President’s Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [2]

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Proposed Report to the Nation on Soviet Troops in Cuba

This evening I want to ask you to listen patiently, because the information I want to present to you cannot be outlined in a sentence or two. I ask you to listen carefully, because the issues at stake concern the security of our country and global peace.

This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations in the world. The relations between us are complex, because they have strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

As early as possible, we must change our decision. If we present states give, and since Gromyko and Brezhnev have set up SALT II. We can't lose the audience's confidence.

*Some believe this is artificial. Others that the public must be prepared to deal with a long and difficult speech.
Militarily and politically, we compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war. That is why, for a generation, the Soviets have cooperated with us, and we with them, in seeking to reduce that danger through arms control agreements. The latest such agreement—the most important and promising so far—is the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-II), which is now awaiting ratification by the U.S. Senate.

Recently, in recent weeks, a new element has been introduced into our relationship: convincing evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970s. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.
Tonight I want to talk to you about the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World. I want to describe for you the actions I am taking to counter report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

And I want to put these issues into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not confront any immediate, concrete threat that could quickly escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.
But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; it is a challenge to our determination [in standing up to] Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way, with a reasoned understanding of our true national interests.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba: In one of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War, at the end of the Cold War, Seventeen years ago, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the withdrawal of those nuclear weapons.

At the time of that 1962 crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we mourned their departure. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.
Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive [irrefutable] evidence [which had been accumulating for some time] that a Soviet combat unit [was] stationed in Cuba. [Once we established this beyond doubt] It was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this unit had been there [at least since 1976 and possibly] longer, since the mid-1970's.

This unit [is] a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. [It does not resemble any of the twenty or so Soviet military advisory groups in other foreign countries.] It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It [has been] organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises [are] those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U. S. is involved.

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Nevertheless, the Soviet brigade is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of countries in that area that they may fall victim to Soviet-Cuban adventurism.® It is a closer part of an intensifying Soviet-Cuban military relationship which includes the transfer of modern arms and the increased presence of Soviet naval forces. Finally, it helps support a pattern of Soviet-Cuban interventions and use of military force throughout the world.®

“This pattern dates back to 1975, when the Soviet Union launched a substantial program to build up Cuba’s armed forces and to back Cuban intrusions into troubled areas of the world — Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and elsewhere.”

®Lloyd believes this word is foreign-sounding.
Now, there are some 40,000 Cuban troops overseas. These troops are supported and armed by the Soviet Union. During the last few years, it has been a matter of concern to us that Soviet throughout this period, Russian military support of Cuba has been increasing. The Soviet Union has provided Cuba with some one and three-quarters billion dollars in military supplies. These supplies have included, for example, 280 advanced jet aircraft; some 100 naval vessels; 650 armored personnel carriers; and an entire naval port. The result is that Cuba now has the largest, best equipped armed forces in the Caribbean and Central American area, except, of course, for our own.

The Cubans get Russian military help free. If East German, Bulgaria, and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries have to pay for their Soviet military supplies, but Cuba does not.

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The socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; it cannot sustain the Communist Party. This pattern holds true for Cuba's whole economy itself. The Soviet Union must send the Castro regime which the Soviets subsidize to the tune of three billion eight million dollars in economic aid every day. That is equal to a quarter of Cuba's entire gross national product.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms but he and his Russian economic subsidy. He has paid a much higher price than that. In effect, Mr. Castro has sold the independence of his country to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Castro claims to be "non-aligned," but this is an absurd and obvious lie. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. There is no more real difference between Soviet and Cuban foreign policy than between Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy.
The Soviet brigade in Cuba is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Mr. Castro. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.

We have been negotiating with the Soviet Union over the past four weeks for a resolution of the problems raised by the combat brigade in Cuba.

I regret to report to you that the overall outcome of the negotiations must be viewed as unsatisfactory. The existing Soviet combat capability in Cuba remains in place. Together with the Soviet unit in Cuba, with the easiness of Mr. Castro with the rapidly modernizing Cuban armed forces a shadow remains to intrude military forces into many other countries, a shadow not only upon the Caribbean and Central America, but upon all the troubled areas of the world in which the Soviets and Cubans may seek to intrude.

When the Soviet combat unit was discovered, we notified the Soviet Union that this was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.

