

4/27/79 [1]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	From Brzezinski to The President (2pp.) re: FY '80 Security Assistance Budget Amendments/enclosed in Hutcheson to McIntyre 4/27/79 <i>open 5/24/90</i>	4/26/79	A
memo	From Vance to The President (2pp.) re: FY 80 Security Assistance Budget Amendments/enclosed in Hutcheson to McIntyre 4/27/79 <i>opened per RAC NLE-126-16-50-1-8 8/22/13</i>	4/20/79	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Handwriting File 4/27/79 [1] BOX 120

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Friday - April 27, 1979.

7:30
(90 min.) Breakfast with Vice President Walter F. Mondale, Secretaries Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mr. Hamilton Jordan - Cabinet Room.

9:00 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

9:30 Mr. Frank Moore - The Oval Office.

10:00 Mr. Charles Schultze - The Oval Office.

10:30 Mr. Jody Powell - The Oval Office.

10:45 Depart South Grounds via Motorcade en route the National Cathedral.

11:00 Attend Memorial Services for Mrs. Marvella Bayh.

12:00 Return to the White House.

1:15
(30 min.) Meeting with Editors. (Mr. Jody Powell).
The Cabinet Room.

2:00
(10 min.) Meeting with Senior Officers of the National Association of Home Builders. (Mr. Stuart Eizenstat) - The Cabinet Room.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
27 Apr 79

Jim McIntyre

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for

~~your information~~ *appropriate*
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Zbig Brzezinski

*EV gave to BC
for transmittal*



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 26 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr. *J. McIntyre*

SUBJECT: Proposed FY 1980 Security Assistance Budget Amendments

In conjunction with the \$150 million Turkey supplemental, State asked you for added FY 79 and 80 money for seven other countries. On April 4, 1979, you indicated doubts about the viability of such add-ons given our overall budget strategy, but authorized the State Department to consult with the Congress concerning these additional security assistance proposals. On the basis of these consultations, Secretary Vance (memorandum at Tab A) is now recommending \$40 million in economic supporting assistance (SSA) and \$10 million in FMS financing for Sudan and \$15 million in FMS financing for Oman to be transmitted as 1980 budget amendments. Consultations on aid for the other countries previously suggested--Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kenya, and Yemen--indicated that these programs could be funded only through substitution from other assistance requests.

Secretary Vance, nevertheless, requests authority to support an additional \$15 million in FMS financing for Thailand (above our \$25 million request) that has been included in the House-passed version of the 1980 security assistance bill. You should be aware, however, that the House's increase for Thailand was achieved, in part, by reductions in other country programs recommended by the Administration (Panama, Zaire, and Botswana).

Additional security assistance was first proposed to reassure our friends and allies in the aftermath of the changes in Iran. With the signing of the Middle East peace agreement, the proposed assistance for Sudan and Oman is now justified largely on the basis of their support of Sadat and the peace process.

State reports there is some Congressional support for additional aid for Sudan and Oman, particularly, in the authorizing committees where Chairmen Church and Zablocki and Israel's supporters (Stone, Rosenthal) are expected to support such a request. Support in the appropriations committee is less certain, though Senator Inouye indicated he would support additional aid for Sudan and Oman. Congressman Obey considers foreign aid in trouble and that any increase for Sudan or Oman will have to be at the expense of other countries.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Jay 5/24/90

CLASSIFIED BY IAD/MAP

Declassify Review for De-
classification on 4/25/85

On their merits, we assess the State proposals as follows:

Oman FMS. Provision of \$15 million in FMS financing would assure both Oman and the Saudis of our active concern for this strategically important Gulf state and reward Oman for its support of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and refusal to support Arab sanctions against Egypt. Nevertheless, we would begin a new security assistance relationship on the Arabian peninsula where, heretofore (e.g., Yemen), we have looked to the Saudis to finance U.S. arms. To provide FMS financing for Oman is likely to lead to Saudi pressures for a U.S. role in financing arms for Yemen and a larger U.S. share in Sudan.

Sudan SSA. Since the State Department consultations with the Congress began, Sudan has reached agreement with an IMF team on an Extended Fund Facility. Final approval by the IMF Board of Directors is expected shortly. Under the agreement, Sudan has accepted certain fiscal and monetary performance criteria in exchange for credits, totalling nearly \$400 million over the three-year life of the agreement.

While the IMF agreement should precipitate significant balance-of-payments financing from Saudi Arabia and other sources, Sudan will face a very tight foreign exchange situation over the medium term. Clearly, the \$40 million in balance-of-payments support proposed would be useful in revitalizing the Sudanese economy during this period. There is, however, no authoritative assessment of Sudan's future needs available now (an IMF study is expected soon) nor has any multidonor group been assembled to share the assistance burden as in the case of Turkey.

Thus, it is hard to be specific about the impact of our assistance, and OMB believes there is a substantial risk that a higher level of U.S. aid could lock us into relatively large-scale budget support of Sudan for several years with little help from other donors and might merely enable other potential donors to reduce their commitments. Moreover, to propose \$40 million SSA for Sudan is likely to create problems in allocating development aid and other SSA funds within the probable tight overall Congressional appropriation for foreign economic aid this year.

Sudan FMS. State proposes to raise Sudan's 1980 FMS financing from \$5 million to \$15 million, primarily as a political gesture. While the additional financing would enable Sudan to purchase needed field engineering equipment and other items (artillery, armored personnel carriers and mobile medical units), most of Sudan's military equipment purchases will continue to be financed by Saudi Arabia, which since 1976 has financed hundreds of millions in military procurement at no cost to Sudan. This token FMS financing will add further to Sudan's serious foreign debt problems without significantly affecting its military capabilities and could encourage the Saudis to stall on their financial support in the expectation the U.S. will do even more.

You have already sent to Congress in recent weeks three security assistance add-ons, and the justification for Sudan and Oman is notably weaker than for the previous increases (especially, Egypt and Israel). Even if the authorizing committees should approve increases for Sudan, Oman, and Thailand, the appropriation committees are not likely to provide additional funds, leaving the Administration under pressure to divert resources from previously planned programs. On balance, I believe we should concentrate our efforts on the supplementals and amendments already transmitted to the Congress, avoiding the risks of raising expectations for increased aid to Sudan, Oman and Thailand.

So be it

Following final action by the Congress, we will have the option of considering reprogramming alternatives as well as reviewing the risks that additional U.S. aid to these countries would encourage other donors, particularly the Saudis, to hold back on the assumption the U.S. will do more.

Additional Defense FMS Proposals. I agree with Secretary Vance that we should not request additional FMS financing for Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Yemen.

Your Decision

Sudan/Oman

Approve the proposed 1980 budget amendments for Sudan and Oman. (State, Defense) (NSC)

✓ 

Disapprove these proposed additional budget amendments. (OMB)

Thailand

Authorize State to support House increase of \$15 million FMS financing for Thailand in 1980. (State, Defense) (NSC)

Support 1980 budget level of \$25 million for Thailand. (OMB)

✓ 

Additional Defense Recommendation

Approve 1980 increases in FMS financing of \$10 million each for Thailand and Indonesia and \$5 million for Malaysia. (Defense) (NSC)

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Declassify Review for De-
classification on 4/25/85

CONFIDENTIAL

4

Disapprove proposed increases for Thailand,
Indonesia, and Malaysia. (State, OMB)

✓

J

If you approve the State recommendation, you should sign the letters to
Chairmen Zablocki (Tab 1) and Church (Tab 2) attached to Secretary
Vance's memorandum (Tab A).

Attachments

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CLASSIFIED BY _____
 Declassify Review for De-
classification on _____

BRZEZINSKI MEMO

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VANCE MEMO

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LETTERS TO CONGRESS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am transmitting to the Congress an amendment to my fiscal year 1980 budget that will provide for a Foreign Military Sales financing program of \$15,000,000 for Oman, and a \$40,000,000 Security Supporting Assistance program and a \$10,000,000 increase in the Foreign Military Sales financing program for Sudan.

These programs will reinforce the moderate, constructive roles being played by Sudan and Oman in regional and bilateral affairs, and will also demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other Arab moderates that we are willing to apply US resources to the task of stabilizing and supporting moderate regimes in the Middle East. The Sudanese and Omani decisions to endorse the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and not to support Arab sanctions against Egypt increase the need for demonstrable US support for those countries.

Oman

A \$15 million Foreign Military Sales financing program will support the security of this strategically important Persian Gulf state. We anticipate that Oman would use the financing to purchase defensive military equipment, such as anti-armor missiles.

In recent years, Oman has resisted a South Yemen-supported Dhofar rebellion in southern Oman. The threat to Oman of a renewed attack from the PDRY remains alive. Past Iranian military assistance, which helped Oman to suppress the insurrection, is no longer available. Oman has sought a direct expression of US interest in its security.

Sudan

In recent years, Sudan has found itself in an adverse balance of payments position because of sharp

The Honorable
Clement Zablocki, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives.

increases in petroleum prices, a decline in balance of payments support from other countries, failure to meet export goals, and an overly ambitious development program. Although US development assistance levels are projected to rise sharply in fiscal year 1980, Sudan still will have a continuing requirement for balance of payments assistance as it works with the IMF to reform its financial management.

The inflation rate of 30-40 percent per year and a balance of payments gap of as high as \$850 million have created a very serious situation. Expected support from other donors, some of which is contingent on an IMF agreement, will help, but will not resolve it.


Additional increases in US project assistance beyond that proposed to the Congress would exacerbate the problems since such projects entail recurrent domestic costs and some additional imports. The \$40 million in Security Supporting Assistance would help alleviate the pressure on foreign exchange by financing essential commodity imports and spare parts for the vital transportation sector.

The increase of \$10 million in Foreign Military Sales financing would permit Sudan to acquire much-needed field engineering equipment. In addition, Sudan would be able to purchase other items, such as artillery, armored personnel carriers, and mobile medical units.

I have requested that the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate take the necessary action to provide authority to carry out these programs as part of its consideration of the Administration's proposed fiscal year 1980 foreign assistance authorization legislation.

I strongly urge that the Committee on Foreign Affairs support my request for these important programs.

Sincerely,



Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am transmitting to the Congress an amendment to my fiscal year 1980 budget that will provide for a Foreign Military Sales financing program of \$15,000,000 for Oman, and a \$40,000,000 Security Supporting Assistance program and a \$10,000,000 increase in the Foreign Military Sales financing program for Sudan.

