedures. At the same time, a small amount of funds can produce a fairly substantial impact in this field; all of the innovative programs that brought acclaim to Bess Myerson in New York City cost less than one million dollars.

On the other hand, such a program would cost tens of millions of dollars, and a broad program (one that gave the states much discretion as to the use of the funds) might include some waste by recipients that did not use the funds well.
Furthermore, it might be preferable to expand the regional office program of the Federal Trade Commission, and to give those regional offices more authority, rather than rely on state and local governments. (This option is discussed in detail in the briefing/options papers, dealing with federal regulation of consumer transactions and with the FTC.)

The bill might provide instead for a grant-in-aid program restricted to the development of small claims courts and similar dispute resolution mechanisms. Most of the work on designing such a program has already been done, in the form of the Consumer Controversies Resolution Act, which passed the Senate in 1976. Such a restricted grant program would have several advantages.

It would probably be less costly in both the short run and the long run than a general consumer protection grant program; the 1976 grant legislation contemplated an authorization level of $5 million in the first year, rising to $20 million in the second year, not more than ten percent of which could be spent for federal administration. And if any consumer program is non-controversial, this is it: business and the consumer both benefit from reducing the cost of complaint resolution.

The only disadvantage to the proposal, aside from its added cost, is that more drafting work is necessary; the Senate Commerce Committee staff concedes that the section of the bill setting forth standards for awarding grants in particular, needs to be
reworked. By contract, the 1973 proposal for grants for general consumer purposes is ready to go. However, the amount of time necessary to perfect the small claims legislation is probably not great.

Ombudsman

Rather than create the type of complaint-handling function envisioned by S.200, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) has suggested a different option: Adding a new section to the ACA bill to create in every major federal agency and department an ombudsman office, which would process complaints made against that agency. (The Democratic Party platform supports the creation of such an office.)

CFA supports this option with the following arguments:

--ACA legislation has been pending for six years. Congress is tired of the proposal and may not enact it, even with Presidential support, unless some new, exciting rider is added to make the bill more attractive. (This seems to be CFA's principal argument for tacking the Ombudsman concept onto the ACA bill.)

--Studies show that many federal agencies are not responding well to complaints from citizens; ombudsman's
offices could improve their responsiveness, an objective of the ACA as well.

These arguments cut against the ombudsman proposal:

CFA may be wrong in its political judgment; Presidential support may be all that would be necessary to pass the ACA bill early in the session, and tacking on a new, untried concept might bog the ACA bill down in months of hearings.

Even if the ombudsman concept is excellent, it is not directly related to the ACA's core advocacy function. It should be considered separately on its own merits, and not as a section of an already complex bill.

--No new legislation is needed to create agency ombudsmen; they can be created by executive or agency orders. Presumably, most agency heads in a Carter Administration would wish to create them anyway, and the cost of such units would be very small relative to their agency budgets. If created by statute, the cost of such offices would be more visible and would be more likely to compete with ACA funds.
--Creation of dozens of Ombudsman offices will cost a substantial amount of money, perhaps more than the ACA has presently contemplated.

--Drafting the necessary legislation may be complicated, and might be inconsistent with the "high priority" strategy, described above, or presenting a Carter ACA bill to Congress shortly after Inauguration.

--Possibly the Ombudsman's office should be centralized, rather than decentralized throughout the government; possibly it should be an arm of Congress, like the GAO. These and other questions require thorough study.

If the Administration deemed it desirable to signal, at an early time, its commitment to the Ombudsman concept, without stalling the ACA bill, it might be possible to include in the ACA bill a section creating a commission to study and report on the various possible versions of a federal Ombudsman's office. Alternatively, the bill might impose standards (e.g., independence, staffing, funding, etc.) which must be met by any agency that decides to establish such an office.
Handling Consumer Complaints

An extremely important issue is whether or not an agency that has the two functions of developing the executive and legislative consumer program, and of representing consumer interests in other agencies, should have the additional function of receiving and transmitting consumer complaints. Section 7 of S.200 provides that when the Administrator receives complaints from consumers, he or she shall transmit them to the respondent and to pertinent federal, state or local agencies for their action; furthermore, the Administrator shall maintain a public document room with an indexed listing of such complaints (with respondents' comments). This provision carries forward the complaint referral function of the Office of Consumer Affairs, with the added twist of public exposure.

The question of the ACA's complaint-handling role has not received the attention that its importance warrants. The following arguments are adduced in favor of formalizing the ACA's complaint processing functions:

(1) there should be a single central depot for consumer complaints against Federal agencies;

(2) the ACA could better structure its priorities and positions through analysis of consumer complaints; and
(3) Congress wants some place to send the flood of mail it receives.

The arguments against a formalized ACA complaint-handling function are probably more persuasive. (It is significant that major consumer organizations oppose such a function for the ACA.) Thus:

(1) since the ACA can only refer complaints anyway, encouraging consumers to complain to ACA will only create red tape and delay in the response to the complaints, which will only exacerbate consumer frustration and delay and therefore hinder the efforts of other agencies;

(2) the ACA's priorities and positions cannot realistically be based on complaint letters, and in any event, the ACA can always examine and analyze the complaint files of other agencies;

(3) because of argument (1) above, ACA complaint-handling will only anger Congress and make the ACA a lightning rod for Congressional criticism;

(4) the provision for indexing complaints and responses from business will be costly in terms of paperwork, and unfair; and
(5) perhaps most important, formalized complaint-handling would swallow up scarce agency resources, and to little avail. This phenomenon almost destroyed the FTC's effectiveness in the 1960's.

President Ford's Consumer Offices

The Administration must decide whether or not it wishes to abolish the many other federal consumer affairs offices by legislation. The House version of the ACA bill would have eliminated 16 named consumer offices and six named advisory committees now located in other agencies and would have transferred their appropriations to the ACA. OMB would also have been required to consider transferring 17 other named consumer offices and perhaps others as well. It is estimated that the transferred funds would provide a substantial part of the appropriation needed by the ACA (although if ombudsmen are set up in each agency, some of the transferred functions will have to be re-created in the transferor agencies). The Senate version of the bill did not contain such a provision.

The advantage of the eliminate-and-transfer-funds approach is obvious: the ACA bill ceases to be one which merely creates a new federal agency; it becomes instead one that replaces at least sixteen federal offices with a single office. On the other hand, some of these offices may do some useful work that the ACA would or could not perform and a more patient case-by-case examination
might be preferable. Some abolition of these offices could be
effectuated by Executive Order after enactment of the ACA bill.
Other options discussed above in the section on handling of
consumer complaints are also relevant here.

Perhaps the simplest option would be to require the ACA to
review the performances of these offices and make recommendations
to the President as to what should be done with each such office.
This would not only avoid another legislative issue and provide
time for study of the question, but it would assist the ACA in its
work by creating incentives for the other agencies to cooperate
with ACA, if only to reduce its criticism of them.

ACA's Budget and Life Expectancy

The House bill would authorize $10 million for the first two
years, and would abolish the agency after 7 years. The Senate
bill would authorize $15, $20, and $25 million for the first three
years, and has no expiration date for the agency. These are very
modest levels of funding (particularly since actual appropriations
would probably be even less), reflect no more than the political
realities during the 94th Congress, and would prevent the ACA from
participating in more than a relatively small number of pro-
ceedings. This is especially true since a large proportion of
ACA's employees will be lawyers, economists, and policy analysts,
persons at relatively high salary levels.
OTHER OPTIONS
OTHER OPTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING CONSUMER ADVOCACY

In addition to - or in lieu of - supporting creating of an ACA, the President-elect may wish to consider other models for encouraging expanded advocacy of consumer interests.* We review three of these models:

In-House Advocates

Under this option the agency would provide its own in-house consumer advocates. These staff members, unlike the consumer ombudsmen (see page 27) who would simply handle complaints, would perform advocacy and representational functions in the agency's legal proceedings. The ICC and CAB have recently created such offices.

This approach has several advantages:

(1) An internal advocate would have greater expertise in the complex technical issues handled by some agencies since it would concentrate its resources in one area.

*The administration could aid consumer representation in a variety of other ways as well. It could reduce filing and copy fees, take a more active responsibility for notice proceedings, facilitate consumer access to technical data, support class action enabling legislation, etc.
(2) It could develop a more systematic and consistent intervention strategy than public interest groups or even a consumer agency that intervened only from time to time could.

(3) It would stick with agency issues even when they were unfashionable, although the dangers of cooption during such periods would rise.

(4) It could identify potential problems more rapidly than outsiders.

(5) It could identify and develop on-going relations with interests that would probably otherwise not organize or be represented.

The weaknesses of this approach have the same roots as its strengths. Its expertise, consistency, and representational advantages all come at the sacrifice of independence. Even if separately budgeted, there will always be the high probability that such internal advocates will be co-opted by the more "main line" parts of the agency due to social and professional pressures. Even if this does not in fact occur, the significant risk that it will impair its credibility.

Creating such in-house public counsel offices would not require new legislation in most cases. However, legislation would
generally be required to set these offices up as independent entities and/or to give them the power to litigate cases in court. (The Congress recently created such an office in the ICC, the Office of Rail Public Counsel, which can take the ICC to court. The Director of this Office is a Presidential appointee; the position is now vacant.)

**Agency Reimbursement of Private Participants**

Another less institutionalized way of promoting participation is for the agencies to pay the costs incurred by private organizations that intervene in their proceedings on behalf of broad public interests. Most agencies have the authority to make such expenditures now, though few do. (Legislation would clarify and expand such authority.)

The FTC, under recent statutory authority, has been conducting such a reimbursement program for more than a year, with apparent success. During the first year, it awarded $500,000 to small business, consumer, and other underrepresented groups for participation in its trade regulation rule proceedings. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has similarly reimbursed consumer groups for helping to develop safety standards. During the 94th Congress hearings were held on legislation (S.2715, the "Kennedy-Mathias bill") that would extend such financial support to participation in the proceedings (and subsequent court appeals) of other agencies.
This approach is "non-bureaucratic": it creates no new agencies or units within agencies. Instead, it facilitates participation by citizen groups directly. If done well, such an approach would allow independent and relatively vigorous self-representation. Public interest groups generally favor this approach to that of an in-house advocate.

The approach has, however, certain apparent vulnerabilities. If no committed and competent group seeks to represent an interest, the interest can easily remain unrepresented. De facto the agency may have to stimulate citizen group involvement.

Because of the importance of agency initiative, and because the agency decides who gets reimbursed, the agency can pretty well determine both which interests can be represented before it and how competently. Weak or captured agencies, i.e., those that need effective outside representation the most, are most likely to abuse this power. Even when acting in good faith, agency administrators will find it difficult to determine which would-be advocate should be awarded what proportion of the available advocacy budget.

Such discretion could be lodged in one or more neutral third parties (including, perhaps, the ACA), but this approach might prove cumbersome and would not avoid the necessity to exercise judgment. Finally if the government's experience with contracting for consulting services is any guide, care will have to be taken in
the design of any such grant program to tie the award to the advocate's performance. Third party grantors will find such judgments difficult to make without investing a good deal of effort.

The Carter Administration could require selective executive branch agencies to adopt such a reimbursement program without seeking specific legislative authority. It could exhort the independent agencies to do the same, or it could help sponsor legislation that would require them to do so. It could also support the enactment of S.2715, or a variant thereupon, if it decided to press for a more comprehensive and uniform reimbursement scheme.

Tax Credits For Advocacy Contributions

Giving individual citizens a tax credit for contributing up to $2.00 or $5.00 to any accredited group's Advocacy Fund would create an entirely independent source of funding for public advocacy. Moreover, each advocate would have to satisfy its citizen constituency both that it was working in their interest and that it was being effective in doing so. And, since a credit has equal value to all taxpayers, the public advocates' clientele would be broadly based.

This approach requires no government intervention or discretionary judgments. Having citizens, not bureaucratic sur-
rogates, as clients would sharpen public interest advocacy and ensure that it responded quickly to changing needs. It would also assist the growth of new public interest organizations.

However, such an increase in independence inevitably means lessened government control. Liberal as well as conservative, religious as well as secular, and unsympathetic as well as sympathetic advocates will appear. Moreover, once in a while, a well-funded advocate may choose to fight an agency more vigorously than the agency would like or probably allow if it had control of the advocate's budget. Moreover, such tax expenditures have budgetary implications that are as real, and at least initially less predictable than, direct expenditures for ACA representation.

**Linking The Options**

Ensuring adequate, independent, competent and quickly adaptive representation for consumer (and others) that are now under-represented in the government's regulatory decision-making processes is an important objective. Although the Agency for Consumer Advocacy probably deserves the most immediate attention (taking into account the extensive consideration already given to the idea, legislative ripeness, and campaign commitments), all four options could probably make useful contributions toward achieving this objective. They are complements more than alternatives.
The in-house advocate can develop an in depth understanding of complex technical areas and of long, slow, complicated cases that outsiders, be they in or outside the government, will be hard-pressed to match. If there is a healthy public interest advocacy of all persuasions and types, again both in and outside the government, in-house advocates will feel much more willing to take risks than they would if their only future career prospects were in their host agency. Both ACA and agency in-house advocates will, moreover, be more likely to retain an active and adaptive citizen-orientation if they must compete for press coverage, professional acclaim, and constituency favor with a large, independent private citizen advocacy community.
STAFFING/APPOINTMENTS
STAFFING

The President has only two major staffing decisions in connection with ACA: (1) who should be appointed as Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs (and Director of the Office of Consumer Affairs in HEW) to carry out the drafting/negotiation functions, and (2) who should be nominated to the ACA Administrator position, once it has been created. Once the Administrator is selected, he or she should have considerable influence in determining who should be nominated to be Deputy Administrator of the ACA.

As discussed above, these two decisions are interrelated; the President must decide what the relationship between the Special Assistant and the ACA Administrator should be, or whether they should be the same person.

Here, the President has three options. He can say nothing until the ACA law is passed, preserving his option to appoint his Special Assistant as ACA Administrator or to select a different nominee. In this case, many people will assume that the Special Assistant is a candidate, but no one will be certain. Or the President could make it known when appointing a Special Assistant that he intended to nominate that Assistant as ACA Administrator. Finally, the President could elect to select as Special Assistant a person who rules himself or herself out as a candidate for ACA Administrator; that is, a person who will serve for only a few
months while pressing for enactment of the bill, and who will then leave office when the Office of Consumer Affairs is abolished.

