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President's First
draft 12/11/79

Aaron/Hertzberg/et al
Draft A-1
12/9/79

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American Power in the 1980s

My *and that of*
every
[I want to speak today of] ~~the~~ first concern ~~of~~ an American
is to and must be
President [and an American government:] the security of [the
our
American] nation.

rests on
That security ~~is rooted in~~ many kinds of strength:
and
[It rests not only on arms ~~but~~ on arms control; not only on
and
military power ~~but~~ on economic vitality; not only on modern
and
weapons ~~but~~ on reliable energy supplies. The well-being of
our Allies and friends is crucial to our own. Our security
is [also] tied to the [advancement of the human welfare and]
and well being other on earth,
human rights, of [at] the earth's people, and to the institutions
which to
of international peace and order, we have helped, build.

[Unless we are mindful of all these elements, we put our
security at risk.]*

*Secretary Brown would omit all this, and also the bracketed sentence in the next paragraph.

But in a dangerous and uncertain world, the keystone of our national security is still military strength... ~~[This is the aspect I want to discuss today.]~~ strength recognized by Americans, ~~by~~ by our allies, and by our potential adversaries.

Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we faced the temptation of isolationism. The first time we succumbed, ^{to the temptation of withdrawing from our global responsibilities,} and a generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we ~~[assumed a global role befitting our power, our interest in a just and enduring peace, and~~ our ^{own} moral and political values and ~~We]~~ built a national consensus around the concept of an active ^{global for America} American role in preserving peace and security ^{for ourselves and} ~~[in key areas for others. of the world]~~

Despite all the changes that have swept across the world in the past thirty years, that basic consensus has endured.

Vietnam was perhaps its ^{most} ~~severest~~ test. That war was a wrenching ^{experience for} ~~[passage] for [all]~~ Americans. ~~[It occupies the place in the~~ We learned that, ^{the mistake of} military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own vital security interests are not involved, but we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of power is a potential Vietnam.

experience of this generation that Munich did in the experience of the last. Such experiences have much to teach us. The danger comes when we apply their lessons too simplistically -- as we did when we let the analogy of Munich draw us into Vietnam. Of course it is true that appeasement only encourages aggression. It is equally true that massive military involvement where our vital interests are not threatened is a mistake. But just as we have learned that not every international accomodation is a potential Munich, we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of power is a potential Vietnam.]

~~but~~ ^{The}
The consensus for national strength and international involvement survived that divisive and tragic war. Today, regardless of our disagreements, we are united in the belief that we need a strong defense, and that military weakness makes wars more likely.

So the issue we face is not whether we should be strong,
but how we will be strong. What will be our defense

responsibilities for the 1980s and beyond? What challenges

will we confront in meeting them? What defense programs do

we need -- and how much ^{will} ~~should~~ we spend to get them? ^{How can we} ~~What is~~

^{correlate most effectively}
~~the right balance between~~ our military ^{readiness} ~~efforts~~ and our ~~efforts~~

~~in the field of~~ arms control ^{efforts}?

Defense responsibilities

To begin with, our defense effort must be tailored to
^{match}
~~the breadth and depth of~~ our responsibilities.

In Europe, our military forces have ^{provided the foundation for} ~~been the mainstay of~~
the longest period of peace and prosperity that continent has
enjoyed in this century. Our strength -- both conventional
and nuclear -- permits our Allies to build greater unity
through the European Community and also to nurture their
historical ties with Eastern Europe. Our commitment to the

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security of our European allies is unshakeable.

[~~In the Far East,~~] American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, *Australia, New Zealand* and the Philippines, and our renewed friendship with China, *all* contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and the world.

In the Middle East, American strength and influence helped bring about the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Our power is still needed to permit the peace process to continue, to bolster the security of Israel and our other friends in the area, and to protect our vital interests there. The turbulence in Iran shows how suddenly those interests can be ~~injured~~ ^{threatened}.

We have significant responsibilities elsewhere as well. *and commerce* Trade ~~ties~~ us to almost every nation on earth. And for many new nations, our support -- direct and indirect -- is their only guarantee of continued freedom as they establish their places in the world.

We must and we will continue a duty to meet these responsibilities which are vital to our friends and ^{also} to the United States.

Challenges to our responsibilities

But there are reasons for concern, about our future peaceful influence.

← For nearly 20 years, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by three or four per cent each year. In contrast, our own defense spending^{has} declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976. [To do what the Russians are doing militarily, we would have to spend 50 per cent more.]

[This disparity is not the result of some sudden and massive effort by the Soviet Union, any more than it is the result of some recent slash in our own programs. The disparity is the result of a steady growth in Soviet forces over two decades -- a growth we simply have not matched. Let me describe some of the consequences.

[Twenty years ago, Soviet ships generally stayed close to home. Today, Russian naval vessels and aircraft patrol all the oceans of the world.

[Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union had no military bases outside Russia and Eastern Europe. Today, Soviet troops are actively involved from Ethiopia to Afghanistan. A network of bases, anchorages, installations and overflight arrangements gives their military forces a global reach.

[In the last ten years, Soviet armed forces have grown by a million men, to 4 million. The quality and capability of Soviet equipment has increased dramatically. They have produced 30,000 tanks, and in the course of repeated modernizations have built 4,000 strategic ballistic missiles.

[Some of the most modern Soviet weapons -- tanks, missiles and aircraft -- are flowing into the arsenals of Middle Eastern and African nations.

[Soviet-equipped Cuban troops support Soviet aims in many countries -- in Africa, in the Arabian Peninsula, and more recently, in small numbers, in some of the Caribbean.

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Islands and in Central America. And Soviet support helps the Vietnamese armed forces play their current role in Cambodia.

[In the past, Soviet influence outside Eastern Europe was based largely on ideological appeals and political subversion. The appeal of Soviet ideology has waned, and Soviet influence today is based increasingly on Soviet arms and Soviet proxies.]*

We almost certainly face
 There will be other challenges -- less direct though
 no less serious. *with that will bring continued*
 The 1980s ~~will be a time of [great]~~ turbulence
Problems of price and supply
 and upheaval. ~~The~~ energy challenge will continue to strain
 the economies ^{of the industrial world} of the industrial nations, and will put even
 more severe pressures on the developing ^{nations} world. Political
 instability may even intensify as the newer nations ^{struggle to} cope
 with these dilemmas.

*From the middle of page 6 to here, Secretary Brown would omit all of this. His comment: "Scaring people with the USSR could rebound against SALT. HB can do it; the President probably should not." Lloyd Cutler also feels that some of this could be cut.

As in the past, when the winds of change threaten to
grow into the storms of ^{conflict} war, we must be prepared ^{wage peace} [to ~~deter~~ war
and] to join with our friends and Allies to resist ^{rising threats} coercion.
to stability and peace,

What are we doing to meet these challenges

The steady Soviet buildup and the growing Soviet inclination
to rely on military power to exploit turbulent situations
call for a ^{calm and} deliberate and sustained American response.

Through the mid-1970s, the United States relied on
defense strategies and force structures devised during the
early 1960s -- a time when ^{we} [the U.S.] enjoyed strategic nuclear
superiority and a tactical nuclear monopoly; when Soviet
seapower was very limited and the Soviet military presence
outside Eastern Europe almost nonexistent. All that had
changed by the time I took office, as President.

