

President's Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [2]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: President's Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [2]; Container 133

To See Complete Finding Aid:

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

Soviet - take
mil in Cuba & US
of concern

9/28/79
Draft THREE (A-1)

08

~~Brief
Reference to
Pope
Kippur,
peace~~

Proposed Report to the Nation on Soviet Troops in Cuba

and especially to discuss

This evening I

want

Fellow citizens, I have asked for this television time to
about the extremely important relationship
between our nation and the Soviet Union, ^{including} concerning
report to you on a number of issues ^{new} [connected with] the presence
of ^a [the] Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

~~This is not an ^{simple} [easy] subject. [I ask you to listen patiently,
because the information I want to present to you cannot be outlined
in a sentence or two.] I ask you to listen carefully, because the
issues at stake concern the security of our country and global
peace.~~

*This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both
the security of our country and global peace.*

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most
powerful nations ^{on earth.} [in the world.] The relations between us are
complex, because ^{there are} [they have] strong elements of both competition
and cooperation.

~~(As ^{as possible,} ~~very~~ early, ^{as possible,} ~~we~~ forge fully ^{as possible,} ~~we~~ itemize
our decision. "Not accept status quo". Not leave Ghou - Deal
up RDT. Inc def budget, etc -) otherwise, we'll lose the
audience's confidence~~

*Some believe this is artificial; others that the public must be prepared to deal with a long and difficult speech.

~~Also, early, state flatly that the ratification
of SALT is vital for US security, the stability (strength) of our
alliances, and world peace.~~

~~Tonight,~~ ^{explain} I want to ~~talk to you about~~ the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to ~~describe for you the actions [I am taking]~~ ^{which are being taken} to counter ~~report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to these activities.]~~ counter these activities.

And, I want to put these ^{issues} ~~problems~~ into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States ^{to be strong,} to ratify the Strategic Arms ^{to maintain peace, and} Limitation Treaty, ^{now before the Senate} and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons. //

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not ~~at this moment~~ confront any immediate, concrete threat that could ~~quickly~~ escalate into war. The United States is at peace ~~tonight~~ -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; *it is*
a challenge to our ~~and~~ *to meet* ~~determination~~ *[in standing up to]* Soviet competition. It is
 also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm,
to protect American interests without destroying the basis
 measured way ~~with a reasoned understanding of our true national~~
 for cooperation *which can maintain a peace and a combat nuclear weapons*
 interests.]

in P 3
 →

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba: ~~In~~

~~one of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War,~~
in the era of the Cold War

Seventeen years ago, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to
 introduce *offensive* nuclear ~~arms~~ *missiles and bombers* into Cuba. This direct threat to the
 United States *was met with a firm American response, and it* ended with the withdrawal of those nuclear ~~arms~~ *weapons.*

At the time of that 1962 *missile* crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet

military personnel in Cuba. *Most of* ~~The bulk of~~ them were also withdrawn,
and we monitored their departure. *not combat forces but were*
 Those that stayed behind, we believed, were [^]there to advise and

train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently,
~~[Then, about six weeks ago],~~ American intelligence obtained
^{persuasive}
~~[irrefutable]~~ evidence ~~[-- which had been accumulating for some~~
~~time --]~~ that a Soviet combat unit ^{was} ~~[was]~~ stationed in Cuba. ~~[Once~~
~~we established this beyond doubt.]~~ It was possible for our experts
to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data,
that this ^{organized} unit had been there ^{for several} ~~at least~~ ^{years,} ~~[since]~~ ^{during} 1976 and ^{probably} ~~[possibly]~~
^{longer.} ~~Probably since the mid-1970's.~~

^{appears to be.}
This unit ~~[is]~~ ^a ground combat brigade of two to three
~~thousand men. [It does not resemble any of the twenty or so~~
~~Soviet military advisory groups in other foreign countries.]~~ It
is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It ~~[is]~~
^{has been} ~~a~~ organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises ^{have been} ~~[are]~~ those
of a combat unit.

^{a large force not}
^{an assault}
This is not ~~[a large]~~ force. It presents no direct threat
to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast
to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U. S. is involved.

Nevertheless, ^{this} ~~the~~ Soviet ^{combat} brigade ^{in Cuba} is a serious matter.

It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American

region. It adds to the fears of ^{some} countries ~~in that area~~ that

they may ^{also (?)} ~~fall victim to~~ Soviet ^{come under} Cuban ^{or} ~~adventurism~~ ^{[interference] (?)} ~~in their~~ ^{pressure.} * It is

a closer part of ~~an intensifying~~ Soviet-Cuban military relationship which includes

~~including~~ the transfer of modern arms ^{to Cuba} and the ~~increased~~ presence of Soviet naval forces ^{in Cuban waters.} Finally, ~~it~~ ^{they} help ^{to} support a pattern

of ~~Soviet~~ ^{military} Cuban ^{in Africa and the Middle East.} interventions ~~and use of military force throughout the world.~~

^{at least} ~~This pattern dates back to 1975, when the Soviet Union launched a substantial program to build up Cuba's armed forces and to back Cuban intrusions into troubled areas of the world -- Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and elsewhere.]~~

*Lloyd believes this word is foreign-sounding.

~~Now, there are some 40,000 Cuban troops overseas. These troops are supported and armed by the Soviet Union.~~

*During the last few years
It is a matter of concern to us that Soviet*

~~Throughout this period, Russian military support of Cuba has been increasing. [The Soviet Union has provided Cuba with some one and three quarters billion dollars in military supplies. These supplies have included, for example, 280 advanced jet aircraft; some 100 naval vessels; 650 armored personnel carriers; and an entire naval port.] The result is~~

~~that Cuba now has the largest, best equipped armed forces in this [hemisphere] (→) [the Caribbean and Central American area], [except, of course, for our own]~~

~~The Cubans get [this Russian military help] free. [East other ^{Soviet} satellite countries Germany, Bulgaria and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries]~~

have to pay for their [Soviet] military supplies, but Cuba does not.

the socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; it

- 8 -

~~the necessary~~ ^{this} ~~is a Communist~~ ^{Country} [Cuba] cannot sustain

~~[This pattern holds true for Cuba's whole economy, itself. The Soviet Union, must send Mr. Castro ^{to Cuba} about which the Soviets subsidize to the tune of three billion eight million dollars, ^{in economic aid} every day! dollars a year. That is equal to a quarter of Cuba's entire gross national product.]~~

~~[Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms but he [and his Russian economic subsidy. He] has paid a much higher price than that. ^{Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the} [In effect, Mr. Castro has sold the independence Soviet Union. of his country to the Soviet Union.]~~

~~[Mr. Castro claims to be "non-aligned," but this is an absurd and obvious lie.] In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. [There is no more real difference between Soviet and Cuban foreign policy than between Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy.]~~

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

The Soviet brigade ~~[in Cuba]~~ is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of ^{Cuba} ~~[Mr. Castro]~~. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.)*

~~[We have been negotiating with the Soviet Union [over the past four weeks] for a resolution of the problems raised by the combat brigade in Cuba.~~

that the
I regret ~~[to report to you that the overall]~~ outcome of the negotiations ^{has been} ~~[must be viewed as]~~ unsatisfactory. ~~[The existing~~

