

[President's Trip to New York and New Hampshire, 4/25/79] [1]

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PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 1979

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PRES ALLEN NEUHARTH

I WANT, FIRST OF ALL, TO COMMEND AND ENDORSE THE THEME
OF THIS CONVENTION: THE DEFENSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

LIBERTY OF EXPRESSION IS OUR MOST IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHT,
AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IS ITS MOST IMPORTANT BULWARK.
WE CAN NEVER AFFORD TO GROW COMPLACENT ABOUT THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
ON THE CONTRARY, WE MUST ACTIVELY PROTECT IT ALWAYS.

THE AMERICAN PRESS HAS GROWN ENORMOUSLY SINCE OUR
NATION'S EARLY DAYS -- NOT ONLY IN SIZE AND BREADTH, BUT IN
ITS CONCEPTION OF ITS OWN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

THE HIGHEST OF THOSE DUTIES IS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC
ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE DAY. AND NO ISSUE IS MORE
IMPORTANT THAN THE ONE I WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU TODAY --
THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

EACH GENERATION OF AMERICANS FACES A CHOICE THAT DEFINES
~~THE~~ ^{our} CHARACTER -- A CHOICE THAT IS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR WHAT IT
SAYS ABOUT OUR NATION'S OUTLOOK ON THE WORLD.

-- IN THE COMING MONTHS,.....

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IN THE COMING MONTHS, WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FACED WITH SUCH A CHOICE: WHETHER TO ACCEPT OR TO REJECT A NEW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY. THE DECISION WE MAKE WILL PROFOUNDLY AFFECT OUR LIVES -- AND THE LIVES OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD -- FOR YEARS TO COME.

WE FACE THIS CHOICE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH -- AS THE STRONGEST NATION ON EARTH -- POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY.

OUR ALLIANCES ARE FIRM AND RELIABLE. OUR MILITARY FORCES ARE STRONG AND READY. OUR ECONOMIC POWER IS UNMATCHED.

ALONG WITH THE OTHER INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, WE LEAD THE WAY IN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION. OUR COMBINED ECONOMIES ARE MORE THAN THREE TIMES AS PRODUCTIVE AS THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES.

OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE BASED ON HUMAN FREEDOM. OUR OPEN SYSTEM ENCOURAGES INDIVIDUAL CREATIVITY -- AND THAT, IN TURN, STRENGTHENS OUR WHOLE SOCIETY.

OUR VALUES AND OUR DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE HAVE A MAGNETIC APPEAL FOR PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD WHICH A MATERIALISTIC AND TOTALITARIAN PHILOSOPHY CAN NEVER HOPE TO RIVAL.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE HAVE A CAPACITY FOR LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD THAT SURPASSES THAT OF ANY OTHER NATION.

THAT LEADERSHIP IMPOSES MANY RESPONSIBILITIES UPON US, BUT OUR NOBLEST DUTY IS TO USE OUR STRENGTH TO SERVE OUR HIGHEST INTEREST: THE BUILDING OF A SECURE, STABLE, AND PEACEFUL WORLD.

WE PERFORM THAT DUTY IN THE SPIRIT PROCLAIMED BY JOHN F. KENNEDY IN 1963: "CONFIDENT AND UNAFRAID," HE SAID, "WE LABOR ON -- NOT TOWARD A STRATEGY OF ANNIHILATION BUT TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE."

IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE POSSIBILITY OF MUTUAL ANNIHILATION MAKES A STRATEGY OF PEACE THE ONLY RATIONAL CHOICE FOR BOTH SIDES.

BECAUSE OUR VALUES ARE SO DIFFERENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE IN COMPETITION FOR AS FAR AHEAD AS WE CAN SEE.

YET WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN SURVIVAL AND WE SHARE A COMMON RECOGNITION THAT OUR SURVIVAL DEPENDS, IN A REAL SENSE, ON EACH OTHER.

-- THE VERY COMPETITION BETWEEN.....

THE VERY COMPETITION BETWEEN US MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE BRING UNDER CONTROL ITS MOST DANGEROUS ASPECT -- THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THAT IS WHY THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS ARE SO IMPORTANT. THIS EFFORT BY TWO GREAT NATIONS TO LIMIT VITAL SECURITY FORCES IS UNIQUE IN HUMAN HISTORY.

AS THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CONSIDER THE S.A.L.T. TREATY WHICH IS NOW NEARLY COMPLETE, THE DEBATE WILL CENTER AROUND FOUR BASIC QUESTIONS:

- WHY DO WE NEED S.A.L.T. II?
- HOW IS THE TREATY RELATED TO OUR OVERALL DEFENSE STRATEGY?
- CAN SOVIET COMPLIANCE BE VERIFIED?
- HOW DOES THE TREATY RELATE TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH CHALLENGE OUR INTERESTS?

LET ME ADDRESS EACH QUESTION IN TURN.

FIRST, WHY DO WE NEED A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY?

WE NEED IT BECAUSE IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD -- AND TO OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY.

TODAY, WE AND THE SOVIET UNION, WITH SHARPLY DIFFERENT WORLD OUTLOOKS AND INTERESTS, BOTH HAVE THE OMINOUS DESTRUCTIVE POWER LITERALLY TO DESTROY EACH OTHER AS A FUNCTIONING SOCIETY, KILLING TENS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS.

