6/8/79 [1]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/8/79 [1]; Container 120

To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF DOCUMENT</th>
<th>CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>note-w/ att.</td>
<td>FROM HATFIELD to The President (8 pp.) re: SALT II-Treaty</td>
<td>6/8/79</td>
<td>A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FILE LOCATION

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/8/79

rick --

since it's correspondence...
original letter and original
file copy of incoming/outgoing
have been given to frank moore...
bcc's have been made and given
to
  vice president
  secretary vance
  secretary brown
  dr. brzezinski
  (per president's request)

however, since it deals with
MX-MMIII missile deployment...
thought you might want copy
for your files.

-- susan
I have read your letter with great care and attention on the MX-SSM III missile deployment question. I have been very helpful to me as I made some initial judgments about this ten-year expenditure, which in any case is very large.

My decision to recommend the MX option is, in my opinion, compatible with the goals you have espoused: stability, mutual deterrence, survivability, verification and an optimum step toward maximum reductions of nuclear warheads on both sides in SALT III. Obviously, the maintenance of peace and our own national security are paramount.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I have not made a decision on the basics mode.

My hope is that we can work together to achieve our common objectives. When I return from Vienna I would like to share my experiences and plans with you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Signature]
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 14th Secretary of State Vance was kind enough to meet with me in my office. The purpose of the discussion was to review the serious concerns I continue to hold regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty. Let me say at the outset that I hold the professionalism and integrity of Secretary Vance in high esteem and greatly appreciated his taking the time to come by and to discuss these vital issues with me.

As you are aware from our subsequent dinner meeting at the White House, my objections to the treaty continue to center on its failure to place stronger controls on the arms race. My principal concern centers on the acquisition of a "counterforce" capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the coming decade -- a capability that will be substantially achieved within the provisions and duration of the SALT II accord.

The Soviet counterforce capability centers on the theoretical assumption that U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike capability by the early 1980's. The alternative U.S. counterforce doctrine involves a similar first-strike capability against Soviet land-base missiles in the 1980's. Those concerned with the Soviet counterforce capability have argued, and you have indicated your agreement, that the U.S. should develop a mobile, M-X missile which would in effect neutralize the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack. What has not been stressed by these individuals, as you are aware, is the first-strike capability of the M-X missile against Soviet sites.

I believe that a U.S. and Soviet acquisition of an effective first-strike capability would be the most dangerous and destabilizing step yet taken in the arms race. I therefore believe it incumbent that we seek a viable option which will halt this move toward a "war-fighting" capability on both sides. I brought what I believe to be a sound and constructive suggestion to the attention of Secretary Vance on May 14. He asked for a more detailed description of the proposal. This description follows.

MARK O. HATFIELD
OREGON

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 5, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 14th Secretary of State Vance was kind enough to meet with me in my office. The purpose of the discussion was to review the serious concerns I continue to hold regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty. Let me say at the outset that I hold the professionalism and integrity of Secretary Vance in high esteem and greatly appreciated his taking the time to come by and to discuss these vital issues with me.

As you are aware from our subsequent dinner meeting at the White House, my objections to the treaty continue to center on its failure to place stronger controls on the arms race. My principal concern centers on the acquisition of a "counterforce" capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the coming decade -- a capability that will be substantially achieved within the provisions and duration of the SALT II accord.

The Soviet counterforce capability centers on the theoretical assumption that U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike capability by the early 1980's. The alternative U.S. counterforce doctrine involves a similar first-strike capability against Soviet land-base missiles in the 1980's. Those concerned with the Soviet counterforce capability have argued, and you have indicated your agreement, that the U.S. should develop a mobile, M-X missile which would in effect neutralize the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack. What has not been stressed by these individuals, as you are aware, is the first-strike capability of the M-X missile against Soviet sites.

I believe that a U.S. and Soviet acquisition of an effective first-strike capability would be the most dangerous and destabilizing step yet taken in the arms race. I therefore believe it incumbent that we seek a viable option which will halt this move toward a "war-fighting" capability on both sides. I brought what I believe to be a sound and constructive suggestion to the attention of Secretary Vance on May 14. He asked for a more detailed description of the proposal. This description follows.

MARK O. HATFIELD
OREGON

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 5, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 14th Secretary of State Vance was kind enough to meet with me in my office. The purpose of the discussion was to review the serious concerns I continue to hold regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty. Let me say at the outset that I hold the professionalism and integrity of Secretary Vance in high esteem and greatly appreciated his taking the time to come by and to discuss these vital issues with me.

As you are aware from our subsequent dinner meeting at the White House, my objections to the treaty continue to center on its failure to place stronger controls on the arms race. My principal concern centers on the acquisition of a "counterforce" capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the coming decade -- a capability that will be substantially achieved within the provisions and duration of the SALT II accord.

The Soviet counterforce capability centers on the theoretical assumption that U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike capability by the early 1980's. The alternative U.S. counterforce doctrine involves a similar first-strike capability against Soviet land-base missiles in the 1980's. Those concerned with the Soviet counterforce capability have argued, and you have indicated your agreement, that the U.S. should develop a mobile, M-X missile which would in effect neutralize the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack. What has not been stressed by these individuals, as you are aware, is the first-strike capability of the M-X missile against Soviet sites.

I believe that a U.S. and Soviet acquisition of an effective first-strike capability would be the most dangerous and destabilizing step yet taken in the arms race. I therefore believe it incumbent that we seek a viable option which will halt this move toward a "war-fighting" capability on both sides. I brought what I believe to be a sound and constructive suggestion to the attention of Secretary Vance on May 14. He asked for a more detailed description of the proposal. This description follows.

MARK O. HATFIELD
OREGON

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 5, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 14th Secretary of State Vance was kind enough to meet with me in my office. The purpose of the discussion was to review the serious concerns I continue to hold regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty. Let me say at the outset that I hold the professionalism and integrity of Secretary Vance in high esteem and greatly appreciated his taking the time to come by and to discuss these vital issues with me.

As you are aware from our subsequent dinner meeting at the White House, my objections to the treaty continue to center on its failure to place stronger controls on the arms race. My principal concern centers on the acquisition of a "counterforce" capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the coming decade -- a capability that will be substantially achieved within the provisions and duration of the SALT II accord.

The Soviet counterforce capability centers on the theoretical assumption that U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike capability by the early 1980's. The alternative U.S. counterforce doctrine involves a similar first-strike capability against Soviet land-base missiles in the 1980's. Those concerned with the Soviet counterforce capability have argued, and you have indicated your agreement, that the U.S. should develop a mobile, M-X missile which would in effect neutralize the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack. What has not been stressed by these individuals, as you are aware, is the first-strike capability of the M-X missile against Soviet sites.

I believe that a U.S. and Soviet acquisition of an effective first-strike capability would be the most dangerous and destabilizing step yet taken in the arms race. I therefore believe it incumbent that we seek a viable option which will halt this move toward a "war-fighting" capability on both sides. I brought what I believe to be a sound and constructive suggestion to the attention of Secretary Vance on May 14. He asked for a more detailed description of the proposal. This description follows.