~~Soviet combat capability in Cuba remains in place.] Together with this Soviet unit in Cuba, with the eagerness of Mr Castro [with the rapidly modernizing Cuban armed forces a shadow remains to intrude military forces into many other countries, a shadow not only upon the Caribbean and Central America, but upon all hands over the Caribbean region and over all the] troubled areas of the world, [in which the Soviets and Cubans~~

~~may seek to intrude.] We have made it clear to ^{brigade} ~~When the Soviet ~~com~~ combat unit was discovered, we notified the Soviet Union that this was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.~~~~

*Lloyd and Warren believe this whole section -- beginning on page 6 -- is given too much prominence, is peripheral or unrelated to the brigade issue and describes something we don't propose to do much about anyway.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this ~~is~~ issue ^{of the brigade} at great length with top Soviet officials. We have made it clear that the presence of a Soviet Combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

In the last few days, for the first time, the Soviets have ~~now~~ given us ^{these} specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

is not acceptable
We now have the terms
of the agreement

Unit

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

~~These~~ ^{new} assurances have been given to me

from the highest levels of the Soviet government. However, ~~most~~ they are significant, but they do not fully resolve this matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We will ~~monitor~~ ^{verify} compliance with ^{these assurances by} increased surveillance of Cuba, and we will assure with our own means that ^{no} Soviet ^{unit} force in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States.

We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The new assurances about the future status of the unit are

any other nation in this hemisphere.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

~~[I have therefore decided to take several appropriate measures -- and I am confident that in these actions I will have the support of the Congress and of you, the American people.]~~

~~[First, I want to affirm that it is the policy of the United States to oppose the deployment of Cuban or Soviet combat forces against any nation in this Hemisphere.]~~ ^{Others} ~~[Every nation] [in the]~~

^{Those nations} ~~[Hemisphere]~~ can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting ~~[any]~~ ^{a military} such threat _{from those other nations} from Soviet or Cuban forces.

~~Y~~ This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to

^{It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances} the Rio Treaty. ~~[It is an affirmation in new circumstances of of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 ~~that~~ John F. Kennedy's declaration on April 19, 1963, "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba~~

~~in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."]*~~

^{that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."}

*Zbig and Harold Brown believe this detracts from the uniqueness of your statement and can be used in the backgrounder. Warren and Lloyd think it is important to establish continuity with the past.

In order to ^{monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to} improve our capacity for rapid response to

~~Second, to improve our capacity to support this policy, I~~

~~Support this policy, ~~and~~ I~~

~~am ordering the following steps:~~

^{establish}

~~[We] will, [form] a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task~~

Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. ^{I will assign} ~~forces [will be~~

~~assigned] to this headquarters as necessary from all the military~~

services, ~~[With this new headquarters permanently]~~ responsible

for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment

of designated forces. ^{This will give us a substantially improved} ~~[we will gain a substantially improved~~

capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in

~~the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.]~~

~~Capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.~~

~~[As a companion measure, [I have, ^{also} ordered an expansion of] We will~~

~~expand military exercises in the region. [As a first step, I have added~~

to a previously planned naval training exercise an additional

phase in the region of our base in Guantanamo, Cuba. As a

~~further step, I have ordered the conduct of an amphibious~~

reinforcement exercise into Guantanamo in the near future,)

~~[involving approximately 1500 marines and 2000 naval personnel,~~

~~for a total exercise force of about 3500.] [A few years ago,~~

~~the United States withdrew approximately 1000 marines from the base and planned to substitute periodic reinforcement exercises~~

~~to assure the security of Guantanamo. Subsequently, however,~~

~~in an effort to improve relations with the Government of Cuba,~~

~~a decision was made to suspend these planned exercises.] [In~~

~~view of the Soviet ^{military} ~~combat~~ presence, ^{in Cuba} We will conduct~~ These exercises will be

conducted regularly from now on, and, of course,

~~[These and other measures which we will adopt as necessary]~~

~~[We will insure our continued capability to respond to any regional or external ^{threat to} [interference with] nations of the Western Hemisphere.~~

~~[More important, they underscore a crucial message -] [The United~~

~~States will stay in Guantanamo, ^{in accordance with existing treaty rights.}~~

develop a better

world-wide capacity to project our military forces. We must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

enlarging

We have already begun ~~upgrading~~ our ability to do this. *We will continue reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean and we have been preparing for some time.*

I have directed the Secretary of Defense, ~~in the course of preparing the budget for the next year, to~~ ~~insure that we~~

accelerate these efforts. *We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.*

~~For example, we will increase our capacity to airlift~~

~~without extensive reliance on staging bases, and to escort our sea-lifted forces. We will, of course, maintain the amphibious assault capability of the Marine Corps.~~

To supplement it, we will proceed with a program to procure so-called forward equipment ships, which can provide ~~our forces with heavy equipment in areas far from American bases.~~

~~I also intend to increase the level of exercises for
training and readiness of forces in the rapid deployment category.]~~


~~[Second,] We ^{shall also} ~~[must]~~ intensify our intelligence effort ~~[in regard]~~
to ^{monitor} Soviet and Cuban ^{military} ~~activities~~ ^{-- both in Cuba and} throughout the world. ~~[To~~~~

~~strengthen our capabilities in this area, I will be making
specific requests of the Congress in this sensitive area.] We
are ^{will increase} ~~[expediting our study of legislation]~~ ^{increasing our efforts} to guard against damage
to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing
civil and constitutional rights.~~

~~[Third, I am modifying our policy of restraint on arms
sales to exempt from the restrictions ^{countries which may be} ~~[any country]~~ menaced by
Soviet and Cuban military activities.]~~

preserve peace, strengthen to alliances, our allies, and to

These steps reflect my determination to defend the interests
of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with
Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan
group of distinguished American citizens. ^{However,} ~~The~~ ^{decisions are my}
~~own, and I take full responsibility for them as
President and Commander-in-Chief.~~



The new Soviet assurance, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment

~~[I am convinced that] [these measures] will meet the challenge~~

symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

~~[But a larger question has arisen. What does the presence~~

~~of the combat brigade mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Is it part of the long-standing mixture of competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union which requires vigilance, firmness and flexibility on our part? Or should it be the occasion for a fundamental change in that policy -- a moving away from efforts to build cooperation and a return to a policy of across-the-board confrontation -- a return to the Cold War?~~

~~I have considered this question carefully as well. I have consulted on it just as widely.]~~

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not ^{a *any* reason} ~~(the occasion)~~ for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of ~~[total]~~

confrontation. ^{for some ~~such~~ few, perhaps,} Such a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the [overall] national interest and the [overall] national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- the policy of [both] competition [and cooperation] with the Soviet Union in some ^{fields} areas, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

Obviously, ^{has increased} The Soviet brigade in Cuba increases the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, ^{[We are} ~~The~~ ^{deeply concerned about the military relationship between} Soviets have shown themselves insensitive to a number of our ~~the Soviet Union and Cuba and about their longstanding~~ concerns; and in addition to the steps I have outlined tonight, ~~and increasing policy for Cuban military forces, supplied~~ we will respond in kind to that insensitivity.]* ~~and encouraged by the Soviets, to intrude into the internal affairs of other countries in Africa and in other parts of the world.]~~

*Lloyd, Warren and Hedley think this is too threatening and breaks the flow of this section. Zbig and Harold Brown believe it is important to lay down this marker both with the Soviets and with the American people.