AND COMMON SENSE TELLS US -- AS IT TELLS THE SOVIET UNION -- THAT WE MUST WORK TO MAKE OUR COMPETITION LESS DANGEROUS, LESS BURDENSOME, AND LESS LIKELY TO BRING THE ULTIMATE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WAR.

INDEED, THE ENTIRE WORLD HAS A VITAL INTEREST IN CONTROLLING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

WE HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES, WHO COUNT ON US NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN STRONG MILITARY FORCES TO OFFSET SOVIET MILITARY POWER, ... BUT ALSO TO MANAGE SUCCESSFULLY A STABLE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

S.A.L.T. IS AT THE HEART OF BOTH THESE CRUCIAL EFFORTS. THAT IS WHY THE LEADERS OF FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, CANADA, AND OTHER NATIONS HAVE VOICED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE EMERGING TREATY.

-- SOME NATIONS WHICH HAVE.....

THEIR OWN
^ SOME NATIONS WHICH HAVE SO FAR HELD BACK FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY WHETHER THE TWO NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS WILL RESTRAIN OUR ~~OWN~~ WEAPONS.

REJECTION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS TREATY WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE EFFORT TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION OF THESE DEADLY WEAPONS.

AND NOTHING WOULD MORE SURELY DAMAGE OUR OTHER CRITICAL EFFORTS IN ARMS CONTROL -- FROM A BAN ON ALL NUCLEAR TESTING TO PREVENTING DANGEROUS SATELLITE WARFARE IN SPACE; FROM EQUALIZING N.A.T.O. AND WARSAW PACT FORCES TO RESTRAINING THE SPREAD OF SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

EVERY PRESIDENT SINCE THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE HAS PURSUED THE EFFORT TO BRING NUCLEAR ARMS UNDER CONTROL. THIS IS AND MUST BE A CONTINUING PROCESS.

-- PRESIDENT KENNEDY, BUILDING ON THE EFFORTS OF PRESIDENTS TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER, SIGNED THE FIRST AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN 1963 TO STOP THE POISONOUS TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE.

-- IN 1968 UNDER PRESIDENT JOHNSON, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION JOINED OTHER NATIONS IN SIGNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY -- AN IMPORTANT STEP IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- In 1972 UNDER PRESIDENT NIXON, THE S.A.L.T. I AGREEMENT PLACED THE FIRST AGREED LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY MADE AN ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO OUR SECURITY.

PRESIDENT FORD CONTINUED AT HELSINKI AND AT VLADIVOSTOK. EACH NEGOTIATION BUILDS ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE LAST. EACH AGREEMENT PROVIDES THE FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP.

THREE PRESIDENTS HAVE ^{now} SPENT MORE THAN SIX YEARS NEGOTIATING THE NEXT STEP IN THIS PROCESS -- THE S.A.L.T. II AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALL NEGOTIATED CAREFULLY AND DELIBERATELY.

EVERY STEP OF THE WAY WE HAVE WORKED WITH OUR MILITARY LEADERS AND EXPERTS, AND WE HAVE SOUGHT THE ADVICE AND COUNSEL OF THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR S.A.L.T. II.

OUR PEOPLE WANT AND EXPECT CONTINUED STEP-BY-STEP PROGRESS TOWARD BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL.

AMERICANS WILL SUPPORT A REASONED INCREASE IN OUR DEFENSE EFFORT, BUT WE DO NOT WANT A WHOLLY UNNECESSARY RETURN TO THE COLD WAR AND AN ALL-OUT ARMS RACE, WITH VASTLY GREATER RISKS AND COSTS. THROUGH STRENGTH, WE WANT WORLD PEACE.

-- LET ME TURN TO THE 2ND.....

LET ME TURN TO THE SECOND QUESTION -- HOW ^{IS} S.A.L.T. II
~~TO~~ RELATED TO OUR OVERALL DEFENSE STRATEGY.

THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION TODAY ARE ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT.

THEY HAVE LARGER AND MORE NUMEROUS LAND-BASED MISSILES.
WE HAVE A LARGER NUMBER OF WARHEADS, AND SIGNIFICANT
TECHNOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES.

EACH SIDE HAS THE WILL AND THE MEANS TO PREVENT THE
OTHER FROM ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY. NEITHER SIDE IS IN A POSITION
TO EXPLOIT ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES, NOR TO
USE STRATEGIC WEAPONS WITHOUT FACING ALMOST CERTAIN SUICIDE.

WHAT CAUSES US CONCERN IS NOT THE CURRENT BALANCE,
BUT THE MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILDUP.

OVER THE PAST DECADE, THE SOVIETS HAVE STEADILY INCREASED
THEIR REAL DEFENSE SPENDING, WHILE OURS HAS HAD A NET DECREASE.

IN AREAS NOT LIMITED BY S.A.L.T. I, THEY HAVE LAUNCHED
AMBITIOUS PROGRAMS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES.

AT SOME FUTURE POINT, THEY COULD ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGE -- UNLESS WE ALTER THESE TRENDS.

THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT I INTEND TO DO -- WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE BIPARTISAN SUPPORT OF CONGRESS.

WE MUST MOVE ON TWO FRONTS AT THE SAME TIME:

-- FIRST, WITHIN MUTUALLY ACCEPTED LIMITS, WE MUST MODERNIZE OUR OWN STRATEGIC FORCES. ALONG WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF N.A.T.O., THAT IS A CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE INCREASED DEFENSE BUDGET I HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS -- IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY EVEN IN A TIME OF FISCAL RESTRAINT.