MARK O. HATFIELD
OREGON

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 5, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 14th Secretary of State Vance was kind enough to meet with me in my office. The purpose of the discussion was to review the serious concerns I continue to hold regarding ratification of the SALT II treaty. Let me say at the outset that I hold the professionalism and integrity of Secretary Vance in high esteem and greatly appreciated his taking the time to come by and to discuss these vital issues with me.

As you are aware from our subsequent dinner meeting at the White House, my objections to the treaty continue to center on its failure to place stronger controls on the arms race. My principal concern centers on the acquisition of a "counterforce" capability by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the coming decade -- a capability that will be substantially achieved within the provisions and duration of the SALT II accord.

The Soviet counterforce capability centers on the theoretical assumption that U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike capability by the early 1980's. The alternative U.S. counterforce doctrine involves a similar first-strike capability against Soviet land-base missiles in the 1980's. Those concerned with the Soviet counterforce capability have argued, and you have indicated your agreement, that the U.S. should develop a mobile, M-X missile which would in effect neutralize the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack. What has not been stressed by these individuals, as you are aware, is the first-strike capability of the M-X missile against Soviet sites.

I believe that a U.S. and Soviet acquisition of an effective first-strike capability would be the most dangerous and destabilizing step yet taken in the arms race. I therefore believe it incumbent that we seek a viable option which will halt this move toward a "war-fighting" capability on both sides. I brought what I believe to be a sound and constructive suggestion to the attention of Secretary Vance on May 14. He asked for a more detailed description of the proposal. This description follows.
A Mobile Minuteman III

My proposal to the Secretary would replace the proposed ICBM force consisting of 200 mobile M-X missiles with the present Minuteman III force of 550 missiles. The Minuteman III missiles, however, would be retrofitted to be made mobile in whatever mode is finally determined by the Executive Branch to be most verifiable by the Soviets, thus posing no serious problems for future SALT verification.

Following my meeting with the Secretary and with you at the White House, I commissioned a study by the Library of Congress of the potential benefits and costs of this alternative. The Library has just completed the study, a copy of which is enclosed for your review. I believe the results of this study cast a shadow over the competency of the Air Force's analysis of the costs of deployment and development of the M-X missile and its alternatives. This study, and another detailed analysis which is forthcoming from the Library at my request, gives, I think, compelling reasons why the proposal to make a Minuteman III force mobile is far preferable to the deployment of a mobile M-X missile. The Minuteman III (MMIII) option would be cheaper, far less strategically destabilizing, faster in its deployment, and could offer fresh new arms control possibilities in the immediate months and years ahead.

Let me be more specific:

Costs

The Air Force has constantly and officially repeated before Congress that its preference for a mobile M-X missile rests largely on the grounds of cost-effectiveness. The Air Force has argued that it would cost $20 billion to build a mobile M-X system (depending on the basing modes selected). They point out that it would cost $29 billion to make a MMIII mobile system.

The reason for the more extensive costs on the mobile MMIII system, the Air Force has reasoned, was because it would take far more protective shelters in, for example, a Multiple Protection Shelter (MPS) scheme (12,000) to "guard" the greater number of MMIII missiles (550) than M-X missiles (200). The Air Force has estimated a need for 4,500 protective shelters to deploy the M-X missile in an MPS mode.

However, the Library of Congress study commission has determined that this analysis by the Air Force is fundamentally in error. In fact, the error in the logic of the Air Force's calculation is exceeded only by the awesome dimensions of the mistake.
The Library study declares that the Air Force overestimated the costs of the mobile MMIII option by a staggering $10 to $12 billion. As you can determine from the enclosed study, when the $10-12 billion Air Force mistake is rectified, the mobile Minuteman III alternative in an MPS basing system results in a total cost ranging from some $16.75 billion to $18.8 billion. Total cost depends on the number of reentry vehicles needed to survive a theoretical Soviet first-strike attack. This compares to the Air Force FY 1978 estimate of $29 billion for a mobile MMIII missile program.

Again depending on the number of warheads desired to survive a presumed attack, taxpayer savings for a mobile MMIII system could range up to $4 billion. This savings estimate is a minimum figure in that the figure does not assume any cost overruns in the years ahead with respect to research, development or deployment of the M-X missile.

The Library also indicates that proportionately the same logic would apply to calculations of a trench deployment as well. Therefore, comparable cost savings should result.

The conclusion of this study on the cost miscalculations of the Air Force with respect to the MMIII option alone is sufficient as a compelling reason for a fundamental reexamination of the M-X program. By the Air Force's own logic, if the M-X missile can be shown to be less cost-effective than one of its options, there can be little need for a new, massive expenditure of money on a system which poses at best limited benefits and, more likely, unnecessary destabilizing risks given its tremendous countersilo capability against Soviet targets.

But reasons for supporting a mobile MMIII option over deployment of a mobile M-X system do not rest alone on the reevaluation of costs completed by the Library. Let me list additional technical evidence for supporting this option at this time.

1. Timing: The Air Force has said that altering the MMIII missile to make it mobile would take about two years. This would allow the United States to have a mobile ICBM force in place by early in the 1980's, precisely at the time when some critics of SALT II would claim that our ICBM force would be most vulnerable to a theoretical ICBM attack by the Soviet Union. Any additional deployment delay would be solely a function of the time required to construct the basing mode. By contrast, the M-X missile will at a minimum not be fully deployed until the end of 1990.

2. Replacement: A decision to deploy the mobile MMIII missile concept would entail no loss of ICBM strength. There are some 65 MMIII missiles in storage and they could be used to replace those missiles which could be sequentially retrofitted for mobility.
3. Reliability: To deploy the Minuteman III missile, you are using a proven weapons system. The technology inherent in the M-X missile, including fuel, guidance and other systems, would have a much higher reliability risk associated with its use.

4. Inhibiting Mutual Counterforce: Mobile deployment of the MMIII would neutralize a theoretical Soviet first-strike against our ICBM force. At the same time, the decision would substantially halt acquisition of the U.S. counterforce capability posed by deployment of the M-X. Strategic doctrine could thus be substantially returned to the concept of deterrence -- and away from counterforce. Once any perceived U.S. ICBM vulnerability is resolved through a mobility concept (hence ending the Soviet counterforce threat), there can be no justification for the U.S. pursuing a first-strike capability posed by M-X deployment. Any such decision would be a prima facie admission of a U.S. first-strike intent.

5. Further Strategic Reductions: Based on reliable reports, the Soviet Union suggested to the United States in May of 1978 during SALT negotiations a moratorium on new land-based missiles. By taking advantage of a MMIII mobile option, the United States would forego the M-X missile and might logically return to and accept the Soviet Union's offer that it forego deployment of a proposed new land-based missile.

6. Stopping a Mobile Soviet ICBM: Foregoing the counterforce capability of M-X deployment would substantially eliminate the very real possibility that the Soviet Union may also need to make mobile their ICBM force in the coming decade. (Additional limits on warhead accuracy would also be necessary.) As you are aware, many experts consider this possibility almost inevitable should the U.S. deploy the M-X. As you are also aware, any such Soviet mobile deployment would stretch to the limit -- if not destroy outright -- any future effort to adequately verify Soviet forces.

