[Trip to Vienna for Signing of SALT II, 6/14/79-6/18/79] [2]

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Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States, fellow citizens:

The truth of the nuclear age is that the United States and the Soviet Union must live in peace -- or we may not live at all.

From the beginning of history, the fortunes of men and nations were made and unmade in unending cycles of war and peace. Combat was the measure of human courage. Willingness to risk war was the mark of statecraft.

My fellow Americans, that pattern of war must now be broken forever.

Between nations armed with thousands of thermonuclear weapons -- each capable of causing unimaginable destruction -- there can be no more cycles of war and peace. There can only be peace.

About two hours ago, I returned from three days of intensive talks with President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union.

I come here in a spirit of patience, of hope, and of reason and responsibility.

-- Patience -- because the way is...
PATIENCE -- because the way is long and hard, and the obstacles ahead are at least as great as those which have been overcome in the last thirty years of diligent and dedicated work.

Hope -- because I am able to report to you tonight that real progress has been made.

Reason and responsibility -- because both will be needed in full measure if the promise awakened in Vienna is to be fulfilled, and the way opened for the next phase in the struggle for a safe and sane world.

Nothing will more strongly affect the outcome of that struggle than the relationship between the two predominant military powers of this earth -- the United States and the Soviet Union.

The talks in Vienna were important in themselves. But their truest significance was as part of a process -- a process that began long before I became President.

This was the tenth time since the end of World War II that American and Soviet leaders have met at a summit. During these past three days, we have moved closer to the goal of stability and security in Soviet-American relations.
THAT HAS BEEN THE PURPOSE OF AMERICAN POLICY EVER SINCE THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION BECAME A CENTRAL FACT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS A GENERATION AGO, IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II.

WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND OUR PEOPLE, EVERY PRESIDENT THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE MOST DANGEROUS ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPETITION.

WHEN THE UNITED STATES STILL HAD A NUCLEAR MONOPOLY, PRESIDENT TRUMAN SOUGHT TO PLACE THE ATOMIC BOMB UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER MADE THE FIRST PROPOSALS TO CONTROL NUCLEAR TESTING.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY NEGOTIATED THE ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON BROADENED THE AREA OF NEGOTIATION TO INCLUDE STRATEGIC ARMS.

PRESIDENT NIXON CONCLUDED THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY.

PRESIDENT FORD NEGOTIATED THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORDS.

THIS IS A VITAL AND CONTINUING PROCESS.

THIS WEEK I WILL DELIVER TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES THE COMPLETE AND SIGNED TEXT OF THE SECOND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT -- S.A.L.T. II.

-- THIS TREATY IS THE PRODUCT....
This treaty is the product of seven years of tough painstaking negotiation under three Presidents. When ratified, it will be a truly national achievement -- an achievement of the Executive and the Congress, of civilians and the military, of liberals and conservatives, of Democrats and Republicans.

S.A.L.T. II will not end competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

That competition is based on fundamentally different visions of human society and human destiny. As long as that basic difference persists, there will always be some degree of tension in the relationship between us.

The United States has no fear of such rivalry.

But we want it to be peaceful.

In any age such a rivalry risks degenerating into war; but our age is unique, for the terrible power of nuclear weapons has created an incentive for avoiding war that transcends even very deep differences of politics and philosophy.

In the age of the hydrogen bomb, there is no longer any meaningful distinction between global war and global suicide.
THE AGREEMENT CONSTRAINS NONE OF THE REASONABLE PROGRAMS WE HAVE PLANNED TO IMPROVE OUR DEFENSES.

Moreover, it helps us respond much more effectively to our most pressing strategic problem -- the prospective vulnerability in the 1980's of our land-based missiles.

The MX missile permitted under S.A.L.T. II and its verifiable mobile deployment system will enhance stability as it deprives an attacker of the confidence that a successful first strike could be launched against I.C.B.M.'s.

Without the S.A.L.T. II limits, the Soviet Union could build so many warheads that any land-based system, fixed or mobile, could be jeopardized.

With S.A.L.T. II, we can concentrate more effort on preserving the balance in our conventional and N.A.T.O. forces. Without the S.A.L.T. treaty we would be forced to spend extra billions each year in a dangerous nuclear arms race.

As I have said many times, S.A.L.T. II is not based on trust. Compliance will be assured by our own nation's means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronics systems, and a vast intelligence network.

Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of trying to violate the treaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively.

