President’s Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [1]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: President’s Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [1]; Container 133

To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF DOCUMENT</th>
<th>CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>memo</td>
<td>From Brzezinski to the President (one page) re: Soviet Assurances about Brigade in Cuba</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo w/att.</td>
<td>From Brzezinski to The President (16 pp.) re: &quot;Alumni Panel&quot;</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>note w/att.</td>
<td>From Turner to The President (4 pp.)</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo</td>
<td>From Brzezinski to the President (one page) re: Soviet Assurances about Brigade in Cuba</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speech draft</td>
<td>Soviet Brigade in Cuba (22 pp.)</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>report</td>
<td>Presence of Soviet Brigade in Cuba (16 pp.)</td>
<td>9/29/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letter</td>
<td>From Brzeznev to The President (3 pp.) re: Soviet Brigade in Cuba</td>
<td>9/27/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo w/att.</td>
<td>From Brzezinski to The President (23 pp.) re: Draft of Speech on Soviet Brigade in Cuba</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo</td>
<td>From Brzezinski to the President (2 pp.) re: Guantanamo</td>
<td>9/27/79</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo</td>
<td>From Vance to The President (2 pp.) re: Speech on Soviet Brigade in Cuba</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FILE LOCATION
Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Handwriting File President's Address to the Nation Re: Soviet Brigade in Cuba 10/1/79 [1] BOX 149

RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Guantanamo (U)

Legal Rights

In two separate treaties signed in 1903 with the Government of Cuba, the U.S. obtained rights to lease and maintain a naval station at Guantanamo in exchange for an annual payment of two thousand gold dollars. These treaties were reaffirmed in 1934 when the U.S. and Cuba agreed that the U.S. could continue to lease the land "until" both governments agreed to modify or abrogate the agreement. In short, we have the legal right to stay in Guantanamo as long as we want to. (C)

Six days after coming to power, the Castro regime sent the U.S. a note that said: "... we are pleased to advise you that the Revolutionary Government has complete control of the Republic... [and] that all international commitments and agreements in force will be fulfilled." Castro cashed our rental check the first year, but none since. The Cuban government periodically insists that we are there illegally, basing its claim on the premise that the 1903 treaties were imposed by force, conveniently ignoring the 1934 treaty. Castro has apparently decided to wage an international propaganda campaign to de-legitimize our presence, and he has received a considerable amount of support, particularly from the Third World. (C)

Military Mission and Posture

The base has 357 marines, nearly 2000 naval personnel, and 20 Air Force and Coast Guard personnel. There are over 3500 dependents and civilian personnel living on the base. The mission of the Naval Base is to conduct and support naval operations in the area, ASW and surveillance operations, naval search and rescue mission, and training of surface units. (C)

Reinforcement and Exercises

It would take four days to reinforce the base by airlifting four infantry battalions (5000 marines) and if required, an
Army airborne brigade (3000 troops). USAF fighter aircraft could deploy within three days to bases in southern Florida. According to OSD, it would cost about $5 million to transport them; permanent billeting would cost about $30 million. Reinforcement exercises are an inexpensive alternative to permanent reinforcement and would convey the same message of displeasure to the Cubans and Soviets. (C)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Speech Draft

September 28, 1979

I enclose the speech draft as developed by Rick Hertzberg on the basis of your previously edited outline and then revised by the editorial group. Disagreements are indicated in the draft.

As far as I am concerned, the basic problem still remains: our response, particularly in the military realm is focussed on the Caribbean, whereas the problem pertains more generally to the need for greater balance in the US-Soviet relationship.

The section on SALT seems to me to be the strongest and rhetorically most compelling.

You should also ask yourself whether the overall tone meets your international and domestic needs. You have heard from all of your advisers and I do not think that at this stage any of us can be of more help to you.

Given Donovan's experience in mass media, I would recommend that you speak to him separately and get an overall assessment, not so much of the specific substance of the speech but the likeliness of its impact.
Proposed Report to the Nation on Soviet Troops in Cuba

Fellow citizens, I have asked for this television time to report to you on a number of issues connected with the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not an easy subject. I ask you to listen patiently, because the information I want to present to you cannot be outlined in a sentence or two. I ask you to listen carefully, because the issues at stake concern the security of our country and global peace.*

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations in the world. The relations between us are complex, because they have strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

*Some believe this is artificial; others that the public must be prepared to deal with a long and difficult speech.
Militarily and politically, we compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often so do our interests.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war. That is why, for a generation, the Soviets have cooperated with us, and we with them, in seeking to reduce that danger through arms control agreements. The latest such agreement -- the most important and promising so far -- is the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which is now awaiting ratification by the U. S. Senate.

In recent weeks, a new element has been introduced into our relationship: convincing evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970s.
Tonight, I want to talk to you about the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to describe for you the actions I am taking to counter these activities.

And, I want to put these problems into the context of our overall national interest— and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not at this moment confront any immediate, concrete threat that could quickly escalate into war. The United States is at peace tonight -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.
But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will and determination in standing up to Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way, with a reasoned understanding of our true national interests.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba. In one of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War, seventeen years ago, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce nuclear arms into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the withdrawal of those nuclear arms. At the time of that 1962 crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The bulk of them were also withdrawn. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.
Then, about six weeks ago, American intelligence obtained irrefutable evidence -- which had been accumulating for some time -- that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. Once we established this beyond doubt, it was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this unit had been there at least since 1976 and possibly longer.

This unit is a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It does not resemble any of the twenty or so Soviet military advisory groups in other foreign countries. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It is organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises are those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U. S. is involved.
Nevertheless, the Soviet brigade is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of countries in that area that they may fall victim to Soviet-Cuban *adventurism*. It is part of an intensifying Soviet-Cuban military relationship including the transfer of modern arms and the increased presence of Soviet naval forces. Finally, it helps support a pattern of Soviet-Cuban interventions and use of military force throughout the world.

This pattern dates back to 1975, when the Soviet Union launched a substantial program to build up Cuba's armed forces and to back Cuban intrusions into troubled areas of the world -- Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and elsewhere.

*Lloyd believes this word is foreign-sounding.*
Now, there are some 40,000 Cuban troops overseas. These troops are supported and armed by the Soviet Union.

Throughout this period, Russian military support of Cuba has been increasing. The Soviet Union has provided Cuba with some one and three-quarters billion dollars in military supplies. These supplies have included, for example, 280 advanced jet aircraft; some 100 naval vessels; 650 armored personnel carriers; and an entire naval port. The result is that Cuba now has the largest, best equipped armed forces in the Caribbean and Central American area, except, of course, for our own.

The Cubans get this Russian military help free. East Germany, Bulgaria and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries have to pay for their Soviet military supplies, but Cuba does not.
This pattern holds true for Cuba's whole economy, which the Soviets subsidize to the tune of three billion dollars a year. That is equal to a quarter of Cuba's entire gross national product.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms and his Russian economic subsidy. He has paid a much higher price than that. In effect, Mr. Castro has sold the independence of his country to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Castro claims to be "non-aligned," but this is an absurd and obvious lie. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. There is no more real difference between Soviet and Cuban foreign policy than between Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy.
The Soviet brigade in Cuba is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Mr. Castro. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.*

We have been negotiating with the Soviet Union over the past four weeks for a resolution of the problems raised by the brigade in Cuba.

I regret to report to you that the overall outcome of the negotiations must be viewed as unsatisfactory. The existing Soviet combat capability in Cuba remains in place. Together with the rapidly modernizing Cuban armed forces a shadow remains not only upon the Caribbean and Central America, but upon all the troubled areas of the world in which the Soviets and Cubans may seek to intrude.

*Lloyd and Warren believe this whole section -- beginning on page 6 -- is given too much prominence, is peripheral or unrelated to the brigade issue and describes something we don't propose to do much about anyway.
I have therefore decided to take several appropriate measures -- and I am confident that in these actions I will have the support of the Congress and of you, the American people.