-- SECOND, WE MUST PLACE MORE STRINGENT LIMITS ON THE ARMS RACE THAN ARE PRESENTLY IMPOSED BY S.A.L.T. I. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE S.A.L.T. II TREATY.

THE DEFENSE BUDGET I HAVE SUBMITTED WILL ENSURE THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCE CONTINUES TO BE ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS YEAR WE HAVE BEGUN TO EQUIP OUR SUBMARINES WITH NEW, MORE POWERFUL AND LONGER-RANGE TRIDENT I MISSILES. NEXT YEAR, THE FIRST OF OUR NEW, EVEN MORE SECURE TRIDENT SUBMARINES WILL BE GOING TO SEA, AND WE ARE WORKING ON A MORE POWERFUL AND ACCURATE TRIDENT II MISSILE FOR THESE SUBMARINES.

-- OUR CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM.....

OUR CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM WILL GREATLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR LONG-RANGE BOMBER FORCE. THESE MISSILES WILL BE ABLE TO PENETRATE ANY AIR DEFENSE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD BUILD IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

WE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING THE ACCURACY AND POWER OF OUR LAND-BASED MINUTEMAN MISSILES. BUT IN THE COMING DECADE MISSILES OF THIS TYPE BASED IN FIXED SILOS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO SURPRISE ATTACK.

THE SOVIETS HAVE THREE-QUARTERS OF THEIR WARHEADS IN SUCH FIXED-SITE MISSILES, COMPARED TO ONLY A QUARTER OF OURS.

NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM -- AND WE MUST DEAL WITH IT SENSIBLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NOW HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION A NUMBER OF OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING MAKING SOME OF OUR I.C.B.M.s MOBILE.

I MIGHT ADD THAT THE OPTIONS WE ARE EVALUATING WOULD BE FAR MORE COSTLY -- AND WE WOULD HAVE FAR LESS CONFIDENCE IN THEIR EFFECTIVENESS -- IN THE ABSENCE OF S.A.L.T. II LIMITS.

FOR WITHOUT THESE LIMITS ON SOVIET WARHEADS, THE SOVIET UNION COULD COUNTER OUR EFFORT SIMPLY BY GREATLY INCREASING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THEIR MISSILES.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE S.A.L.T. II AGREEMENT PRESERVES ADEQUATE FLEXIBILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

OUR STRATEGIC FORCES MUST BE ABLE TO SURVIVE ANY ATTACK, AND TO COUNTERATTACK MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS IN THE AGGRESSOR NATION.

WE HAVE HAD THIS CAPACITY -- WHICH IS THE ESSENCE OF DETERRENCE -- IN THE PAST;...WE HAVE IT TODAY;...AND S.A.L.T. II PLUS THE DEFENSE PROGRAMS I HAVE DESCRIBED WILL ENSURE IT FOR THE FUTURE.

THE S.A.L.T. II AGREEMENT WILL SLOW THE GROWTH OF SOVIET ARMS AND LIMIT THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION, AND BY HELPING TO DEFINE FUTURE THREATS WE MIGHT FACE, S.A.L.T. II WILL MAKE OUR DEFENSE PLANNING MORE EFFECTIVE.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES WILL BE LIMITED TO EQUAL NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC LAUNCHERS FOR THE FIRST TIME, ENDING THE ^{SUBSTANTIAL} SOVIET NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE PERMITTED IN THE CURRENTLY EFFECTIVE S.A.L.T. I AGREEMENT.

-- TO REACH THESE NEW AND LOWER.....

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TO REACH THESE NEW AND LOWER LEVELS, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR OVERALL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS BY 10 PERCENT -- MORE THAN 250 SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCHERS OR BOMBERS.

NATURALLY, THE SOVIETS WILL CHOOSE TO PHASE OUT THEIR OLDER SYSTEMS, BUT THESE SYSTEMS ARE STILL FORMIDABLE. THE MISSILES TO BE TORN DOWN ARE COMPARABLE IN AGE AND PAYLOAD TO OUR MINUTEMAN II AND POLARIS MISSILES.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT, THEY WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO REPLACE THESE SYSTEMS WITH MODERN ONES. OUR OWN OPERATIONAL FORCES HAVE BEEN KEPT SOMEWHAT BELOW THE PERMITTED CEILING. THUS, UNDER THE AGREEMENT, WE COULD INCREASE OUR FORCE LEVEL, IF NECESSARY.

S.A.L.T. II WILL ALSO IMPOSE THE FIRST LIMITED BUT IMPORTANT RESTRAINTS ON THE RACE TO BUILD NEW SYSTEMS AND IMPROVE EXISTING ONES -- THE SO-CALLED "QUALITATIVE" ARMS RACE.

IN SHORT, S.A.L.T. II PLACES SERIOUS LIMITS ON WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT DO IN THE ABSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WITHOUT S.A.L.T. II, THE SOVIET UNION COULD BUILD UP TO SOME 3000 STRATEGIC WEAPONS BY 1985. WITH S.A.L.T., WE WILL BOTH BE LIMITED TO 2250 SUCH WEAPONS.

THIS NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WILL OBVIOUSLY SERVE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. IT WILL REDUCE THE DANGEROUS LEVELS OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND RESTRAIN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE WEAPONS.