*Lloyd and Warren believe this whole section -- beginning on page 6 -- is given too much prominence, is peripheral or unrelated to the brigade issue and describes something we don't propose to do much about anyway.
Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. We have made it clear that the presence of a Soviet Combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

In the past few days, for the first time, though the Soviets have given us specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation.
- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and
- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future. These assurances have been given to us from the highest levels of the Soviet government. However, they are significant, but they do not fully resolve their matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The new assurance about the future status of the unit

We will verify these assurances by increased surveillance of Cuba, and we will assure with our own means that no Soviet force in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or
any other nation in this hemisphere.
[I have therefore decided to take several appropriate measures— and I am confident that in these actions I will have the support of the Congress and of you, the American people.]

First, I want to affirm that it is the policy of the United States to oppose the deployment of Cuban or Soviet combat forces against any nation in this Hemisphere. Every nation in the Hemisphere can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy’s declaration in 1963 that John F. Kennedy’s declaration on April 19, 1963, “that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries.”

*Zbig and Harold Brown believe this detracts from the uniqueness of your statement and can be used in the backgrounder. Warren and Lloyd think it is important to establish continuity with the past.
In order to improve our capacity for rapid response to Second, to improve our capacity to support this policy, I support the policy, I am ordering the following steps:

We will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. forces will be assigned to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services. This will give us a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces. We will gain a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.

As a companion measure, I have ordered an expansion of military exercises in the region. As a first step, I have added to a previously planned naval training exercise an additional phase in the region of our base in Guantanamo, Cuba. As a further step, I have ordered the conduct of an amphibious
 recoil exercise into Guantanamo in the near future, involving approximately 1500 marines and 2000 naval personnel, for a total exercise force of about 3500. [A few years ago, the United States withdrew approximately 1000 marines from the base and planned to substitute periodic reinforcement exercises to assure the security of Guantanamo. Subsequently, however, in an effort to improve relations with the Government of Cuba, a decision was made to suspend these planned exercises.]

In view of the Soviet combat presence, these exercises will be conducted regularly from now on, and, of course,

[These and other measures which we will adopt as necessary]

We will insure our continued capability to respond to any regional or external interference with nations of the Western Hemisphere.

[More important, they underscore a crucial message—] The United States will stay in Guantanamo, in accordance with our treaty rights.
To further insure the ability of troubled people to resist Soviet turmoil and possible communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to the nations of Central America and the Caribbean. 

Beyond the Hemisphere, the United States has acted to meet the broader challenge to our interests from Cuban intervention. Along with other nations, we helped block the invasion of Shaba in Africa. We helped to thwart the attack on North Yemen. We will shortly announce an important continuing reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.

And if we are to compete effectively with the Soviet Union, to preserve peace, and be prepared to protect our global interests, we must have...
develop a better
world-wide capacity to project our military forces. We
must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant
areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun upgrading our ability to do this. We will
continue reinforcing our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which
we have been preparing for some time. I have directed the Secretary of Defense, in the course of
preparing the budget for the next year, to [insure that we]
accelerate these efforts. We will never let United States military
strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

[For example, we will increase our capacity to airlift
without extensive reliance on staging bases, and to escort our
sea-lifted forces. We will, of course, maintain the amphibious
assault capability of the Marine Corps.

To supplement it, we will proceed with a program to
procure so-called forward equipment ships, which can provide
our forces with heavy equipment in areas far from American bases.
I also intend to increase the level of exercises for training and readiness of forces in the rapid deployment category.

Second, we must intensify our intelligence efforts in regard to Soviet and Cuban military activities throughout the world. To strengthen our capabilities in this area, I will be making specific requests of the Congress in this sensitive area. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

Third, I am modifying our policy of restraint on arms sales to countries which may be menaced by Soviet and Cuban military activities. I was 10.

These steps reflect my determination to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.
symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

But a larger question has arisen. What does the presence of the combat brigade mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Is it part of the long-standing mixture of competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union which requires vigilance, firmness and flexibility on our part? Or should it be the occasion for a fundamental change in that policy -- a moving away from efforts to build cooperation and a return to a policy of across-the-board confrontation -- a return to the Cold War?

I have considered this question carefully as well. I have consulted on it just as widely.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not the occasion for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of...
confrontation. Such a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- the policy of competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union in some areas, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear risks.