First, I want to affirm that it is the policy of the United States to oppose the deployment of Cuban or Soviet combat forces against any nation in this Hemisphere. Every nation in the Hemisphere can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is an affirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration on April 19, 1963, "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."*Zbig and Harold Brown believe this detracts from the uniqueness of your statement and can be used in the backgrounder. Warren and Lloyd think it is important to establish continuity with the past.
Second, to improve our capacity to support this policy, I am ordering the following steps:

We will form a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. Forces will be assigned to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services. With this new headquarters permanently responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces, we will gain a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.

As a companion measure, I have ordered an expansion of military exercises in the region. As a first step, I have added to a previously planned naval training exercise an additional phase in the region of our base in Guantanamo, Cuba. As a further step, I have ordered the conduct of an amphibious
reinforcement exercise into Guantanamo in the near future, involving approximately 1500 marines and 2000 naval personnel, for a total exercise force of about 3500. A few years ago, the United States withdrew approximately 1000 marines from the base and planned to substitute periodic reinforcement exercises to assure the security of Guantanamo. Subsequently, however, in an effort to improve relations with the Government of Cuba, a decision was made to suspend these planned exercises. In view of the Soviet combat presence, these exercises will be conducted regularly from now on.

These and other measures which we will adopt as necessary will insure our continued capability to respond to any regional or external interference with nations of the Western Hemisphere. More important, they underscore a crucial message -- the United States will stay in Guantanamo.
But the threat to the stability of the Caribbean and Central America comes not merely from the menace of Soviet and Cuban arms, it also comes from the social turmoil caused by unmet economic and human needs. Therefore, as a crucial element of these efforts, I will be asking the Congress for a supplemental appropriation for economic and security assistance to the nations of Central America and the Caribbean.

Beyond the Hemisphere, the United States has acted to meet the broader challenge to our interests from Cuban intervention. We helped block the invasion of Shaba in Africa. We helped thwart the attack on North Yemen. We will shortly announce an important continuing reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.

But if we are to compete effectively with the Soviet Union and be prepared to protect our global interests, we must have
a world-wide capacity to project our military forces. We must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun upgrading our ability to do this. I have directed the Secretary of Defense, in the course of preparing the budget for the next year, to insure that we accelerate these efforts.

For example, we will increase our capacity to airlift without extensive reliance on staging bases, and to escort our sea-lifted forces. We will, of course, maintain the amphibious assault capability of the Marine Corps.

To supplement it, we will proceed with a program to procure so-called forward equipment ships, which can provide our forces with heavy equipment in areas far from American bases.
I also intend to increase the level of exercises for training and readiness of forces in the rapid deployment category.

Second, we must intensify our intelligence effort in regard to Soviet and Cuban activities throughout the world. To strengthen our capabilities in this area, I will be making specific requests of the Congress in this sensitive area. We are expediting our study of legislation to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

Third, I am modifying our policy of restraint on arms sales to exempt from the restrictions any country menaced by Soviet and Cuban military activities.

These steps reflect my determination to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens.
I am convinced that these measures will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

But a larger question has arisen. What does the presence of the combat brigade mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Is it part of the long-standing mixture of competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union which requires vigilance, firmness and flexibility on our part? Or should it be the occasion for a fundamental change in that policy -- a moving away from efforts to build cooperation and a return to a policy of across-the-board confrontation -- a return to the Cold War?

I have considered this question carefully as well. I have consulted on it just as widely.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not the occasion for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of total
confrontation. Such a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the overall national interest and the overall national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- the policy of both competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Obviously, the Soviet brigade in Cuba increases the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The Soviets have shown themselves insensitive to a number of our concerns; and in addition to the steps I have outlined tonight, we will respond in kind to that insensitivity./*

*Lloyd, Warren and Hedley think this is too threatening and breaks the flow of this section. Zbig and Harold Brown believe it is important to lay down this marker both with the Soviets and with the American people.*
But the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is not a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not Cuban divisions in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of nuclear holocaust.

That is why tonight I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are increasing at 3% per year -- on areas of greater need.
Finally, SALT II is the absolute prerequisite to further negotiations aimed at deep, mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals. All this has been established in months of exhaustive Senate hearings.

Furthermore -- and I ask you to listen particularly closely to this -- the abandonment of SALT would seriously compromise our security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight -- the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba -- would take a whole new ominous dimension.* Against

*Lloyd believes this greatly exaggerates the importance of the brigade issue. Hedley and Warren also favor removal. Claytor, Aaron and Hertzberg believe it helps tie the speech together and uses the SALT budget argument against the SALT opponents.
the background of an uncontrolled, unlimited nuclear arms race, every competitive element of U.S.-Soviet relations would carry the seeds of the ultimate horror.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership of the Western Alliance.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II unanimously. I have talked to a number of those leaders in the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects SALT II, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and concern.* The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But

*Rick Hertzberg favors "fright."
the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support. So does SALT II.

I say to the Senate and I say to you, the American people, with all the urgency and conviction at my command, that the ratification of this treaty is in the interest of the United States.

And I call upon you -- the American people -- to demand of your Senators that they move swiftly to approve this absolutely crucial bulwark against nuclear war.

I call upon each and every one of you -- not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans -- to write to the Senators from your state and tell them that you want the SALT II Treaty ratified.\* 

\*Everyone but Rick Hertzberg thinks these two paragraphs should be deleted.
The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight in the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba are exactly the same.

That purpose is a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our Nation and to all the nations of the earth.

This morning, Pope John Paul II arrived in our country. He has come here, as he has traveled the globe, in the service of world peace. My fellow Americans, let us not disappoint him. Let us show him -- let us show each other -- let us show all humanity that the United States of America stands for justice, for reason, for faith -- and for peace.

*Again, everybody but Rick thinks this should be out.*
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: DAVID AARON
SUBJECT: Dinner Meeting with the "Alumni Group"

This memo briefly summarizes the results of the discussion of the Alumni Group Friday evening. The discussion divided unpredictable lines between those who felt we should minimize the importance of the combat brigade so as to protect a far more important possibility of SALT ratification and those who felt it was part of a broader pattern of Soviet activity which required a firm U.S. response -- again for the sake of SALT.

The most interesting points to emerge were the following:

-- Dean Rusk suggested that since we do not know the exact purpose of the brigade, your speech ought to "box the compass" of possibilities stating what we will do about such possibilities. For example, if it is there to intimidate or intervene in the Caribbean or Central America, we will take the following actions: If it is there to encourage Cuban intervention in the Third World, we will strengthen our rapid deployment force and our intelligence capacity. If it is there to serve as the cadre for a larger Soviet force, we will strengthen our own capabilities in that region, etc.

-- Governor Harriman and others emphasized the importance of including in your speech those assurances which the Soviets have given us and trying to build upon them. (You will note the present draft omits any detailed discussions of what we asked for or what the Soviets have given us.)

-- Finally, Henry Kissinger suggested that your speech deal only with the Soviet brigade and not go into SALT. He and others seem to feel it would be too difficult to make the case in the same speech that we were responding firmly to the Soviet brigade in Cuba and yet we should still go forward with SALT ratification. He urged a short (10-minute) statement confined to the brigade.
Mr. President:

Apparently it would be good if we could have your edited draft back early tomorrow (before your meetings). That way, Jerry Rafshoon, Anne Edwards, Gordon Stewart and I can work with Dorothy Sarnoff on it before the afternoon.

Rick

Rick Hertzberg
D Rush

Task must be explained

Whither they training Cubans for
Concern about subversives - U.S. - Venus, 64
Africa -
Asia/Pac -

Short A - mainly Cuba - SAD lightly - don't link -
Coop - May 22, 1974
Emph Resp of Senate

R Gibson: Duff task - no 2 Cuba, down SAD.

1) Everybody about Cuba can be used by
opp about against SAD. Examine
phrasing carefully - (duplicity, deception)

2) Say something about mounting need
and allied
of U.S. forces not to be used directly with SAD.

J McColly: Be careful about accepting
training
and characterization. Do not support

1) Public shock at learning of 3000 in Cuba

Why trust them on SAD?

3) Press should explain why - and why also
necessary to meet their competition
by various means... Strong position
in seeking to rectify.

J McColly

1) Concern about training function
2) Refer to non-aligned and
attempt to align against U.S.
W. Rogers

1. Hang on - like old fashioned notion on facts - must inform public as to whether there has been a change or not since 1962.