~~In spite of this concern,~~

but ^{But} ~~[But]~~ the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is ^{certainly} not ~~two or three thousand~~ ^a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not ~~even~~ ^{brigades} Cuban ~~[divisions]~~ ^{military} forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of ^a nuclear holocaust.

~~[That is why tonight]~~ I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are ^{now} increasing ⁱⁿ ~~[at~~ ^{real terms --} ~~3% per year]~~ -- on areas of greater need.

~~Finally, SALT II is the absolute prerequisite to further negotiations aimed at deep, mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals. All this has been established in months of exhaustive Senate hearings.~~

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

Furthermore -- ^{the rejection} ~~[and I ask you to listen particularly closely to this --] the abandonment~~ of SALT would seriously compromise our ^{nations peace and} security.

^{Sometimes} Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets, ~~[of even hostility, of course we have conflicts with them. course we have conflicts with them.]~~ If we did not have those ^{and conflicts,} disagreements ~~[and conflicts]~~, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

~~If SALT II is rejected,~~ ^{regional} a difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight ~~(-- the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba --)~~ ^{could} ~~[would]~~ ^{on} take a whole new ominous dimension. ~~]~~* Against

*Lloyd believes this greatly exaggerates the importance of the brigade issue. Hedley and Warren also favor removal. Claytor, Aaron and Hertzberg believe it helps tie the speech together and uses the SALT budget argument against the SALT opponents.

the background of an uncontrolled [~~unlimited~~] nuclear arms
 race, every ^{confrontation or dispute} ~~competitive element of U.S.-Soviet relations~~ would
 carry the seeds of ~~the ultimate horror~~ a nuclear ^{confrontation.} ~~war.~~

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and
 to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously, a secure Europe is
 vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support ^{the} SALT II --
 We
 unanimously. I have talked to a number of those leaders in
 the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if
 the Senate rejects ^{the treaty} SALT II, they and their countries would
 react with incomprehension and ^{deep alarm.} ~~concern~~. * The effort to
 build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have
 invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose
 momentum ^{or fail.}

[Handwritten scribbles and markings on the right side of the page, including a large 'X' and illegible text.]

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling
 and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But

*Rick Hertzberg favors "fright."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Hamilton Jordan

SUBJECT: Cuba Speech

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

You might consider confronting the politics/SALT linkage directly in the speech, in a way that claims the high ground. At the top of page 21 (Draft Three), you might add some language like this:

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this [^{extremely}extraordinarily] important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

A ~~I want you to know that I am not going to~~ ^{we must not} play politics with the security of the United States. ~~I am~~ ^{we must not} ~~not going to~~ play politics with the survival of the human race. ~~I am not going to~~ ^{we must not} play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too important to our Nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

(This suggestion comes out of a meeting I convened with Jerry Rafshoon, Tim Kraft, ~~Landon~~ Landon Butler, Pat Caddell, Rick Hertzberg, and Phil Wise.)

the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support. So

does ~~SALT II~~.

(A) →

~~[I say to the Senate and I say to you, the American people,~~
~~with all the urgency and conviction at my command, that] the~~
ratification of this treaty is in the ^{security} interest of the United
States, *and in the interest of world peace.*

~~[And I call upon you -- the American people -- to demand~~
of your Senators that they move swiftly to approve this absolutely
crucial bulwark against nuclear war.

~~[I call upon each and every one of you -- not as Republicans~~
or Democrats, but as Americans -- to write to the Senators from
your state and tell them that you want the SALT II Treaty
ratified. *7**]

*Everyone but Rick Hertzberg thinks these two paragraphs should be deleted.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower.

we have a special responsibility for
maintaining the peace.

I have no illusions about ~~ever~~
We have had fundamental ^{since 1917.}
differences with the Soviet Union, ~~but~~
→ them, but
the best way to accommodate these
differences is to maintain American
unity, ~~strength and resolve~~ American
will and American strength.

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight ^{Concerning Cuba} [~~in the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba~~] are exactly the same.

*a strong America and
a strong America and*

That purpose is ^a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our Nation and to all the nations of the earth. *That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.*

~~[This morning, Pope John Paul II arrived in our country.~~

He has come here, as he has traveled the globe, in the service of world peace. My fellow Americans, let us not disappoint him. Let us show him -- let us show each other -- let us show all humanity that the United States of America stands for justice, for reason, for faith -- and for peace.]*

#

Opposition

*Again, everybody but Rick thinks this should be out.

This might be of some help in your decision,

	<u>The Problem</u>	<u>Your Response</u>
Soviet-Cuban Military Threat in the Caribbean	Minor immediate issue	Central emphasis
Caribbean Socio-Political Problem	Major source of instability	Some response
Global Soviet-Cuban Military Activism	Key troubling issue in US-Soviet detente; most visible aspect of Soviet assertiveness	Hardly any

US Response

Costs to the US

Costs or Effects on Soviet Union

Public Perception

Speech

Acts not mentioned in the speech

DRAFT

(Sent to Brezhnev, et. al.)

This evening I want to report to you about the extremely important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, and especially to discuss a number of new issues concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations between us are complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

We compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.

It is important to both countries to reduce that danger through arms control agreements.

Recently a new element has been introduced into the (competitive side of) our relationship: we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not confront any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; it is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way to protect American interests without destroying the basis for cooperation which can maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.

I want to explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

And I want to put these issues into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to be strong, to maintain peace, and to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba:

Seventeen years ago, in the era of the Cold War the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States was met with a firm American response, and it ended with the

withdrawal of those nuclear weapons. At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were not combat forces but were there to advise and train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. It was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit had been there for several years, probably since the mid-1970s.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force nor an assault force.

It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure. It is part of a closer Soviet-Cuban military relationship which includes the transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters. Finally, the brigade may help support a pattern of Cuban military interventions in Africa and the Middle East.

During the last few years Soviet military support of Cuba has been increasing. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region.

The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies, but Cuba does not.

The Socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms but he has paid a much higher price than that. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.

We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this brigade was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. Now, the Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.

These new assurances have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The new assurances about the future status of the unit are significant. However, they do not fully resolve this matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

We will verify compliance with these assurances by increased surveillance of Cuba, and we will assure with our own means that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request from those other nations for assistance in meeting such a military threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I will establish a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces. This will give us a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.

We will expand military exercises in the region.

We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on and, of course, the United States will stay in Guantanamo in accordance with existing treaty rights.

To further insure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet economic and human needs.

And if we are to continue competing effectively with the Soviet Union, to preserve peace, and be prepared to protect our global interests, we will develop a better worldwide capacity to project our military forces. We must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun enlarging our ability to do this. We will continue reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts. We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

We shall also intensify our intelligence effort to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens. However, the decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.

The new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation. For some few, perhaps, a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- the policy of competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

The Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are now increasing in real terms -- on areas of greater need.

Furthermore, the rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, a regional difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II -- unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in

the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects the SALT Treaty, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm. The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum -- or fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support.

Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival

of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II.

It is much too important for that -- too important to our nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about them, but the best way to accommodate these differences is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight are exactly the same.