Since the skills of the two jobs are similar (both officials will draft legislative or regulatory language, negotiate with consumer and business interests, and advocate consumer positions), the choice among these options must be made on other grounds. Saying nothing has the advantage of not confusing the issue of support for the legislation with support for the candidate; that is, a legislator who did not like the Special Assistant could still vote for the bill without being certain that he or she was voting to confirm the candidate.

It should be noted, though, that the Consumer Federation of America has recently expressed support for the third option—the interim public servant. It apparently fears that even the possibility that the Special Assistant will be appointed to the position of Administrator might cause the legislation to be defeated.

Against the CFA position, three arguments can be made. First success or failure of the bill is unlikely to turn on this particular ad hominem issue; indeed, if the Special Assistant proved to be someone who could command the respect of those who have traditionally opposed the bill, the possibility of continuance in office might even help enactment. Second, it might be difficult to attract to the job the best possible person if the reward for doing
the job well were disqualification for promotion. Finally, the Special Assistant's job should not be thought of primarily in symbolic terms; the selection should not be made on the basis of who will and will not alienate legislative support (although that is obviously a factor). The function of the Special Assistant during his or her short tenure will be not only to bring matters to a point where the bill is voted up or down, but to work on the details of the legislation, making perhaps daily decisions on language and compromise proposals. The Administrator, subsequently, may have to live with the decisions and compromises made by the Special Assistant, and it may be that those decisions will be made more sensitively if the Special Assistant believes that there is at least a possibility that he or she will have to administer the law as it is finally enacted.

The criteria for both positions seem reasonably straightforward. The person or persons selected should be lawyers, so that they can make personal decisions on the finest details of legislative or regulatory proposals. They should be persons highly respected by the consumer movement; indeed, S.200 requires that the ACA Administrator be "an individual who by reason of training, experience and attainments is exceptionally qualified to represent the interests of consumers". At the same time, they should be persons who are not "red flags" to the business community, preferably persons who are perceived by industry spokespersons as reasonable and pragmatic. They should also be persons who have or can gain the respect of the other agencies notwithstanding the
adversarial relationship that will often exist between them. Legislative drafting and negotiating experience is highly desirable; as in the case of most appointments, good judgment and unquestioned integrity rank high among the list of qualifications.
APPENDIX A

The following list of specific instances in which an ACA might have been able to influence an agency in a way helpful to consumers was compiled, for the most part, by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen.

--The Department of Transportation failed for seven years to issue standards to improve the crash survivability of school busses despite numerous Congressional requests. This failure finally necessitated Congressional enactment of statutory deadlines requiring DOT action.

--The Federal Energy Office (FEO) raised the maximum profit margin for gasoline retailers from 8 cents to 11 cents per gallon during the early months of 1974 to compensate them for a reduction in sales caused by government allocation. But when gasoline sales returned to normal, the FEO failed to roll back the maximum profit margin to 8 cents.

--A 1975 Report by the Comptroller General of the United States found that the Food and Drug Administration did not comply with its own procedures to independently investigate the cause of a recall of cardiac pacemakers by manufacturers. The common defect in the pacemakers was a leakage of body fluids through the plastic seal of the pacemaker causing short circuiting. The FDA did not give adequate consideration to possible alternatives and still has not issued any standards to deal with this problem.
--Interstate Commerce Commission regulations which require trucks to return empty from delivery, to make mandatory often out of the way stops, and which allow companies to cooperate in rate-setting, have been estimated to cost consumers several billion dollars yearly. The trucking industry has little incentive to argue with the ICC because it passes these costs on to consumers who have no direct representation in ICC rate-setting activities.

--Under the 1974 railroad reform legislation, the ICC is required to issue guidelines defining "market dominance" which, if found to exist, authorizes the ICC to suspend rate reductions filed by railroads. The ICC has defined "market dominance" so broadly and rigidly that it has effectively eliminated the rate flexibility and price competition that Congress wished to encourage. The Council on Wage and Price Stability protested this action, but no consumer organizations were involved in the proceeding.

--An FEA regulation permitted oil refiners to collect increased oil costs twice. This practice which has been dubbed "double dipping" might have eventually led to $332 million in consumer over-charges. After 6 months this loophole was discovered and eliminated, but only after a consumer organization threatened suit.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
APPENDIX B
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*

(Involved in drafting the ACA Legislation)

SENATE

Committee on Government Operations
Chairman: Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.), 244-2823
Ranking Minority Member: Charles Percy (R-Ill.), 244-2152
Key Staff: Richard Wegman, Matt Schneider, 244-4751

HOUSE

Committee on Government Operations
Chairman: Jack Brooks (D-Tex.), 225-6565
Ranking Minority Member: Frank Horton (R-N.Y.), 255-4916
Key Staff: William Jones, 255-5051

Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security
Chairman: Jack Brooks (D-Tex.), 255-6565
Ranking Minority Member: Frank Horton (R-N.Y.), 255-4916
Key Staff: Elmer Henderson, 225-5147

Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs
Chairman: Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.), 255-2601
Ranking Minority Member: Garry Brown (R-Mich.), 255-5011
Key Staff: Peter Barash, 255-4407

While Mr. Brooks' subcommittee held hearings on the bill, Mr. Rosenthal used his position, as both chairman of the Consumer Subcommittee and a member of Mr. Brooks' subcommittee, to play a most influential role in drafting the legislation.

*The bill was not assigned to the Appropriations Committee because it was not enacted into law.


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Committees


Finance (4th). Subcommittees: Energy; Health; International Trade (Chairman); Social Security Financing.

Joint Economic Committee (4th, Senate Side). Subcommittees: Consumer Economics; Economic Growth; International Economics; Priorities and Economy in Government; Urban Affairs.

Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) No-Knock AGN 8) Gov Abortion Aid FOR 15) Consumer Prot Agy FOR
2) Busing FOR 9) Cut Mil Brass ABS 16) Forced Psych Tests FOR
3) No Fault FOR 10) Gov Limousine AGN 17) Fed Campaign Subs FOR
4) F-111 FOR 11) RR Featherbed FOR 18) Rhod Chrome Ban FOR
5) Death Penalty FOR 12) Handgun License FOR 19) Open Legis Meetings FOR
6) Foreign Aid FOR 13) Less Troop Abroad FOR 20) Strikers Food Stamps AIS
7) Filibuster AGN 14) Resume Turk Aid AGN 21) Gov Info Disclosure FOR

Election Results

1974 general: Abraham A. Ribicoff (D) ..................... 125,215 (68%) ($435,985)
James H. Brannen III (R) ......................... 60,017 (32%) ($66,162)
1974 primary: Abraham A. Ribicoff (D), nominated by convention
1968 general: Abraham A. Ribicoff (D) ..................... 655,043 (54%)
Edwin H. May, Jr. (R) ......................... 551,455 (46%)
Sen. John L. McClellan (D) Elected 1942, seat up 1978; b. Feb. 25, 1896, near Sheridan; home, Little Rock; studied law in father's office and admitted to Ark. bar in 1913; Baptist.


Committees

Appropriations (Chairman). Subcommittees: Defense (Chairman); Interior; Legislative; State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary; Treasury, U.S. Postal Service and General Government.

Government Operations (2d). Subcommittees: Reports, Accounting and Management; Intergovernmental Relations; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

The Judiciary (2d). Subcommittees: Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation; Criminal Laws and Procedures (Chairman); Constitutional Rights; Federal Charters, Holidays and Celebrations; Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights (Chairman).

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16) Forced Psych Tests AGN
17) Fed Campaign Subs AGN
18) Rhod Chrome Ban AGN
19) Open Legis Meetings AGN
20) Strikers Food Stmps AGN
21) Gov Info Disclosure AGN

Election Results

1972 general: John L. McClellan (D) ................. 386,398 (61%) ($516,573)
Wayne H. Babbitt (R) .......... 248,238 (39%) ($72,643)
1972 runoff: John L. McClellan (D) ................. 242,983 (52%)
David Pryor (D) ............... 224,262 (48%)
1972 primary: John L. McClellan (D) ................. 220,588 (45%)
David Pryor (D) ............... 204,058 (42%)
Ted Boswell (D) ............... 62,496 (13%)
Foster Johnson (D) ............ 6,358 (1%)
1966 general: John L. McClellan (D), unopposed


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Committees

Interior and Insular Affairs (Chairman). Subcommittees: Energy Research and Water Resources; Environment and Land Resources; Indian Affairs; Minerals, Materials and Fuels; Parks and Recreation.

Armed Services (3d). Subcommittees: Arms Control (Chairman); Military Construction Authorization; Preparedness Investigating; Tactical Air Power.


Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (2d, Senate Side). Subcommittees: Communities; ERDA, Nuclear Energy (Chairman); Legislation; National Security.

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Key Votes

1) No-Knock AGN 8) Gov Abortn Aid FOR 15) Consumer Prot Agy FOR
2) Busing FOR 9) Cut Mil Brass AGN 16) Forced Psych Tests FOR
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6) Foreign Aid FOR 13) Less Troop Abrd AGN 20) Strikers Food Stmps FOR
7) Filibuster AGN 14) Resume Turk Aid AGN 21) Gov Info Disclosure FOR

Election Results

1970 general: Henry M. Jackson (D) ......................... 879,385 (84%)
                          Charles W. Elicker (R) .................. 170,790 (16%)
1970 primary: Henry M. Jackson (D) .......................... 497,309 (84%)
                          Carl Maxey (D) ............................. 79,201 (13%)
                          Two others (D) .............................. 13,507 (2%)
1964 general: Henry M. Jackson (D) .......................... 875,950 (72%)
                          Lloyd J. Andrews (R) .................. 337,138 (28%)


Committees

Budget (Chairman).

Government Operations (4th). Subcommittees: Intergovernmental Relations (Chairman); Reports, Accounting and Management; Oversight Procedures.

Public Works (2d). Subcommittees: Environmental Pollution (Chairman); Economic Development; Transportation.

Group Ratings

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Election Results

1970 general: Edmund S. Muskie (D) ...................... 199,954 (62%)
              Neil S. Bishop (R) .......................... 123,906 (38%)
1970 primary: Edmund S. Muskie (D), unopposed
1964 general: Edmund S. Muskie (D) ...................... 253,511 (67%)
              Clifford G. McIntire (R) ...................... 127,040 (33%)


Committees

Government Operations (5th). Subcommittees: Intergovernmental Relations; Reports, Accounting and Management (Chairman).

Interior and Insular Affairs (3d). Subcommittees: Environment and Land Resources; Indian Affairs; Minerals, Materials and Fuels (Chairman).

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Election Results

1972 general: Lee Metcalf (D) ........................................ 163,609 (52%) ($136,551)
Henry S. Hibbard (R) ............................................. 151,316 (48%) ($286,748)
1972 primary: Lee Metcalf (D) ........................................ 106,491 (86%)
Jerome Peters (D) ................................................ 16,729 (14%)
1966 general: Lee Metcalf (D) ........................................ 138,166 (53%)
Tim Babcock (R) .................................................... 121,697 (47%)


Offices 6205 DSOB, 202-224-5744. Also 5th Floor, Frank Nelson Bldg., Birmingham 35203, 205-325-3449; and P.O. Box 3294, Montgomery 36109, 205-265-9507.

Committees

Agriculture and Forestry (4th). Subcommittees: Agricultural Credit and Rural Electrification; Agricultural Research and General Legislation (Chairman); Environment, Soil Conservation and Forestry; Rural Development.


Rules and Administration (4th). Subcommittees: Printing; Restaurant (Chairman).

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Election Results

1974 general: Jim Allen (D) 501,541 (96%) ($37,328)
Alvin Abercrombie (Prohib.) 21,749 (4%) ($1,428)
1974 primary: Jim Allen (D) 572,584 (83%)
John Taylor (D) 118,848 (17%)
1968 general: Jim Allen (D) 638,774 (70%)
Pery Hooper (R) 201,227 (22%)
Robert P. Schwenn (NDPA) 72,699 (8%)


Committees

Appropriations (14th). Subcommittees: Agriculture and Related Agencies; District of Columbia (Chairman); Foreign Operations; HUD and Independent Agencies; Interior; Labor and HEW.

Budget (7th).

Government Operations (7th). Subcommittees: Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency and Open Government (Chairman); Intergovernmental Relations; Oversight Procedures; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

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Election Results

1970 general: Lawton Chiles (D) ......................... 902,438 (54%)
William C. Cramer (R) ................................ 772,817 (46%)

1970 run-off: Lawton Chiles (D) ......................... 474,420 (66%)
Farris Bryant (D) ........................................ 247,211 (34%)

1970 primary: Farris Bryant (D) ......................... 240,222 (33%)
Lawton Chiles (D) ........................................ 188,300 (26%)
Fred Schultz (D) .......................................... 175,745 (24%)
Al Hastings (D) .......................................... 91,948 (13%)
Joel T. Daves III (D) ................................... 33,939 (5%)


Offices 110 RSOB, 202-224-3521. Also Rm. 430, 275 Peachtree St. N.E., Atlanta 30303, 404-526-4811.

Committees

Armed Services (7th). Subcommittees: General Legislation; Manpower and Personnel; National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves; Tactical Air Power.

Budget (10th).

Government Operations (8th). Subcommittees: Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency and Open Government; Oversight Procedures (Chairman); Reports, Accounting and Management; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

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18) Rhod Chrome Ban AGN
19) Open Legis Meetings AGN
20) Strikers Food Stmps AGN
21) Gov Info Disclosure AGN

Election Results

1972 general: Sam Nunn (D) ........................................ 635,970 (54%) ($567,968)
Fletcher Thompson (R) ........................................... 542,331 (46%) ($444,635)
1972 run-off: San Nunn (D) ....................................... 326,186 (52%)
David H. Gambrell (D) ........................................... 299,919 (48%)
1972 primary: David Gambrell (D) ................................ 225,470 (31%)
Sam Nunn (D) ..................................................... 166,035 (23%)
S. Ernest Vandiver (D) ........................................... 147,135 (21%)
Twelve others (D) .................................................. 178,001 (25%)
Sen. John Glenn (D) Elected 1974, seat up 1980; b. July 18, 1921, Cambridge; home, Columbus; Muskingum Col., B.S. 1939; Presbyterian.


Offices 204 RSOB, 202-224-3353. Also 85 Marconi St., Columbus 43215, 614-469-6697.

Committees

The District of Columbia (4th).


Interior and Insular Affairs (7th). Subcommittees: Energy Research and Water Resources; Environment and Land Resources; Minerals, Materials and Fuels; Special Subcommittee on Integrated Oil Operations.