These programs will reinforce the moderate, constructive roles being played by Sudan and Oman in regional and bilateral affairs, and will also demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other Arab moderates that we are willing to apply US resources to the task of stabilizing and supporting moderate regimes in the Middle East. The Sudanese and Omani decisions to endorse the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and not to support Arab sanctions against Egypt increase the need for demonstrable US support for those countries.

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In recent years, Oman has resisted a South Yemen-supported Dhofar rebellion in southern Oman. The threat to Oman of a renewed attack from the PDRY remains alive. Past Iranian military assistance, which helped Oman to suppress the insurrection, is no longer available. Oman has sought a direct expression of US interest in its security.

Sudan

In recent years, Sudan has found itself in an adverse balance of payments position because of sharp

The Honorable
Frank Church, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

increases in petroleum prices, a decline in balance of payments support from other countries, failure to meet export goals, and an overly ambitious development program. Although US development assistance levels are projected to rise sharply in fiscal year 1980, Sudan still will have a continuing requirement for balance of payments assistance as it works with the IMF to reform its financial management.

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
Additional increases in US project assistance beyond that proposed to the Congress would exacerbate the problem since such projects entail recurrent domestic costs and some additional imports. The \$40 million in Security Supporting Assistance would help alleviate the pressure on foreign exchange by financing essential commodity imports and spare parts for the vital transportation sector.

The increase of \$10 million in Foreign Military Sales financing would permit Sudan to acquire much-needed field engineering equipment. In addition, Sudan would be able to purchase other items, such as artillery, armored personnel carriers, and mobile medical units.

In order to assist the Committee in taking action on these important programs, I enclose revisions to the appropriate provisions of the Administration's proposed fiscal year 1980 security assistance authorization legislation, introduced in the Senate by request as S. 584. The revision to section 7 of the bill would amend section 532 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to increase by \$40,000,000 the fiscal year 1980 authorization of appropriations for carrying out security supporting assistance programs. The revisions to section 12 of the bill would amend section 31 of the Arms Export Control Act to increase the authorization of fiscal year 1980 appropriations for foreign military sales programs by \$2,500,000 and the fiscal year 1980 overall foreign military sales financing program ceiling by a corresponding \$25,000,000.

I strongly urge the Committee to support this request so that these important programs may be carried out.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/27/79

rick--

for handwriting file....

president's approved
version of a press release
for today.

--susan

*Construction of the
Liquid Metal
Fast Breeder nuclear
reactor at*

Thursday's House Science and Technology Committee's
vote ~~(which failed to terminate)~~ ^{to proceed with} the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor was a significant setback to a rational and
responsible nuclear energy policy. In spite of forceful
leadership by the Committee's Chairman, Don Fuqua, the
~~big nuclear energy companies and their utility customers~~
^{members of the Committee voted}
~~are trying~~ to force continuation of spending at a rate of
\$15 million per month, or more, for this unneeded project.

The ^(spell out) CRBR is technically unsound. It is a waste of
~~our taxpayers' dollars.~~ ^{more than 1 1/2 billion ?} It is inconsistent with our non-
proliferation policy.

During a time when our attention should be riveted ^{on}
~~to~~ improving the safety and operation procedures of the
light water reactor technology which we now use, the
debate over the CRBR spurred on by ~~these~~ special interests
has diverted our time and resources ^{toward a new and unnecessary plutonium}. I have proposed an ^{technology.}
orderly and scientifically sound breeder research and
development program which will make this technology avail-
able to us ^{if and} when it is needed. ~~--- well into the next century.~~

^{Now we} do not need the CRBR, which was originally under-
taken as a crash program to commercialize ^(plutonium) breeder reactors.
Corners were cut, and designs have been locked into place
without the benefit of the scientific improvements which
^{continues to make}
~~our~~ research ^{has} ~~since made~~ available.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7907189

April 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance *CV*
Subject: FY-1980 Security Assistance Budget
Amendments for Sudan and Oman

Pursuant to your decision authorizing consultations with the Congress concerning possible supplemental security assistance requests for seven countries, we have taken soundings on the Hill and concluded that only the requests for the Sudan and Oman should be forwarded to the Congress. As to those two countries, we recommend an additional \$40 million in SSA and \$10 million in FMS financing for Sudan, and \$15 million in FMS financing for Oman, to be transmitted as FY-1980 budget amendments. Support for increased aid to these two countries is based not only on their intrinsic need but also on their strong support for President Sadat and the peace process.

Additionally, the House of Representatives has added \$15 million in FMS financing to the \$25 million FY-1980 FMS budget request for Thailand. This in large measure meets the requirement we identified for that country. If you concur, we will indicate in testimony before the appropriate Congressional committees that we support the higher level as contained in the House bill.

With respect to possible programs for Malaysia, Indonesia, Kenya and Yemen, we received indications that funds for these programs would be taken from our other assistance requests. I therefore recommend that we not request supplementals for those four countries.

If you approve the Sudan and Oman proposals, it is important that we send the FY-1980 budget amendments and related proposals for changes to the FY-1980 security assistance bill to the Hill early in the week of April 23, because the Senate will begin mark-up of its security assistance authorization bill the first week in May.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Per: Pac Project

ESDN: NLC-126-16-50-1-8

BY: *KS* NARA DATE: *8/24/13*

Warren Christopher will also testify on security assistance before the SFRC on April 27 and should be prepared to answer questions about the Sudan and Oman proposals.

The Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development concur with my recommendation. In addition, the Department of Defense believes that in view of the increased security concerns in ASEAN stimulated by Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea and the acquisition of military operating rights by the Soviets in Vietnam, the Administration should request an additional \$10 million in FMS financing for Thailand and for Indonesia, and an additional \$5 million in FMS financing for Malaysia.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you approve the proposed budget amendments for Sudan and Oman and sign the attached letters to Chairmen Church and Zablocki requesting their support.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you authorize us to support the House action increasing FMS to Thailand by \$15 million for a total program of \$40 million.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Additional Department of Defense Recommendation:

That you approve an additional \$10 million in FMS financing each for Thailand (total program of \$50 million) and Indonesia (total program of \$45 million), and an additional \$5 million in FMS financing for Malaysia (total program of \$12 million).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Transmittal Letter to Chairman Zablocki.
- Tab 2 - Transmittal Letter to Chairman Church.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/27/79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

①
/

April 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

TIM KRAFT TK
ARNIE MILLER AA

SUBJECT:

National Advisory Council on Extension
and Continuing Education

The National Advisory Council on Extension and Continuing Education has four vacancies. Secretary Califano has recommended candidates for appointment, and based on our checks, we have made a change. Our revised list is as follows:

Leo C. Donohue (Massachusetts): Former Superintendent of Schools in Somerville. Highly recommended by Speaker O'Neill.

Francis M. Davin (Florida): Member (and former Chair) of the Board of County Commissioners. The Council needs a local elected official. Recommended by Phil Wise.

Rupert Trujillo (New Mexico): Associate Professor and Dean of Continuing Education and Community Service at the University of New Mexico.

Lowell R. Ecklund (Michigan): Dean and Professor of Continuing Education at Oakland University.

RECOMMENDATION:

Appoint the four new members as recommended to the National Advisory Council on Extension and Continuing Education.

✓ _____ approve

_____ disapprove

J

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
 REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF NOMINEES
 FOR PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
 (See reverse for Instructions)

Date Prepared
 9/28/78

Principal
 Alternate

Name of Companion Nominee

Name of Nominee: (last, first, middle, prof. degrees)
 Donahue, Leo C. Dr.

Business Title:
 Retired

Home Address:
 12 Benton Road
 Somerville, Massachusetts 02143

Business Address:

Date of Birth:

Place of Birth:

Agency:
 HEW/OE/BHCE/DTF/CSCE

Proposed Committee
 Member, National Advisory Council on Extension and
 Continuing Education

Initial Appointment
 Proposed Term:
 From:
 To: 6/30/81

Reappointment
 Proposed Term:
 From:
 To:

Current Term:
 From:
 To:

Name of Retiring Member:
 Dr. Charles H. Lawshe
 Termination Date: 6/30/78

Sources of Recommendations:

Name	Title	Date
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.	U.S. House of Representatives	9/15/78

Special Qualifications of Nominee (briefly describe unique qualifications)

Active in community affairs, higher education experience, special knowledge of community problems.

Type Qualifications Needed for Committee Position:

Knowledge of and expertise in community problems

Previous Membership on DHEW Committees and Terms of Office

Program Director Recommendation/Approval *DM*
 Oct 2, 78 BY: *Alfred M. ...*

Agency Head Recommendation/Approval
 10/24/78 BY: *[Signature]*

Department Committee Management Office Concurrence
 10-31-78 BY: *R.H. ...*

Assistant Secretary Recommendation/Approval
 OCT 25 1978 BY: *[Signature]*

Assistant to the Secretary Recommendation

SECRETARY'S APPROVAL
 NOV 20 1978 *[Signature]*
 Date acting Secretary

Date BY:

LEO C. DONAHUE
12 Benton Road
Somerville, Massachusetts 02143

EDUCATION

Ph.D., in History, Boston College, 1942
Ed.M., Tufts University, 1948
A.M., in History, Boston College, 1930
A.B., Boston College, 1929

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

Community Director, Cambridge-Somerville Program for Alcoholic Rehabilitation
Member, Cambridge-Somerville Mental Health Board
Vice-President, Somerville Chamber of Commerce
Director, Somerville Boys Club; Chairman, Fund Drive for \$50,000,
exceeded goal by \$10,000
Past President and Trustee, Somerville Hospital Board of Trustees

Education Member, Archdiocesan Central High Schools, Inc., Board of Trustees
Chairman, Curry College, Board of Trustees
Member, Corporation and President's Advisory Council, Bentley College
Member, St. Catherine Parish, School Committee

Church Director, National Conference of Christians and Jews
Director, Archdiocesan Council of St. Vincent de Paul; President,
St. Catherine Parish St. Vincent de Paul Conference

Banking Director, Central Cooperative Bank, Chairman of Security Committee
Chairman, Middlesex Bank Advisory Board

EXPERIENCE

Superintendent of Schools, Somerville, Mass., 1953-1974
Responsible for school system with 13,000 students,
\$12,000,000 annual budget, 1200 employees.

Assistant Superintendent, 1948-1958; Principal of Junior High and
Elementary Schools, 1933-1941; Teacher, 1929-33;
Somerville, Massachusetts.