IT WILL HELP TO MAINTAIN OUR RELATIVE STRENGTH COMPARED TO THE SOVIETS; AND WILL AVERT A COSTLY, RISKY, AND POINTLESS BUILDUP OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND BOMBERS -- AT THE END OF WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD BE EVEN LESS SECURE.

LET ME TURN NOW TO THE THIRD OF THE FOUR QUESTIONS I LISTED AT THE BEGINNING: HOW CAN WE KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE LIVING UP TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS S.A.L.T. AGREEMENT?

NO OBJECTIVE HAS COMMANDED MORE ENERGY AND ATTENTION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE INSISTED THAT THE S.A.L.T. II AGREEMENT BE MADE VERIFIABLE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT NO SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE TREATY COULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES DETECTING IT.

OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT DERIVES FROM THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES WE MUST MONITOR AND THE MANY EFFECTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SYSTEMS WHICH WE POSSESS.

FOR EXAMPLE, NUCLEAR SUBMARINES TAKE SEVERAL YEARS TO CONSTRUCT AND ASSEMBLE. MISSILE SILOS AND THEIR SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT ARE LARGE AND VISIBLE.

-- INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS ARE....

INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS ARE BUILT AT A FEW PLANTS AND NEED MAJOR AIRFIELDS. OUR PHOTORECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES SURVEY THE ENTIRE SOVIET UNION ON A REGULAR BASIS AND GIVE US HIGH CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO COUNT ACCURATELY THE NUMBERS OF ALL THESE SYSTEMS.

BUT OUR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES ARE NOT LIMITED ONLY TO OBSERVING THESE LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES.

WE CAN DETERMINE NOT ONLY HOW MANY SYSTEMS THERE ARE, BUT WHAT THEY CAN DO. OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITES AND OTHER SYSTEMS ENABLE US TO FOLLOW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES WITH GREAT ACCURACY.

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT ANY CHEATING WHICH MIGHT AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE DISCOVERED IN TIME FOR US TO RESPOND FULLY.

FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE MONITORED SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES AND SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE S.A.L.T. I AGREEMENT WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE. THIS OVERALL CAPABILITY REMAINS. IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT LOST WITH OUR OBSERVATION STATIONS IN IRAN, WHICH WAS ONLY ONE OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WE USE FOR FOLLOWING SOVIET STRATEGIC ACTIVITIES.

WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THAT LOSS, BUT WE MUST KEEP IT IN PERSPECTIVE.

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THIS MONITORING CAPABILITY RELATES PRINCIPALLY TO THE PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT DEALING WITH THE MODERNIZATION LIMITS ON I.C.B.M.s AND TO ONLY A PORTION OF SUCH MODERNIZATION.

THE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES CANNOT BE DISCLOSED IN PUBLIC, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT IF THERE IS AN EFFORT TO CHEAT ON THE S.A.L.T. AGREEMENT -- INCLUDING THE LIMITS ON MODERNIZING I.C.B.M.s -- WE WILL DETECT IT, AND WE WILL DO SO IN TIME FULLY TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY.

WE MUST ALSO KEEP IN MIND THAT QUITE APART FROM S.A.L.T. LIMITS, OUR SECURITY IS AFFECTED BY THE EXTENT OF OUR INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES. WITH THIS S.A.L.T. II TREATY, THAT VITAL INFORMATION WILL BE MUCH MORE ACCESSIBLE TO US.

THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY FORBIDS INTERFERENCE WITH THE SYSTEMS USED FOR MONITORING COMPLIANCE. IT PROHIBITS ANY DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT THAT WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION. ANY SUCH CONCEALMENT ACTIVITY WOULD ITSELF BE DETECTABLE, AND A VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE SO SERIOUS AS TO GIVE US GROUNDS TO CANCEL THE TREATY ITSELF.

AS I HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH TO RELY ON TRUST -- OR EVEN ON THE SOVIETS' RATIONAL INCLINATION TO ACT IN THEIR OWN BEST INTEREST. THE TREATY MUST -- AND WILL BE -- VERIFIABLE FROM THE DAY IT IS SIGNED.

-- FINALLY, HOW DOES S.A.L.T. II ...

FINALLY, HOW DOES S.A.L.T. II FIT INTO THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

BECAUSE S.A.L.T. II WILL MAKE THE WORLD SAFER AND OUR OWN NATION MORE SECURE, IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN AS WE COMPETE WITH THE SOVIETS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.

A S.A.L.T. AGREEMENT IN NO WAY LIMITS OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE OUR INTERESTS AND TO ANSWER SOVIET THREATS TO THOSE INTERESTS.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONS WHO STRUGGLE TO STAY FREE.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL DISPUTES, AND TO OPPOSE EFFORTS BY ANY OTHERS TO INFLAME THOSE DISPUTES WITH OUTSIDE FORCE.

AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

IT IS A DELUSION TO BELIEVE THAT REJECTION OF S.A.L.T. WOULD SOMEHOW INDUCE THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE NEW RESTRAINT IN TROUBLED AREAS. THE ACTUAL EFFECT MIGHT BE PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE.

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THE MOST INTRANSIGENT AND HOSTILE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET POWER STRUCTURE WOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND STRENGTHENED BY A REJECTION OF S.A.L.T.

THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL FEEL THAT THEY HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE BY CREATING NEW INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

A REJECTION OF S.A.L.T. II WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND THE FATE OF A SINGLE TREATY. IT WOULD MEAN A RADICAL TURNING AWAY FROM AMERICA'S LONG-TERM POLICY OF SEEKING WORLD PEACE, THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE EASING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE UNDER A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS.

THE REJECTION OF S.A.L.T. II WOULD RESULT IN A MORE PERILOUS WORLD. AS I SAID AT GEROGIA TECH ON FEBRUARY 20: "EACH CRISIS, EACH CONFRONTATION, EACH POINT OF FRICTION -- AS SERIOUS AS IT MAY BE IN ITS OWN RIGHT -- WILL TAKE ON AN ADDED MEASURE OF SIGNIFICANCE AND AN ADDED DIMENSION OF DANGER.

"FOR IT WOULD OCCUR IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNBRIDLED STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND DETERIORATING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

"IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE WE HAVE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO BRING THIS MOST DANGEROUS ELEMENT OF OUR MILITARY COMPETITION UNDER CONTROL."

-- FOR THESE REASONS,.....

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FOR THESE REASONS, WE WILL NOT TRY TO IMPOSE BINDING LINKAGE BETWEEN SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND S.A.L.T. -- AND WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO LINK S.A.L.T. WITH ASPECTS OF OUR OWN FOREIGN POLICY OF WHICH THEY MAY DISAPPROVE.

AGAIN, S.A.L.T. II IS NOT A FAVOR WE ARE DOING FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS AN AGREEMENT CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

* * *

I PUT THESE ISSUES TO YOU TODAY BECAUSE THEY NEED DISCUSSION AND DEBATE, AND BECAUSE THE VOICES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST BE HEARD.

IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE WILL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO EXPLAIN THE TREATY CLEARLY AND FULLY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I KNOW THAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM BOTH PARTIES WILL JOIN IN THIS EFFORT TO INSURE AN INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE.

DURING THIS DEBATE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE EXERCISE CARE. WE WILL BE SHARING WITH THE CONGRESS SOME OF OUR MOST SENSITIVE DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE SECRETS.

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AND THE LEADERS IN CONGRESS MUST INSURE THAT THESE SECRETS WILL BE GUARDED CAREFULLY SO THAT THE DEBATE ITSELF DOES NOT UNDERMINE OUR SECURITY.

AS THE NATIONAL DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE, LET US BE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT THE ISSUES ARE -- AND ARE NOT.

-- AMERICANS ARE COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING A STRONG DEFENSE. THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO COMPETE -- AND COMPETE EFFECTIVELY -- WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE.

THE ISSUE IS WHETHER WE WILL MOVE AHEAD WITH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, OR RESUME A RELENTLESS ARMS COMPETITION.

THAT IS THE CHOICE WE FACE -- BETWEEN AN IMPERFECT WORLD WITH S.A.L.T. II ; ... ^{or} ~~AND~~ AN IMPERFECT, AND MORE DANGEROUS, WORLD WITHOUT IT.

-- WITH S.A.L.T. II , WE WILL HAVE.....

WITH S.A.L.T. II, WE WILL HAVE:

- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES;
- FAR GREATER CERTAINTY IN OUR DEFENSE PLANNING AND IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE THREATS WE FACE;
- FLEXIBILITY TO MEET OUR DEFENSE NEEDS;
- THE FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS; AND
- OUR OWN SELF-RESPECT AND THE EARNED RESPECT OF THE WORLD FOR A UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO THE WORKS OF PEACE.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., THE SOVIETS WILL BE UNCONSTRAINED AND CAPABLE OF AN ENORMOUS FURTHER BUILDUP.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MUCH SHARPER RISE IN OUR OWN DEFENSE SPENDING.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., WE WOULD END UP WITH THOUSANDS MORE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES, WITH FAR GREATER COSTS -- AND LESS SECURITY -- FOR OUR CITIZENS.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., WE WOULD SEE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION REPLACED BY HEIGHTENED TENSIONS.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., THE LONG, SLOW PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL, SO CENTRAL TO BUILDING A SAFER WORLD, WOULD BE DEALT A CRIPPLING BLOW.

WITHOUT S.A.L.T., THE WORLD WOULD BE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT AMERICA HAD CHOSEN CONFRONTATION RATHER THAN COOPERATION AND PEACE.

THIS IS THE INESCAPABLE CHOICE WE FACE. FOR THE FACT IS THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS TREATY IS NOT A PERFECT AGREEMENT DRAFTED UNILATERALLY BY THE UNITED STATES IN WHICH WE GAIN EVERYTHING AND THE SOVIETS NOTHING.

THE ALTERNATIVE, NOW AND IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, IS NO AGREEMENT AT ALL.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS THE MORAL AND POLITICAL WILL TO CONTROL THE RELENTLESS TECHNOLOGY WHICH COULD CONSTANTLY DEVISE NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

WE NEED NOT DRIFT INTO A DARK NIGHTMARE OF UNRESTRAINED ARMS COMPETITION.

-- WE AMERICANS HAVE THE WISDOM.....

WE AMERICANS HAVE THE WISDOM TO KNOW THAT OUR
SECURITY DEPENDS ON MORE THAN MAINTAINING OUR UNSURPASSED
DEFENSE FORCES.

