

President's Address to the Nation, RE: Soviet Brigade in Cuba, 10/1/79 [4]

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Tonight I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern ^{for} as it has been [the highest ~~concern of~~] every President. That subject is the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throuout ^{gh} the time of my service in this office. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed-in-the-world. Those defenses are stronger ^{today} tonight than they were two years ago; they will be stronger two years from now ^{today} than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward with-your-support and with-the-support-of-Congress.

Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO alliance [→] is-on-track, with-the-full-cooperation-and-participation-of our European allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough

to destroy any potential-adversary many times over, and
 the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further
 assured by a new system of powerful mobile missiles.

Beyond these military defenses, ~~and for the first time,~~
 we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control
 of nuclear weapons -- the adoption of the second
 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, ~~the~~ SALT II.

This evening I also want to report to you about the
 highly publicized Soviet brigade in Cuba and about its
 bearing on the important relationship between our nation
 and the Soviet Union. #

This is not a simple or easy subject. #

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two
 most powerful nations on earth, ~~and the~~ ^{and the} relationship between
 us is complex, ~~because~~ ^{IAH it involves} because there are strong elements of both
 competition and cooperation. #

Our fundamental philosophies conflict, and quite
often our interests conflict as well. //

~~BUT~~ AS TWO GREAT NATIONS, WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS /
 AND SHARE AN OVERWHELMING MUTUAL CONCERN / IN PREVENTING A
 NUCLEAR WAR. / WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEREFORE / THAT NUCLEAR ARMS
 CONTROL AGREEMENTS / ARE VITAL TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. / ^{that} AND WE
 MUST ALSO EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT IN OUR RELATIONS / AND BE
 SENSITIVE TO EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS.

Recently [~~however,~~] we have obtained evidence / that a
 Soviet-combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years. //

The presence of Soviet-combat troops in Cuba / is of serious -
concern to us. #

I want to reassure you at the outset / that we do not -
face any immediate, concrete threat / that could escalate
 into war, *or a major confrontation. //*

But we do face a challenge. / It is a challenge to our -
 wisdom -- a challenge to our ability to act in a firm,
decisive way / without destroying the basis for cooperation /

~~that~~ which helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It is a challenge to our determination to give a measured and effective response to Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world. #

Now let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade and ~~later~~^{more} describe the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba: As most of you know, 17 years ago in the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement to withdraw those nuclear weapons, and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter. X

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were ~~some~~^{More than} 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them

were also withdrawn / (and) we monitored their departure. /

It was believed that those who stayed behind ~~were not~~ -

combat forces / but were there to advise and train Cubans /

and to perform intelligence functions. //

Just recently / American intelligence obtained persuasive

evidence / that some of these Soviet forces [→] / had been organized

into a combat unit. / When attention was then focussed on [→]

a careful review of past intelligence data, / it was possible

for our experts to conclude / that this unit had existed for

several years, / probably since the mid-1970s / and possibly

even longer. //

This unit appears to be a brigade of two to three thousand

men. / It is armed with about forty tanks [→] / and other modern

military equipment. / It has been organized as a combat unit, /

and [?] Its training exercises have been those ~~of a~~ combat unit. /

This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U.S. is involved.

Nevertheless this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American region. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship ^{They have} ~~and~~ added to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

During the last few years the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest best-equipped armed forces in this region ~~and (they use)~~ ^{found} these military forces to intrude into other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

There is a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get their weapons free. Other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies. //

The Communist regime in Cuba is an economic failure; it cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about \$8 million in economic aid every day!

Cuba's Fidel Castro does
~~Although Fidel Castro does not pay money for his~~
~~Russian arms, he has paid a much higher price.~~ *The Cuban people pay* In every international dispute, on every international issue, *The Cuban*
regime Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. #

The Soviet brigade ^a is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take ^{escalating} for Cuban military actions abroad. //

Now I want to report further on what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

Over the past three weeks we have discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials.

We have made it clear that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. ~~It has officially stated that the unit is a training center, that it has been in place since 1962, and that it has not changed significantly either in number of personnel or in function since that time.~~ By these statements, the Soviets apparently recognize that the presence of a Soviet ground combat unit in Cuba would be a matter of legitimate concern to us and other nation.

However,

The Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to ^{our} this concern:

-- That the unit in question is a training center, /
 that it does nothing more than training, and can do
 " nothing more; "

-- That they will not change its function or status
 as a training center. // We understand this to mean that
 they do not intend to enlarge the unit or give it additional
 capabilities;

-- That the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and
will not be a threat to the U.S. or to any other state;

-- That they reaffirm the 1962 ^{7.} [undertaking] understanding " /
 and the mutually agreed confirmation in 1970, not to
 station offensive weapons in Cuba, and will abide by it
 in the future. We, for our part, reconfirm this under-
 standing.

~~assurances~~
 These statements have been given to me from the

highest level of the Soviet government. #

Although we are still convinced that in the past the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future non-combat status of the unit are significant.

(However,) we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone. ^{First} We will monitor the status of the Soviet forces

by increased ²¹ surveillance of Cuba. ^{Second,} We will assure that

no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to

threaten the security of the United States or any other

nations in this hemisphere.

Those nations can be confident that the United States

will act in response to a request for assistance ^{to meet} in meeting

any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces. #

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a

party to the Rio Treaty. It is a reaffirmation, in new
 circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963
 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move
 off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any
 neighboring countries." #

Speed →
 I am establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean
 Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. ~~In~~

~~order to monitor the situation in the Caribbean region~~
~~and to improve our capacity for rapid response to support~~

~~this policy.~~ // I will assign forces to this headquarters
 as necessary from all the military services responsible
 for expanded planning and conducting exercises. This

headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action,
 if required. This will substantially improve our capability

To monitor and respond rapidly
~~for rapid response to any attempted military encroachment~~

in the region. X

fourth,

We will expand military exercises in the region, ~~and~~

We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on.

In accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States

will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

fifth,

To further ^{to} ensure the ability of troubled [Caribbean and Central American] people, to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination, we will increase our

economic assistance to alleviate their ~~the~~ unmet economic

and human needs, *in the Caribbean region and further*

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THE UNITED STATES HAS A WORLDWIDE INTEREST
IN PEACE AND STABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE DIRECTED
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO FURTHER ENHANCE THE
CAPACITY FO OUR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES TO PROTECT
OUR OWN INTERESTS AND ^{to act} IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR
HELP FROM OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. WE MUST BE ABLE
TO MOVE OUR GROUND, SEA AND AIR UNITS TO DISTANT
AREAS -- RAPIDLY AND WITH ADEQUATE SUPPLIES.

I have ~~directed the Secretary of Defense~~ to accelerate these efforts. //

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. //

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities -- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights. //

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I have consulted not only with my own advisers but with Congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well. The decisions are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander-in-Chief.

I have concluded that the brigade issue [→] is certainly
 no reason for a return to the Cold War. A [policy of]
 confrontation might be emotionally satisfying [→] for a few
 days or a few weeks for some people, but it would be
 destructive to the national interest and the national security
 of the United States. //

We must continue the basic policy [→] that the United States
 has followed for 20 years, under six Administrations of
 both parties -- a policy that recognizes [→] that we are in
 competition with the Soviet Union in some fields, and that
 we seek cooperation in others -- notably maintaining the
 peace and controlling nuclear arms.

~~Now let me speak~~ My fellow Americans,

The greatest danger to American security tonight [→] is
 certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in
 Cuba. ~~[Nor is it the 40,000 Cuban military troops in Africa.]~~

The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the breakdown of a common effort to preserve the peace, and the ultimate threat of a nuclear war.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify ~~the~~ SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Ensuring compliance with its terms will not be a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated national technical means, carefully focussed on the Soviet Union to ensure that the Treaty is verifiable. This Treaty is the most important step ever taken ^{to control} in controlling strategic nuclear arms.

It permits us to strengthen our defense ^{to} and preserve the strategic balance ^{at} lower risk and cost. During the past few years we have ^{made} [been making] real increases in our defense expenditures to fulfill the goals of our Five-Year Defense Plan. ^{With} SALT II ^{we can} [permits us to] concentrate these increases in areas where our interests are most threatened and where direct military challenge is most likely.

The rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets.

Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, these disagreements and conflicts could take on a new and ominous dimension.

Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute could carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance.

Obviously a secure Europe is vital to our own security.

The leaders of our European allies ~~support SALT II~~ ~~A~~
~~unanimously.~~ We have talked to a number of those leaders
in the past several days. ~~And~~ I must tell you tonight
that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT Treaty,
these leaders and their countries would be confused and
deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in
our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of
nuclear weapons, our effort to build a stronger and more
united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a
troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult
time. [Unfortunately, every four years the political season
seems to begin earlier and earlier.] We have all seen
evidence in recent weeks that politics ^{can interfere} [is interfering] with
the calm consideration of this extremely important and
serious issue.

~~Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix.~~ //

~~We must not play politics with the security of the~~
~~United States. We must not play politics with the survival~~
~~of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II.~~ !/

It is much too important, for that -- too vital to our
 country, / to our allies, / and to the cause of peace. //

The purpose of [~~ratifying~~] the SALT II Treaty / and the
 purpose of [~~the~~] ^{my} actions [~~being taken~~] in dealing with Soviet
 and Cuban military relationships [~~are~~] ^{are} exactly the same --
 to keep our nation secure and to maintain a world at peace. //

As a powerful nation -- as a superpower -- / we have
 a special responsibility [~~for maintaining~~] ^{to maintain} stability / even --
 when there are serious disagreements among nations. //

We have had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. / I have no illusions about these differences, ~~but~~ ^{but} the best way to deal with them successfully / is to maintain American unity, / American will / and American strength. /

~~That is what I am determined to do.~~

The struggle for peace -- / the long, ~~hard~~ ^{hard} struggle / to bring weapons of mass destruction under the control of human reason and human law -- / is the central drama of our age. ~~##~~

~~At another time of challenge~~ ^{cross road} in our nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people: "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth."

~~We chose~~ ^{acted wisely} [hope] then, and preserved our Union. Let us ~~choose~~ ^{act wisely} [hope] now, and preserve our world.

#

LNC
Lloyd
Cutler
suggestion

Proposed Report to the Nation on Soviet Troops in Cuba

Fellow citizens, I have asked for this television time to report to you on a number of issues connected with the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba...

~~This is not an easy subject. I ask you to listen patiently, because the information I want to present to you cannot be outlined in a sentence or two. I ask you to listen carefully, because the issues at stake concern the security of our country and global peace.~~*

The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations in the world. The relations between us are complex, because they have strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

*Some believe this is artificial; others that the public must be prepared to deal with a long and difficult speech.

Militarily and politically, we compete with the Soviets around the world. Our philosophies conflict in fundamental ways, and quite often so do our interests.

On the other hand, the Soviets and ourselves share an overwhelming mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war. That is why, for a generation, the Soviets have cooperated with us, and we with them, in seeking to reduce that danger through arms control agreements. The latest such agreement -- the most important and promising so far -- is the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which is now awaiting ratification by the U. S. Senate.

In recent weeks, a new element has been introduced into the competitive side of our relationship: our intelligence community has obtained ~~convincing~~ evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970s.

the evidence indicating

Tonight, I want to talk to you about the specific problem of the Soviet brigade in Cuba and the general problem of Soviet-Cuban military ^{cooperation} ~~activism~~ in the Third World.

I want to describe for you the actions I am taking to counter these activities.

And, I want to put these problems into the context of our overall national interest -- and to tell you why it remains essential for the United States to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to persevere in our efforts to control nuclear weapons.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not at this moment confront any immediate, concrete threat that could quickly escalate into war. The United States is at peace tonight -- just as we have been at peace throughout the time I have been President.

But we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our will and determination in ~~standing up to~~ ^{meeting} Soviet competition. It is also a challenge to our wisdom -- our ability to act in a firm, ~~proportional~~ measured way, ~~with a reasoned understanding of our true national~~ ^{that meets this competition without destroying} ~~interests.~~ ^{the basis for cooperation in our mutual interest} in the field of nuclear arms control.

Here is the background on the Soviet brigade in Cuba. ~~It~~ ~~is~~ ~~one of the most dangerous confrontations of the Cold War,~~ ^{in the era of the Cold War,} ~~Seventeen years ago,~~ the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce nuclear ~~arms~~ ^{missiles and other nuclear} bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ^{met with a firm American response,} and it ended with the withdrawal of those nuclear arms.

At the time of that 1962 ^{missile} crisis, there were some 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The bulk of them ^{including ground combat units guarding the missile bases} were also withdrawn. We monitored their departure ~~throughout~~ ^{throughout} 1963. Those that stayed behind, we believed, were there to advise and ^{not combat forces but} train Cuban forces and to perform intelligence functions.

Then, about six weeks ago, American intelligence obtained ^{persuasive} ~~irrefutable~~ evidence ^{which was added to earlier} ~~which had been accumulating for some~~ ~~time~~ that a Soviet combat unit was stationed in Cuba. Once ^{reached this ~~area~~} we ~~established this beyond doubt~~, it was possible for our experts to ~~conclude~~ ^{conclude}, through a careful review of past intelligence data, that this unit had been there at least since 1976 and possibly longer.

^{appears to be}
This unit ~~is~~ a ground combat brigade of two to three thousand men. It does not resemble any of the twenty or so Soviet military advisory groups in other foreign countries. It is armed with tanks and other modern military equipment. It is organized as a combat unit, and its training exercises ^{Correspond to} ~~are~~ those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the U. S. is involved.

Nevertheless, ^{apparent} ~~the~~ ^{the presence of a} Soviet brigade ^{combat} ~~is a serious matter.~~ ^{in Cuba is a cause for concern.}

It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and Central American

region. It adds to the fears of countries in that area that

they may fall victim to Soviet-Cuban ^{interventions.} ~~adventurism.~~ ^{It comes on} ~~It is~~

^{top} ~~part~~ ^{a closer} of ~~an intensifying~~ Soviet-Cuban military relationship

including the transfer of modern arms and the increased presence

of Soviet naval forces. ~~Finally,~~ ^{may} ~~it helps support~~ ^{to sustain} a pattern

of ~~Soviet-Cuban~~ ^{military} ~~interventions and use of military force~~ ^{with Soviet support} throughout

the world.

~~[This pattern dates back to 1975, when the Soviet Union launched a substantial program to build up Cuba's armed forces and to back Cuban intrusions into troubled areas of the world -- Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and elsewhere.]~~

~~It~~ ~~There are no~~ ~~we have no~~

*Lloyd believes this word is foreign-sounding.

~~No President~~ ~~has~~

It is the first occasion since the Cuban missile crisis that the presence of such a unit has been noted anywhere in this hemisphere.

Now, there are some 40,000 Cuban troops overseas. These troops are supported and armed by the Soviet Union.

Throughout this period, Russian military support of Cuba has been increasing. The Soviet Union has provided Cuba with some one and three-quarters billion dollars in military supplies. These supplies have included, for example, 280 advanced jet aircraft; some 100 naval vessels; 650 armored personnel carriers; and an entire naval port. The result is that Cuba now has the largest, best equipped armed forces in the Caribbean and Central American area, except, of course, for our own.

The Cubans get this Russian military help free. East Germany, Bulgaria and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries have to pay for their Soviet military supplies, but Cuba does not.

This pattern holds true for Cuba's whole economy, which the Soviets subsidize to the tune of three billion dollars a year. That is equal to a quarter of Cuba's entire gross national product.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for his Russian arms and his Russian economic subsidy. He has paid a much higher price than that. In effect, Mr. Castro has sold the independence of his country to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Castro claims to be "non-aligned," but this is an absurd and obvious lie. In every international dispute, on every international issue, Cuba automatically follows the Soviet line. There is no more real difference between Soviet and Cuban foreign policy than between Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy.

Why they recognize that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba would be a ^{proper} cause of concern to us.

~~The Soviet brigade in Cuba is the latest manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Mr. Castro. It raises the level of that dominance -- and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for Cuban military actions abroad.~~*

Secretary Vance has

~~We have~~ been negotiating with the Soviet Union over the Ambassador and Foreign Minister

past ~~four~~ ^{three} weeks for a resolution of the problems raised by the apparent presence of this brigade in Cuba.

The Soviets have told us that the unit we observe is a training center for Cuban officers. I regret to report to you that the overall outcome of the negotiations must be viewed as unsatisfactory. The existing unit ~~has not~~ varied significantly since that time, and ~~that it does not deny its combat capabilities, but they do not admit it is a combat unit~~ ^{it does not pose} ~~Soviet combat capability in Cuba remains in place.~~ Together with the rapidly modernizing Cuban armed forces a shadow remains.

And they affirm it

The Soviet description of the unit as a training center not only upon the Caribbean and Central America, but upon all which shows many characteristics of a combat brigade and no characteristics associated with the ^{current} training of Cubans. While intelligence assessments on such questions ^{can} ~~never be~~ ^{never be} conclusive, we would not be justified at this

*Lloyd and Warren believe this whole section -- beginning on page 6 -- is given too much prominence, is peripheral or unrelated to the brigade issue and describes something we don't propose to do much about anyway.

very important to observe that the Soviets do not admit the presence of a combat unit, because in so

very time to accept the Soviet ^{explanation} ~~statement~~. ^{At the same time,} But this is very important to observe that the Soviets do not admit the presence of a combat unit, because in so

~~In the light of~~ 10 -

~~But we cannot rely on the Soviet~~
~~denial statement~~ statement that the unit is a training center
and that it will pose no threat to any American state.
I have therefore decided to take several appropriate

measures -- and I am confident that in these actions I will have
the support of the Congress and of you, the American people.

We must take precautions on the basis that our intelligence assessment is correct and that the unit could be ~~used~~ ^{someday} used to threaten another American state.

First, I want to affirm that it is the policy of the United States to oppose the deployment of Cuban or Soviet combat forces against any nation in this Hemisphere. Every nation in the Hemisphere can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty. It is an affirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration on April 19, 1963, "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring countries."

*Zbig and Harold Brown believe this detracts from the uniqueness of your statement and can be used in the background. Warren and Lloyd think it is important to establish continuity with the past.

Second, to improve our capacity to support this policy, I am ordering the following steps:

We will form a permanent, full-time Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West, Florida. Forces will be assigned to this headquarters as necessary from all the military services. With this new headquarters permanently responsible for expanded planning, exercising, and, if required, employment of designated forces, we will gain a substantially improved capability for rapid response to any attempted encroachment in the region by Cuban or Soviet armed forces.

As a companion measure, I have ordered an expansion of *our* military ~~exercises~~ *preparedness* in the region. As a first step, I have added *in the Caribbean* to a previously planned naval training exercise *an* additional phase in the region of our base in Guantanamo, Cuba. As a further step, I have ordered the conduct of an amphibious

reinforcement exercise into Guantanamo in the near future,

involving approximately 1500 marines and 2000 naval personnel.

We had planned such an exercise,
~~for a total exercise force of about 3500.~~ *A few years ago,*

When we ~~the United States~~ withdrew approximately 1000 marines from the ~~base~~ *infirmary* and planned to substitute periodic reinforcement exercises .

~~to assure the security of Guantanamo.~~ Subsequently, however,

in an effort to improve relations with the Government of Cuba,

~~a decision was made to suspend these planned exercises.~~ *we did not carry out* ~~In~~ *As a*
precaution in the light of.

~~view of the Soviet combat presence,~~ these exercises will be

conducted regularly from now on, *and of course*

These and other measures which we will adopt as necessary will insure our continued capability to respond to any regional or external interference with nations of the Western Hemisphere.

More important, they underscore a crucial message -- the United

States will stay in Guantanamo.

But ~~the~~ ^{the} threat to the stability of the Caribbean and Central America comes not merely from the menace of ^{Cuban and} Soviet and ~~Cuban~~ arms, ~~it~~ ^{but also} also comes from the social turmoil caused by unmet economic and human needs. ~~Therefore, as a crucial element of these efforts,~~ ^{therefore ask} I will be ~~asking~~ the Congress for a supplemental appropriation for economic and security assistance to the nations of Central America and the Caribbean.

~~Beyond the Hemisphere, the United States has acted to meet the broader challenge to our interests from Cuban intervention. We helped block the invasion of Shaba in Africa. We helped thwart the attack on North Yemen. We will shortly announce an important continuing reinforcement of our naval presence in the Indian Ocean which we have been preparing for some time.~~

To
p. 14

~~But if we are to~~ ^{To continue to} compete effectively with the Soviet Union and ~~be prepared~~ to protect our global interests, we must have

a world-wide capacity to project our military forces. We must be able to move our ground and sea units to distant areas -- rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have already begun upgrading our ability to do this. I have ^{also} directed the Secretary of Defense, in the course of preparing the budget for the next year, to insure that we accelerate these efforts.

Rider
from
P. 13

For example, we will increase our capacity to airlift without extensive reliance on staging bases, and to escort our sea-lifted forces. We will, of course, maintain the amphibious assault capability of the Marine Corps.

To supplement it, we will proceed with a program to procure so-called forward equipment ships, which can provide our forces with heavy equipment in areas far from American bases.

I also intend to increase the level of exercises for training and readiness of forces in the rapid deployment category.

~~Second~~, ^{shall also} We ~~must~~ intensify our intelligence effort in regard ~~to~~ ^{monitor} Soviet and Cuban activities ^{in Cuba and} throughout the world. To strengthen our capabilities ~~in this area~~, I will ~~be making~~ ^{request} additional funding ^{for} ~~specific requests of the Congress~~ in this sensitive area. We ^{also} are expediting our study of legislation to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.

Delete from speech - too complex to grasp

~~Third~~, I am modifying our policy of restraint on arms sales to exempt from the ~~restrictions~~ ^{what restrictions - why?} any country menaced by Soviet and Cuban military activities.

Zimbabwe Rhodesia

These steps reflect my determination to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I consulted with Congressional leaders, with my own advisers, and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens.

The decisions, of course, are my own, and I take full responsibility for them as President and Commander in Chief.

I am convinced that these measures will meet the challenge symbolized by the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

But a larger question has arisen. What does the presence of the combat brigade mean for our ^{overall} relations with the Soviet Union? Is it part of the long-standing mixture of competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union which requires vigilance, firmness and flexibility on our part? Or should it be the occasion for a fundamental change in that policy -- a moving away from efforts to build cooperation and a return to a policy of across-the-board confrontation -- a return to the Cold War?

I have considered this question carefully as well. I have consulted on it just as widely.

And I have concluded -- with a sense of absolute certainty -- that the brigade issue is not the occasion for a return to the Cold War. It is not the occasion for a policy of total

confrontation. Such a policy might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or a few weeks. But it would be enormously destructive to the overall national interest and the overall national security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for twenty years, under six Administrations of both parties -- the policy of both competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union *in some fields, and cooperation in others - notably nuclear arms control.*

Obviously, the Soviet brigade in Cuba increases the competitive aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The Soviets have shown themselves insensitive to a number of our concerns; and in addition to the steps I have outlined tonight, we will respond in kind to that insensitivity. 7*

*Lloyd, Warren and Hedley think this is too threatening and breaks the flow of this section. Zbig and Harold Brown believe it is important to lay down this marker both with the Soviets and with the American people.

But the effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue.

The greatest danger to American security tonight is not a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. It is not Cuban divisions in Africa. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world -- including the United States and the Soviet Union -- is the threat of nuclear holocaust.

That is why tonight I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. It is verifiable. It is the most important step ever taken in controlling strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and cost. It permits us to concentrate our defense budget -- which we are increasing at 3% per year -- on areas of greater need.

Finally, SALT II is the absolute prerequisite to further negotiations aimed at deep, mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals. All this has been established in months of exhaustive Senate hearings.

Furthermore -- and I ask you to listen particularly closely to this -- the abandonment of SALT would seriously compromise our security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have those disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

/If SALT II is rejected, a difficulty such as the one I have discussed tonight -- the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba -- would take a whole new ominous dimension.* Against

*Lloyd believes this greatly exaggerates the importance of the brigade issue. Hedley and Warren also favor removal. Claytor, Aaron and Hertzberg believe it helps tie the speech together and uses the SALT budget argument against the SALT opponents.

the background of an uncontrolled, unlimited nuclear arms race, every competitive element of U.S.-Soviet relations would carry the seeds of the ultimate horror.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership of the Western Alliance.

The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II -- unanimously. I have talked to a number of those leaders in the past several days. And I must tell you tonight that if the Senate rejects SALT II, they and their countries would react with incomprehension and concern.* The effort to build up and modernize NATO -- an effort in which we have invested so much time, money and attention -- would lose momentum.

I know that for Members of Congress, this is a troubling and difficult issue in a troubling and difficult time. But

*Rick Hertzberg favors "fright."

the actions I have outlined tonight deserve their support. So does SALT II.

I say to the Senate and I say to you, the American people, with all the urgency and conviction at my command, that the ratification of this treaty is in the ^{vital} interest of the United States.

CWC would stop here

And I call upon you -- the American people -- to demand of your Senators that they move swiftly to approve this absolutely crucial bulwark against nuclear war.

I call upon each and every one of you -- not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans -- to write to the Senators from your state and tell them that you want the SALT II Treaty ratified.*

*Everyone but Rick Hertzberg thinks these two paragraphs should be deleted.

The purpose of SALT II and the purpose of the actions I have outlined tonight in the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba are exactly the same.

That purpose is a just and lasting peace in the world -- a peace that brings security to our Nation and to all the nations of the earth.

[This morning, Pope John Paul II arrived in our country.

He has come here, as he has traveled the globe, in the service of world peace. My fellow Americans, let us not disappoint him.

Let us show him -- let us show each other -- let us show all humanity that the United States of America stands for justice, for reason, for faith -- and for peace.]*

#

*Again, everybody but Rick thinks this should be out.

FLASH

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FROM: RICK HERTZBERG
TO: SUSAN CLOUGH FOR
THE PRESIDENT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Mr. President --

This is the new language I mentioned to you a few minutes ago, plus the memo I was going to leave with Zbig.

I know the draft has changed a lot since I saw it, and of course I'm not suggesting replacing the first 2/3 of the speech at this point. But you might want to read through this to see if there are any phrases or formulations that could be usefully plugged in.

Rick

31 01 31 1979 SEP

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

From: Rick Hertzberg *Rick*

Subject: The speech

I threatened to give you my "policy recommendations," and now I'm making good on that.

I'm concerned that the speech is topheavy with stuff about the brigade and with overly detailed descriptions of marginal military steps which, thanks to the detail, end up sounding weak. I'm worried that the brigade itself is blown up out of proportion, when the important things are (a) responding to Soviet-Cuban mischief in the Third World and (b) SALT.

Finally, I'm concerned that the speech (as of Draft Three) has a whiny tone, and that it fails to let the President come through as a brisk, in-charge, everything's-under-control leader.

I think the speech should (a) treat the issue of the brigade, in and of itself, with something bordering on contempt; (b) address the broader issue of Russian mischief in a calm, measured, serious way; and (c) get to SALT before the audience has lapsed into a coma.

Attached is a new beginning for the speech that I wrote this evening. I think it establishes a tone that comes closer to the mark. Again, I am worried that sounding too flustered about these troops is simply unbecoming to the leader of a great power.

I hope you will read this -- if only as a matter of literary interest -- but I especially commend to your attention the bits marked in red. For instance, the formulation on page 8 might be a better way to characterize the outcome of the negotiations, since it makes it a Soviet rather than an American failure.

arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even more important, SALT II puts us on the path to the reduction and ultimate elimination of the nuclear weapons that threaten the destruction of human civilization and the extinction of the human race.

This path leads not only to freedom from the threat of nuclear holocaust but to freedom from the backbreaking and escalating expenditures that have burdened the industrial world with inflation and the developing world with an inability to cope with its grave economic problems.

A world free from nuclear terror has been the dream of every President since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is the dream of the American people and of all the peoples of the world. It is the among the first responsibilities of every President of the United States and of every responsible statesman in the world.

Having over the years overcome immovable obstacles on the road to agreement, we now see a pebble in our path.

Our intelligence reports tell us of a brigade of Soviet combat troops on the island of Cuba.

These are the facts: This Soviet brigade consists of some two to three thousand men. It is armed with tanks, artillery and the other normal weapons of a modern infantry unit. Although the Soviets have claimed -- in discussions we have had with them over the past four weeks -- that this brigade is part of what they call a "training center," it is in fact organized as a combat unit. It does not resemble the twenty or so Soviet military training missions in other foreign countries. The Soviet brigade has no airlift or sealift capability. No nuclear weapons of any kind are involved.

I do not underestimate the importance of this intelligence discovery. I have investigated it exhaustively and discussed its implications fully with my advisers and with Congressional leaders. I have asked a bipartisan panel of responsible Americans of both parties, with broad foreign policy and governmental experience, to come to the White House to discuss it with me. And tonight I want to report to you my views of the meaning of this Soviet brigade for our security and for the overall foreign policy of the United States.

First, we are not faced with any military threat from this Soviet brigade. We are not afraid of these two or three thousand Russians, whether they drill in combat formation or not.

Second, the discovery of this brigade does not change our assessment of the security requirements of the United

States in the Caribbean and Central American area. I assure you that my predecessors in this office and I have provided amply for the defense of American interests and American security in this area. —In a purely military sense, against the background of U.S. military power in the area, this Soviet brigade is -- in a word -- insignificant.

Nevertheless, the brigade does highlight a serious problem -- a problem that relates more to our political competition with the Soviet Union than to our military competition.

The brigade carries the prospect of increased Soviet political influence in this hemisphere and raises a principle of Soviet behavior which we must challenge.

The discovery of this brigade coincides with two highly disturbing trends.

First, since 1975 the Soviet Union has turned the Cuban military from an essentially defensive force into one of the most modern in the developing world, with a sophisticated offensive capability. With Soviet assistance and encouragement, the Cubans now maintain more than 40,000 troops and military advisers in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and also in Latin America.

Second, since 1975 the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union has been fundamentally changed. Cuba is no longer simply a friend of the Soviet Union; Cuba is now a Soviet dependency. The Soviet Union provided over \$3 billion in assistance to Cuba in 1978, amounting to 25 per cent of Cuba's gross national product. Cuba is now the only country in the world that receives military equipment from the Soviet Union free of charge.

Of course Cuba pays for this, though not in money.

The price is higher than that. In effect, Mr. Castro has sold the independence of his country to the Soviet Union. Despite his claims of "non-alignment," he automatically follows the Soviet line on every international question. There is even less difference between Soviet and Cuban foreign policy than between Soviet foreign policy and that of the most subservient government in Eastern Europe.

This heightened dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union would be less troubling if the Soviet Union and Cuba were not exploiting serious tensions that exist in Central America, the Caribbean, Southern Africa, and elsewhere. But they are, and all indications are that they intend to accelerate and expand these activities.

In four weeks of negotiations since our discovery of the brigade, the Soviet Union has failed to satisfy our concerns. Those concerns, I repeat, have less to do with

the brigade itself than with the pattern of Soviet-Cuban interference in developing countries around the world.

I have therefore become convinced that unless the Soviet Union and Cuba are met with an appropriate response now, they would be tempted to engage in further reckless activism. It is time to clarify the determination of the United States to counter further activity of this kind.

For these reasons, I have decided to take the following actions:

First, I am making it clear here and now that it is the policy of the United States to oppose the deployment of Soviet or Cuban combat forces against any nation in this Hemisphere. Every nation of the Americas can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance in meeting any such threat

from Soviet or Cuban forces.

Second, I will increase the U.S. military and naval presence in the Caribbean and the area adjacent to it.

Third, I intend to take a number of steps to augment our rapid deployment force to assist our friends in areas where American forces are not permanently stationed.

Fourth, I will increase our intelligence monitoring of Soviet and Cuban efforts to exploit tensions around the world.

These steps are intended to remind the Soviets and the Cubans that the United States will not accept foreign adventurism on their part.

But the instability that the Soviet and Cuban governments are attempting to exploit cannot be addressed

only by actions directed against these two governments. That instability is ultimately the result social turmoil caused by economic and political inequities. We are therefore encouraging governments in the Hemisphere to undertake crucial political reforms, and we are prepared to support them fully if they do. Moreover, I intend to increase economic and security assistance to the region to aid governments in making the difficult transition toward greater democratization. Only by helping countries meet the economic, social and political needs of their people can we guarantee that the poisonous tree of Soviet-Cuban will have no soil in which to grow.

More broadly, the Soviets must expect that the United States will not take kindly to the kind of activity symbolized by the brigade in Cuba, and that the result can only be a measured drawing back from certain

forms of cooperation between us. Particularly in the economic sphere, the Russians would suffer the most from this because they have the most to gain, and I believe they will understand this point as we make it clear to them in a variety of carefully calibrated ways in the months ahead.

However, a larger question has arisen in the debate over this issue here in the United States. That question is: What does the presence of the combat brigade mean for our relations with the Soviet Union? Is it part ...

[PICK UP DRAFT THREE FROM LINE 5, PAGE 16]

DRAFT -- FOR PRACTICE SESSION

1. I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU →
2. ABOUT THE SUBJECT THAT IS MY-HIGHEST-CONCERN —
3. AS IT HAS BEEN FOR EVERY PRESIDENT. //
4. THAT SUBJECT IS THE SECURITY-OF-THE-UNITED STATES. //
5. WE ARE AT PEACE TONIGHT —
6. AS WE HAVE-BEEN-AT-PEACE THROUGHOUT THE TIME OF MY SERVICE
IN THIS OFFICE. //
7. THE PEACE-WE-ENJOY/IS THE PEACE-OF-THE-STRONG. //
8. OUR NATIONAL DEFENSES ARE UNSURPASSED-IN-THE-WORLD./
9. THOSE DEFENSES ARE STRONGER-TONIGHT →
10. THAN THEY WERE TWO-YEARS-AGO:
11. THEY WILL BE STRONGER-TWO-YEARS-FROM NOW)
12. THAN-THEY-ARE-TONIGHT —
13. BECAUSE OF CAREFULLY-PLANNED-IMPROVEMENTS →
14. { THAT ARE GOING FORWARD
15. { WITH YOUR SUPPORT —
16. AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF CONGRESS.
17. OUR PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZING AND STRENGTHENING
18. THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE N.A.T.O. ALLIANCE
19. IS ON TRACK,
20. WITH THE FULL COOPERATION AND PARTICIPATION OF
OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

1. OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ARE POWERFUL ENOUGH
2. TO DESTROY ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY MANY TIMES OVER,
3. AND THE INVULNERABILITY OF THOSE FORCES
4. WILL SOON BE FURTHER ASSURED
5. BY A NEW SYSTEM OF POWERFUL MOBILE MISSILES.
6. ^EBYOND THESE MILITARY DEFENSES, ✓
7. WE ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A GREAT ADVANCE IN THE
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS --
8. THE ADOPTION OF THE SECOND
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY, SALT II.
9. THIS EVENING I ALSO WANT TO REPORT TO YOU
10. ABOUT THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA
11. AND ABOUT ITS BEARING
12. ON THE IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OUR NATION AND THE SOVIET UNION.
13. THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE OR EASY SUBJECT.
14. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
15. ARE THE TWO MOST POWERFUL NATIONS ON EARTH,
16. AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US IS COMPLEX
17. BECAUSE IT INVOLVES STRONG ELEMENTS
18. OF BOTH COMPETITION AND COOPERATION.

1. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES CONFLICT.
2. QUITE OFTEN OUR INTERESTS CONFLICT AS WELL.
3. AS TWO GREAT NATIONS,
4. WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS
5. AND SHARE AN OVERWHELMING MUTUAL CONCERN
6. IN PREVENTING A NUCLEAR WAR.
7. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEREFORE
8. THAT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
9. ARE VITAL TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.
10. AND THAT WE MUST ALSO EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT IN OUR RELATIONS
11. AND BE SENSITIVE TO EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS.
12. RECENTLY WE OBTAINED EVIDENCE
13. THAT A SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE HAS BEEN IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
14. THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA.
15. IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US.
16. I WANT TO REASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET
17. THAT WE DO NOT FACE ANY IMMEDIATE, CONCRETE THREAT
18. THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO WAR OR A MAJOR CONFRONTATION.
19. BUT WE DO FACE A CHALLENGE.
20. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO OUR WISDOM, ...
21. A CHALLENGE TO OUR ABILITY TO ACT IN A FIRM, DECISIVE WAY
22. WITHOUT DESTROYING THE BASIS FOR COOPERATION
23. THAT HELPS TO MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE
24. AND CONTROL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

1. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO OUR DETERMINATION
2. TO GIVE A MEASURED AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE
3. TO SOVIET COMPETITION
4. AND TO CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AROUND THE WORLD.

5. NOW LET ME EXPLAIN THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM

OF THE SOVIET BRIGADE

6. AND DESCRIBE THE MORE GENERAL PROBLEM

OF SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVISM

IN THE THIRD WORLD.

7. HERE IS THE BACKGROUND ON SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA:

8. AS MOST OF YOU KNOW,

9. 17 YEARS AGO IN THE ERA OF THE COLD WAR,

10. THE SOVIET UNION SUDDENLY ATTEMPTED

11. TO INTRODUCE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND BOMBERS

INTO CUBA.

12. THIS DIRECT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

13. ENDED WITH THE SOVIET AGREEMENT

14. TO WITHDRAW THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

15. AND A COMMITMENT

16. NOT TO INTRODUCE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA THEREAFTER.

17. AT THE TIME OF THAT 1962 MISSILE CRISIS,

18. THERE WERE MORE THAN 20,000 SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA.

1. MOST OF THEM WERE ALSO WITHDRAWN
2. AND WE MONITORED THEIR DEPARTURE.
3. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND
4. WERE NOT COMBAT FORCES
5. BUT WERE THERE TO ADVISE AND TRAIN CUBANS
6. AND TO PERFORM INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS.

7. JUST RECENTLY
8. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE
9. THAT SOME OF THESE SOVIET FORCES
10. HAD BEEN ORGANIZED INTO A COMBAT UNIT.
11. WHEN ATTENTION WAS THEN FOCUSED
12. ON A CAREFUL REVIEW OF PAST INTELLIGENCE DATA,
13. IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR OUR EXPERTS TO CONCLUDE
14. THAT THIS UNIT HAD EXISTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS,
15. PROBABLY SINCE THE MID-1970's
16. AND POSSIBLY EVEN LONGER.

17. THIS UNIT APPEARS TO BE A BRIGADE OF TWO TO THREE THOUSAND MEN.
18. IT IS ARMED WITH ABOUT 40 TANKS
19. AND OTHER MODERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
20. IT HAS BEEN ORGANIZED AS A COMBAT UNIT.
21. ITS TRAINING EXERCISES HAVE BEEN THOSE OF A COMBAT UNIT.