Associate in Education, Faculty of The School of Education,
Harvard University, 1959-74.

Guest Lecturer, Boston College, Tufts University, Bentley College,
Regis College.

ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE - State and National

Massachusetts Commission to Study Public Financial Aid to Non-Public
Primary and Secondary Education
Delegate to White House Conferences on Health and Education,
1950, 1955, 1970
Member, Massachusetts Higher Education Facilities Commission
Member and Chairman, Massachusetts Board of Education and State
Board of Vocational Education, 1949-65
Trustee, Massachusetts State Colleges
Member, Massachusetts State Board of Collegiate Authority, 1949-65
Advisor, Presidential Commission on Juvenile Delinquency and
Crime Prevention, 1962
Participated in on-site evaluations of Army, Navy, and Air Force
programs

HONORS AND AWARDS

L.L.D., Hon., Curry College, 1971
L.H.D., Hon., Western New England College, 1965
Ed.D., Hon., Suffolk University, 1954
Alpha and Omega Award, Boston College, 1958
Knight of the Holy Sepulcher, 1968, named by Pope Paul VI
Past President, Boston College Alumni Association
Invited by the National Conference of Christians and Jews to
visit Israel, fall of 1977

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Member of many national and regional professional educational
associations.

FRANCES M. DAVIN
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY COMMISSIONER
DISTRICT 4

BORN: Boston, Massachusetts
July 19, 1933

BUSINESS ADDRESS: P. O. Box 1110
Tampa, Florida 33601

HOME ADDRESS: 930 Buck Court
Brandon, Florida 33511

ALUMNA: Stonehill College; Emerson College

**PROFESSIONAL
BACKGROUND:** Director of government Contract Administration, Kauke &
Inc. (Electronic Engineering Company, Los Angeles, Cal.)
Director of Personnel, Kauke & Co., Inc.
Editor of National Industrial Magazine
Past President, League of Women Voters of Hillsborough C
State Consultant, League of Women Voters of Florida

ELECTED: Board of County Commissioners, Hillsborough County, 1974

BOARD ASSIGNMENTS: Chairman, Board of County Commissioners (1977-78)
Chairman, Hospital and Welfare Board (1975-77)
Member, Tampa-Hillsborough County Library Board
Chairman, West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority
Board of Directors, Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council
Board of Directors, State Association of County Commissio
also Chairman, Social Services Committee
Chairman, Home Rule and Regional Affairs Committee,
National Association of Counties
Board of Directors, American Heart Association, Hillsboro
County
Board of Directors, United Way of Greater Tampa
Audubon Society
Tampa Bay Area on Foreign Relations
Plant City Arts Council
Athena Society
Rape Crisis Center Advisory Council

MEMBERSHIPS:

APPOINTMENTS: Statewide Phosphate Land Use Advisory Committee
701 Policy Review Council, Department of Community
Affairs, State of Florida
Task Force on Civil Rights; President's Reorganization
Project, Washington, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
 REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF NOMINEES
 FOR PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
 (See reverse for Instructions)

Date Prepared Principal
 August 22, 1978 Alternate
 Name of Companion Nominee

Name of Nominee: (last, first, middle, prof. degrees) **Trujillo, Robert Dr.** Business Title: **Dean**

Home Address: **908 Grecian Way, NW
 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87107** Business Address: **Division of Continuing Education and
 Community Service - The University of New
 Mexico - Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131**

Date of Birth: **March 2, 1932** Place of Birth: **Raton, New Mexico**

Agency: **HEW/OE/BHCE/DTF/CSCE** Proposed Committee: **Member, National Advisory Council on Extension and
 Continuing Education**

Initial Appointment Proposed To: **From: To: 6/30/81** Reappointment Proposed Term: **From: To:** Current Term: **From: To:** Name of Retiring Member: **John L. Blackburn** Termination Date: **6/30/78**

Sources of Recommendations:

Name	Title	Date
Lloyd M. Davis	Executive Director, National University Extension Association	6/7/78

Special Qualifications of Nominee (briefly describe unique qualifications)

Experience in teaching and administration including bilingual/bicultural concerns, management of continuing education/community service programs; male, Hispanic

Type Qualifications Needed for Committee Position:

Knowledgeable about continuing and extension education

Previous Membership on DHEW Committees and Terms of Office

Program Director Recommendation/Approval: **8/22/78** BY: *[Signature]* Agency Head Recommendation/Approval: **10/24/78** BY: *[Signature]*

Department Committee Management Office Concurrence: **10-31-78** BY: *[Signature]* Assistant Secretary Recommendation/Approval: **OCT 25 1978** BY: *[Signature]*

Assistant to the Secretary Recommendation: **NOV 20 1978** BY: *[Signature]* SECRETARY'S APPROVAL



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
 REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF NOMINEES
 FOR PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEES
 (See reverse for Instructions)

Date Prepared **September 29, 1978** Principal Alternate

Name of Companion Nominee

Name of Nominee: (last, first, middle, prof. degrees) **Eklund, Lowell R. Dr.** Business Title: **Dean (and Professor) of Continuing Education**

Home Address: **2464 Devonshire Road
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013** Business Address: **Oakland University
Rochester, Michigan 48063**

Date of Birth: **October 5, 1917** Place of Birth: **Brookston, Minnesota**

Agency: **HEW/OE/BHCE/DTF/CSCE** Proposed Committee: **Member, National Advisory Council on Extension and Continuing Education**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Initial Appointment Proposed Term From: To: 6/30/81	<input type="checkbox"/> Reappointment Proposed Term From: To:	Current Term: From: To:	Name of Retiring Member: Pamela R. Melton Termination Date: 6/30/78
--	---	--------------------------------	--

Sources of Recommendations:

Name	Title	Date
Peggy Rainwater	White House Staff	8/28/78

Special Qualifications of Nominee (briefly describe unique qualifications)
Active leadership roles in adult education, experience in extension and continuing education, author, lecturer.

Type Qualifications Needed for Committee Position
Experience in community service and continuing education and a broad knowledge of how programs in this area can best serve local and national needs.

Previous Membership on DHEW Committees and Terms of Office

Program Director Recommendation/Approval Oct 2, '78 BY: Alfred M. ...	Agency Head Recommendation/Approval 10/24/78 BY: [Signature]
--	---

Department Committee Management Office Concurrence 10-31-78 BY: RH ...	Assistant Secretary Recommendation/Approval OCT 25 1978 BY: [Signature]
---	--

Assistant to the Secretary Recommendation BY: _____	SECRETARY'S APPROVAL NOV 20 1978 [Signature] Acting Secretary
--	--

RESUME

LOWELL R. EKLUND

Home Address: 2464 Devonshire Road, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013

Birthdate: October 5, 1917 - Brookston, Minnesota

Nationality: Swedish - German

Family: Married, one daughter, 30 years

Education: B. S., Michigan State University 1939
M. S., Syracuse University 1948
Maxwell Fellowship 1948 - 1949
Ph. D., Syracuse University* 1956
Doctoral Thesis: "Service Function of a State University"

Professional Experience

1940 - 1954 Officer, Regular Army (2nd Lieutenant to Lt. Colonel)
Regular Army appointment on competitive examination
Served as Troop Commander; Staff Officer (2 years overseas - Pacific Theater)
Post war duty included three years Fort Shafter, Hawaii, as
Special Assistant to Commanding General; 5 years General Staff,
Pentagon, as planning officer; executive officer, Research and
Development Division; administrative assistant to Undersecretary
of Army; Aide to Chief of Staff; three major service schools.
Planned and taught evening courses in management at University
of Hawaii while in service.
(Currently, /member of USAR; Colonel) **
/retired

1954 - 1958 Academic Administration and Teaching

1954 - 1956
Regional Director, Continuing Education, Michigan State University,
for Southeastern Michigan (including Detroit). Organized, promoted,
and administered off-campus credit and non-credit courses and pro-
grams and represented University in public relations capacity, includ-
ing Alumni Relations, and some legislative activity.

1956 - 1958
Director, University Conferences, and Associate Professor,
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan. Responsible
(with six professional assistants) for planning, designing, and
administering over 400 adult residential conferences for 60,000
conferees each year.

* Majored in Public Administration at the federal level with
emphasis on organization and management

** 1965-1977 Active reserve status with Selective Service System
C.O. of Detroit SSS Unit for five years.

1958 to date

Academic Administration and Teaching (continued)

Dean (and Professor) of Continuing Education, Oakland University

As one of the first two professional appointments for this new University, helped develop physical and curricular plans for the institution, and initiated the adult education program. Designed, promoted, and presented the first academic programs of Oakland University, commencing September, 1958.

Organized, staffed, and conducted at Meadow Brook Hall a high level seminar of national leaders in the field to explore the optimum Continuing Education program for the Oakland community. After ten years of operation, program is now serving over 6,000 adult students each year in courses, and approximately 6,000 in conferences and institutes.

Organized and assumed responsibility for functions of University Placement and Alumni Relations departments.

Organized and administered University-Community Arts Council winter concert series: 1960 - 1963.

Taught graduate seminars (extension) in adult education for Michigan State University (approximately one per year).

Member, Chancellor's (now President) Administrative Group.

1967 - 1969 Responsible to Chancellor for general oversight of management of the Meadow Brook Theater with annual budget of \$500,000.

Consultant to universities (Canada, United States, Puerto Rico), professional associations, etc., on continuing education facilities and programs.

Organized and launched new cultural and Continuing Education Center, Meadow Brook Hall at Oakland University with 70,000-100,000 conferees and participants each year.

Research Grants and Contracts

Authored an experimental program in Alumni Education in which the University cooperates with employing agencies in professional and personal developmental education for the alumnus' entire career. Proposed project to Kellogg Foundation and a preliminary grant for \$60,000 was authorized, which was renewed for \$185,000 in 1966.

Presented a proposal for support by the Mott Foundation of a varied program of community services which was approved in 1965 for \$132,500 per year on an open-ended basis. Organized, staffed and launched the program under the grant. Served as Director of the Mott

PUBLICATIONS

Eklund, Lowell: "The Alumni University - Education's New Frontier,"
Adult Education Spring 1961 edition, issued quarterly by The Adult Education
Association of the U. S. A.: 161 - 171.

Eklund, Lowell: "Some Further Comments," NUEA SPECTATOR, December 1962-
January 1963 edition: 5 - 6.

Eklund, Lowell: "The Oakland Plan," Alma Mater Journal of the American Alumni
Council, No. 5: November, 1964: 16 - 17.