-- It is the S.A.L.T. II...
It is the S.A.L.T. II agreement itself which forbids concealment measures, interference with our monitoring, and the encryption or encoding of crucial missile-test information. A violation of this part of the agreement -- which we would quickly detect -- would be as serious as a violation of the limits on strategic weapons themselves.

Consider these prospects:

-- Suppose Soviet leaders build a thousand additional missiles, several of advanced and formidable design. This can happen only if the S.A.L.T. II treaty is defeated.

-- Suppose the Soviet leaders double the number of warheads on their existing missiles, triple the annual production of the Backfire bomber and greatly increase its range and payload. These things can happen only if the S.A.L.T. II treaty is defeated.

-- Suppose the Soviet leaders encrypt all data on their missile tests, conceal their nuclear launcher deployment rate and hide all existing missile launchers. This can happen only if the S.A.L.T. II treaty is defeated.

S.A.L.T. II is very important, but it is more than a single arms control agreement. It is part of a long historical process of gradually reducing the danger of nuclear war -- a process that we must not undermine.
Under the treaty, the Soviet Union will be held to a third fewer strategic missile launchers and bombers by 1985 than they would have simply by continuing to build at their present rate.

With S.A.L.T. II, the numbers of warheads on missiles, their throw weight, and the qualitative development of new missiles will be limited.

The Soviet Union will have to destroy or dismantle some 250 strategic launcher systems -- systems such as nuclear submarines armed with relatively new missiles built in the early 1970's, and aircraft carrying their largest multi-megaton bombs.

Once dismantled, these systems cannot be replaced.

By contrast, no operational U.S. forces will have to be reduced. For one Soviet missile alone -- the SS-18 -- the S.A.L.T. II limits will mean that some six thousand fewer Soviet nuclear warheads can be built and aimed at our country.

With or without S.A.L.T. II we must modernize and strengthen our strategic forces -- and we are doing so. But S.A.L.T. II makes this task easier, surer, and less expensive.
THE RESTRICTIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS ARE COMPLEX, FOR THESE WEAPONS REPRESENT THE HIGHEST DEVELOPMENT OF THE TECHNICAL SKILLS OF TWO GREAT NATIONS.


THE S.A.L.T. II TREATY REDUCES THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT PLACES EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF BOTH SIDES, ENDING A PREVIOUS NUMERICAL IMBALANCE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION.

S.A.L.T. II PRESERVES OUR OPTIONS TO BUILD THE FORCES WE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE TREATY ENHANCES OUR ABILITY TO MONITOR SOVIET ACTIONS. AND IT LEADS DIRECTLY TO THE NEXT STEP IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

S.A.L.T. II DOES NOT END THE ARMS COMPETITION. IT DOES MAKE THAT COMPETITION SAFER AND MORE PREDICTABLE, WITH CLEAR RULES AND VERIFIABLE LIMITS WHERE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO RULES, NO LIMITS.

IT IS IN OUR INTEREST BECAUSE IT SLOWS -- EVEN REVERSES -- THE MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP.

-- UNDER THE TREATY,.....
Yet for the same reason -- to keep the peace -- we must prevent an uncontrolled and pointless nuclear arms race that would damage the security of all countries, including our own, by exposing the world to a greater risk of war through instability, tension and uncertainty.

That is why the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is so important.

S.A.L.T. II will become the most exhaustively discussed treaty of our time. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others who hammered out this treaty will testify for it before the Senate, in detail and in public. I will explain it throughout our nation.

This treaty will withstand the most severe scrutiny, because it is so clearly in the interest of American security and world peace.

S.A.L.T. II is the most detailed, far-reaching, comprehensive treaty in the history of arms control. Its provisions are interwoven by the give and take of the negotiating process.

Neither side obtained everything it sought. But the package that emerged is a carefully-balanced whole, and it will make the world a safer place for both sides.
Our shared understanding of these realities has given the world an interval of peace -- a strange peace, marked by tension and danger and sometimes even regional conflict,... but a kind of peace nonetheless.

In the 27 years before Hiroshima, the leading powers of the world were twice engulfed in total war. In the 34 years since Hiroshima, humanity has by no means been free of armed conflict; ...but there has been no world war.

Yet this twilight peace carries the ever-present possibility of a catastrophic nuclear war, a war that in horror and destruction and death would dwarf all the combined wars of man's long and bloody history.

We must prevent such a war. (We must prevent such a war.)

