

10/12/79 [1]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 10/12/79
[1]; Container 134

To See Complete Finding Aid:

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	From Vance to The President (2 pp.) re: Central America and the Caribbean <i>opened per RAC NLC-126-18-25-1-5 11/18/13</i>	10/9/79	A
memo w/att.	From McIntyre to The President (5 pp) re: Aid to Egypt/enclosed in Hutcheson to McIntyre <i>opened per RAC NLC-126-18-25-1-4 11/18/13</i>	10/10/79	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Hand-writing File 10/12/79 [1] BOX 151

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute, or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

Revised:
10/12/79
8:00 a.m.

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE
Friday - October 12, 1979

NOT ISSUED

7:15 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

7:30 Breakfast with Vice President Walter F. Mondale,
(90 min.) Secretaries Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown,
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Hedley Donovan,
and Mr. Hamilton Jordan - The Cabinet Room.

9:15 Meeting with Congressional Liaison Group.
(15 min.) (Mr. Frank Moore) - The Cabinet Room.

9:45 Announcement/Heating Oil Goals - White House Press Room.

10:00 Mr. Hamilton Jordan and Mr. Frank Moore.
The Oval Office.

11:00 Presentation of Diplomatic Credentials.
(40 min.) (Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski) - The Oval Office.

12:15 Lunch with Senator William Roth - The Oval Office.
(30 min.)

1:30 Mr. Sol Linowitz - The Oval Office.
(20 min.)

2:00 Mr. James McIntyre - The Oval Office.
(20 min.)

2:30 Mr. Hedley Donovan - The Oval Office.
(5 min.)

3:00 Drop-By Briefing on SALT for Community Leaders.
(15 min.) (Ms. Anne Wexler) - The East Room.

6:30 Informal Dinner with Core of Freshman Members
of Congress - First Floor Private Dining Room.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/12/79

Ev Small

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling -- forwarding.

Rick Hutcheson

4474

Bonker Not Backing Ted

*Ed: The...
F...
...*

By **JEFF GREEN**
Shelton Bureau Chief
SHELTON — If you think 3rd District Congressman Don Bonker is in love with the Washington Post, just ask him — he'll tell you he isn't.

And Bonker doesn't think much of Senator Edward Kennedy either.

Bonker this morning spoke before a no-host breakfast crowd in Shelton. After commenting on



REP. DON BONKER

Raps Post

(Olympian Photo)

log exports, energy and the federal budget, he launched into the state of the presidency.

During this post-Watergate era, it may be the country is in a position where it's incapable of effective leadership, Bonker said. "The president and presidency is paralyzed," even though President Carter has lived up to the image of openness, compassion, honesty and moral leadership.

The nation now wants someone who is strong and decisive, Bonker said, warning listeners to look at what happened earlier with that type of leader in the White House, alluding to the Vietnam War and Watergate.

"The press is unfair and unnecessarily negative in its coverage of the president," Bonker said, adding the Washington Post has become, "a sophisticated gossip column."

Bonker said conflicts and enormous problems can't be solved in an arena of intense political adversity and intense press cynicism. There needs to be more tolerance, patience and support for people who are vested with

He's concerned because the nation seems to be experiencing a desecration of the person and the office.

"We couldn't come up with a more effective person to lead the country," Bonker said of President Carter. "Ted Kennedy would do more to polarize the country than anyone running."

"The Washington Post has a way of promoting Ted Kennedy and tearing down Carter." But Bonker added that if Senator Kennedy is nominated, the Post would begin tearing him down as well.

If the Democratic Party denies the nomination to President Carter without reason, Bonker said he doesn't know if the party deserves another four years in the office.

Other comments made by the congressman included the following:

— "The most arrogant staff in Washington, D.C. is that which surrounds Ted Kennedy — they're snobs."

— On White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, "There's not a shred of evidence anywhere" regarding Jordan's alleged use of cocaine. "Somebody makes a statement about a party and it's in the press."

— "Hamilton Jordan is talented politically and loyal to Carter, but he's misplaced in that position."

— "Carter should have a Bob Strauss rather than a Hamilton Jordan in the White House."

— On columnists in the nation's capitol, "they're either conservative or liberal, and they all hate Carter."

— "If the Post were to cover me like they cover Carter, I couldn't stand it and neither could my family."

— Daily newspapers in Bonker's district are more sophisticated in their coverage of Washington, D.C. than is the Washington Post.

Following his formal address, the congressman spoke with a small group of constituents. He elaborated on his comments about the Post and the Washington press corps.

The newspaper, "brought down one president and really has a sense of power," he said. The newspaper doesn't like President Carter because he's from the South, because of his faith and because he doesn't fit into categories, he added. The Post doesn't know nor understand the president. "It's like the National Enquirer on a daily basis," Bonker said of the Post. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal are a little more

*To Don Bonker
Thank you
Jimmy Carter*

3:00 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

October 11, 1979

BRIEFING ON SALT FOR COMMUNITY LEADERS FROM MINNESOTA AND MISSOURI

Friday, October 12, 1979

3:00 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.