Eklund, Lowell: "The Pursuit of Excellence," New England Purchaser, Boston,
Massachusetts, August, 1966: 12 - 13.

Also: Southwestern Purchasing Agent, Los Angeles, California,
September, 1966: 7 - 12.

Oregon Purchaser, Portland, Oregon, September, 1966: 16, 36, 37.

Eklund, Lowell, Ph. D.: "Continuing Education for Internists," The Journal of the
American Osteopathic Association, January, 1967: 66 - 502-511.

Eklund, Lowell: "The Oakland Plan for the Continuing Education of Alumni," Adult
Leadership, November, 1966:

Contributor (Chapter Essay on "Aging and Education") to Russell Sage Foundation
3 volume publication on Aging and the Professions published November, 1969.

Professional Papers Published:

"Post Graduate Professional Education," Galaxy Conference (Adult Education Organizations),
Washington, D. C.

"Residential Adult Education," dedicatory address, Rutgers University Continuing Educa-
tion Center.

"New Markets in Continuing Education," Rio Piedras Campus, University of Puerto Rico.

25 - 30 major speaking engagements annually.

PUBLICATIONS

Eklund, Lowell: "The Alumni University - Education's New Frontier,"
Adult Education Spring 1961 edition, issued quarterly by The Adult Education
Association of the U. S. A.: 161 - 171.

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Leadership, November, 1966:

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Washington, D.C.

"Residential Adult Education," dedicatory address, Rutgers University Continuing Educa-
tion Center.

"New Markets in Continuing Education," Rio Piedras Campus, University of Puerto Rico.

25 - 30 major speaking engagements annually.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXTENSION AND CONTINUING
EDUCATION

Independent

AUTHORITY: 29 U.S.C. 1009 (a), 1233b, 1233c
ORDER, 5/5/72, by the President

METHOD: Ex officio and appointed by the President

MEMBERS: ONE representative of the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Labor, Interior,
State, and Housing and Urban Development
Office of Economic Opportunity,
and of such other Federal agencies having extension
education responsibilities as the President may designate
Department of Justice,
Small Business Administration,
and
TWELVE members appointed by the President
(shall include persons knowledgeable in fields of
extension and continuing education, State and local
officials, and other persons having special knowl-
edge, experience, or qualification with respect to
community problems, and persons representative
of the general public.)

NOTE: - Where the President fails to appoint a member
to fill a vacancy in the membership of a Presi-
dential advisory council within sixty days after
it occurs, then the Secretary of HEW shall
immediately appoint a member to fill such
vacancy. -- (P. L. 93-363, 8/21/74 (86 Stat. 575)

CHAIRMAN: Elected by the members of the Council

Continued

NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXTENSION AND CONTINUING
EDUCATION

Independent

TERM: Members shall serve for terms of not to exceed three years and the initial members shall serve staggered terms. (NOT HOLDOVERS) (20 U.S.C. 1233b - Although not specified it is assumed that vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term.)

SALARY: Members who are not regular full-time employees of the United States shall be entitled to receive compensation at a rate fixed by the Commissioner of Education, but not exceeding the daily rate of a GS-18, including travel-time. (20 U.S.C. 1233c)

PURPOSE: Advise the Commissioner of Education in preparation of general regulations and policies to eliminate duplication of continuing education programs. Make ANNUAL reports commencing March 31, 1967 of its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and to the President. President shall transmit each such report to the Congress together with his comments.

TERMINATION: Subject to section 448(b) of the General Education Provisions Act, the Council shall continue to exist until June 30, 1975. (P.L. 93-383, 5/21/74 (82 Stat. 693))

Notwithstanding the above the Council shall continue in existence until June 30, 1976. (See attached correspondence from the Council regarding this matter).

Subject to 20 U.S.C. 1233g, the Council shall continue to exist until the programs authorized are terminated (20 U.S.C. 1009(f). P. L. 94-482, Title I Sec. 101, 90 Stat. 2083, of 10/12/76 provides for appropriations to be authorized for these programs through fiscal year 1979. (20 U.S.C. 1001) Therefore, the Council can continue in existence until 9-30, 1979.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/27/79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1979

C
/

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

TIM KRAFT *TK*
ARNIE MILLER *AAA*

SUBJECT:

Merit Systems Protection Board Vacancy

The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is one of the three new agencies created by the civil service reorganization plan. This three-member, bipartisan board will adjudicate employee grievances and personnel rule violations formerly vested in the Civil Service Commission.

In December you nominated Ruth Prokop to be Chairman, and Ersa Poston as Republican member of MSPB. Both nominations are currently pending in the Senate.

The quasi-judicial nature of MSPB suggests that someone with a strong legal background and a familiarity with governmental operations should be appointed to the final vacancy.

Attorney Ronald P. Wertheim is a partner in the firm of Ginsburg, Fedlman and Bress, Washington, D.C. He is primarily engaged in civil litigation in Federal courts involving corporate mergers and securities law, commercial matters, and FTC enforcement proceedings.

He has served as Deputy General Counsel of the Peace Corps (1964-1966), Peace Corps Director in Brazil (1966-1968), Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Law of the Sea negotiations, Alternate U.S. Representative to U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (1977), and as Special Counsel to HUD. He is a very good lawyer. Comments about him are attached.


Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

Stu and Ruth Prokop join us in the following recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION

Nominate Ronald P. Wertheim as a Member of the Merit Systems Protection Board.

 ✓ approve disapprove



**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

RONALD P. WERTHEIM
Washington, D.C.

EXPERIENCE

1969 - Present Attorney, Ginsburg, Feldman and
Bress, Washington, D.C.

1977 Advisor to Secretary of Defense
for Law of the Sea Negotiations
and Alternate U.S. Representa-
tive to U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea

1966 - 1968 Peace Corps Director, Northeast
Brazil

1964 - 1966 Deputy General Counsel, The Peace
Corps

1961 - 1964 Associate Professor of Law,
University of Virginia

1959 - 1961 Assistant Public Defender,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1957 - 1959 Attorney, Dechert, Price & Rhoads,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

EDUCATION

1962 Hague Academy of International
Law, Diploma

1957 University of Pennsylvania, J.D.

1954 Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, B.S.

ACTIVITIES

Trustee, Arena Stage
Board of Directors, Associates for Renewal in
Education, Advisory & Learning Exchange
Trustee, Children's Museum for Inquiry and
Discovery
Founding Member, Washington Society of English Buffs

PERSONAL

White Male
Age 45
Democrat

COMMENTS ON RONALD P. WERTHEIM

Jill Wine Volner, General Counsel, Department of the Army

"I have known Ron personally and professionally for a number of years. He is a very bright attorney, a thorough researcher, and an excellent advocate. He is also a person of great integrity and character."

Alan Morrison, Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School and Chief Counsel, Public Citizens Litigation Group

"Ron is a very able lawyer and a very dedicated person, whom I hold in the highest regard. He is willing to leave a lucrative law practice to serve in government and I have no doubt his contribution will be tremendous."

Charles F. C. Ruff, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice

"Ron Wertheim is an outstanding attorney of the highest integrity and character. He was successful in appealing a conviction I had won in the Watergate trial of Robert Mardian and I have the utmost respect for him."

Togo West, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

"Ron is a good sound lawyer and his firm has an excellent reputation. He is thorough, bright, and quite competent. He would be an excellent member of the Merit Systems Protection Board."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4/27/79

Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
your information.

Rick Hutcheson

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

ROOM 318
1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET
CAMBRIDGE,
MASSACHUSETTS 02138
PHONE (617) 495-3220

December 11, 1978

*This -
info
J*

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale
Vice President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Fritz:

Haru and I have followed all that you and Joan have been doing these past two years with great interest and also with a bit of reflected pride, but, knowing how overwhelming your jobs are, we have avoided bothering you. I don't think we even sent an initial note of congratulation. But a situation has arisen, that induces me to write you as a way to draw not only your attention but that of the President to what I feel is a great opportunity to try to tackle one of our major world problems.

The problem I refer to is the growing strain in our economic relations with Japan, which has given rise to some rather serious grassroots political reactions in this country and equally serious irritations in Japan. Economic frictions of this sort appear to be cyclical but with each cycle become more severe because of the growing relative size of the Japanese economy. They are not easy to avoid because the Japanese economy is gradually establishing itself as being more efficient than ours, and it is quite differently geared. It shows a greater and steadier drive for growth, and, at times of economic recession, when we and the Europeans are likely to cut production to maintain profits, the Japanese economy does its best to maintain full production. To do this it is likely to export a greater percentage of its product than usual, thus compounding the problems for us. The reasons for this different gearings of our respective economies lie deep in Japanese psychology and social organization and will not change quickly.

So far I have not been much impressed with our efforts to ameliorate the situation. We seem to concentrate too much on little side issues that cannot have a very great overall effect and do so with far too much publicity, producing a lot of political heat for the modest gains achieved. The usual temporary solution to these crises, as it probably will be again this time, is the application by the Japanese of so-called "voluntary restraints" on exports, but this normally comes only after the political damage has been done and a great deal of ill will has built up on both sides.

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for Preservation Purposes

As things are now going, we may not be in a much better position than we are now when the next cycle comes around, say in four or five years. But by that time we are likely to have a more protectionist congress than now and the Japanese economy will be relatively still larger, making things worse. In fact they may get entirely out of hand. I can imagine an economic blow up starting with an American-Japanese crisis which could start the whole trading world on a downward spiral, paralleling the dismal 1920s that were the prelude to world catastrophe.

There are several related problems. One is that Japan has been reluctant to pull its weight in world economic and political affairs, both in the problems within the group of advanced trading nations and in North-South relations with the so-called developing world, which may in the long run prove the most dangerous problems of all. On the Japanese side also, because of their very vulnerable position, they have good reason to desire some deeper commitments from us. They need guarantees on the availability of necessary supplies from us. Our stupid soybean embargo of 1973 is still remembered. As a stable democracy and major American partner, they also deserve to be clearly placed in a category in our strategic commitments parallel to Western Europe and far ahead of such unstable and undemocratic countries as the Philippines and South Korea, where, except in very special circumstances, the American public may well not support our military commitment if it were put to the test.