Group Ratings: Newly Elected

Key Votes

- 1) No-Knock NE
- 2) Busing NE
- 3) No Fault NE
- 4) F-111 AGN
- 5) Death Penalty NE
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- 17) Fed Campaign Subs NE
- 18) Rhod Chrome Ban NE
- 19) Open Legis Meetings NE
- 20) Strikers Food Stmps NE
- 21) Gov Info Disclosure NE

Election Results

- 1974 general: John H. Glenn, Jr. (D) ......................... 1,930,670 (65%) ($1,149,130)
- Ralph J. Perk (R) ............................................ 918,133 (31%) ($292,838)
- K. G. Harroff (Ind.) ...................................... 76,882 (3%) ($7,978)
- Richard B. Kay (Ind.) ...................................... 61,921 (2%) ($3,944)

- 1974 primary: John H. Glenn, Jr. (D) ......................... 571,871 (54%)
- Howard M. Metzenbaum (D) ......................... 480,123 (46%)


Offices 1200 DSOB, 202-224-2152. Also 219 S. Dearborn St., Suite 1860, Chicago 60604, 312-353-4952, and Old P.O. Bldg., Rm. 117, Springfield 62701, 217-525-4442.

Committees

Government Operations (Ranking Member). Subcommittees: Oversight Procedures; Reports, Accounting and Management; Permanent Subcommittees on Investigations.

Foreign Relations (5th). Subcommittees: Far Eastern Affairs; Multinational Corporations; Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Joint Economic Committee (2d, Senate Side). Subcommittees: Consumer Economics; Economic Growth; International Economics; Priorities and Economy in Government; Urban Affairs.

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Election Results

1972 general:  Charles H. Percy (R) ............................... 2,867,078 (62%) ($1,408,822)
                Roman Pucinski (D) .................................. 1,721,031 (38%) ($335,482)
1972 primary:  Charles H. Percy (R), unopposed
1966 general:  Charles H. Percy (R) ............................... 2,100,449 (56%)
                Paul H. Douglas (D) ................................. 1,678,147 (44%)
Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R) Elected 1956, seat up 1980; b. May 18, 1904, New York City; home, New York City; Columbia U., NYU, LL.B. 1926; Jewish.


Committees

Labor and Public Welfare (Ranking Member). Subcommittees: Alcoholism and Narcotics; Education; Employment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor; Health; Labor; Special Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities.

Foreign Relations (2d). Subcommittees: Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements; European Affairs; Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy; Personnel; Western Hemisphere Affairs.


Joint Economic Committee (Ranking Member, Senate Side). Subcommittees: Consumer Economics; Economic Growth; Economic Progress; International Economics; Urban Affairs.

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7) Filibuster AGN 14) Resume Turk Aid AGN 21) Gov Info Disclosure FOR

Election Results

1974 general: Jacob K. Javits (R-L) .................. 2,340,188 (46%) ($1,090,437)
Ramsey Clark (D) .................. 1,973,781 (38%) ($855,576)
Barbara A. Keating (C) ........... 822,584 (16%) ($192,462)

1974 primary: Jacob K. Javits (R-L), unopposed

1968 general: Jacob K. Javits (R-L) .................. 3,269,772 (50%)
Paul O'Dwyer (D) .................. 2,150,695 (33%)
James L. Buckley (C) ............ 1,139,402 (17%)


Committees


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17. Fed Campaign Subs AGN
18. Rhod Chrome Ban FOR
19. Open Legis Meetings FOR
20. Strikers Food Stmps AGN
21. Gov Info Disclosure FOR

### Election Results

1970 general: William V. Roth (R) ........................................ 96,021 (60%)  
Jacob W. Zimmerman (D) ........................................ 64,835 (40%)

1970 primary: William V. Roth (R), nominated by convention


Office 254 RSOB, 202-224-3344. Also Rm. 319, Main P.O. Bldg., Knoxville 37901, 615-523-0992, and 204 Fed. Bldg., Chattanooga 37402, 615-756-4250.

Committees

Finance (6th). Subcommittees: Health; International Finance and Resources; Revenue Sharing; Financial Markets.


Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) No-Knock AGN 8) Gov. Abortn Aid FOR 15) Consumer Prot Agy AGN
2) Busing AGN 9) Cut Mil Brass ABS 16) Forced Psych Tests AGN
3) No Fault AGN 10) Gov. Limousine ABS 17) Fed Campaign Subs AGN
4) F-111 FOR 11) RR Featherbed AGN 18) Rhod Chrome Ban AGN
5) Death Penalty FOR 12) Handgun License AGN 19) Open Legis Meetings FOR
6) Foreign Aid AGN 13) Less Troop Abrd AGN 20) Strikers Food Stmps AGN
7) Filibuster FOR 14) Resume Turk Aid FOR 21) Gov. Info Disclosure AGN

Election Results

1970 general: William E. Brock III (R) .................. 562,645 (52%)
               Albert Gore (D) .................. 519,858 (48%)
1970 primary: William E. Brock III (R) .................. 176,703 (75%)
               Tex Ritter (R) .................. 54,401 (23%)
               James Durellie Bolcs (R) ........ 4,942 (2%)


Offices 324 RSOB, 202-224-4041. Also 102 U.S. Court House, 915 Lafayette Blvd., Bridgeport 06603, 203-325-3866.

Committees

Commerce (5th). Subcommittees: Communications; Environment; Oceans and Atmosphere; Surface Transportation; Special Subcommittee to Study Textile Industry; Special Subcommittee on Freight Car Shortage; Special Subcommittee on Oil and Gas Production and Distribution.


Group Ratings

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Key Votes

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2) Busing FOR 9) Cut Mil Brass AGN 16) Forced Psych Tests AGN
3) No Fault FOR 10) Gov Limousine AGN 17) Fed Campaign Subs AGN
4) F-111 FOR 11) RR Featherbed FOR 18) Rhod Chrome Ban FOR
5) Death Penalty AGN 12) Handgun License AGN 19) Open Legis Meetings FOR
6) Foreign Aid AGN 13) Less Troop Abrd ABS 20) Strikers Food Stmps FOR
7) Filibuster FOR 14) Resume Turk Aid AGN 21) Gov Info Disclosure FOR

Election Results

1970 general: Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R) ...................... 443,008 (42%)
Joseph P. Duffey (D) ........................................ 360,094 (34%)
Thomas J. Dodd (Ind.) ....................................... 260,264 (24%)

1970 primary: Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R) .......................... 77,057 (60%)
John M. Lupton (R) ............................................ 50,657 (40%)
The 9th congressional district of Texas is the eastern segment of the state's Gulf Coast—an area of big refineries, petrochemical plants, and other factories. It is, in other words, an area dominated by heavy industry, and it has one of the highest concentrations of blue-collar workers in Texas. It is dominated by two urban centers of roughly equal size. On Galveston Bay, which leads into the Houston Ship Channel, are the cities of Galveston (pop. 61,000) and Texas City (pop. 38,000). Galveston, one of the oldest cities in Texas, is situated on a sand bar where the Bay empties into the Gulf of Mexico. It was the state's first port, but now handles far less tonnage than Houston or Texas City. The other major population center in the 9th lies around Beaumont (pop. 115,000) and Port Arthur (pop. 57,000). Like Galveston and Texas City, these are industrial towns dominated by the oil and petrochemical industries. The 9th also includes a small portion of Harris County and Houston.

Most of the residents of the district are migrants from the rural South. Some 22% of them are black; another 6% are Cajuns from nearby southern Louisiana. To a surprising extent the people here have retained populist, Democratic voting habits. These political attitudes are fostered by the Texas labor movement, which is stronger in the 9th than in just about any other part of the state. Though plenty of votes were cast here for George Wallace in 1968 (26%), Hubert Humphrey still carried the district. In 1972, George McGovern ran only 2% behind Humphrey's 1968 showing—the closest the South Dakotan came to matching the Minnesotan in any Texas congressional district. Also in 1972, the 9th was one of the few Texas districts to go for Democrat Borel Sanders over Republican Senator John Tower.

Before the 1965 redistricting, Galveston-Texas City and Beaumont-Port Arthur were in two separate districts. Congressman Clark Thompson, who served from 1933 to 1935 and from 1947 to 1967, represented the former and was a member of the Ways and Means Committee. As the elder of two incumbents thrown together by redistricting, Thompson decided to retire. His decision left the seat to Jack Brooks, who continues to occupy it. Brooks is a Texas Congressman in the Sam Rayburn tradition. He often, though not always, takes liberal positions on issues and stays close to the House leadership. His rather liberal voting record, especially his vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was noteworthy in the early 1960s, when his district included some east Texas rural counties akin to the Deep South.

As the third-ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, Brooks was an important part of the impeachment proceedings of 1974. There was little doubt where he stood. As Chairman of a Government Operations Subcommittee which had looked into the financing of the Nixon homes in San Clemente and Key Biscayne, he had sharply criticized the White House, to the discomfort of many Republicans; and he is by nature a partisan, aggressive man. In any case, Brooks voted for all five resolutions of impeachment, and was one of the main supporters of the unsuccessful move to impeach Nixon for misappropriation of government funds.

Only 30 when he was first elected to Congress in 1952, Brooks has finally moved into the positions of power he has long sought. He is now the number two member of Judiciary, in line for the chair if Peter Rodino should leave, and the Chairman of Government Operations. In that latter position, he is expected to lead aggressive investigations into what has been going on in the Executive Branch; if he does not share all the policy positions of the new Democratic freshmen, he is at least as aggressive as any of them.

Census Data: Pop. 466,678. Central city, 60%; suburban, 38%. Median family income, $9,344; families above $15,000: 17%; families below $3,000: 11%. Median years education, 11.5.

The Voters

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Presidential vote

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<td>1968</td>
<td>46,166 (42%)</td>
<td>61,422 (37%)</td>
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Committees

- Government Operations (Chairman), Subcommittees: Communications; Consumer Protection and Finance; Energy and Power.
- Judiciary (2d), Subcommittees: Monopolies and Commercial Law.

Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid | FOR | 6) Gov. Abortion Aid | AGN |
2) Busing | AGN | 7) Coed Phys Ed | AGN |
3) ABM | FOR | 8) Pov Lawyer Gag | AGN |
4) B-1 Bomber | FOR | 9) Pub Trans Sub | AGN |
5) Nerve Gas | FOR | 10) EZ Voter Regis | AGN |
6) Coed Phys Ed | AGN | 11) Pub Cong Election $ | AGN |
7) Turkish Arms Cutoff | AIB | 12) Agric Com | AGN |
8) Youlth Camp Regs | AGN | 13) Farm Bill Veto | AGN |
9) Pub Trans Sub | AGN | 14) Strip Mine Veto | AGN |
10) EZ Voter Regis | AGN | 15) Farm Bill Veto | AGN |

Election Results

1974 general: Jack Brooks (D), unopposed 37,725 (62%) ($79,023)
1974 primary: Jack Brooks (D) 22,935 (38%) ($12,805)
1972 general: Jack Brooks (D) 89,113 (62%) ($33,565)
1972 primary: Randolph Reed (R) 45,462 (34%) ($6,527)
The 3d district of California consists of most of the city of Sacramento and some of its suburbs. The site of Sutter's Fort, Sacramento has been an important urban center since the Gold Rush of 1849; today it is the largest city in the Central Valley, the much-irrigated and inescapably rich farmland north along the Sacramento River and south along the San Joaquin. Ever since the Gold Rush, Sacramento has been a Democratic stronghold. These days the preference can be seen as a function of the large number of public employees—federal and local as well as state—who like most of their kind are not displeased with the idea of big government. In fact, the 3d district has a higher proportion of public employees than all but four others in the nation: three suburban Washington districts and the state of Alaska. Moreover, Sacramento is one of the few American cities with staunchly Democratic newspapers—part of the McClatchy chain that also dominates journalism in Modesto and Fresno farther south in the Valley. As a result, Sacramento's Democratic voting habits are strong enough that this middle-class, middle-income district missed by just a hair going for George McGovern in 1972.

Naturally, the 3d sends a Democrat to Congress, and for the last 22 years he has been John E. Moss. Now past 60, Moss looks rather like the businessman he once was, and certainly nothing like a liberal young freshman. Yet for all those years he has been backing the causes and fighting the fights the new freshmen have just begun. That Moss was not an ordinary, moderate liberal Congressman became clear back in the late 1950s when he began sponsoring the Freedom of Information Act. Almost alone, Moss worked to force the government to give citizens access to the information their taxes pay for. There was no lobby battling for such legislation, no public demand or outcry—just John Moss. But finally, in the mid-sixties, FOIA passed. It has been somewhat disappointing to its backers, including Moss; the courts have tended to read the general rule narrowly instead of the exceptions. So far, the FOIA's chief beneficiary has been Ralph Nader and a few investigative reporters who have used it to ferret out information bureaucrats and political appointees would prefer being kept secret.

The independence and prickliness which kept Moss pressing for the FOIA when his own party was in control of the Executive Branch also prevented him from achieving any leadership position among House Democrats. But he has made his mark on the Commerce Committee. This body for years has been dominated by Congressmen sympathetic to the points of view of the businesses which their laws and the agencies they oversee are supposed to regulate. Not John Moss. As a subcommittee chairman in the 93d Congress, Moss took aim at what he considered abuses in the brokerage industry; he was also one of the leaders in the move to set up an independent Consumer Product Safety Commission, outside what he feels are industry-dominate regulatory agencies.

It is typical of Moss's bluntness that he was the first member of Congress to suggest, back in March 1973 as the Watergate mess was just breaking, that the House set up a procedure to pass on the impeachment of the President. Other, cooler heads said such talk was irresponsible; they were wrong and Moss was right. If the impeachment process had not been short-circuited by Nixon's resignation, television viewers would undoubtedly have been treated to Moss's loud, strident voice coming out of his stolid visage in denunciation of the man he had spotted long before as a criminal President.

With John Jarman of Oklahoma becoming a Republican early in 1975, Moss became the third-ranking Democrat on the Commerce Committee, but still, as the 94th Congress began, one with little real power. Freshmen votes changed that. Commerce was one of the committees with the largest infusion of new, liberal blood, and Moss ran against full committee Chairman Harley Staggers of West Virginia for the chairmanship of the Special Subcommittee on Investigations. This particular chair was a prize the Commerce subcommittee had as a budget large as all the other subcommittees put together. But Staggers, a pleasant, quiet man, had made little use of the staff resources and the subcommittee's jurisdiction over virtually every regulatory agency. Moss unseated Staggers comparatively easily, and can be expected to lead some scaring probes of federal agencies during the 94th Congress. It was, after all, promises of lenient treatment of business that netted the Nixon people so much of the tainted money they used in Watergate and related misdeeds; Moss will be on the lookout for other, just undiscovered instances of favoritism.