The East Room

From: Anne Wexler *AW*

I. PURPOSE

To educate a group of prominent community leaders from Minnesota and Missouri on SALT, with the expectation that these leaders will carry our message back to their home states.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background

This is the sixth in a series of SALT briefings for community leaders from key states. The persons in attendance were generally selected because of their ability to influence public opinion in the States of Minnesota and Missouri.

B. Participants

Of the 350 persons invited, the largest group consists of persons recommended to us by Senators Boschwitz, Durenberger, Danforth, and Eagleton. The four senators were invited and may be in attendance. We will not know for certain until the briefing begins, and we will let Phil know then. In general, the audience will consist of political leaders, businesspersons, trade union leaders, attorneys, publishers, university administrators, and interest group leaders.

C. Press Plan

White House Photo and Press Pool for the first five minutes of your remarks. In addition, several members of the press will be in the audience for the entire briefing, including all of your remarks. They represent media outlets in Minnesota and Missouri.

III. AGENDA

When you arrive, Zbig Brzezinski and George Seignious will be answering questions from the audience at the completion of a one-hour briefing. After you make your remarks and (if you choose) take questions, there will be a reception in the State Dining Room. (See attached agenda.)

IV. TALKING POINTS

Suggested talking points are attached.

SALT BRIEFING FOR COMMUNITY LEADERS

October 12, 1979

The East Room

2:00 p.m.	Opening Remarks	Anne Wexler
2:05 p.m.	The SALT II Agreement and U.S. - Soviet Relations	Zbigniew Brzezinski
2:25 p.m.	Questions and Answers	Zbigniew Brzezinski George Seignious
3:00 p.m.	Remarks	The President
3:15 p.m.	Reception -- The State Dining Room	

TALKING POINTS

Briefing on SALT for Community Leaders

1. SALT II is the most serious matter I will address during my Presidency. The SALT II Treaty was hammered out by the sustained work of three Administrations: President Nixon's, President Ford's, and mine. It builds on the work of every American President since the end of World War II.

2. SALT must be examined realistically. It is not a panacea. It will not end the arms race but it will stabilize and order the competition. It is a supplement -- not a substitute -- for a strong national defense. But it is a major step in the long, historic process of bringing nuclear weapons under regional control.

3. SALT II is based on self-interest, ours and the Soviet Union's. Although the competition between us will continue as far into the future as anyone can see, we share a mutual interest in survival and in steering our competition away from its most dangerous element, an uncontrolled strategic nuclear arms race.

4. SALT II is not based on trust. The Treaty will be adequately verifiable by our own national technical means of verification. In addition, it is in the interest of the Soviet Union to abide by this Treaty. Despite predictions to the contrary, the Soviets have observed the terms of the SALT I Treaty.

5. Whether or not the treaty is ratified, we must be able to make accurate assessments of Soviet capabilities. But SALT II will make this task much easier -- not only because the Treaty forbids concealment measures and interference with means of verification, but also because the Treaty gives us basic standards with which we can compare the information we derive independently from our satellites and other methods.

6. The details of ICBMs and SLBMs, throwweight and yield and all the rest are important. It was largely because of these details that the Treaty took seven years to negotiate. But these details should not blind us to the real significance of the treaty as a contribution to stability, security and peace.

7. The Treaty must be judged on its merits, but we must consider the consequences of rejection:

-- If we do not get SALT ratified, I think it will be a profound blow against the security of our country and against the prospect for world peace, heightening the possibility of confrontation in each local crisis.

-- Radical departure from the process of arms control that began with the atmospheric test ban and SALT I and will continue with SALT III and a comprehensive test ban.

-- Triggering an expensive, dangerous race for a nuclear superiority that each side has the means and will to prevent the other from attaining, with a loss of security for both.

-- Calling into question our ability to manage a stable East-West relationship, undermining the very foundation of some of our alliances, including NATO.

-- It will weaken efforts to control nuclear proliferation because of a breakdown between the superpowers.

-- Gravely compromise and weaken our Nation's position as a leader in the search for peace.

8. We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that -- too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace. I am confident that all Senators will perform their high responsibilities as the national interest requires.

9. Importance of the coming debate; solicitation of support, stressing that SALT is on track and we are pressing for a vote this year.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1979

MR. PRESIDENT:

Because of schedule conflicts for several participants, this meeting should be scheduled Saturday afternoon or late Sunday afternoon or it must wait until next Friday.

Saturday early afternoon
after radio call in show

Sunday afternoon after
5 p.m. (the snow at Camp
David has melted)

Friday, October 19

PHIL

230 p/m
For 10/13 mtg

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

(Entire text)

October 9, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance *CV*
Subject: Central America and the Caribbean

Last Friday at breakfast you expressed the desire to know more about the situation in the Central American and Caribbean regions and suggested that our Ambassadors might be brought back for a briefing session. I would like to suggest that instead we structure a briefing session around Phil Habib for the Caribbean, Bill Bowdler for Central America, and Pete Vaky for overall Latin America. Habib and Bowdler have recently made separate surveys of the respective regions and all three have an overview of the trends and dynamics. As you suggested, we would also have a CIA briefing on the countries involved.

I believe this would be preferable to bringing up the Ambassadors. A series of briefings by five or more Ambassadors is likely to be country-centered and less cohesive and integrated than a specially structured overview by Habib, Bowdler, and Vaky.