That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

#

DRAFT

This evening I want to report to you about the ^{its} ~~extremely~~ ^{and their bearing on} important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, ~~and especially to discuss a number of~~ ^{Some} ~~new issues concerning~~ the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject, because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations ^{hip} between us are ^{is} complex, because there are strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

~~[We compete with the Soviets around the world.]~~ Our philosophies conflict, ~~[in]~~ ~~fundamental~~ ~~ways~~ and quite often our interests conflict as well.

But what we share in common is an ~~[On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an]~~ overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

And that is why ~~the~~ ⁻²⁻ our nuclear arms control agreements
are so ~~it is~~ important to both countries, ~~to reduce that danger~~
~~through arms control agreements.~~

, however,
Recently ~~a new element has been introduced into the~~
(competitive side of) our relationship we have obtained
evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba
for several years. The presence of ^a Soviet combat troops in
Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not
^{face}
[confront] any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate
into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have
been ^{at peace} since I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. ~~It is a challenge to our~~
will, ~~It is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet~~
competition. It is ~~also~~ a challenge to our wisdom -- ^{a challenge to} our
ability to act in a firm, ^{decisive} ~~measured~~ way ~~to protect American~~
~~interests~~ without destroying the basis for cooperation
which ^{helps to} ~~can~~ maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.

Now let me

- 3 -

~~[I want to]~~ explain the specific problem of the
Soviet brigade in Cuba and ^{later describe} the general problem of Soviet-
Cuban military activism in the Third World.

I want to report what we are doing to resolve these
problems and to counter these activities.

And I want to put these issues into the context of our
overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains
essential for the United States to be strong, to maintain
peace, and to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
now before the Senate and to persevere in our efforts to
control nuclear weapons.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba:

As most of you know,

Seventeen years ago, in the era of the Cold War the Soviet Union

suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and

bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States

~~[was met with a firm American response, and it]~~ ended with the

Soviet agreement to

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

and a commitment not to
introduce offensive weapons
into Cuba thereafter.

withdrawal of those nuclear weapons, At the time of that

1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military

personnel in Cuba. Most of them were also withdrawn, and we

It was believed that
monitored their departure. Those that stayed behind [we believed]

were not combat forces but were there to advise and train

Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive

evidence that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba.

it
It was possible for our experts to conclude [through a] careful

when attention was
then focussed on a

review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit

had been there for several years, probably since the mid-1970s.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two
to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other
modern military equipment. It has been organized as a combat
unit, and its training exercises have been those of a combat
unit.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

This is not a large force nor an assault force.

It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. It adds to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

~~[It is part of a closer Soviet-Cuban military relationship which~~

includes] the transfer of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters. ^{strengthens the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.} [Finally,

the brigade may help support a pattern of Cuban military interventions in Africa and the Middle East.]

During the last few years Soviet ^{have been increasing} military [support of] ^{supplies to} Cuba ~~has been increasing~~. The result is that Cuba now has

one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region.

The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies, but Cuba does not.

The ^{Communist regime} ~~[Socialist economic experiment]~~ in Cuba ^{is an economic failure;} ~~[has failed]~~

it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms. but he has paid a much higher price. ~~[than that]~~. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. ~~[Mr. Castro is, in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.]~~

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.

TSP 7

Now

I want to report what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

... quo was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. Now, the Soviets have, for the first time, given us these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

Insert

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.

statements

These ~~[new assurances]~~ have been given to me from the

highest levels of the Soviet government. ^{TP Although} We are convinced that

^{in the past}

the unit has been a combat brigade, ^{still} the ~~[new assurances]~~ ^{statements} about

the ^{non-combat} future status of the unit are significant. ^{TP} However, ~~[they~~

~~do not fully resolve this matter]~~ ^{we} We shall not rest on these

Soviet ~~assurances~~ ^{statements} alone.

monitor the status of the Soviet forces

We will ~~[verify compliance]~~ ~~[with these assurances]~~ by

increased surveillance of Cuba. ~~[and]~~ We will assure ~~[with our~~

~~own means that]~~ no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a

combat force to threaten the security of the United States or

any other nations in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States

will act in response to a request ~~[from those other nations]~~

for assistance in meeting ^{any such} ~~[such]~~ ~~[a military]~~ threat from

Soviet or Cuban forces.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I ~~will establish~~ ^{am establishing} a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida

I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from

all the military services responsible for expanded planning ^{and} ~~exercising~~ ^{conducting} ~~and, if required, employment of designated forces,~~ ^{and, if required, employment of designated forces,} ~~for action if required.~~ ^{if This headquarters ^{unit} will}

This will ~~give us a~~ substantially improved ^{our} capability for

rapid response to any attempted ^{military} encroachment in the region.

~~by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.~~

*We intend to
expand our presence
in the Caribbean
increased funding
troops
deployment
of...*

We will expand military exercises in the region.

We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on and

~~of course,~~ the United States will stay in Guantanamo, ~~in~~

in accordance with existing treaty rights.

To further insure the ability of troubled Caribbean and Central American people to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate their unmet economic and human needs.

And if we are to continue competing effectively

with the Soviet Union, to preserve peace, and be prepared to protect our global interests, we must ensure that U.S. military strength is second to none. ~~we will develop a better~~

We will improve our worldwide capacity to project our military forces in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, and sea, and air units to distant areas --

rapidly and with adequate supplies.

are We have already increasing begun enlarging our ability to do this.

we have reinforced We will continue reinforcement of our naval presence in the

Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to accelerate these efforts. [~~We will never let United States military strength become inferior to that of the Soviet Union.~~]

We shall also intensify our intelligence effort to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources *of collection,* and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I ^{have} consulted ^{but} with Congressional leaders, *not only* with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens, ^{as well.} However, the decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

^{and the}
~~the~~ new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance
 to verify compliance, ^{and} ~~our~~ increased military commitment,
 will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in
 Cuba.

^{So}
~~And~~ I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute
 certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a
 return to the Cold War. [~~It is not the occasion for a policy~~
~~of confrontation.~~] ^{Such of confrontation} For some few, perhaps, ^A policy might be
 emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks ^{for some}
^{people,}
 but it would be enormously destructive to the national
 interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States
 has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of
^a ~~the~~ policy ^{that recognizes that we are in}
^{Cooperation and} of competition with the Soviet Union
^{that we seek to cooperate in others.. notably}
 in some fields, and ^{Cooperation in} ~~others~~ ^{notably} maintaining
 the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

The Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the competitive aspect of the U.S. Soviet relationship, but the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not ^{even} Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our ~~defense~~ ^{strategic deterrent} and

preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. *During the past few years, we have been increasing our defense expenditures in real terms each year. I plan further increases in the future to fulfill the goals of the Five Year Defense Plan. SALT II permits us to concentrate those increases in areas where direct military challenge is most likely.*

Although

~~The Soviet brigade in Cuba has increased the~~

competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, [but] the

~~effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.~~

The greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not ^{the} two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba.

Nor is it

~~it is not~~ Cuban military forces in Africa. The greatest

danger to all the nations of the world -- including the

United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of a

nuclear holocaust.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States

to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

highly sophisticated Compliance with its terms is not a matter of trust. We have *sophisticated* national technical means, carefully focused on the Soviet Union to insure that the treaty

SALT II is a solid treaty. ~~It~~ is verifiable. It is

the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic

nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and

preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost.

It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we

are now increasing in real terms -- on areas of greater need.