2. Call in. Measures concern about NUC etc.


4. Hard to follow up Re 248, let us get his presentation and later.

J. Schlesinger

1. Agree with McNamara.


3. Don't confine to Cuba itself - remedial cosmetic.

4. Larger issue - Cuba forces around world - West that opportunity. Direct efforts toward this.

5. SA will slip - CHURCHI problem.

Brent Scowcroft

Goal: (1) Be tough in message & action
(2) Support McClory

Act 5, Lumber
Saying on recently discovered burglars
(2) Send 3rd Special Forces group
- no cutter to S
- warning to be conducted initially
(3) Question is not what it says but what it does
(4) So we are going to take steps to ensure this limit will not be changed or perceived as being against our interests

Adm. Haarman

1. Say - Nodlink - COPPER COOP
2. Cuban unit - agrees with SC
3. Concern about Harlem Cuban to go world - you reap
4. Must ensure rousing and Kuban being harmed do not become disruptive force on U.S.
5. Make best use of what Gough said
6. Remember today's speech as to gross overreaction
6a. Emphasize lack of levels; rev Cuba 154.
7. Emphasize strengthening defense
8. Emphasize map of SALT for NATO.
9. Emphasize SALT II needed to reach next level.

H. Kissinger

1. Distinguish Cuba vs SALT. To speak on both cannot and well. Tough response on front well cut against SALT case in back. Some mention of or at end.
Whole group supports this.

2. Must explain facts and relate to statement. Not status quo acceptable.

3. Stress reality - not threat of unit to US - but ability to project power outward thru Carrib - foreign combat base.

4. Their treatment of US is deplorable. Could have lowered temperature if didn't. Castro personal attack very serious.

5. Agrees with McCoy on future ground rules as to projecting mil. power beyond Cuba - don't tie to presence
of Brigade but face larger problem
Improving our defense should be
related to larger problem rather than
to this one Sov. unit.
(6) Same as toarming China
(7) Don't trivialize what the Unit
put the unit - in light of S.S.
and Press statements - Sov. and
China know what as there

C. Clifford
1) Brigade is false issue - unfortunate
2) Pass steps wrong - Church
Admin. Should not have said
very serious matter - that status
quo is not acceptable
3) Doesn't we believe we have right to
complain to Cuba about presence
of Brigade. No history of offensive
use of this UNIT
4) Thinks 25th been there for long time,
prob. since 63
5) Thinks 25th should pull away from issue
He should lay off it being very serious
Unacceptable. Say it is now a matter
of concern. Refer to other S-C
actions in Carrol & elsewhere
and express concern

2. Don't indicate we are scared of 2,600 men attacking us.

3. Don't use incident for frontal attack on everything Soviet do that bothers us. Well kill some.

4. Say we found out and don't know long to dream these

Say so; say at training center

and will not threaten anyone

Say we are going to make sure

thus is what happens by

surveillance & other measures

Note: Reaffirmation of 62 command.

- no use of Cuba as off base

Put in proportion - we are taking measures to respond based on our intelligence;

Don't talk about S.R.T.

will create greater antagonism to S.R.T. in view of what we say so are doing.

M. Bundy -

1. Agree with Ball, Lomontz, Clifford

2. Cap the brigade pub, say we will watch it. Say:

continuing reappraisal of ant. estimate shows...
I don't know if this is recently introduced force. Then describe the measures we will take to make sure this force is projected beyond Cuba.

N Katzenbach

1. Should be a non-linkage speech.
2. Don't use brigade problem to focus on other Sov-Cub activities.
3. Whatever we say that is tough along these lines will increase public resistance to SP.
4. Make maximum use of what Sov. have said. Using words Gromyko has said we can use:
   1) Training centre
   2) Peace mission will not change. No thread.
   3) Emphasis to anyone else.
5. Say we can't rely on these statements and must take precautions.
6. See NK's handwritten outline. LNC believes it has very useful points. LNC has only copied.
D. Packard

1. State facts as we know them. Amendment out of

and extent this type can be conducted.

2. Not what Soviets have

said - recognizes a combat

unit would be matter of concern.

3. Describe our responsive

measures if even used Cuba

in Cuba.

4. Describe need to cooperate

as well as cooperate on SALT

delinking.

5. Generalize steps we

will take to strengthen our

defense posture, but do not

give specifics as to measures we will take

in Caribbean or elsewhere.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 29, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

I chaired the "Alumni Panel" for 1-1/2 hours this morning and I asked each participant to address himself specifically to the questions of tone and substance in regard to:

1. Cuba/Brigade
2. Caribbean
3. Wider Soviet/Cuban Activity
4. SALT

My hasty report is attached on an individual-by-individual basis, though most seem to agree that it should not be a speech both on the brigade and SALT issues.

Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL

RUSK

1. Stress concern about what they are training the Cubans for and indicate that U.S. would defend against any actions in the Caribbean.

2. Refer to Africa and Arabian activities, and indicate that you would consult the Allies on it.

3. We will not tolerate their adventures.

4. Make short statement—don't talk too much about SALT because it lengthens it too much.

GILPATRICK

1. Avoid wording that would hurt SALT.

2. U.S. forces would be maintained at sufficient level so there is no advantage for the Soviet Union.

MC CONE

1. Don't accept training unit version.

2. Public surprise that there are as many as 3,000 Soviet military in Cuba.

3. Need strong statement that Soviet military support of Cuba is unacceptable and that brigade is tip of the iceberg.

4. Deprive the Soviets of some trade and do more for military budget.

MC CLOY

1. Would be more concerned if the brigade was training.

2. Refer to NAM and Castro's role.

3. We are better off with SALT than without it.

4. Drop MFN to the Soviets.

5. Brigade too narrow a wicket for the speech.

CONFIDENTIAL
ROGERS

1. How to deal with the facts? Troops there since when?

2. We have a credibility problem because the impression is that the brigade is a sudden and serious problem.

3. Should say a great deal about the Caribbean, but how will we prevent Cuban involvement like the one in Nicaragua?


5. Only a paragraph on SALT but not more than that.

SCHLESINGER

1. Generally agrees with McCone.

2. If we confine the US response to the brigade, the US will lose. The Soviets will stand pat.

3. Larger issue: clarification of the Cuban expeditionary force, backed by the Soviets, around the world. This is the strategically central consideration.

4. We must make clear to the Soviets that the above not acceptable.

5. The solution to that is in the Caribbean.

6. US military disadvantages must be corrected.

7. Again, it would be a setback for the US if the issue overly focused on the brigade itself.

SCOWCROFT

1. Be tough in rhetoric but soft in action.

2. Do not accept training unit interpretation.
LINOWITZ

1. Would not tie it to other issues.

2. Would say combat brigade and indicate the Soviets say it is on a training mission -- therefore, it is essential that it not undertake combat functions.

3. We will therefore insure by our own steps that it cannot transpose itself in the region.

HARRIMAN

1. Cuba not linked to SALT.

2. Agrees with Sol Linowitz.

3. The Soviets cannot dodge responsibility for what the Cubans are doing around the world. This should be neither understated nor minimized.

4. Cannot permit the Cubans to upset hemispheric stability.

5. Put emphasis on allies and defense.

6. Interpret Gromyko as best suits us.
KISSINGER

1. Important to disassociate Cuban problem from SALT, as speech on both topics will create the wrong impression -- a soft impression and it won't be convincing.

2. Some adequate presentation of the facts to support proposal that "status quo is unacceptable."

3. Do not overemphasize Soviet combat training to the U.S.

4. Turn to regional instability in Central America and the Caribbean -- that is the significance of Soviet combat presence.

5. Vance's account of his talks with Gromyko are disdainful treatment of the U.S. Kissinger expected Castro to announce a concession and the personal attack on the President now goes beyond the challenge that we pose to them. We should respond by saying Cuban military presence in Africa transforms the challenge of the wider one.

6. I am opposed to doing the things we need to do (e.g., Defense) to the Soviet brigade in Cuba. We should do them anyway.

7. Same point on arming the Chinese.

8. Soviet combat presence in the Western Hemisphere is the first time a significant development and don't not trivialize it.