I recommend that you agree to set aside a suitable period, perhaps an evening session, for such a briefing, at an early date.

*breakfast
or late afternoon*

~~SECRET~~

GDS 10/9/85

3PM

Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-126-18-25-1-5
BY *KS* NARA DATE *11/18/13*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
10/12/79

Jim McIntyre
Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED
Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-126-18-25-14
BY KS NARA DATE 11/18/13

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE 5859
WASHINGTON

OCT 10 1979

C

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM MCINTYRE *Ji*
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*
SUBJECT: Additional PL 480 for Egypt

As you requested, Cy Vance has studied Egypt's request for additional assistance, particularly PL 480. He proposes that \$34 million (for 200,000 tons of wheat) be added to the \$77 million for Egypt already in the PL 480 budget add-on now being considered by Congress -- a \$36.5 million increase after adjusting for freight and other factors. He cites the political objectives to be served as overriding other concerns arguing against the increase. The Department of Agriculture and IDCA Director Ehrlich oppose Vance's proposal. *(et)*

OMB agrees with USDA and IDCA. As Cy acknowledges, there is no economic case for more funds, and our economic assistance pipeline to Egypt is growing. Already you have approved giving Egypt over one-third of the pending PL 480 add-on of \$206 million -- \$60 million to maintain wheat tonnage at the level originally planned despite price increases and \$17 million to add 100,000 tons as you decided last month. *(et)*

The proposal would compound our problems with congressional committees. Congress has cut deeply into the original foreign aid budget request and may not allow sufficient supplementary funds even for the current \$206 million PL 480 add-on. In addition, you have approved \$115 million in supplementals for Central American and Caribbean countries and hurricane disaster relief. The congressional ceiling is likely to be below these new totals, before this requested \$36.5 million for Egypt. The larger the supplemental request is above the total Congress will allow, the greater is Congress' leverage over the composition of foreign aid by determining where the inevitable cuts will be taken. Cy has supplied no strategy for handling this problem. *(et)*

Finally, OMB sees this latest in a series of almost daily supplemental and reclama proposals from State as inconsistent

~~SECRET~~

Review on October 9, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

Per: Rac Project

ESDN: NLC-126-18-25-1-4

BY: KS NARA DATE 11/19/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

with rational budgeting in a tight year. These frequent changes in our budget requests to the Congress inspire lack of confidence on the Hill in our judgment. This proposal does not respond to an urgent need. OMB urges you to consider carefully the implications of approving this further increment for Executive-Legislative cooperation on fiscal matters and internal Executive Branch discipline. (C)

Owen concurs with the foregoing and adds four points: (i) An Egyptian share of 34 percent of our worldwide PL 480 credit sales program would run counter to your declared intention of increasing the developmental focus of this program; (ii) It has proved impossible to roll back any increase in aid to Egypt, once given, so that we would be permanently adding \$36 million (on top of \$77 million additional for Egypt that is now pending in the PL 480 add-on); (iii) Additional food aid for Egypt, which is not justified on economic grounds, would almost certainly have to come out of our aid to needier countries; (iv) The congressional committees are unimpressed by the case for supplementals at this stage in the budget cycle unless clearly justified by emergencies -- which is not the case here. These problems can be greatly mitigated by deferring action on State's proposal until your fall review of the FY 81 aid budgets. At that time, we will see the picture much more clearly; and the risks and disadvantages of a supplemental request will have been avoided. (C)

The NSC favors the State proposal. It accepts the point that economically there may be more needy countries; however, the increase for Egypt is justified on political grounds. This is a particularly delicate moment in the peace negotiations -- your most visible foreign policy achievement, and vital to U.S. interests. It is important for us to demonstrate to Egypt (and the rest of the Arab world) that "peace pays," and also to help provide political underpinnings for Sadat in his current very exposed position. Given the stakes, an extra 200,000 tons of grain is a good investment. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:


Option 1: Increase the pending PL 480 supplemental request by about \$36 million to raise the increase for Egypt from the 100,000 tons you approved in August to 300,000 tons. (Vance, Brzezinski)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 7, 1979

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance *cv*
SUBJECT: Egypt's Request for More PL-480 Wheat

You asked to look again at the question raised by Mubarak on raising the amount of PL-480 wheat for Egypt. I have done so.

I recommend that you ask the Congress to approve an additional \$34 million for Title I wheat (200,000 tons) for Egypt as soon as the House resumes consideration of the budget amendment bill. These funds would be in addition to the \$17 million already requested for 100,000 additional tons of wheat and would bring Egypt's FY 1980 level to 1.8 million tons. N.B. The Egyptians will doubtless wish to regard this as a new floor for future years, but we can try to make it clear that they should not do so when we inform them of our decision.

We estimate the total cost of Sadat's list-- presented by Mobarak -- at \$337.1 million, of which \$85 million is for wheat and \$292.1 million for other items. We see little economic justification for either of these requests in view of the improved performance of Egypt's economy in recent years and the substantial levels of assistance already in the pipeline. Nevertheless, the Embassy in Cairo has previously recommended that we provide 2.0 million tons of wheat annually to Sadat, and it is clear that the Egyptians are now hopeful that we will respond more favorably. We can delay a decision on the other items Egypt seeks; we expect to get additional information from Cairo.