Furthermore, ^{the} rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets.

Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagree-ents and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us,

If SALT II is rejected, ^{these disagreements and} ~~[a regional difficulty such as~~
^{conflicts}
~~the one I have discussed tonight]~~ could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II -- unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in

the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if

^{fails to approve}
 the Senate ~~[rejects]~~ the SALT Treaty, ^{these leaders} they and their countries ^{should}
 be confused and deeply alarmed. ^{If our allies lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons,}
~~would [react with incomprehension and deep alarm], the effort~~
^{a stronger and more united}
 to build ~~[up and modernize]~~ NATO ~~[-- an effort in which we have~~ ^{invested so much time, money and attention --] would lose}
~~momentum -- or] fail.~~

^{1st} I know that for Members of Congress, this ~~[is a troubling~~
^{Leave sentence as is} ~~and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time.]~~ ^{been an easy issue} ~~But~~
~~the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support.]~~

Unfortunately, every four years the political season
 seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence
 in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's
 consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the
 United States. We must not play politics with the survival

of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II.

It is much too important for that -- too ^{vital} ~~important~~ to our ^{country} ~~nation~~, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining ^{stability even when} ~~the peace~~ there are ^{serious disagreements} ~~differences~~ among nations.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about ^{these differences,} ~~them~~, but the best way to ^{deal with} ~~accommodate~~ ^{them} ~~these differences~~ ^{successfully} is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of ^{ratifying the} ~~SALT II~~ and the purpose of the actions being taken in dealing with ^{the} ~~Soviet~~ troops in Cuba ~~I have outlined tonight~~ are exactly the same.

That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

#

DRAFT

This evening I want to report to you about the extremely important relationship between our nation and the Soviet Union, and ~~especially to discuss a number of new issues concerning~~ the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

This is not a simple or easy subject because the issues affect both the security of our country and global peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on earth. The relations between us ^{ship} ~~are~~ ^{is} complex, ~~because~~ ^{it has} strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

We compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often our interests conflict as well.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war.

as two great nations do have common interests and

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

It is important to both countries to reduce that danger through arms control agreements.

Recently a new element has been introduced into the competitive side of our relationship: we have obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not confront any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war. The United States is at peace -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

The Soviet brigade reminds us that

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will; it is a challenge to our determination to meet Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, measured way to protect American interests without destroying the basis for cooperation which can maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons.

and a commitment ^{not to introduce} to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.

to withdrawal of those nuclear weapons, At the time of that

1962 missile crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, ^{including ground combat units guarding the missile bases.} Most of them were also withdrawn, and we

~~monitored their departure.~~ Those that stayed behind, we believed,

were not combat forces but were there to advise and train

Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive

^{is now}

evidence that a Soviet combat unit ~~was~~ stationed in Cuba.

It was possible for our experts to conclude, through a careful

review of past intelligence data, that this organized unit

? had been there ~~for several years,~~ probably since the mid-1970s, ~~and perhaps earlier.~~ ^{possibly as early as} and perhaps since the late 1960's.

This unit appears to be a ground combat brigade of two

to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks and other

modern military equipment. ^{Its organization} ~~it has been organized as a combat~~

^{are}

^{an characteristic}

~~unit,~~ and its training exercises ~~have been those~~ of a combat

unit.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

~~The Cubans get these weapons free. Other Soviet
satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies,
but Cuba does not.~~

~~The ^{Communist regime} Socialist economic experiment in Cuba has failed; ^{is an economic} failure;~~
it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba
about eight million dollars in economic aid every day!

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms
but he has paid a much higher price than that. In every
international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba
automatically follows the Soviet line. ~~Mr. Castro is,~~
~~in effect, a puppet of the Soviet Union.~~

The Soviet brigade is the latest manifestation of
Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that
dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that
the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.

Vance / Cutler
want the page cut.

Apparently prefer deletion
of entire page

We have made it clear to the Soviet Union that this brigade was a matter of serious concern to us, and that the status quo was not acceptable.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials. *In the course of the* ~~Now, the Soviets~~

discussion, we have ~~for the first time~~ *received* ~~given us~~ these specific assurances with respect to this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training, and can do nothing more;

-- That they will not change its function or status as a training center;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation;

-- That they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional capabilities; and

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 agreement not to station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it in the future.

Substitute

These ~~now~~ assurances have been given to me from the highest levels of the Soviet government. We are convinced that the unit has been a combat brigade. The ~~now~~ assurances about the future status of the unit are significant. However, they do not fully resolve this matter. We shall not rest on these Soviet assurances alone.

First,

*protect our interest and the security of our friends
 protect our interest and the security of our friends*

We will ~~verify compliance with these assurances by~~

increased surveillance of Cuba. ~~and~~ We will assure with our own means that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request ~~from these other nations~~ ^{any nation in this hemisphere} for assistance in meeting ^{any} ~~a military~~ threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

Second

In order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support this policy, I ^{am} ~~will~~ ^{ing} establish a permanent, full-time

Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida

I will assign forces to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services, it will be responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces.

This will give us a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region

(by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.)

Vance favors omission.

The new Soviet assurances, our increased surveillance to verify compliance, and our increased military commitment will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not a reason for a return to the Cold War. ~~It is not the occasion for a policy of confrontation.~~ ~~of confrontation.~~ For some few, perhaps, a policy ^{of confrontation} might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks.

But it would be enormously destructive to the national interest and the national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- ^a ~~the~~ the recognition that we are in the policy of competition with the Soviet Union ^{the US can seek to cooperate} in some fields, and ~~cooperation~~ in others -- notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

Furthermore, the rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us,

If SALT II is rejected, ~~a regional difficulty such as~~ ^{these disagreements and} ~~the one I have discussed tonight~~ ^{conflict} could take on a whole new ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II -- unanimously. We have talked to a number of those leaders in

the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate ~~rejects~~ ^{fails to approve} the SALT Treaty, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and deep alarm. The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum -- or fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. ^{The} ~~our~~ ^{on pressures} ~~to treat this as a political issue.~~
~~the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support.~~

7
Unfortunately, every four years the political season seems to begin earlier and earlier. We have all seen evidence in recent weeks that politics is interfering with the Senate's consideration of this extremely important and serious issue.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.

We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival

of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too important to our nation, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- we have a special responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about ~~them~~ ^{these differences} but the best way to accommodate these differences is to maintain American unity, American will and American strength.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight are exactly the same.

That purpose is a strong America and a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our nation and to all the nations on the earth.

That is what we want. That, God willing, is what we shall have.