Mr. President, the Library of Congress is completing a second study at my request which gives additional, and in my view overwhelming, evidence as to why this nation should be proceeding with a mobile MMIII missile instead of the mobile M-X. The reasons already outlined are only a small number of those currently being developed in more detail. They all point to the fact that a decision to deploy the M-X missile would be a major tactical and budgetary mistake that would add immeasurably to strategic instability in the decade ahead.

I wanted to bring this evidence directly to your attention prior to your summit meeting with Chairman Breshnev next week. I want to make clear to you my intent to offer this as an alternative to the M-X missile when appropriations for that missile system
come before the Senate in the months ahead. I further expect to strongly pursue this alternative as an option which might well lead to stronger limits on both arsenals during debate on the SALT II treaty.

It is my earnest hope that you will give this suggestion your careful and immediate consideration, and that, in light of these facts, you will at a minimum avoid making a precipitous decision on M-X deployment. I believe this option offers a highly constructive alternative to the move on the part of both the U.S. and Soviet Union to embrace a war-fighting, counterforce doctrine that will add immeasurably to nuclear instability in the generations ahead.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senator

MOH:jrj

cc: Secretary of State Vance
Costs of Minuteman III vs. MX in Mobile Basing Modes:
A Partial Assessment of Air Force Calculations

Jonathan E. Hedalia
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
June 5, 1979
THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Friday - June 8, 1979

7:30 Breakfast with Secretaries Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mr. Hamilton Jordan - The Cabinet Room. (90 min.)

9:00 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

9:30 Mr. Frank Moore - The Oval Office.

12:00 Mr. Charles Schultze - The Oval Office. (20 min.)

12:20 Photograph with Mr. Bill Morris, Mayor of Shelby County, Memphis, Tenn. (Mr. Jim Free) - Oval Office. (3 min.)

12:25 Greet the Executive Committee of the National School Board Association. (Mr. Stuart Eizenstat) - Oval Office. (3 min.)

12:30 Lunch with Mrs. Rosalynn Carter - Oval Office. (60 min.)

1:45 Budget Appeals Meeting. (Mr. James McIntyre). (1 hr.) - The Cabinet Room.

3:45 Depart South Grounds via Helicopter en route Camp David.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
08 June 79

Secretary Califano

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

The Vice President
Hamilton Jordan
Stu Eizenstat
Frank Moore
Jack Watson
Jim McIntyre
Charlie Schultze
Alfred Kahn
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR STAFFING</th>
<th>FOR INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO DEADLINE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAST DAY FOR ACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FOR ACTION |
|----------------|------------------|
| FYI |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICE PRESIDENT</th>
<th>ARONSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>BUTLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIZENSTAT</td>
<td>H. CARTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRAFT</td>
<td>CLOUGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPSHUTZ</td>
<td>CRUIKSHANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOORE</td>
<td>FIRST LADY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWELL</td>
<td>HARDEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAFSHOON</td>
<td>HERNANDEZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATSON</td>
<td>HUTCHESON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEXLER</td>
<td>KAHN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRZEZINSKI</td>
<td>LINDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCINTYRE</td>
<td>MARTIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHULTZE</td>
<td>MILLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADAMS</td>
<td>MOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDRUS</td>
<td>PETERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELL</td>
<td>PETTIGREW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGLAND</td>
<td>PRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUMENTHAL</td>
<td>SANDERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN</td>
<td>WARREN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFANO</td>
<td>WEDDINGTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRIS</td>
<td>WISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KREPS</td>
<td>VOORDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHLESINGER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRAUSS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VANCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ADMIN. CONFIDEN.  
CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRET  
EYES ONLY
Mr. President:

Kahn, Watson and Congressional Liaison concur with Califano and Eizenstat/McIntyre -- as does CEA, provided that Step II in Califano's memo is a general statement, not a firm, step-by-step commitment.

Bill Cable observes that "Corman/Rangel/Long could be a bill that would pass and end 40 years of wishing for a beginning. Without Corman it is less likely and much less dramatic."

Rick
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JOE CALIFANO
SUBJECT: JIM CORMAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN

Stu and I met this afternoon with Jim Corman. As you know, he has previously indicated his strong objection to the Kennedy Health Insurance proposal and stated that he would like to support your proposal.

I cannot overestimate the importance of having Corman as an up-front and vocal supporter of the Administration bill. As you know, he was the name sponsor, with Kennedy, of the Health Security Bill -- the labor movement's previous universal, comprehensive proposal. He would bring the instant credibility our effort deserves with a host of liberal groups in the Democratic Party. He will also be key in joining with Charlie Rangel and moving the Administration proposal through the Ways and Means Committee.

In short, his support would be a significant step in building the kind of broad-based coalition necessary to pass a major national health bill.

We can get Corman's support if we take two steps.

Step 1 -- In the Phase I legislation. Corman would like to include a universal benefit that provides neonatal, delivery and first year services to all mothers and infants in the United States with no cost-sharing. This benefit is already in the plan for the low-income population, but would be an exception to our general $2,500 deductible approach for the rest of the population.

In the plan you saw last week, we had allocated $300 million on-budget to prevention. And, at your request, we have saved approximately $700 million on-budget by modifying the spend-down.

The additional costs are $300 million on-budget over the $300 million already set aside for prevention, and $700 million off-budget.
I strongly urge you to consider this benefit as your preventive effort. The additional $300 million on-budget ($600 million total) for this prevention element is well worth the price. It will receive wide acclaim, both because it has a strong prevention impact and because it is a first-dollar universal benefit.

Step 2 -- In the Outline of the National Health Plan. Corman would also like the sketch of our broad plan to include a commitment to extend this first-dollar coverage through age 6. (In all other features of our plan, there would be some cost-sharing.) I suggest we do this by expressing a long-range desire to extend this coverage year by year over a 6 year period at some point in the future -- i.e., in the first year, cover one-year-olds; in the second, one- and two-year-olds, etc.

Again, agreeing to this is sound politically and sound substantively.

I strongly recommend that you approve these two steps.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT
JIM MCINTYRE

SUBJECT: NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN

At the last NHP meeting, we explained that we were still developing a prevention package. The package we have agreed upon would require employers to provide first dollar coverage for pre-natal services for pregnant women, delivery, and post-natal services for children up to age one. This coverage would be provided to all employed Americans and their dependents, regardless of income. The prevention package would increase the cost of the plan to employers by $700 million, and increase the cost of the federal subsidy to small businesses from $200 million to $632 million.

With the addition of this prevention package, we would probably secure Congressman Corman's support for your NHP proposal. Since Corman was previously co-sponsor of the Health Security Act, his endorsement would be very important. Furthermore, support from Rangel and Corman would seem to assure favorable action by the Health Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee.

As Secretary Califano's memorandum (attached) indicates, Corman also would like to have the sketch of the comprehensive plan provide first dollar coverage through age six. (Otherwise, there would be a 25% co-payment on services to young children.) Given the tentative nature of the comprehensive plan (you are not committed to seek its enactment in the future), we agree with Secretary Califano that it makes political sense to accede to Corman's request.

Approve prevention package.