To keep the peace, we must have strong military forces, strong alliances, and a strong national resolve -- so strong that no potential adversary could be tempted to attack us.

We have that strength -- and the strength of the United States is growing, not diminishing.

-- Yet for the same reason......
THE S.A.L.T. II TREATY MUST BE JUDGED ON ITS OWN MERITS -- AND ON ITS OWN MERITS IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL GAIN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

But it would be the height of irresponsibility to ignore other possible consequences of a failure to ratify the treaty.

These consequences would include:

-- Greatly increased spending for strategic arms;

-- Greater uncertainty about the strategic balance;

-- Vastly increased dangers of nuclear proliferation among other nations throughout the world; and

-- Increased political tensions between East and West, with a greater likelihood that other inevitable problems could escalate into superpower confrontations.

Rejection would also be a damaging blow to the Western alliance. All of our European and other allies, including especially those most directly and courageously facing Soviet power, strongly support S.A.L.T. II.

If the Senate were to reject the treaty, America's leadership of the alliance would be compromised, and the alliance itself would be severely shaken.

-- In short, S.A.L.T. II is not....
IN SHORT, S.A.L.T. II IS NOT A FAVOR WE ARE DOING FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS A DELIBERATE, CALCULATED MOVE WE ARE MAKING AS A MATTER OF SELF-INTEREST -- A MOVE THAT HAPPENS TO SERVE THE GOALS BOTH OF SECURITY AND OF SURVIVAL, THAT STRENGTHENS BOTH THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.

AND OF COURSE S.A.L.T. II IS THE ABSOLUTELY INDISPENSIBLE PRECONDITION FOR MOVING ON TO MUCH DEEPER AND MORE SIGNIFICANT CUTS IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS IN S.A.L.T. III.

ALTHOUGH WE WILL NOT BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON S.A.L.T. III UNTIL S.A.L.T. II GOES INTO EFFECT, I DISCUSSED OTHER NUCLEAR CONTROL ISSUES WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV SUCH AS DEEPER MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPON INVENTORIES,... STRicter LIMITS ON THE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS,... ENHANCED SURVIVABILITY AND STABILITY OF AUTHORIZED MISSILE SYSTEMS,... PRENOTIFICATION OF MISSILE TESTS OR LARGE STRATEGIC BOMBER EXERCISES,... AND LIMITS AND CONTROLS ON TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT NOW COVERED BY S.A.L.T. AGREEMENTS.

The U.S.-Soviet relationship covers a broad range of issues, some of which bear directly upon our joint responsibility to reduce the possibility of war.

President Brezhnev and I discussed these issues in Vienna. I undertook these discussions with a firm confidence in the strength of America.

Militarily, our power is second to none. I am determined that it will remain so. We will continue to have the military power to deter aggression, maintain security, and permit the continuing search for peace and the control of arms.

Economically, despite serious problems of energy and inflation, we are by far the most productive nation on earth. With our allies, our economic strength is three times greater than that of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Diplomatically, we have strengthened our friendships with Western Europe and Japan, China and India, Israel and Egypt, and much of the Third World. Our alliances are stronger because they are based not on force, but on common interests and most often on common values.

-- Politically, our democratic...
Politically, our democratic system is an enormous advantage -- not only to each of us as individuals, but to all of us together as a nation.

Our support of human rights, backed by the concrete example of our own American society, has aligned us with peoples everywhere who yearn for freedom.

These strengths are such that we need fear no other country. This confidence in our nation helped me in Vienna as we discussed specific areas of potential direct or indirect confrontation around the world, including Southern Africa and the Middle East.

For instance, I made it clear to President Brezhnev that Cuban military activities in Africa, sponsored or supported by the Soviet Union, and the growing Cuban involvement in the problems of Central America and the Caribbean, can only have a negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Despite disagreements, our exchange was useful, because it enabled us to clarify our positions directly to each other, face to face, and thus to reduce the chances of future miscalculations on both sides.
Finally, President Brezhnev and I developed a better sense of each other as leaders and as men. The responsibility for many decisions involving the future of the world rests on me as the leader of this great country, and it is vital that my judgments be based on as much firsthand knowledge and experience as possible.

In these conversations, I was careful to leave no doubt about either my desire for peace or my determination to defend the interests of the United States.

I believe that together we laid a foundation on which we can build a more stable relationship between our two countries.

We will seek to broaden the areas of cooperation, and we will compete where and when we must. We know how determined the Soviet leaders are to secure their interests. We are equally determined to protect and to advance our own.