* * *

1. I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU →
2. ABOUT THE SUBJECT THAT IS MY-HIGHEST-CONCERN —
3. AS IT HAS BEEN FOR EVERY PRESIDENT. //
4. THAT SUBJECT IS ^{PEACE AND} THE SECURITY-OF-THE-UNITED STATES. //
5. WE ARE AT PEACE TONIGHT —
6. AS WE HAVE BEEN AT PEACE THROUGHOUT THE TIME OF MY SERVICE
IN THIS OFFICE. //
7. THE PEACE-WE ENJOY IS THE PEACE-OF-THE-STRONG. //
8. OUR NATIONAL DEFENSES ARE UNSURPASSED-IN-THE-WORLD. /
9. { THOSE DEFENSES ARE STRONGER-TONIGHT →
10. { THAN THEY WERE TWO-YEARS-AGO:
11. { THEY WILL BE STRONGER-TWO-YEARS-FROM NOW)
12. { THAN THEY ARE TONIGHT —
13. { BECAUSE OF CAREFULLY-PLANNED-IMPROVEMENTS →
14. { THAT ARE GOING FORWARD
15. { WITH YOUR SUPPORT —
16. { AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF CONGRESS.
17. { OUR PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZING AND STRENGTHENING →
18. { THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE N.A.T.O. ALLIANCE →
19. { IS ON TRACK,
20. WITH THE FULL COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION OF
OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. //

1. { OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ARE POWERFUL ENOUGH →
2. { TO DESTROY ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY, MANY TIMES OVER,
3. { AND THE INVULNERABILITY OF THOSE FORCES. →
4. { WILL SOON BE FURTHER ASSURED →
5. { BY A NEW SYSTEM OF POWERFUL MOBILE MISSILES.
THESE SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED FOR STABILITY AND DEFENSE
6. BYOND THESE MILITARY DEFENSES,
7. WE ARE ON-THE-THRESHOLD-OF A GREAT ADVANCE-IN THE
CONTROL-OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS --
8. THE ADOPTION OF THE SECOND
STRATEGIC-ARMS LIMITATION TREATY, SALT II. //
9. { THIS EVENING I ALSO WANT TO REPORT TO YOU →
10. { ABOUT THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA —
11. { AND ABOUT ITS BEARING →
12. { ON THE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OUR NATION AND THE SOVIET UNION. //
13. THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE OR EASY SUBJECT. //
14. { THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION →
15. { ARE THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NATIONS ON EARTH,
16. AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US IS COMPLEX —
17. { BECAUSE IT INVOLVES STRONG ELEMENTS
18. { OF BOTH COMPETITION-AND-COOPERATION.

1. ~~OUR FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES CONFLICT~~ —
2. QUITE OFTEN OUR INTERESTS ~~CONFLICT AS WELL~~. //

NATIONAL

3. { AS TWO GREAT NATIONS,
4. { WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS →
5. { AND SHARE AN OVERWHELMING MUTUAL CONCERN
6. { IN PREVENTING A NUCLEAR WAR.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

7. { WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEREFORE,
8. { THAT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS →
9. { ARE VITAL TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES,
10. { AND THAT WE MUST ALSO EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT IN OUR RELATIONS →
11. { AND BE SENSITIVE TO EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS. ✕

✕

12. { RECENTLY WE OBTAINED EVIDENCE →
13. { THAT A SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE HAS BEEN IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
14. { THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA,
15. { IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US.

16. I WANT TO REASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET /
17. THAT WE DO NOT FACE ANY IMMEDIATE CONCRETE THREAT →
18. THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO WAR OR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION. //

19. BUT WE DO FACE A CHALLENGE. //
20. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO OUR WISDOM, ...
21. A CHALLENGE TO OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN A FIRM, DECISIVE WAY, ↘
22. { WITHOUT DESTROYING THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION →
23. { THAT HELPS TO MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE →
24. { AND CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

→

1. { IT IS A CHALLENGE-TO-OUR-DETERMINATION →
2. { TO GIVE A MEASURED AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE →
3. { TO SOVIET COMPETITION →
4. AND TO CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AROUND THE WORLD. ✕
5. NOW LET ME EXPLAIN THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM
OF THE SOVIET BRIGADE →
6. AND DESCRIBE THE MORE GENERAL PROBLEM
OF SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVISM
IN THE THIRD WORLD. ✕
7. HERE IS THE BACKGROUND ON SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA: /
8. AS MOST OF YOU KNOW,
9. 17 YEARS AGO IN THE ERA OF THE COLD WAR,
10. { THE SOVIET UNION SUDDENLY ATTEMPTED →
11. { TO INTRODUCE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND BOMBERS
INTO CUBA. //
12. THIS DIRECT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
13. ENDED WITH THE SOVIET AGREEMENT →
14. TO WITHDRAW THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
15. AND A COMMITMENT →
16. NOT TO INTRODUCE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA THEREAFTER. //
17. AT THE TIME OF THAT 1962 MISSILE CRISIS,
18. THERE WERE MORE THAN 20,000 SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA.

1. MOST OF THEM WERE ~~WITHDRAWN~~ WITHDRAWN .
2. AND WE MONITORED THEIR DEPARTURE. /
3. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND
4. WERE NOT COMBAT FORCES,
5. BUT WERE THERE TO ADVISE AND TRAIN CUBANS
6. AND TO PERFORM INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS. /

7. JUST RECENTLY
8. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE
9. { THAT SOME OF THESE SOVIET FORCES →
10. { HAD BEEN ORGANIZED INTO A COMBAT UNIT.
11. WHEN ATTENTION WAS THEN FOCUSED →
12. ON A CAREFUL REVIEW OF PAST INTELLIGENCE DATA,
13. IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR OUR EXPERTS TO CONCLUDE
14. THAT THIS UNIT HAD EXISTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. —
15. PROBABLY SINCE THE MID-1970's —
16. AND POSSIBLY EVEN LONGER. //

17. THIS UNIT APPEARS TO BE A BRIGADE-OF-TWO-TO-THREE-THOUSAND-MEN.
18. IT IS ARMED WITH ABOUT 40 TANKS ?
19. AND OTHER MODERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
20. IT HAS BEEN ORGANIZED AS A COMBAT-UNIT.
21. ITS TRAINING EXERCISES HAVE BEEN THOSE OF A COMBAT-UNIT.

1. THIS IS NOT A LARGE FORCE,
2. NOR AN ASSAULT FORCE.
3. IT PRESENTS NO DIRECT THREAT TO US.
4. IT HAS NO AIRBORNE OR SEABORNE CAPABILITY.
5. IN CONTRAST TO THE 1962 CRISIS,
6. NO NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE U.S. IS INVOLVED. //

7. NEVERTHELESS THIS SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA
IS A-SERIOUS-MATTER.
8. IT CONTRIBUTES TO TENSION IN
THE CARIBBEAN-AND-CENTRAL-AMERICAN REGION,
9. THE DELIVERY OF MODERN ARMS TO CUBA
10. AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN CUBAN WATERS →
11. HAVE STRENGTHENED THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. /
12. ~~AND~~ THEY HAVE ADDED TO THE FEARS OF SOME COUNTRIES
THAT THEY MAY COME UNDER SOVIET OR CUBAN PRESSURE. *

13. DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS,
14. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN-INCREASING-THE-DELIVERY-OF
MILITARY-SUPPLIES-TO-CUBA.