Disapprove prevention package.
ID 792552  THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 07 JUN 79

FOR ACTION: STU EISENSTAT  FRANK MOORE (LES FRANCIS)
JIM MCINTYRE
ALFRED KAHN

INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT
ANNE WEXLER

SUBJECT: CALIFANO MEMO RE JIM CORMAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL
HEALTH PLAN

FRANK MOORE (LES FRANCIS)
CHARLIE SCHULTZE - concurs with SE/JM provided that step 2 in Califano's
memo is a general statement - not a firm step-by-step commitment

ALFRED KAHN
JACK WATSON

SUBJECT: CALIFANO MEMO RE JIM CORMAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL
HEALTH PLAN

+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY: 1200 PM SATURDAY 09 JUN 79 +

ACTION REQUESTED:

STAFF RESPONSE: ( ) I CONCUR. ( ) NO COMMENT. ( ) HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:
Watson comment on
Califano memo re Jim Corman...

concurs. Agreed with Joe's recommendation. The proposals make sense and I think Corman's visible and upfront support of the Carter plan is critically important.

(Watson wasn't staffed for action)
MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO.
   CODE/EXT. ___________________________ ☐ FTS

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

RECEIVED BY | DATE | TIME
---|---|---
63-109

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8–76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101–11.6

U.S. GPO: 1977-0-234-508
Meg:

Bill Cable's comments on the Califano memo:

"I concur. Corman/Rangel/Long could be a bill that would pass and end 40 years of wishing for a beginning. Without Corman it is less likely and much less dramatic."
The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Frank Moore
| FOR STAFFING |
| FOR INFORMATION |
| FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX |
| LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY |
| IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND |
| NO DEADLINE |
| LAST DAY FOR ACTION |

| VICE PRESIDENT |
| JORDAN |
| EIZENSTAT |
| KRAFT |
| LIPSHUTZ |
| MOORE (W.L.N) |
| POWELL |
| RAFSHOON |
| WATSON |
| WEXLER |
| BRZEZINSKI |
| MCINTYRE |
| SCHULTZE |
| ADAMS |
| ANDRUS |
| BELL |
| BERGLAND |
| BLUMENTHAL |
| BROWN |
| CALIFANO |
| HARRIS |
| KREPS |
| MARSHALL |
| SCHLESINGER |
| STRAUSS |
| VANCE |

| ARONSON |
| BUTLER |
| H. CARTER |
| CLOUGH |
| CRUIKSHANK |
| FIRST LADY |
| HARDEN |
| HERNANDEZ |
| HUTCHESON |
| KAHN |
| LINDER |
| MARTIN |
| MILLER |
| MOE |
| PETERSON |
| PETTIGREW |
| PRESS |
| SANDERS |
| WARREN |
| WEDDINGTON |
| WISE |
| VOORDE |

| ADMIN. CONFIDEN. |
| CONFIDENTIAL |
| SECRET |
| EYES ONLY |
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BILL CABLE
SUBJECT: Star Editorial of June 7, 1979

Mrs. Frank Thompson (Evie) called and asked me to apologize to you for any inconvenience her statements may have caused you, but to tell you that she thinks the recipe is great!
Blue note on bluefish

Ordinarily, how a president cooks his fish falls shy of public concern. But there are limits. As is now known, President Carter last Saturday summoned 31 House Democrats and their spouses to Camp David for merriment and informal political talk.

What was not disclosed beforehand, and probably covered up afterward, was the shocking fact that a deliberate attempt would be made during these proceedings to suborn, indeed subvert, the good judgment of the president's guests on the most delicate of all questions — namely, the cooking and eating of that saintly fish, the Atlantic blue.

But there was a leak.

Not to be doctrinaire about it, it must be straightly said that the blue, fresh caught in a cool spring or summer sea, comes to us without need of embellishment as classic as a doric column, as needless of adjectival dressing as a King James sentence, as self-explanatory as a great wine.

Consider, then, that the president was heard to tell his congresswoman's wife, no doubt in a sly whisper. "You can cut catfish or bluefish into strips, dip it into Worcestershire or A-1 sauce, then Bisquick batter and deep fry it for a terrific snack."

"A snack? Forsooth! We shall not bandy with our temporal sovereign the question of the lowly catfish, which dwells in muddy waters and for which God ordained such disguises as grocery store sauces, instant batters and deep-fat frying — it deserves no better. But to speak of the bluefish as a candidate for such gross ministrations! Was there no one within earshot to cry out at this indecent suggestion, to stalk from the room, or at least to make a citizen's arrest? Apparently there was not.

There is, as all right-thinking people know, only one appropriate destiny for the bluefish — to be gently baked for a few minutes with a bit of butter, paprika and pepper, and then, graced with a few drops of lemon and escorted by a dry, chilly sauté, to be eaten in sober thanksgiving.

Anyone who will slice up a bluefish for snacks will slash the Mona Lisa, if indeed that act had not served as appetizer to the other.

There is, we are compelled to say, only one appropriate destiny for anyone who believes in or spreads Mr. Carter's advice, and that is to be sent to the public pillory for culinary blasphemy. As for the president himself, we are even now meditating condign punishment. Impeachment naturally suggests itself; keelhauling might be better; offering some hope, however, slight, of re-education and rehabilitation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6/8/79

Dick Moe

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for your appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD MOE
SUBJECT: NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN STRATEGY

This memorandum contains a summary of the activities, proposed by the National Health Plan Task Force, intended to maximize favorable public, editorial, and Congressional acceptance of the National Health Plan (NHP). The NHP Task Force is made up of eighteen agency representatives and White House staff members, including Hale Champion, Dick Warden, Anne Wexler, Bert Carp, Joe Onek, Bill Cable, Dan Tate, and Pat Bario.

The activities described are divided into Congressional Liaison, Public Outreach, and Press/Media. Within each category, the activities are identified as occurring during the pre-announcement period, on announcement day, or in the post-announcement phase.

You are scheduled to announce NHP at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June 12. We propose that the announcement be made in the Cabinet Room, with Congressional sponsors present. The White House press corps and specialized writers on health, minority, and elderly issues will cover the announcement.

I. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON
A. Pre-Announcement Activities

Prior to announcement date, consultations and briefings will be held with most of the Senate and House leadership, as well as most of the Democrats and some Republicans and the Committee staffs of the appropriate committees. You have already met with Senator Long and Congressman Rangel.
Memorandum for the President
June 6, 1979

Page 2

Briefings have been offered to the following:

-- Senate and House leadership
-- Senate Finance Committee
-- Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
-- Senate Budget Committee
-- House Ways and Means Committee
-- Democratic Study Group (with a special briefing for the Executive Committee of the Democratic Study Group)
-- House Commerce Committee
-- Staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee
-- Staff of the House Labor/HEW Appropriations Subcommittee

A complete listing of Senate and House consultations is attached at Tab A.

B. Announcement Day

The announcement format, we suggest, should be similar to that of Hospital Cost Containment. Congressional sponsors will be present and should be asked to comment following your announcement remarks. We believe that substantial credibility can be added to your proposal if you are joined by Rangel, Staggers, Corman, Ribicoff and others, including, hopefully, Russell Long.