Census Data  
Pop. 464,541, Central city, 44%; suburban, 56%. Median family income, $11,019; families above $15,000, 27%; families below $3,000, 7%. Median years education, 12.5.

The Voters  
Median voting age 41.  
Employment profile  
White collar, 62%. Blue collar, 25%. Service, 12%. Farm, 1%.  
Ethnic groups  
Black, 5%. Japanese, 2%. Chinese, 2%. Spanish, 9%. Total foreign stock, 20%. Canada, UK, Germany, and Italy, 2% each.

Presidential vote  
1972 Nixon (R) 103,642 (50%) McGovern (D) 101,927 (50%)  
1968 Nixon (R) 71,328 (42%) Humphrey (D) 87,014 (52%) Wallace (A) 10,602 (6%)  
Rep. John E. Moss (D) Elected 1952; b. Apr. 13, 1915, Carbon County, Utah; home, Sacramento; Sacramento Coll., 1931-33; Protestant.  
Career  
Real Estate Broker; Retail merchant; Navy, WWII; Cal Assembly, 1948-52.  
Offices  
Committees  
 Interstate and Foreign Commerce (3d). Subcommittees: Oversight and Investigations (Chairman). 
Group Ratings  
ADA COPE LWV RIPON NFI LCV CIFA NAB NSI ACA  
1974 70 100 73 40 85 86 90 10 0 8  
1973 95 100 73 79 81 100 75 9 0 0 9  
1972 94 100 92 78 50 86 0 20 0 6  
Key Votes  
2) Bus. FOR 7) Coed Phy. Ed. FOR 12) Turkish Arms Cutoff FOR  
3) ABM AGN 8) Pow. Lawyer Gab AGN 13) Youth Camp Regs FOR  
4) B-1 Bomber AGN 9) Pub Trans Sub FOR 14) Strip Mine Veto Yeto  
5) Nerve Gas AGN 10) EZ Voter Regs FOR 15) Farm Bill Veto Yeto  
Election Results  
1974 general: John E. Moss (D) 122,134 (72%) Ivaldo Lent (R) 46,712 (28%)  
1974 primary: John E. Moss (D), unopposed  
1972 general: John E. Moss (D) 151,706 (70%) John Rakus (R) 65,298 (30%)  
1972 primary: John E. Moss (D) 151,706 (70%) John Rakus (R) 65,298 (30%)
"Cowtown" is what Dallasites are inclined to call Fort Worth. Though the two are often considered twin cities, Dallas (pop. 844,000) long ago eclipsed Fort Worth (pop 393,000) in size and wealth. Other differences also exist. According to the cliché, Dallas is the East and Fort Worth the beginning of the West. There is some geographical truth to this; the Balcones Escarpment, which separates dry west Texas from humid east Texas, runs between the two cities, somewhere around Freeway Stadium and Six Flags Over Texas in Arlington. Economically the idea makes sense too. Fort Worth did in fact get its start as a cowtown, a place where cowboys drove longhorns to the railhead and later to local stockyards. In the years when Dallas was becoming the leading banking and insurance center of the Southwest, Fort Worth was growing as a meat-packing, blue collar factory town.

Even the kinds of defense contracts awarded to the two cities illustrate how they differ. Dallas produces radar systems, infrared detecting devices, and special communications equipment—all spinoffs of its high technology, high value-added electronics and computer industries. Fort Worth, meanwhile, is one of the nation's leading recipients of Defense Department funds, because the General Dynamics plant here produces the F-111—as the result of a contract award made during the Kennedy Administration after some Texas string-pulling.

Given these differences, Fort Worth is, as one would expect, less Republican and generally less conservative than Dallas. The 12th congressional district, which includes most of Fort Worth and the Tarrant County suburbs to the north, is therefore one of the state's more liberally inclined seats. Since the elections of 1954, the 12th has sent Congressman Jim Wright to Washington. During his first years of service, Wright was the foremost liberal in the Texas delegation. He remains one of its enthusiastic backers of liberal positions on economic issues. But on other issues, he has found that his views diverge from those held by most House Democrats. For one thing, Wright has always supported American military intervention in Southeast Asia; in 1969, he was chief sponsor of a resolution which, in the face of the Moratorium demonstration, was an endorsement of Nixon's Vietnam war policy. For another, Wright does not share the consensus seen in many younger, less senior Democrats—and some Republicans—for environmental causes.

Indeed, Wright's major role in Congress these days seems to be as an adversary to such causes. He is a senior member of the Public Works Committee, a body whose leadership has always been more sympathetic to the idea of building dams and roads than to the notion that you ought to care about the rivers and earth you are building them on. In 1973, Wright was the main opponent of the move to prevent opening the highway trust fund to expenditures for mass transit; he was successful in the House, with the help of the highway lobby of course and of Gerald Ford, but he lost out in conference committee.

But if Wright is the friend of one big lobby, he is certainly not a favorite of the oil lobby which is so important in Texas politics. In 1974, he was head of a Democratic panel which was supposed to draw up an energy policy; thought nothing came of his plan (House Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman, among others, didn't like it), it was not what the oil companies wanted either. In any case, the big oil money certainly did not flow to Wright when he ran for the Senate in 1961. In the special election to fill Lyndon Johnson's seat, he ran a close third behind William Blakely, the ultra-conservative Democrat who had been appointed ad interim, and John Tower, the Republican who upset Blakely in the runoff. In 1966, he wanted another shot at Tower's seat. But the Tory establishment and Governor John Connally decided that state Attorney General Waggoner Carr was the better candidate. Unable to raise the big money, Wright went on TV and asked for $10 contributions. He received a lot of them, but not enough for a Senate race in Texas.

Wright might very well have won the Senate seat had he been able to get into either general election. Both time Tower was helped by liberal voters who refused to support the Democratic nominee—and would certainly have voted for Wright. By now Wright has given up hopes of statewide office; at 54, he is comfortable in his senior position in the House. In the 12th district, he wins routine reelection, usually without opposition.

Census Data: Pop. 666,930. Central city, 61%; suburban, 39%. Median family income, $9,441; families above $15,000: 18%; families below $3,000: 9%. Median years education, 11.6.
Like the 1st, the 2d district of Florida is part of Dixie in the northern part of the state—a region politically and sociologically not terribly different from neighboring south Georgia. For years this area’s affection for racial segregation and the Democratic Party controlled its politics. In the days before the one-man-one-vote rule, rural legislators from this part of Florida—known as the Pork Chop Gang—dominated the state’s politics. For some years, this part of Florida was overrepresented in the U.S. House of Representatives; the current 2d is basically a consolidation of what were two separate districts before 1966.

There are, however, two significant differences between the 1st and 2d districts—differences that have not yet been decisive in congressional races, but still seem to have had a political effect. For one, the 2d is Florida’s blackest district; some 28% of its residents and 20% of the registered voters are black. For the other, the 2d’s two largest cities, Gainesville and Tallahassee, contain the state’s two largest universities, the University of Florida and Florida State. Both of these schools draw most of their enrollment from south Florida, and these students, far more than those in most Southern universities, tend to support liberal candidates for public office. Altogether, some 13% of the 2d district’s eligible voters are students, and although they have not yet turned out in proportionate numbers, their impact has been noticeable.

Thus the 2d district contains two sizeable voting blocs inclined to oppose the generally conservative politics of the district’s Congressman, Democrat Don Fuqua. Since he was first elected to the House in 1962, Fuqua has usually voted with the dwindling number of conservative Southern Democrats on the Hill. With two exceptions, he has had little trouble at the polls. In 1966, he beat the more senior and slightly less conservative Rep. D. R. (Billy) Matthews when their seats were combined by redistricting.

The other exception was in 1972. In the Democratic primary that year, Fuqua got by an opponent who won most of his support from blacks and students without too much difficulty. But his voting record was affected; in 1973, for example, he voted against the bombing of Cambodia. Fuqua is now chairman of the Space Science and Applications Subcommittee and, like most Florida Congressmen, a big booster of the space program and the proposals for a space shuttle—which would incidentally create hundreds of jobs in Florida’s ailing space industry.

Census Data
Pop. 452,633. Central city, 16%; suburban, 30%. Median family income, $7,071; families above $15,000: 13%; families below $3,000: 19%. Median years education, 11.3.

The Voters
Median voting age 39.
Employment profile White collar, 49%. Blue collar, 28%. Service, 16%. Farm, 7%.
Ethnic groups Black, 28%. Spanish, 1%. Total foreign stock, 4%.

Presidential vote
1972 Nixon (R) ................. 111,042 (69%)
McGovern (D) ............... 50,861 (31%)
1968 Nixon (R) ............... 30,161 (31%)
Humphrey (D) .............. 39,011 (28%)
Wallace (A) ................. 72,755 (31%)


Career
Offices 2266 RHOB, 202-225-5235. Also 100 P.O. Bldg., Tallahassee 32302, 904-224-5710.

Committees
Science and Technology (4th). Subcommittees: Energy Research, Development and Demonstration; Science, Research, and Technology; Space Science and Applications (Chairman).

Group Ratings
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Key Votes
1) Foreign Aid: AGN 6) Gov Abort. Aid: AGN
2) Busing: AGN 7) Coed Phys Ed: AGN
3) ABM: FOR 8) Pow Lawyer Gag: FOR
4) B-1 Bomber: FOR 9) Pub Trans Sub: AGN
5) Nerve Gas: FOR 10) EZ Voter Regs: AGN

Election Results
1974 general: Don Fuqua (D), unopposed .......... ($32,316)
1974 primary: Don Fuqua (D) ....................... 64,226 (86%)
1972 general: Anthony P. (Tony) Wesolowski (D) ..... 10,528 (14%)
1972 primary: Don Fuqua (D), unopposed .......... ($24,186)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania's second largest city, was the first urban center of the American interior. Pittsburgh grew because of its propitious site; here the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers join to form the Ohio. And where that happens—at the Golden Triangle—remains the city's focal point: it is now filled with high-rise buildings, products of a downtown renaissance. When most of the nation's commerce moved over water, Pittsburgh's location was ideal; and when the traffic switched to railroads, the city adapted nicely. By the turn of the century, Pittsburgh, with its large deposits of coal nearby, was the center of the steel industry, then the nation's largest and also one of the fastest growing segments of the economy. Today, Pittsburgh remains the headquarters of many of the nation's largest corporations: U.S. Steel and several other steel companies; Westinghouse; H.J. Heinz; and the giant concerns associated with the Mellon family, Alcoa, Gulf Oil, and Koppers.

But in spite of the city's recent progress—it's program of downtown renewal and its relatively successful campaign against air pollution—Pittsburgh has been unable to keep pace with other major metropolitan areas. Its major industry, steel, has not shown much dynamism lately. As a result, the population of central city Pittsburgh has declined, and so also has the population of the entire Pittsburgh metropolitan area—the only major metropolitan area in the country to lose population during the 1960s.

The 14th congressional district of Pennsylvania includes most of the city of Pittsburgh, plus a few suburbs. The district takes in most of the city's landmarks: the Golden Triangle, the University of Pittsburgh and its skyscraper campus, and Carnegie Mellon University. Though few of the city's steel mills lie within the 14th, many of the steel workers live here, mostly in ethnic neighborhoods nestled between the Pittsburgh hills. Only 21% of the people in the district are black. But a far smaller figure than in most major industrial cities; employment opportunities in Pittsburgh peaked before the big waves of black migration from the South. Since the New Deal, the 14th has been solidly Democratic; in 1972, for example, it was one of only four districts in the state (the other three were in Philadelphia) which gave George McGovern a majority of its vote. The district's Congressman is liberal Democrat William Moorhead. After nearly 20 years in the House, Moorhead is now a senior member of the Banking and Government Operations Committees. In the 93d Congress, he served as Chairman of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, in which capacity he tried to get some changes in our system of classifying documents. Now, in the 94th Congress, he is Chairman of the Conservation, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee. Back home, Moorhead has never encountered a really serious challenge since he was first slated by Mayor (and later Governor) David Lawrence's slate (the other three were in Philadelphia) which gave George McGovern a majority of its vote.

Census Data  - Pop. 470,537. Central city, 83%; suburban, 17%. Median family income, $8,952; families above $15,000: 18%; families below $3,000: 11%. Median years education, 11.9.

The Voters

Median voting age 47.

Employment profile  - White collar, 53%. Blue collar, 29%. Service, 18%. Farm, 5%.

Ethnic groups  - Black, 21%; Total foreign stock, 25%; Italy, 5%; Poland, Germany, 3% each; USSR, UK, Ireland, 2% each; Austria, 1%.

Presidential vote

1972  - Nixon (R) ........................................ 86,912 (48%)
       - McGovern (D) ................................... 95,687 (52%)
1968  - Nixon (R) ........................................ 60,696 (30%)
       - Humphrey (D) ................................... 122,887 (60%)
       - Wallace (AI) .................................... 20,721 (10%)

Election Results

1974 general:  - William S. Moorhead (D) ....................... 93,169 (77%) $23,929
               - Zachary Taylor Davis (R) .................... 27,116 (23%) ($1,129)
1974 primary:  - William S. Moorhead (D), unopposed .106,158 (59%)
1972 general:  - William S. Moorhead (D) ....................... 72,275 (41%) ($7,800)
               - Roland S. Catarinella (R) ..................... 86,912 (48%)

Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid  - FOR  2) Busing  - FOR  3) ABM  - FOR  4) B-1 Bomber  - FOR  5) Nerve Gas  - FOR
   14) Strip Mine Veto  - AGN  15) Farm Bill Veto  - AGN


Committees


Group Ratings

ADA   COPE   LWV   RIPON   NFU   LCV   CFA   NAB   NSI   ACA

1974  - 73  91  83  67  93  93  67  18  20  0
1973  - 84  100  92  69  100  78  100  -  -  0
1972  - 94  100  100  78  86  87  100  9  0  0

After putting in years of service on Capitol Hill, some Congressmen grow more grudgingly conservative. They begin to feel comfortable in the company of their colleagues and resent the demands placed on them by outsiders. The veterans have metamorphosed from young crusaders to defenders of the establishment which they, after all, have become a part. The pattern is common one, though perhaps not seen as often today as in the past. The opposite pattern also exists. Congressmen come to Washington as believers in political orthodoxy, convinced that whatever is, is probably for the best. Then, after a few years in Congress, they change. They begin to listen to argument and consider points of view not part of life back home; these politicians soon begin to vote and operate on committees in unorthodox fashion. Such is an increasingly common pattern in the House these days, and one exemplar is Congressman J. William Stanton of the 11th district of Ohio.