15. THE RESULT IS →
16. THAT CUBA NOW HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST, BEST EQUIPPED
ARMED FORCES IN THIS REGION. //

1. THESE MILITARY FORCES
2. ARE USED TO INTRUDE INTO OTHER COUNTRIES
IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. //
3. THERE IS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
4. BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION. /
5. THE CUBANS-GET THEIR WEAPONS FREE. /
6. OTHER SOVIET SATELLITE COUNTRIES
7. HAVE-TO-PAY-FOR-THEIR-MILITARY-SUPPLIES. // (C) (C) //
8. THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CUBA IS AN ECONOMIC FAILURE;
9. IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ITSELF. //
10. THE SOVIET UNION MUST SEND TO CUBA
11. ABOUT \$8 MILLION IN ECONOMIC AID EVERY DAY!
12. FIDEL CASTRO DOES NOT PAY MONEY FOR RUSSIAN ARMS: ~~but~~
13. THE CUBAN PEOPLE PAY A-MUCH-HIGHER-PRICE. *
14. IN EVERY-INTERNATIONAL-DISPUTE,
15. ON EVERY INTERNATIONAL -ISSUE,
16. THE CUBAN REGIME AUTOMATICALLY-FOLLOWS-THE-SOVIET-LINE.
17. THE SOVIET BRIGADE →
18. IS A MANIFESTATION OF MOSCOW'S DOMINANCE OF CUBA. /
19. IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF THAT DOMINANCE,...
20. AND IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY →
21. THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST TAKE
22. FOR ESCALATING CUBAN MILITARY ACTIONS ABROAD.

*/

1. NOW I WANT TO REPORT FURTHER
2. ON WHAT WE ARE DOING TO RESOLVE-~~THESE~~ PROBLEMS
3. AND TO COUNTER-~~THESE~~-ACTIVITIES. /
4. OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS
5. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE AT GREAT LENGTH
6. WITH TOP SOVIET OFFICIALS.
7. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR
8. THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMBAT UNIT IN CUBA
9. IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US. //
10. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ADMIT
11. THAT THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A COMBAT UNIT.
12. HOWEVER THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CERTAIN STATEMENTS
TO US WITH RESPECT TO OUR CONCERN:
13. --THAT THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A TRAINING-CENTER,
14. THAT IT DOES NOTHING MORE THAN TRAINING,
15. AND CAN DO NOTHING MORE:
16. --THAT THEY WILL NOT
17. CHANGE ITS FUNCTION OR STATUS AS A TRAINING CENTER. //
18. WE UNDERSTAND THIS TO MEAN
19. THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ENLARGE THE UNIT
20. OR GIVE IT-ADDITIONAL-CAPABILITIES;

- 9 -

THEY HAVE SAID

1. --THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA
2. ARE-NOT-AND-WILL-NOT-BE
3. A THREAT TO THE U.S. _____
4. OR TO ANY-OTHER ~~STATE~~ NATION.

5. --THAT THEY REAFFIRM THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING
6. AND THE MUTUALLY-AGREED-CONFIRMATION-OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IN 1970,
7. ~~NOT TO STATION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA.~~
8. AND WILL ABIDE BY IT IN THE FUTURE. //

9. WE FOR OUR PART,
10. RECONFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING. //

11. THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ME
12. FROM THE HIGHEST-LEVEL-OF-THE-SOVIET-GOVERNMENT. //

13. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT
14. THE UNIT HAS BEEN A COMBAT BRIGADE,
15. THE SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE
16. NON-COMBAT STATUS OF THE UNIT
17. ARE SIGNIFICANT. //

18. HOWEVER WE SHALL NOT REST
19. ON THESE SOVIET STATEMENTS ALONE.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

1. FIRST WE WILL MONITOR THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET FORCES
2. BY INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA.
3. SECOND, WE WILL ASSURE →
4. THAT NO SOVIET UNIT IN CUBA
5. CAN BE USED AS A COMBAT FORCE →
6. TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
7. OR ANY-OTHER-NATION, IN THIS HEMISPHERE.
8. THOSE NATIONS CAN BE CONFIDENT
9. THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ACT ↘
10. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
11. TO MEET ANY SUCH THREAT FROM SOVIET OR CUBAN FORCES.
12. THIS POLICY IS CONSISTENT-WITH-OUR-RESPONSIBILITIES ↘
13. AS A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
14. AND A PARTY TO THE RIO TREATY. /
15. IT IS A REAFFIRMATION IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
16. OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S DECLARATION IN 1963
17. "THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY TROOPS -FROM-CUBA
18. TO MOVE OFF THE ISLAND -OF-CUBA
19. IN ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ANY-NEIGHBORING-COUNTRIES. ✕
20. THIRD I AM ESTABLISHING
21. A PERMANENT, FULL-TIME CARIBBEAN JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
22. AT KEY WEST, FLORIDA.

1. I WILL ASSIGN FORCES TO THIS HEADQUARTERS ~~AS NECESSARY~~,
2. FROM ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES →
3. RESPONSIBLE FOR EXPANDED PLANNING AND ^{FOR} CONDUCTING EXERCISES. /
4. THIS HEADQUARTERS UNIT
5. WILL EMPLOY DESIGNATED FORCES FOR ACTION, IF REQUIRED. /
6. THIS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE →
7. OUR CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND RESPOND RAPIDLY
8. TO ANY ATTEMPTED MILITARY ENCROACHMENT IN THE REGION. //
9. FOURTH WE WILL EXPAND MILITARY ~~EXERCISES~~ ^{MANEUVERS} IN THE REGION.
10. WE WILL CONDUCT THESE [EXERCISES] REGULARLY FROM NOW ON.
11. IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING-TREATY-RIGHTS, ↘
12. THE UNITED STATES WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP-OUR-FORCES ↘
IN-GUANTANAMO. //
13. FIFTH, WE WILL INCREASE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ,
14. TO ALLEVIATE THE UNMET-ECONOMIC-AND-HUMAN NEEDS
IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION / →
15. AND FURTHER, TO ENSURE THE ABILITY OF TROUBLED PEOPLES →
16. TO RESIST SOCIAL TURMOIL AND POSSIBLE-COMMUNIST-DOMINATION. //
17. THE UNITED STATES HAS-A-WORLDWIDE-INTEREST
IN-PEACE-AND-STABILITY.

1. ACCORDINGLY—I HAVE DIRECTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2. TO FURTHER ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF OUR
RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES ↗
3. TO PROTECT OUR OWN INTERESTS —
4. AND TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR HELP
5. FROM OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. //
6. WE MUST BE ABLE TO MOVE OUR GROUND, SEA AND AIR UNITS
TO DISTANT AREAS -- RAPIDLY--
7. AND WITH ADEQUATE SUPPLIES. //
8. WE HAVE REINFORCED OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. //
9. WE ARE ENHANCING OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY
10. IN ORDER TO MONITOR SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES --
11. BOTH IN CUBA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
12. WE WILL INCREASE OUR EFFORTS /
13. TO GUARD AGAINST DAMAGE ↘
14. TO OUR CRUCIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTION,
15. WITHOUT IMPAIRING CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. #
16. THESE STEPS REFLECT MY DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE PEACE,
17. TO STRENGTHEN-OUR-ALLIANCES,
18. AND TO DEFEND-THE-INTERESTS-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

1. IN DEVELOPING THEM,
2. I HAVE CONSULTED NOT ONLY WITH MY OWN ADVISERS,
3. BUT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
4. AND WITH A BIPARTISAN GROUP-OF-DISTINGUISHED
AMERICAN CITIZENS AS WELL.
5. THE DECISIONS ARE MY OWN,
6. AND I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM
7. AS PRESIDENT AND AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. ✖
8. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BRIGADE ISSUE
9. IS CERTAINLY NO REASON FOR A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR.
10. A CONFRONTATION MIGHT BE EMOTIONALLY SATISFYING
11. FOR A FEW DAYS OR ~~A FEW~~ WEEKS FOR SOME PEOPLE,
12. BUT IT WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE-TO-THE-NATIONAL-INTEREST
13. AND THE ~~NATIONAL~~ SECURITY-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES. //
14. WE MUST-CONTINUE-THE-BASIC-POLICY
15. THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED FOR 20 YEARS,
16. UNDER SIX ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES --
17. A POLICY THAT RECOGNIZES
18. THAT WE ARE IN COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
IN SOME FIELDS,
19. AND THAT WE SEEK COOPERATION IN OTHERS --
20. NOTABLY MAINTAINING-THE-PEACE AND CONTROLLING-NUCLEAR-ARMS.