C. Post-Announcement

Our Congressional Liaison activity immediately after the announcement will be geared primarily toward the Senate Finance Committee, which is scheduled to take up NHP in the week following the announcement. We will ask for meetings and telephone calls by you, the Vice President, and other Administration officials as the need arises.
II. PUBLIC OUTREACH

A. Pre-Announcement

In order for our NHP proposal to be adopted over the many others being offered, we will have to pull away many of the supporting groups which are currently inclined to favor another proposal. We propose to accomplish this through a series of meetings with the interest groups, during which we explain that the "best obtainable" health insurance proposal is our NHP. To that end, we have already met with:

-- state and local government association leaders,

-- insurance industry representatives, and

-- elderly, consumer, and union representatives.

In addition, the following pre-announcement outreach activities are planned:

-- The Vice President will meet with Dean Jeffers, Chairman of Nationwide Insurance Company, in Columbus, Ohio on June 8. Nationwide will be supporting our proposal, and Jeffers will be asked to seek support for NHP within the insurance industry.

-- The Vice President will meet with leaders of the major black and Hispanic organizations over breakfast on the morning of the announcement. Eizenstat and Califano will also be present.

-- We are planning a briefing for the staffs of civil rights and poor people's organizations.

We are hopeful that our fairly large supporting coalition for Hospital Cost Containment will provide additional groups supporting our NHP proposal. As these additional interest groups become identified, we will hold Roosevelt Room briefings for them.

We also hope to actively pursue governors, county officials, mayors, and their interest groups, for support. These groups should be supportive of our program, as it contains sizeable financial savings for them.
Memorandum for the President -  
June 6, 1979  

Page 4  

Due to your impending foreign travel, we will not ask you to meet with anyone to discuss NHP. We will, however, request that you make short telephone calls to George Meany and Doug Fraser to inform them of the upcoming announcement and to offer to have Joe Califano and Stu Eizenstat brief them on our proposal. (Doug Fraser is speaking to the Conference of Mayors on the day of the announcement, and you might ask him to refrain from blasting NHP publicly before taking a good hard look at it.)

Will call Meany and Fraser

Will not call

We will also request your approval of letters from you to leaders of the other unions, elderly groups, mayors, governors, and other political leaders.

B. Post-Announcement

Our post-announcement outreach activities will be similar to those we have conducted in garnering support for our Hospital Cost Containment legislation. We are arranging the following activities:

-- A series of East Room briefings by Califano and Eizenstat, with drop-by appearances by you or the Vice President, targeted at the appropriate Congressional committees.

-- We hope to formulate a supporting coalition of various interest groups with whom we will meet periodically in the Roosevelt Room.

-- Union legislative workshops, educational and trade organization leadership institutes, and other groups gathering in Washington, will be briefed on NHP in Family Theater briefings.

-- While you are abroad, we will host intimate lunches or dinners in the family dining room with leaders of national organizations.

Electrostatic Copy Made  
for Preservation Purposes
We will work with the White House Speakers Bureau to secure favorable forums for speeches on NHP. Our goal is to obtain speaking opportunities in districts targeted to the appropriate Congressional committees. Each time a speaker is sent to a forum, we will have the speaker meet with local editorial boards, grant interviews, and seek to participate in a radio call-in or talk show.

III. MEDIA AND PRESS

A. Pre-Announcement

Prior to the announcement, we plan to have briefed the following specialized press:

-- black and other minority writers
-- writers for elderly group publications
-- health writers

In addition, we will prepare a general press backgrounder and mail it to 7,000 press affiliates on Friday, June 8. The backgrounder will be embargoed until the announcement.

B. Announcement Day

We propose that you announce NHP in the Cabinet Room before an assembly of White House press corps and specialized writers on health, minority, and elderly issues. Following your remarks and comments from supporting members of Congress, Joe Califano and Stu will brief the press in the Press Room. We will distribute copies of your speech, your Message to Congress, and summaries of the proposal, as well as the press backgrounder. We suggest this format rather than one involving interest groups because a) we don't believe we can put together a group of supporters of sufficient size and stature at this time, and b) the risk of adverse public comments from some of them is so great that it's not worth it --
nearly everyone familiar with this subject is too polarized, and it will take some time and effort to get them aboard.

approve Cabinet Room format

C. Post-Announcement

We will try to schedule Califano and Eizenstat for both morning news programs and the MacNeil-Lehrer Report in the week following the announcement, as well as the Sunday talk shows.

In the weeks following the announcement, we intend to have special briefings for major newspaper columnists, network executives, Washington bureau chiefs, and out-of-town editors. Hopefully, NHP will be a subject mentioned in your press conferences, as well as press conferences whenever the Vice President and Cabinet members travel. As we send speakers around the country to address local groups on NHP, we will strongly encourage them to make themselves available for meetings of editorial boards, interviews, talk shows, and radio call-ins. We will also be arranging videotaped interviews and live radio hook-ups of Administration spokespeople here in Washington to be broadcast around the country.
National Health Plan Consultation

Senate

Leadership

The Secretary (JAC) and Jim Mongan --- Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Alan Cranston

Finance

Democrats: Republicans:

J. Mongan --- Senator Talmadge J. Mongan --- Senator Packwood
JAC --- Senator Ribicoff H. Champion --- Senator Durenberger
H. Champion --- Senator Nelson D. Warden --- Senator Heinz
D. Warden --- Senator Gravel J. Mongan --- Senator Danforth
J. Mongan --- Senator Bentsen D. Warden &
D. Warden --- Senator Matsunaga J. Mongan --- Senator Chafee
H. Champion --- Senator Moynihan
D. Warden --- Senator Baucus
H. Champion --- Senator Boren
B. Heineman --- Senator Bradley

Staff Director: Michael Stern

Labor and Human Resources

Democrats: Republicans:

D. Warden --- Senator Williams D. Warden --- Senator Schweiker
D. Warden --- Senator Randolph D. Warden --- Senator Javits
--- Senator Kennedy (?) D. Warden --- Senator Stafford
D. Warden --- Senator Eagleton
D. Warden --- Senator Riegle
D. Warden --- Senator Metzenbaum

Budget

Democrats: Republicans:

D. Warden --- Senator Muskie D. Warden --- Senator Bellmon
D. Warden --- Senator Chiles

Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee: Terry Lierman

NOTE: White House Congressional Liaison and Domestic Policy Staff will participate in the briefings
National Health Plan Consultation
House

Leadership

The Secretary -- The Speaker
Jim Wright
John Brademas
Dan Rostenkowski
Tom Foley

Steering and Policy -- JAC

Ways and Means

Followup with Congressman Ullman and Congressman Rangel

Congressman Conable

Congressman Corman

Staff Briefing -- Jim Mongan

-------------------------

Commerce

D. Warden -- Congressman Staggers
D. Warden -- Congressman Carter
D. Warden -- Congressman Waxman

Staff Briefing --

-------------------------

DSG -- Membership Briefing
JAC -- Executive Committee of DSG (Chairman: Dave Obey)

D. Warden -- Congressman Giaimo

D. Warden -- Congressman Pepper


-------------------------

NOTE: White House Congressional Liaison and Domestic Policy Staff will participate in the briefings.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6/8/79

Hugh Carter

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Note: was given original letter.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HUGH CARTER

SUBJECT: Presidential Library in the Plains-Americus-Sumter County Area

The attached materials (Tab A) from the Plains Town Council and others from Sumter County were sent to you through me.