Obviously, the Soviet brigade in Cuba increases the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We are deeply concerned about the military relationship between Soviets have shown themselves insensitive to a number of our concerns, and in addition to the steps I have outlined tonight, and increasing policy for Cuban military forces, supplied we will respond in kind to that insensitivity.*

and encouraged by the Soviets, to intrude into the internal affairs of other countries in Africa and in other parts of the world.*

*Lloyd, Warren and Hedley think this is too threatening and breaks the flow of this section. Zbig and Harold Brown believe it is important to lay down this marker both with the Soviets and with the American people.
In spite of this concern, but [out of this] the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is not a thousand or three thousand military forces in Cuba. It is not a Cuban division. It is not the greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

That is why tonight I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are now increasing in real terms -- 3% per year -- on areas of greater need.
Finally, SALT II is the absolute prerequisite to further negotiations aimed at deep, mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals. All this has been established in months of exhaustive Senate hearings. Furthermore -- and I ask you to listen particularly closely to this -- the abandonment of SALT would seriously compromise our security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets, of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those conflicts we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight -- the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba -- would take a whole new ominous dimension. * Against

*Lloyd believes this greatly exaggerates the importance of the brigade issue. Hedley and Warren also favor removal. Claytor, Aaron and Hertzberg believe it helps tie the speech together and uses the SALT budget argument against the SALT opponents.
the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every competitive element of U.S.-Soviet relations would carry the seeds of the ultimate horror: a nuclear war.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously, a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II -- we unanimously. I have talked to a number of those leaders in the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects SALT II, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm.* The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum or fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But

*Rick Hertzberg favors "fright."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Hamilton Jordan

SUBJECT: Cuba Speech

You might consider confronting the politics/SALT linkage directly in the speech, in a way that claims the high ground. At the top of page 21 (Draft Three), you might add some language like this:

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extraordinarily important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix. I want you to know that I am not going to play politics with the security of the United States. I am not going to play politics with the survival of the human race. I am not going to play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too important to our Nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

(This suggestion comes out of a meeting I convened with Jerry Rafshoon, Tim Kraft, Brandon Butler, Pat Caddell, Rick Hertzberg, and Phil Wise.)
the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support. So does SALT II.

I say to the Senate and I say to you, the American people, with all the urgency and conviction at my command, that the ratification of this treaty is in the interest of the United States, and in the interest of world peace.

And I call upon you -- the American people -- to demand of your Senators that they move swiftly to approve this absolutely crucial bulwark against nuclear war.

I call upon each and every one of you -- not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans -- to write to the Senators from your state and tell them that you want the SALT II Treaty ratified.

*Everyone but Rick Hertzberg thinks these two paragraphs should be deleted.
As a powerful nation - as a superpower, we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace.

I have no illusions about them. We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union, but the best way to accommodate those differences is to maintain American unity, strength, and resolve. American will and American strength.
The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight in the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba are exactly the same.

That purpose is a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our Nation and to all the nations of the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

This morning, Pope John Paul II arrived in our country. He has come here, as he has traveled the globe, in the service of world peace. My fellow Americans, let us not disappoint him.

Let us show him -- let us show each other -- let us show all humanity that the United States of America stands for justice, for reason, for faith -- and for peace.7

*Again, everybody but Rick thinks this should be out.
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<tr>
<th>The Problem</th>
<th>Your Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet-Cuban Military Threat in the Caribbean</td>
<td>Minor immediate issue</td>
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<td>Central emphasis</td>
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<td>Caribbean Socio-Political Problem</td>
<td>Major source of instability</td>
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<td>Some response</td>
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<td>Global Soviet-Cuban Military Activism</td>
<td>Key troubling issue in US-Soviet detente; most visible aspect of Soviet assertiveness</td>
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**US Response**

- Speech
- Acts not mentioned in the speech

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<th>Public Perception</th>
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This evening I want to report to you about the extremely important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, and especially to discuss a number of new issues concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations between us are complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

We compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.
It is important to both countries to reduce that danger through arms control agreements.

Recently a new element has been introduced into the (competitive side of) our relationship: we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not confront any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; it is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way to protect American interests without destroying the basis for cooperation which can maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.
I want to explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

And I want to put these issues into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to be strong, to maintain peace, and to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba:

Seventeen years ago, in the era of the Cold War the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States was met with a firm American response, and it ended with the
withdrawal of those nuclear weapons. At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. It was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit had been there for several years, probably since the mid-1970s.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.
This is not a large force nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure. It is part of a closer Soviet-Cuban military relationship which includes the transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters. Finally, the brigade may help support a pattern of Cuban military interventions in Africa and the Middle East.

During the last few years Soviet military support of Cuba has been increasing. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region.
The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies, but Cuba does not.

The Socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms but he has paid a much higher price than that. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.
We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this brigade was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. Now, the Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.
These new assurances have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The new assurances about the future status of the unit are significant. However, they do not fully resolve this matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We will verify compliance with these assurances by increased surveillance of Cuba, and we will assure with our own means that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request from those other nations for assistance in meeting such a military threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.
This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces. This will give us a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.
We will expand military exercises in the region. We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on and, of course, the United States will stay in Guantanamo in accordance with existing treaty rights.