We look to the future with anticipation and confidence, not only because of the material power of our nation, but because of the power of our nation's ideas and principles. The ultimate future of the human race lies not with tyranny, but with freedom, ...not with war, but with peace.

-- With that vision to......
WITH THAT VISION TO SUSTAIN US, WE MUST NOW COMPLETE THE WORK OF RATIFYING THIS TREATY, A MAJOR STEP IN THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

THEN WE MAY TURN OUR ENERGIES NOT ONLY TO FURTHER PROGRESS ON THAT PATH, BUT ALSO MORE URGENTLY TO OUR OWN DOMESTIC AGENDA -- IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE STRENGTHENED THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

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Address to Joint Session of Congress

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States, fellow citizens:

The truth of the nuclear age is that the United States and the Soviet Union must live in peace — or we will not live at all.

From the beginning of history the fortunes of men and nations were made and unmade in unending cycles of war and peace. "Battle was the measure of human courage. Willingness to risk war was the mark of statecraft.

Between nations armed with thousands of thermonuclear
wepons -- each capable of causing unimaginable destruction -- there can be no more cycles of war and peace. There can only be peace.

About an hour ago, I returned from three days of intensive talks with President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union.

I return with the counsel of patience, of hope, and of reason and responsibility.

Patience -- because the way is long and hard, and the obstacles ahead are at least as great as those which have been overcome in the last thirty years of diligent and dedicated work.

Hope -- because I am able to report to you tonight that real progress has been made.

Reason and responsibility -- because both will be needed in full measure if the promise awakened in Vienna
is to be fulfilled, and the way opened for the next phase in the struggle for a safe and sane world.

Nothing will more strongly affect the outcome of that struggle than the relationship between the two predominant military powers of this earth -- the United States and the Soviet Union.

The talks in Vienna were important in themselves. But their truest significance was as part of a process -- a process that began long before my presidency.

This was the tenth time since the end of World War II that American and Soviet leaders have met at the summit. During these past three days, we have moved closer to the goal of stability and security in Soviet-American relations.

That has been the goal of American policy ever since the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union
became the central fact of international relations a generation ago, in the wake of World War II.

With the support of the Congress and the people, every President throughout this period has sought to reduce the most dangerous elements of the Soviet-American competition.

When the U.S. still had a nuclear monopoly, President Truman sought to place the atomic bomb under international authority. President Eisenhower made the first proposals to control nuclear testing. President Kennedy negotiated the Atmospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson broadened the area of negotiation to include strategic arms. President Nixon concluded the historic first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. President Ford negotiated the Vladivostok accords. This is a vital and continuing process.

Tomorrow, I will deliver to the Senate of the United States the complete and signed text of the second Strategic
Arms Limitation Agreement -- SALT II.

This treaty

SALT II is the product of seven years of tough, painstaking negotiation under three Presidents. Once it is ratified, it will be a truly national achievement -- an achievement of the Executive and the Congress, of civilians and the military, of Democrats and Republicans, of liberals and conservatives alike.

SALT II does not end the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

That competition is based on fundamentally different visions of human society and human destiny. As long as that basic difference persists, there will always be some degree of tension in the relationship between us. The United States has no fear of such rivalry with any other nation. But in any age, such a profound rivalry risks degenerating into war, but our age is unique, for the terrible power of nuclear weapons has created an incentive for avoiding
war that transcends even very deep differences of politics and philosophy. In the age of the hydrogen bomb, there is no longer any meaningful distinction between global war and global suicide. The United States has no fear of such a reality without war. These realities are the realities of the world.

Our shared understanding of this reality has given an interval of peace -- a strange peace, marked by tension and danger and sometimes conflict, but a kind of peace nonetheless. In the twenty-seven years before Hiroshima, the leading powers of the world were twice engulfed in total war. In the thirty-four years since Hiroshima, humanity has by no means been free of armed conflict; but there has been no world war.

Yet this twilight peace carries the ever-present possibility of a catastrophic nuclear war, a war that in horror and destruction and death would dwarf all the wars of man's long and bloody history.
We must prevent such a war. [We must prevent such a war.]

To keep the peace, we must have strong military forces, strong alliances and a strong national resolve -- so strong that no potential adversary could be tempted to attack us.

We have that strength -- and [redacted] is growing, not diminishing.