What is necessary, I feel, is to work out more fundamental and lasting agreements with the Japanese on the very threatening economic problems that loom between us and also on these other matters of concern. On the economic side, we would want them to play a much more active role in North-South relations and in smoothing out our recurrent trade problems. They would have to take much more positive steps than they have so far to open up their markets to industrial goods and thus help balance trade a little more in this way. Beyond that it will probably be necessary to have a system of automatic limitations on trade imbalances and also on sudden spurts of export growth in specific fields in order to avoid intolerable domestic political strains. This of course is not just a Japanese-American problem but a growing world-wide problem, but a good place to start may be in American-Japanese trade relations. My specific suggestions may not be the right ones--I don't pretend to be an economist--but as a historian and a longtime observer of Japanese-American relations I am sure that something quite fundamental should be done now while we still have the time.

All this may be obvious enough and I present it merely as an introduction to my main point. What I really am writing about is the opportunity we now have to work effectively on these problems. This opportunity is the emergence of Ohira as the Japanese prime minister. I am afraid that it may not be fully realized in Washington what an opportunity he presents or how to go about taking advantage of it.

It may sound immodest, but I feel I can write about this with some confidence, because I suspect that no one in our government knows Ohira as well as I do. I had very close dealings with him during my five and a half years as ambassador (he was Foreign Minister for two of those years), and we established a very close relationship. The fact that we were born the same year may have helped and also that he is a Christian, which he mentioned to me 17 years ago, though I have seen it in print for the first time either in English or Japanese only in recent weeks. I found him always completely reliable, very wise, and extremely competent in getting things done in the quiet, behind-the-scenes Japanese way. In a couple of matters I particularly remember, both of which involved very large and somewhat touchy national interests, he simply told me that he understood what I was saying and that he would arrange matters but wanted me to say nothing more to anybody, and in both cases the problems were solved very satisfactorily from the American point of view and in a remarkably short period of time with no undesirable publicity.

From these and other experiences I have developed a complete trust in his reliability, his good sense, his friendship for the United States, and his skill as a politician in the Japanese style. The problem is that he has a very Japanese personality and style of operation that makes it difficult for Americans to get to know him and appreciate him. But behind his sleepy-looking, non-committal exterior is a man of outstanding integrity and extraordinary ability. I believe he is the most astute and capable politician and the man of greatest intellectual depth and breadth to have achieved the prime ministership in recent years. The only prime minister at all comparable was Ikeda, and it is possible that some of Ikeda's statesmanlike qualities were inspired by Ohira, who was his close associate. In Ohira we may well have the first Japanese prime minister who has the statesmanship and the political skills and daring to be able to deal with the big problems that our two countries are now jointly facing, and I feel it would be a tragedy not to try to take advantage of this situation.

The way to go about it, I feel, is for the President to try to establish close personal relations with Ohira, but in a very quiet, unostentatious way. If this can be done, the two of them might then mull over together the broad problems, allowing plenty of time for Ohira to come up with his own way of approaching them. It will not be easy to get the Japanese government and people to take the leadership in world economic matters and to take the steps that are needed of them, and Ohira will require a good bit of time and space for tactical maneuver, but I think he can understand the requirements of the situation and that he has the skills to meet them, though he would have to work on his own schedule and in his own quiet way. Open negotiation and haggling over details would only make his task harder. It is for this reason that an approach to these problems at the Presidential level but in a very informal manner would seem the best way to take advantage of the high quality of the man we are lucky enough to find at the helm in Japan. And, incidentally,

my own reading of the situation is that Ohira is likely to last there quite a bit longer than his three immediate predecessors have, who averaged only two years each.

I am reluctant to presume on our personal relationship to make demands on your time in this way, but the matter seemed to me of sufficiently great importance to justify doing so. Haru joins me in sending our best wishes to you and Joan and our hopes that you will both be able to keep up your fine work of which we are all so proud.

Sincerely,



Edwin O. Reischauer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4/27/79

Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

ps - I called Patty Pettit and told her - no copy sent. McKinney's announcement will be Monday.

FOR STAFFING
FOR INFORMATION
FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
NO DEADLINE
LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

ADMIN CONFID
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
EYES ONLY

	VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
X	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT *TK*
ARNIE MILLER *AM*

SUBJECT: Federal Home Loan Bank Board

*Tim -
Keep Confidential
until Bob's resignation
is public
J*

The Federal Home Loan Bank Board supervises and regulates savings and loan associations, operates the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and directs the Federal Home Loan Bank System. It is a three member, bipartisan board, presently chaired by Bob McKinney. You appointed Anita Miller as the Democratic Member in March 1978. Each Member serves a fixed term of four years. Bob McKinney has just submitted his resignation.

There is a non-Democratic vacancy on the Board. There are two candidates for this position.

Richard T. Pratt, Ph.D., Professor of Finance at the University of Utah, has had extensive experience with bank board activities and home financing, both here and abroad. He has served as the Public Interest Director of the Seattle Bank, and as a consultant to both the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. For AID, he conducted housing finance studies in Korea, Chile, and Egypt. Two of his private sector consulting clients are Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation, the largest mortgage insurance company in the country, and Weyerhaeuser Corporation. Several state Savings & Loan Leagues have been clients as well.

Bob McKinney strongly recommends his appointment because of his financial experience and the financial problems confronting the Board.

Andrew A. DiPrete, Attorney, and a partner in a large and successful law firm in Providence, Rhode Island also merits consideration. For three years during the Chafee administration he served as Director of the State's Department of Business Regulation, an agency with jurisdiction over all categories of financial institutions and insurance companies.

RICHARD T. PRATT
Salt Lake City, Utah

EXPERIENCE

1973 - Present	Professor of Finance, University of Utah
1970 - Present	President, Richard T. Pratt Associates
1967 - 1969	Chief Economist, U.S. Savings and Loan League
1966 - 1973	Associate Professor of Finance, University of Utah
1965 - 1966	Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Iowa

EDUCATION

1966	Indiana University, Doctor of Business Administration
1962	University of Utah, M.B.A.
1961	University of Utah, B.S.

ACTIVITIES

Consultant, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation
Economic consultant, Department of Defense
Consultant, Agency for International Development,
Office of Housing, Department of State for
countries of Egypt, Chile, Portugal, and Korea
Economic consultant, Federal Home Loan Bank of
Seattle
Contractor, National Savings and Loan League, Thailand
Member, Board of Directors, Wycoff Company, and
Chairman of Wycoff Development Committee

PERSONAL

White Male
Age 39
Republican

ANDREW A. DiPRETE
Providence, Rhode Island

EXPERIENCE

1965 - Present	Partner, Tillinghast, Collins and Graham
1963 - 1965	Director, Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation
1961 - 1965	Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer, Smith Estates, Inc. and Incorporated Estates. (Related closely-held investment companies)
1960 - 1961	Partner, Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons
1963 - 1960	Associate, Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons

EDUCATION

1953	Yale Law School, LL.B.
1950	Harvard College, A.B., with honors

CIVIC AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

American Bar Association
Rhode Island Bar Association
Board of Trustees of Rhode Island State Colleges
Board of Directors, Rhode Island Legal Services
Rhode Island Association for Retarded Citizens
Special Supreme Court Commission on Disciplinary Procedure

PERSONAL

White Male
Age 50
Republican

COMMENTS ON RICHARD T. PRATT

Peter Kim, Director, Housing Investment Guarantee Program,
Agency for International Development

"Richard Pratt has really been great in the work that he has done for us. He's a top-notch professional, hard working and very good. We have used him to set up savings and loan infrastructures in less developed countries, as one potential solution to their housing problems, and we've been extremely pleased with his work. He is held in high regard by his professional peers and we intend to continue using him."

Donald Kaplan, Kaplan and Smith, Economic Consultants,
Formerly Director of Research and Chief Economist at the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board

"I've come to know Richard Pratt and his work from several different perspectives. When I was on the Harvard Business School faculty as a Professor of Finance I became familiar with his academic work through the various publications in our field. When I was with the Bank Board I was familiar with his service as Public Interest Director of the Seattle Bank and his consulting work with the mortgage corporation and the Bank Board. Now, since starting my own business, we see each other at various industry and trade association meetings. This man knows the industry, and knows what it needs in the way of regulations. His work has been consistently outstanding and it has earned him a very, very strong reputation. He would be a clearly superior choice for a spot on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board."

Kim Fletcher, President, Home Federal Savings and Loan
(Sixth Largest in the U.S.), San Diego, California

"Mr. Pratt is a student of the industry, he knows it extremely well. He's a thinker; he's very capable. I met him at the first Mid-Winter Housing Conference he sponsored for chief executive officers of savings and loan associations about eight years ago. There may have been 20 of us present at the first one but that number has now grown to 75 or 80. His understanding of our industry, its problems and what's needed to solve them has been first-rate. His work with variable rate mortgage plans and graduated payment mortgage plans has facilitated the introduction of an element of much needed flexibility in home financing."

Maury Mann, Vice Chairman, Warburg, Paribas, Becker, Inc.,
Formerly President, San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank
Board

"He's bright, energetic, and well respected by the industry in spite of challenging it from time to time when he felt it was needed. He has everything you would want in a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. He's a recognized expert in the field of home financing and he fully understands the implications of regulation and its effect on overall economic policy."

COMMENTS ON ANDREW A. DiPRETE

The Honorable John Pastore, Chairman, Columbia National Bank, Providence, Rhode Island, Former U.S. Senator

"You couldn't make a better choice than Andy DiPrete. When he served the State as Director of the Office of Business Regulation, he was known for his fairness to banks and savings and loan associations, and all other financial organizations as well. When you get that kind of reaction from competitors you had to have done a lot of things correctly. He had to give some and take some from all of them but he never showed any favoritism."

Thomas Calderone, Director, Office of Business Regulation, State of Rhode Island

"I serve in a capacity that Mr. DiPrete served in some years ago, and that gives me a rather unique perspective from which to comment. He gets very high marks from employees who remain in the department, as well as from individuals in the various industries he had contact with while in this position. Words like solid, dependable, moderate, progressive are the ones you're most likely to hear from someone describing DiPrete. He has a first rate reputation throughout the State."

G. Myron Leach, President, Old Colony Cooperative Bank, and Newport National Bank, Providence, Rhode Island

"DiPrete is in every respect qualified for a seat on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. His experience as a regulator, a savings and loan board member, and as an attorney with several savings and loans, banks and bank holding companies as clients, and a strong reputation he has in each regard, warrant the strongest consideration. I have known him for some time and the prestige and esteem he enjoys is richly deserved."