CLIFFORD

1. Cuba -- a false issue -- everything that happened has been wrong. The President should not have said "this is a very
serious matter"; Vance should not have said the "status quo is not acceptable."
2. Soviet presence wholly defensive.
3. The President now in a false position because the people expect the President to do something about the brigade. He should pull back from the issue -- drop all previous statements -- use softer statements ("a matter of concern") -- talk about the Caribbean and Africa with misgivings.

BALL
1. Agrees with Clark. Claimed he also agreed with Henry?
2. Big mistake to make frontal attack on what the Soviets/Cubans are doing.
3. Should we talk to the Soviets and they say the training mission will not be changed; we will make certain that is the case.
4. Welcome Soviet reaffirmation of the 1962 commitments and say we have gotten a full clarification from the Soviets.
5. Do not talk about SALT -- talking about it at this time will create a problem.
BUNDY
1. Agrees with Ball, Linowitz, Clifford on what should be said.
2. Lopez Portillo would not like American troops or a flag moving around the Caribbean.
3. We should "cap this brigade" by saying we will watch it, etc.
4. Not a serious intelligence failure -- drop it all. The time and language should be used to dilute the issue.
5. Fidel nearer the truth on the facts.

KATZENBACH
1. Talk only about the brigade. Other issues and any tough language will fuel a quantum jump.
2. Make the most of what the Soviets have said -- training unit -- 1962 commits, etc.
3. Express concern about training of Cubans for missions abroad.
4. Emphasize non linkage with SALT.
5. (If providing specific language, we could claim that the Soviets have given us something).

PACKARD
1. Avoid too much detail.
2. Say Soviet building up since 1975.
3. Repeat what Soviets have said that it will remain a training center.
4. Admit that we have many areas of conflict with the Soviets but also common interests and these must be taken into account (e.g. SALT)
5. Don't talk about specific steps but simply take them

Clifford added that we should not mention the Monroe Doctrine in this speech.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Cy Vance's proposed language on Soviet "assurances".

I transmit Cy's proposed language. My advice is twofold:

1. The claimed assurances should be conveyed with greater skepticism on our part.

2. We should pocket the alleged concessions, but in no way even hint that the issue has been resolved. A cosmetic solution will be politically the most costly outcome.

There is a more fundamental issue involved here and I will state my concern very directly. I think you are pointed the wrong way. The country doesn't care about the brigade—but it does care about the Soviets. Every poll shows that the country wants you to be tougher. Unless you convey credibly the message that you will not let the Russians push us around (in addition to blasting Castro personally) you will lose Salt.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

The following is a proposed insert for the speech regarding assurances received from the Soviets:

Begin Insert

Over the past three weeks, Secretary Vance has discussed this issue at great length with the Soviet Ambassador and Foreign Minister Gromyko. We have pointed out that the evident presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. It has officially stated that the unit is a training center, for the purpose of training Cuban officers in the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment, that it has been in place since 1962, and that it has not changed significantly either in number of personnel or in function since that time. By these statements, the Soviets implicitly recognize that the presence of a Soviet ground combat unit in Cuba would be a matter of legitimate concern to us and other nations.

The Soviets have given us certain assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 11/13/83
BY NARS
DATE 11/13/83
-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are
not and will not be a threat to the US or to
any other state;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the
unit or to give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 undertaking
not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and
will abide by it in the future.

The Soviet assurances are significant, but they do not
[fully] resolve the matter. Our recent intelligence evidence
shows characteristics of a ground combat unit. Thus, we
will not rest on these Soviet assurances alone. We shall
take steps so as to assure that the unit will not be used
to pose a threat to the United States or any other state.

[End Insert]
September 27, 1979

His Eminence
James E. Carter
President of the United States of America
White House, Washington

Respected Mr. President,

My colleagues and I have familiarized ourselves with your appeal.

First of all, it is necessary to frankly tell you that we are extremely surprised by the campaign, openly hostile to the Soviet Union, which is unfolding in the U.S.A. with the active participation of the administration, for which the United States has absolutely no real reasons and no legal bases. It appears to us that the only result of emphasizing this artificially contrived campaign is to render noticeable damage to relations between our countries and to the cause of strengthening peace, the importance of which we spoke about in Vienna. We regret that you still maintain the contrived story about a Soviet combat unit allegedly located in Cuba.

My advice to you: discard this story. We have a military training center in Cuba which has existed there for more than seventeen years. It fulfills its training function
according to an agreement with the Cuban government. It does nothing more and can do nothing more. You can be completely at rest in this regard. After all, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance himself, in a conversation with A.A. Gromyko declared that the Soviet Union had done nothing contravening the 1962 agreement and that the Soviet military personnel located in Cuba do not represent any sort of threat to the United States.

I repeat, there is a military training center in Cuba. It will continue to exist. We have no intention of changing its status as such a center in the future. We are reporting this to you in order to display good will, since the whole question is totally in the purview of only two sovereign states - the Soviet Union and Cuba.

But if these things occurring today in the U.S.A. around this question are a venture dictated by some other sort of considerations, then we can only express regret on this subject.

It seems to us that any other consideration must give way before the significance of Soviet-American relations in which the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-II) holds an important place.

Let us proceed, Mister President, from the results of the exchange of opinions on the fundamental questions of
Soviet-American relations and the problems of world politics which we had in Vienna and which I value highly.

In general, Mister President, I would like to convey one thought to you: this artificially created problem should be removed without charging the atmosphere, by exhibiting restraint and consideration.

I think that such an approach would meet our mutual interests.

Respectfully, L. Brezhnev
Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. The Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- that the unit in question is a training center,

-- that it does nothing more than training and can do nothing more;

-- that they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- that they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.
These new assurances have been given to me from the highest-level of the Soviet government.

Although we are still convinced that in the past the unit has been a combat brigade, the new assurances about the future non-combat status of the unit are significant.

However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone. We will verify compliance by increased surveillance of Cuba, and we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nations in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting any such military threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a
party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963, "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid-response to support this policy, I will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean-Joint-Task-Force-Headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability for rapid-response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.
We will expand military exercises in the region, and we will conduct these exercises regularly from now on and of course, keep our forces. The United States will stay in Guantanamo in accordance with existing treaty rights.

To further insure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible-Communist-domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet-economic and human-needs.

In order to preserve peace, to protect our global interests, to continue competing effectively with the Soviet Union, we must ensure that U.S. military strength is second to none. We will improve our in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, air, and sea units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies. We are increasing our ability to do this.
We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts. We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

We shall also intensify our intelligence effort to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I have consulted not only with my own advisers, but with Congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.
Our increased military commitment, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and the new Soviet assurances will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

I have concluded with a sense of absolute certainty that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation. Such a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks for some people, but it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for 20 years, under six Administrations of both parties -- a policy that recognizes that we are in a policy of competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and that we seek cooperation in others -- notably in maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.
Although the Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased
the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the
effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is
certainly not the two-or-three thousand Soviet troops in
Cuba. Nor is it Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest
danger to all the nations of the world -- including the
United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a
nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States
to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Compliance with its
terms is not a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated
national technical means, carefully focussed on the Soviet
Union to ensure that the treaty is verifiable. It is the
most important step ever taken in controlling strategic
nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. During the past few years we have been increasing our defense expenditure in real terms each year. I plan further increases in the future. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget—which we are now increasing in real terms—on areas of greater need. This direct military challenge is most likely.

The rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a regional difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight could take on a whole new and ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.
In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects the SALT Treaty, these leaders and their countries would be confused and deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, our effort to build a stronger and more united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with
the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.  


We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

The purpose of ratifying the SALT II Treaty and the purpose of the actions being taken in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationships (troops in Cuba) are exactly the same -- to keep our nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations.
We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about them but the best way to deal with these differences successfully is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

That is what I am determined to do.

Our purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

# # #
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Rick Hertzberg

Subject: Speech closer

Here is a possibility:

The struggle for peace -- the long, hard struggle to bring weapons of mass destruction under the control of human reason and human law -- is the central drama of our age. At another time of challenge in our Nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people: "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth." We chose hope then, and preserved our Union. Let us choose hope now, and preserve our world.