1976
Beginning in ~~President Ford's Administration~~ and continuing

my administration
in ~~mine~~, we have set out to counterbalance Soviet military power by launching new efforts that draw on our own very considerable strengths.

of the last four During each ~~year~~ *of the last four* of this Administration, *There has been a moderate increase in* real defense spending, ~~has been increased.~~ For the first time since World War II, ~~it has gone up three years in a row~~ *been increasing at a steady pace* at a time when ~~we were not at war.~~

In Europe, we have taken steps to reverse a decade of decline in Allied military strength.

began to meet
When I first ~~met~~ *began to meet* with Allied leaders nearly three years ago, I found them dispirited about the state of our common defense.

I pledged to raise our own real level of defense spending by some 3 per cent each year, *and* Our NATO Allies responded by making the same pledge.

Under American leadership, NATO, ^{also} took the crucial step of adopting a bold Long-Term Defense Program. That program is helping us increase our capacity to deter or defeat any surprise attack against our European Allies.

Today we also took ~~We are also taking~~ steps to redress the balance in theater nuclear forces.

The U.S. ^{removed} took its medium-range missiles ^{from Western} ~~out of~~ [NATO] Europe in the early 1960s. We could do this because of the then overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority.

But the Soviet Union did not show similar restraint. Their ^{relatively long range} mobile, multi-warhead SS-20 missile is a major escalation in theater nuclear armaments. With the advent of rough strategic parity, this new missile creates a potentially dangerous weakness in NATO's ^{theater} deterrent.

In the SALT II negotiations, we carefully protected our

freedom to correct this weakness. Now NATO is moving toward strengthening its nuclear weapons to offset actual Soviet deployments. Then, on the basis of ^{with the Warsaw Pact} a commitment to strength, we can negotiate, to reduce nuclear weapons in the European theater.

In the area of intercontinental or strategic forces, we also face adverse trends that must be corrected.

Improving Soviet air defenses, ^{now} threaten to make our strategic bombers vulnerable. The cruise missile is the solution to that problem. Production of the first generation air-launched cruise missile will begin next year, and future generations will be available when needed.

In addition, our land-based Minuteman ICBMs ^{are becoming} ~~have become~~ increasingly vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of the Soviet Union's multiple-warhead missiles. That is why we ^{relatively small number of} ~~missiles~~ decided last spring to produce the MX missile. The ^{missiles} MX will

have [~~so much~~] mobility and [~~such~~] a large number of shelters and [~~that it~~] will be far less vulnerable than our present fixed-shelter Minutemen. Further, ^{in response to any first strike,} the MX will have [~~a strong second-strike~~] capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet military targets -- not enough to undermine stability, [~~in a crisis~~], but enough to deter attack and encourage negotiations on further ^{nuclear arms} limits. In addition, by increasing the difficulty of any contemplated Soviet strike, MX will contribute to the survivability of our strategic bombers and submarines. With or without SALT II, America needs the MX ^{to maintain the strategic nuclear balance.}

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. The first new Trident submarine has come off the ways. The first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already been put to sea.

Thus, each leg of our strategic Triad is being modernized -- cruise missiles for our bombers, MX for our ICBMs, and

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Trident for our undersea deterrent.

Nor will we neglect modernizing our conventional forces, though here we must rely heavily on the parallel efforts of our Allies, in Asia as well as in Europe. They must fully share the increased burdens of the common defense.

I am determined to keep our naval forces the most powerful on this planet. [~~We will build more ships~~]* -- and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy, in peace and in war.

Finally, we are moving rapidly to counterbalance the growing ability of the Soviet Union to use its military power in Third World regions, and to deal with hostile actions against our citizens or our vital interests from others as well.

For this purpose, our greatest need is not more forces,

*Randy Jayne would substitute: "Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s..." He says there are specifics offered for some of the other services, and the Navy is important to many Senators, especially Republicans.

but better tailoring of the forces we already have for rapid deployment.

Our 1981 defense budget and our five-year defense program will meet this need in two ways. The first will be a new fleet of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry the heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine brigades, and that can be stationed in ^{forward} ~~remote~~ areas where U.S. forces may be needed.

With their supplies already near the scene of action, the troops themselves can move in by air. The second innovation will be a new fleet of large cargo aircraft to carry Army tanks and other equipment over intercontinental distances.

Having Rapid Deployment Forces does not, ^{necessarily} mean we will ~~inevitably~~ use them, ~~though we will if we must.~~ We intend their existence to deter the very developments that would invoke their use.

To sum up, the United States is taking strong action:

We must always remember that no matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security depends on the recruitment, abilities, training, and dedication of the people who serve in our armed forces. I am determined to recruit and to retain an adequate level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

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¶ To improve all aspects of our strategic forces, thus assuring our deterrent to nuclear war.

¶ To upgrade our forces in NATO and the Pacific, as part of a common effort with our Allies.

¶ To modernize our naval forces to keep them the best in the world.

¶ ~~And~~ To strengthen our rapid deployment capabilities to meet our responsibilities outside NATO.

¶ And to maintain ^{adequate} a force of highly trained military personnel.

We must sustain these efforts in order to maintain peace and security in the 1980s. To ensure that we press forward vigorously, the budget I will submit for FY 1981 will increase funding for defense to over \$157 billion [~~exact figure~~ ^{of more than five} \$157.5 billion], a real growth [~~after estimated inflation~~ ^{of more than five and one-half [exact figure 5.6]}] per cent. Just as in 1979 and 1980, our estimated outlays for defense during FY 1981 will grow by more than three per cent [~~exact figure 3.3~~] in real terms.

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We will continue [~~increasing~~] this effort. The five-year defense program specifies ^{net} funding increases that average well over four per cent a year, ~~after estimated inflation~~.

I intend to carry out this program. With careful, efficient management, we should be able to do so within the budget increases I propose. If inflation exceeds the projected rates, I intend to adjust the defense budget as needed, just as I have for 1980.*

Much of this program will take five [~~or even ten~~] years ^{or more} to reach fruition. The imbalances it will correct ^{have been caused} [~~resulted~~ ^{by} ~~from~~] more than a decade of disparity, and they cannot be remedied overnight, so we must be willing to see this program through. To insure that we do so, I am setting a growth rate for defense that will be tolerable over the long haul.

The most wasteful and self-defeating thing we could do would

*Secretary Brown would add: "And if Congress reduces my requests, I will consider additional submissions as necessary to assure our defense capabilities."

be to start an ambitious program, then alter ^{or} [it, then] cut it
back after a year or two when other ^{competing} demands for resources
^{make it less politically attractive.}
~~and concerns [about its effect on the economy lead to a loss~~

~~of public support.]~~ The defense ^{program} [growth rate] I am proposing

for the next five years will require ^{some} sacrifice -- but sacrifice
we can afford. <sup>It will not increase the percentage of our gross national
product devoted to defense, which will remain at about 5%.</sup>
~~[It is no greater than the average growth~~
^{We must have a long range balanced approach to}
~~rate of non-defense expenditures we have supported over the~~
^{the allocation of federal expenditures.}
~~past 25 years.]~~

I remain committed to meeting the Nation's
^{and we will meet them,}
social needs. ^{for our nation.} But our greatest social need is to assure
peace. So in asking Congressional support for our defense

efforts, I am asking for consistent support -- steadfast
support ~~[intelligent support]~~ -- not just for 1980 or 1981,
^{until these commitments have been fulfilled.}
but ~~[throughout the 1980s]~~

Power and peace

^{Sustained}
^{for}
American strength is the only possible basis ^{of} the
wider, truly reciprocal detente we seek with the Soviet Union.