This is not what one would have predicted when Stanton first came to Congress. His first election, in 1964, was a considerable achievement. He ran in an 11th district that had rather different boundaries than at present. It included the steel-manufacturing city of Warren (pop. 63,000), no longer in the district, along with the Democratic-leaning Cleveland suburbs of Lake County (Willowick, Wickliffe, and Willoughby), industrial Ashtabula County in the far northeast corner of the state, and Kent State University. The University was then less well-known than it is today, and of course it had far fewer liberal votes. The old 11th was clearly a marginal district, having been won by a Democrat as recently as 1960. But Stanton, who campaigned as a traditional Ohio Republican conservative, managed to run almost 20% ahead of the Goldwater-Miller ticket and to capture the seat with 55% of the vote.

Stanton's vote-getting prowess has been further demonstrated by his landslide reelection victories in later elections—68% in 1970 and 1972, 61% in 1974. His success may be due in part to his liberal position on many issues. He has voted, for example, for end-the-war legislation and against the SST. and since his first election, his ADA and COPE ratings have risen substantially.

Stanton's majorities, however, are probably less a response to his voting record than an appreciation of the kind of constituency service that helps so many congressmen win easy reelection in technically marginal districts. Also, Stanton has been helped by successive redistrictings, which have made the 11th more Republican. It has long since lost Warren and by 1972 no longer included Kent or the easternmost (and most Democratic) suburbs in Lake County. The line-drawing was as much an accommodation of neighboring Democratic Congressmen as an attempt to aid Stanton, who doesn't need the help.

Stanton has been mentioned on a number of occasions as a candidate for statewide office, and he would be helped, in the Cleveland media market anyway, by his own popularity and that of 20th district Congressman James Stanton, a Democrat and no relation. But Stanton has not made the move to make the races and now, at 52, probably never will.

Census Data Pop. 462,701. Central city, 6%; suburban, 79%. Median family income, $11,142; families above $15,000: 25%; families below $3,000: 6%. Median years education, 12.2.

The Voters

Median voting age 41.
Employment profile White collar, 41%. Blue collar, 47%. Service, 10%. Farm, 2%. Ethnic groups Black, 2%. Total foreign stock, 15%. Italy, UK, 2% each; Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 1% each.

Presidential vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nixon (R)</th>
<th>McGovern (D)</th>
<th>Nixon (R)</th>
<th>Humphrey (D)</th>
<th>Wallace (A)</th>
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Career Army, WWII; Lake Co. Commissioner, 1956-64.

Offices 2448 RHOB, 202-225-5306. Also 170 N. St. Clair St., Painesville 44077, 216-352-6167.

Committees

Banking, Currency and Housing (2d). Subcommittees: Economic Stabiliization; Housing and Community Development; International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy.


Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid FOR 6) Gov Abortn Aid AGN 11) Pub Cong Election $ FOR
2) Busing AGN 7) Coed Phys Ed ABS 12) Turkish Arms Cutoff AGN
3) ABM FOR 8) Pub Lawyer Gag FOR 13) Youth Camp Regs AGN
4) B-1 Bomber ABS 9) Pub Trans Sub AGN 14) Strip Mine Veto AGN
5) Nerve Gas AGN 10) EZ Voter Regs AGN 15) Farm Bill VETO

Election Results

1974 general: J. William Stanton (R) ........................................ 79,756 (61%) ($25,834)
Michael D. Coffey (D) ........................................ 52,017 (39%) ($35,009)

1974 primary: J. William Stanton (R), unopposed 106,841 (62%) ($19,853)

1972 general: J. William Stanton (R) ........................................ 49,849 (32%) ($22,823)
The 6th congressional district of Massachusetts is the North Shore district. Along and just back of the rocky coast north of Boston are the estates of some of the Commonwealth's oldest families including—no name so still important politically—the Saltonstalls and the Louises. Only a few miles away are the fishermen of Gloucester, suffering badly these days because the banks are being fished out by efficient Russian and Icelandic trawlers. Here also are the textile mill workers in Haverhill and Newburyport on the Merrimack River, and the artists and Summer people of Rockport. To the south is Salem, where twenty witches were once hanged and pressed to death, and where Nathaniel Hawthorne's House of Seven Gables still stands in a neighborhood of near nineteenth century homes. Also to the south is the boat building suburb of Marblehead, which Jews now share with WASPs, and Lynn, whose troubled shoe industry has been pressing hard for restriction against imports.

The 6th district is the site of the original gerrymander, named for the desire of its perpetrator, Elbridge Gerry, to push together all the area's Democrats in one misshapen seat. Since then, the North Shore's wealthy towns and Brahmin families have given the area a reputation for Republicanism it has sometimes since ceased to deserve. In recent years the 6th has even supported relatively unpopular Democrats like George McGovern. But for many years the district persisted in electing Republican Congressmen, at least if they were members of the Bates family: George J. Bates of Salem won from 1936 to 1950, and his son William up through 1968.

But Bates died suddenly in 1969, and in the special election to fill the vacancy, Democratic state Representative Michael Harrington waged a sophisticated and vigorous campaign to beat Republican state Senator William Saltonstall. The race tested the popularity of the Nixon Administration's foreign policy and spending priorities: Harrington fervently opposed the Vietnam war and the AIIM while Saltonstall, son of former Senator Leverett Saltonstall, supported Nixon on both issues. Harrington won that race with 52% of the vote; by 1970 he was able to win with 61% over Republican Howard Phillips, who would go on to brief national fame in early 1973 as the Nixon appointee who attempted illegally to dismantle the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Harrington has not always seemed happy with the pace of life in the House or with his position, for a time, as one of its more junior members. In the 92d Congress Harrington managed to win assignment to the Armed Services Committee, but this rather contentious dove had a number of run-ins with committee hawks that were so acrimonious that he moved to the Foreign Affairs in 1973. (He had his revenge, however, since his Armed Services seat went to Ron Dellums of California.) The Congressman also created a furor while serving on the special committee investigating the CIA by accusing the Chairman, Lucien Nedzi, of not disclosing information he had received a year before on CIA involvement in assassinations. But the House decided not to condemn Nedzi, but rather to, in effect, condemn Harrington for allegedly making public information about CIA involvement in Chile.

With the assets of an Irish heritage and a Harvard education—not to mention a raft of cousins well connected in Massachusetts politics—Harrington could conceivably be a strong contender for state-wide office, but the seats held securely by Edward Kennedy and Edward Brooke, that avenue seems blocked now. In any case, with the influx of freshmen in the 94th Congress, Harrington suddenly has dozens of new allies, and a chance to be part of the majority of the House most of the time. So it may be that he will decide that a long House career has its charms as well as its drawbacks.

Census Data Pop. 475,885. Central city, 10%; suburban, 72%. Median family income, $10,904; families above $15,000, 25%; families below $3,000, 6%. Median years education, 12.3.

The Voters
- Median voting age 45.
- Employment profile White collar, 52%. Blue collar, 36%. Service, 12%. Farm, -%.
- Ethnic groups Total foreign stock, 31%. Canada, 10%; Italy, 4%; Ireland, UK, 3% each; USSR, Poland, Greece, 2% each.

Presidential vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nixon (R)</th>
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<th>Wallace (I)</th>
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<td>116,157</td>
<td>76,125</td>
<td>6,588</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>104,027</td>
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Offices 405 CHOB, 202-225-8020. Also Salem P.O., Salem 01970, 617-475-5800.

Committees

Group Ratings

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<th>ADA</th>
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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid FOR 6) Govt. Abortion Aid FOR 11) Pub Cong Election $ FOR
2) Busing FOR 7) Coed Phys Ed FOR 12) Turkish Arms Cutoff AiS
3) AIM AGN 8) Pov Lawyer Gag AGN 13) Youth Camp Regs FOR
4) B-1 Bomber AGN 9) Pub Trans Sub FOR 14) Strip Mine Veto AGN
5) Nerve Gas AGN 10) EZ Voter Regs FOR 15) Farm Bill Veto FOR

Election Results

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>Percent</th>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Michael J. Harrington (D), unopposed ...</td>
<td>(59%)</td>
<td>$29,810</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Michael J. Harrington (D)</td>
<td>39,798</td>
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<td>Ronald Kowalski (D)</td>
<td>130,679</td>
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<td>Michael Harrington (D)</td>
<td>$114,317</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>James Brady Mosely (R)</td>
<td>78,981</td>
<td>(36%)</td>
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($93,400)
The 34th congressional district of New York lies along the southern shores of Lake Ontario, and includes the east side of the city of Rochester, eastern Monroe County, and Wayne County. Rochester's economy, to a greater extent than those of other Upstate New York cities, depends on white collar and highly skilled labor; major employers here are Eastman Kodak and Xerox. These high technology companies have given the Rochester area a healthier economy over the years than is found in Upstate cities which depend more on heavy industry.

The city of Rochester by itself is almost large enough to constitute a congressional district, and if it were one it would almost certainly elect Democrats. Knowing this, Republican legislators for years have split Rochester between two districts, adding plenty of heavily Republican suburban and rural territory to each. Consequently, both the 34th and 35th congressional districts are considered safely Republican. In the 34th, profoundly conservative Wayne County is a particular Republican stronghold and, incidentally, the birthplace of the Mormon church (see Utah).

Since 1963, the 34th's Congressman has been Frank Horton, on most issues Upstate New York's most liberal Republican. The political coloration has become traditional in the district; some years ago (1947-59) its Congressman was Kenneth Keating, later U.S. Senator, judge on New York's highest court, and Ambassador to India and Israel. Like Keating, Horton is more in tune with New Deal liberals on economic issues than in step with the dovish Democrats who today control their party's caucus in the House; he is really something of a liberal hawk, a sort of Republican Scoop Jackson. However you describe his politics, it is clear he is very popular in the 34th district. In 1972 he ran 10% ahead of Richard Nixon here, and in 1974, despite the Democratic trend and an opponent of substance, he got 68%. The only conceivable threat to his tenure is conservative primary opposition, which shows no signs of developing.

Census Data Pop. 467,641. Central city, 38%; suburban, 62%. Median family income, $12,082; families above $15,000: 34%; families below $3,000: 6%. Median years education, 12.2.

The Voters

Median voting age 44.
Employment profile White collar, 54%; Blue collar, 34%; Service, 11%; Farm, 1%.
Ethnic groups Black, 6%; Spanish, 1%; Total foreign stock, 27%; Italy, 7%; Germany, Canada, 3% each; UK, USSR, Poland, 2% each.

Presidential vote

Nixon (R) ............... 130,757 (63%)
McCovey (D) ............ 77,699 (37%)
1968
Nixon (R) ............... 98,521 (51%)
Humphrey (D) .......... 88,744 (49%)
Wallace (Al) ........... 7,584 (4%)


Career Army, WWII; Practicing atty., 1947-62; Rochester City Cncl., 1955-61.


Committees


Group Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADA</th>
<th>COPE</th>
<th>LWY</th>
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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid FOR
2) Busing FOR
3) ABM FOR
4) B-1 Bomber FOR
5) Nerve Gas AGN

6) Gov Abortion Aid FOR
7) Coed Phys Ed FOR
8) Pro Lawyer Gag FOR
9) Pub Trans Sub FOR
10) EZ Voter Regs AGN

Election Results

1974 general: Frank Horton (R) 105,585 (68%) ($68,207)
Irene Gossin (D) 45,408 (29%) ($26,379)
J. Warren McGee (C) 4,309 (3%) (NA)

1974 primary: Frank Horton (R) 142,803 (73%) ($32,326)

1972 general: Frank Horton (R) 46,509 (24%) ($5,411)
Richard E. Lusink (C) 5,603 (3%) (NA)
If you take 1970 median family income as the standard, three of the nation's five richest congressional districts lie in the suburbs of Chicago. The 14th is one of them. And of all these rich districts, the 14th is indisputably the most heavily Republican and conservative. The district includes practically all of DuPage County, a fast-growing, wealthy suburb directly west of Chicago, which regularly produces higher Republican percentages than Orange County, California. Appropriately, DuPage was also the site of the palatial estate of Colonel McCormick, the longtime owner of the Chicago Tribune. For almost fifty years, McCormick's paper was the house organ for his brand of conservative, isolationist Republicanism. And if DuPage County can no longer be counted as isolationist, then it certainly has remained conservative; the Colonel would not be displeased at how it has responded to the political choices put before it in the twenty years since his death. In 1964, for example, DuPage gave 60% of its votes to Barry Goldwater; in 1972, 75% for Richard Nixon. Indeed, the suburbs of Chicago, led by DuPage, have become the heartland of Illinois Republicanism, producing larger percentages and sometimes more votes for the party's candidates than historically Republican Downstate Illinois.

The Colonel might not be quite so pleased—at least not all the time—with the record of the 14th district's Congressman, John Erlenborn. He is, to be sure, one of the leading conservatives on the liberal-dominated Education and Labor Committee, as well as second-ranking Republican on Government Operations. But on occasion Erlenborn, if he has not exactly strayed from orthodoxy, has at least taken some positions which one might not have expected from a representative of his constituency. He has, for example, worked to break down Executive Branch secrecy, even at a time when that Branch was in the hands of his own party, and he voted for opening up the highway trust fund to spending for mass transit. Still under 50, he is one of the brighter conservative-to-moderate Republicans and, as might be expected, he has had little difficulty winning in this always Republican district.

Census Data Pop. 464,029. Central city, 0%; suburban, 100%. Median family income, $14,527; families above $15,000: 47%; families below $3,000: 2%. Median years education, 12.6.

The Voters

Median voting age 40.

Employment profile White collar, 65%. Blue collar, 27%. Service, 8%. Farm, -.%

Ethnic groups Spanish, 2%. Total foreign stock, 21%. Germany, 4%; Italy, Poland, UK, 2% each; Czechoslovakia, Canada, Sweden, 1% each.

Presidential vote

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
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<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>118,335 (67%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humphrey (D)</td>
<td>43,922 (26%)</td>
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<td>Wallace (A)</td>
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Committees

Education and Labor (4th). Subcommittees: Labor Standards; Postsecondary Education.