To further insure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet economic and human needs.

And if we are to continue competing effectively with the Soviet Union, to preserve peace, and be prepared to protect our global interests, we will develop a better worldwide capacity to project our military forces. We must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant areas rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun enlarging our ability to do this. We will continue reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.
I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts. We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

We shall also intensify our intelligence effort to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens. However, the decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.
The new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation. For some few, perhaps, a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administration of both parties -- the policy of competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.
The Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are now increasing in real terms -- on areas of greater need.
Furthermore, the rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a regional difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in
the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects the SALT Treaty, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm. The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum -- or fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support.

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival
of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II.

It is much too important for that -- too important to our nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about them, but the best way to accommodate these differences is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight are exactly the same.

That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

#    #    #
This evening I want to report to you about the extremely important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, and especially to discuss a number of new issues concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject, because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations between us are complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

We compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways and quite often our interests conflict as well.

But what we share in common is an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.
And that is why our nuclear arms control agreement are so important to both countries, to reduce that danger through arms control agreements.

However, recently a new element has been introduced into the competitive side of our relationship. We have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of a Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way to protect American interests without destroying the basis for cooperation which can maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.
Now let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

And I want to put these issues into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to be strong, to maintain peace, and to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba:

As most of you know, Seventeen years ago, in the era of the Cold War the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States was met with a firm American response, and it ended with the Soviet agreement to
withdrawal of those nuclear weapons. At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. Those that stayed behind were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. It was possible for our experts to conclude, through careful review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit had been there for several years, probably since the mid-1970s.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.
This is not a large force nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

The transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters finally, the brigade may help support a pattern of Cuban military interventions in Africa and the Middle East.

During the last few years Soviet military supplies to Cuba have been increasing. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region.
The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies, but Cuba does not.

Communist regime

The [Socialist economic experiment] in Cuba has failed

it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms, but he has paid a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. [Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.]

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.
I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

... you was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. Now, the Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.
These [new assurances] have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. We are convinced that in the past the unit has been a combat brigade. The [new assurances] about non-combat the future status of the unit are significant. However, [they do not fully resolve this matter] we shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We will verify compliance with these assurances by increased surveillance of Cuba. [End] We will assure [with our own means that] no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request [from those other nations] for assistance in meeting [such a military threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

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This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and conducting exercises, and, if required, employment of designated forces for action if required. This will give us a substantially improved capability for military rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region.

[by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.]

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We will expand military exercises in the region.

We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on and the United States will stay in Guantanamo, in accordance with existing treaty rights.

To further insure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet economic and human needs.

And if we are to continue competing effectively with the Soviet Union, to preserve peace, and be prepared to protect our global interests, we must ensure that U.S. military strength is second to none. We will improve our worldwide capacity to project our military forces in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, and sea units to distant areas rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun enlarging our ability to do this. We will continue reinforcing our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which we have been preparing for some time.
I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts. [We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.]

We shall also intensify our intelligence effort to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources of collection and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. Indeveloping them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens. However, the decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.
the new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment, will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

So I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. [It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation] For some few, perhaps, a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks, for some people, but it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of a policy that recognizes that we are in both parties -- the policy of competition with the Soviet Union that we seek to cooperate in others -- notably in some fields, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.
The Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. During the past four years, we have been increasing our defense expenditures in real terms each year. I plan further increases in the future to fulfill the It permits us to concentrate our defense budget, which we goals of the Five Year Defense Plan. SALT II permits us to concentrate those increases in areas where direct military are now increasing in real terms -- on areas of greater need challenge is most likely
Although the Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. Nor is it Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Compliance with its terms is not a matter of trust. We have developed national technical means carefully focused on the Soviet Union to insure that the treaty is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost.

It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are now increasing in real terms -- on areas of greater need.
Furthermore, the rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a regional difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in
the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects the SALT Treaty, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm. The effort to build up and modernize NATO—an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention—would lose momentum—or fail.

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival
of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too important to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace among nations. We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about them, but the best way to accommodate these differences is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions being taken in dealing with Soviet troops in Cuba are exactly the same. That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

# #

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This evening I want to report to you about the extremely important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, and especially to discuss a number of new issues concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations between us are complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

We compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.
It is important to both countries to reduce that danger through arms control agreements.