Only through strength can we create global political conditions hospitable to worldwide economic and political progress --
both conventional and nuclear
and to controlling arms.

As the strongest, most advanced country in the world, we have a special obligation to seek security through arms control as well as through military power. So I welcome the debate [occasioned] by the Senate's ^{in its} consideration of the SALT II treaty. It ^{will} enable us to build a ^{clearer understanding} ~~stronger~~ ^{consensus} that efforts in both arms control and defense are vital to our security.

There are four reasons why SALT II will strengthen the military aspects of our national security.

First, we have a better chance of maintaining strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons with SALT II. ~~(than without it.)~~
Without it, the Soviets can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage they may achieve in the early 1980s, and conceal from us what they are doing. For us, ^{maintaining parity with} these

uncontrolled

Soviet actions would ~~(it)~~ add to ^{our} ~~(the)~~ costs -- in time, money and uncertainty, ~~of maintaining parity.~~

Second, we have a better chance of maintaining the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces with SALT II than without it. Whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it will have to go into strategic weapons if SALT II is not ratified.

Third, we have a better chance of strengthening the *unity,* resolve and ~~[the nuclear]~~ capability of the NATO alliance with SALT II than without it. That is why the heads of the other NATO governments have urged its ratification.

Fourth, we have a better chance of continuing the SALT process of negotiating further ^{reductions} ~~[cuts]~~ in the world's nuclear arsenals with SALT II than without it. Without SALT II and ^{restrictions, etc} all of its ~~complex~~ rules and definitions in place, an agreement in SALT III ^{at best,} on deeper cuts would take many more years to achieve.

[Handwritten signature]

Fifth, we have a much better chance to controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons among presently non-nuclear nations with SALT II than without it. This could be one of the most important factors involved in our pending decision.

[In addition, and most important, SALT II lessens the chances of nuclear war.

[To reject SALT II would be to write a dark and ominous page in our history. The generation-long process of arms control, supported by every President and every Congress since the end of World War II, could disintegrate. That process has yielded benefits to all humanity. To halt it would be an act of incredible shortsightedness. It would be an expression of despair, not hope; of fear, not confidence.]*

All of these issues are extremely important and intimately related.

A strong defense is a matter of simple common sense. So is SALT II.

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I will do my utmost to keep America strong and secure.

But this cannot be done without effort or sacrifice.

*Given the four points above, Lloyd Cutler would omit these two paragraphs. So would Secretary Brown. David Aaron thinks the paragraphs should be kept.

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The best investment in defense is in weapons that will never have to be used and soldiers who will never have to die.

But the peace we enjoy is the fruit of our strength -- and our will to use it if we must.

With your help, we will continue to build that strength.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Susan - Call Tim M^cJ
get his approval on P's
marked #

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P15

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J

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Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we faced the temptation of isolationism. The first time we succumbed to the temptation of withdrawing from our global responsibilities, and a generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we built a national consensus around our own moral and political values and the concept of an active role for America in preserving peace and security for ourselves and for others.

Despite all the changes that have swept across the world in the past 30 years, that basic consensus has endured.

~~[Vietnam was perhaps its most severe test. That war was a wrenching experience for Americans.]~~ ^{have} We learned the mistake of military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own vital security interests ^{were} are not involved; but we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of power is a potential Vietnam.

The consensus for national strength and international involvement survived ^{that} ~~that~~ divisive and tragic war. Today, regardless of our disagreements, we are united in the belief that we need a strong defense, and that military weakness ^{would} ~~would~~ ^{inevitably} makes wars more likely.

So the issue we face is not whether we should be strong, but how we will be strong. What will be our defense responsibilities for the 1980s and beyond? What challenges will we confront in meeting them? What defense programs do we need -- and how much will we spend to get them? How can we correlate most effectively our military readiness and our arms control efforts?

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Defense Responsibilities

To begin with, our defense ^{program} ~~effort~~ must be tailored to match our responsibilities.

In Europe, our military forces have provided the foundation for the longest period of peace and prosperity that continent has enjoyed in this century. Our strength -- both conventional and nuclear -- ^{helps to} permits our Allies to build ^{together} ~~greater~~ unity through the European Community and also to nurture their historical ties with Eastern Europe. Our ^{mutual} commitments within the Atlantic Alliance are vital to us all, and they are ~~[to the security of our European Allies is unshakeable]~~ permanent and unshakeable.

American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines ^{also} [and ~~our~~ renewed friendship with China] all contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and the world.

We must and we will continue to meet these responsibilities -- a duty vital to our friends and also to the United States.

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Challenges to Our Responsibilities

But there are reasons for concern about our ^{ability to ~~continue~~ ^{effectively} ~~our~~ ^{extend} ~~future~~ ^{sustain}} ^{beneficial and} peaceful influence. For nearly 20 years, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by three or four percent each year. In contrast, our own defense spending has declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976.

We will almost certainly face other challenges -- less direct though no less serious. The 1980s ^{are likely to} will bring continued turbulence and upheaval. Problems of energy price and supply will continue to strain the economy of the industrial world, and will put even more severe pressures on the developing nations. Political instability may even intensify as the newer nations struggle to cope with these ^{problems.} ^{dilemmas.}

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President Jimmy Carter
"American Power in the 1980s"
Draft -- December 11, 1979

NO OTHER COPIES cc Zb19
Lloyd
Jody
Stu
Rick by 3:00 pm.
J.C.

Approved
Paul
J.C.

My first concern and that of every American President
is and must be the security of our nation.

That security rests on many kinds of strength: on arms
and on arms control; on military power and on economic vitality
and the quality of life the well-being of our people;
on modern weapons and on reliable energy supplies. The well-being
of our Allies and friends is ^{also} crucial to our own. Our security
is tied to ~~the~~ human rights and ~~well-being of the~~ ^{social justice prevailing among} other people
on earth, and to the institutions of international peace and
order which we have helped to build.

We will hope and work and pray for a world in which the weapons
of war are no longer necessary, but we ^{now} must deal with the hard
facts -- with the world as it is. In ~~the~~ ^{today's} ~~today's~~
But in a dangerous and uncertain world, the keystone of

our national security is still military strength -- strength that is
clearly recognized
respected
recognized by Americans, by our Allies, and by ^{any} our potential
adversaries.

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1
2
Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we ^{were tempted by} ~~[faced the temptation of]~~ isolationism.

The first time, we succumbed to the temptation, of withdrawing from our global responsibilities, and a generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we built a national consensus ^{-- based on} around our own moral and ^{-- around} political values, and the concept of an active role for America in preserving peace and security for ourselves and for others.

Despite all the ^{changes} changes that have swept across the world in the past 30 years, that basic consensus has endured.

We have learned the mistake of military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own vital security interests were not ^{directly} involved. But we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of power is a potential Vietnam. *Continue on P-3*

*
↓
P3
Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and united America -- a nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of its strength, and its commitment to international law and the preservation of peace.

← The consensus for national strength and international
, although shaken and threatened,
involvement, survived that divisive and tragic war. Today,

2 $\sqrt{x^3}$ from p 2

regardless of ^{other} ~~our~~ disagreements, we are united in the belief
that we ^{must have} need a strong defense, and that military weakness
would inevitably make war more likely.