~~SECRET~~

GDS 10/7/85

DECLASSIFIED
Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-12618-25-1-4
BY GDS NARA DATE 11/18/17

~~SECRET~~

-2-

IDCA and the Department of Agriculture are opposed to any increase, as is OMB. They argue that Egypt will receive 31% of Title I aid in FY 1980 and that a further increase would distort our worldwide program. IDCA also fears that more concessional wheat aid will deter the Egyptian authorities from further rationalizing their price and subsidy system, and will erode the developmental goals of the PL-480 program, which are of great interest to the Hill. There is concern that such a large program in a single country could result in future legislative restrictions on Executive Branch use of the program, as occurred in the Viet Nam era. These are legitimate concerns but they do not outweigh in my view the need for political purposes for a more positive response.

If you agree to recommend more wheat for Egypt, Agriculture would prefer that a separate supplemental request be submitted for Egypt alone. I believe that this would not be desirable since it would delay a prompt, positive response to Sadat and the issue could become linked with other questions of increased economic and military assistance to Egypt and Israel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For these reasons, I recommend that you ask the Congress to raise Egypt's PL-480 Title I level by an additional \$34 million in time to be considered when the House reconvenes on October 9.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

done
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONGRESSIONAL TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut)

DATE: October 12

RECOMMENDED BY: Frank Moore *F.m/pd*

PURPOSE: To ask his advice about Senator Roth with whom you are having lunch on October 12.

BACKGROUND: Because of their work together on MTN, Roth and Ribicoff have become close friends. We have been told that Roth respects Ribicoff's opinion, and, in turn, Ribicoff has some insights about Roth's thinking. As a strong SALT supporter himself, Ribicoff could give you some valuable advice on how to approach Roth, who we think is a possible SALT vote.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: I am having lunch with Bill Roth today. I know that he has kept himself very well informed on SALT and has kept an open mind. Senator Roth's role could be key in bringing Republican support to the Treaty. I understand that you and Bill Roth have become good friends, and I would value your opinion on how to approach him today.

DATE OF SUBMISSION: October 11, 1979

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
/	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

ACTION
FYI

	VICE PRESIDENT
	JORDAN
	CUTLER
	DONOVAN
	EIZENSTAT
	MCDONALD
/	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEDDINGTON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE
	ANDRUS
	ASKEW
	BERGLAND
	BROWN
	CIVILETTI
	DUNCAN
	GOLDSCHMIDT
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	LANDRIEU
	MARSHALL

	MILLER
	VANCE
	BUTLER
	CAMPBELL
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	CRUIKSHANK
	FIRST LADY
	FRANCIS
	HARDEN
	HERTZBERG
	HUTCHESON
	KAHN
	LINDER
	MARTIN
	MILLER
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PRESS
	SANDERS
	SPETH
	STRAUSS
	TORRES
	VOORDE
	WISE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/12/79

Jack Watson
Stu Eizenstat
Gretchen Poston
Helen Donaldson

The attached was returned
in the President's outbox
today and is forwarded to you
for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Phil
J

October 10, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JACK WATSON *Jack*
STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*

SUBJECT:

Urban Policy Reception/Recognition of
UDAG Program

Since the inception of the Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG), you have not had an opportunity to take sufficient credit for its overwhelming success. (Nearly \$900 million in UDAG funds has leveraged \$5.5 billion in private investment.) This Friday, October 12, is the second anniversary of your signing the authorizing legislation. In addition, we are holding up the announcement of the next round of big city UDAG grants.

We propose to hold an Urban Policy reception at the White House next Friday, October 19, 1979, to give long overdue recognition to this effort which is under Bob Embry's direction. While Secretary Landrieu would actually announce this round of grants, you would make a strong "Urban Accomplishments" statement to the assembled Mayors, Members of Congress, and general urban constituency.

It is important that you personally highlight one of the most dramatic achievements of your Presidency, developing and implementing a national urban policy.

Approve _____ ✓

Disapprove _____

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

2 P M

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C

MEETING WITH SENATOR ROTH

Friday, October 12, 1979
12:15 p.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Zbigniew Brzezinski ²⁰
Frank Moore ^{f.m/pd.}

I. PURPOSE

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

To discuss SALT

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

A. Background: We have suggested this meeting with Senator Roth because we have reason to believe that although he is inclined to support SALT he is beginning to feel pressure from Senators, such as Bellmon, who are advocating putting a vote off until next year. An explanation by you of the importance of voting on SALT this year and an appeal by you for his help is extremely important at this time.

Because of Roth's reputation as a moderate/conservative Republican, his endorsement of the Treaty could be crucial. If he were willing to do so, he could play a role similar to that of Baker during the Panama debate, i.e., providing bipartisan support by being a rallying point for Republicans. He has been an advocate of bipartisan support for foreign policy and in February, 1977, he wrote to you suggesting the formation of an advisory Foreign Policy Council to include Members of Congress and former Secretaries of State. He also suggested that Members of Congress accompany you on foreign trips. His staff tells us that he was impressed by your calling on the wise men during the Cuba episode.