Recently a new element has been introduced into the competitive side of our relationship: we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not confront any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; it is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way to protect American interests without destroying the basis for cooperation which can maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.
In the 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and monitored their departure. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. It was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit had been there for several years, probably since the mid-1970s, and perhaps even longer. This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. Its organization and its training exercises are characteristic of a combat unit.
This is not a large force, nor an invocable force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure. It is part of a closer Soviet-Cuban military relationship which includes the transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters. The presence of the brigade cannot be separated from the pattern of Cuban military interventions in Africa and the Middle East. More than 40,000 Cuban soldiers, equipped and supplied by the Soviet Union, are now engaged in these areas.

During the last few years Soviet military support of Cuba has been increasing. The result is that Cuba now has a and military than any other nation of the largest, best equipped armed forces in the Western Hemisphere.
The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies, but Cuba does not.

The Socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms but he has paid a much higher price than that. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.
We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this brigade was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. Now, the Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.
These assurances have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The assurances about the future status of the unit are significant. However, they do not fully resolve this matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We will verify compliance with these assurances by increased surveillance of Cuba. We will assure with our own means that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request from any other nation for assistance in meeting such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.
This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

Second, in order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services, responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces. This will give us a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region (by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.)
The new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation. For some few, perhaps, a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administration of both parties -- the policy of competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.
Furthermore, the rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, then disagreements and conflicts could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in
the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT Treaty, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm. The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum -- or fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. The actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support.

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival
of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too important to our nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about them, but the best way to accommodate these differences is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight are exactly the same.

That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.
1. I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern—

2. as it has been for every president. Peace and

3. that subject is the security of the United States.

4. We are at peace tonight—

5. as we have been at peace throughout the time of my service in this office.

6. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong.

7. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world.

8. Those defenses are stronger tonight—

9. than they were two years ago.

10. They will be stronger two years from now—

11. than they are tonight—

12. because of carefully planned improvements—

13. that are going forward

14. with your support—

15. and with the support of Congress.

16. Our program for modernizing and strengthening

17. the military forces of the N.A.T.O. alliance—

18. is on track,

19. with the full cooperation and participation of

20. our European allies.
1. OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ARE POWERFUL ENOUGH TO DESTROY ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY MANY TIMES OVER.
2. AND THE INVULNERABILITY OF THOSE FORCES WILL SOON BE FURTHER ASSURED BY A NEW SYSTEM OF POWERFUL MOBILE MISSILES.
3. THESE SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED FOR STABILITY AND DEFENSE.
4. BYOND THESE MILITARY DEFENSES, WE ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A GREAT ADVANCE IN THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
5. THE ADOPTION OF THE SECOND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRATEGIC-ARMS LIMITATION TREATY, SALT II.
6. THIS EVENING I ALSO WANT TO REPORT TO YOU ABOUT THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA AND ABOUT ITS BEARING ON THE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR NATION AND THE SOVIET UNION.
7. THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE OR-EASY-SUBJECT.
1. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES CONFLICT
2. QUITE OFTEN OUR INTERESTS CONFLICT AS WELL.

3. AS TWO GREAT NATIONS,
4. WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS
5. AND SHARE AN OVERWHELMING MUTUAL CONCERN
6. IN PREVENTING A NUCLEAR WAR.

7. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEREFORE,
8. THAT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE VITAL TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES,
9. AND THAT WE MUST ALSO EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT IN OUR RELATIONS AND BE SENSITIVE TO EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS.

10. RECENTLY WE OBTAINED EVIDENCE THAT A SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE HAS BEEN IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
11. THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US.
12. I WANT TO REASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT WE DO NOT FACE ANY IMMEDIATE CONCRETE THREAT THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO WAR OR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION.
13. BUT WE DO FACE A CHALLENGE.
14. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO OUR WISDOM.
15. A CHALLENGE TO OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN A FIRM, DECISIVE WAY WITHOUT DESTROYING THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION THAT HELPS TO MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE AND CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
1. It is a challenge to our determination→
2. To give a measured and effective response→
3. To Soviet competition→
4. And to Cuban military activities around the world.→
5. Now let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade→
6. And describe the more general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.→

7. Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba:

8. As most of you know,
9. 17 years ago in the era of the Cold War,
10. The Soviet Union suddenly attempted→
11. To introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba.→

12. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement→
13. To withdraw those nuclear weapons,
14. And a commitment→
15. Not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.→

16. At the time of that 1962 missile crisis,
17. There were more than 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba.
1. Most of them were withdrawn.
2. And we monitored their departure.
3. It was believed that those who stayed behind
4. were not combat forces,
5. but were there to advise and train Cubans
6. and to perform intelligence functions.