I will put a copy of this in the Presidential Library File that Bob Lipshutz and I created a couple of years ago, but thought you would be interested in seeing how the folks down home feel.

Also attached (Tab B) is a response for you to send them.
To Mayor Boze Godwin

Thank you, the members of the Plains Town Council and all my other friends in Sumter County for your kind letters concerning the location of the future Carter Presidential Library. I am glad to be wanted back home for good, and I appreciate your giving me until 1985!

You can be sure that when the time comes for a decision on the Library site, I will give every possible consideration to the area where I held my first public office.

It was good to hear from you, and I send each of you my warm good wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable Lynton E. Godwin III
Mayor of Plains
Post Office Box 185
Plains, Georgia 31780
To Mayor Boze Godwin

Thank you, the members of the Plains Town Council and all my other friends in Sumter County for your kind letters concerning the location of the future Carter Presidential Library. I look forward to returning back home for good, and I appreciate your giving me an option to wait until 1985!

You can be sure that when the time comes for a decision on the Library site, I will give every possible consideration to the area where I held my first public office.

It was good to hear from you, and I send each of you my warm good wishes.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lynton E. Godwin III
Mayor of Plains
Post Office Box 185
Plains, Georgia 31780
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/8/79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

EPA INSPECTOR GENERAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: TIM KRAFT
ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT: Inspector General Position - EPA

On January 3, 1979, you approved Judy Rogers to be Inspector General of the Environmental Protection Agency. Subsequently, Ms. Rogers changed her mind.

We and Doug Costle recommend Inez Smith Reid (resume attached). Ms. Reid is currently the Deputy General Counsel for Regulation Review at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. From 1976 to 1977, she served as General Counsel for the New York State Division for Youth in Albany and was in private practice in New York from 1972 to 1976. During the years 1963 to 1971, Ms. Reid served as a lecturer and a professor in criminal law, African Studies, and Political Science, in the State university system in New York as well as the Ecole Nationale de Droit et D'Administration in Congo-Kinshasa (now Zaire).

Ms. Reid is a tough, bright Black attorney of considerable integrity.

If you approve this recommendation, Ms. Reid will be the last of the I.G.'s appointed under the "Inspector General Act of 1978." Of the twelve, five will be women of whom two are Black, and one is an Asian-American.

RECOMMENDATION:

Nominate Inez Smith Reid to be the Inspector General of the Environmental Protection Agency. OMB and the Department of Justice concur.

[Signature] approve [Signature] disapprove

[Stamp: Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes]
INEZ SMITH REID
1245 Delaware Avenue, S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20024

Professional Experience

1977 - Present  Deputy General Counsel for Regulation Review, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

1976 - 1977  General Counsel, New York State Executive Department, State Division for Youth, Albany, New York


1971 - Present  Associate Professor of Political Science (on leave Fall 1972, 1976-1979) Barnard College, Columbia University New York, New York

1966 - 1971  Instructor to Associate Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College, CUNY, Brooklyn, New York

1965 - 1966  Lecturer in Political Science, Hunter College, CUNY, New York, New York

1964 - 1965  Assistant Professor of African Studies and Political Science, State University of New York, New Paltz, New York

1963 - 1964  Lecturer in criminal law and law librarian, Ecole Nationale de Droit et D'Administration, Congo-Kinshasa (now Zaire)

Education

1959  Tufts University, B.A., Magna Cum Laude

1962  Yale University, LL.B.

1963  U.C.L.A., M.A., Political Science

1968  Columbia University, Ph.D.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/8/79

r...rk --

frank moore already has a copy of attached

--susan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President —

HB 131 (Pan Canal)

Can be won but

NOT NEXT TUESDAY.

A NATIONAL EDUCATION

effort, T.V., etc. By you

and other ideas I have

could win it.

But if you only have

one shot at it before

Oct 1st — Please don't take

that shot on Tuesday. You

will lose.

Floyd Finch

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/8/79

TO: Rick Hutchinson

For Your Information: 

For Appropriate Handling: 

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

Robert D. Linder
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM SCHLESINGER
SUBJECT: Recommended Response to the Domestic Policy Review of Solar Energy

Stu Eizenstat and the Domestic Policy staff presently have under review the Response Memorandum from the Domestic Policy Review of Solar Energy. In consultation with the agencies that participated in the Review, they are preparing a Decision Memorandum for your consideration.

There is a growing interest in the possibilities that solar energy holds for reducing our vulnerability from an overdependence on imported petroleum-based products and for more rapidly meeting a significant portion of domestic and international energy needs. I have stated on previous occasions that solar energy has begun to capture the imagination of the American people. Thus, it is my conviction that there is a growing base of support for your campaign promise to invigorate the development of environmentally safe sources of energy such as solar.

The significant findings of the Domestic Policy Review (DPR) can be summarized as follows:

- Solar energy offers numerous important advantages over competing technologies; and significant potential exists for expanding its use;
- Even with today's subsidized energy prices, many solar technologies are already economic and can be used in a wide range of applications;
- Although the Federal Government can provide a leadership role, Federal actions alone cannot ensure widespread solar use.

Additionally, the DPR emphasizes the need to address public awareness and consumer protection; industry competition; job training; economic and regulatory barriers and incentives in both the public and private sectors; the need for greater balance between long-term research and development of centralized facilities and decentralized applications with nearer term benefits; foreign policy and international trade potential.
Although many combinations of specific initiatives are possible, the DPR provided for your consideration three broad options, each one cumulative in its effect upon the national energy supply and the Federal budget.

Option 1

Option 1 would increase the effectiveness of current Federal solar energy programs ensuring that all Federal RD&D, housing, financing, economic development, utility, procurement and information programs actively support commercialization of solar technologies. It would not require an increase in federal outlays beyond the approximately $820 million in FY 1980 until 1982, with total incremental expenditures amounting to about $160 million by 1985. It should be noted that there is more than a ten-fold increase in solar funding since 1975. Solar penetration in the year 2000 would be expected to increase by 0.3 to 0.7 quads over the base case estimate of approximately 10 quads, assuming oil prices rise to $25 per barrel in 1977 dollars.

Option 2

Option 2 would provide substantial additional stimulation in the near term. Tax incentives and credit assistance to such near-term technologies as passive solar, solar hot water, and industrial process heat would be provided, in addition to the measures of Option 1. Option 2 would increase the Federal budget by $2.5 billion cumulatively through 1985 for financial incentives beyond Option 1, with no budget increases in FY 1980 or FY 1981. This amount does not include increases in DOE or other agency RD&D programs, which will be decided annually in the context of each agency's budget. Successful pursuit of Option 2 will require continued real growth in the solar RD&D budget through 1985 and larger tax expenditures. The incremental increase in solar penetration over Option 1 would most likely be between 2 and 3 quads by the year 2000, although it could be higher.

Option 3

Option 3 would increase Federal support for solar energy far more dramatically. This alternative, proposed by solar and public interest groups, assumes adoption of both Options 1 and 2 with significant additional financial incentives and stronger regulatory measures. Estimated additional costs are $6 billion in 1980, $44 billion cumulatively through 1985 and between $81 billion and $113 billion cumulatively through 2000. Under this Option, solar penetration in the year 2000 is estimated to be approximately 18 quads over the base case estimate, resulting in solar energy contributing over 25 percent of this Nation's energy supply by 2000.
I recommend that you select Option 2 which presupposes the selection of Option 1. In addition, Option 3 should be assessed carefully to determine priority items that could provide relatively favorable benefits for the costs involved.