Group Ratings

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Key Votes

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<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) ABM</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Humphrey (D)</td>
<td>43,922 (26%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) B-1 Bomber</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Wallace (A)</td>
<td>13,082 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Election Results

1974 general: John N. Erlenborn (R) ..................................... 77,718 (67%) ($34,214)
1974 primary: John N. Erlenborn (R), unopposed.............................. 38,981 (23%) ($3,474)
1972 general: John N. Erlenborn (R) ..................................... 154,794 (73%) ($24,871)
1972 primary: John N. Erlenborn (R) ..................................... 57,874 (27%) ($7,183)
Every major American city is divided into distinct neighborhoods. There is always a part of town where the wealthier, more white collar, better-educated people tend to live. In Seattle, this has been on the north side, in the hills between Puget Sound and Lake Washington. Accordingly, the pleasant neighborhoods around the University of Washington have always been the more Republican part of Seattle, even though many of the younger affluent people have moved out to the suburbs. The north side contains the heart of Washington’s 1st congressional district—the only part of the state to send a Republican to Congress.

Before the 1972 redistricting, the 1st district was more Republican than it is now, a redistricting plan concocted by a geography professor. Seattle, heavily Republican areas, and added some Democratic territory—noteably Mountlake Terrace, a blue collar community just across the line in Snohomish County. But despite the addition and the presence of the university, the north side of the city remains a Republican district; it also retains most of Seattle’s largest suburb of Bellevue (pop. 61,000), a Republican area east of Lake Washington. In the old district, the big race, when one took place, occurred in the Republican primary; in the new district, there were real contests in both the primary and the general election.

For the 18 years before 1972 the 1st district saw little political turbulence at all. Things were quiet from 1952, when Republican Thomas Pelly was first elected, until 1970, when state Senator Joel Pritchard challenged Pelly in the Republican primary. Pelly was then ranking Republican on the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, but he was also 68; he refused to fly in airplanes, and so only visited the district when he could afford the time to take the train.

Pritchard, a liberal in the mold of Governor Daniels Evans, was well known in the district and won 47% of the vote, and Pelly decided to retire in 1972.

But it was not quite smooth sailing for Pritchard. Senator Henry Jackson, after his humiliating loss to Governor Evans in 1974, willed his political power to fellow Democrat John Hempelmann, a former Jackson staffer. Senator Jackson was Hempelmann’s main resource, and on the Senator’s strength the Democrat nearly won; Pritchard had a far lower than expected 51% of the vote, once in office, however, the Republican was able to use the advantages of incumbency to the point that he had little difficulty in the Democratic year of 1974. He serves on the Government Operations and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committees, and is on record to the effect that no member of Congress should serve more than 12 years: that means he will probably retire in 1984.

Census Data Pop: 465,810. Central city, 68%; suburban, 32%. Median family income, $12,084; families above $15,000: 33%; families below $3,000: 5%. Median years education, 12.7.

The Voters
Median voting age 42.
Employment profile White collar, 65%. Blue collar, 23%. Service, 12%. Farm, -5%.
Ethnic groups Spanish, 2%. Total foreign stock, 25%. Canada, 6%; Norway, UK, 3% each; Germany, Sweden, 2% each.

Presidential vote
1972 Nixon (R).......................... 137,563 (58%)
McGovern (D)........................ 97,967 (42%)
1968 Nixon (R)........................ NA
Humphrey (D)......................... NA
Wallace (A/J)......................... NA


Committees


Group Ratings

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Key Votes
1) Foreign Aid AGN 6) Gov Abortion Aid FOR 11) Pub Cong Election $ FOR
2) Housing AGN 7) Cred Phys Ed AGN 12) Turkish Arms Cutoff AGN
3) ABOM AGN 8) Pub Lawyer Gag AGN 13) Youth Camp Regs AGN
4) B-1 Bomber AGN 9) Pub Trans Sub AGN 14) Strip Mine Veto AGN
5) Nerve Gas AGN 10) EZ Voter Regs FOR 15) Farm Bill Veto FOR

Election Results
1974 general: Joel Pritchard (R).......................... 108,391 (71%) ($129,093)
1974 primary: Joel Pritchard (R), unopposed........ 107,581 (51%) ($119,933)
1972 general: John Hempelmann (D).................... 104,959 (49%) ($84,136)
Roughly speaking, the 8th congressional district of New York encompasses the central part of
the borough of Queens. The district's tortuous boundaries were drawn to keep as many
conservative and Republican voters as possible within the confines of the adjacent 6th and 9th
districts; in effect, the 8th is a seat Republican redistricters conceded to the Democrats.
The district radiates in three directions like spokes from the hub of a wheel. The hub is Flushing
Meadow Park, site of the World's Fairs of 1933-34 and 1964-65, and today the home of Shea
Stadium's Mets and Jets. One of the spokes passes through the middle class, predominantly Jewish
neighborhood of Flushing on its way to Long Island Sound. Another passes east through Fresh
Meadows and a neighborhood with the real estate promoter's name of Utopia, and on toward the
Nassau County line. The third spoke moves west from Flushing Meadow to include the high rise
complex of LeFrak City, a small black ghetto in Corona, and the two and four family house
neighborhood of lower middle income whites called Jackson Heights.

These seemingly disparate areas all have certain things in common. All have large Jewish
populations, as if the redistricters took care to gather together all the predominantly Jewish
neighborhoods in Queens. And the district lines, as they write about to manage to cover most of
the borough's big high rise apartment complexes and many of its public housing projects. Before
World War II, most of Queens was given over to neighborhoods of one and two family houses,
occupied by Irish, Italian, and German immigrants; it was a conservative suburban Republican
stronghold that happened, technically, to be part of a Democratic central city. But after World
War II, most of the growth here has come in the high rises, a large percentage of whose occupants
are Jewish and liberal Democratic voters. So the 8th district may be said to be postwar Queens.

The liberal Democratic mood of the voters here is shaken occasionally. There were fierce
debates over building which wanted to limit the number of years for lower and middle income residents in Forest Hills. Residents pointed out, correctly,
that such an infusion of population would strain public facilities in the area; another reason, of
course, for the strength, if not the existence, of the opposition was the fact that blacks and Puerto
Ricans would be more common in the neighborhood. Perhaps it was only coincidence, but in
1972, just after this controversy began to boil, George McGovern only barely managed to carry the
ordinarily heavily Democratic 8th district.

Rosenthal has had an interesting congressional career, paralleling the metamorphosis of
the New York City congressional delegation in recent years. He was first selected to run for the seat in
1962 by the Queens regular organization, at a time when young politicians aspired more after
judgships than seats in Congress. He was a quiet freshman, but in his first few years found
herself opposed to the Johnson Administration's policies in Vietnam, and increasingly voted with a
small bloc of liberals who otherwise had never had the support of a Congressman from Queens.

By 1970, he was one of the leading advocates of consumer legislation in the House, and the
major force behind the Consumer Protection Agency. His advocacy for this proposal got him
rather stubborn young liberal in a feud with Chet Holifield, an old-time liberal who had never had the support of a Congressman from Queens.

By 1972, just after this controversy began to boil, George McGovern only barely managed to carry the
ordinarily heavily Democratic 8th district.

The Voters

Median voting age 45

Ethnic groups: Black, 4%; Chinese, 1%; Spanish 2%; Total foreign stock, 59%; Italy, USSR, 8%
Each; Poland, 6%; Ireland, Germany, 4% each; Austria, 3%; UK, Greece, 2% each; Hungary, Rumania, 1% each.

Presidential vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nixon (R)</th>
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<th>Humphrey (D)</th>
<th>Wallace (AI)</th>
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Committees


International Relations (9th). Subcommittees: International Organizations; International Political

Group Ratings

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Key Votes

1) Foreign Aid
   FOR
2) Busing
   FOR
3) Arms
   FOR
4) B-I Bomber
   FOR
5) Nerve Gas
   FOR
6) Gov. Aid
   FOR
7) Coed Phys Ed
   FOR
8) Lawyer Gag
   FOR
9) Pub Trans Sub
   FOR
10) EZ Voter Regs
    FOR
11) Pub Cong Election 5
     FOR
12) Turkish Arms Cutoff
     FOR
13) Youth Camp Regs
     FOR
14) Strip Mine Veto
     AGN
15) Farm Bill Veto
     AGN

Election Results

1974 general: Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-L)
   90,200 (79%) ($14,100)
1974 primary: Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D), unopposed
   23,980 (21%)
1972 general: Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-L)
   110,293 (65%) ($18,739)
1972 primary: Frank L. LaPina (R-C)
   60,166 (34%) ($6279)

Census Data

Pop. 467,691, Central city, 100%; suburban, 0%. Median family income, $12,244; families above $1,000, 35%; families below $3,000, 5%. Median years education, 12.
The Loop is what one thinks of when one thinks of Chicago. Here, where high-rise construction was pioneered, stand the city's giant skyscrapers, including the new Sears and Roebuck Building—the world's tallest. Chicago also means the Near North Side, with its huge, well-designed high-rise apartment buildings along Lake Michigan and, behind them, alternately smart and raunchy shopping streets. This is all part of Illinois's 7th congressional district—the glamorous part, the part best known to the outside world. But beyond the Chicago River and the miles of railroad track—Chicago is still the nation's biggest rail center—lie the grim West Side ghettos. As one goes inland from the lakefront, the territory is at first a potpourri: the nation's largest skid row on West Madison, followed by odd settlements of American Indians and Appalachians. Then comes the West Side ghetto, which casts the bulk of the votes here in the 7th district.

The West Side is machine country. The black community here is more newly arrived, middle-class, and less well-organized than the blacks on the South Side (see Illinois I). Some wards that are virtually 100% black still elect Jewish or Italian ward committeemen—the last vestige of their onetime ethnic composition. When the South Side wards broke party lines in 1972 and voted for Republicans Charles Percy for Senate and Bernard Carey for State's Attorney, the West Side stayed true to the machine, casting huge Democratic majorities for all offices.

Of all of Chicago's 50 wards, the 24th on the far West Side usually turns in the highest Democratic percentages—96% for George McGovern in 1972, for example. (Interestingly, the all-black 24th ward sits right next to all-white, heavily Republican-Cicero.) In 1970, George W. Collins, then 24th ward Alderman, became Chicago's second black Congressman. In December 1972, Collins was killed in an airplane crash that also took the life of Dorothy Hunt, of Watergate fame. Collins' successor in Congress is his widow, Cardiss Collins, who won a special election in June 1973. Her margin was so large and her opposition so negligible (her Republican opponent was Lar Daly, who likes to show up on TV talk shows wearing an Uncle Sam suit) that it appears that machine control on the West Side is undisputed. In the House, Collins can be counted as a solid vote for the Daley machine.

Census Data
Pop. 464,283. Central city, 100%; suburban, 0%. Median family income, $7,536; families above $15,000: 13%; families below $3,000: 16%. Median years education, 9.7.

The Voters
Median voting age 39.
Employment profile White collar, 35%. Blue collar, 49%. Service, 16%. Farm, 0%.
Ethnic groups Black, 55%. Spanish, 17%. Total foreign stock, 22%. Poland, 4%; Italy, 2%; USSR, 1%.

Presidential vote
1972 Nixon (R) .......... 33,266 (26%)
McGovern (D) .......... 93,318 (74%)
1968 Nixon (R) .......... 22,768 (15%)
Humphrey (D) .......... 126,222 (81%)
Wallace (AI) .......... 6,271 (4%)


Career Stenographer, Ill. Dept. of Labor; Secy., accountant, and revenue auditor, Ill. Dept. of Revenue.


International Relations

Group Ratings
ADA COPE LWV RFPON NFO LCV CFA NAB NSI ACA
1974 89 90 83 50 77 81 92 18 20 7
1973 100 100 90 100 100 75 100 - - 6

Key Votes
1) Foreign Aid FOR 6) Gov Abortion Aid FOR 11) Pub Cong Election $ FOR
2) Busing FOR 7) Coed Phys Ed FOR 12) Turkish Arms Cutoff FOR
3) ABM AGN 8) Pow Lawyer Gab AGN 13) Youth Camp Regs FOR
4) B-1 Bomber AGN 9) Pub Trans Sub FOR 14) Strip Mine Veto AGN
5) Nerve Gas AGN 10) EZ Voter Regs FOR 15) Farm Bill Veto FOR

Election Results
1974 general: Cardiss Collins (D) .......... 63,962 (68%) (7,292)
Donald L. Metzger (R) ........... 8,800 (12%) (188,822)
1974 primary: Cardiss Collins (D), unopposed
1973 special: Cardiss Collins (D) .......... 33,875 (93%) (NA)
Angel Moreno (Ind.) .......... 1,429 (4%) (NA)
Lar Daly (R) .......... 1,311 (4%) (NA)
Dozens of Protestant clergymen have served in the House of Representatives, but until 1974 only one Roman Catholic priest had ever been elected Congressman: Father Robert F. Drinan of Massachusetts. From any perspective, he is an unusual political figure. With no political experience, Drinan beat an incumbent Congressman not once but twice in 1970, beating a tough Republican challenger two years later, was the first Congressman to introduce a resolution to impeach Richard Nixon, and voted as part of a large majority in the House Judiciary Committee to impeach him.

The story begins in 1970, when Drinan was finishing 14 years as the highly respected Dean of the Boston College Law School. Living near the school, the priest was resident of what then was the 3d district—a geographic entity stretching from suburban Newton, just a mile north of the city, to Framingham, some 100 miles out in a narrow corridor to the town of Fitchburg in central Massachusetts and beyond. For 28 years Congressman Philip J. Philbin had represented the 3d, combining a liberal record on domestic issues with a strong hawkish point of view as a member of the Armed Services Committee. In 1968, after redistricting had added Newton and several other Boston suburbs to the district, Philbin won only 49% of the vote in a four-candidate Democratic primary, and only 48% in the general election where an independent peace candidate finished second.

This was obviously a constituency waiting for a candidate. About half the district's population had been represented by Philbin before 1968, and these people felt little rapport for this old-time politician. The problem was to put together a majority composed of middle-class Newton, with its large Jewish population; Waltham, a Catholic working-class suburb; and the upper-income, upper-class towns of Weston, Lincoln, and Wayland—a majority large enough to overcome Philbin's predictable margins in the western end of the district. Drinan was chosen the candidate in a liberal caucus, and he became one of consultant John Martin's first clients; a major grassroots campaign beat Philbin in the primary. The old regular, refusing to accept defeat, ran in the general election as an independent, and with a strong Republican candidate in the field, Drinan got just enough votes for a 38–36–26 victory.