So the issue we face is not whether we should be strong,
but how we will be strong. What will be our defense
responsibilities for the 1980s and beyond? What challenges
will we confront in meeting them? What defense programs do
we need -- and how much will we spend to get them? How can
we correlate most effectively our military readiness and our
arms control efforts?

3 $\sqrt{4}$

Defense Responsibilities

To begin with, our defense program must be tailored
to match our responsibilities.

In Europe, our military forces have provided the foundation for ^{one of} the longest periods of peace and prosperity that continent has ^{ever} enjoyed, ^{century.} ~~in this country.~~ Our strength -- both conventional and nuclear -- helps ^{to maintain peace while} ~~to~~ ^{to} our Allies build together through the European Community and also ~~to~~ nurture their historical ties with Eastern Europe. Our mutual commitments within the Atlantic Alliance ^{are} ~~are~~ vital to us all, and they ^{are} ~~are~~ permanent and unshakeable.

American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, ^{and Thailand} Australia, New Zealand, ~~and~~ the Philippines, all contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and the world.

We must and we will continue to meet these responsibilities. ~~[-- a duty vital to our friends and also to the United States.]~~

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Challenges to Our Responsibilities

But there are reasons for concern about our ability to sustain our beneficial and peaceful influence. For nearly 20 years, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by three or four percent each year. In contrast, our own defense spending has declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976. This is ^{creating} a real challenge to American leadership and influence in the world.

We will almost certainly face other challenges -- less direct though no less serious. The 1980s are likely to bring continued turbulence and upheaval. Problems of energy price and supply will continue to strain the economy of the industrial world, and will put even more severe pressures on the developing nations. Political instability may even intensify as the newer nations struggle to cope with these problems.

As in the past, when the winds of change threaten to ~~grow into~~ ^{arouse} ~~the~~ storms of conflict, we must be prepared to join ~~with~~ our friends and Allies ^{in resisting} ~~to resist rising~~ threats to stability and peace.

What Are We Doing To Meet These Challenges

The steady ~~Soviet~~ ^{by the} buildup and the "growing" ~~Soviet~~ inclination to rely on military power to exploit turbulent situations call for a calm, ~~and~~ deliberate and sustained American response.

Through the mid-1970s, the United States relied on a defense strategy ^{on} ~~and~~ force structures devised during the early 1960s -- a time when we enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority and a tactical nuclear monopoly; when Soviet seapower was ~~very~~ limited and the Soviet military presence

outside Eastern Europe almost nonexistent. All that had changed by the time I took office as President.

Beginning in 1976 and continuing in my administration, we have set out to counterbalance ^{the growth in} Soviet military power by launching new efforts that draw on our own [very] considerable strengths. *457*

During each of the last four years, there has been a moderate increase in real defense spending.

In Europe, we have taken steps to reverse a decade of ^{relative} decline in ^{the} Allied military strength, ^{of} the Atlantic Alliance.

When I first began to meet with Allied leaders nearly three years ago, I found them ^{troubled by} ~~dispirited~~ about the state of our common defense [?] capability.

^{promised}
I ~~pledged~~ to raise our own real level of defense spending by some three percent each year, and our NATO Allies responded by making the same pledge.

^{With}
~~Under~~ American leadership, NATO also took the crucial step of adopting a bold Long-Term Defense Program. That program is helping us increase our capacity to deter or defeat any surprise attack against our European Allies.

^{in Europe} ^{we are also taking}
Today, ~~we also took~~ steps to redress the balance in Theater Nuclear Forces.

^{then}
The U.S. removed its medium-range missiles from Western Europe. In the early 1960s We could do this, because ^{there was} ~~[of the then]~~ overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority. 75

← But the Soviet Union did not show similar restraint. The accelerating development of their relatively long-range mobile, multi-warhead SS-20 missile

solution to that problem. Production of the first generation of
air-launched^h cruise missile, will begin next year, and future
generations will be available when needed.

In addition, our land-based Minuteman ICBMs are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of the Soviet Union's multiple-warhead missiles. That is why we decided last spring to produce the MX missile. The relatively small number of MX missiles will have mobility and a large number of shelters and will be far less vulnerable than our present fixed-shelter Minutemen. Further, in response to any first strike, the MX will have the capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet military targets, ^{The MX missile will not} ~~not enough to~~ ^{it will} ~~enough to~~ undermine stability, but ~~enough to~~ deter attack and encourage negotiations on further nuclear arms limits. In addition, by increasing the difficulty of any contemplated Soviet strike, ^{it} ~~MX~~ will contribute to the survivability of our strategic

Even with bombers and submarines. ~~With or without~~ SALT II, America needs the MX to maintain the strategic nuclear balance. ⁹ 10

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. The first new Trident submarine has ^{been launched, and the} ~~come off the ways. The~~ first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already been put to sea.

Thus, each leg of our strategic Triad is being modernized -- ^{intercontinental missiles,} cruise missiles for our bombers, MX for our ~~ICBMs,~~ and Trident for our undersea deterrent.

Nor will ^{we} ~~be~~ neglect modernizing our conventional forces, though here we must rely heavily on the parallel efforts of our Allies, in Asia as well as in Europe. They must ^{bear their proportion} ~~fully~~ share of the increased burdens of the common defense.

I am determined to keep our naval forces ^{more} ~~the most~~ powerful ^{than any other nation.} ~~on this planet.~~ Our shipbuilding program will

sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s; and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy -- in peace and in war.

13
511

Finally, we are moving rapidly to counterbalance the growing ability of the Soviet Union, ^{directly or through surrogates,} to use its military power in Third World regions, ^{we must be prepared} and to deal with hostile actions against our citizens or our vital interests from others as well.

For this purpose, ^{we} ~~our greatest~~ need ^{is not} ~~is~~ ^{only stronger} ~~more~~ forces, but better, ^{means for rapid deployment} ~~tailoring~~ of the forces we already have, ~~for rapid deployment~~.

Our 1981 defense budget and our five-year defense program will meet this need in two ways. The first will be a new fleet of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry the heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine brigades, and that can be stationed in forward areas where U.S. forces

may be needed. With their supplies already near the scene of action, the troops themselves can move in by air. The second innovation will be a new fleet of large cargo aircraft to carry Army tanks and other equipment over intercontinental distances.

" 12

Having Rapid Deployment Forces does not necessarily mean we will use them. We intend their existence to deter the very developments that would invoke their use.

We must always remember that no matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security depends on the abilities, training, and dedication of the people who serve in our armed forces. I am determined to recruit and to retain an ^{ample} [adequate] level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

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To sum up, the United States is taking strong action:

First, -- To improve all aspects of our strategic forces,
thus assuring our deterrent to nuclear war.

Second, -- To upgrade our forces in NATO and the Pacific,
as part of a common effort with our Allies.

Third, -- To modernize our naval forces to keep them the
best in the world.

Fourth, -- To strengthen our rapid deployment capabilities
to meet our responsibilities outside NATO.

fifth, *effective*
A -- And, to maintain an ~~adequate~~ force of highly trained
military personnel. *12* *13*

We must sustain these *commitments* ~~efforts~~ in order to maintain

peace and security in the 1980s. To ensure that we press

forward vigorously, ~~the budget~~ I will submit for FY 1981
~~just as in 1979 and 1980, a budget to increase funding as then~~
~~will increase funding~~ for defense ~~to over \$157 billion --~~
to more than \$157 billion, a real growth of more than five percent
a ~~real growth of more than five percent.~~ Just as in 1979
over my request for FY 1980.