Accelerated transition to a significantly greater reliance on renewable resources will require action on many fronts. A successful solar program must take major steps to accelerate the transition while retaining the flexibility to respond advantageously to shifts in the marketplace, technological breakthroughs or failures, and changes in social values. To achieve accelerated market penetration in the transition to solar energy, a commitment by you personally and this Administration to establish a partnership between all levels of government and all sectors of our economy will be required.

For this reason, I think, in preparing a solar Decision Memorandum, it is particularly important that the Domestic Policy Staff and the participating agencies give serious consideration to the merits and timing of establishing a goal or a set of solar goals which assert your leadership and serve both to drive the government programs and to challenge America's industries, institutions, and the public.

Should you decide to further assert your leadership by articulating an accelerated solar program, I recommend that you announce your decision in the context of a major energy address to the Nation or a message to the Congress. Such a Presidential statement can serve to mobilize and coalesce the growing public interest in solar energy, will build upon your previous statements on this subject, and put it in the context of the Administration's overall energy policy.
The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JODY POWELL

After a great deal of consideration, I have decided that I should establish a "mem-con" system for press contacts within the Administration. Under this system, any statements to the press by those working in the White House would be reported to the Press Office on a same-day basis when possible in an informal memo. In the Departments, the memos would go to the departmental press office.

I believe this procedure would lessen the frequency of inaccurate stories about Administration action and policies.

I believe it would enhance our ability to speak to the public with a clear voice.

Most previous Administrations have had such a policy. It is no panacea, but I believe it would be helpful.

There will undoubtedly be unfavorable press reaction, but I am prepared to take the heat on it. If you approve, perhaps I could make the announcement to the Cabinet and Senior Staff at the Monday meeting. They would need to know that you support the policy completely, but I see no need to involve you directly in the matter.

Along the same lines, we have repeatedly requested that members of the Cabinet check with Jerry Rafshoon before accepting any appearances on network television. They do not always do so. In addition to reinforcing this procedure, I recommend that we require Cabinet officers through their press secretaries to provide to Rafshoon a transcript whenever possible or a memo when no transcript is available of any press conferences or interviews.
The impact of these two actions on the public would be positive, despite the negative press reaction. People long to see you crack the whip a little and impose some order on what they see as chaos in the Administration.

I propose to distribute the attached memo on Monday so there will be a written record of the basis for the decision.

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE CABINET
AND SENIOR STAFF

FROM: JODY POWELL

SUBJECT: Press Statements

This Administration is frequently charged by members of the press with a failure to enunciate clearly Administration policy. To some extent those allegations are justified. The following two procedures can help to alleviate this problem:

1. All members of the White House staff and Departmental officials who make statements to the press or respond to press queries should file a memorandum of conversation with the appropriate press office, describing the questions asked and responses given. These mem-cons should be filed on the day of the interview and in no case later than the day after. Cabinet officers and Senior Staff have personal responsibility for establishing this system among their employees.

2. Cabinet officers should provide the White House with a similar record of their interviews with the press. A transcript is always preferable. A memo is suitable when a transcript is clearly impractical.

This system will allow the White House Press Office and the Departmental press offices to catch and correct any ambiguities that might be misinterpreted by the press. The system will also be a great asset to White House and Departmental press offices in responding to queries based on statements or responses to questions by Administration officials.

I would like to begin this system immediately. Thank you for your cooperation.
Jack Watson

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
cc: Phil Wise
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR ACTION</th>
<th>FYI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VICE PRESIDENT</td>
<td>ARONSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td>BUTLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIZENSTAT</td>
<td>H. CARTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRAFT</td>
<td>CLOUGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPSHUTZ</td>
<td>CRUIKSHANK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOORE</td>
<td>FIRST LADY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWELL</td>
<td>HARDEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAFSHOON</td>
<td>HERNANDEZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATSON</td>
<td>HUTCHESON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEXLER</td>
<td>KAHN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRZEZINSKI</td>
<td>LINDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCINTYRE</td>
<td>MARTIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHULTZE</td>
<td>MILLER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADAMS</td>
<td>MOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDRUS</td>
<td>PETERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELL</td>
<td>PETTIGREW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGLAND</td>
<td>PRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUMENTHAL</td>
<td>SANDERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN</td>
<td>WARREN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFANO</td>
<td>WEDDINGTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRIS</td>
<td>WISE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KREPS</td>
<td>VOORDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHLESINGER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRAUSS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VANCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADMIN. CONFIDEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECRET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EYES ONLY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Jack Watson

SUBJECT: Social Meeting with the Cabinet

This is in response to your request to me after the budget briefing this morning that I comment on your suggestion to have a late afternoon on Monday with the Cabinet members and senior staff. (4:00 p.m. is the time Phil has recommended.) Because of the extreme tightness of your schedule right now and the rest of the month, and because I think a somewhat different session with your top advisors would pay greater dividends, I suggest that we defer the meeting until early July. (In addition, though I've not checked, I am afraid that, because there is no Cabinet meeting on Monday, several members of the Cabinet will be out of town. For example, Cece and I will be at the Western Governors Conference, and the U. S. Conference of Mayors' annual meeting begins on Monday in Pittsburgh.)

In Joe Califano's last weekly report, he recommended another Camp David meeting with the Cabinet and White House senior staff to counter the "mid-term blues" which he thinks are affecting everyone.

I think Joe is right about the problem, but wrong about the remedy. I fear that a meeting at Camp David would be viewed by the press as evidence of "trouble" at the top of the Carter Administration.

At the same time, I think the problem is real and might better be addressed in the following way.

1. An informal social evening and dinner at the White House for Cabinet members and spouses, plus senior staff and spouses.
2. The evening would begin with a social hour of wine and conversation, followed by dinner. (If the weather is nice, perhaps having the reception and the dinner itself in the Rose Garden.)

3. After dinner, in informal remarks, you would make a very strong statement about your intentions to carry the story of the Administration's significant foreign and domestic accomplishments to every corner of the nation. Your remarks would be forceful and upbeat in tone and optimistic about the future.

The purpose of the dinner and your remarks would be two-fold:

1. To pep the Cabinet up by seeing you full of energy and ready for all comers; and

2. To produce press stories that the President "in a relaxed, social session with his top advisors displayed great confidence and determination and made unmistakably clear that he is in good spirits and strong form despite recent set-backs in the polls and on the Hill."

News of the dinner and your resolve will be good politically; will have a salutory effect on the entire Administration; and will serve the purposes Joe Califano had in mind when he suggested a second Camp David meeting.