Something similar happened in 1972. Republicans had been eying the district for a number of reasons. There was Drinan's low percentage in 1970; many Catholics opposed the idea of a priest in Congress; and Drinan had lost the heavily Catholic, mill-town western end of the district. Redistricting complicated the picture, adding the prosperous Boston suburb of Brookline. Though the home of Brahms like Elliot Richardson, Brookline is important politically for its large Jewish community. In 1917 John F. Kennedy was born here in what was then and remains today a Jewish neighborhood. The Republican candidate, state Representative Martin Linsky, was well-financed, and used the Israel issue even against the pro-Israel Drinan.

What saved Drinan in that election was his constituent service organization in the western part of the district—which he carried, in contrast to 1970. For Republican Linsky carried Brookline and fought to get into the Congressmen's strength in Newton and other suburbs. In 1974, Brookline was again a target of Drinan's, but he went for Independent candidate (and Democratic state Representative) Jon Rotenberg. Drinan has a solid record of supporting Israel and working for the rights of Soviet Jews; yet he keeps drawing upon the traditional values of his even better known dovishness on Vietnam, that he is soft on Israel. The tactic seems not to be working, but so far it has prevented him from winning an absolute majority of the vote.

In his first term in the House Drinan, with his years of experience as a law school dean, was able to win a seat on the Judiciary Committee, which of course put him in the perfect position to act on his conviction that Richard Nixon had violated the Constitution and the laws of the land. Even here, however, Drinan was frustrated as the Committee majority declined to vote impeachment on the grounds that Nixon's bombing of Cambodia exceeded his legal powers, more it seemed out of a general weariness and relief at having voted impeachment on other grounds than out of any sustained examination of the case Drinan was presenting. Drinan also served on the House Interior Security Committee—at least until 1973, when Phil Burton of California persuaded him to leave it, and the committee, after more than 30 years of controversy existence, quietly went out of existence—which was Drinan's goal all along.

Census Data: Pop. 476,130. Central city, 46%; suburban, 71%. Median family income, $12,406; families above $15,000, 36%; families below $3,000, 5%. Median years education, 12.5.
Stuck smack in the middle of the Old South is the booming metropolis of Atlanta—"the city," it liked to boast, "too busy to hate." The slogan grew out of Atlanta's reputation for racial tolerance and moderation, which it earned back in the 1930s and 1960s. But if Atlanta has practiced little overt segregation and possesses the sophistication of some northern cities, it has also developed some of their problems. Foremost among them, perhaps, is the white exodus from the central city, as metropolitan Atlanta has grown apace—up 91% between 1950 and 1970—whites have moved increasingly to the suburbs, while blacks have moved outward within Atlanta itself. The result: by 1970, the city of Atlanta was a majority black—the first such major city in the South—while the suburbs formed an almost all-white noose around its perimeter. Children growing up in metropolitan Atlanta, whether black or white, may well have less contact with members of the other race than they would have 20 years ago—or than they do in the now-integrated schools in the small towns and counties of south Georgia.

Just about half the residents of suburban Atlanta live in DeKalb County, just to the east of the city; together with a small part of the city and small, just-suburbanizing Rockdale County, DeKalb makes up the 4th congressional district of Georgia. This area is the home of the higher-income, better-educated Atlanta suburbs; statistically, it is far closer to many such northern areas than to southern Georgia. Politically, DeKalb and the 4th behave more like a northern constituency than like the non-Atlanta Georgia districts. When the district was first created in 1964, the result of a landmark Supreme Court case, it went for Lyndon Johnson and elected a liberal Democratic Congressman, while the rest of Georgia switched from its traditional Democratic allegiance to the Republicanism of Barry Goldwater. In 1966, like many northern districts, the 4th elected a Republican Congressman and in the state elections gave a large majority to textile heir Bo Callaway over former chicken restauranteur Lester Maddox. In the years that followed, DeKalb generally preferred the Republicans smooth, neutral-accented candidates to the rural-oriented, Southern-accented candidates nominated by the Democrats. This is the only part of Georgia which has consistently elected a significant number of Republican state legislators.

But suddenly, in 1974, the 4th shifted—again in the same direction as the north. In the past three elections, Congressman Ben Blackburn, a quiet but staunch conservative, had been reelected with very little difficulty; he had 76% of the vote in 1972. But in 1974 he had strong opposition from another Atlanta attorney, Democrat Elliott Levitas. Blackburn had supported Richard Nixon to the very end; Levitas, a member of the Georgia legislature, was counted as a liberal. When the votes were in, Levitas had won in one of the biggest upsets in the South that year. Levitas will be working hard for reelection, but he can count on tough Republican opposition; the 4th may prove, once again, to be a good, if geographically unlikely, national barometer in 1976.

Census Data
Population: 459,335. Central city, 16%; suburban, 80%. Median family income, $11,750; families above $15,000, 31%; families below $3,000, 5%. Median years education, 12.4.

Employment profile
White collar, 66%; Blue collar, 25%; Service, 9%. Farm, –%.

Ethnic groups
Black, 15%; Spanish, 1%. Total foreign stock, 5%.

Presidential vote
1972
Nixon (R) .................. 110,574 (77%)
McGovern (D) ............... 33,043 (23%)

1968
Nixon (R) .................. 54,809 (48%)
Humphrey (D) ............... 31,233 (27%)
Wallace (AI) ............... 28,216 (25%)

Key Votes
1) Foreign Aid AGN 6) Gov. Abortion Aid NE
2) Busing NE 7) Coal Phys Ed FOR
3) ABM NE 8) Pov Lawyer Gag NE
4) B-1 bomber FOR 9) Pub Trans Sub NE
5) Nerve Gas NE 10) EZ Voter Regs NE

Election Results
1974 general: Elliott H. Levitas (D) ............... 61,211 (55%) ($121,724)
Ben B. Blackburn (R) .............. 49,922 (45%) ($160,151)

1974 primary: Elliott H. Levitas (D) ............... 36,137 (63%)
Bruce B. Gruber (D) ............... 14,946 (26%)
Nick M. Belluso (D) ............... 6,439 (11%)


Committees

Public Works and Transportation (20th). Subcommittees: Aviation; Investigations and Review; Public Buildings and Grounds; Surface Transportation.

Group Ratings: Newly Elected

Key Votes
1) Foreign Aid AGN 6) Gov. Abortion Aid NE
2) Busing NE 7) Coal Phys Ed FOR
3) ABM NE 8) Pov Lawyer Gag NE
4) B-1 bomber FOR 9) Pub Trans Sub NE
5) Nerve Gas NE 10) EZ Voter Regs NE

Election Results
1974 general: Elliott H. Levitas (D) ............... 61,211 (55%) ($121,724)
Ben B. Blackburn (R) .............. 49,922 (45%) ($160,151)

1974 primary: Elliott H. Levitas (D) ............... 36,137 (63%)
Bruce B. Gruber (D) ............... 14,946 (26%)
Nick M. Belluso (D) ............... 6,439 (11%)
The 6th district of Indiana was the scene in 1974 of one of the two biggest upsets in House races (the other was the 2d district of New York), when 28-year-old Democrat David Evans beat 24-year House veteran William Bray, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. An unlikely place for such a result could scarcely be imagined. The 6th takes in about a third of the recently expanded city of Indianapolis, four suburban counties, and a couple of townships in another county; and almost all the territory is usually solidly Republican. The exceptions are part of the Indianapolis black ghetto (put here to keep it out of the 11th district) and some working class neighborhoods around the Indianapolis Speedway; but in recent years, the latter had been tending to the Republicans, in apparent disgust with liberal Democratic programs.

At any rate metropolitan Indianapolis has always been one of our most Republican cities; it has never had the really large influxes of Eastern European immigrants who provide so many of the traditional Democratic votes in places like Chicago and Detroit and Cleveland, and its economic base is decidedly white collar, with banks, insurance companies, and state government all being major employers. Beyond that, there is an ethos here that is profoundly conservative, as one might expect in the city that is the headquarters of the American Legion and the home town of James Whitcomb Riley, Benjamin Harrison, and Tom Charles Huston. Indeed, the 6th district was the only one of Indiana's eleven as they exist today which went for Barry Goldwater in 1964, and so one might have thought that Congressman Bray would have no trouble, no matter how Democratic the year.

But party landslides produce a kind of Darwinian natural selection. Democrats in 1974 did not necessarily capture the seats where the Republicans were—on the basis of presidential or statewide votes—the weakest; rather, they tended to beat the Republicans who were the most complacent, who had not been working their district hard in years and year out. That appears to have been the case with Bray, blessed with a supposedly solid Republican district, he had not bothered to return on weekends or to send out thousands of newsletters like his younger and technically more marginal colleagues Elwood Hillis and John Myers, both of whom survived the Democratic landslide. So Bray was ripe for being picked off. But even at that, Evans could scarcely have hoped to win without the straight ticket voting behavior which remains stronger here in Indiana than just about anywhere else in the country.

And that, of course, will be Evans's problem in 1976. No one supposes that the Democratic candidates for President or Governor or Senator Vance Hartke (assuming he gets the Democratic nomination) will carry the 6th district, so Evans knows he must make it on his own. Numerous ambitious young Indianapolis area Republicans undoubtedly see this as the district which could elect them to Congress for years (or until they are chosen to run for statewide office), and so Evans is assured of plenty of competition. It will be one of the toughest seats in the country for the Democrats to hold.

Census Data    Pop. 471,595. Central city, 54%; suburban, 46%. Median family income, $10,497; families above $15,000: 20%; families below $3,000: 6%. Median years education, 12.0.

The Voters

Median voting age 41.

Employment profile  White collar, 45%. Blue collar, 42%. Service, 11%. Farm, 2%.

Ethnic groups  Black, 4%. Total foreign stock, 4%.

Presidential vote

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<td>Nixon (R)</td>
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<td>McGovern (D)</td>
<td>45,691</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>95,265</td>
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<td>Humphrey (D)</td>
<td>55,664</td>
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<td>Wallace (AI)</td>
<td>27,095</td>
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Offices  513 CHOB, 202-225-2276. Also 4th Floor, Administration Bldg., Weir Cook Airport, Indianapolis 46241, 317-269-7364.

Committees

Banking, Currency and Housing (29th). Subcommittees: Economic Stabilization; International Development Institutions and Finance; General Oversight and Renegotiation.


Group Ratings: Newly Elected

Key Votes

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<td>7) Coed Phys Ed</td>
<td>AGN</td>
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<td>8) Pow Lawyer Gag</td>
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<td>9) Pub Trans Sub</td>
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<td>10) EZ Voter Regs</td>
<td>AGN</td>
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<td>11) Pub Cong Election $</td>
<td>NE</td>
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<tr>
<td>12) Turkish Arms Cutoff</td>
<td>NE</td>
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<tr>
<td>13) Youth Camp Regs</td>
<td>AGN</td>
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<tr>
<td>14) Strip Mine Veto</td>
<td>AGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Farm Bill Veto</td>
<td>ABS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Election Results

1974 general: David W. Evans (D) 78,414 (52%) William G. Bray (R) 71,134 (48%) ($15,846)

1974 primary: David W. Evans (D) 10,407 (56%) John Bardon (D) 5,528 (30%) George F. Cooper (D) 2,526 (14%)
Some congressional districts seem to be made up of territory left over after everyone else has constructed his own constituency. Such a district is the 6th of Connecticut. Its population centers are widely dispersed, at just about the opposite ends of the district. Enfield and Windsor Locks, in the far northeastern corner, are predominately Italian-American and are part of the Hartford-to-Springfield (Massachusetts) industrial corridor. In the southeast corner of the 6th are Bristol and New Britain, the latter the city with the state's largest concentration of Polish-Americans. In the north central part of the district, amid the gentle mountains, are the mill towns of Torrington and Winsted, the latter of which is Ralph Nader's home town. In between these Democratic areas are the Yankee towns (like Sharon, home of the Buckley clan) and some posh Republican Hartford suburbs like Farmington, Avon, and Simsbury.

The 1964 legislature, which drew the district's lines (they have been altered only slightly since), expected the 6th to elect a Democrat, and generally it has, but overall the district must be classed as marginal. Indeed, in its relatively brief history, the 6th has had four different Representatives—practically a record in this day when Congressmen seek ever-longer seniority. The first, Bernard Grubowski, was the last beneficiary of the tradition that the state's Congressman-at-Large be of Polish descent; he was slated in 1962 when the incumbent rebelled against the leadership of Democratic State Chairman John Bailey. Grubowski did fine while riding the coattails of the state ticket in 1962 and 1964; left to his own devices in this rather disparate constituency in 1966, he lost. The winner was Thomas Meskill, the brash conservative Republican Mayor of New Britain, who went on to the Governorship in 1970, and who had been a Democrat in the district. So too did Meskill's successor, Ella Grasso, after a narrow win here in the 6th in 1970 and a solid reelection in 1972.

That left the district once again up for grabs in 1974. The winner was an unlikely one, at least from the perspective of traditional Connecticut politics: 30-year-old Toby Moffett, once a Nader's Raider and director of the Nader-inspired Connecticut Citizens' Action Group. Moffett's strong suit was constituency service—something 6th district residents were used to; Grasso has had a toll-free phone number she advertised as the "Ella-phone" to take complaints. Moffett used his staff to solve constituent's problems all during the campaign and in the process demolished the Republican candidate, Patsy J. Piscopo, by almost a 2-1 margin. This was an even better showing than Grasso herself was making in the district, or had made two years before, and suggests that Moffett should have no trouble at all winning reelection—if he isn't already thinking about statewide office. After all, the 6th district has produced the last two Governors.

Census Data Pop. 505,331. Central city, 26%; suburban, 51%. Median family income, $11,898; families above $15,000: 30%; families below $3,000: 5%. Median years education, 12.2.

The Voters

Median voting age 43.

Employment profile White collar, 50%. Blue collar, 40%. Service, 9%. Farm, 1%

Ethnic groups Black, 1%. Spanish, 1%. Total foreign stock, 32%. Italy, 6%; Canada, Poland, 5% each; Germany, UK, 2% each; Ireland, 1%

Presidential vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate (R)</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Candidate (D)</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>136,430 (58%)</td>
<td>McGovern (D)</td>
<td>98,328 (42%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>89,516 (44%)</td>
<td>Humphrey (D)</td>
<td>104,210 (51%)</td>
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Key Votes

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>AGN</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>FOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Pub Cong Election $</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Busing</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Coed Phys Ed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) ABM</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pov Lawyer Gag</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) B-1 Bomber</td>
<td>AGN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pub Trans Sub</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Nerve Gas</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>EZ Voter Reg</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Gov. Abortin Aid</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turkish Arms Cutoff</td>
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<tr>
<td>7) Coed Phys Ed</td>
<td>FOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>12) Turkish Arms Cutoff</td>
<td>NE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Election Results

1974 general: Anthony Toby Moffett (D) ............................................... 122,785 (64%) ($144,205)

1974 primary: Anthony Toby Moffett (D) ............................................... 19,448 (42%)


Offices 1008 LHOB, 202-225-4476. Also 245 Main St., Bristol 06010, 203-589-5750.