Just as in 1979 and 1980, requested outlays for defence during FY 1981 and 1980, ~~our estimated outlays for defense during FY 1981~~ will grow ~~by~~ will grow by more than three percent in real terms, over the preceding year.

Sustain This effort.

We will ^{maintain} ~~continue~~ this ^{commitment.} ~~effort~~ The ^{My} five-year defense

^{which provides} program, ^{average more than} specifies real funding increases that ~~average well~~ exceed ~~our 3% NATO commitment.~~ over four percent a year. *four and one-half per cent a year.*

I intend to carry out this program. With careful, and efficient management, we should be able to do so within

the budget increases I propose. If inflation exceeds the projected rates, ^{I intend to adjust} ~~I intend to adjust~~ the defense budget, ^{will be adjusted} as

^{it was done in} needed, just as ~~I have~~ for 1980. *13/14*

Much of this program will take five years or more to reach fruition. The imbalances it will correct have been caused by more than a decade of disparity and they cannot be remedied overnight, so we must be willing to see this program through. To ensure that we do so, I am setting a growth rate

for defense that will be tolerable over the long haul.

The most wasteful and self-defeating thing we could do would

be to start ^{This necessary} ~~[an ambitious]~~ program, then alter or cut it back after a year or two when ^{Such action might become} ~~[other competing demands for resources~~ ~~make it less]~~ politically attractive. The defense program

I am proposing for the next five years will require some

sacrifice -- but sacrifice we can afford. It will not increase ^{at all} the percentage of our Gross National Product devoted to

defense, which will remain ^{steady} at about five percent. ¹¹ \int ¹⁵ We must

have a long-range, balanced approach to the allocation of

federal expenditures. ^{We will continue to meet our ^{such crucial} national needs} I ~~remain committed to meeting the~~ ^(as) jobs, housing, education, ^{and} health but we must realize that nation's social needs and we will meet them; but our greatest ^{a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such progress is} social need is] to assure peace for our nation. So in asking

Congressional support for our defense efforts, I am asking

for consistent support -- steadfast support -- not just for

1980 or 1981, but until these commitments have been fulfilled.

Power and Peace

Sustained American strength is the only possible basis for the wider, truly reciprocal detente we seek with the Soviet Union. Only through strength can we create global political conditions hospitable to worldwide economic and political progress -- and to controlling both conventional and nuclear arms.

15
14

As the strongest, most advanced country in the world, we have a special obligation to seek security through arms control as well as through military power. So I welcome the debate by the Senate in its consideration of the SALT II Treaty. It will enable us to build a clearer understanding that *these* efforts in both arms control and defense are vital to our security.

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^{Several}
There are ~~four~~ reasons why SALT II will strengthen the military aspects of our national security.

^{can}
First, we ~~have a~~ better ~~chance of~~ maintain~~ing~~ strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons with SALT II. Without it, the Soviets can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage they may achieve in the early 1980s, and conceal from us what they are doing. For us, maintaining parity with these uncontrolled Soviet actions would add to our costs -- in time, money and uncertainty.

14
17

^{can}
Second, we ~~have a~~ better ~~chance of~~ maintain~~ing~~ the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces with SALT II than without it. Whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it will have to go into strategic weapons if SALT II is not ratified.

Third, we ^{can} ~~have a~~ better ~~chance of~~ strengthen~~ing~~ the unity, resolve and capability of the NATO Alliance with SALT II than without it. That is why the heads of other NATO governments have urged its ratification.

Fourth, we ^{can} ~~have a~~ better ~~chance of~~ continu~~ing~~ the SALT process of negotiating further reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals with SALT II than without it. Without SALT II and all of its ^{limits} ~~restrictions~~, rules and definitions in place, an agreement in SALT III on deeper cuts would, at best, take many more years to achieve.

Fifth, we ^{can} ~~have a much~~ better ~~chance of~~ control~~ling~~ the proliferation of nuclear weapons among ^{currently} ~~presently~~ non-nuclear nations with SALT II than without it. This could be one of the most important factors involved in our pending decision.

All of these issues are extremely important and intimately related.

A strong defense is a matter of simple common sense. So is SALT II.

I will do my utmost to keep America strong and secure. But this cannot be done without effort or sacrifice.

The best investment in defense is in weapons that will never have to be used and soldiers who will never have to die. But the peace we enjoy is the fruit of our strength -- and our will to use it if we must.

As a great nation devoted to peace, we must and
~~With your help,~~ we will continue to build that strength.

#

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CHMAN REG JONES, MEMBR OF THE BUSINESS COUNCIL

IMP STATEMENT → RECEIPT → Q & A = ECON/EN/IRAN

1. MY FIRST CONCERN AND THAT OF EVERY AMERICAN PRESIDENT
2. IS AND MUST BE THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION. //
3. THAT SECURITY RESTS ON MANY-KINDS-OF-STRENGTH:
4. ON ARMS AND ON ARMS CONTROL;
5. ON MILITARY POWER AND ON ECONOMIC VITALITY >
6. AND THE QUALITY-OF-LIFE OF OUR PEOPLE;
7. ON MODERN WEAPONS AND ON RELIABLE-ENERGY-SUPPLIES. /
8. THE WELL-BEING OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS IS ALSO CRUCIAL TO OUR OWN.
9. OUR SECURITY IS TIED >
10. TO HUMAN-RIGHTS AND SOCIAL-JUSTICE PREVAILING AMONG PEOPLE ON EARTH,
11. AND TO THE INSTITUTIONS-OF-INTERNATIONAL-PEACE AND ORDER
12. WHICH WE HAVE HELPED TO BUILD. //
13. WE WILL HOPE AND WORK AND PRAY FOR A WORLD >
14. IN WHICH THE WEAPONS-OF-WAR ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY,
15. BUT ~~WE~~ ^{WE} NOW, MUST DEAL WITH THE HARD FACTS -- WITH THE WORLD-AS-IT-IS. /
16. IN THE DANGEROUS AND UNCERTAIN WORLD OF TODAY
17. THE KEYSTONE OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IS STILL MILITARY STRENGTH --
18. STRENGTH THAT IS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED
19. BY AMERICANS, BY OUR ALLIES, AND BY ANY POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. //

1. TWICE IN THIS CENTURY, EACH TIME IN THE AFTERMATH OF A GLOBAL WAR, ^z
WE WERE TEMPTED BY ISOLATIONISM.
2. THE FIRST TIME WE SUCCUMBED TO THE TEMPTATION, ^z
WITHDRAWING FROM OUR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES,
3. AND A GENERATION LATER THE WORLD WAS AGAIN ENGULFED BY WAR. /
4. BUT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR WE BUILT A NATIONAL CONSENSUS
5. -- BASED ON OUR OWN MORAL AND POLITICAL VALUES --
6. AROUND THE CONCEPT OF AN ACTIVE ROLE FOR AMERICA ^z
IN PRESERVING-PEACE-AND-SECURITY FOR OURSELVES AND FOR OTHERS.
7. DESPITE ALL THE CHANGES THAT HAVE SWEPT ACROSS THE WORLD IN THE PAST 30 YEARS,
8. THAT BASIC-CONSENSUS-HAS-ENDURED. /
9. WE HAVE LEARNED THE MISTAKE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION ^z
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY ^z
10. WHEN OUR OWN VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
11. BUT WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT NOT-EVERY-INSTANCE ^z
OF THE FIRM APPLICATION OF POWER IS A POTENTIAL VIETNAM.
12. THE CONSENSUS-FOR-NATIONAL-STRENGTH AND INTERNATIONAL-INVOLVEMENT,
13. ALTHOUGH SHAKEN AND THREATENED,
14. SURVIVED THAT-DIVISIVE-AND-TRAGIC WAR. //