7. Just recently
8. American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence
9. that some of these Soviet forces
10. had been organized into a combat unit.
11. When attention was then focussed
12. on a careful review of past intelligence data,
13. it was possible for our experts to conclude
14. that this unit had existed for several years—
15. probably since the mid-1970’s—
16. and possibly even longer.

17. This unit appears to be a brigade-of-two-to-three-thousand-men.
18. It is armed with about 40 tanks
19. and other modern military equipment.
20. It has been organized as a combat-unit.
21. Its training exercises have been those of a combat-unit.
1. This is not a large force,
2. nor an assault force.
3. It presents no direct threat to us.
4. It has no airborne or seaborne capability.
5. In contrast to the 1962 crisis,
6. no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved. 
7. Nevertheless this Soviet brigade in Cuba
   is a serious matter.
8. It contributes to tension in
   the Caribbean-and-Central-American region.
9. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba
10. and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters,
11. have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.
12. They have added to the fears of some countries
    that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.
13. During the last few years,
14. the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of
    military supplies to Cuba.
15. The result is
16. that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped
    armed forces in this region.
1. THESE MILITARY FORCES
2. ARE USED TO INTRUDE INTO OTHER COUNTRIES
   IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. THERE IS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
4. BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION.
5. THE CUBANS GET THEIR WEAPONS FREE.
6. OTHER SOVIET SATELLITE COUNTRIES
   HAVE TO PAY FOR THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES.
7. THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CUBA IS AN ECONOMIC FAILURE;
   IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ITSELF.
8. THE SOVIET UNION MUST SEND TO CUBA
   ABOUT $8 MILLION IN ECONOMIC AID EVERY DAY!
9. FIDEL CASTRO DOES NOT PAY MONEY FOR RUSSIAN ARMS:
   THE CUBAN PEOPLE PAY A MUCH HIGHER PRICE.
10. IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE,
11. ON EVERY INTERNATIONAL ISSUE,
   THE CUBAN REGIME AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWS THE SOVIET LINE.
12. THE SOVIET BRIGADE IS A MANIFESTATION OF MOSCOW'S DOMINANCE OF CUBA.
13. IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF THAT DOMINANCE,
14. AND IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST TAKE
15. FOR ESCALATING CUBAN MILITARY ACTIONS ABROAD.
1. Now I want to report further.
2. on what we are doing to resolve these problems.
3. and to counter these activities.
4. Over the past three weeks.
5. We have discussed this issue at great length.
6. with top Soviet officials.
7. We have made it clear.
8. That the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba.
9. Is a matter of serious concern to us.
10. The Soviet Union does not admit.
11. That the unit in question is a combat unit.
12. However, the Soviets have made certain statements.
   to us with respect to our concern:
13. --That the unit in question is a training-center.
14. That it does nothing more than training.
15. And can do nothing more.
16. --That they will not.
17. Change its function or status as a training center.
18. We understand this to mean.
19. That they do not intend to enlarge the unit.
20. Or give it additional capabilities;
THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA
ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO THE U.S.
OR TO ANY OTHER STATE.

--THAT THEY REAFFIRM THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING
AND THE MUTUALLY AGREED CONFIRMATION OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IN 1970,
NOT TO STATION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA.
AND WILL ABIDE BY IT IN THE FUTURE.

WE FOR OUR PART,
RECONFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING.

THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ME
FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT
THE UNIT HAS BEEN A COMBAT BRIGADE,
THE SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NON-COMBAT STATUS OF THE UNIT
ARE SIGNIFICANT.