Another Lincoln quote:

"The struggle of today is not altogether for today -- it is for a vast future also. With a reliance on Providence, all the more firm and earnest, let us proceed in the great task which events have devolved upon us."
Report to the Nation on Soviet troops in Cuba

Tonight I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern, as it has been the highest concern of all my predecessors in this office. That subject is the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throughout the time of my presidency. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world. Those defenses are stronger tonight than they were two years ago; they will be stronger two years from now than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward.
with your support and with the support of the Congress. Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO alliance is on track, with the full cooperation and participation of our European allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough to destroy any potential adversary many times over, and the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further assured by a new system of extremely powerful mobile missiles.

Beyond these military defenses, and for the first time, we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control of nuclear weapons -- the adoption of the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT II.

SALT II, hammered out by three Presidents of both parties in seven years of tough, painstaking negotiations, establishes verifiable limits on the strategic nuclear
This evening I want to report to you about the highly publicized issues concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and about its bearing on the important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union.

This is not a simple or easy subject. It concerns both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relationship between us is complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

Our fundamental philosophies conflict, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

But what we share in common is an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.

And that is why our nuclear arms control agreements are so important to both countries.
Recently, however, we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace just as we have been since I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our wisdom—a challenge to our ability to act in a firm, decisive way without destroying the basis for cooperation which helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world.
Now let me explain the specific problem-of-the-Soviet-brigade-in-Cuba—and later describe the general problem of Soviet-Cuban-military-activism in the Third-World.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba:

As most of you know, 17 years ago, in the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States was met with a firm American response.

It ended with the withdrawal of those nuclear weapons and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we monitored their departure.

It was believed that those who stayed behind were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cubans and to perform intelligence functions.
Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. When attention was then focused on a careful review of past intelligence data, it was possible for our experts to conclude that this organized unit had existed for several years, probably since the mid-1970s and possibly even longer.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of about fortytwo to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.
Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet-Cuban pressure.

The transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters strengthen the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.

During the last few years, Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best-equipped armed forces in this region. There is a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies.

The [Communist regime] in Cuba has failed; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about $8 million in economic aid every day!
Although Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms, he has paid a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance — and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban-military actions abroad.

Now I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities. We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this brigade was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance

The following is a proposed insert for the speech regarding assurances received from the Soviets:

[Begin Insert]

Over the past three weeks, Secretary Vance has discussed this issue at great length with the Soviet

officials, Ambassador Gromyko. We have pointed

out that the evident presence of a Soviet combat unit in

Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in

question is a combat unit. It has officially stated that

the unit is a training center, for the purpose of training

Cuban officers in the use and maintenance of Soviet equip-

ment, that it has been in place since 1962, and that it

has not changed significantly either in number of personnel

or in function since that time. By these statements, the

Soviets, implicitly recognize that the presence of a Soviet

ground combat unit in Cuba would be a matter of legitimate

concern to us and other nations.

The Soviets have given us certain assurances with

respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training

center, that it does nothing more than training,

and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or

status as a training center; we understand this

to mean that they do not intend to enlarge

the unit or give it additional capability;

[End Insert]
That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the US or to any other state;

That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities; and

That they reaffirm the 1962 undertaking not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding.

The Soviet statements are significant, but they do not fully resolve the matter. Our recent intelligence evidence shows characteristics of a ground combat unit. Thus, we will not rest on these Soviet assurances alone. We shall take steps so as to assure that the unit will not be used to pose a threat to the United States or any other state.

[End Insert]
WHITE PAPER ON THE PRESENCE
OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

A month ago the United States intelligence community obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet ground combat unit with a strength of 2600 - 3000 men was present in Cuba. The purpose of this White Paper is to set forth the facts about the Soviet brigade and its significance in the light of the 1962 missile crisis and Soviet-Cuban military relationships since that time.

1. The Facts About The Brigade

From 1964 until 1979, the United States intelligence community had believed that the Soviet ground combat units which had accompanied the Soviet missile units in 1962 had left Cuba by 1963-4, and that no Soviet combat units were present in Cuba. In the Spring of this year the National Security Council requested the intelligence community to prepare a current analysis of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. In the course of this analysis the intelligence community reviewed current intelligence observations as well as data accumulated in earlier years. As a result, the community concluded that there was a body of evidence suggesting the presence in Cuba of a Soviet ground combat unit at least
since 1976, but that the evidence was not sufficient to confirm the suggestion. This information was duly reported within the intelligence community and to the senior policy officials of the government. In July, the same information was fully reported to the appropriate committees of the Congress. It was also discussed in executive session with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in connection with the hearings related to the SALT II Treaty. At the same time, the President directed the intelligence community to intensify its efforts to substantiate the possible presence of the unit, and the appropriate Congressional committees were so advised.

As a result of these intensified intelligence efforts, additional persuasive evidence was obtained. On the basis of this evidence, the intelligence community concluded that a Soviet ground forces brigade was indeed present in Cuba. It judged the number of personnel to be 2600 - 3000. It found the brigade to be composed of a headquarters, three motorized rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, and other service support and combat support elements.

On August 17, the Soviet tank battalion and related combat and service support elements were observed conducting combat exercises at the San Pedro training area which is primarily used by the Cuban Armed Forces.
The 1979 data justified a firm conclusion that the unit observed conducting the exercises was a Soviet unit rather than a Cuban unit. A review of earlier data showed a virtually identical unit conducting similar exercises during the same period of 1978. Although it had not been possible to determine from the 1978 data alone whether the unit conducting the 1978 exercise was a Soviet unit or a Cuban unit, the conclusion drawn from the 1979 data created a reasonable inference that the 1978 exercises had also been conducted by the same Soviet unit.

The tanks and other equipment observed at the San Pedro training area on August 17, 1979 were no longer present in the area a few days later. However, what appeared to be a portion of the same equipment was observed at a facility near Santiago de las Vegas, and an additional portion of what appeared to be the same equipment was observed at a garrison area near Lourdes, a town approximately ten miles from Santiago de las Vegas.

Lourdes is near the site of a large Soviet communications collection intelligence facility focused on the United States, comparable to collection facilities which the United States maintains in third countries focused on the Soviet Union. One of the brigade's elements, a motorized rifle battalion, appears to be stationed near Lourdes adjacent to the Soviet communications collection
facility, and it is possible that one function of this unit is to protect the facility. There is no intelligence evidence as to the purpose of the other elements of the brigade.

The Soviets have claimed that what we have determined to be a combat brigade is a "training center" engaged in the training of Cuban military personnel. While the possibility of a training function cannot be entirely excluded, the available intelligence does not confirm it. The combat exercises observed in 1979 and 1978 appear to have been separate exercises of the Soviet unit, unassociated with the presence of Cuban units or personnel. Other evidence relating to the existence and activities of the brigade do not indicate significant relationships with Cuban military personnel or units. Moreover, whether or not the unit does some training, it appears to have a combat capability that is maintained by field combat exercises, and that is not typical of units primarily engaged in the training of other personnel.

The existence of the Soviet brigade had not been publicly acknowledged within Cuba. No reference to the existence, identity or location of the brigade has been found in Cuban publications or broadcasts.

Soviet ground forces are not conventionally organized along brigade lines. However, the Soviet Army does use the brigade designation for various units that operate
separately from larger conventional ground force formations. The structure of the brigade in Cuba is similar to the structure of other identified Soviet brigades outside Cuba. The battalions which comprise the brigade in Cuba are similar to standard Soviet ground force battalions throughout the Soviet Army.