Yet for the same reason -- to keep the peace -- we must prevent an uncontrolled and pointless nuclear arms race that would damage the security of all countries, including our own, by exposing the world to a greater risk of war through instability, tension and uncertainty.

That is why the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is so important -- why it is in the interest not only of the United States and the Soviet Union but of every country and every man, woman and child on earth.

SALT II will become the most exhaustively discussed
treaty of our time. The Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others will
testify on it before the Senate, in detail and in public.
I will speak about it frequently. It will be examined down
to the last detail — as it should be, as it must be — and
This treaty, I believe, will withstand the severest scrutiny,
because it is so profoundly in the interest of American
security and world peace.

SALT II is the most detailed, far-reaching, comprehen-
sive treaty in the history of arms control. Its provisions
are related to each other by the give and take of the nego-
tiating process. Neither side obtained everything it sought.
But the package that emerged is a carefully balanced whole,
and it will make the world a safer place for both sides.
The strategic weapons the treaty restricts are complex, for these weapons represent the highest development of the technical skills of two great nations.

But the basic realities underlying the treaty -- and the thrust of the treaty itself -- are not so complex. When all is said and done, SALT II is a matter of common sense.

SALT II reduces the danger of nuclear war. For the first time, it places equal ceilings on the strategic arsenals of both sides, ending a previous numerical imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. SALT II preserves our options to build the forces we need to maintain the strategic balance. It enhances our ability to monitor Soviet actions. And it leads directly to the next step in controlling nuclear weapons.

SALT II does not end the arms competition. It does
make that competition safer and more predictable, with clear agreed-upon rules and verifiable limits where otherwise there would be no rules, no limits.

It is in our interest because it slows -- even reverses -- the momentum of the Soviet arms buildup.

Under the treaty, the Soviet Union will be held to a fewer third strategic missile launches and bombers by 1985 than they would have without it simply by continuing to build at their present rate.

With SALT II, the numbers of warheads on missiles, their throw weight, and the qualitative development of new Soviet missiles will be limited. The Soviet Union will have to destroy or dismantle some 250 of their strategic launcher systems -- systems such as nuclear submarines armed with missiles built in the early 1970's and aircraft carrying their largest multi-megaton bombs. Once dismantled, these systems cannot be replaced. By contrast, no operational U.S. forces
will have to be reduced. For one Soviet missile alone -- the SS-18 -- the SALT II limits will mean that some six thousand fewer Soviet nuclear warheads can be built and aimed at our country.

With or without SALT II we must modernize and strengthen our strategic forces -- and we are doing so. But SALT II makes this task easier, surer and less expensive.

The agreement constrains none of the programs we have planned to improve our defenses. Moreover, it helps us respond much more effectively to our most pressing strategic problem -- the prospective vulnerability in the 1980's of our land-based missiles. The MX missile and the mobile missile system we will build are designed to deprive an attacker of the confidence that a successful first strike could be launched. Without the SALT II limits, the Soviet Union could build so many warheads that any land-based
system, fixed or mobile, could be neutralized.

With SALT II, we can concentrate more effort on making the improvements we need in our conventional and NATO forces. Without SALT II, we would be forced to spend extra billions each year in a dangerous nuclear arms race.

As I have said many times, SALT II is not based on trust. It is verifiable by our own means of verification, including extremely sophisticated satellites, powerful electronics systems, radars, and a vast intelligence network. Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of violating the treaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively.

It is itself which forbids concealment measures, interference with our monitoring, and the encryption or encoding of crucial missile-test information. A violation
of this part of the agreement -- which we would quickly
detect -- would be as serious as a violation of the limits
on strategic weapons themselves.

Without SALT II, the Soviets would be free not only
to engage in an unlimited strategic buildup, but also to
hide that buildup and to interfere with our efforts to moni-
tor it. That is why SALT II gives us much greater knowledge
of what the Soviets are doing, and enables our own military
planning to be much more precise and effective.

Finally, SALT II is more than a single arms control
agreement. It is one part of a long historical process of
gradually reducing the danger of nuclear war -- a process
that we must not permit ourselves to undermine.

The agreement must be judged on its own merits -- and
on its own merits it is a substantial gain for national
security and international stability. But it would be the
Consider these prospects:

III. Suppose the Soviet leaders build a thousand additional missiles, several of advanced and formidable design. This can only happen if the SALT II treaty is defeated.

IV. Suppose the Soviet leaders double the number of warheads on their intercontinental missiles, triple the annual production of the Silkworm bomber and greatly increase its range and payload. These things can happen only if the SALT II treaty is defeated.