HOWEVER WE SHALL NOT REST ON THESE SOVIET STATEMENTS ALONE.
1. FIRST WE WILL MONITOR THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET FORCES
2. BY INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA.
3. SECOND, WE WILL ASSURE
4. THAT NO SOVIET UNIT IN CUBA
5. CAN BE USED AS A COMBAT FORCE
6. TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
7. OR ANY-OTHER-NATION IN THIS HEMISPHERE.
8. THOSE NATIONS CAN BE CONFIDENT
9. THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ACT
10. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
11. TO MEET ANY SUCH THREAT FROM SOVIET OR CUBAN FORCES.
12. THIS POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES
13. AS A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
14. AND A PARTY TO THE RIO TREATY.
15. IT IS A REAFFIRMATION IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
16. OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S DECLARATION IN 1963
17. "THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY TROOPS FROM CUBA
18. TO MOVE OFF THE ISLAND OF CUBA
19. IN ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ANY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
20. THIRD I AMESTABLISHING
21. A PERMANENT, FULL-TIME CARIBBEAN JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
22. AT KEY WEST, FLORIDA.
1. I WILL ASSIGN FORCES TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS NEEDED.
2. FROM ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES FOR EXERCISES.
3. RESPONSIBLE FOR EXPANDED PLANNING AND CONDUCTING EXERCISES.
4. THIS HEADQUARTERS UNIT
5. WILL EMPLOY DESIGNATED FORCES FOR ACTION, IF REQUIRED.
6. THIS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE
7. OUR CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND RESPOND RAPIDLY
8. TO ANY ATTEMPTED MILITARY ENCROACHMENT IN THE REGION.
9. FOURTH WE WILL EXPAND MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE REGION.
10. WE WILL CONDUCT THESE EXERCISES REGULARLY FROM NOW ON.
11. IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING-TREATY-RIGHTS.
12. THE UNITED STATES WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP OUR FORCES IN GUANTANAMO.
13. FIFTH, WE WILL INCREASE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
14. TO ALLEVIATE THE UNMET-ECONOMIC-AND-HUMAN NEEDS IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION.
15. TO ENSURE THE ABILITY OF TROUBLED PEOPLES TO RESIST SOCIAL TURMOIL AND POSSIBLE-COMMUNIST-DOMINATION.
16. THE UNITED STATES HAS A WORLDWIDE-INTEREST IN PEACE AND STABILITY.
1. ACCORDINGLY—I HAVE DIRECTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2. TO FURTHER ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF OUR
   RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES
3. TO PROTECT OUR OWN INTERESTS—
4. AND TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR HELP
5. FROM OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS./
6. WE MUST BE ABLE TO MOVE OUR GROUND—SEA-AND-AIR-UNITS
   TO DISTANT AREAS—RAPIDLY—
7. AND WITH ADEQUATE SUPPLIES./
8. WE HAVE REINFORCED OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN./
9. WE ARE ENHANCING OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY
10. IN ORDER TO MONITOR SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES—
11. BOTH IN CUBA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
12. WE WILL INCREASE OUR EFFORTS /
13. TO GUARD AGAINST DAMAGE /
14. TO OUR CRUCIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTION,
15. WITHOUT IMPAIRING CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
16. THESE STEPS REFLECT MY DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE PEACE,
17. TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCES,
18. AND TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. IN DEVELOPING THEM,
2. I HAVE CONSULTED NOT ONLY WITH MY OWN ADVISERS,
3. BUT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
4. AND WITH A BIPARTISAN GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED
   AMERICAN CITIZENS AS WELL.
5. THE DECISIONS ARE MY OWN,
6. AND I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM
7. AS PRESIDENT AND AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. *
8. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BRIGADE ISSUE
9. IS CERTAINLY NO REASON FOR A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR.
10. A CONFRONTATION MIGHT BE EMOTIONALLY SATISFYING
11. FOR A FEW DAYS OR A FEW WEEKS FOR SOME PEOPLE,
12. BUT IT WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST
13. AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. //
14. WE MUST CONTINUE THE BASIC POLICY
15. THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED FOR 20 YEARS,
16. UNDER SIX ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES --
17. A POLICY THAT RECOGNIZES
18. THAT WE ARE IN COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
   IN SOME FIELDS,
19. AND THAT WE SEEK COOPERATION IN OTHERS --
20. NOTABLY MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS.
1. MY FELLOW AMERICANS —
2. THE GREATEST DANGER TO AMERICAN-SECURITY-TONIGHT
3. IS CERTAINLY NOT THE TWO OR THREE THOUSAND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA.
4. THE GREATEST DANGER TO ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD,...
5. INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,...
6. IS THE BREAKDOWN OF A COMMON EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE PEACE,
8. I RENEW MY CALL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
9. TO RATIFY THE SALT II TREATY. //
10. SALT II IS A SOLID-TREATY. //
11. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TERMS
12. WILL NOT BE A MATTER OF TRUST. /
13. WE HAVE HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS,
14. CAREFULLY FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET UNION
15. TO ENSURE THAT THE TREATY-IS-VERIFIABLE.
16. THIS TREATY IS THE MOST-IMPORTANT-STEP-EVER-TAKEN.
17. TO CONTROL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS.
18. IT PERMITS US TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSE
19. AND TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE,
20. AT LOWER RISK AND COST.
1. DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS,
2. WE HAVE MADE REAL INCREASES IN OUR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
3. TO FULFILL THE GOALS OF OUR FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN.
4. WITH SALT II, WE CAN CONCENTRATE THESE INCREASES
5. IN AREAS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE MOST THREATENED,
6. AND WHERE DIRECT MILITARY CHALLENGE IS MOST LIKELY.