Aside from the members of the SFRC, SASC, and SSCI, Roth has spent as much time studying SALT as any other Member of the Senate. In February, he and Senator Melcher formed a bipartisan SALT II study

group of uncommitted Senators (not members of the three committees) to meet with proponents of the Treaty. This group has been meeting on a fairly regular basis since that time, and they have asked various members of the Administration to discuss concerns such as those raised in his letter to Brown, Vance, and Brzezinski (Tab A). Members include:

Senator John Melcher
Senator Henry Bellmon
Senator Rudy Boschwitz
Senator Lawton Chiles
Senator Jack Danforth
Senator Dennis DeConcini
Senator David Durenberger
Senator Howell Heflin
Senator Walter Huddleston
Senator Nancy Kassebaum
Senator Larry Pressler
Senator Jim Sasser
Senator Alan Simpson
Senator Donald Stewart

Roth is a member of the Tripartite Commission and has always been interested in Allied views. It would be useful if you reiterated Allied support for the Treaty and spent some time discussing TNF--which he apparently finds hard to understand.

His staff tells us that until recently Roth has thought that SALT was useful in terms of our national security; he has been impressed by the fractionation limit and has accepted the argument that SALT II is a modest step in the right direction. Although he does not accept SALT linkage with Cuba, he is concerned about what he sees as a general Soviet testing of U.S. will in various parts of the world and a drift in U.S. foreign policy. Recently he has turned the "modest step" argument about SALT II around and said that if it is so modest, it may not be worth taking now as an indication that we intend to be firm with the Soviets. He also has developed some Glenn-like doubts on verification. He has asked some questions about the cold launch/hot launch controversy.

Despite these recent doubts on his part, the sense we get is that Roth is a man who is working his way through questions on SALT in an effort to arrive at a way he can vote for it.

Roth has been privately irked at the mileage Biden has gotten out of his SALT role and the fact that he presumes to speak for all the people in Delaware. To add to his irritation, his early idea of offering an understanding on noncircumvention has been preempted by the SFRC. Therefore, despite the fact that he has made clear that the vote on SALT will be the most important foreign policy issue before the 96th Congress, he sees himself without a crucial role.

We believe that you should point out to him that not only would his endorsement be vital, but also an active part in the Floor debate could be crucial in bringing the bipartisan support we must have to win. He could be the Republican to put the Treaty over.

B. Participants

Senator William Roth (R-Delaware)

C. Press Arrangements: White House photographer

III. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. His role to bring bipartisan support
2. TNF (Tab B)
3. Noncircumvention (Tab C)
4. Cold Launch/Hot Launch Controversy (Tab D)
5. Verification (SSCI Summary at Tab E)

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.
DELAWARE
15 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: 202-224-2441

COMMITTEES
FINANCE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

1979 JUL 15 AM 10:17

July 12, 1979

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

16 JUL 1979
SECDEF HAS SEEN

*7/16
WS to
prepare answers
I think they
are relatively
straight forward
for them we are
prepared to
answer at a
time*

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Because of your experience and knowledge of foreign policy and defense matters, I would be very interested in your views on the proposed SALT II treaty.

As you may know, I have organized a "SALT II Study Group" of several senators of both parties who have not yet taken a position on the treaty. The purpose of our meetings are to study different views on the relevant issues.

I would be especially interested in what you believe to be the key issues senators should examine in considering the treaty. By what criteria would you evaluate the treaty? Are there any matters that have received considerable attention which you believe are not relevant? What do you deem important which has not received attention?

I would also like your views on two specific questions -- renegotiation of the treaty and "linkage."

In the event the Senate does not have the required vote to pass the treaty or if the Senate should feel the treaty is not in our best national interest, should it be returned to the President for renegotiation? Do you believe such a course feasible or desirable? If so, what items should be renegotiated?

On linkage, some argue Soviet foreign policy behavior in such areas as Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia is highly relevant to the treaty; others argue SALT II should be evaluated on its own merits or demerits. In your judgment, should Soviet activities and programs outside the strategic arms area be a factor in Senate consideration?


I appreciate your taking the time to respond and look

10749

The Honorable Harold Brown
July 12, 1979
Page 2

forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Roth". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

William V. Roth, Jr.

U. S. Senate

WVR/jps

B

Talking Points - TNF

-- The Alliance is faced with a serious challenge of both political and military dimensions. I decided some time ago that it is necessary to respond to Soviet theater nuclear efforts, especially the SS-20 and Backfire.

-- Under our leadership, two groups in NATO have completed their work on this issue. One group -- the High Level Group -- has recommended a deployment program including Pershing II and GLCM. The other group -- the Special Group -- has outlined an arms control policy for including long-range theater systems in SALT THREE.

-- For a variety of reasons we feel it necessary to have both a deployment decision and an arms control decision at the December NATO Ministerials. This has been the Alliance target for some time. In particular, our Allies feel they need an arms control component to the December decision in order to improve the political climate in their own countries for the deployment decision.

-- This is why it is important to move ahead with SALT TWO. Once ratified, we will be in a position to move forward with SALT THREE and with our necessary TNF modernization decisions. But failure to ratify SALT TWO will leave our Allies confused as to the constancy of American leadership in the Alliance, as to their position with respect to both the US and the Soviet Union. In the face of this uncertainty, it is unlikely they will want to take the necessary deployment decision.