John Cummings, Chief Executive Officer, Industrial Bank, Providence, Rhode Island

"Andrew DiPrete has had a very distinguished career here in Rhode Island. He is highly respected as a fair and honest attorney, who is conscientious and thorough in his representation of his clients. When he served as a regulator of financial institutions here he was straightforward, and even-handed and went about his duties as his conscience dictated. He was not identified as being either pro-industry or pro-consumer; he understood the need for the judicious use of regulatory authority and he applied it accordingly."


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4-28-79

To Top Administration Officials

No issue facing our administration, our nation or the world is more important than SALT. I want you personally to study these materials and to become thoroughly familiar with the subject. Please rely on this information and on my speech emphases in any public presentation of SALT issues.

Thank you -

 Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1979

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JERRY RAFSHOON 

RE: SALT Theme

Attached is a packet of materials on SALT which we will be distributing to all Administration officials who may be involved in presenting the issue to the public. It includes:

1. A copy of your ANPA speech
2. A theme paper which summarizes the speech
3. A summary of the Treaty

We would like to include a cover note from you, handwritten. If you will do this I suggest the following language:

"No issue facing this Administration, our nation or our world is more important than SALT. I want everyone in my Administration to become deeply familiar with the subject. Please study the attached materials and rely on them in any public presentation of SALT."

Also, in a few days we will have the speech reprinted in booklet form and a short film based on the speech.

I put these issues to you today because they need discussion and debate, and because the voices of the American people must be heard.

In the months ahead, we will do all in our power to explain the Treaty clearly and fully to the American people. I know that Members of Congress from both parties will join in this effort to insure an informed public debate.

During this debate, it is important that we exercise care. We will be sharing with the Congress some of our most sensitive defense and intelligence secrets. And the leaders in Congress must insure that these secrets will be guarded carefully so that the debate itself does not undermine our security.

As the national discussion takes place, let us be clear about what the issues are -- and are not.

- Americans are committed to maintaining a strong defense. That is not the issue.

- We will continue to compete -- and compete effectively -- with the Soviet Union. That is not the issue.

The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless arms competition. That is the choice we face -- between an imperfect world with SALT II and an imperfect, and more dangerous, world without it.

With SALT II, we will have:

- significant reductions in Soviet strategic forces;
- far greater certainty in our defense planning and in the knowledge of the threats we face;
- flexibility to meet our defense needs;
- the foundation for further controls on nuclear and conventional arms; and
- our own self-respect and the earned respect of the world for a United States committed to the works of peace.

Without SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable of an enormous further buildup.

Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending.

Without SALT, we would end up with thousands more strategic nuclear warheads on both sides, with far greater costs -- and less security -- for our citizens.

Without SALT, we would see improved relations with the Soviet Union replaced by heightened tensions.

Without SALT, the long, slow process of arms control, so central to building a safer world, would be dealt a crippling blow.

Without SALT, the world would be forced to conclude that America had chosen confrontation rather than cooperation and peace.

We must also keep in mind that quite apart from SALT limits, our security is affected by the extent of our information about Soviet strategic forces. With this SALT II treaty, that vital information will be much more accessible to us.

The agreement specifically forbids interference with the systems used for monitoring compliance. It prohibits any deliberate concealment that would impede verification. Any such concealment activity would itself be detectable, and a violation of this agreement would be so serious as to give us grounds to cancel the Treaty itself.

As I have said many times, the stakes are too high to rely on trust -- or even on the Soviets' rational inclination to act in their own best interest. The Treaty must -- and will be -- verifiable from the day it is signed.

Finally, how does SALT II fit into the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union?

Because SALT II will make the world safer and our own nation more secure, it is in our national interest to control nuclear weapons even as we compete with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

A SALT agreement in no way limits our ability to promote our interests and to answer Soviet threats to those interests.

We will continue to support the independence of Third World nations who struggle to stay free.

We will continue to promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional disputes, and to oppose efforts by any others to inflame those disputes with outside force.

And we will continue to work for human rights.

It is a delusion to believe that rejection of SALT would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new restraint in troubled areas. The actual effect might be precisely the opposite. The most intransigent and hostile elements of the Soviet power structure would be encouraged and strengthened by a rejection of SALT. The Soviets might well feel that they have little to lose by creating new international tensions.

A rejection of SALT II would have significance beyond the fate of a single treaty. It would mean a radical turning away from America's long-term policy of seeking world peace, the control of nuclear weapons, and the easing of tensions between Americans and the Soviet people under a system of international law based on mutual interests.

The rejection of SALT II would result in a more perilous world. As I said at Georgia Tech on February 20: "Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction -- as serious as it may be in its own right -- will take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For it would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability. It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous element of our military competition under control."

For these reasons, we will not try to impose binding linkage between Soviet behavior and SALT -- and we will not accept any Soviet attempts to link SALT with aspects of our own foreign policy of which they may disapprove.

Again, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It is an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interest of the United States.

In short, SALT II places serious limits on what the Soviets might do in the absence of the agreement. For example, without SALT II, the Soviet Union could build up to some 3000 strategic weapons by 1985. With SALT, we will both be limited to 2250 such weapons.

This new arms control agreement will obviously serve our national interests. It will reduce the dangerous levels of strategic arms and restrain the development of future weapons. It will help to maintain our relative strength compared to the Soviets, and will avert a costly, risky, and pointless buildup of missile launchers and bombers -- at the end of which both sides would be even less secure.

Let me turn now to the third of the four questions I listed at the beginning: How can we know whether the Soviets are living up to their obligations under this SALT agreement?

No objective has commanded more energy and attention in our negotiations. We have insisted that the SALT II agreement be made verifiable. We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it.

Our confidence in the verifiability of the agreement derives from the size and nature of the activities we must monitor and the many effective and sophisticated intelligence collection systems which we possess.

For example, nuclear submarines take several years to construct and assemble. Missile silos and their supporting equipment are large and visible. Intercontinental bombers are built at a few plants and need major airfields. Our photoreconnaissance satellites survey the entire Soviet Union on a regular basis and give us high confidence that we will be able to count accurately the numbers of all these systems.

But our independent verification capabilities are not limited only to observing these large-scale activities. We can determine not only how many systems there are, but what they can do. Our photographic satellites and other systems enable us to follow technological developments in Soviet strategic forces with great accuracy. There is no question that any cheating which might affect our national security would be discovered in time for us to respond fully.

For many years we have monitored Soviet strategic forces and Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreement with a high degree of confidence. This overall capability remains. It was certainly not lost with our observation stations in Iran, which was only one of many intelligence sources we use for following Soviet strategic activities.

We are concerned with that loss, but we must keep it in perspective.

This monitoring capability relates principally to the portion of the agreement dealing with the modernization limits on ICBMs and to only a portion of such modernization.

The sensitive intelligence techniques cannot be disclosed in public, but the bottom line is that if there is an effort to cheat on the SALT agreement -- including the limits on modernizing ICBMs -- we will detect it, and we will do so in time fully to protect our security.

MORE

systems are still formidable. The missiles to be torn down are comparable in age and payload to our Minuteman II and Polaris missiles. Under the agreement, they will not be permitted to replace these systems with modern ones. Our own operational forces have been kept somewhat below the permitted ceiling. Thus, under the agreement, we could increase our force level, if necessary.

SALT II will also impose the first limited but important restraints on the race to build new systems and improve existing ones -- the so-called "qualitative" arms race.

- First, within mutually accepted limits, we must modernize our own strategic forces. Along with the strengthening of NATO, that is a central purpose of the increased defense budget I have submitted to the Congress -- improvements necessary even in a time of fiscal restraint.
- Second, we must place more stringent limits on the arms race than are presently imposed by SALT I. That is the purpose of the SALT II Treaty.

The defense budget I have submitted will ensure that our nuclear force continues to be essentially equivalent to that of the Soviet Union.

This year we have begun to equip our submarines with new, more powerful and longer-range Trident I missiles. Next year, the first of our new, even more secure Trident submarines will be going to sea, and we are working on a more powerful and accurate Trident II missile for these submarines.

Our cruise missile program will greatly enhance the effectiveness of our long-range bomber force. These missiles will be able to penetrate any air defense which the Soviet Union could build in the foreseeable future.

We are substantially improving the accuracy and power of our land-based Minuteman missiles. But in the coming decade missiles of this type based in fixed silos will become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack. The Soviets have three-quarters of their warheads in such fixed-site missiles, compared to only a quarter of ours. Nevertheless, this is a serious problem -- and we must deal with it sensibly and effectively.

The Defense Department now has under consideration a number of options for responding to this problem, including making some of our ICBMs mobile. I might add that the options we are evaluating would be far more costly -- and we would have far less confidence in their effectiveness -- in the absence of SALT II limits. For without these limits on Soviet warheads, the Soviet Union could counter our effort simply by greatly increasing the number of warheads on their missiles.

Let me emphasize that the SALT II agreement preserves adequate flexibility for the United States in this important area.

Our strategic forces must be able to survive any attack, and to counterattack military and civilian targets in the aggressor nation. We have had this capacity -- which is the essence of deterrence -- in the past; we have it today; and SALT II plus the defense programs I have described will ensure it for the future.

The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition, and by helping to define future threats we might face, SALT II will make our defense planning more effective.

Under the agreement, the two sides will be limited to equal numbers of strategic launchers for the first time, ending the Soviet numerical advantage permitted in the currently effective SALT I agreement.

To reach these new and lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce their overall number of strategic delivery systems by 10 percent -- more than 250 Soviet missile launchers or bombers. Naturally, the Soviets will choose to phase out their older systems, but these

- President Kennedy, building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, signed the first agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963 to stop the poisonous testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere;
- In 1968 under President Johnson, the United States and the Soviet Union joined other nations in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- an important step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons;
- In 1972 under President Nixon, the SALT I agreement placed the first agreed limits on the number of offensive weapons; and
- The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty made an enduring contribution to our security.

President Ford continued at Helsinki and at Vladivostok. Each negotiation builds on the accomplishments of the last. Each agreement provides the foundation for further progress toward a more stable nuclear relationship.

Three Presidents have spent more than six years negotiating the next step in this process -- the SALT II agreement. We have all negotiated carefully and deliberately. Every step of the way we have worked with our military leaders and experts, and we have sought the advice and counsel of the members of Congress.

An overwhelming majority of the American people recognize the need for SALT II. Our people want and expect continued step-by-step progress toward bringing nuclear weapons under control. Americans will support a reasoned increase in our defense effort, but we do not want a wholly unnecessary return to the Cold War and an all-out arms race, with vastly greater risks and costs. Through strength, we want world peace.

Let me turn to the second question -- how SALT II is related to our overall defense strategy.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union today are essentially equivalent.

They have larger and more numerous land-based missiles. We have a larger number of warheads, and significant technological and geographical advantages.

Each side has the will and the means to prevent the other from achieving superiority. Neither side is in a position to exploit its nuclear weapons for political purposes, nor to use strategic weapons without facing almost certain suicide.

What causes us concern is not the current balance, but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. Over the past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, while ours has had a net decrease. In areas not limited by SALT I, they have launched ambitious programs to strengthen their strategic forces. At some future point, they could achieve a strategic advantage -- unless we alter these trends.

That is exactly what I intend to do -- with the support of the American people and the bipartisan support of Congress.

We must move on two fronts at the same time:

Because our values are so different, it is clear that the United States and the Soviet Union will be in competition for as far ahead as we can see.

Yet we have a common interest in survival and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other. The very competition between us makes it imperative that we bring under control its most dangerous aspect -- the nuclear arms race. That is why the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are so important. This effort by two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history.

As the Congress and the American people consider the SALT Treaty which is now nearly complete, the debate will center around four basic questions:

- Why do we need SALT II?
- How is the Treaty related to our overall defense strategy?
- Can Soviet compliance be verified?
- How does the Treaty relate to Soviet activities which challenge our interests?

Let me address each question in turn.

First, why do we need a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty?

We need it because it will contribute to a more peaceful world -- and to our own national security.

Today, we and the Soviet Union, with sharply different world outlooks and interests, both have the ominous destructive power literally to destroy each other as a functioning society, killing tens of millions of people in the process. And common sense tells us -- as it tells the Soviet Union -- that we must work to make our competition less dangerous, less burdensome, and less likely to bring the ultimate horror of nuclear war.

Indeed, the entire world has a vital interest in controlling the strategic arms race.

We have consulted closely with our allies, who count on us not only to maintain strong military forces to offset Soviet military power, but also to manage successfully a stable East-West relationship. SALT is at the heart of both these crucial efforts. That is why the leaders of France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and other nations have voiced their support for the emerging Treaty.

Some nations which have so far held back from building nuclear weapons will be strongly influenced by whether the two nuclear superpowers will restrain our own weapons. Rejection of the new Strategic Arms Treaty would seriously undermine the effort to control proliferation of these deadly weapons. And nothing would more surely damage our other critical efforts in arms control -- from a ban on all nuclear testing to preventing dangerous satellite warfare in space; from equalizing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to restraining the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons.

Every President since the dawn of the nuclear age has pursued the effort to bring nuclear arms under control. This is and must be a continuing process.

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY;
NO WIRE TRANSMISSION BEFORE
2:00 AM (EST), APRIL 25, 1979

APRIL 24, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS
TO THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
APRIL 25, 1979

I want, first of all, to commend and endorse the theme of this convention: the defense of the First Amendment and the freedom of the press.

Liberty of expression is our most important civil right, and the freedom of the press is its most important bulwark. We can never afford to grow complacent about the First Amendment. On the contrary, we must actively protect it always.

The American press has grown enormously since our nation's early days -- not only in size and breadth, but in its conception of its own duties and responsibilities. The highest of those duties is to inform the public on the important issues of the day. And no issue is more important than the one I want to discuss with you today -- the control of nuclear arms.

Each generation of Americans faces a choice that defines its character -- a choice that is also important for what it says about our nation's outlook on the world.

In the coming months, we will almost certainly be faced with such a choice: whether to accept or to reject a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. The decision we make will profoundly affect our lives -- and the lives of people all over the world -- for years to come.

We face this choice from a position of strength -- as the strongest nation on earth -- politically, economically and militarily.

Our alliances are firm and reliable. Our military forces are strong and ready. Our economic power is unmatched. Along with the other industrial democracies, we lead the way in technological innovation. Our combined economies are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviet Union and its allies. Our political institutions are based on human freedom. Our open system encourages individual creativity -- and that, in turn, strengthens our whole society. Our values and our democratic way of life have a magnetic appeal for people around the world which a materialistic and totalitarian philosophy can never hope to rival.

For all these reasons, we have a capacity for leadership in the world that surpasses that of any other nation.

That leadership imposes many responsibilities upon us, but our noblest duty is to use our strength to serve our highest interest: the building of a secure, stable, and peaceful world. We perform that duty in the spirit proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in 1963: "Confident and unafraid," he said, "we labor on -- not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational choice for both sides.

MORE

This is the inescapable choice we face. For the fact is that the alternative to this treaty is not a perfect agreement drafted unilaterally by the United States in which we gain everything and the Soviets nothing. The alternative, now and in the foreseeable future, is no agreement at all.

I am convinced that the United States has the moral and political will to control the relentless technology which could constantly devise new weapons of mass destruction. We need not drift into a dark nightmare of unrestrained arms competition. We Americans have the wisdom to know that our security depends on more than maintaining our unsurpassed defense forces. Our security and that of our Allies also depend on the strength of ideas and ideals, and on arms control measures that can stabilize and finally reverse a dangerous and wasteful arms race which neither side can win. This is the path of wisdom -- and of peace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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
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SALT II

The Reasons Why



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8978
General Foreign Policy Series 312

Released April 1979

Office of Public Communication
Bureau of Public Affairs

The SALT II Agreement

First and foremost, SALT II will contribute to our security. By imposing important limits on the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, SALT II will reduce the risk of nuclear war.

- It will establish, for the first time, the principle of equal numbers of strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers for both sides. SALT I, signed in 1972, froze each side at its existing levels of strategic missiles which had the effect of permitting the Soviets greater numbers than the United States.
- SALT II will limit both sides to 2,250 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers; without the agreement it is estimated that the Soviets could have as many as 3,000 by 1985.
- To reach the 2,250 level, the Soviets will be compelled to dismantle or destroy over 250 missile launchers or heavy bombers they now have deployed. Because we are below the limits, we would not have to destroy any of the missiles or bombers we now have deployed and could, if we desire, increase our numbers.
- The agreement will impose equal sublimits on certain kinds of weapons, most notably MIRVed missiles—those equipped with several warheads that can be aimed independently to hit more than one target (multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle).
- SALT II will place limits on the race to improve existing strategic weapons and build new and more sophisticated—the so-called qualitative arms race. For the period of the treaty, for example, each nation will be permitted only one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the number of warheads allowed on strategic missiles will be limited.

- The agreement does not interfere with any of our defense programs—such as the M-X missile; the Trident submarine and missiles; air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles; a cruise missile carrier and a possible new strategic bomber.

- It enables us to continue nuclear and conventional military cooperation with our allies.

SALT II is the next major step in the process of bringing nuclear weapons under sensible control. That process has already produced concrete benefits for the United States. The limited test ban treaty, signed by President Kennedy in 1963, stopped the poisonous testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The SALT I antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, signed by President Nixon in 1972, headed off a costly and dangerous competition in defensive weapons. The SALT I Interim Agreement, signed the same year, froze the overall number of strategic missiles at a time when the Soviets were building up and we were not. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter carefully and deliberately negotiated this next step—SALT II—for 6 years

In addition to its role in maintaining the stability of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, SALT II is the foundation for a more enduring political relationship between two nations with awesome power. It is an important element of political stability in a turbulent world—stability which can provide the basis for containing the kinds of crises that we face today and preventing them from growing into nuclear confrontation.

America's allies count on us not only to maintain strong military forces to offset Soviet military power but also to manage a stable East-West relationship. The leaders of France, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany have all expressed their support for the SALT II treaty.

Other nations around the world which will be deciding whether to obtain nuclear weapons will be strongly influenced by whether the two nuclear superpowers are serious in their efforts at restraint. Indeed, the Nonproliferation Treaty itself, acceded to by over 100 nations, explicitly provides that the nuclear-weapons states shall pursue effective arms control measures. Collapse of the SALT process could fuel further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Our other arms control efforts—to bring about parity of forces in central Europe, to ban nuclear testing, to restrain conventional arms sales, to prevent antisatellite warfare—would also be jeopardized if SALT were rejected.

SALT II and Our Defense

SALT is not a substitute for a strong defense. Our security—and that of our allies—continues to depend upon maintaining a credible deterrent—the unquestionable capacity to convince potential adversaries that an attack on us or our allies would mean equal or greater destruction for themselves.

We clearly have that capacity today. And to assure that we maintain it, we are now engaged in an extensive modernization of our nuclear forces.

- We are equipping our strategic bomber force with long-range cruise missiles. They will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses for the foreseeable future.
- We are placing the new longer-range Trident I missile in our existing missile-carrying submarines, and

our new Trident submarines. These will make our submarine forces even less vulnerable to attack than they are now. We are also developing a more sophisticated Trident II missile for eventual deployment on these new submarines.

- We are significantly improving the capabilities of our existing Minuteman land-based ICBM's. We are also developing a new ICBM, the M-X, with improved accuracy and increased payload. And we are actively considering a number of new basing modes, including mobile missile launchers, for dealing with the increasing vulnerability of fixed-site missiles to surprise attack in the 1980's.

The SALT II treaty preserves our right to proceed forward on schedule with all of these defense programs. By helping to define and limit the future military threats we will face, SALT will make our own defense planning more manageable.

Verifying SALT II

How do we know that the Soviets won't violate the agreement? The simple answer is that we can determine for ourselves whether the Soviets are living up to their obligations. The stakes are too high to rely on trust.

We have a variety of intelligence collection systems for observing Soviet military activities. These include photographic satellites, radar, and systems for collecting information sent from Soviet missile tests. Any cheating on a scale that could affect the strategic balance would be discovered in time for us to respond.

The agreement itself strengthens our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces.

- It prohibits any interference with the systems used for monitoring.

- It bans deliberate concealment measures which would impede verification.
- And it contains a number of other provisions which will make it easier to monitor Soviet strategic forces—a task we face with or without a SALT II agreement.

SALT II and Soviet Activities Elsewhere

Because this carefully negotiated and responsible arms control agreement will make the world safer and more secure, it is in our national interest to pursue it even as we compete with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

A SALT agreement in no way limits our right and responsibility to promote our interests and respond to Soviet behavior which adversely affects those interests.