It is not yet possible to reach a definite conclusion as to how long the brigade or some predecessor unit has been in Cuba. As related in the next section of this White Paper, the Soviet units identified in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis included a ground combat unit at the same location near Santiago de las Vegas where elements of the present brigade have been identified. The United States intelligence community believed that the unit present near Santiago de las Vegas in 1962 was removed from Cuba after the end of the missile crisis, and had no firm indication that any Soviet ground combat unit was present in the Santiago de las Vegas area or any other part of Cuba. There were some later but inconclusive indications that elements of a combat unit were reintroduced by 1968 or at least by 1975 or 1976. It is now clear that the unit has been present at least since 1975 or 1976, and it is at least possible that it has been there since 1962 or 1968.
2. The Significance of the Brigade in the Light of the 1962 Missile Crisis and Soviet-Cuban Military Relationships Since That Time

A. The 1962 Missile Crisis

The Cuban missile crisis in the Fall of 1962 was the gravest development in Soviet-American relationships since World War II. The concealed deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets in the United States and its neighbors in the Caribbean region posed an intolerable threat to our national security and that of the Western hemisphere.

The current presence of the Soviet ground combat brigade does not directly threaten the United States as did the missiles of 1962. Nevertheless, the 1962 crisis and its aftermath must be understood to appraise the significance of the brigade's presence in 1979.

In the Summer of 1962 we began observing a substantial movement of Soviet personnel and equipment into Cuba. There were numerous rumors that the Soviets were planning to install offensive weapons in Cuba capable of reaching United States targets. But intensive surveillance did not confirm these rumors until a U-2 flight on October 14. That flight clearly identified the preparation of a Soviet medium-range missile base in the San Cristobal area.
Additional surveillance confirmed preparations for the deployment of three major Soviet offensive weapons systems in Cuba:

- 6 MRBM (medium range ballistic missile) sites
- 3 IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) sites
- 2 squadrons of IL-28 nuclear capable bombers.

On October 22, President Kennedy announced these facts to the American public. He instituted a "quarantine" of Cuba backed by a naval blockade, intensified our surveillance of the build-up, reinforced our naval base at Guantanamo, and appealed to the Soviet Union to withdraw these offensive weapons immediately from Cuba. As the result of negotiations during the ensuing month, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the offensive weapons, and the quarantine was lifted on November 20. As part of these arrangements, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that United Nations observers could conduct on-site inspections of the removal of the offensive weapons systems from Cuba, that the further introduction of such weapons systems would not occur, and that the United States would give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.

The Soviet Union proceeded promptly to remove the offensive weapons systems, and the United States verified this removal by intensive aerial and naval surveillance. President Castro subsequently declined to permit the on-site inspections by United Nations observers. As a result, the United States did not give the agreed assurances against an invasion of Cuba.
Before the 1962 crisis was resolved, our surveillance noted the existence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba deployed at four major and several smaller locations. One of the four major locations was near Santiago de las Vegas, at the same place where we have now identified major elements of the current brigade.

In the course of the 1962 negotiations, the United States called the existence of these units to the attention of the Soviet Union. In a letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 20, 1962, Chairman Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union would "ship out of Cuba those groups of our military personnel which although [they] were not directly involved in servicing the rocket weapons now removed still had something to do with guarding those installations." At his news conference on November 20 announcing the lifting of the quarantine, President Kennedy stated on the basis of this letter:

"The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and will also be withdrawn in due course."
In a subsequent conversation of November 29, 1962 between President Kennedy and Soviet First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan, President Kennedy said that the withdrawal agreement covered missiles, bombers, and in due course, other units destined to service or guard the strategic offensive weapons. He also said there was of course other military material present in Cuba about which he was not speaking. Mr. Mikoyan said that the correspondence between the two Heads of State is clear on that point.

During the 1962 negotiations the Soviet Union did not specifically identify the ground combat unit observed at Santiago de las Vegas (or any other specific unit) as one of the units which were present to guard the missile bases and were to be removed in due course. One of the four major units identified in 1962 was located at Holguin, some distance from the missile bases, but the other three, (Santiago de las Vegas, Remedios, and Artemisa), were located near Soviet missile bases.

The United States conducted intensive surveillances during 1963 to determine whether the Soviet ground combat units were being removed. By 1964 the intelligence community concluded that the ground combat units had been essentially withdrawn. It was believed that the remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba consisted of between 500 and 2000 personnel primarily engaged in training, advisory and communications
intelligence collection activities, but this was not a very firm estimate.

As noted, the area near Santiago de las Vegas where the Soviet ground combat unit was identified in 1962 is the identical area where major elements of the present brigade are now identified. The intelligence community had estimated that only 200 Soviet military personnel were present in this area in 1964 (as compared to between 1200 and 1500 in 1962). A recent retrospective analysis of photographs and other data obtained since 1964 shows that the facility at Santiago de las Vegas has been undergoing periodic improvement and expansion and the presence of combat equipment has been periodically noted. From 1964 until recently, however, the intelligence community associated this facility with a Cuban rather than a Soviet military presence.

B. Soviet-Cuban Military Relationships Since the 1962 Crisis

From time to time since 1964, the United States has observed various activities in Cuba which appeared to raise questions under the 1962 Agreement. U-2 photographs on August 26, 1970, showed the initial stages of construction of barracks and a wharf on Alcatraz Island near Cienfuegos. On September 7, 1970, a Soviet naval task force arrived, including a submarine tender, two guided missile cruisers
and two support barges of a type which the Soviets had used in facilities supporting nuclear-powered submarines. The United States called these facts to the attention of the Soviet Union. In a note dated October 6, 1970, the Soviet Union reconfirmed the 1962 commitment relating to offensive weapons and stated that it was "not doing in Cuba now -- that includes the area of the Cienfuegos port -- anything of the kind that would contradict that mentioned understanding."

In a reply note dated October 9, 1970, the United States set forth its understanding of the above-quoted phrase as meaning that the Soviet Union "will not establish, utilize, or permit the establishment of any facility in Cuba that can be employed to support or repair Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons; i.e., submarines or surface-to-surface ships armed with nuclear capability, or surface-to-surface missiles."

Since 1977 the United States has observed the construction at Cienfuegos of a pier and a large high bay building of a type seen at a number of Soviet naval bases. These buildings can be used to handle or repair naval missiles or torpedoes. The Soviet Union has equipped the Cuban Navy with cruise missiles having a range of up to 50 miles and designed for antishipping roles rather than shore bombardment. Because of the inconclusive nature of the evidence to date, no question has been raised with the
Soviet Union concerning compliance with the 1962 Agreement, but surveillance of the Cienfuegos facility is continuing.

In the Fall of 1978, the United States observed that the Soviet Union was furnishing MIG-23 aircraft to the Cuban Air Force in Cuba. Because MIG-23 aircraft in some configurations are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and because MIG-23s stationed in Cuba are capable of reaching the Southeastern United States, the United States raise this question with the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviet Union replied that the aircraft in question "were of the same class as those previously in Cuba and had nothing to do with the 1962 Agreement." (The Soviet MIG-21s present in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis were not considered to be offensive weapons under the 1962 Agreement and remained in Cuba as part of the Cuban Air Force.) The Soviet Union also reconfirmed its intention to abide by the 1962 Agreement and confirmed that the MIG-23 planes delivered to Cuba do not have the capability of being used as carriers of nuclear weapons.*

There are of course many other Soviet-Cuban military relationships not related to the 1962 missile crisis or the 1962 understanding. In addition to the Soviet ground combat brigade, the intelligence community estimates that there is a military assistance group in Cuba of between 500 and 1000 personnel engaged in training Cuban military personnel, as well as an additional 1000 Soviet military personnel at

*see the more detailed alternative for the remainder of the paper at the end of this draft.
the communications collection intelligence facility at Lourdes. Since 1970 the Soviets have flown TU95 reconnaissance flights from the Soviet Union to Cuba and return, conducting reconnaissance throughout the Atlantic area. Since 1969, Soviet naval task forces have called periodically at Cuban ports on nineteen occasions. When Cuban pilots were deployed to Africa in 1976 and 1978, Soviet pilots were integrated into Cuban units as substitutes. Between 1961 and 1978 the Soviet Union furnished more than $1.5 billion worth of military aid to Cuba.

The command and organizational structure of the Cuban Army is largely based on Soviet models. During the past five years the Soviet Union has conducted a major program to modernize the equipment of the Cuban armed forces. Among the modern weapons transferred in recent years are 12 MIG23 fighter aircraft, more than 20 M18 helicopters, 20 AN-26 transport planes, 7 OSAI11 cruise missile patrol boats, a Foxtrot class submarine, 2 Turya hydrofoil patrol boats, 40 BM21 multiple rocket launchers, and 50 T62 tanks.