OUR SECURITY AND THAT OF OUR ALLIES ALSO DEPEND ON
THE STRENGTH OF IDEAS AND IDEALS,...AND ON ARMS CONTROL
MEASURES THAT CAN STABILIZE AND FINALLY REVERSE A DANGEROUS
AND WASTEFUL ARMS RACE WHICH NEITHER SIDE CAN WIN.

THIS IS THE PATH OF WISDOM -- AND OF PEACE.

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President Jimmy Carter
American Newspaper Publishers Association
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I want, first of all, to commend and endorse the theme of this convention: the defense of the First Amendment and the freedom of the press.

Liberty of expression is our most important civil right, and the freedom of the press is its most important bulwark. We can never afford to grow complacent about the First Amendment. On the contrary, we must actively protect it always.

The American press has grown enormously since our nation's early days -- not only in size and breadth, but in its conception of its own duties and responsibilities. The highest of those duties is to inform the public on the important issues of the day. And no issue is more important than the one I want to discuss with you today -- the control of nuclear arms.

Each generation of Americans faces a choice that defines its character -- a choice that is also important for what it says about our nation's outlook on the world.

In the coming months, we will almost certainly be faced with such a choice: whether to accept or to reject a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The decision we make will profoundly affect our lives -- and the lives of people all over the world -- for years to come.

We face this choice from a position of strength -- as the strongest nation on earth -- politically, economically, and militarily.

Our alliances are firm and reliable. Our military forces are strong and ready. Our economic power is unmatched. Along with the other industrial democracies, we lead the way in technological innovation. Our combined economies are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviet Union and its allies. Our political institutions are based on human freedom. Our open system encourages individual creativity -- and that, in turn, strengthens our whole society. Our values and our democratic way of life have a magnetic appeal for people around the world which a materialistic and totalitarian philosophy can never hope to rival.

For all these reasons, we have a capacity for leadership in the world that surpasses that of any other nation.

That leadership imposes many responsibilities upon us, but our noblest duty is to use our strength to serve

our highest interest: the building of a secure, stable, and peaceful world. We perform that duty in the spirit proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in 1963: "Confident and unafraid," he said, "we labor on -- not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational choice for both sides.

Because our values are so different, it is clear that the United States and the Soviet Union will be in competition for as far ahead as we can see.

Yet we have a common interest in survival and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other. The very competition between us makes it imperative that we bring under control ~~the~~ *its* most dangerous aspect ~~of that competition~~ -- the nuclear

arms race. That is why the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are so important. This effort by two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history.

As the Congress and the American people consider the SALT Treaty which is now nearly complete, the debate will center around four basic questions:

- Why do we need SALT II?
- How is the Treaty related to our overall defense strategy?
- Can Soviet compliance be verified?
- How does the Treaty relate to Soviet activities which challenge our interests?

Let me address each question in turn.

First, why do we need a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty?

We need it because it will contribute to a more peaceful world -- and to our own national security.

~~The invention of nuclear weapons changed all previous history of arms and warfare. For the first time, we possessed the power not just to damage another country but instantaneously~~

and literally to destroy ^{each other} ~~it~~ as a functioning society, killing tens of millions of people in the process. Today,

we and the Soviet Union, with sharply different world outlooks and interests, both have ^{the} ~~that~~ ominous destructive power. And common sense tells us -- as it tells the

Soviet Union -- that we must work to make our competition less dangerous, less burdensome, and less likely to bring the ultimate horror of nuclear war.

Indeed, the entire world has a vital interest in controlling the strategic arms race.

We have consulted closely with
our Allies, ^{who} count on us not only to maintain strong military forces to offset Soviet military power, but also to manage successfully a stable East-West relationship.

SALT is at the heart of both these crucial efforts. That is why the leaders of France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and other nations have voiced their support for the emerging Treaty.

Some
~~Many~~ nations which have so far held back from building nuclear weapons will be strongly influenced by whether the two nuclear superpowers will restrain our own weapons. Rejection of the new Strategic Arms Treaty would seriously undermine the effort to control proliferation of these deadly weapons. And nothing would more surely damage our other critical efforts in arms control -- from equalizing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to restraining the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons, from a ban on all nuclear testing to preventing dangerous satellite warfare in space.

Every President since the dawn of the nuclear age has pursued the effort to bring nuclear arms under control. This is and must be a continuing process.

-- President Kennedy, building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, signed the first agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963 to stop the poisonous testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

-- In 1968 under President Johnson, the United States and the Soviet Union joined other nations in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- an important step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

under President Nixon
-- In 1972, the SALT I agreement placed the first agreed limits on the number of offensive weapons, *and*

-- The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty made an enduring contribution to our security.

President Ford continued at Helsinki and at Vladivostok. Each negotiation builds on the accomplishments of the last. Each agreement provides the foundation for further progress toward a more stable nuclear relationship.

Three Presidents have spent more than six years negotiating the next step in this process -- the SALT II agreement. We have all negotiated carefully and deliberately. Every step of the way we have worked with our military leaders and experts, and we have sought the advice and counsel of the members of Congress.

An overwhelming majority of the American people recognize the need for SALT II. Our people want and expect continued step-by-step progress toward bringing nuclear weapons under control. Americans will support a reasoned increase in our defense effort, but we do not want a wholly unnecessary return to the Cold War and an all-out arms race, with vastly greater risks and

costs. Through strength, we want world peace.