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1. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE BEEN A VIVID REMINDER
OF THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND UNITED AMERICA --
2. A NATION WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES
3. AND WHICH NEED NOT BLUFF OR POSTURE IN THE QUIET EXERCISE OF ITS STRENGTH,
4. AND IN ITS COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. /
5. TODAY, REGARDLESS OF OTHER DISAGREEMENTS,
WE ARE UNITED IN THE BELIEF THAT WE MUST HAVE A STRONG DEFENSE,
6. AND THAT MILITARY WEAKNESS WOULD INEVITABLY MAKE WAR MORE LIKELY. /
7. SO THE ISSUE WE FACE IS NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD BE STRONG,
8. BUT HOW WE WILL BE STRONG. /
9. WHAT WILL BE OUR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE 1980s AND BEYOND?
10. WHAT CHALLENGES WILL WE CONFRONT IN MEETING THEM?
11. WHAT DEFENSE PROGRAMS DO WE NEED, >
12. AND HOW MUCH WILL WE SPEND TO GET THEM?
13. HOW CAN WE CORRELATE MOST EFFECTIVELY
OUR MILITARY READINESS AND OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS? /

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(DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES)

1. TO BEGIN WITH,
OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM MUST BE TAILORED TO MATCH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. IN EUROPE OUR MILITARY FORCES HAVE PROVIDED THE FOUNDATION \checkmark
FOR ONE OF THE LONGEST PERIODS OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY \checkmark
THAT CONTINENT HAS EVER ENJOYED.
3. OUR STRENGTH -- BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR -- HELPS TO MAINTAIN PEACE
4. WHILE OUR ALLIES BUILD TOGETHER THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
5. AND ALSO NURTURE THEIR HISTORICAL TIES WITH EASTERN EUROPE.
6. OUR MUTUAL COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE VITAL TO US ALL,
7. AND THEY ARE PERMANENT AND UNSHAKEABLE. /
8. AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTH PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK
WITHIN WHICH OUR MATURE FRIENDSHIPS WITH
9. JAPAN, KOREA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAILAND
10. ALL CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC BASIN AND THE WORLD.
11. WE MUST AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THESE ^{& OTHER} RESPONSIBILITIES. //

THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY A STRONG AMERICA
AND BY CONFIDENCE IN US AMONG OUR FRIENDS
IN EGYPT & ISRAEL. WE ARE DETERMINED TO
CONTINUE THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE.

(CHALLENGES TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES)

1. BUT THERE ARE REASONS-FOR-CONCERN ↗
ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN OUR BENEFICIAL AND PEACEFUL INFLUENCE. /
2. FOR NEARLY 20 YEARS ↗
THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN INCREASING-ITS-REAL-DEFENSE-SPENDING ↗
3. BY THREE OR FOUR PERCENT EACH YEAR.
4. IN CONTRAST, OUR OWN DEFENSE SPENDING HAS-DECLINED-IN-REAL-TERMS ↗
EVERY YEAR FROM 1968 THROUGH 1976. /
5. THIS IS CREATING A REAL-CHALLENGE-TO-AMERICAN-LEADERSHIP-AND-INFLUENCE-
IN THE WORLD. /
6. WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FACE OTHER CHALLENGES --
7. LESS DIRECT THOUGH NO LESS SERIOUS.
8. THE 1980s ARE LIKELY TO BRING CONTINUED TURBULENCE AND UPHEAVAL. /
9. PROBLEMS OF ENERGY-PRICE-AND-SUPPLY ↗
WILL CONTINUE TO STRAIN THE ECONOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD,
10. AND WILL PUT EVEN MORE SEVERE PRESSURES ON THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. /
11. POLITICAL INSTABILITY MAY EVEN INTENSIFY ↗
AS THE NEWER NATIONS STRUGGLE TO COPE WITH THESE PROBLEMS. /

1. AS IN THE PAST, WHEN THE WINDS OF CHANGE THREATEN TO AROUSE STORMS OF CONFLICT,
2. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO JOIN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES
IN RESISTING THREATS TO STABILITY AND PEACE. //

(WHAT ARE WE DOING TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES)

1. THE STEADY BUILDUP BY THE SOVIETS ↗
AND THEIR GROWING INCLINATION TO RELY ON MILITARY POWER
TO EXPLOIT TURBULENT SITUATIONS
2. CALL FOR A CALM, DELIBERATE AND SUSTAINED-AMERICAN-RESPONSE. //
3. THROUGH THE MID-1970s THE UNITED STATES RELIED ON A DEFENSE STRATEGY
AND ON FORCE STRUCTURES DEvised DURING THE EARLY 1960s --
4. A TIME WHEN WE ENJOYED STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR-SUPERIORITY ↗
AND A-TACTICAL-NUCLEAR-MONOPOLY;
5. WHEN SOVIET SEAPOWER WAS LIMITED ↗
AND THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE ALMOST NONEXISTENT.
6. ALL THAT HAD CHANGED BY THE TIME I TOOK OFFICE AS PRESIDENT. /
7. BEGINNING IN 1976 AND CONTINUING IN MY ADMINISTRATION ↗
8. WE HAVE SET OUT TO COUNTERBALANCE THE GROWTH IN SOVIET-MILITARY POWER ↗
9. BY LAUNCHING NEW EFFORTS THAT DRAW ON OUR OWN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTHS. /

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1. DURING EACH OF THE LAST 4 YEARS ➤
THERE HAS BEEN A MODERATE-INCREASE IN REAL-DEFENSE-SPENDING.
2. IN EUROPE WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO REVERSE A DECADE-OF-RELATIVE-DECLINE ➤
IN THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.
3. WHEN I FIRST BEGAN TO MEET WITH ALLIED LEADERS NEARLY 3 YEARS AGO
4. I FOUND THEM TROUBLED BY THE STATE OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE CAPABILITY.
5. I PROMISED TO RAISE OUR OWN REAL LEVEL OF DEFENSE SPENDING ➤
BY SOME 3 PERCENT EACH YEAR,
6. AND OUR "NATO" ALLIES RESPONDED BY MAKING THE SAME PLEDGE. /
7. WITH AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, "NATO" ALSO TOOK THE CRUCIAL STEP
OF ADOPTING A BOLD-LONG-TERM-DEFENSE PROGRAM.
8. THAT PROGRAM IS HELPING US INCREASE OUR CAPACITY ➤
TO DETER OR DEFEAT ANY SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. /
9. WE ARE ALSO TAKING STEPS TO REDRESS-THE BALANCE IN THEATER-NUCLEAR-FORCES.
10. IN THE EARLY 1960s THE "U.S." REMOVED ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ➤
FROM WESTERN EUROPE.
11. WE COULD DO THIS THEN
BECAUSE THERE WAS OVERWHELMING "U.S." STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY.