The Soviet Union has also trained and equipped large Cuban expeditionary forces that have participated in civil and border wars in Angola and EthiopiaSomalia, and Cuban military personnel have trained guerilla forces participating in the civil wars in Africa and Latin America.
advisers also supported the Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza government in Nicaragua. The Cuban force in Angola reached a total of 25 to 30,000 men, many of whom engaged in a direct combat role. These forces arrived directly from Cuba but much of their equipment came from the Soviet Union. In Ethiopia, similarly, a Cuban force of 15,000–17,000 including pilots and three ground force brigades, was met in Ethiopia by a full set of equipment shipped directly from the Soviet Union, including MIGs, helicopters, medium tanks, and armored personnel carriers.

C. The Significance of the Soviet Brigade

The facts set forth above provide the perspective to appraise the true significance of the Soviet brigade. The relevant points are these:

1. The brigade's presence does not threaten the domestic security of the United States. The brigade has no airlift or sealift support. While these could conceivably be provided, the size and combat capability of the brigade is too small for any conceivable military operation aimed at the United States.

2. The presence of a Soviet ground combat unit in the Western Hemisphere has always been a matter of concern to the United States. The brigade is the only known Soviet bloc ground
combat unit in Cuba or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. On the only previous occasion when we observed Soviet ground combat units in this hemisphere (the units observed in Cuba during the 1962 crisis), the Soviet Union agreed to remove the units guarding the missile bases. While it was never clear whether this commitment covered all the ground combat units we observed, President Kennedy and Secretary State Rusk stated repeatedly that so long as such a Soviet military presence remained in Cuba, the United States could not accept the situation. By 1964, the United States intelligence community concluded that no Soviet ground combat units remained in Cuba, and the issue of whether we would accept their continuing presence was mooted.

3. The fact that the Soviet Union and Cuba have maintained secrecy about the brigade is itself a matter for concern. The presence of the Soviet brigade has been kept secret by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The purposes of that presence remain unclear. The combat capability
of the brigade has not been denied. With equipment and advice and support from the Soviet Union, Cuban armed forces continue to take part in civil and border wars in many parts of the world that do not affect the legitimate interests of Cuba. So long as the status quo remains unchanged, there is a reasonable basis for concern that the brigade has a purpose related not to the defense of Cuba, but to the use of Cuban or Soviet force against the territory of another state.
In and of itself the existence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba does not pose an immediate military threat to the United States. However, the political and military significance of the Soviet brigade in Cuba cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be seen against the broader background of the pattern of Soviet/Cuban military activity and intervention in the Third World, and particularly the continued expansion of this activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. The uninterrupted continuation of these developments poses a threat to global stability, peace in the Western Hemisphere, and to U.S. security.

While the Cubans may have reasons of their own for pursuing interventionist policies in Africa and Latin America, the fundamental fact is that they could not do this without Soviet support. Since the early 1960s the Soviet Union has supplied almost all of Cuba's military equipment. Soviet arms shipments to Cuba from 1961 through 1978 equalled $1.55 billion, including $150 million in 1978. Beginning in 1975, the Soviets began a program to build up the Cuban forces, both in quality and quantity. Deliveries grew steadily and by 1978 they had reached 32,400 tons, the highest level in a decade. Arms deliveries in 1979 are expected to reach the 1978 level.

As a result of this huge build-up, the Cuban military in the past four years has been transformed from an army with a defensive mission to one with significant offensive capabilities.
The USSR has provided Havana with a major naval facility, submarines, almost 100 naval vessels, 280 advanced aircraft, including ground-attack models of the MIG-23, a wide variety of ground force equipment, including more than 200 tanks and 650 armored personnel carriers, and all the other characteristics of a modern armed force. Cuba is now by far the best armed local force in the region.

It is significant that the Soviets do not charge the Cubans a penny for the equipment which they provide to Havana, and that Cuba, although it claims to be an "nonaligned" nation, is the only country in the world which receives Soviet military equipment free of charge. The Warsaw Pact countries -- Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and all the others -- have to pay for their military equipment. Cuba does not.

Moreover, there is a strong correlation between the intensification of the Soviet military commitment to Cuba and another significant development in 1975: the Soviet decision to support one of the three factions engaged in the civil war in Angola and to transport some 20,000 Cuban troops to fight in that civil war.

-- A large portion of the arms used by the Cuban ground forces in Angola was Soviet equipment from Cuba.

-- The shipment of these arms to Cuba began to pick up concurrent with the Cuban involvement in Angola. As
noted earlier, since 1975 -- the year when Cuba began its military involvement in Angola -- Soviet arms shipments to Cuba have risen each succeeding year, reaching a decade high in 1978.

Subsequently, despite our protests and the concerns expressed by other nations, the Soviets financed another Cuban army and transported it to Ethiopia where with the full logistical support of the USSR it engaged in combat in another civil war. Moreover, in contrast to Angola, the Cuban forces in Ethiopia were supplied almost entirely with Soviet arms brought directly from the USSR by sea and air.

-- Between November 1977 and April 1978 Soviet ships delivered 80,000 tons of military equipment to Ethiopia.

-- In addition, Soviet passenger ships transported the initial contingent, between 2,000-4,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia, followed by an airlift of Cuban troops. (TS)

-- For the first time, Cuban air and ground forces fought under the overall command of Soviet military officers. The combined military operation in Ethiopia
was coordinated in part through frequent high-level consultations between Cuban and Soviet officials in Moscow, Havana, and Addis Ababa.

In addition, since 1977, Cuban and Soviet advisors have been cooperating in training Zapu (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) forces in Zambia and Angola under the overall supervision of the Soviets.

And following the outbreak of fighting between North and South Yemen in February 1979, Soviet aircraft transported at least several hundred Cuban troops to South Yemen from Ethiopia, swelling the total Cuban military presence there to about 1,000. The Cubans provided rear echelon support services and security and advised PDRY ground and air forces in the use of Soviet equipment.

Today there are some 40,000 Cubans, most of them armed combat troops, stationed outside the confines of their country in various nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These Cubans receive their entire support -- their logistics, their transportation, their military weapons -- from the Soviet Union. Most importantly, as a result of the recent Soviet build-up in Cuba since 1975, the Cubans now have a lift capability to pursue their adventures throughout the Caribbean and Central America.
It is against the background of this intervention and the overall build-up of the Cuban armed forces into the most modern and formidable military force in Latin America that the issue of the Soviet brigade must be seen. This increasing military cooperation between the Soviet Union, coupled with the growth of Soviet/Cuban military capabilities in our own backyard and the Cuban support for revolutionary movements and covert actions in a number of Latin American countries, is a matter of grave concern to the United States. It was undertaken in disregard of long-standing U.S. sensitivities, and its continuation could pose a serious threat to stability in an area that has historically been considered important to U.S. national security.
Regret to you on our recent intelligence as to a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, our discussions with the Russians - and attempt to put this in perspective, with particular emphasis on START.

First, we have been aware of Soviet military personnel in Cuba for a long period of time. Since the removal of the missiles that presence - with no offensive capability has posed no threat to the U.S. or our L. F. friends. This remains true today. A Soviet brigade with forty tanks is a threat to no one - particularly when we consider that the Cuban themselves have over 700 of the same Soviet tanks and related equipment.

What is new is the organization of the Soviet personnel into what we call a combat brigade consisting of some 2,500 to 3,000 soldiers. Just when this new organization form took place we cannot precisely state. It has been evolving over a number of years. No one
we state why it really doesn't make much sense to argue in this way for training Cubans. No
does it's location suggest any other
strategic mission.

Second, the fact that this brigade does
not if itself raise any security threat to the
U.S. or L.A. does not make it less offensive
to us. To the Soviet Union
stationing any combat troops in Cuba is - as
they know - unacceptable to the American people
and its government. There is no threat to Cuba
and Cuban forces are obvious able to cope with
any threat that they could conceive really or
wrong.

to say the Soviets know and understand
that even one combat brigade is unacceptable
to us. They deny that it has any purpose
other than training Cuban officers; that is, that
it has any combat mission whatever [Add
Strombo's assurance]. Wherever the facts -
and it is not possible at the time for us to
know with certainty its purpose or mission,
pertinent when it seems so utterly voided
purpose — the Soviet position on this point is a recognition in acceptance that we will not tolerate any control forces. And we should take satisfaction from this understanding. It will, we believe, have its impact on what happens to this brigade in the future.