1. THIS IS NOT A LARGE FORCE,
2. NOR AN ASSAULT FORCE.
3. IT PRESENTS NO DIRECT THREAT TO US.
4. IT HAS NO AIRBORNE OR SEABORNE CAPABILITY.
5. IN CONTRAST TO THE 1962 CRISIS,
6. NO NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE U.S. IS INVOLVED.
7. NEVERTHELESS THIS SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA
IS A SERIOUS MATTER.
8. IT CONTRIBUTES TO TENSION IN
THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION.
9. THE DELIVERY OF MODERN ARMS TO CUBA
10. AND THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN CUBAN WATERS
11. HAVE STRENGTHENED THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
12. AND THEY HAVE ADDED TO THE FEARS OF SOME COUNTRIES
THAT THEY MAY COME UNDER SOVIET OR CUBAN PRESSURE.
13. DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS
14. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INCREASING THE DELIVERY OF
MILITARY SUPPLIES TO CUBA.
15. THE RESULT IS
16. THAT CUBA NOW HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST, BEST EQUIPPED
ARMED FORCES IN THIS REGION.

1. THESE MILITARY FORCES
2. ARE USED TO INTRUDE INTO OTHER COUNTRIES
IN AFTICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. THERE IS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
4. BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION.
5. THE ^{CUBANS} BUCANS GET THEIR WEAPONS FREE.
6. OTHER SOVIET SATELLITE COUNTRIES
7. HAVE TO PAY FOR THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES.
8. THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CUBA IS AN ECONOMIC FAILURE;
9. IT CANNOT SUSTAIN ITSELF.
10. THE SOVIET UNION MUST SEND TO CUBA
11. ABOUT \$8 MILLION IN ECONOMIC AID EVERY DAY!
12. FIDEL CASTRO DOES NOT PAY MONEY FOR RUSSIAN ARMS;
13. THE CUBAN PEOPLE PAY A MUCH HIGHER PRICE.
14. IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE,
15. ON EVERY INTERNATIONAL ISSUE,
16. THE CUBAN REGIME AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWS THE SOVIET LINE.
17. THE SOVIET BRIGADE
18. IS A MANIFESTATION OF MOSCOW'S DOMINANCE OF CUBA.
19. IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF THAT DOMINANCE,...
20. AND IT RAISES THE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY
21. THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST TAKE
22. FOR ESCALATING CUBAN MILITARY ACTIONS ABROAD.

1. NOW I WANT TO REPORT FURTHER
2. ON WHAT WE ARE DOING TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS
3. AND TO COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES.

4. OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS
5. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE AT GREAT LENGTH
6. WITH TOP SOVIET OFFICIALS.

7. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR
8. THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMBAT UNIT IN CUBA
9. IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US.

10. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ADMIT
11. THAT THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A COMBAT UNIT.

12. HOWEVER THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CERTAIN STATEMENTS
TO US WITH RESPECT TO OUR CONCERN:

13. --THAT THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A TRAINING CENTER,
14. THAT IT DOES NOTHING MORE THAN TRAINING,
15. AND CAN DO NOTHING MORE:

16. --THAT THEY WILL NOT
17. CHANGE ITS FUNCTION OR STATUS AS A TRAINING CENTER.
18. WE UNDERSTAND THIS TO MEAN
19. THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ENLARGE THE UNIT
20. OR GIVE IT ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES;

1. --THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA
2. ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE
3. A THREAT TO THE U.S.
4. OR TO ANY OTHER STATE:

5. --THAT THEY REAFFIRM THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING
6. AND THE MUTUALLY AGREED CONFIRMATION IN 1970,
7. NOT TO STATION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA,
8. AND WILL ABIDE BY IT IN THE FUTURE.

9. WE FOR OUR PART,
10. RECONFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING,

11. THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ME
12. FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

13. ALTHOUGH WE ARE STILL CONVINCED
14. THAT IN THE PAST
15. THE UNIT HAS BEEN A COMBAT BRIGADE,
16. THE SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE
FUTURE ~~NON~~-COMBAT STATUS OF THE UNIT
17. ARE SIGNIFICANT.

18. HOWEVER WE SHALL NOT REST
19. ON THESE SOVIET STATEMENTS ALONE.

1. FIRST WE WILL MONITOR THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET FORCES
2. BY INCREASES SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA,
3. SECOND, WE WILL ASSURE
4. THAT NO SOVIET UNIT IN CUBA
5. CAN BE USED AS A COMBAT FORCE
6. TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
7. OR ANY OTHER NATIONS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.
8. THOSE NATIONS CAN BE CONFIDENT
9. THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL ACT
10. IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
11. TO MEET ANY SUCH THREAT FROM SOVIET OR CUBAN FORCES.
12. THIS POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES
13. AS A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
14. AND A PARTY TO THE RIO TREATY.
15. IT IS A REAFFIRMATION IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
16. OF JOHN F. KENNEDY'S DECLARATION IN 1963
17. "THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY TROOPS FROM CUBA
18. TO MOVE OFF THE ISLAND OF CUBA
19. IN ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ANY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.
20. THIRD I AM ESTABLISHING
21. A PERMANENT, FULL-TIME CARIBBEAN JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
22. AT KEY WEST, FLORIDA,

1. I WILL ASSIGN FORCES TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AS NECESSARY
2. FROM ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES
3. RESPONSIBLE FOR EXPANDED PLANNING AND CONDUCTING EXERCISES.
4. THIS HEADQUARTERS UNIT
5. WILL EMPLOY DESIGNATED FORCES FOR ACTION, IF REQUIRED.
6. THIS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE
7. OUR CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND RESPOND RAPIDLY
8. TO ANY ATTEMPTED MILITARY ENCROACHMENT IN THE REGION.
9. FOURTH WE WILL EXPAND MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE REGION.
10. WE WILL CONDUCT THESE EXERCISES REGULARLY FROM NOW ON,
11. IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING TREATY RIGHTS,
12. THE UNITED STATES WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP OUR FORCES
IN GUANTANAMO.
13. FIFTH, WE WILL INCREASE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
14. TO ALLEVIATE THE UNMET ECONOMIC AND HUMAN NEEDS
IN THE CARIBBEAN REGION AND FURTHER
15. TO ENSURE THE ABILITY OF TROUBLED PEOPLES
16. TO RESIST SOCIAL TURMOIL AND POSSIBLE COMMUNIST DOMINATION.
17. THE UNITED STATES HAS A WORLDWIDE INTEREST
IN PEACE AND STABILITY.

1. ACCORDINGLY I HAVE DIRECTED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2. TO FURTHER ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF OUR
RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES
3. TO PROTECT OUR OWN INTERESTS
4. AND TO ACT IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR HELP
5. FROM OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS.
6. WE MUST BE ABLE TO MOVE OUR GROUND, SEA AND AIR UNITS
TO DISTANT AREAS --
7. RAPIDLY AND WITH ADEQUATE SUPPLIES.
8. WE HAVE REINFORCED OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.
9. WE ARE ENHANCING OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY
10. IN ORDER TO MONITOR SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES --
11. BOTH IN CUBA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
12. WE WILL INCREASE OUR EFFORTS
13. TO GUARD AGAINST DAMAGE
14. TO OUR CRUCIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTION,
15. WITHOUT IMPAIRING CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
16. THESE STEPS REFLECT MY DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE PEACE,
17. TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCES,
18. AND TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. IN DEVELOPING THEM,
2. I HAVE CONSULTED NOT ONLY WITH MY OWN ADVISERS,
3. BUT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
4. AND WITH A BIPARTISAN GROUP OF DISTINGUISHED
AMERICAN CITIZENS AS WELL.
5. THE DECISIONS ARE MY OWN,
6. AND I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM
7. AS PRESIDENT AND AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
8. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE BRIGADE ISSUE
9. IS CERTAINLY NO REASON FOR A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR.
10. A CONFRONTATION MIGHT BE ^E MOTIONALLY SATISFYING
11. FOR A FEW DAYS OR A FEW WEEKS FOR SOME PEOPLE,
12. BUT IT WOULD BE DESTRUCTIVE TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST
13. AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
14. WE MUST CONTINUE THE BASIC POLICY
15. THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED FOR 20 YEARS,
16. UNDER SIX ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES --
17. A POLICY THAT RECOGNIZES
18. THAT WE ARE IN COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
IN SOME FIELDS,
19. AND THAT WE SEEK COOPERATION IN OTHERS --
20. NOTABLY MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS.

1. MY FELLOW AMERICANS
2. THE GREATEST DANGER TO AMERICAN SECURITY TONIGHT
3. IS CERTAINLY NOT THE TWO OR THREE THOUSAND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA.
4. THE GREATEST DANGER TO ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD,...
5. INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,...
6. IS THE BREAKDOWN OF A COMMON EFFORT TO PRESERVE THE PEACE,
7. AND THE ULTIMATE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR.

8. I RENEW MY CALL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
9. TO RATIFY THE SALT II TREATY.

10. SALT II IS A SOLID TREATY.
11. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TERMS
12. WILL NOT BE A MATTER OF TRUST.

13. WE HAVE HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS,
14. CAREFULLY FOCUSEED ON THE SOVIET UNION
15. TO ENSURE THAT THE TREATY IS VERIFIABLE.

16. THIS TREATY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP EVER TAKEN
17. TO CONTROL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS.

18. IT PERMITS US TO STRENGTHEN OUR DEFENSE
19. AND TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE,
20. AT LOWER RISK AND COST.

1. DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS
2. WE HAVE MADE REAL INCREASES IN OUR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
3. TO FULFILL THE GOALS OF OUR FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PLAN.
4. WITH SALT II WE CAN CONCENTRATE THESE INCREASES
5. IN AREAS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE MOST THREATENED
6. AND WHERE DIRECT MILITARY CHALLENGE IS MOST LIKELY.
7. THE REJECTION OF SALT
8. WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE OUR NATION'S PEACE AND SECURITY.
9. OF COURSE WE HAVE DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS.
10. OF COURSE WE HAVE CONFLICTS WITH THEM.
11. IF WE DID NOT HAVE THOSE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS,
12. WE WOULD NOT NEED A TREATY
13. TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN US.
14. IF SALT II IS REJECTED,
15. THESE DISAGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS
16. COULD TAKE ON A NEW AND OMINOUS DIMENSION.
17. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF AN UNCONTROLLED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE,
18. EVERY CONFRONTATION OR DISPUTE
19. COULD CARRY THE SEEDS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

1. IN ADDITION, SALT II IS CRUCIAL TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
2. AND TO THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
3. OBVIOUSLY A SECURE EUROPE IS VITAL TO OUR OWN SECURITY.
4. THE LEADERS OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES
5. SUPPORT SALT II UNANIMOUSLY.
6. WE HAVE TALKED TO A NUMBER OF THOSE LEADERS

IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

7. I MUST TELL YOU TONIGHT
8. THAT IF THE SENATE FAILS TO APPROVE THE SALT TREATY,
9. THESE LEADERS AND THEIR COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFUSED
10. AND DEEPLY ALARMED.

11. IF OUR ALLIES SHOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY
12. TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY FOR THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
13. OUR EFFORT TO BUILD A STRONGER AND MORE UNITED NATO

COULD FAIL.

14. I KNOW THAT FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
15. THIS IS A TROUBLING AND DIFFICULT ISSUE
16. IN A TROUBLING AND DIFFICULT TIME.

17. WE HAVE ALL SEEN EVIDENCE IN RECENT WEEKS
18. THAT POLITICS CAN INTERFERE
19. WITH THE CALM CONSIDERATION OF THIS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
AND SERIOUS ISSUE.

1. POLITICS AND NUCLEAR ARSENALS DO NOT MIX.
2. WE MUST NOT PLAY POLITICS WITH THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
3. WE MUST NOT PLAY POLITICS WITH THE
SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN RACE.
4. WE MUST NOT PLAY POLITICS WITH SALT II.
5. IT IS MUCH TOO IMPORTANT FOR THAT -- TOO VITAL
TO OUR COUNTRY,
TO OUR ALLIES,
AND TO THE CAUSE
OF PEACE.
6. THE PURPOSE OF THE SALT II TREATY
7. AND THE PURPOSE OF MY ACTIONS
8. IN DEALING WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
9. ARE EXACTLY THE SAME --
10. TO KEEP OUR NATION SECURE
11. AND TO MAINTAIN A WORLD AT PEACE.
12. AS A POWERFUL NATION -- AS A SUPERPOWER --
13. WE HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO MAINTAIN STABILITY
14. EVEN WHEN THERE ARE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS AMONG NATIONS.

1. WE HAVE HAD FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION
SINCE 1917.
2. I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THESE DIFFERENCES.
3. THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THEM SUCCESSFULLY
4. IS TO MAINTAIN AMERICAN UNITY,
AMERICAN WILL
AND AMERICAN STRENGTH.
5. THAT IS WHAT I AM DETERMINED TO DO.
6. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE --
7. THE LONG, HARD STRUGGLE
8. TO BRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
9. UNDER THE CONTROL OF HUMAN REASON AND HUMAN LAW --
10. IS THE CENTRAL DRAMA OF OUR AGE.
11. AT ANOTHER TIME OF CHALLENGE IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY,
12. PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
13. "WE SHALL NOBLY SAVE,
14. OR MEANLY LOSE,
15. THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH."
16. WE CHOSE WISELY THEN, AND PRESERVED OUR UNION.
17. LET US CHOOSE WISELY NOW, AND PRESERVE OUR WORLD.

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