V. Suppose the Soviet leaders encrypt all data on their missile tests, conceal their deployment rate and hide all missile launchers. This can happen only if the SALT II treaty is defeated.

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height of irresponsibility to ignore the possible consequences of a failure to ratify the treaty.

These consequences would include:

--Greatly increased spending for strategic arms;

--Greater uncertainty about the strategic balance;

--Vastly increased dangers of nuclear proliferation among other nations throughout the world; and

--Increased political tensions between East and West, with a greater likelihood that local problems could escalate into superpower confrontations.

Rejection would also be a damaging blow to the Western alliance. All of our European and other allies, including especially those most directly threatened by Soviet power, strongly support SALT II. If the Senate were to reject the treaty, America's leadership of the alliance would be gravely compromised, and the alliance itself would be severely shaken.

In short, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the
Soviet Union. It is a deliberate, calculated move we are making as a matter of self-interest -- a move that happens to serve the goals both of security and of survival, that strengthen both the military position of the United States and the cause of world peace.

And of course SALT II is the absolutely indispensable precondition for moving on to much deeper and more significant cuts in strategic armaments in SALT III.

Though SALT is the most important part of the complex relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is only a part.

The U.S. - Soviet relationship covers a broad range of issues, some of which, like SALT, bear directly upon our joint responsibility to reduce the possibility of nuclear war. President Brezhnev and I discussed all these issues
Although we will not lose sight of the fact that nuclear control is a mission essential to the security, stability, and survival of our nuclear systems, we must not be complacent. We must continue to educate and train personnel in nuclear control and ensure that everyone has and knows how to stop a crisis.
I undertook these discussions with a firm confidence in the strength of America.

Militarily, our power is second to none. I am determined that it will remain so. [With the strategic and conventional improvements we have begun, and those I have proposed and will propose to the Congress, we will continue to have the military power to deter aggression, maintain security, and permit the continuing search for peace and the control of arms.]

Economically, despite critical problems of energy and inflation, we are by far the most productive nation on earth. With our allies, our economic strength is three times greater than that of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Diplomatically, during the past two and one-half years we have strengthened our friendships with Western Europe
and Japan, China and India, Israel and Egypt, and much of the Third World. Our alliances are stronger because they are based not on force, but on common interests and most often on common values.

Politically, our democratic system is an enormous advantage -- not only to each of us as individuals, but to all of us together as a nation. Our support of human rights, backed by the concrete example of our own free society, has aligned us with the yearnings of peoples everywhere for freedom.

These strengths are such that we need fear no country. This confidence in our nation That fact was continually in the background at Vienna, and I believe it helped me make progress in my conversations in Vienna with President Brezhnev as we These conversations covered not only SALT-II, but also a wide range of other arms-control negotiations and international matters. President Brezhnev and I also discussed specific areas
of potential direct or indirect conflict around the world, including Southern Africa and the Middle East. I made it clear to President Brezhnev that Cuban military activities in Africa, sponsored and supported by the Soviet Union, and the growing Cuban involvement in the problems of Central America and the Caribbean, can only have a negative impact on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Despite our disagreements, our exchange was an extremely useful one, because it enabled us to clarify and express our positions directly to each other, face to face, and thus to reduce the chances of future miscalculations on both sides.

Finally, President Brezhnev and I got to know each other and to have a much better sense of each other as leaders and as men. The time we spent across the table from each other, alone except for our interpreters, was very useful to me and, I think, to him as well. The final responsibility for many
decisions involving the future of the world rests on me as the leader of this great country, and it is vital that my judgments be based on as much firsthand experience as possible. In these conversations, I was careful to leave no doubt in Mr. Brezhnev's mind about my determination to defend the interests of the United States. But I believe that together we laid a foundation on which we can strive to build a more stable relationship between our two countries.

We will continue to seek to broaden the areas of cooperation, and we will compete where and when we must. We know how determined the Soviets are to secure their interests. We are equally determined to protect and advance our own.

We look to the future with a sense of confidence, not only because of the material power of our nation, but because of the power of the ideas our nation represents.

The ultimate future of the human race lies not with tyranny
but with freedom, not with war but with peace. With that vision to sustain us, let us complete the work of ratifying this next step in the limitation of strategic arms. Then we may turn our energies not only to further steps on that path, but also to our urgent domestic agenda -- in the knowledge that we have strengthened the security of our nation and the peace of the world.