TALKING POINTS
ON
NON-CIRCUMVENTION

-- We do not believe that any amendments or understandings dealing with the non-circumvention issue are necessary.

-- Nothing in the Treaty interferes with continued cooperation with our Allies. This is confirmed by our successful rejection of the original Soviet non-transfer proposal. The Soviets have signed the Treaty against this background.

-- We have consulted closely with our NATO Allies, who are satisfied that their interests are protected. They agreed that we should not negotiate any interpretation of this clause with the Soviets, because to do so would give the Soviets precisely the entree into the question of Allied cooperation which we have tried to exclude.

D

TALKING POINTS

COLD LAUNCH/HOT LAUNCH CONTROVERSY

-- Of the group of Soviet ICBMs being deployed, both the SS-17 and the SS-19 employ cold launch techniques. These techniques would, in principle, permit SS-17 and SS-18 launchers to be reloaded in a time period on the order of 6 hours in a benign environment.

-- However, this capability is of marginal significance militarily since in a full-scale nuclear war, each Soviet ICBM launcher would be targeted by at least an SLBM warhead. Reloading these launchers in the resulting nuclear environment would be extraordinarily difficult.

-- We believe that the Soviets went to the cold launch technique as the most efficient approach to equipping modernized ICBM launchers with increased throw-weight ICBMs.

-- In one MINUTEMAN launch this was, in principle, for reloading in a time period on the order of 12 to 24 hours in a benign environment. However, we do not plan such reloading in large part because there are no interesting nuclear war scenarios in which it would be likely to be practical.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS BY THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

In approaching the duty given to us by the Senate to examine the ability of the intelligence community to monitor Soviet compliance with the SALT II Treaty, the Committee has kept in mind that our reconnaissance system cannot provide absolute certainty. In the past our monitoring system has, in some instances, underestimated the rate of deployment of some strategic weapon systems of the Soviet Union. In other instances it has overestimated the deployment of some strategic weapon systems.

Since 1970, the estimating record has improved as a direct consequence of improvements in the technical capabilities of the United States reconnaissance systems and in the intelligence community's analysis of that data. These improved technical collection and analytical capabilities have resulted in a reduction in uncertainties about the state of development, testing, and deployment of Soviet strategic weapons. Because we are forced by history to bear in mind the analytic error of the "missile gap," as well as the underestimating of the rate of deployment of some strategic weapons systems, the Committee has conducted an independent review and assessment of United States monitoring capabilities. As a result of this review, the Committee has made findings with respect to the following issues:

- A. Implications of SALT I record for monitoring SALT II Accords;
- B. The degree to which United States SALT II negotiating positions were based on monitoring capabilities;
- C. Providing the necessary resources for the United States monitoring system;
- D. Improved analysis;
- E. Congressional oversight; and
- F. The ability of the United States to monitor the SALT II Treaty.

The subject of U.S. monitoring capabilities is so complex that Senators are strongly encouraged to read and study the full text of the classified Report and its accompanying attachments, in order to fully understand these brief Findings.

A. Implications of SALT I Record for Monitoring SALT II Accords

On the basis of the SALT I record, the Committee believes that the Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II Treaty might permit. Further, the Soviet Union will probably continue nearly all its present concealment and deception practices, and additional concealment and deception practices

may be attempted. The record also indicates, however, that the Standing Consultative Commission is a valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible ambiguities in intelligence information and Treaty interpretation, when the United States aggressively pursues them. For example, in the case of the expanded pattern of Soviet concealment activities, vigorous pursuit by the U.S. of this issue in the Standing Consultative Commission halted the expansion.

Therefore, the United States must expect that unanticipated Soviet activities may occur during the course of the SALT II Treaty and be willing to raise and aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance with the Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission, which will play an even more significant role during SALT II.

B. The Degree to Which United States SALT II Negotiating Positions Were Based on Monitoring Capabilities

The Committee has also reviewed in detail the substance and process of SALT II diplomatic negotiations to see how the need for effective monitoring was factored into the actual negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere. Members of the Committee have gone to Geneva repeatedly to observe firsthand the negotiation process, paying particular attention to monitoring ques-

tions. We have also examined the diplomatic record of these negotiations, the historical record of the SALT I and ABM Treaties, and the Proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission in order better to understand Soviet SALT behavior and the monitoring record concerning those agreements. We have also studied the specific verification provisions of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol and have made our own judgments as to the monitoring requirements of these provisions.

The Committee has reviewed the extent to which the provisions of the SALT II accords contribute to monitoring compliance. There are provisions which enhance our monitoring capability; there are other provisions which reduce monitoring difficulties but retain substantial ambiguities; and there are provisions which impose very difficult monitoring burdens.

The Committee believes that, in most cases, monitoring requirements were given high priority during Treaty negotiations, and that monitoring necessities were reflected in the Treaty provisions. In some cases, however, Treaty provisions were not drawn precisely because of negotiated trade-offs and U.S. and Soviet interest in not impairing the flexibility of some of their respective weapons development programs.