If we reject SALT, however, that inevitable competition will grow even more dangerous. Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction, as serious as each may be in its own right, will take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For each would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability.

It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviets that the need to bring the nuclear-weapons competition under control is so compelling. Linkage would mean that we could settle nothing with the Soviets unless we settle everything. This is a policy of paralysis, not progress.

Without SALT II

The fundamental choice is not between some ideal agreement and this agreement but between a world with SALT II and a world without it. If the agreement were rejected:

- There could be a dangerous and wasteful new surge in the strategic arms race. We would have to keep pace, at a cost of tens of billions of additional dollars and with the added risk that accompanies an intense military buildup. The result will be more weapons on both sides—but no additional security for either;
- It could lead to the failure of the ABM treaty and an unrestrained competition in strategic defensive as well as offensive weapons;
- With no restrictions on Soviet systems and no prohibition on concealing strategic programs, our knowledge of the risks we face—and thus our ability to plan for them—would sharply diminish;
- The painstaking process of strategic arms control would be dealt a profound blow. The progress we have already made would be jeopardized. The prospect for further steps toward restraining strategic arms and limiting other aspects of military competition—including the spread of nuclear weapons—would be set back immeasurably;
- Tensions with the Soviet Union would inevitably heighten; and
- There would be a global perception that America had chosen confrontation rather than cooperation and peace.


A Special Report

SALT II

A Basic Guide



United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/27/79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

1:15 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

AB
Patricia Barrio

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Members of the United Press
International Advisory Board, 1 p.m., Friday,
April 27, The Cabinet Room

The group is made up of members of the United Press International Advisory Board, past and present, plus some corporate officers. You and Mrs. Carter had three of them in for dinner on January 11. They are Roderick Beaton, Steve Stevenson and Grant Dillman.

The UPI Board consists of 15 members, most of whom are editors/publishers of papers subscribing to the UPI news service.

Most of these gentlemen attended the ANPA meeting in New York this week and heard you speak.

The meeting format will be as usual, with the White House press corps in for the first 2 minutes and stopping after 25 minutes to allow for individual pictures.

Time-caller this time will be Linda Peek. As you know, she has been handling all arrangements for this series of conferences from the beginning. This is her last. Tuesday she becomes Director of Communications for the Carter-Mondale Campaign Committee.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EDITORS' BRIEFING

April 27, 1979

AGENDA

8:40-9:00 a.m.	PATRICIA Y. BARIO Associate Press Secretary Office of Media Liaison
	PATRICIA E. BAUER Editor White House News Summary
9:00-9:45 a.m.	JAMES R. SCHLESINGER Secretary Department of Energy
9:45-10:00 a.m.	Break
10:00-10:30 a.m.	DAVID AARON Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
10:30-11:15 a.m.	ROGER MOLANDER Member National Security Council Staff
11:15-12:00 noon	JOE ONEK Associate Director for Human Resources (Health) Domestic Policy Staff
12:00-12:30 p.m.	Lunch
12:30-12:45 p.m.	En Route to Cabinet Room
12:45-1:00 p.m.	JODY POWELL Press Secretary to the President

1:00-1:30 p.m.	Q AND A WITH PRESIDENT CARTER
1:30-1:50 p.m.	Filing Time
1:50-2:30 p.m.	CHARLES L. SCHULTZE Chairman Council on Economic Advisers
2:30-2:45 p.m.	Break
2:45-3:30 p.m.	ALONZO L. McDONALD Deputy Special Trade Representative

UPI REPRESENTATIVES

Grant Dillman
Vice President
Washington, D. C.

Roderick W. Beaton
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New York, New York

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New York, New York

Hubert L. Stevenson
Vice President and Editor-in-Chief
New York, New York

COPLEY NEWSPAPERS

Richard G. Capen, Jr., Senior Vice President, La Jolla, California. Copley owns 9 dailies in California and Illinois, with a combined daily circulation of approximately 580,000. In addition, Copley owns 22 weeklies in those 2 states. Editorials from the chain's flagship newspaper, The San Diego Union, are sent to all group papers. Like Scripps-Howard, Copley representatives claim these editorials run at the discretion of local editors. In practice, they are usually run verbatim, although San Diego's evening newspaper, The Tribune, is an exception.

HARRIS
ENTERPRISES

Peter M. Macdonald, Chairman, Hutchinson, Kansas. There are 10 John P. Harris papers, all small dailies in Kansas, California and Iowa. Total circulation is about 108,000.

HEARST NEWSPAPERS

William R. Hearst Jr., Editor-in-Chief, New York. Hearst Newspapers, with 8 papers having a combined circulation of about 1.5 million, sends 2 or 3 editorials per day to each of its member newspapers. These editorials are written in Hearst's New York office and almost always deal with issues of nationwide concern. Although the editorials are generally run at the discretion of local

editors, approximately one out of every 20 is labelled "must use" or "run if you can." The tags vary from paper to paper. In practice, Hearst's two East Coast newspapers, The Boston Herald-American and Baltimore News-American and also The San Antonio Light use the "canned" editorials more frequently than other Hearst papers.

INGERSOLL
PUBLICATIONS

Ralph Ingersoll II, Vice President and General Manager, Sharon, Connecticut. Each of the 15 dailies is owned by a separate corporation, each of which is headed by Mr. Ingersoll. The papers are not operated as a chain and each one operates under local management. Ingersoll Publications also publishes 11 weeklies in Ohio, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

KNIGHT-RIDDER
NEWSPAPERS

James Batten, Vice President-News/Metro Group, Miami, Florida. Knight-Ridder is the largest chain, based on circulation. Its 24 papers include The Detroit Free Press, The Miami Herald and The Philadelphia Inquirer.

OTTAWAY NEWSPAPERS

James H. Ottaway, Jr., President, Campbell Hall, New York. There are 13 dailies in the Ottaway group, ranging from 3,000 to 60,000 circulation.

SCRIPPS-HOWARD
NEWSPAPERS

Jack R. Howard, Chairman of the Executive Committee; and Edward W. Scripps II, Trustee. Scripps-Howard has 17 dailies, located in Alabama, California, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Florida and Pennsylvania. Four are in Ohio. Combined circulation for Scripps-Howard papers is 2.2 million. The company maintains that it does not have a uniform editorial policy. In practice, editorials on foreign policy and other national issues, written in the Scripps-Howard Washington bureau, are sent to all member newspapers. Twelve to 15 of these papers, located in the principal metropolitan areas around the country, use the editorials verbatim or with slight revision. The largest papers in their group are The Rocky Mountain News, The Cleveland Press and The Cincinnati Post.

IDAHO

Robert Miller, Jr., Publisher, Idaho Statesman, Boise (Gannett). Middle-of-the-road to liberal. Main concerns: sale of C-130 transport planes to Libya, sugar production, agriculture and water policy.

ILLINOIS

Len H. Small, President, Kankakee Daily Journal. Republican, conservative paper and community. Main concerns: agriculture, recent flooding.

INDIANA

Robert N. Brown, Publisher, Columbus Republic. Brown, paper and community are conservative. Main concerns: possible CETA cutbacks (high unemployment), international trade, defense spending, labor, industry, agriculture and urban issues. Upcoming UAW talks will involve many local workers. Cummings Diesel Engine Company has its headquarters here. Brown is a member of that board.

IOWA

Joseph F. Hladky III, Executive Vice President and Production Manager, Cedar Rapids Gazette. Fairly liberal paper and community. Hladky is conservative, but paper's editorials tend to be moderate. Main issues: flood insurance (long-standing dispute with the federal government), controversy between the city government and HUD over urban renewal financing procedures (HUD is trying to get back money), unusual air pollution problems (odor pollution from the corn processing plants (Karo syrup) and international trade (many exporting companies, particularly of small farm machinery).

LOUISIANA

Joe D. Smith, Jr., President and Publisher, Alexandria Town Talk. Moderate paper and community, generally supportive. Smith was president of the National Newspaper Association. Overwhelming concern: energy. Other interests: rumored expansion of England Air Force Base.

MAINE

Richard J. Warren, Vice President and Assistant Publisher, Bangor News. Conservative paper and community. Main concerns: Loring Air Force Base, fisheries agreement with Canada, Three-Mile Island (similar nuclear power plant nearby that has been closed recently), agriculture (potato farmers suffering terribly), energy (most oil-dependent state in the nation), SALT II (conservative), multilateral trade (shoe and clothespin industries very hard hit).

MARYLAND

James M. Schurz, President and Publisher, Hagerstown Herald-Mail. The Morning Herald is moderate, while the Daily Mail is more conservative. Main issues: defense spending (A-10 aircraft are built by Fairchild Industries), National Fire Academy (talk of moving the proposed Emmitsburg site to New York). Proposed reduction in the number of aircraft to be built by Fairchild Industries is a concern.

MASSACHUSETTS

K. Prescott Low, Publisher, Quincy Patriot Ledger (Griffin-Larrabee). Relatively liberal paper, more conservative on domestic issues. Main concerns: General Dynamics plant (wants more Navy contracts), unemployment, energy, industry, labor. Blue-collar, industrial district.

Robert C. Achorn, Vice President and Editor, Worcester Telegram and Gazette (Griffin-Larrabee). Very conservative paper, serving a mature, northeast industrial city. Main concerns: UDAG consideration (to build a first-class downtown hotel), energy, Worcester airport (runway needs to be reconstructed).

OKLAHOMA

Tams Bixby III, Publisher and Editor, Muskogee Phoenix and Times Democrat (Gannett). Very conservative paper and publisher. Main concerns: nuclear power plant construction (Black Fox), federal reimbursement to Cherokee Indians for river bottom lands (sand and gravel that has been removed for use in federal projects), water policy and transportation.

TEXAS

Richard J. V. Johnson, President, Houston Chronicle. Conservative Republican paper, but more liberal than the competing Houston Post. Main concerns: oil and gas (by far the biggest issues), RARE-II (hunters want some of RARE-II lands designated as wilderness for recreational purposes).

VIRGINIA

J. Stewart Bryan, Publisher, Richmond Newspapers (Media General). Both papers, News Leader and Times-Dispatch, are very conservative.

WASHINGTON

James E. Tonkin, President and Publisher, Yakima Herald-Republic. Moderate paper and community. Main concerns: Yakima River enhancement, water policy, farming (especially sugar beets), industry (sugar beet manufacturing), Yakima Indian Reservation (jurisdiction and water rights problems), foreign trade (especially with Taiwan), and the Hanford nuclear power facility.