If you think this alternative has merit, I will be happy to work with Phil and Gretchen to schedule it. If not, I'll begin immediately to call the Cabinet and Senior staff for the meeting on Monday afternoon.

cc: Ham Jordan
Phil Wise
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 7, 1979

PHOTO SESSION WITH MAYOR BILL MORRIS, SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Friday, June 8, 1979
12:20 p.m. (3 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Jim Free

I. PURPOSE

Photo session with Mayor Bill Morris.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

Background: William N. Morris, Jr. was elected Mayor of Shelby County last year. The city of Memphis has a Mayor as well as Shelby County, where Memphis is located. The city Mayor, Wyche Chandler, is up for re-election this year and it will be a hotly contested race, placing Mayor Morris now in a powerful position within the county.

Bill Morris was a former sheriff of Shelby County. After his term expired he entered the construction business, and in 1971, ran unsuccessfully for City Mayor. When he ran last year for the position of Mayor of Shelby County, he was backed heavily by Congressman Harold Ford thus enabling him to receive the majority of the black vote.

The Carter Administration has done more for the City of Memphis than any other city in Tennessee. Morris is aware of that and realizes we have not been given the credit or publicity deserved.

Mayor Morris is becoming the most popular politician in the Memphis area. He claims he's an independent but has very close ties with the Baker forces. However, he has indicated he will lend us his support. His sister, Gladys Linton, is a member of the Shelby County Democratic Executive Committee. He is married and has four children.
Participants: The President
Mayor Bill Morris
Ann Morris (his wife)
John Morris (his 12 year old son)
James E. Payne (friend of the Mayor's)
Joann Payne (his wife)
Jim Free

Press Plan: White House Photographer only.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. Tell the Mayor you enjoyed being in Memphis, and thank him for his cooperation given to us for the Mid-term Conference. This conference gave the city of Memphis added revenue.

2. It had been predicted that the Memphis Naval Air Station would be closed. It was not closed, therefore you should inquire as to how it's operating.

3. EDA gave a loan grant to the city of Memphis to help downtown historic preservation (approximately 12 million), and in particular, the renovation of the Peabody Hotel (9 million). You should inquire as to how this project is progressing.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: STU EIZENSTAT
        BETH ABRAMOWITZ
SUBJECT: Photo Opportunity (3 minutes) - Executive Committee of the National School Board Association, Friday, June 8, 1979, at 12:25 p.m., The Oval Office

The National School Board Association (NSBA) is the largest body of elected officials in the country. Membership is composed of local school board members.

The NSBA has consistently supported the education priorities of your Administration. NSBA was especially helpful in the defeat of tuition tax credits and passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act last year. This year NSBA has worked aggressively for your Department of Education bill.

You will be greeting the national officers who form the executive committee of NSBA. They are in town for a regular business meeting.

Talking Points

- Congratulations to Hiroshi Yamashita (Hawaii) on his recent election as president of NSBA. The Administration enjoyed a warm and productive relationship with Margaret Bivinger, NSBA past president.

- Thank you for all of your help in passage of the bill to create a cabinet-level Department of Education.

- As a former school board member, I appreciate the importance of your work in insuring quality education for all students.

- Since taking office, we have increased federal aid to education by about $6 billion or over 60 percent.

- Education is the key to the future stability and prosperity of our country.
Participants
National School Board Association Executive Committee members:
Hiroshi Yamashita, President (Hawaii)
Margaret Buvinger, Past President (Ohio)
Jean Tufts, 1st Vice President (Massachusetts)
Robert Haderlein, 2nd Vice President (Kansas)
Rayma Page, Secretary-Treasurer (Florida)
Thomas Shannon, Executive Director (Washington, D.C.)
August Steinhilber, Executive Vice President, (Washington, D.C.)

Press Coverage
Press will be handled by the White House Press Office.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
08 Jun 79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
| FOR STAFFING | ARONSON |
| FOR INFORMATION | BUTLER |
| FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX | H. CARTER |
| LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY | CLOUGH |
| IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND | CRUIKSHANK |
| NO DEADLINE | FIRST LADY |
| LAST DAY FOR ACTION | HARDEN |
| | HERNANDEZ |
| | HUTCHESON |
| | KAHN |
| | LINDER |
| | MARTIN |
| | MILLER |
| | MOE |
| | PETERSON |
| | PETTIGREW |
| | PRESS |
| | SANDERS |
| | WARREN |
| | WEDDINGTON |
| | WISE |
| | VOORDE |
| | ADMIN. CONFIDEN. |
| | CONFIDENTIAL |
| | SECRET |
| | EYES ONLY |
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: TIM KRAFT ARNIE MILLER
SUBJECT: Federal Maritime Commission

James V. Day's term as a Member of the Federal Maritime Commission expires June 30. Day (Republican-Maine) has been a Member of the Commission since 1962.

The current Chairman whom you appointed, Richard Daschback, supports his reappointment, as does Senator Muskie.

Frank Moore concurs with the following recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION
Nominate Richard V. Day for a five year term as a Republican Member of the Federal Maritime Commission.

_________ approve ___________ disapprove

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes
JAMES V. DAY

EXPERIENCE

1962 - Present
Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission, Washington, D.C.

1956 - 1962
National Director of Public Affairs, American Legion
Vice Chairman, Merchant Marine Committee

1946 - 1956
President, Spillers, Inc., Kennebunk, Maine

1941 - 1946
U.S. Army

1936 - 1941
Sales Supervisor, H.J. Heinz Company

EDUCATION

1971
University of Maine, Honorary Doctorate Degree

1934
Washington State Teachers College, Education Certificate

ACTIVITIES

Member, Board of Advisors, Blinded Veterans Association, 1964 - Present
Member, Board of Visitors, Maine Maritime Academy
Recipient, President's Award, American Legion Press Association, 1961
Recipient, Big M Award, State of Maine Society, 1965

PERSONAL

White Male
Age 64
Republican
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE

You may be interested in some developments which occurred as a result of the Democratic Leadership Breakfast. Cranston went back to the Hill and reported to Byrd. Senator Byrd then called a meeting with Scoop and Cranston concerning Scoop's emergency energy legislation. There will be a press conference Monday with Scoop, Stevens, Hatfield, et al announcing this legislation and their intent to pass it in August with bipartisan support. (We will have an analysis of the bill early next week.) Yesterday morning with the House and Senate Democratic Leadership including Russell Long, and Scoop Jackson, Byrd used Tip to make a run at Long in forcing windfall profits tax out as soon as possible. There was an agreement to try to get it out before the August recess. Very heavy pressure came from Byrd on Long to have short hearings in the Senate Finance Committee to fight whatever amendments they had on the floor rather than the Committee. In summary, Cranston and O'Neill are proud that there has been some planned and coordinated response as a result of the Wednesday breakfast.
regular foreign affairs breakfast 6/8/79

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For MB 6-8-79

> Rhodesia
> MX
> Vienna
> Nicaragua - Somoza
> Soviet grain
> SALT III
> Panama
> MFN
> Giscard to US < 626
> Energy
> Settlements, talks = Cong del.
> Mubarak - Iwan Miller
> Telemetry
> Pre notification
> ASAT
> Tom Watson to SG
> Lebanon - Pales out of S.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2:00 P.M.: Friday
JUNE 8, 1979

MR. PRESIDENT

SENATOR KENNEDY CALLED.

Good re Rhodesia
Better decision than on MX
today

PHIL
Complete agreement on truck bill
Kennedy willing to sponsor
Canton hearings 6/6-7

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes