

10/6/79 [2]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	From Cutler to The President (2 pp.) re: SALT II <i>opened per RAC NLC-126-18-23-1-7 11/18/13</i>	10/4/79	A
note w/att.	From Wise to The President (3 pp.) re: Caribbean Central American Aid Package <i>opened per RAC NLC-126-18-23-1-6 11/19/13</i>	10/5/79	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Hand-writing File 10/6/79 [2] BOX 150

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VISIT BY HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II

October 6, 1979

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

The President

SCENARIO

PROPOSED SCENARIO
VISIT OF HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II
Saturday, October 6, 1979

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6

11:00 a.m. MRS CARTER, accompanied by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, meet His Holiness John Paul II at Andrews Air Force Base.

1:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER, accompanied by the Vice President and Mrs. Mondale, greet Pope John Paul II as his motorcade arrives at the North Portico.

NOTE: Bishop Marcinkus will be in the Lead Car. The following will be in the Papal Car:

Pope John Paul II
Cardinal Baum
Father Dziwisz
Father Magee
Commander Cibin (Vatican Secretary)

(those accompanying the Pope will be escorted to seating)

(3-4 minutes is needed after introductions for the cameras to set-up and for us to brief His Holiness John Paul II.)

The Vice President and Mrs. Mondale and Bishop Marcinkus will be escorted to seating.

1:34 p.m. THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II move out to the right of the Portico to Section C where they shake hands and greet Members of the House Leadership. They then move to Section B and greet the Senate Leadership. They then proceed to Section A for the greeting of Judiciary.

1:45 p.m. THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II proceed to platform on North Lawn.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

Papal Remarks

NOTE: If time permits, at conclusion of remarks, walk to Section B. If time does not permit, proceed to Blue Room.

2:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II join the Vice President and Mrs. Mondale for receiving line in Blue Room.

NOTE: Receiving Line:

His Holiness John Paul II
The President
Mrs. Carter
The Vice President
Mrs. Mondale

Papal Official Party, Carter family members, Cabinet Members and Senior Staff are escorted to the Blue Room for receiving line.

NOTE: Coffee and juice served.
Harp and flute playing in cross-hall.

2:15 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and His Holiness John Paul II depart State Floor and proceed to the Oval Office for private meetings.

NOTE: Official Party escorted to the Roosevelt Room and the Cabinet Room.

2:30-3 p.m. Official Party escorted from Roosevelt Room and Cabinet Room to reserved seating in Section A on South Lawn.

3:15 p.m. PRIVATE FAMILY MEETING

3:30 p.m. Family members escorted from Yellow Oval Room to reserved seating in Section B on South Lawn.

3:40 p.m. Vice President and Mrs. Mondale enter South Lawn via Diplomatic Reception Room and are escorted to reserved seating in Section B on South Lawn.

3:45 p.m. THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER and His Holiness John Paul II escorted to Blue Room and proceed out to balcony to descend West Staircase to speaker's platform.

Leontyne Price sings "The Lord's Prayer" by Malotte.

3:50 p.m. PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

Papal Remarks

At conclusion of remarks, THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II walk to areas designated on the attached diagram of the South Lawn.

The Vice President and Mrs. Mondale are escorted through the Diplomatic Reception Room to the Blue Room.

Governors and their spouses are escorted through the Diplomatic Reception Room to the Blue Room.

Official Party is escorted through Diplomatic Reception Room to North Portico to Motorcade.

4:25 p.m. At conclusion of walk, THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II go to West Balcony stairs.

As they ascend stairway, Leontyne Price sings "America the Beautiful".

THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER AND His Holiness John Paul II go to balcony and from there proceed inside the Residence to the Blue Room.

NOTE: Governors and their spouses will be in receiving line order so His Holiness John Paul II can greet them.

THE PRESIDENT, MRS. CARTER, and His Holiness John Paul II proceed to cross-hall where they are met by the Vice President and Mrs. Mondale.


Departure from the North Portico

NORTH LAWN CHART

OCTOBER 6th 1979

10-1-79

TV CAMERA
SHANNON BLDG



NW GATE

1:00 STAFF & GUESTS (YEL) PRESS

STAFF & GUESTS

NE GATE

1:00 SEATED GUESTS (RED)
CONGRESS
JUDICIARY
CABINET

PRESS AREA


LEGEND

- ROPE BARRIER
- ▣ SATURDAY WORKING STAFF
- POPE'S OFFICIAL PARTY OF 30
- ▤ RESERVED SEATING
- ⊠ TV POOL PLATFORM (5x7)
- UNILATERAL TV PLATFORM
- - - - POPE'S ROUTE



WEST WING
WORKING STAFF

EAST WING
WORKING STAFF

NORTH LAWN PLATFORM



ELEVATION OF STAGE & CANOPY NO. GROUNDS
SCALE 1/8" = 1'-0"



PLAN VIEW OF STAGE & CANOPY NO. GROUND
SCALE 1/8" = 1'-0"

POPE'S VISIT - OCTOBER 6th
North Grounds Platform

SOUTH LAMN CHART

LEGEND

- ROPE BARRIER
- ▣ SATURDAY WORKING STAFF
- POPE'S OFFICIAL PARTY OF 30
- ▤ RESERVED SEATING
- TV POOL PLATFORM (5x7)
- UNILATERAL TV PLATFORM
- - - - POPE'S ROUTE

WEST WING
WORKING STAFF

EAST WING
WORKING STAFF

NATIONAL
SYMPHONY

RADIO

A

F

E

C

D

G

H

J

I

SW GATE


- 9:00 NSO INSTRUMENT TRUCK & STAGE HANDS (WALK IN)
- 1:50 ORCHESTRA MEMBERS (WALK IN)
- 2:00 MATISLAV ROSTROPOVICH WITH LBONTYNE PRICE IN VEHICLE TO SOUTH PARTIC
- 7:30 GUESTS WITH BLUE INVITATION (A THRU L)

SE GATE



- 2:30 GUESTS WITH GREEN INVITATION (M-Z)

NO STAIRS

SOUTH LAWN PLATFORM



ELEVATION



PLAN

POPE'S VISIT - OCTOBER 6th
South Grounds Platform

SEATING (congressional)

NUMERICAL SENIORITY - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - 96TH CONGRESS

1- ~~SPEAKER O'NEILL~~ 3- ~~RHODES~~ 5- ~~MICHEL~~
 2- ~~WRIGHT~~ 4- ~~BRADEMAS~~

	Terms		Term
6 Whitten (11/4/41)	20	56 Cleveland	9
7 Price	18	57 Edwards, CA	9
8 Bennett	16	58 Fuqua	9
9 Bolling, MO	16	59 Gibbons	9
10 Perkins	16	60 Hawkins	9
11 Rodino	16	61 Horton	9
12 Staggers	16	62 Long, MD	9
13 Steed	16	63 McClory	9
14 Zablocki	16	64 McDade	9
15 Boland, MA	14	65 Minish	9
16 Brooks	14	66 Murphy, NY	9
17 Fountain	14	67 Patten	9
O'Neill	14	68 Pepper	9
Rhodes	14	69 Quillen	9
18 Wilson, Bob	14	70 Roybal	9
19 Natcher (8/1/53)	14	71 Van Deerlin	9
20 Flood	13&3	72 Wilson, Chas. H., CA	9
21 Ashley	13	73 Wydler	9
22 Diggs	13	74 Clausen (1/22/63)	9
23 Fascell	13	75 Andrews, ND (10/22/63)	9
24 Reuss	13	76 Pickle (12/21/63)	9
25 Thompson	13	77 Burton, Phillip (2/18/64)	9
26 Vanik	13	78 Yates	8&
Wright	13	79 Annunzio	8
27 Dingell (12/13/55)	13	80 Bingham	8
28 Broomfield	12	81 Buchanan	8
Michel	12	82 Carter	8
29 Ullman	12	83 Conable	8
Brademas	11	84 Conyers	8
30 Conte	11	85 de la Garza	8
31 Derwinski	11	86 Dickinson	8
32 Devine	11	87 Duncan, TN	8
33 Giaimo	11	88 Edwards, AL	8
34 Johnson, CA	11	89 Erlenborn	8
35 Kastenmeier	11	90 Foley	8
36 Latta	11	91 Ford, MI	8
37 Moorhead, PA.	11	92 Hamilton	8
38 Rostenkowski	11	93 Hanley	8
39 Slack	11	94 Howard	8
40 Smith, IA	11	95 McEwen	8
41 Stratton	11	96 Satterfield	8
42 Addabbo	10	97 Stanton	8
43 Anderson, IL	10	98 White	8
44 Ashbrook	10	99 Wolff	8
45 Corman	10	100 Brown, OH (11/2/65)	8
46 Findley	10	102 Jones, NC (2/5/66)	8
47 Harsha	10	103 Vander Jagt (11/8/66)	8
48 Ichord	10	104 Snyder	7&
49 St Germain	10	105 Wampler	7&
50 Udall (5/2/61)	10	106 Bevill	7
51 Gonzalez (11/4/61)	10	107 Brinkley	7
52 Nedzi (11/7/61)	10	108 Eckhardt	7
53 Roberts (1/30/62)	10	109 Hammersc midt	7
54 Rosenthal (2/20/62)	10	110 Heckler	7
55 Broyhill	9	111 Kazen	7

Numerical Seniority
Page 2

Terms

Teri

112	Miller, OH	7	165	Runnels	5
113	Montgomery	7	166	Seiberling	5
114	Myers, IN	7	167	Spence	5
115	Nichols	7	168	Young, FL	5
116	Railsback	7	169	Davis, SC (4/27/71)	5
117	Winn	7	170	Breaux (9/30/72)	5
118	Wylie	7	171	Butler (11/7/72)	5
119	McCloskey (12/12/67)	7	172	Brown, CA	4 &
120	Collins, TX (8/24/68)	7	173	Long, LA	4 &
121	Gaydos (11/5/68)	7	174	Abdnor	4
122	Mollohan	6 & 2	175	Andrews, NC	4
123	Alexander	6	176	Bafalis	4
124	Anderson, CA	6	177	Beard, TN	4
125	Biaggi	6	178	Bowen	4
126	Burlison, MO	6	179	Burgener	4
127	Chappell	6	180	Daniel, Robert W., VA	4
128	Chisholm	6	181	Gilman	4
129	Clay	6	182	Ginn	4
130	Coughlin	6	183	Guyer	4
131	Daniel, Dan, VA	6	184	Holt	4
132	Fish	6	185	Holtzman	4
133	Lujan	6	186	Johnson, CO	4
134	Preyer	6	187	Jones, OK	4
135	Sebelius	6	188	Lehman	4
136	Stokes	6	189	Lott	4
137	Whitehurst	6	190	Madigan	4
138	Yatron	6	191	Martin	4
139	Jones, TN (3/25/69)	6	192	Mitchell, NY	4
140	Obey (4/1/69)	6	193	Moakley	4
141	Goldwater (4/29/69)	6	194	Moorhead, CA	4
142	Roe (11/4/69)	6	195	O'Brien	4
143	Crane, Philip M. (11/25/69)	6	196	Pritchard	4
144	Rousselot (6/30/70)	6 & 1	197	Regula	4
145	Forsythe (11/3/70)	6	198	Rinaldo	4
146	Archer	5	199	Rose	4
147	Aspin	5	200	Schroeder	4
148	Cotter	5	201	Shuster	4
149	Danielson	5	202	Stark	4
150	Dellums	5	203	Studds	4
151	Drinan	5	204	Symms	4
152	Frenzel	5	205	Taylor, MO	4
153	Hillis	5	206	Treen	4
154	Kemp	5	207	Wilson, Chas., TX	4
155	Lent	5	208	Young, AK	4
156	McCormack	5	209	Boggs (3/20/73)	4
157	McKay	5	210	Collins, IL (6/5/73)	4
158	McKinney	5	211	Bauman (8/21/73)	4
159	Mathis	5	212	Murtha (2/4/73)	4
160	Mazzoli	5	213	Lagomarsino (3/5/74)	4
161	Mitchell, MD	5	214	Traxler (4/17/74)	4
162	Murphy, IL	5	215	Burton, John L. (6/4/74)	4
163	Rangel	5	216	Jacobs	3 & 4
164	Robinson	5	217	Scheuer	3 & 4

Numerical Seniority

	Terms		Terms
324 Kostmayer, PA	2	380 Dixon, CA	1
325 Leach, IA	2	381 Donnelly, MA	1
326 Lederer	2	382 Dougherty, PA	1
327 Marks	2	383 Erdahl, MN	1
328 Marlenee	2	384 Fazio, CA	1
329 Marriott	2	385 Ferraro, NY	1
330 Mattox	2	386 Frost, TX	1
331 Mikulski	2	387 Gingrich, GA	1
332 Murphy, PA	2	388 Gramm, TX	1
333 Oakar	2	389 Gray, PA	1
334 Panetta	2	390 Grisham, CA	1
335 Pease	2	391 Guarini, NJ	1
336 Pursell	2	392 Hall, OH	1
337 Quayle	2	393 Hance, TX	1
338 Rahall	2	394 Hinson, LA	1
339 Rudd	2	395 Hopkins, KY	1
340 Sawyer	2	396 Hutto, FL	1
341 Skelton	2	397 Jeffries, KS	1
342 Stockman	2	398 Kogovsek, CO	1
343 Stump	2	399 Kramer, CO	1
344 Tribble	2	400 Leach, IA	1
345 Vento	2	401 Leath, TX	1
346 Volkmer	2	402 Lee, NY	1
347 Walgren	2	403 Loeffler, TX	1
348 Walker	2	404 Leland, TX	1
349 Watkins	2	405 Lewis, CA	1
350 Weiss	2	406 Lowry, WA	1
351 Whitley	2	407 Lungren, CA	1
352 Young, MO	2	408 Matsui, CA	1
353 Stangeland (2/22/77)	2	409 Mavroules, MA	1
354 Fowler, (4/5/77)	2	410 Mica, FL	1
355 Livingston, (8/27/77)	2	411 Nelson, FL	1
356 Garcia (2/14/78)	2	412 Pashayan, CA	1
357 Green (2/14/78)	2	413 Ratchford, CT	1
358 Peyser, NY	1&3	414 Ritter, PA	1
359 Paul, TX	1&1	415 Roth, WI	1
360 Albosta, MI	1	416 Sabo, MN	1
361 Anthony, AR	1	417 Sensenbrenner, WI	1
362 Atkinson, PA	1	418 Shannon, MA	1
363 Bailey, PA	1	419 Shelby, AL	1
364 Barnes, MD	1	420 Shumway, CA	1
365 Bereuter, NE	1	421 Snowe, ME	1
366 Bethune, AR	1	422 Solomon, NY	1
367 Boner, TN	1	423 Stack, FL	1
368 Byron, MD	1	424 Stenholm, TX	1
369 Campbell, SC	1	425 Stewart, IL	1
370 Carney, NY	1	426 Swift, WA	1
371 Cheney, WY	1	427 Synar, OK	1
372 Clinger, PA	1	428 Tauke, IA	1
373 Coelho, CA	1	429 Thomas, CA	1
374 Courter, NJ	1	430 Whittaker, KS	1
375 Crane, Daniel B., IL	1	431 Williams, OH	1
376 Dannemeyer, CA	1	432 Williams, MT	1
377 Daschle, SD	1	433 Wolpe, MI	1
378 Davis, MI	1	434 Wyatt, TX	1
379 Deckard, IN	1		

Unofficial
SENIORITY OF SENATORS

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME OF SENATOR</u>	<u>STATE</u>
1	Warren G. Magnuson	Washington
2	Milton R. Young	North Dakota
3	John C. Stennis	Mississippi
4	Russell B. Long	Louisiana
5	Henry M. Jackson	Washington
6	Strom Thurmond	South Carolina
7	Herman E. Talmadge	Georgia
8	Frank Church	Idaho
9	Jacob K. Javits	New York
10	William Proxmire	Wisconsin
11	Jennings Randolph	West Virginia
12	Robert C. Byrd	West Virginia
13	Harrison A. Williams, Jr.	New Jersey
14	Edmund S. Muskie	Maine
15	Howard W. Cannon	Nevada
16	Quentin N. Burdick	North Dakota
17	Claiborne Pell	Rhode Island
18	John Tower	Texas
19	Edward M. Kennedy	Massachusetts
20	Abraham Ribicoff	Connecticut
21	George McGovern	South Dakota
22	Daniel K. Inouye	Hawaii

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME OF SENATOR</u>	<u>STATE</u>
23	Birch Bayh	Indiana
24	Gaylord Nelson	Wisconsin
25	Harry F. Byrd	Virginia
26	Ernest F. Hollings	South Carolina
27	Charles H. Percy	Illinois
28	Howard H. Baker, Jr.	Tennessee
29	Mark O. Hatfield	Oregon
30	Ted Stevens	Alaska
31	Thomas F. Eagleton	Missouri
32	Barry Goldwater	Arizona
33	Richard S. Schweiker	Pennsylvania
34	Charles Mac. Mathias, Jr.	Maryland
35	Robert Dole	Kansas
36	Henry Bellmon	Oklahoma
37	Alan Cranston	California
38	Bob Packwood	Oregon
39	Mike Gravel	Alaska
40	Adlai E. Stevenson	Illinois
41	William V. Roth, Jr.	Delaware
42	Lloyd Bentsen	Texas
43	Lowell P. Weicker	Connecticut
44	Lawton Chiles	Florida
45	Robert T. Stafford	Vermont
46	Sam Nunn	Georgia
47	J. Bennett Johnston	Louisiana

RANK

NAME OF SENATOR

STATE

48

James A. McClure

Idaho

49

Jesse Helms

North Carolina

50

Walter D. Huddleston

Kentucky

51

Pete V. Domenici

New Mexico

52

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Delaware

53

Paul Laxalt

Nevada

54

Jake Garn

Utah

55

John Glenn

Ohio

56

Wendell H. Ford

Kentucky

57

Richard Stone

Florida

58

John C. Culver

Iowa

59

Dale Bumpers

Arkansas

60

Robert Morgan

North Carolina

61

Gary Hart

Colorado

62

Patrick J. Leahy

Vermont

63

John A. Durkin

New Hampshire

64

John C. Danforth

Missouri

65

Edward Zorinsky

Nebraska

66

Howard M. Metzenbaum

Ohio

67

John Chafee

Rhode Island

68

Donald W. Riegle, Jr.

Michigan

69

S. I. Hayakawa

California

70

Spark M. Matsunaga

Hawaii

71

John Melcher

Montana

72

Paul S. Sarbanes

Maryland

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME OF SENATOR</u>	<u>STATE</u>
73	H. John Heinz, III	Pennsylvania
74	Daniel Patrick Moynihan	New York
75	Richard G. Lugar	Indiana
76	James R. Sasser	Tennessee
77	Dennis DeConcini	Arizona
78	Orrin G. Hatch	Utah
79	Harrison H. Schmitt	New Mexico
80	Malcolm Wallop	Wyoming
81	David Durenberger	Minnesota
82	Donald Stewart	Alabama
83	Max Baucus	Montana
84	Nancy L. Kassebaum	Kansas
85	Thad Cochran	Mississippi
86	Rudy Boschwitz	Minnesota
87	Alan K. Simpson	Wyoming
88	John Warner	Virginia
89	David H. Pryor	Arkansas
90	William L. Armstrong	Colorado
91	William S. Cohen	Maine
92	Paul S. Tsongas	Massachusetts
93	Larry Pressler	South Dakota
94	J. James Exon	Nebraska
95	David L. Boren	Oklahoma
96	Carl Levin	Michigan
97	Bill Bradley	New Jersey

RANK

NAME OF SENATOR

STATE

98

Howell Heflin

Alabama

99

Roger W. Jepsen

Iowa

100

Gordon J. Humphrey

New Hampshire

DETAILED BACKGROUND
INFORMATION

NORTH LAWN CEREMONY

Guests on the North Lawn consist of:

- Members of Congress and their spouse
- Members of the Cabinet and their spouse
- Members of the Supreme Court and spouse
- White House staff members and spouse/guest

CONGRESSIONAL:

Transportation needs will be taken care of by Norde Hoffman for the House and by Ken Harding for the Senate. They are using buses for transportation and we will provide parking. They will begin arriving at 1:00 p.m.

Each Member of Congress will have reserved seating, in protocol order with the Leadership in the front. A seating chart (numerical) will be given to each Member so that they will know in advance where they are to go.

Section A

This will be reserved for the Judiciary; official Papal Party; Cabinet Officers; Carter family members; Senior Staff. (all of the above groups have been given an invitation for their spouse or 1 guest)

Section B

This will be reserved for the Senate with leadership in the front. The Vice President and Mrs. Mondale and Speaker and Mr. O'Neill will be seated here.

Section C

This will be reserved for House Members with the Leadership in front.

We expect the following representation from these groups:

Congressional-----	1070
Judiciary-----	18
Official Papal Party--	38 (approx.)
Cabinet Officers-----	34
Senior Staff-----	48
Family Members-----	*

(* Please advise regarding family members)

WHITE HOUSE STAFF:

We expect 3000 White House Staff and their guests. Invitations were extended to about 1500 Green White House staff passholders. Included in this group:

- West Wing personnel
- EOB personnel (limited)
- Residence Staff (Kitchen/grounds/telephone operators)

These guests will be in a standing area in back of our reserved seating areas. Admittance will be through the NW gate and each staff person has been given a special numbered ticket with their name on it.

Samples of all invitations are included -- see tab.

Charts showing seating and platform are also attached.

MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE ARRIVAL CEREMONY:

A cordon of joint service soldiers will be formed on the North Drive from the Northwest Gate to the North Portico (dismount point) for the arrival of Pope John Paul II.

The U.S. Army Herald Trumpets will be in a position near the North Portico to play a trumpet fanfare as Pope John Paul II arrives.

A ceremony of this type is less than what would be provided to a visiting Head of State/Head of Government thus preventing the analogy being drawn that a Head of State/Head of Government arrival was afforded Pope John Paul II.

The U.S. Military Band will be playing a special program of music as the North Lawn Guests begin arriving and will play until just before His Holiness John Paul II arrives.

PAPAL ARRIVAL

As the motorcade arrives, the trumpets begin playing. The lead car proceeds to the North Portico. Bishop Marcinkus is in the lead card.

The motorcade is stopped at Section A and the official party disembarks and are escorted to reserved seating in Section A.

The Papal Car continues to the North Portico where Bishop Marcinkus and His Holiness John Paul II meet the President and Mrs. Carter and the Vice President and Mrs. Mondale.

There will be a photo opportunity at this time.

Three to four minutes are need^{ed} to prepare cameras and also for us to brief Bishop Marcinkus and His Holiness John Paul II. The Papal Party will have been traveling and even though they have been kept aware of the overall plan, they have asked to be briefed at this time regarding last minute developments.

Bishop Marcinkus, Vice President and Mrs. Mondale will be escorted to reserved seating at this time and the President and Mrs. Carter and His Holiness John Paul II will move out the the right of the Portico to Section C where they begin greeting guests.

SOUTH LAWN CEREMONY

Approximately 6000 guests are expected to participate in the South Lawn Ceremony.

We have color-coded the invitations so that half will come in the SW Gate (A-L) and the other half will come in the SE Gate (M-Z). All guests will be directed to an entrance below the fountain once they are inside and from that point they will be directed to seating.

All Governors (and their spouses) will be seated in a reserved area in Section B. They all have been contacted by phone and know where to go.

The family members will be seated in front of the Governors in Section B.

Reserved seating has also been provided to special guests. Each of these guests have been called and know where they are to be seated. In addition cards with their names will be placed on their assigned seats.

Parking has been arranged for the handicapped; in addition, special requests have been accommodated.

Lead Car	✓ Bishop Marcinkus
Papal Car	✓ Pope John Paul II ✓ Cardinal Baum ✓ Father Dziwisz ✓ Father Magee ✓ --Cmdr. Cibin (Vatican Secretary)
Follow-up	✓ Major Buchs ✓ Lt. Grassi ✓ Lt. Hasler
Car 1	✓ Cardinal Casaroli ✓ Archbishop Martinez ✓ Archbishop Jadot ✓ Monsignor Backis ✓ --Mr. Angelo Gugiel
Car 2	✓ Monsignor Delgallo ✓ Archbishop Quinn ✓ Bishop Kelly ✓ Bishop Martin ✓ --Monsignor Noe
Car 3	✓ Dr. Buzzonetti ✓ Monsignor Rigali ✓ Monsignor Rakoczy ✓ Father PanciVolli ✓ --Dr. Wislocki
Car 4	✓ Mr. Felice ✓ Mr. Mari ✓ Father Tucci ✓ Mr. Goroni ✓ Prof. Voltini ✓ Father Schotte
Car 5	✓ Archbishop Donnellan ✓ Archbishop Roache
Car 6 ARCHDIOCESAN CAR	✓ Cardinal O'Boyle ✓ Bishop Lyons ✓ Bishop Marino ✓ Monsignor Boland <u>OR</u> Foley** ✓ Monsignor Donoghue ✓ Monsignor Gillan

** Father Lynch and one of the two local coordinators will ensure that the motorcade is ready to move and then take positions in a preceding police car. Except for the Archdiocesan Car, the motorcade is the same for every city and for security reasons, Bishop Marcinkus has asked that under no circumstances should changes be made.

PROGRAM

Remarks by

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II

*Selections by
the United States Marine Band*

A



South
LAWN

[]

THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER

WELCOME YOU TO

THE WHITE HOUSE

ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF

HIS HOLINESS

JOHN PAUL II

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1979

[B]

Remarks by

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II

B

NATIONAL SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA
MSTISLAV ROSTROPOVICH, *Music Director*

LEONTYNE PRICE, *Soprano*

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| <i>William Schuman</i> | <i>American Festival Overture</i> |
| <i>Dvorak</i> | <i>Symphony No. 9 in E Minor,
Op. 95 "From the New World"
Adagio—Allegro molto
Largo
Scherzo: Molto vivace
Allegro con fuoco</i> |
| <i>Prokofiev</i> | <i>Duel Scene from "Romeo and
Juliet"</i> |
| <i>Malotte</i> | <i>The Lord's Prayer
Miss Price</i> |

National Symphony Orchestra
Mstislav Rostropovich, Music Director

Leontyne Price, Soprano

William Schuman

American Festival Overture

Dvorak

Symphony No. 9 in E Minor, Op. 95
"From the New World"

Adagio--Allegro molto

Largo

Scherzo: Molto vivace

Allegro con fuoco

Prokofiev

Duel Scene from Romeo and Juliet

Malotte

The Lord's Prayer

Miss Price

THE WHITE HOUSE

South Lawn

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**



*The President and Mrs. Carter
request the pleasure of your company
at a reception to be held at
The White House
on Saturday afternoon, October 6, 1979
at two-thirty o'clock*

South Lawn

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

*On the occasion of the visit of
His Holiness
John Paul II*

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

*Please respond to
The Social Secretary
The White House
at your earliest convenience*

(202) 456-7880

LK

Please present this card

with personal identification

at the Southern Gate

THE WHITE HOUSE

NOT TRANSFERABLE

—

North lawn

THE WALLER RECORDS

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**



*The President and Mrs. Carter
request the pleasure of your company
at a reception to be held at
The White House
on Saturday afternoon, October 6, 1979
at one o'clock*

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

LK

*Please present this card
with personal identification
at the Northeast Gate*
THE WHITE HOUSE

NOT TRANSFERABLE

*On the occasion of the visit of
His Holiness
John Paul II*

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

*On the occasion of
the visit of
His Holiness John Paul II*

*Please present this card with identification
at the Northwest Gate
The White House
Saturday, October 6, 1979
at one o'clock*

NOT TRANSFERABLE

1268

Staff

9:15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C

October 4, 1979

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LLOYD N. CUTLER

LNC

SUBJECT: SALT II

Now that we have regained the initiative on moving SALT II to the Senate Floor, we need to keep it.

To do so, it is essential in my judgment that within the next week we take four further steps:

1. Every business day we should follow through on the specifics of the broad measures you set forth in your speech. This means:

- a) Running the first SR-71 overflight;
- b) Creating the Joint Caribbean Command;
- c) Publicizing the Guantanamo exercise;
- d) Filming the Forrestal exercise for TV; and
- e) Sending the economic assistance supplemental request to Congress, in a form that is not limited to aid for Nicaragua, but also covers potential target countries such as Honduras, Salvador, Guatemala and the small Caribbean nations. (To confine the requested supplemental to aid for Nicaragua would be counter productive in my view.)

2. Directing Harold Brown to prepare the 1981 defense budget so as to achieve the basic Five Year Plan including the accelerations mentioned in the speech, without limiting him to 3% real growth or any other percentage figure.*

* - In your letter to Senator Hollings dated September 14 you stated "I can assure you that the FY 1981 and 1982 budget proposals. . . will achieve the basic objectives of our Five Year Defense Program."

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DECLASSIFIED
Per, Rac Project
ESDN: 100-126-18-23-1-7
BY: *KS* NARA DATE 10/23/13

3. Directing Stan Turner to prepare the intelligence portion of the 1981 defense budget so as to carry out the speech commitment to strengthen our intelligence capabilities. To me, this implies strengthening our capabilities to a level greater than permitted by OMB's pre-speech guidelines to Stan. If the actual 1980 defense appropriation turns out to be less than the real 3% increase you support, and it becomes necessary to present another 1980 supplemental request to achieve the 3%, it would be desirable to include some additional 1980 funds for intelligence.

4. Authorizing Harold Brown, when he testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in the middle of next week, to say that he and Stan Turner have received these directives, and that the President will provide the Senate with a preview of the Administration's proposed 1981 defense budget during the SALT debate on the Senate Floor.

Items 1(e), 2, 3 and 4 require the making of hard and disputed policy decisions that have not yet been made. To sustain the commitments and the momentum of the speech, to validate our own Five Year Defense Plan, and to win 67 votes for SALT II, they will have to be made sooner or later. I submit it is better to make them now to sustain our momentum, and to convince the doubters in the Senate that the measures mentioned in the speech have substance, and that you are committed not only to SALT II, but also to a stronger and more mobile defense. I appreciate the substantive arguments against taking some of these steps and the tactical arguments for saving them until later. But if we hesitate or equivocate now, we will lose the momentum we have regained, and we will not get it back again.

Little time is left to debate the substance of these issues and to make the necessary decisions. Since Harold and Cy will be testifying on SALT by next Tuesday or Wednesday, and Harold will be in Florida from Saturday through Monday, the decisions ought to be made by this Friday.

LNC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/5/79

rick --

copy has been given to
brzezinski; read to
mcintyre. however, you
may want to send jim his
copy.

thanks--susan

(jim asks that you do
send him his copy so he
can have actions executed)
(thanks)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

06 Oct 79

FOR THE RECORD

BRZEZINSKI AND MCINTYRE
RECEIVED COPIES OF THE ATTACHED.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1979

MR. PRESIDENT:

Jim McIntyre reports that it is possible to re-program the \$15 million for Central America and the Caribbean without difficulty because it will come from collapsed programs mainly Afghanistan or other programs where the needs have lessened - Jordan.) In fact, 10 of the 15 have already been re-programed by State.

In addition, we can provide \$10 million in FMS credits if desired.

PHIL

Copies given
10/5/79
R

To: Jim & Zbig - Re
Caribb @ America aid -
Put #75 mil already
approved, #15 mil reprogramming,
#10 mil in FMS credits, plus
#5 mil in "need funds."
Let Henry & State
recommend how to
use funds -
JC.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

*See Phil's memo
J*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 5, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
 FROM: JIM McINTYRE *Jim*
 SUBJECT: Caribbean/Central American Aid Package (U)

At your request, Henry Owen and I have considered a \$90 million aid package which would meet our primary goals by seeking a \$75 million supplemental and reprogramming \$15 million from 1979 and yet-to-be-appropriated 1980 funds. We would support the following package:

- \$75 million ESF supplemental for Nicaragua
- \$5 million in reprogrammed AID (ESF) funds for development projects in Honduras and, if necessary conditions are met, in El Salvador
- \$10 million in reprogrammed AID funds (\$7.5 million from 1979 funds, plus another \$2.5 million in 1980) for public works in the Eastern Caribbean. (e)

This package provides increases for all areas, but limits the supplemental request to the one case where an emergency need is clearly present and is too large to be met by reprogramming. This will sit better with the budget and appropriations committees than a more expansive approach. (e)

We do not favor significantly reducing the supplemental request for Nicaragua; about \$75 million is needed there urgently. Other Central American and Caribbean needs can be met through the reprogramming outlined above and by increases in FY 81 aid, which will be foreshadowed in general terms when we seek the Nicaraguan supplemental. (e)

The Nicaraguan supplemental could, however, be reduced by \$1 million in favor of an FMS appropriation of \$1 million, which would make available \$10 million in FMS credits for the Eastern Caribbean Coast Guard. (FMS credits require only 10% appropriation.) This would help to meet the State Department's political concerns. I would like to reserve this decision until we can have further consultations with State and others. (The FMS need also could be met by reprogramming if events develop in a way that makes it desirable, although I have serious reservations about this course of action.) (e)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on October 5, 1985

DECLASSIFIED
 Per, Rac Project
 ESDN: 126-18-23 1-6
 BY: K/S DATE: 10/23/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

If you approve the \$90 million package, I will issue the necessary budget notice to the agencies concerned. I would like to retain OMB flexibility to make minor adjustments, depending on the final FY 1980 appropriations action and on the consultations about whether the Nicaraguan supplemental should be \$75 or \$74 million. (e)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

06 Oct 79

FOR THE RECORD

STU EIZENSTAT RECEIVED A COPY
OF MCINTYRE MEMO.

FOR STAFFING
FOR INFORMATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
NO DEADLINE
FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING
LAST DAY FOR ACTION

file

ADMIN CONFID
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
EYES ONLY


ACTION
FYI

VICE PRESIDENT
JORDAN
CUTLER
DONOVAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EIZENSTAT - <i>has</i>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MCDONALD
MOORE
POWELL
WATSON
WEDDINGTON
WEXLER
BRZEZINSKI
MCINTYRE
SCHULTZE
ANDRUS
ASKEW
BERGLAND
BROWN
CIVILETTI
DUNCAN
GOLDSCHMIDT
HARRIS
KREPS
LANDRIEU
MARSHALL

MILLER
VANCE
BUTLER
CAMPBELL
H. CARTER
CLOUGH
CRUIKSHANK
FIRST LADY
FRANCIS
HARDEN
HERTZBERG
HUTCHESON
KAHN
LINDER
MARTIN
MILLER
MOE
PETERSON
PRESS
SANDERS
SPETH
STRAUSS
TORRES
VOORDE
WISE

From Jim McIntyre for 9:15 meeting

In addition to your copy, Jim
has furnished copies for other
participants in meeting.





ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 5, 1979

C

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr. *J. McIntyre*
SUBJECT: SALT Testimony and the FY 81 Defense Budget

I must tell you that I am as concerned about the issues Harold raises in this memo as I have been about any issue I have ever had to take to you before. I believe that Harold's memo masks issues of major importance in deceptively mild and understated language.

In his memorandum, Harold recommends the following:

"Specifically, I believe I should be able to say:

-- The President has authorized me to prepare the FY 81 budget so as fully to accomplish the FY 81 segment of our defense program at the so-called basic level.

-- We recognize that this will require an increase of at least 3%, and may require more. The exact level depends on the readiness of certain programs to be carried out, manpower considerations, efficient rates of production, changes in world conditions, and a detailed final budget scrub. (FYI: The basic level represents (after a 2% budget scrub) about a 4% real increase in expenditures over our amended FY 80 request, but that is subject to some change in the course of the detailed budget preparation, as indicated above. The rate of budget authority increase would be larger than that for expenditures, reversing the pattern of the past few years. Over a longer period, the two measures will come into approximate equilibrium. I would not, however, plan to use a single specific number for the level of budget authority or expenditure increase. I'd say the number could be 3% or it could be more).

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

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-- We will commit now to giving appropriate members of the Senate a "preview" of the Administration's FY 81 budget and FY 81-85 FYDP at a later time, but prior to the normal announcement date, if the timing of the vote on the SALT Treaty makes such a preview necessary in order for them to be able to vote on the SALT Treaty in an informed way. (FYI: What I have in mind for such a "preview" is the outlay number and highlights of the five year program. To meet a late November SALT vote, I could be prepared to submit ZBB rankings to you by early November.) --

-- In addition, the Administration fully supports the expenditure level set as a limit for FY 1980 in the Senate version of the budget resolution, i.e., a 3 percent increase in outlays above the FY 1979 level in real terms.

-- Should the Congress fail to appropriate sufficient funds to meet that level, the President has authorized me to state he will submit additional FY 1980 supplemental budget requests as necessary, and will continue to do so until the full level is appropriated by Congress."

You are being asked nothing less than (1) to commit in November to your defense budget and program; (2) to commit now for that budget to the "basic" level which is certainly in excess of 3% real growth (Harold's minimum level is almost 1% real growth) and may be as high as 8% real growth in budget authority; (3) to commit now to budgeting for the Five Year Defense Program; (4) to agree to make all of this public in detail this fall before you have had a chance to review the complete DOD budget submission, to review all of the other FY 81 programs, or to look at totals or fiscal policy issues.

I believe that this request has extraordinary implications for the Presidency, for the general perception of your leadership, for the budget process, and for your ability to put together an FY 81 program, budget, and philosophy.

THE PRESIDENCY. For 190 years, the ability to initiate action -- to define the nation's agenda -- has been a major source of Presidential and executive power. For sixty years, the legal right to present a budget and consequently an Administration program has been the most significant means by which the agenda is set, the program defined, the executive managed. Every President -- and you foremost among them -- has defended this right against the constant encroachment of Congress and, to be frank, the instant desires of Agency Heads.

Numbers and Programs

You are currently on record as supporting 3% real growth. ("As the result of other economies and improved coordination of our defense programs with those of our allies, we should be able to carry out our defense objectives without exceeding the 3% level of annual increase in 1981 or 1982." Sept. 14, 1979 letter to Senator Ernest Hollings). You should be aware that while Secretary Brown's numbers are unclear, because the DOD does not yet have a precise budget, they are substantially higher than any you have seen before.

Secretary Brown's current basic program represents 8% real growth in budget authority. It is possible -- as Secretary Brown will argue -- that that same budget authority number represents 4% real growth in outlays. But DOD does not now have detailed outlay figures, nor has it completed its own programming decisions. It certainly does not now have a budget. We are scheduled to get precise numbers and rankings from DOD in mid-November. We are therefore quite concerned about what DOD will provide you and then Congress weeks earlier.

As you will recognize, an 8% rate of growth or a 4% rate gives us and you major problems in other areas of government. This is bothersome. It is all the more so when it is reached by giving meaning to a budgetary concept we have always regarded as empty.

In his memo Secretary Brown asks that you commit to the "basic level." The unfortunate use of the term "basic" suggests somehow that this level is related to a particular force structure or strategy that you have examined and accepted as Administration policy. It is not. It is not an inherently correct level, it has not been reviewed, it has not been carefully priced. It is most accurately characterized as a particular rate of modernization -- one with which we have some disagreement. I believe that the form of argument presented in Secretary Brown's memo represents an unfortunate continuation of the defense budget process with which we were so unhappy last year.

Finally, Secretary Brown implies that we should also commit to the five year defense plan. I regard this as a dangerous precedent, one we have never considered before. The plan has not been approved nor even seen by you; and it has not been costed out or related to budgetary or program concerns. I would strongly advise that we not make that commitment.

Alternatives

I have, I think, adequately indicated my disagreement with Harold's memo. It is profound. More importantly, I think there is also a better alternative. I believe Harold should structure testimony around the following:

- (1) Your commitment to at least 3% real growth;
- (2) The general forms of investment this commitment will allow, focusing on such themes as improved readiness, sustainability, and modernization;
- (3) Specific programs we can safely discuss -- the MX, the cruise missile.

The essence of my suggestion is that if early defense budget commitments must be made, they be made in outline not in detail. I am sure that this will not satisfy the Armed Services Committee -- whose interests are not entirely yours -- but it will permit us to tell a strong story, to avoid the effects I believe Harold's recommendations will have, and to avoid an auction in which particular Senators make symbolic demands which the Administration must make good on.

I have been greatly bothered by the fact that in the last few months the President who began the 3% commitment, who budgeted for it when Congress did not, and who took the heat for it has been made to appear anti-defense and has not been defended by our friends on the Hill. I greatly fear that Harold's recommendations will make you look worse, not better. Finally, I am personally insulted by the implication in this suggested process that the President cannot be trusted to make good in January for commitments he makes in October or November.

You will appear far stronger by continuing your already firm substantial commitment, by refusing to jump to another "quick" solution, and by defending the authority of the Presidency than you would by publicly trading the Defense Budget for SALT with the Armed Services Committee.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr. /s/Jim
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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

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Secretary Brown has now recommended -- for a well-intentioned reason -- that you give that right away. He has proposed that he present the DOD budget to the Congress before you review it, shape it, and conform it to other pressures and concerns. Even by itself, this request is extraordinary. But, on the basis of all we know about the Congress, we have no reason to expect that this will not represent a precedent in future years and for other issues that will be hard, if not impossible, to set aside. If the FY 81 defense budget, why not FY 82 or FY 83? If defense, why not HEW or HUD? If for the sake of this significant issue, why not for the next one? In short, I think this modest request is nothing less than a recommendation that you agree to diminish the power of the Presidency.

The Budget Process

I believe that the executive budget process is only incidentally a counting exercise. It is far more importantly (1) a way of forcing a Presidential perspective on agencies whose every instinct and interest is to be parochial; (2) a means of comparing and trading-off programs and resources; (3) a way of managing the executive branch; (4) a process by which discipline and rigor can be forced by the President; (5) the President's principal fiscal policy tool, (6) the only process in government that really works, and (7) the major vehicle for specifically stating the Administration's programs and priorities. It isn't perfect, it is never pleasant, it is sometimes necessarily contentious. At best, Secretary Brown's proposal will seriously limit the effectiveness of the budget process in the future.

The nub of the budget process -- and what distinguishes it from Congress' process -- is that the President and his advisors examine budgets, compare them, and determine priorities. Agency Heads are then required to defend these priorities to the Congress. Secretary Brown's proposal changes the process and all of its incentives in fundamental ways.

First, there will be no time when the President can review, reflect and decide on the defense budget in detail or in the context of the total budget. The Departmental rankings will be presented to you and then the Congress before that can be done. And then only after the Secretary has already publicly committed you to the basic program before you have seen any budget.

Second, the President loses any real opportunity to determine priorities. He is being asked to present 25% of his budget independently of the rest.

Third, if this practice should spread, every incentive is for the Agency Head to maximize his requests in the Fall and for the President either to acquiesce or to be the public villain of the new process. Last year you -- rightly -- registered concern when the DOD budget was presented in such a way that you had to cut and change; in Secretary Brown's recommendation that will happen again, unless you agree in advance to no changes.

Fourth, it is unlikely -- even at the extraordinary levels proposed -- that the Senate Armed Services Committee will (1) agree with the totals; or (2) forebear discussing details. Therefore, it is likely -- first, that the President will be forced to negotiate the defense budget publicly with the Senate this fall, and second, that the President will be pictured as short-changing defense no matter what level he recommends.

Politics

I am not your political expert, but nevertheless the political merits of these recommendations are not immediately apparent.

First, I do not know -- nor I suspect does anyone else -- what level defense budget will enable us to attain SALT. But I do know that these recommendations raise the odds that you will be perceived as a piker at any level you can accept. The political value of that evades me.

Second, I do not believe that a process which forces the President publicly to debate and negotiate his defense budget this fall strengthens the President or provides any opportunity for affirmative leadership.

Third, these recommendations do not take into account likely reactions from the rest of the political spectrum. At the levels Secretary Brown is advising you to accept, resources will become an issue with other Senators whose concerns are different. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that other Senators will not demand the same public and advance disclosure for the budgets they care about. We all know that the logical relationship between SALT and defense resources is at best tenuous. (Senator Nunn has made it clear that he regards this as a good opportunity to raise the budget to the levels he desires.). Others can and will argue that SALT is importantly related to resources for their programs -- the more publicly we negotiate defense resources, the more likely we are to force these arguments.

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Alternatives


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I have been greatly bothered by the fact that in the last few months the President who began the 3% commitment, who budgeted for it when Congress did not, and who took the heat for it has been made to appear anti-defense and has not been defended by our friends on the Hill. I greatly fear that Harold's recommendations will make you look worse, not better. Finally, I am personally insulted by the implication in this suggested process that the President cannot be trusted to make good in January for commitments he makes in October or November.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr. /s/ Jim
SUBJECT: SALT Testimony and the FY 81 Defense Budget

I must tell you that I am as concerned about the issues Harold raises in this memo as I have been about any issue I have ever had to take to you before. I believe that Harold's memo masks issues of major importance in deceptively mild and understated language.

In his memorandum, Harold recommends the following:

"Specifically, I believe I should be able to say:

-- The President has authorized me to prepare the FY 81 budget so as fully to accomplish the FY 81 segment of our defense program at the so-called basic level.

-- We recognize that this will require an increase of at least 3%, and may require more. The exact level depends on the readiness of certain programs to be carried out, manpower considerations, efficient rates of production, changes in world conditions, and a detailed final budget scrub. (FYI: The basic level represents (after a 2% budget scrub) about a 4% real increase in expenditures over our amended FY 80 request, but that is subject to some change in the course of the detailed budget preparation, as indicated above. The rate of budget authority increase would be larger than that for expenditures, reversing the pattern of the past few years. Over a longer period, the two measures will come into approximate equilibrium. I would not, however, plan to use a single specific number for the level of budget authority or expenditure increase. I'd say the number could be 3% or it could be more).

-- We will commit now to giving appropriate members of the Senate a "preview" of the Administration's FY 81 budget and FY 81-85 FYDP at a later time, but prior to the normal announcement date, if the timing of the vote on the SALT Treaty makes such a preview necessary in order for them to be able to vote on the SALT Treaty in an informed way. (FYI: What I have in mind for such a "preview" is the outlay number and highlights of the five year program. To meet a late November SALT vote, I could be prepared to submit ZBB rankings to you by early November.) --

-- In addition, the Administration fully supports the expenditure level set as a limit for FY 1980 in the Senate version of the budget resolution, i.e., a 3 percent increase in outlays above the FY 1979 level in real terms.