Let me turn to the second question -- how SALT II is related to our overall defense strategy.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union today are essentially equivalent.

They have larger and more numerous land-based missiles. We have a larger number of warheads, and significant technological and geographical advantages.

~~Neither side has superiority~~ and Each side has the will and the means to prevent the other from achieving *superiority.*

it Neither side is in a position to exploit its nuclear weapons for political purposes, nor to use strategic weapons without facing almost certain suicide.

What causes us concern is not the current balance, but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. Over the

past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, while ours has ^{had a net} decreased. In areas not limited by SALT I, they have launched ambitious programs to strengthen their strategic forces. At some future point, they could achieve a strategic advantage -- unless we alter these trends.

That is exactly what I intend to do -- with the support of the American people and the bipartisan support of Congress.

We must move on two fronts at the same time:

-- First, within mutually accepted limits, we must modernize our own strategic forces. Along with the strengthening of NATO, that is a central purpose of the increased defense budget I have submitted to the Congress -- improvements necessary even in a time of fiscal restraint.

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-- Second, we must place more stringent limits on the arms race than are presently imposed by SALT I. That is the purpose of the SALT II Treaty.

The defense budget I have submitted will ensure that our nuclear force continues to be essentially equivalent to that of the Soviet Union.

This year we have begun to equip our submarines with new, more powerful and longer-range Trident I missiles. Next year, the first of our new, even more secure Trident submarines will be going to sea, and we are working on a more powerful and accurate Trident II missile for these submarines.

Our cruise missile program will greatly enhance the effectiveness of our long-range bomber force. These missiles will be able to penetrate any air defense which the Soviet Union could build in the foreseeable future.

We are substantially improving the accuracy and power of our land-based Minuteman missiles. But ~~it is likely that~~ in the coming decade missiles of this type based in fixed silos will become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack. The Soviets have three-quarters of their warheads in such fixed-site missiles, compared to only a quarter of ours. Nevertheless, this is a serious problem -- and we must deal with it sensibly and effectively.

The Defense Department now has under consideration a number of options for responding to this problem, *including making some of our ICBMs mobile.*
~~[Some of these involve making our ICBMs mobile -- that is, not fixed in a single, easily targetted spot.]~~ I might add that the ~~mobile~~ options we are evaluating would be far more costly -- and we would have far less confidence in their effectiveness -- in the absence of SALT II limits. For without these limits on Soviet warheads, the Soviet Union could counter our effort simply by greatly increasing the number of warheads on their missiles.

~~All of the options will be examined carefully before I make a decision, but~~ Let me emphasize that the SALT II agreement preserves adequate flexibility for the United States in this important area.

Our strategic forces must be able to survive any attack, and to counterattack military and civilian targets in the aggressor nation. We have had this capacity -- which is the essence of deterrence -- in the past; we have it today; and SALT II plus the defense programs I have described will ensure it for the future.

The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition, and by helping to define future threats we might face, SALT II will make our defense planning more effective.

Under the agreement, the two sides will be limited to equal numbers of strategic launchers for the first time,

ending the Soviet numerical advantage permitted in the currently effective SALT I agreement.

To reach these new and lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce their overall number of strategic delivery systems by 10 percent -- more than 250 Soviet missile launchers or bombers. Naturally, the Soviets will

choose to phase out their older systems, but these

systems are still formidable. *The missiles to be torn down are*
~~equivalent to our~~
comparable in age and payload to our
Minuteman II and ^{Polaris}~~Poseidon~~ missile systems. Under the

agreement, they will not be permitted to replace these

systems with modern ones. Our own operational forces

have been kept somewhat below the permitted ceiling.

Thus, under the agreement, we could increase our force

level, if necessary.

SALT II will also impose the first limited but important restraints on the race to build new systems and improve existing ones -- the so-called "qualitative" arms race.

In short, SALT II places serious limits on what the Soviets might do in the absence of the agreement. For example, without SALT II, the Soviet Union could build up to some 3000 strategic weapons by 1985. With SALT, we will both be limited to 2250 such weapons.

This new arms control agreement will obviously serve our national interests. It will reduce the dangerous levels of strategic arms and restrain the development of future weapons. It will help to maintain our relative strength compared to the Soviets, and will avert a costly, risky, and pointless buildup of missile launchers and bombers -- at the end of which both sides would be even less secure.

Let me turn now to the third of the four questions I listed at the beginning: How can we know whether the Soviets are living up to their obligations under this SALT agreement?

No objective has commanded more energy and attention in our negotiations. We have insisted that the SALT II

agreement be made ~~[adequately]~~ verifiable. *We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it.*

Our confidence in the verifiability of the agreement derives from the size and nature of the activities we must monitor and the many effective and sophisticated intelligence collection systems which we possess.

~~For example, nuclear submarines take several years~~
to construct and assemble. Missile silos and their supporting equipment are large and visible. Intercontinental bombers are built at a few plants and need major airfields. Our photoreconnaissance satellites survey the entire Soviet Union on a regular basis and give us high confidence that we will be able to count accurately the numbers of all these systems.

But our independent verification capabilities are not limited only to observing these large-scale activities. We can determine not only how many systems there are, but what they can do. Our photographic satellites and other systems enable us to follow technological developments in Soviet strategic forces with great accuracy. There is no question that any cheating which might affect our national security would be discovered in time for us to respond fully.