7. THE REJECTION OF SALT
8. WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE OUR NATION'S PEACE AND SECURITY.

9. OF COURSE WE HAVE DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS.
10. OF COURSE WE HAVE CONFLICTS WITH THEM.
11. IF WE DID NOT HAVE THOSE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS,
12. WE WOULD NOT NEED A TREATY
13. TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN US.

14. IF SALT II IS REJECTED,
15. THESE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS
16. COULD TAKE ON A NEW AND OMINOUS DIMENSION.

17. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF AN UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.
18. EVERY CONFRONTATION OR DISPUTE
19. COULD CARRY THE SEEDS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.
1. IN ADDITION, SALT II IS CRUCIAL TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
2. AND TO THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
3. OBVIOUSLY A SECURE EUROPE IS VITAL TO OUR OWN SECURITY.
4. THE LEADERS OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES
5. SUPPORT SALT II UNANIMOUSLY.
6. WE HAVE TALKED TO A NUMBER OF THOSE LEADERS
   IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.
7. I MUST TELL YOU TONIGHT
8. THAT IF THE SENATE FAILS TO APPROVE THE SALT TREATY,
9. THESE LEADERS AND THEIR COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFUSED
10. AND DEEPLY ALARMED.
11. IF OUR ALLIES SHOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY
12. TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY FOR THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
13. OUR EFFORT TO BUILD A STRONGER AND MORE UNITED NATO
    COULD FAIL.
14. I KNOW THAT FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
15. THIS IS A TROUBLING-AND-DIFFICULT-ISSUE
16. IN A TROUBLING-AND-DIFFICULT-TIME.
17. BUT THE SENATE HAS A TRADITION
18. OF BEING THE GREATEST DELIBERATIVE BODY IN THE WORLD;
19. AND THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING THE SENATE TODAY.
20. I AM CONFIDENT
21. THAT ALL SENATORS WILL PERFORM THEIR HIGH RESPONSIBILITIES
22. AS THE NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES.
1. Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.
2. We must not play politics with the security of the United States.
3. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race.
4. We must not play politics with SALT II.
5. It is much too important for that -- too vital
   to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.
6. The purpose of the SALT II Treaty,
7. and the purpose of my actions,
8. in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationships,
9. are exactly the same --
10. to keep our nation secure
11. and to maintain a world at peace.
12. As a powerful nation -- as a superpower --
13. we have special responsibilities to maintain stability,
14. even when there are serious disagreements among nations.
1. WE HAVE HAD FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION
   SINCE 1917.
2. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THESE DIFFERENCES. /
3. THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THEM SUCCESSFULLY
4. IS TO MAINTAIN AMERICAN UNITY,
   AMERICAN WILL
   AND AMERICAN STRENGTH. //
5. THAT IS WHAT I AM DETERMINED TO DO.
6. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE --
7. THE LONG, HARD STRUGGLE --
8. TO BRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ?
9. UNDER THE CONTROL OF HUMAN-REASON AND HUMAN-LAW --
10. IS THE CENTRAL DRAMA OF OUR AGE. //
11. AT ANOTHER TIME OF CHALLENGE IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY,
12. PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
13. "WE SHALL NOBLY SAVE,
14. OR MEANLY LOSE,
15. THE LAST-BEST-HOPE-OF-EARTH." #
16. WE CHOSE WISELY THEN, AND PRESERVED OUR UNION,
17. LET US CHOOSE WISELY NOW, AND PRESERVE OUR WORLD.
   #   #   #

    Electrostatic Copy Made
    for Preservation Purposes
1. **FIRM** Body

   **NO** SHIFTING.

2. Down in pitch ↓

3. Finish Phrase

4. Hand
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sat. 9:45

Zbig—
Re the speech:

1. Keep the emphasis on Soviet policy generally in the Third World, not on Cuba. People resent the Cuban brigade not in itself but as the last in a series of provocations—the straw that breaks the camel’s back. The President should talk about the camel, not the straw—at least that’s where his main emphasis should be.

2. The theme of the speech should be building up U.S. strength & power in response to the Soviet challenge. Then this theme can become the focus of the administration’s actions & statements in the next 12 months—building up that strength through defense, economic, military, & foreign policy actions. The speech’s legacy should be this unifying theme for everything we do.