C. Providing the Necessary Resources for the
United States Monitoring System

Although our national reconnaissance system is complex and comprehensive, some of its components are fragile. In order

for the reconnaissance system to be effective, sufficient back-up and redundancy must be provided during the period of SALT II.

In order to provide these resources a very high budget priority must be given to the intelligence collection systems, as well as to processing and analysis functions.

The Committee finds that continued improvement and investment will be required during this period to ensure that United States monitoring systems keep pace with the monitoring tasks they must perform. Arbitrary resource constraints must not curtail these needed improvements and investment.

The Committee also recommends that increased analytic attention to SALT monitoring should be accompanied by the intelligence community's full and careful attention to other areas of Soviet military, political and economic activity and to military, political, social and economic developments in other countries. It is for this reason that we recommend a very high budget priority for processing and analysis, as well as for intelligence collection systems.

D. Improved Analysis

The Soviets unanticipated ability to emplace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented

the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBMs. Similarly, the range of the SS-N-8 missile on the Delta class Soviet ballistic missile submarine was greater than expected. This reduced the significance of the Soviet "geographical disadvantage" on the basis of which we conceded to the Soviets in SALT I the right to build a larger number of ballistic missile submarines than were permitted to the United States. The Committee is of the view that the intelligence community should make every effort to minimize intelligence surprises. Recognizing that predicting the future is a very difficult, if not impossible task, the Committee recommends the following:

Soviet SALT negotiating strategy and tactics should be exhaustively studied for hints about future developments which the Soviets may have been trying to protect. On the basis of this analysis, "warning signs" should be formulated whose appearance would alert the analyst to the possibility the Soviets are taking unexpected steps in their weapons development program.

Various possible Soviet "cheating scenarios" should be developed, using technical experts outside the intelligence community who have been given briefings containing information about U.S. intelligence sources and methods roughly comparable to what the Soviets may be expected to possess. On the basis of these scenarios, similar "warning signs" should be formulated.

Other committees of the Senate with the task of SALT II oversight are the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. Under S.Res. 400, the Select Committee on Intelligence is obliged to keep these committees informed of any intelligence information that might be of significance in carrying out their mandated duties.

The Committee wishes to point out that monitoring compliance with the new strategic arms agreement is only the first step in the SALT process. The capability to determine whether the Soviets had violated the SALT II agreement would be of little consequence if at the same time the United States did not have the will and determination to pursue an aggressive verification policy.

In order to assure effective oversight of monitoring of SALT II, the Committee finds that the Select Committee on Intelligence should be kept fully and currently informed on all intelligence concerned with the monitoring of the SALT II Treaty. The Committee undertakes to keep the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee informed of any significant information affecting their mandated duties. Further, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence should receive a detailed intelligence annex, to be maintained under the security provisions of S. Res. 400, along with the semi-annual monitoring report supplied by ACDA to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

F. Evaluation of the Ability of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty

The Committee's examination of the United States monitoring capabilities show that, under current Soviet practices, most counting provisions can be monitored with high or high-moderate confidence. Monitoring qualitative limitations on weapons systems is a far more difficult task and is dependent on the collective capability of a large number of systems. In general, these qualitative limitations present some problems but most can, on balance, be monitored with high to moderate confidence. There are some provisions of the Treaty which can be monitored with only a low level of confidence. *

The Committee also finds that the present capabilities of the national reconnaissance system could be degraded by the use of changed practices on the part of the Soviet Union and through concealment and deception. Some of these changed practices would be permitted under the Treaty; other changed practices which involve deliberate concealment and deception would constitute serious violations of the Treaty. The impact of those changed practices permitted under the Treaty may decrease

* The terms "high," "high moderate," "moderate," and "low" refer to the monitoring uncertainties (in terms of quantitative measures or probabilities of detection) and do not suggest the military significance of the resulting monitoring uncertainties.

our confidence in our ability to monitor counting provisions, and a combination of such changed practices could greatly complicate our task of monitoring those provisions involving qualitative limitations.

Overall, the Committee finds that the SALT II Treaty enhances the ability of the United States to monitor those components of Soviet strategic weapons forces which are subject to the limitations of the Treaty. The Treaty permits measures short of "deliberate concealment" which could impede monitoring, and does not indicate what types of collection systems are to be considered national technical means. In the absence of the SALT II Treaty, however, the Soviets would be free to take more sweeping measures, such as unrestrained concealment and deception, which could make monitoring these strategic forces still more difficult.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Frank Moore

Fm/pd

C

FYI -- No action necessary

The House has just passed and sent to the Senate a continuing resolution that includes the pay raise and the compromise language on abortion. The Senate will probably take up the continuing resolution this afternoon. Prospects for passage are uncertain. It is quite possible that because of the pay raise provision the Senate will reject the conference report.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE / Bob

SUBJECT: SENATE ENERGY COMMITTEE - ESC VOTE

This afternoon, the Senate Energy Committee approved by a vote of 15-2 the title of its bill dealing with ESC/synfuels. The Committee must complete action on other titles before the entire bill is cleared for floor action.

The title approved today incorporates all major features of your proposal, including the corporation itself and \$20 billion first-phase financing.

Weicker and Wallop voted against. Tsongas, the only Senator sitting on both the Energy and Banking Committee, did not vote.