For many years we have monitored Soviet strategic forces and Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement with a high degree of confidence. This overall capability remains. It was certainly not lost with our observation stations in Iran, which was only one of many intelligence sources we use for following Soviet strategic activities.

We are concerned with that loss, but we must keep it in perspective.

This monitoring capability relates principally to the portion of the agreement dealing with the modernization limits on ICBMs and to only a portion of such modernization.

~~We will be able to recover the reduced capability in approximately one year. During that period, even if a violation of the SALT agreement were attempted the Soviets would not be able to complete a test program for a new or modernized ICBM whose introduction would adversely affect the strategic balance or our security.~~

The sensitive intelligence techniques cannot be discussed closed in public, but the

~~The~~ bottom line is that if there is an effort to cheat on the SALT agreement -- including the limits on modernizing ICBMs -- we will detect it, and we will do so in time to fully protect our security.

We must also keep in mind that quite apart from SALT limits, our security is affected by the extent of our information about Soviet strategic forces. With

this SALT II Treaty, that vital information will be much more accessible to us.

The agreement specifically forbids interference with the systems used for monitoring compliance. It prohibits any deliberate concealment that would impede verification. Any such concealment activity would itself be detectable, and a violation of ~~the~~^{this} agreement would be so serious as to give us grounds to cancel the Treaty itself.

As I have said many times, the stakes are too high to rely on trust -- or even on the Soviet^{U.S.} rational inclination to act in their own best interest. The Treaty must -- and will be -- verifiable from the day it is signed.

Finally, how does SALT II fit into the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union?

To answer this question, we must look at the practical relationship between a SALT agreement and other aspects of our relations.

Because SALT II will make the world safer and our own nation more secure, it is in our national interest to control nuclear weapons even as we compete with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

A SALT agreement in no way limits our ability to promote our interests and to answer Soviet threats to those interests.

We will continue to support the independence of Third World nations who ^{struggle} ~~fight hard~~ to stay free.

We will continue to promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional disputes, and to oppose efforts by ^{any} ~~the Soviets and~~ others to inflame those disputes with outside force.

And we will continue to work for human rights.

It is a delusion to believe that rejection of SALT would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new restraint in troubled areas. The actual effect might be precisely the opposite. The most intransigent and hostile elements of the Soviet power structure would be encouraged and strengthened, *by a rejection of SALT.* The Soviets might well feel that they have little to lose by creating new international tensions.

A rejection of SALT II would have significance beyond the fate of a single treaty. It would mean a radical turning away from America's long-term policy of seeking world peace, the control of nuclear weapons, and the easing of tensions between Americans and the Soviet people under a system of international law based on mutual interests.

The rejection of SALT II would result in a more perilous world. As I said at Georgia Tech on February 20: "Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction -- as serious as it may be in its own right -- will take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For it would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability. It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous element of our military competition under control."

For these reasons, we will not try to impose binding linkage between Soviet behavior and SALT -- and we will not accept any Soviet attempts to link SALT with aspects of our own foreign policy of which they may disapprove.

Again, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It is an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interest of the United States.

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I put these issues to you today because they need discussion and debate, and because the voices of the American people must be heard.

In the months ahead, ^{we} ~~I and members of my~~ ~~Administration~~ will do all in our power to explain the Treaty clearly and fully to the American people. I know that Members of Congress from both parties will join in this effort to insure an informed public debate.

During this debate, it is important that we exercise care. We will be sharing with the Congress some of our most sensitive defense and intelligence secrets.

And the leaders in Congress must insure that these secrets will be guarded carefully so that the debate itself does not undermine our security.

As the national discussion takes place, let us be clear about what the issues are -- and are not.

-- Americans are committed to maintaining a strong defense. That is not the issue.

-- We will continue to compete -- and compete effectively -- with the Soviet Union. That is not the issue.

The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless arms competition. That is the choice we face -- between an imperfect world with SALT II and an imperfect, and more dangerous, world without it.

With SALT II, we will have:

- significant reductions in Soviet strategic forces;
- far greater certainty in our defense planning and in the knowledge of the threats we face;
- flexibility to meet our defense needs;
- the foundation for further controls on nuclear and conventional arms; and
- our own self-respect and the earned respect of the world for a United States committed to the works of peace.

Without SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable of an enormous further buildup.

Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending.

Without SALT, we would end up with thousands more strategic nuclear warheads on both sides, with far greater costs -- and less security -- for our citizens.

Without SALT, we would see improved relations with the Soviet Union replaced by heightened tensions.

Without SALT, the long, slow process of arms control, so central to building a safer world, would be dealt a crippling blow.

Without SALT, the world would be forced to conclude that America had chosen confrontation rather than cooperation and peace.

This is the inescapable choice we face. For the fact is that the alternative to this treaty is not a perfect agreement drafted unilaterally by the United States

in which we gain everything and the Soviets nothing.

The alternative, now and in the foreseeable future, is no agreement at all.

I am convinced that the United States has the moral and political will to ^{Control}~~manage~~ the relentless technology which ^{Could}~~can~~ constantly devise new weapons of mass destruction.

We need not drift into a dark nightmare of unrestrained arms competition. We Americans have the wisdom to know that our security depends on more than maintaining our unsurpassed defense forces. Our security and that of our Allies also depends on the strength of ideas and ideals, and on arms control measures that can stabilize and finally reverse a dangerous and wasteful arms race which neither side can win. This is the path of wisdom -- and of peace.

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