✖

1. MY FELLOW AMERICANS —
2. THE GREATEST DANGER TO AMERICAN-SECURITY-TONIGHT
3. IS CERTAINLY NOT THE TWO OR THREE THOUSAND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA.
4. THE GREATEST DANGER TO ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD,...
5. INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,...
6. IS THE BREAKDOWN OF A COMMON EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE PEACE,
7. AND THE ULTIMATE-THREAT-OF-A-NUCLEAR-WAR. //

8. I RENEW MY CALL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
9. TO RATIFY THE SALT II TREATY. //

10. SALT II IS A SOLID-TREATY. //
11. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TERMS
12. WILL NOT BE A MATTER OF TRUST. /

13. WE HAVE HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS,
14. CAREFULLY FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET UNION
15. TO ENSURE THAT THE TREATY-IS-VERIFIABLE.

16. THIS TREATY IS THE MOST-IMPORTANT-STEP-EVER-TAKEN.
17. TO CONTROL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS.

18. IT PERMITS US TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSE
19. AND TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE,
20. AT LOWER RISK AND COST.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

1. DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS,
2. WE HAVE MADE REAL INCREASES IN OUR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
3. TO FULFILL THE GOALS OF OUR FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN.

4. WITH SALT II, WE CAN CONCENTRATE THESE INCREASES
5. IN AREAS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE MOST THREATENED,
6. AND WHERE DIRECT MILITARY CHALLENGE IS MOST LIKELY. /

7. THE REJECTION OF SALT
8. WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE OUR NATION'S PEACE AND SECURITY. //

9. OF COURSE WE HAVE DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. /
10. OF COURSE WE HAVE CONFLICTS WITH THEM. /

11. IF WE DID NOT HAVE THOSE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS,
12. WE WOULD NOT NEED A TREATY ↗
13. TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN US. //

14. IF SALT II IS REJECTED,
15. THESE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS
16. COULD TAKE ON A NEW AND OMINOUS DIMENSION. /

17. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF AN UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,
18. EVERY CONFRONTATION OR DISPUTE ↗
19. COULD CARRY THE SEEDS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. //

1. IN ADDITION, SALT II IS CRUCIAL TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
2. AND TO THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
3. OBVIOUSLY A SECURE EUROPE IS VITAL TO OUR OWN SECURITY. //
4. THE LEADERS OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES
5. SUPPORT SALT II UNANIMOUSLY.
6. WE HAVE TALKED TO A NUMBER OF THOSE LEADERS
IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

7. I MUST TELL YOU TONIGHT
8. THAT IF THE SENATE FAILS TO APPROVE THE SALT TREATY,
9. THESE LEADERS AND THEIR COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFUSED
10. AND DEEPLY ALARMED. /
11. IF OUR ALLIES SHOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE / IN OUR ABILITY →
12. TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY FOR THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
13. OUR EFFORT TO BUILD A STRONGER AND MORE UNITED NATO

COULD FAIL. #

x x x

14. I KNOW THAT FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
15. THIS IS A TROUBLING-AND-DIFFICULT-ISSUE
16. IN A-TROUBLING-AND-DIFFICULT-TIME.
17. BUT THE SENATE HAS A TRADITION
18. OF BEING THE GREATEST DELIBERATIVE BODY IN THE WORLD;
19. AND THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING THE SENATE TODAY.
20. I AM CONFIDENT
21. THAT ALL SENATORS WILL PERFORM THEIR HIGH RESPONSIBILITIES
22. AS THE NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES.

#

1. POLITICS-AND-NUCLEAR-ARSENALS-DO-NOT-MIX. ✓
2. WE MUST ~~NOT-PLAY~~ POLITICS WITH THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
3. WE MUST ~~NOT-PLAY~~ POLITICS WITH THE
SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN RACE.
4. WE MUST NOT ~~PLAY~~ POLITICS WITH SALT II. //
5. IT IS MUCH TOO IMPORTANT FOR THAT -- TOO VITAL
 { TO OUR COUNTRY,
 { TO OUR ALLIES,
 { AND TO THE CAUSE
 { OF PEACE. ✕
6. THE PURPOSE OF THE SALT II TREATY,
7. AND THE PURPOSE OF MY ACTIONS, →
8. IN DEALING WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS,
9. ARE EXACTLY THE SAME --
10. TO KEEP-OUR-NATION-SECURE ✓
11. AND TO-MAINTAIN-A-WORLD-AT-PEACE. ✕
12. AS A POWERFUL NATION -- AS A SUPERPOWER -- ✓
13. WE HAVE ~~IS~~ SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO MAINTAIN STABILITY,
14. EVEN WHEN THERE ARE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS AMONG NATIONS.

1. WE HAVE HAD FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION
SINCE 1917.
2. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THESE DIFFERENCES. /
3. THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THEM SUCCESSFULLY
4. IS TO MAINTAIN AMERICAN UNITY,
AMERICAN WILL
AND AMERICAN STRENGTH. //
5. THAT IS WHAT-I-AM-DETERMINED-TO-DO.
x x x
6. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE --
7. THE LONG, HARD STRUGGLE --
8. TO BRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION →
9. UNDER THE CONTROL OF HUMAN-REASON AND HUMAN-LAW --
10. IS THE CENTRAL-DRAMA-OF-OUR-AGE. //
11. AT ANOTHER TIME OF CHALLENGE IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY,
12. PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
13. "WE SHALL NOBLY-SAVE,
14. OR MEANLY-LOSE,
15. THE LAST-BEST-HOPE OF EARTH." #
16. WE ^{ACTED} ~~CHOOSE~~ WISELY THEN, AND PRESERVED ^{THE} ~~OUR~~ UNION. /
17. LET US ^{ACT} ~~CHOOSE~~ WISELY NOW, / AND PRESERVE ^{THE} ~~OUR~~ WORLD.

#

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

x 0

1. FIRM BODY

2. NO SHIFTING.
Down in pitch ↓

3 - FINISH PHRASE

4 - ~~HAND~~

Saturday a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2 big -

Re the speech:

1. Keep the emphasis on Soviet policy generally in the third world, not on Cuba. People resent the Cuban brigade not in itself but as the last in a series of provocations - the straw that breaks the camel's back. The President should ~~be~~ talk about the camel, not the straw - at least, that's where his main emphasis should be.
2. The Theme of the speech should be building up US strength & power, in response to the Soviet challenge. Then this theme can become the focus of the administration's actions & statements in the next 12 months - building up that strength through domestic economic, military, & foreign policy actions. The speech's legacy should be this unifying theme for everything we do. 100