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1979

done
J

DINNER WITH REPS. TONY COEHLO, BERYL ANTHONY AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE FRESHMAN CLASS

Friday, October 12, 1979

6:30 p.m.

The Residence

From: Frank Moore

FMM/pc

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

I. PURPOSE

To discuss politics and legislation with a selected group of Freshmen.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

Background: Every member of this group has endorsed your reelection. Beryl Anthony and Tony Coehlo pulled together the group as a core of freshmen to help pass your legislation and to help with your reelection. Tony has polled every Democratic freshman and asked whether they support your reelection, as well as how they view Kennedy. He plans to continue organizing your supporters.

This group will want to know your legislative priorities and how they can get them passed. We would especially appreciate your concentrating on the passage of Hospital Cost Containment, the energy package, and endangered species.

Hospital Cost Containment should be on the House floor within the next two weeks. There has been great pressure from the special interest groups against our position. However, we have an impressive array of supporters -- the elderly, the insurance carriers and labor, those who will suffer if the bill is not enacted. If each of these members will speak to five or six members asking for their support, we will have a good chance of getting the bill passed.

The Endangered Soecies Act will be on the House floor late next week; our credibility with the environmentalists is on the line with this bill. Not only is the legislation important, but the vote is symbolic to the environmentalists who are still disappointed over the Tellico Dam. We will need your help to defeat any weakening amendments and to push for final passage.

Our position on the Energy Mobilization Board has been clear. We want to cut the red tape which has caused long procedural delays, but not erase substantive law. An effective Energy Mobilization Board is necessary to expedite future energy development.

Participants: The President, Frank Moore, list of Members on the attached list.

Press Plan: White House photographer only.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. Thank Beryl and Tony for pulling together this group.
2. Let the group know that you value their support and trust that together we can pass our priorities.
3. Tony wants you to give a firm, tough stance on your feelings toward reelection. He thinks that if you are tough and not defensive about reelection, these members can use your comments to persuade other members to endorse and work toward your reelection.
4. Additionally the members will ask you to support them. When they ask the White House Congressional Liaison staff to do something, they want us to be able to deliver.

ADDENDUM FOR THE MEETING WITH REPS. BERYL ANTHONY, TONY
COEHLI AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FRESHMAN CLASS

Today you received H.R. 5419, a bill to name a portion of the Appalachian Trail for former Rep. Goodloe Byron. Last year Byron died while jogging; he was a great promotor of the Appalachian Trail. On Saturday, October 13, the Appalachian Trail Commission has scheduled a ceremony commemorating Goodloe Byron's efforts on behalf of the Trail.

Before you go to the dinner, would you please meet Byron's widow and his successor in Congress, Rep. Beverly Byron, in the Red Room and have your picture taken with her while you sign the bill. Additionally we would appreciate your giving Rep. Byron the pen used to sign the bill.

10/12/79

Mr. President---

If you have no objection, we plan to announce tonight that you have signed the bill.

I would say the following:

"The President was concerned about the appropriations delay, and he directed that once the bill reached the White House it be brought to him immediately. It was, and the President signed the bill in the White House residence at 10 p.m."

approve

disapprove

Rex

J

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

10/12/79

Mr. President----

If you have no objection, we plan to announce tonight that you have signed the bill.

I would say the following:

"The President was concerned about the appropriations delay, and he directed that once the bill reached the White House it be brought to him immediately. It was, and the President signed the bill in the White House residence at ____ p.m."

_____ approve

_____ disapprove

Rex

foreign affairs breakfast 10/12/79

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- > Intel data pervulgarization 10-12-79
- > Mexico Amb.
- > Lebanon
- > Mid East talks
- > Miller → OPEC
- > Caribbean/Castro speech
- Soviet assertiveness
- > Morocco OV10-Cobra
- > SR 71 + Pol, then Intel
- > Pakistan. No PNE
- > SALT
- > Rhodesia - 2 mos.
- > Somalia facilities
- > Dutch will fall re TNF
- > Equatorial Guinea

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

UGANDA DR. ZAKE { Chi Univ
NW Univ
DARTM
Chicago
PRES. BINIESA

SECURITY? UN Force?
Aid \$63 mil
Hum Rts +
Elections 6/81

ECUADOR RICARDO CRESPO { Harvard
PRES SOLÓIS

DEMOCRACY

NICARAGUA - ANDEAN

10-12-79

GREECE = TZOU'NISIS { TURKEY
LONDON
MOSCOW
PRES TSATSOS PM KARAMANLIS

NATO
CYPRUS

DOMINICAN REP = DEL ROSARIO

PRES GUZMAN

HURRICANE

Demo/Hum RLS +

BELGIUM SCHOUMAKER

KING BAUDOUIN { VNAM
PRC
U.S.

RELATIONS +

ATL ALLIANCE

LRTNF IMP.

10/12/79

diplomatic credentials

10/12/79

SALT briefing (Minnesota/Missouri)

SALT

10-12-79

Minn - Mo
#1 - Sec/Peace

7/3

Defense

10% - Not trust

Monitor

NATO

World leader

Magnify Confrontations

Break SALT process

Non Prolif

Not play politics

Electrostatic Copy Made

for Preservation Purposes