Committees

Government Operations (27th). Subcommittees: Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs; Manpower and Housing.


Group Ratings: Newly Elected
Bergen County, the northeastern corner of New Jersey, is one of the nation's most comfortable and wealthiest suburban areas. Just across the George Washington Bridge from New York, behind the Palisades that line the Hudson, are some of the state's wealthiest suburbs, sparsely settled (because of minimum acreage zoning), hilly, and tree shaded. Shopping centers, not skyscrapers, are the most prominent landmarks here, and although there are some out of gas industrial towns along the Passaic and Hackensack Rivers, the overall picture here is one of settled affluence and neat prosperity.

Bergen County is divided into two congressional districts; the 7th occupies roughly the western half of the county. Republicans drew the slightly irregular boundary lines to split the county's centers of Democratic strength evenly between the two districts; accordingly, the 7th bulges southward to take in industrial Hackensack and Jewish Teaneck, to go with the generally Republican suburbs to the north and west. But the redistricters' strategy, as so many do, went awry; and today both Bergen County districts, the 7th and the 9th, are represented by Democrats.

The 7th is the one which changed hands most recently, in 1974, with the defeat of Republican Congressman William Widnall, ranking minority member of the House Banking and Currency Committee. Widnall had been responsible for some provisions of the nation's housing laws over the years and had generally had a moderate to liberal record. Indeed, for many years, he seemed to suit this district perfectly, and was reelected with correspondingly large majorities. If he had won in 1974, he would have become the senior Republican in the House—but that was just the trouble. At 68 he was visibly past his prime, unable to campaign effectively and apparently unwilling to give his constituents the sort of services they have come to expect from their congressman.

But Widnall still would have been reelected had he not faced spirited competition in the person of Democrat Andrew Maguire. A 35-year-old Ph.D. and former Ford Foundation official, Maguire soundly beat two well known Bergen County figures in the Democratic primary and went on to wage a textbook general election campaign. He enlisted volunteers, raised money, put out good media and door-to-door literature, and generally convinced the voters of the 7th district that he would represent them better and more actively than his opponent. He beat the previously unbeatable Widnall by a solid 50-44 margin.

In the House Maguire became part of the freshman contingent on the Commerce and Government Operations Committees which has changed so drastically the basic balance of power on major policy questions. He seems to show the kind of political astuteness and the stands on issues—he is an outspoken opponent of the big oil companies—that enable young Congressmen to turn a landslide year victory into a lifetime congressional career. Despite the Republican background of his district, it would be wise to bet against Maguire in 1976.

Census Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pop.</th>
<th>Central city, %</th>
<th>Suburban, %</th>
<th>Median family income, $</th>
<th>Median years education, %</th>
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<tr>
<td>479,999</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$14,257</td>
<td>12.4</td>
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The Voters

- Median voting age 45
- Employment profile: White collar, 65%; Blue collar, 27%; Service, 8%; Farm, 3%

Presidential Election Results

| Year | Candidate (Party) | Votes for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>150,619 (66%)</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>121,037 (56%)</td>
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Election Results

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<td>Andrew Maguire (D)</td>
<td>79,808 (50%) ($117,270)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>William B. Widnall (R)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Three others (D)</td>
<td>5,029 (23%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic Groups

- Black: 3%
- Total foreign stock: 36%
- Italy: 9%
- Germany: 5%
- Poland, UK: 3%
- USSR, Ireland: 2%
- Austria, Canada, Netherlands: 1%

Government and Individual Rights


Committees


Group Ratings: Newly Elected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Foreign Aid</td>
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<td>AGN</td>
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<td>5) Nerve Gas</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2) Gov Abortion Aid</td>
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<td>3) Coed Phys Ed</td>
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Of all the nation's 435 congressional districts, the one which has had the closest elections in the last dozen years, not just in November but also in primary contests, is the 1st district of Iowa. To visitors from New York or Los Angeles, this southeast corner of Iowa along the Mississippi River must look like rather an ordinary part of the Midwest, with a lot of farmland and some small manufacturing cities. But the 1st does have some distinctive features. The little city of Burlington (pop. 32,000) has given its name to a major railroad and has a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, John McCormally of the Hawk Eye. Davenport (pop. 98,000), the largest city in the district, is a marginally Republican town with a Democratic Mayor named Kathryn Kirschbaum; it is also the home of the Palmer School of Chiropractic. And Iowa City (pop. 47,000) is the site of the State University of Iowa, the largest institution of higher learning in the state, with 20,000 students.

But listing these features does not explain why this district has been one of the most marginal in the nation. The real explanation lies in personalities, particularly that of former Congressman Fred Schwengel. A sometimes liberal Republican with a wide range of interests, Schwengel is president of the National Capital Historical Society and a Lincoln buff. First elected to the House in 1954, he was something of a loner, and despite his liberal record lost the district to college professor John Schiemihauser in 1964. Schwengel won it back in 1966 and beat Schiemihauser again in 1968—all by narrow margins. In 1970, Schwengel faced former state Representative David Stanley in the Republican primary; Stanley, who had nearly beaten Senator Harold Hughes two years before, spent over $100,000 and got 44% of the vote. In the fall, Schwengel beat antiwar Democrat Edward Mezvinsky by only 765 votes.

From that time on, it looked like Mezvinsky's seat—and it was. He began by beating Schiemihauser by almost 2-1 in the Democratic primary. The general election was not so much a matter of positions on the issues as a contrast in attitudes and styles. Schwengel, the 65-year-old incumbent, was genial and often uncommittal on issues; Mezvinsky, the 35-year-old challenger, earnestly spoke out against the Nixon Administration's policies. That, hard work, and a good organization—plus strong majorities from students in Iowa City—gave Mezvinsky a 54-46 victory.

Mezvinsky was the most junior Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee which voted to impeach Richard Nixon. His speaking style was not considered as arresting as some others', and his advocacy of an article relating to Nixon's misuse of government funds on his person failed to carry. But if he did not completely shine, his earnestness and his position apparently did not hurt him with his constituents. He faced—appropriately, considering the district's history—the strongest challenge Republicans have made in any Iowa district recently; Mezvinsky won again by a 54-46 margin. Provided he does not face such well-financed opposition again, he can probably look forward to more comfortable victories in the future.

Census Data Pop. 471,260. Central city, 21%; suburban, 9%. Median family income, $9,594; families above $15,000: 18%; families below $3,000: 9%. Median years education, 12.3.

The Voters

Median voting age 42.
Employment profile White collar, 45%; Blue collar, 33%; Service, 14%; Farm, 8%.
Ethnic groups Black, 1%; Total foreign stock, 9%; Germany, 3%.

Presidential Vote

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Democrat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>111,577 (56%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McGovern (D)</td>
<td>87,448 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Nixon (R)</td>
<td>93,947 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humphrey (D)</td>
<td>81,468 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallace (AI)</td>
<td>11,007 (6%)</td>
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</table>
The 3rd congressional district of Michigan centers on the cities of Kalamazoo (pop. 86,000) and Battle Creek (pop. 39,000), and reaches north to include some of the suburbs of Lansing. This historically Republican territory enthusiastically attached itself to the Party as soon as it was created in 1854 and has seldom left it since. These are places where old fashioned virtues—honesty, thrift, reserve—are taken seriously, and where they are considered the heart of political morality. For years they were exemplified, at least for people here, by the Republican Party, but that seems to have changed with Richard Nixon. For even before the Watergate scandal broke, the 3rd was moving left, giving George McGovern a higher percentage of its votes than Hubert Humphrey, and coming increasingly closer to going Democratic in state elections. Then came Watergate, and the 3rd, like most of outstate Michigan, seemed ready for a shift to the left.

Indeed, just as 1974 began, the 3rd seemed especially likely to show a direct Watergate impact. For the district's Congressman, Garry Brown, had got himself involved, innocently but involved, in part of the scandal. Brown, a feisty, hardworking Republican, is a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, and could be counted on in the past to oppose just about anything the populist then Chairman, Wright Patman, wanted. One of the things Patman wanted, in the fall of 1972, was an investigation of Watergate. At the time, the scandal was generally ignored, except for the pages of the Washington Post—and among those inside the headquarters of CREEP and the White House who were plotting to cover it up. One of their most plant tools, as it turned out, was Garry Brown. The CREEP people didn't want Patman's men subpoenaing them, and Brown was perfectly willing to cooperate. He helped line up every Republican on Banking and Currency against the Patman move; and either he or others got six of the Democrats to vote that way, too—enough for a majority.

Brown's activity in this was typical. He is just as aggressive and unyielding when arguing against the FDA on behalf of Upjohn, a Kalamazoo-based pharmaceutical manufacturer, or when pleading the interests of the company that builds Checker cabs, a big employer in the 3rd. In these cases as in the Watergate, Brown does not seem to inquire into all the motives of his client; if he is convinced the cause is O.K., he just goes ahead and fights. In his defense, Brown says that he just did what any good partisan would do—to protect his party's interest in a general election.

Whether that is how a Congressman should view his duties was the issue in the 3rd in 1974—or, rather, should have been the issue. But though Brown was terribly vulnerable he had the luck to draw an opponent who declined to use the strongest issues. The Democrats had looked around for an ambitious young candidate; finding none of suitable quality, they settled on Paul Todd, a 53-year-old former Congressman who had won in the 1964 Democratic landslide and had been beaten by Brown two years later. Todd declined to use Watergate or the Patman investigation in any way during the campaign. And when Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon, Todd came out in favor of Ford's action—allowing Brown to get into an anti-Nixon posture by himself.

Even at that, Brown only won by a 52-48 margin, by far his closest race since he first won the seat. Presumably he will not have as much trouble in 1976; the Watergate issue, and its peculiar display of some dissatisfaction with the pardon.

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Brown's activity in this was typical. He is just as aggressive and unyielding when arguing against the FDA on behalf of Upjohn, a Kalamazoo-based pharmaceutical manufacturer, or when pleading the interests of the company that builds Checker cabs, a big employer in the 3rd. In these cases as in the Watergate, Brown does not seem to inquire into all the motives of his client; if he is convinced the cause is O.K., he just goes ahead and fights. In his defense, Brown says that he just did what any good partisan would do—to protect his party's interest in a general election.

Whether that is how a Congressman should view his duties was the issue in the 3rd in 1974—or, rather, should have been the issue. But though Brown was terribly vulnerable he had the luck to draw an opponent who declined to use the strongest issues. The Democrats had looked around for an ambitious young candidate; finding none of suitable quality, they settled on Paul Todd, a 53-year-old former Congressman who had won in the 1964 Democratic landslide and had been beaten by Brown two years later. Todd declined to use Watergate or the Patman investigation in any way during the campaign. And when Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon, Todd came out in favor of Ford's action—allowing Brown to get into an anti-Nixon posture by themselves.

Even at that, Brown only won by a 52-48 margin, by far his closest race since he first won the seat. Presumably he will not have as much trouble in 1976; the Watergate issue, and its peculiar display of some dissatisfaction with the pardon.
The 1st district of Ohio is the eastern half of Cincinnati and suburban Hamilton County. This is, by and large, the more prosperous half of the old river city, which was the cultural and commercial capital of the Midwest even before the Tafts arrived. In some neighborhoods within Cincinnati and in the hills beyond the city limits are the fashionable estates of the city's elite. Probably the most prestigious is the suburb of Indian Hill, home of Senator Robert Taft, Jr. To the north, one finds a mix of shopping centers and high-income suburban terrain. Within the city itself are the formerly Jewish sections of Avondale and Walnut Hills, now predominantly black. Many neighborhoods, like Norwood, a suburban enclave surrounded by Cincinnati, are inhabited mainly by migrants from the hills of Kentucky and Tennessee. The 1st also has most of the city's Jewish population; from its early days as a heavily German river town, Cincinnati has had an important German Jewish community. Politically, it is more conservative and Republican than Jewish communities in other major cities. Over the years, many prominent Cincinnati Jews have supported the Tafts.

Cincinnati has a well-deserved reputation for being a Republican city. Of the nation's 25 largest metropolitan areas, only Dallas and San Diego turn in Republican margins with greater regularity. Such has been the case since before the Civil War, when Cincinnati was a German, pro-Union, and Republican island surrounded by a sea of Southern Democratic sentiment. Moreover, Cincinnati has never attracted large numbers of those ethnic groups which have traditionally voted for Democratic politicians. There are fewer blacks here than in Cleveland, Detroit, or Buffalo, and very few people of Eastern or Southern European origin. And many of the city's Appalachians come from solidly Republican mountain counties, bringing both their politics and religion to the big Ohio city.

Out of Cincinnati have come several prominent Republicans, including Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, President and Chief Justice William Howard Taft, Speaker of the House Nicholas Longworth (whose nonagenarian widow, the former Alice Roosevelt, still reigns as one of Washington's social elite), and of course the late Senator Robert Taft. In more recent years the 1st district has produced a succession of congressmen of both parties who for one reason or another have achieved some national prominence. The string started in 1964, when John Gilligan, then a college professor, was elected to the Ohio House of Representatives. He was succeeded by William Keating, a Republican whose Cincinnati lawyer brother is a judge here two years later by Robert Taft, Jr., later U.S. Senator. When Taft moved up to the college professorship of Governor of Ohio, was elected Congressman to the Cincinnati City Council, 1961-74, Vice Mayor, 1967-71, Mayor, 1971.

The Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nixon (R)</th>
<th>McGovern (D)</th>
<th>Wallace (M)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>111,925</td>
<td>57,516</td>
<td>20,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>88,124</td>
<td>71,824</td>
<td>40%</td>
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Committees

Joking, Currency and Housing (10th). Subcommittees: Domestic Monetary Policy; Economic Stabilization; Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance.


Key Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Foreign Aid</th>
<th>6) Gov. Aborton Aid</th>
<th>11) Pub Cong Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOR</td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>AGN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1974 general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willis D. Gradison, Jr. (R)</th>
<th>70,284 (51%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas A. Luken (D)</td>
<td>67,683 (49%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1974 primary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willis D. Gradison, Jr. (R)</th>
<th>16,437 (51%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willis, E. Flax (R)</td>
<td>14,148 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. McKinney (R)</td>
<td>849 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>