-- Should the Congress fail to appropriate sufficient funds to meet that level, the President has authorized me to state he will submit additional FY 1980 supplemental budget requests as necessary, and will continue to do so until the full level is appropriated by Congress."

You are being asked nothing less than (1) to commit in November to your defense budget and program; (2) to commit now for that budget to the "basic" level which is certainly in excess of 3% real growth (Harold's minimum level is almost 1% real growth) and may be as high as 8% real growth in budget authority; (3) to commit now to budgeting for the Five Year Defense Program; (4) to agree to make all of this public in detail this fall before you have had a chance to review the complete DOD budget submission, to review all of the other FY 81 programs, or to look at totals or fiscal policy issues.

I believe that this request has extraordinary implications for the Presidency, for the general perception of your leadership, for the budget process, and for your ability to put together an FY 81 program, budget, and philosophy.

THE PRESIDENCY

For 190 years, the ability to initiate action - to define the nation's agenda - has been a major source of Presidential and executive power. For sixty years, the legal right to present a budget and consequently an Administration program has been the most significant means by which the agenda is set, the program defined, the executive managed. Every President -- and you foremost among them -- has defended this right against the constant encroachment of Congress and, to be frank, the instant desires of Agency Heads.

Secretary Brown has now recommended -- for a well-intentioned reason -- that you give that right away. He has proposed that he present the DOD budget to the Congress before you review it, shape it, and conform it to other pressures and concerns. Even by itself, this request is extraordinary. But, on the basis of all we know about the Congress, we have no reason to expect that this will not represent a precedent in future years and for other issues that will be hard, if not impossible, to set aside. If the FY 81 defense budget, why not FY 82 or FY 83? If defense, why not HEW or HUD? If for the sake of this significant issue, why not for the next one? In short, I think this modest request is nothing less than a recommendation that you agree to diminish the power of the Presidency.

The Budget Process

I believe that the executive budget process is only incidentally a counting exercise. It is far more importantly (1) a way of forcing a Presidential perspective on agencies whose every instinct and interest is to be parochial; (2) a means of comparing and trading-off programs and resources; (3) a way of managing the executive branch; (4) a process by which discipline and rigor can be forced by the President; (5) the President's principal fiscal policy tool, (6) the only process in government that really works, and (7) the major vehicle for specifically stating the Administration's programs and priorities. It isn't perfect, it is never pleasant, it is sometimes necessarily contentious. At best, Secretary Brown's proposal will seriously limit the effectiveness of the budget process in the future.

The nub of the budget process -- and what distinguishes it from Congress' process -- is that the President and his advisors examine budgets, compare them, and determine priorities. Agency Heads are then required to defend these priorities to the Congress. Secretary Brown's proposal changes the process and all of its incentives in fundamental ways.

First, there will be no time when the President can review, reflect and decide on the defense budget in detail or in the context of the total budget. The Departmental rankings will be presented to you and then the Congress before that can be done. And then only after the Secretary has already publicly committed you to the basic program before you have seen any budget.

Second, the President loses any real opportunity to determine priorities. He is being asked to present 25% of his budget independently of the rest.

Third, if this practice should spread, every incentive is for the Agency Head to maximize his requests in the Fall and for the President either to acquiesce or to be the public villain of the new process. Last year you -- rightly -- registered concern when the DOD budget was presented in such a way that you had to cut and change; in Secretary Brown's recommendation that will happen again, unless you agree in advance to no changes.

Fourth, it is unlikely -- even at the extraordinary levels proposed -- that the Senate Armed Services Committee will (1) agree with the totals; or (2) forebear discussing details. Therefore, it is likely -- first, that the President will be forced to negotiate the defense budget publicly with the Senate this fall, and second, that the President will be pictured as short-changing defense no matter what level he recommends.

Politics

I am not your political expert, but nevertheless the political merits of these recommendations are not immediately apparent.

First, I do not know -- nor I suspect does anyone else -- what level defense budget will enable us to attain SALT. But I do know that these recommendations raise the odds that you will be perceived as a piker at any level you can accept. The political value of that evades me.

Second, I do not believe that a process which forces the President publicly to debate and negotiate his defense budget this fall strengthens the President or provides any opportunity for affirmative leadership.

Third, these recommendations do not take into account likely reactions from the rest of the political spectrum. At the levels Secretary Brown is advising you to accept, resources will become an issue with other Senators whose concerns are different. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that other Senators will not demand the same public and advance disclosure for the budgets they care about. We all know that the logical relationship between SALT and defense resources is at best tenuous. (Senator Nunn has made it clear that he regards this as a good opportunity to raise the budget to the levels he desires.). Others can and will argue that SALT is importantly related to resources for their programs -- the more publicly we negotiate defense resources, the more likely we are to force these arguments.

Numbers and Programs

You are currently on record as supporting 3% real growth. ("As the result of other economies and improved coordination of our defense programs with those of our allies, we should be able to carry out our defense objectives without exceeding the 3% level of annual increase in 1981 or 1982." Sept. 14, 1979 letter to Senator Ernest Hollings). You should be aware that while Secretary Brown's numbers are unclear, because the DOD does not yet have a precise budget, they are substantially higher than any you have seen before.

Secretary Brown's current basic program represents 8% real growth in budget authority. It is possible -- as Secretary Brown will argue -- that that same budget authority number represents 4% real growth in outlays. But DOD does not now have detailed outlay figures, nor has it completed its own programming decisions. It certainly does not now have a budget. We are scheduled to get precise numbers and rankings from DOD in mid-November. We are therefore quite concerned about what DOD will provide you and then Congress weeks earlier.

As you will recognize, an 8% rate of growth or a 4% rate gives us and you major problems in other areas of government. This is bothersome. It is all the more so when it is reached by giving meaning to a budgetary concept we have always regarded as empty.

In his memo Secretary Brown asks that you commit to the "basic level." The unfortunate use of the term "basic" suggests somehow that this level is related to a particular force structure or strategy that you have examined and accepted as Administration policy. It is not. It is not an inherently correct level, it has not been reviewed, it has not been carefully priced. It is most accurately characterized as a particular rate of modernization -- one with which we have some disagreement. I believe that the form of argument presented in Secretary Brown's memo represents an unfortunate continuation of the defense budget process with which we were so unhappy last year.

Finally, Secretary Brown implies that we should also commit to the five year defense plan. I regard this as a dangerous precedent, one we have never considered before. The plan has not been approved nor even seen by you; and it has not been costed out or related to budgetary or program concerns. I would strongly advise that we not make that commitment.

Alternatives

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