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1. BUT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT SHOW SIMILAR RESTRAINT.
2. THE ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT ^z
OF THEIR RELATIVELY LONG-RANGE MOBILE, MULTI-WARHEAD "SS-20" MISSILE ^z
IS A MAJOR ESCALATION IN THEATER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.
3. WITH THE ADVENT OF ROUGH STRATEGIC PARITY ^z
4. THIS NEW MISSILE CREATES A POTENTIALLY-DANGEROUS-WEAKNESS ^z
IN "NATO's" ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION. ^z
5. IN THE "SALT II" NEGOTIATIONS
WE CAREFULLY PROTECTED OUR FREEDOM TO CORRECT THIS WEAKNESS.
6. TODAY, ^z THE "NATO" ALLIANCE ^z
^{JUST A FEW HOURS AGO ^z}
RESOLVED TO STRENGTHEN-ITS ^z ^{THEATER} NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
TO OFFSET ACTUAL SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS.
7. THEN, ON THE BASIS OF STRENGTH, WE CAN NEGOTIATE WITH THE WARSAW PACT
TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. ^z
8. IN THE AREA OF INTERCONTINENTAL OR STRATEGIC FORCES ^z
WE ALSO FACE ADVERSE TRENDS THAT MUST BE CORRECTED.
9. IMPROVING SOVIET AIR DEFENSES NOW THREATEN TO MAKE ^z
OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS VULNERABLE.
10. THE CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE OUR SOLUTION TO THAT PROBLEM.
11. PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST GENERATION OF AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES ^z
WILL BEGIN NEXT YEAR. ^z

1. IN ADDITION,

OUR LAND-BASED MINUTEMAN "ICBMs" ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE ↗

2. BECAUSE OF THE IMPROVED ACCURACY OF THE SOVIET UNION'S MULTIPLE-WARHEAD MISSILES

3. THAT IS WHY WE DECIDED LAST SPRING TO PRODUCE THE "MX" MISSILE.

4. THE RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF "MX" MISSILES ↗

WILL HAVE MOBILITY AND A LARGE NUMBER OF SHELTERS ↗

5. AND WILL BE FAR LESS VULNERABLE THAN OUR PRESENT FIXED-SHELTER MINUTEMEN. /

6. FURTHER, IN RESPONSE TO ANY FIRST STRIKE, THE "MX" WILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY
TO ATTACK A WIDE VARIETY OF SOVIET MILITARY TARGETS.

7. THE "MX" MISSILE WILL NOT UNDERMINE STABILITY,

8. BUT IT WILL DETER ATTACK ↗

AND ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITS. /

9. IN ADDITION, BY INCREASING THE DIFFICULTY OF ANY CONTEMPLATED SOVIET STRIKE,

10. IT WILL CONTRIBUTE ↗

TO THE SURVIVABILITY OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND SUBMARINES.

11. EVEN WITH "SALT II", AMERICA NEEDS THE "MX" ↗

TO MAINTAIN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE.

1. WE ARE ALSO MODERNIZING OUR STRATEGIC SUBMARINE FORCE.
2. THE FIRST NEW TRIDENT SUBMARINE HAS BEEN LAUNCHED,
3. AND THE FIRST OF OUR NEW TRIDENT MISSILES, WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 4,000 MILES,
HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUT TO SEA. /
4. THUS EACH LEG OF OUR STRATEGIC TRIAD IS BEING MODERNIZED --
5. CRUISE MISSILES FOR OUR BOMBERS,
"MX" FOR OUR INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES,
AND TRIDENT FOR OUR UNDERSEA DETERRENT. //
6. NOR WILL WE NEGLECT MODERNIZING OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES,
7. THOUGH HERE WE MUST RELY HEAVILY ON THE PARALLEL EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES,
IN ASIA AS WELL AS IN EUROPE.
8. THEY MUST BEAR THEIR PROPORTIONAL SHARE OF THE INCREASED BURDENS
OF THE COMMON DEFENSE. /
9. I AM DETERMINED TO KEEP OUR NAVAL FORCES >
MORE POWERFUL THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER NATION.
10. OUR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM WILL SUSTAIN A 550-SHIP NAVY IN THE 1990s;
11. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD THE MOST CAPABLE SHIPS AFLOAT.
12. SEAPOWER IS INDISPENSABLE TO OUR GLOBAL STRATEGY -- IN PEACE AND IN WAR. //

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1. FINALLY, WE ARE MOVING RAPIDLY
TO COUNTERBALANCE THE GROWING-ABILITY-OF-THE-SOVIET-UNION
-- DIRECTLY OR THROUGH SURROGATES --
2. TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IN THIRD WORLD REGIONS.
3. AND WE MUST BE PREPARED ↗
TO DEAL WITH HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST OUR CITIZENS OR OUR VITAL INTERESTS
FROM OTHERS AS WELL. /
4. FOR THIS PURPOSE WE NEED NOT-ONLY-STRONGER-FORCES,
5. BUT BETTER-MEANS-FOR-RAPID-DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCES-WE-ALREADY-HAVE.
6. OUR 1981 DEFENSE BUDGET AND OUR 5-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM ↗
WILL MEET THIS NEED IN 2 WAYS:
7. THE FIRST WILL BE A NEW FLEET OF MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS
8. THAT WILL CARRY THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR 3 MARINE BRIGADES,
9. AND THAT CAN BE STATIONED-IN-FORWARD-AREAS WHERE "U.S." FORCES MAY BE NEEDED. /
10. WITH THEIR SUPPLIES ALREADY NEAR THE SCENE OF ACTION, ↗
THE TROOPS THEMSELVES CAN MOVE IN BY AIR. /
11. THE SECOND INNOVATION WILL BE A NEW FLEET OF LARGE-CARGO-AIRCRAFT, ↗
12. TO CARRY ARMY TANKS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT OVER INTERCONTINENTAL DISTANCES. /

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1. HAVING RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN WE WILL ^{EVER} USE THEM. ~~IN COMBAT~~ ✓
2. WE INTEND THEIR EXISTENCE ✓
TO DETER THE VERY DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD INVOKE THEIR USE. ✓
3. WE MUST ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT NO MATTER HOW CAPABLE OR ADVANCED OUR WEAPONS
SYSTEMS,
4. OUR MILITARY SECURITY DEPENDS ON THE ABILITIES, TRAINING, AND DEDICATION
5. OF THE PEOPLE WHO SERVE IN OUR ARMED FORCES.
6. I AM DETERMINED TO RECRUIT AND TO RETAIN
AN AMPLE LEVEL OF SUCH SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED MILITARY PERSONNEL. ✓
7. TO SUM UP, THE UNITED STATES IS TAKING STRONG ACTION:
8. FIRST, TO IMPROVE ALL ASPECTS OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES,
THUS ASSURING OUR DETERRENT TO NUCLEAR WAR.
9. SECOND, TO UPGRADE OUR FORCES IN "NATO" AND THE PACIFIC,
AS PART OF A COMMON EFFORT WITH OUR ALLIES.
10. THIRD, TO MODERNIZE OUR NAVAL FORCES TO KEEP THEM THE BEST IN THE WORLD.
11. FOURTH, TO STRENGTHEN OUR RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES
TO MEET OUR RESPONSIBILITIES OUTSIDE "NATO".
12. AND FIFTH, TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE FORCE OF HIGHLY-TRAINED MILITARY PERSONNEL.

1. WE MUST SUSTAIN THESE COMMITMENTS ➤
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN-PEACE-AND-SECURITY IN THE 1980s. //
2. TO ENSURE THAT WE PRESS FORWARD VIGOROUSLY, I WILL SUBMIT FOR "FY-1981"
3. A BUDGET TO INCREASE FUNDING AUTHORITY FOR DEFENSE TO MORE THAN \$157 BILLION --
4. A REAL GROWTH OF MORE THAN 5 PERCENT OVER MY REQUEST FOR "FY-1980".
5. JUST AS IN 1979 AND 1980, REQUESTED OUTLAYS FOR DEFENSE DURING "FY-1981"
6. WILL GROW BY MORE THAN 3 PERCENT IN REAL TERMS OVER THE PRECEDING YEAR.
7. WE WILL SUSTAIN THIS EFFORT. /
8. MY 5-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM PROVIDES REAL FUNDING INCREASES ➤
9. THAT AVERAGE MORE THAN 4½ PERCENT A YEAR.
10. I INTEND TO CARRY OUT THIS PROGRAM. /
11. WITH CAREFUL AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT, ➤
WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO WITHIN THE BUDGET INCREASES I PROPOSE.
12. IF INFLATION EXCEEDS THE PROJECTED RATES, ➤
I INTEND TO ADJUST THE DEFENSE BUDGET AS NEEDED, ➤
JUST AS WAS DONE IN 1980. //

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1. MUCH OF THIS PROGRAM WILL TAKE 5 YEARS OR MORE TO REACH FRUITION.
2. THE IMBALANCES IT WILL CORRECT ✓
HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY MORE-THAN- A-DECADE- OF- DISPARITY. ✓
3. ~~AND~~ THEY CANNOT BE REMEDIED OVERNIGHT, ✓
4. SO WE MUST BE WILLING TO SEE THIS PROGRAM THROUGH.
5. TO ENSURE THAT WE DO SO,
I AM SETTING A GROWTH RATE FOR DEFENSE ✓
THAT WILL BE TOLERABLE OVER THE LONG HAUL.
6. THE MOST WASTEFUL AND SELF-DEFEATING THING WE COULD DO ✓
7. WOULD BE TO START THIS NECESSARY PROGRAM,
8. THEN ALTER OR CUT IT BACK AFTER A YEAR OR TWO ✓
WHEN SUCH ACTION MIGHT BECOME- POLITICALLY- ATTRACTIVE. ✓
9. THE DEFENSE PROGRAM I AM PROPOSING FOR THE NEXT 5 YEARS
10. WILL REQUIRE SOME SACRIFICE -- BUT SACRIFICE WE CAN ^{WELL} AFFORD. ✓
11. IT WILL NOT INCREASE AT ALL ✓
THE PERCENTAGE OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DEVOTED TO DEFENSE, ✓
12. WHICH WILL REMAIN- STEADY- AT- ABOUT- 5- PERCENT.

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1. WE MUST HAVE A LONG-RANGE, BALANCED APPROACH ↗
TO THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURES.
2. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET SUCH CRUCIAL NEEDS ↗
AS JOBS, HOUSING, EDUCATION AND HEALTH,
3. BUT WE MUST REALIZE THAT A PREREQUISITE TO THE ENJOYMENT OF SUCH PROGRESS ↗
4. IS TO ASSURE PEACE FOR OUR NATION. /
5. SO IN ASKING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS,
6. I AM ASKING FOR CONSISTENT SUPPORT -- STEADFAST SUPPORT --
7. NOT JUST FOR 1980 OR 1981, BUT UNTIL THESE COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. //

(POWER AND PEACE)

8. SUSTAINED-AMERICAN-STRENGTH IS THE ONLY-POSSIBLE-BASIS ↗
9. FOR THE WIDER, TRULY RECIPROCAL DETENTE WE SEEK WITH THE SOVIET UNION. /
10. ONLY THROUGH-STRENGTH CAN WE CREATE GLOBAL-POLITICAL-CONDITIONS ↗
HOSPITABLE TO WORLDWIDE-ECONOMIC-AND-POLITICAL-PROGRESS --
11. AND TO CONTROLLING BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS. //

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1. AS THE STRONGEST, MOST ADVANCED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, ✓
2. WE HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO SEEK SECURITY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL ✓
AS WELL AS THROUGH MILITARY POWER.
3. SO I WELCOME THE DEBATE BY THE SENATE ✓
IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE "SALT II" TREATY.
4. IT WILL ENABLE US TO BUILD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING ✓
THAT THESE EFFORTS IN BOTH ARMS-CONTROL AND DEFENSE
ARE VITAL TO OUR SECURITY. //
5. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS WHY "SALT II" ✓
WILL STRENGTHEN THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.
6. FIRST, WE CAN BETTER MAINTAIN STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ✓
WITH "SALT II".
7. WITHOUT IT, THE SOVIETS CAN ADD MORE TO THE POWER OF THEIR OWN FORCES, ✓
8. WIDEN ANY ADVANTAGE THEY MAY ACHIEVE IN THE EARLY 1980s, ✓
9. AND CONCEAL FROM US WHAT THEY ARE DOING. ✓
10. FOR US, MAINTAINING PARITY WITH THESE UNCONTROLLED SOVIET ACTIONS
WOULD ADD TO OUR COSTS --
11. IN TIME, MONEY AND UNCERTAINTY. //

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1. SECOND, WE CAN BETTER MAINTAIN ↘
THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY AND READINESS OF OUR NON-NUCLEAR FORCES ↘
WITH "SALT II" THAN WITHOUT IT.
2. WHATEVER THE LEVEL OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET,
3. MORE OF IT WILL HAVE TO GO INTO STRATEGIC WEAPONS ↘
IF "SALT II" IS NOT RATIFIED. /
4. THIRD, WE CAN BETTER STRENGTHEN ↘
THE UNITY, RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY OF THE "NATO" ALLIANCE ↘
WITH "SALT II" THAN WITHOUT IT.
5. THAT IS WHY THE HEADS OF OTHER "NATO" GOVERNMENTS ↘
HAVE URGED ITS RATIFICATION. /
6. FOURTH, WE CAN BETTER CONTINUE
THE "SALT" PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING FURTHER-REDUCTIONS ↘
IN THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR ARSENALS ↘
WITH "SALT II" THAN WITHOUT IT.
7. WITHOUT "SALT II" AND ALL OF ITS LIMITS, RULES AND DEFINITIONS IN PLACE, ↘
8. AN AGREEMENT IN "SALT III" ON DEEPER CUTS WOULD, AT BEST, ↘
TAKE MANY MORE YEARS TO ACHIEVE. /

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2:30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1979

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MEETING WITH REP. JACK BROOKS (D-TEXAS)

Wednesday, December 12, 1979

2:30 p.m. (5 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Frank Moore *F.M.*

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Congressman Brooks and accept a gift of venison from him.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN:

Background: Chairman Brooks will be presenting you with a gift of frozen venison/pork sausage, which members of his staff say is delicious. In the past the Chairman has "bagged" the deer himself, but that could not be confirmed in this instance.

Brooks has, as you know, endorsed you for re-election, and will be working hard on your behalf.

Participants: The President, Chairman Brooks, Frank Moore, Bill Cable.

Press Plan: White House photographer only.