The Cubans to have explicitly denied the control presence at mission. Mr. Carter’s role as a colorful mediator is clear. That the presence of a Soviet control brigade in Cuba is as offensive to the Cubans as it is to us. And again, this forceful denial also will affect what happens to this brigade in the future.

In sum, I believe the evolution of Soviet troops into a combat brigade is at an end. We will, I believe, see no more of such developments in the future — thus giving credence to the denial of the present.
We cannot solve the problem of Soviet trained Cubans in Africa or Latin America—

let alone the presence of a Soviet Brigade in Cuba, whether it exists—by self the
Senate does a duty nor it wilt respect to
Salt. Etc.
MEMORANDUM TO: President Jimmy Carter

I have thought a good bit about Cuba since talking with you on Tuesday of this week and I am fearful that they will try to get you to withdraw or agree to a delay and avoid a vote prior to the general election next year.

You will get a lot of flak and some political damage if they vote and defeat it, but I am convinced you will get as much more if it is allowed to dangle into next year and involved in the election. There could be some political wisdom in which any of the ambitious senators might join to delay this thing and let some candidate claim that if you are defeated he can work it out with the senate.

Would it be possible or wise to do the following:

(1) Lay out the facts about how the question of troops developed.

(2) How the information presented a problem that should and could have been resolved in normal discussions with the Russians.

(3) Senator Church came about the information due to his chairmanship and it would normally have been treated as confidential, but for reasons sufficient for him it was made public.
(4) There is a continuing dispute between the Russians and the United States about the facts.

(5) While we cannot accept the situation on the basis of what we believe the facts to be, it does not present a present danger to the United States.

(6) The problem can be resolved in time and should not impede the progress or success of SALT II.

(7) I have submitted the treaty to the senate in accordance with the constitution and it is the duty of that body to either consent or reject.

(8) I have offered to make reasonable compromises in the size of the defense budget, but I cannot agree to an extended delay.

(9) While it would be a disservice to the nation and the world for the treaty to be rejected, it will be even worse that it be pushed aside, caught up in election year and finally defeated or abandoned.

(10) The country is entitled to a prompt and responsible action by the senate and I hope the people will demand action.

Perhaps if you could indicate to Senator Byrd that something like this was coming, he might could develop some sort of a basis on which the senate could proceed and accept or consent to the treaty.
I do not believe that the senate would like to take the responsibility of having rejected the treaty. If they do, it is likely that history will show that it is comparable to the senate's rejection of President Wilson's League of Nations proposal.

It may be that patience might require delay before taking such action, but I have a gut feeling that Senator Byrd might be willing to help and advise you in working this out fairly promptly. If not, I feel it would be more harm in delaying it indefinitely than having it defeated in the senate.

CHK/b
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

text used by president
address to nation
re soviet troops in cuba
10/1/79
Tonight I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern, as it has been the highest concern of every President. That subject is the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throughout the time of my service in this office. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world. Those defenses are stronger tonight than they were two years ago; they will be stronger two years from now than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward with your support and with the support of Congress.

Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO alliance is on track, with the full cooperation and participation of our European allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough
to destroy any potential adversary many times over, and the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further assured by a new system of powerful mobile missiles. These systems are designed for stability and defense.

Beyond these military defenses, we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control of nuclear weapons -- the adoption of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT II.

This evening I also want to report to you about the highly publicized Soviet brigade in Cuba and about its bearing on the important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union.

This is not a simple or easy subject.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth, and the relationship between us is complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.
Our fundamental philosophies conflict, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

But as two great nations, we do have common interests and share an overwhelming mutual concern in preventing a nuclear war. We must recognize therefore that nuclear arms control agreements are vital to both our countries. And we must also exercise self-restraint in our relations and be reciprocally sensitive to each other's concerns.

Recently, we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war or a major confrontation.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our wisdom -- a challenge to our ability to act in a firm, decisive way without destroying the basis for cooperation.
which helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It is a challenge to our determination to give a measured and effective response to Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world.

Now let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade and describe the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba:

As most of you know, 17 years ago in the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement to withdraw those nuclear weapons, and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them
were also withdrawn, and we monitored their departure.

It was believed that those who stayed behind were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cubans and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that some of these Soviet forces had been organized into a combat unit. When attention was then focussed on a careful review of past intelligence data, it was possible for our experts to conclude that this unit had existed for several years, probably since the mid-1970s and possibly even longer.

This unit appears to be a brigade of two to three thousand men. It is armed with about forty tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.
This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship and added to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

During the last few years the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region, and they use these military forces to intrude into other countries in Africa and the Middle East.
There is a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get their weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies.

The Communist regime in Cuba is an economic failure; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about $8 million in economic aid every day!

Although Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms, he has paid a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, the Cuban regime automatically follows the Soviet line.

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.
Now I want to report further on what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials.

We have made it clear that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. It has officially stated that the unit is a training center, that it has been in place since 1962, and that it has not changed significantly either in number of personnel or in function since that time. By these statements, the Soviets apparently recognize that the presence of a Soviet ground combat unit in Cuba would be a matter of legitimate concern to us and other nations.

However, the Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to [this] concern:
-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities;

They have said

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the U.S. or to any other state;

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed confirmation in 1970, not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this understanding.
assurances

These statements have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. Although we have persuasive evidence that in the past the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future non-combat status of the unit are significant.

However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone. We will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba. We will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nations in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a
party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

Third,
I am establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida, [in order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region [and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy]] I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability to monitor and respond rapidly [for rapid response] to any attempted military encroachment in the region.
fourth, we will expand military exercises in the region, and we will conduct these exercises regularly from now on.

In accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

To further ensure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further.

The United States has worldwide interests in peace and stability. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to improve our military strength to ensure that U.S. military strength is second to none. We are enhancing the capacity of our Rapid Deployment Forces in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea and air units to distant areas rapidly and with adequate supplies. We are increasing our ability to do this.
I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts.

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I have consulted not only with my own advisers, but with Congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.
I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the Cold War. A confrontation might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks for some people, but it would be destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for 20 years, under six Administrations of both parties -- a policy that recognizes that we are in competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and that we seek cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

Now let me speak, My fellow Americans,

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. [Nor is it the 40,000 Cuban military troops in Africa.]
The greatest danger to all the nations of the world --
including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the
breakdown of a common effort to preserve the peace, and the
ultimate threat of a nuclear war.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to
ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Ensuring compliance with its
terms will not be a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated
national technical means, carefully focussed on the Soviet Union
to ensure that the Treaty is verifiable. This Treaty is the
most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms.

It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve
the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. During the past
few years we have [been-making] real increases in our defense
expenditures to fulfill the goals of our Five Year Defense
Plan. SALT II [permits-us-to] concentrate these increases in
areas where our interests are most threatened and where direct
capital and direct military challenge is most likely.
The rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets.
Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, these disagreements and conflicts could take on a new and ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.
The leaders of our European allies support SALT II -- unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT Treaty, these leaders and their countries would be confused and deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, our effort to build a stronger and more united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. Unfortunately, every four years the political season

But the Senate has a tradition of being the greatest deliberative body in the world, and the whole world is watching the Senate today. I am confident that all Senators will perform their high responsibilities as the national interest requires.
Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

The purpose of ratifying the SALT II Treaty and the purpose of the actions being taken in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationships are exactly the same -- to keep our nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations.
We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about these differences, but the best way to deal with them successfully is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

That is what I am determined to do.

The struggle for peace -- the long, hard struggle to bring weapons of mass destruction under the control of human reason and human law -- is the central drama of our age.

At another time of challenge in our nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people:

"We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth."

We chose our hope then, and preserved our Union. Let us act wisely now, and preserve our world.

#     #     #

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes