

12/29/79 [1]

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo w/ att.	From Brzezinski to The President (6 pp.) re: Extension of Export Control for Foreign Policy Purposes/enclosed in Hutcheson to Brzezinski 12/29/79	12/28/79	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec. -Pres. Handwriting File 12/29/79 [1] BOX 161

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1979

Q

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
RICK NEUSTADT

SUBJECT: Paperwork Message

We are attaching a draft Message. It has been cleared by the speechwriters, OMB and the Counsel's office.

The ceremony to sign the Paperwork Executive Order and release the Message is scheduled for November 30.

We expect the key Congressional leaders on this issue (Senator Chiles, Congressman Brooks, and others) to attend.

approve disapprove

? Stu - How much
p'work will the
"p'work budget"
add?
J

(TWO SIGNATURES REQUESTED)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DEC 28 1979

Q

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr

SUBJECT: Paperwork Budget

In approving the Congressional Message on Paperwork Reduction, you asked Stu how much "paperwork" the "paperwork budget" will create.

No additional paperwork will be imposed on the public. The paperwork "budget" comprises information that the agencies already develop internally. This information will now be made available so that the public gets early warning about new information collection proposals.

Some additional paperwork will be imposed on the agencies, although most of the required information must already be prepared at some point before a federal form is used.

The main changes affecting agencies are two: The information will be prepared in advance, and all the information will be consolidated into a "budget" that is submitted to OMB. This will replace the current practice of scattering the information in many different areas that usually receive no policy level review. The small amount of additional paperwork inside the Government will help us cut the paperwork outside, on the public.

**Electrostatic Copy Made
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 27, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDWARD SANDERS 

I thought you would be interested in the attached letters. Rabbi Mandelbaum is the Executive Vice President of the Synagogue Council of America that presented you with their first International Human Rights Award on October 24th. Rabbi Mandelbaum participated in the presentation.

Attachments

cc: Hamilton Jordan
Jody Powell

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/29/79

Ed Sanders

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for your
information.

Rick Hutcheson

original to stripping via Linder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12-29-79

To Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum

I appreciated your
incisive analysis of the
statements made recently
by Rev. William Sloane
Coffin.

Jimmy Carter



SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA 432 PARK AVENUE SOUTH • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 683 6670

Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum
Executive Vice-President

4 Tevet 5740
December 24, 1979

Rev. Dr. William Sloane Coffin Jr.
Riverside Church
Riverside Drive & 122nd Street
New York, New York 10027

Dear Reverend Coffin:

I am absolutely appalled by the folly of your statement about the President's action vis-a-vis Iran, which has the overwhelming support of the American people. Your incomprehensible judgment advances two deleterious consequences:

- 1) It strengthens the hands of those who are impatient with the President's patient, policy of gradualism, and who want to see military action.
- 2) As a result of your comparison to the bombing of Cambodia, it could make one wonder about the wisdom of your earlier anti-Vietnam position -- not really, but it could!

The issue is not the psychological question whether: "it puts iron up the spines of the other side", but the theological and moral question: "Is it right?" From almost every point of view, the President's step-by-step reaction has been right.

For anyone, especially a sensitive religious leader like you, to comment on events surrounding Iran without absolute, uninhibited condemnation of the lawlessness, barbarity, and sheer destructiveness of the Ayatollah Khomeini's statements and actions - it is simply not to be believed!

If anything, you, as a respected religious leader - with commendable anti-Vietnam credentials - had, and still have (both of our religious traditions, each in its own way, leave plenty of room for repentance),

(more)


Rev. Dr. William Sloane Coffin Jr.
December 24, 1979

-2-

an opportunity to call to task the irreligious, anarchic policies of
a. Khomeini.


Even if - please God - the hostages are released before you receive
this note, please think about the tremendous damage of your state-
ments. Judging from your past achievements, you are big enough to
repent, recant, and return to justice and mercy - applicable, in this
instance only, to the hostages and the U.S. policy backed by 98 per
cent of the nations of the world.

Sincerely,



Bernard Mandelbaum

BM:hfe



SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA 432 PARK AVENUE SOUTH - NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016 (212) 686-8670

Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum
Executive Vice-President

4 Tevet 5740
December 24, 1979

Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43 Street
New York, New York 10036

Dear Sir:

It is incredible to read the absolute folly of the statement of the Reverend Dr. William Sloane Coffin Jr., comparing U.S. policy towards Iran to the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam war.

His judgment advances two deleterious consequences: (1) It strengthens the hands of those who are impatient with the President's patient, policy of gradualism, and who want to see military action. (2) As a result of his comparison, it could make one wonder about the wisdom of his earlier anti-Vietnam position -- not really, but it could!

The issue is not the psychological question whether: "it puts iron up the spines of the other side", but the theological and moral question: "Is it right?" From almost every point of view, the President's step-by-step reaction has been right.

It is incomprehensible that a sensitive religious leader like the Reverend Dr. Coffin could comment on events surrounding Iran without condemning the lawlessness, barbarity, and sheer destructiveness of the Ayatollah Khomeini's statements and actions.

Even if - please God - the hostages are released in the very near future, one would hope that the Reverend Dr. Coffin would think about the tremendous damage in his comments, and, judging from his past achievements, would take the opportunity to return to justice and mercy, with proper concern for the hostages and the U.S. policy backed by 98 per cent of the nations of the world.

Sincerely,

Bernard Mandelbaum

BM:hfc

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Kinders
sent to
to hold
1/2/50

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1979

Hold until 1/2/80
C

**Electrostatic Copy Made
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
TOM LAMBRIX
SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill H.R. 595 - Strategic and Critical
Materials Transaction Authorization Act of 1979

THE BILL

The key provisions of H.R. 595 are:

- o Authorizes \$237,000,000 in appropriations for the acquisition of strategic and critical materials for the National Defense Stockpile. The Administration's FY 81 budget contains a request for \$177,000,000 for stockpile acquisitions, and since the bill does not stipulate a fiscal year limitation on the authorization, an orderly acquisition program will still be permitted.
- o Requires a 60-day review period (of the scheduled list of materials to be bought) by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees prior to any acquisition.
- o Authorizes the sale of 35,000 long tons of tin and 3,000,000 carats of industrial diamond stones from the National Defense Stockpile. The Administration had requested authority to sell only 10,000 long tons of tin and 1,500,000 carats of industrial diamond stones. However, the Administration did not object to the higher authorized levels on the assumptions that the sales would take place over a number of years to avoid market disruptions and that sales would be reduced or suspended during periods of price weaknesses.
- o Authorizes the President to contribute up to 5,000 long tons of tin (from the authorized 35,000 long tons to be sold) to the Tin Buffer Stock established under the Fifth International Tin Agreement. Upon termination of the Agreement in 1981, all proceeds generated from this contribution will be remitted to the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

LINDER HAS COPY OF EIZENSTAT
MEMO. BILL WILL BE DISPATCHED
ON MONDAY 12/31.

KIRSCHENBAUM MAKING CALLS
PER PRESIDENT'S NOTE SATURDAY
AFTERNOON AND WILL NOTIFY
PRESS OFFICE TO ANNOUNCE
BILL SIGNING.

RICK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 27, 1979

*Jack - You
Call Byrne &
Carey
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill H.R. 4943 - Congressional Consent
to an Interstate Compact Between New York and
New Jersey

You must decide by Saturday, December 29, 1979, whether to sign or veto this bill.

THE BILL

Grants the consent of Congress to a compact between the states of New York and New Jersey enabling the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to finance and promote industrial and other economic development projects.

THE VOTE IN CONGRESS

-- House - 410-0

-- Senate - Voice

ARGUMENTS FOR SIGNING

The Constitution requires the consent of Congress to this interstate compact. The enrolled bill provides this consent to the compact between New York and New Jersey amending their bi-state agreement of 1921 which created the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) and the Port of New York District (District). The District includes parts of northern New Jersey and metropolitan New York located within a 25-mile radius of the Statue of Liberty. The compact, approved by the two state legislatures effective August 24, 1978, permits the Port Authority to engage in industrial development projects to counteract the effects of high unemployment, underutilization of land, and the erosion of the commercial tax base in the District.

The compact authorizes the Port Authority to develop a master economic plan, to issue bonds and commit money from its general fund or allocate portions of its revenues as securities for the bonds, and to negotiate agreements with the two States, any municipality, private entities, or the federal government with respect to the rehabilitation and economic redevelopment of the District.

This compact was deemed necessary to provide explicit authority for the Port Authority to engage in economic development activities, and is symbolically important to New York and New Jersey.

ARGUMENTS FOR VETO

None.

AGENCY AND STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS

OMB and I recommend approval. DOJ, DOC, and DOT informally expressed no objection. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations had no comment.

Jack Watson and I suggest that you issue the attached signing statement. It indicates your personal pleasure in signing this bill; congratulates the New York and New Jersey Congressional delegations, governors, Mayor Koch, and Alan Sagner and Peter Goldmark of the Port Authority on this legislation and applauds the efforts of the Port Authority to work with the private sector to retain and attract private economic development to this older urban center in the Northeast. The speechwriting office has reviewed and approved the attached statement.

Jack also recommends that you call Governor Carey to express your pleasure at signing the bill. The call to Carey is more important politically than substantively, and would allow you to discuss with him the general situation in New York. Jack will take care of a similar call to Byrne. I have no objection to this recommendation.

DECISION

✓
(Recommended)

Sign H.R. 4943 with signing statement

Sign H.R. 4943

Veto H.R. 4943

December 29, 1979

TALKING POINTS ON OUR UN APPROACH:

- I. We are definitely proceeding toward sanctions. This two-step approach is not a departure or delay from our previous position. There will be a deadline following Waldheim's trip (Secretary Vance is meeting Waldheim now - we will update you before lunch on the results of his meeting).
- II. UN action is in line with my statement Friday that "Iran will continue to pay an increasingly higher price for the illegal detention of our people."
- III. Our basic goals remain the safety of our fellow citizens and the protection of the long-term interests of the U.S. In the imposition of sanction, laws of various countries are involved in proceeding to the second step. In the meantime, discussions are continuing. This is a continuation of our efforts to gain UN imposition of sanctions. No abrupt departure.
- IV. During the consultations, various ideas and approaches were discussed on how best to follow through for early action and the two-step approach is a meaningful response.
- V. The international community is supporting us on our basis goal of the release of the hostages. They have made this clear by their votes in the Security Council and we have seen this in the International Court of Justice decision.
- VI. The integrity of international law and modern civilized diplomacy are at stake and it is clear that this is the world's case against Iran, not solely that of the U.S.

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done
J

TALKING POINTS - PRESIDENT ZIA

--I deeply appreciate Bangladesh's support for our efforts to free the hostages in Iran. I particularly appreciate the work of your Ambassador to Iran, who has visited our Charge, Mr. Laingen, at the Foreign Ministry in Tehran.

--As a leading member of the non-aligned movement, Bangladesh has great influence on international affairs and its position on the Security Council is critical. A number of nations look to Bangladesh for leadership.

--Iran continues to defy the decisions of the Security Council and World Court. Our attempts to induce Iran to comply with international law and release the hostages have met with intransigence.

--The time has come for the international community to take firm action to further the decisions of the Security Council and the World Court. We seek effective economic sanctions which will cause Iran to live up to its international obligations.

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--This is not primarily a dispute between Iran and the United States, but between Iran and the rest of the world. Iran has challenged the authority of the world order and the international norms of behavior which have been so carefully constructed over the years.

--We have acted with moderation and restraint and I want to continue our efforts to obtain a peaceful solution. But I cannot expect unlimited patience and forbearance from the American people.

--It is important that the Security Council act before January 1 when the change in membership could bring further delays. We will be asking for a decision soon.

--I therefore ask that Bangladesh give its strong support in the Security Council to the imposition of measured, but significant economic sanctions. This support will be crucial to the success of the effort.

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRIVATE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

Judge Webster:

Attached is a private
message to you from
President Carter.



Rick Hutcheson
Staff Secretary
to the President

The Honorable William K. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

800092

12/29/79

Jody --

I gather you gave the
boss attached article.


Your copy is also attached.
Would appreciate your
having envelope addressed
for Graham, and then the
whole thing (excluding your
copy) sent over to
stripping desk.

Thanks -- Susan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

b cc Jody
John White

J



Under the Dome

Graham puckers up for mule

Agriculture Commissioner James A. Graham recently kept a 1976 campaign promise by kissing a donkey's rear end.

"My wife said if I ever did anything like that again she'd leave me," Graham said.

He had made the campaign promise in 1976, while campaigning in heavily Republican Wilkes County.

"In my zeal, I said if Wilkes County goes Democratic all the way — I mean Jimmy Carter, Jim Hunt, Jimmy Green (and local officials) — I'd kiss that donkey in front of the courthouse," Graham said.

"I didn't dream they'd ever carry it."

After the Democratic sweep, Graham said he hoped his promise would be forgotten. But at a Young Democrats Club rally on Nov. 17 in Wilkesboro, he was surprised when a donkey named Franklin D. was trotted out on stage.

TRAPPED — According to several accounts, Graham tried for 10 to 15 minutes to talk his way out of it. He said that it wasn't the original mule and that they were not in the front of the courthouse. And he tried braying like a mule as a substitute.

Finally, he kept his promise. While someone held the donkey's tail, he bent over and kissed it, amid much laughter.

"You needn't tell anyone, but I had a handkerchief across my mouth," said Graham. "I'll tell you it was done in a fast manner, before he could contaminate me or I could contaminate him."

Two front-page pictures of Graham keeping his promise were featured in the bi-weekly Journal Patriot in Wilkes County.

DISPLEASED — Despite the publicity, Graham was not pleased when contacted by Dome.

"I was hoping you wouldn't find out about it," he said.

Graham tried to be philosophic about it. He said that the donkey was a prominent animal in the Bible and that it is the symbol of the Democratic Party.

"If (Wilkes) went Democratic again, I'd almost do it again," Graham said. Long pause. "No, hell no. Don't say I'd do it again. No way."

Stewart's allies map out plans

More than 100 key supporters of House Speaker Carl J. Stewart Jr. gathered in Raleigh Saturday to talk some nuts-and-bolts politics regarding his campaign for lieutenant governor.

The supporters, key county campaign volunteers, spent Saturday afternoon at the Sheraton Highwoods Inn talking about precinct organization, getting out the vote and other campaign details.

Stewart helped conduct the session. He is challenging Lt. Gov. James C. Green, who is seeking a second term.

To Jim
Graham:
If you
will just
promise to
do this in
every
county, we
will be sure
of a
Democratic
sweep in
1980 -
Thanks!
Jimmy
Carter

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 29, 1979

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/

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RAY JENKINS *RJ*
SUBJECT: Print Media Luncheon

The guests for today's session are print journalists, and the rules are background only, with no direct quotation.

White House regulars include Frank Cormier of AP, Helen Thomas of UPI, Ralph Harris of Reuters, Terry Smith of The New York Times, Jerry O'Leary of The Star, Andrew Glass of Atlanta/Cox, Godfrey Sperling of The Christian Science Monitor, and Pat Sloyan of Newsday.

Two diplomatic reporters will attend: Karen Elliot House of The Wall Street Journal and Don Oberdorfer of The Washington Post.

Two are bureau chiefs: Jack Nelson of The LA Times and Ernest (Pat) Furgurson of The Baltimore Sun.

We have indicated that Iran and Afghanistan will be the principal topics of discussion.

A photo chart is being prepared.

We will break at 1 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox. It is forwarded to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

Sarah Weddington
Frank Moore
Jim Johnson

Called 5 pm - Hedges

12/29/79

5-8-11
↑ ↑ ↑
Daly Rosten Annun
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tim
info
J

Mr. President:

Jim Johnson called last night to say that Rostenkowski had sent word he was being pressured into approving a Kennedy slate for his district. Given your previous conversations with the cong. Jim felt you might want to call him. Jim has more details if you care to talk with him.

Phil

Only one Ward Committee
(Ayello) on Ken slate in 8th =
11th undecided: Poll in 8th
7me CPM 3:1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for your
information.

Rick Hutcheson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

rick --

presume this went in
directly. also, f.y.i.,
a card (presumably in
polish) came out -- which
i've sent over to jane
simpson for her to handle
in accordance with other
christmas cards.

thanks--ssc

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12.28

Mr. President -

Because the enclosed
was not addressed to me,
it might have some
credibility.

U's .

THE ECONOMIC CLUB of CHICAGO

105 WEST MADISON STREET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602 ☎ 312-726-1628

December 21, 1979

*Zb17 -
It's always good
to know what one's
brother-in-law thinks
J*

The Honorable Philip Klutznick
Secretary of Commerce
875 North Michigan Avenue
Suite 4044
Chicago, IL 60611



Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Economic Club of Chicago greatly appreciates your help in obtaining Dr. Brzezinski as our speaker on December 18. He made a powerful impression and built great confidence in our members and guests (in excess of 1,300) both in America's stance in foreign affairs and security and in the Carter administration.

We are most grateful to you for your part and we send our warmest wishes to you in your new post as Secretary of Commerce. This is a most important post for our nation and we are proud that you were selected to make it work.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Stuhr
Executive Director

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President,

I think it worth
your time to read
them this so you
won't be any more
misled.

Also it will help
start your mind working
on what you want to
say.

Judy

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B A C K G R O U N D B R I E F I N G

THIS BRIEFING MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.
DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 5:20 P.M. EST

DECEMBER 28, 1979

FRIDAY

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought that what I might do is take a few minutes to answer questions that you may have. I would say by way of introduction that the events of the last several days do have a wider significance. They pose questions which pertain to regional stability in a part of the world that is strategically sensitive. The President today spoke by telephone to several key leaders.

Q Do you know who he spoke with?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He spoke with Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Schmidt, President Giscard, Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy, and President Zia. They all share a sense of concern over these developments. It is in the light of these discussions that the President then decided to send Deputy Secretary of State Christopher to London for broader and more sustained consultations with concerned allies.

Q Is that his only stop in Europe?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As of now. This is just in the process of being shaped.

Q Will all of the allies that you just mentioned be there?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would assume so. But probably others as well.

Q But the discussions will concern Afghanistan, is that correct?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the major purpose of the meeting is to review the situation in Afghanistan in the light of the Soviet intervention. I cannot exclude the possibility that other related subjects might arise. But the purpose of the meeting is to provide an opportunity for like-minded allied countries to consult on what is clearly an important development.

Q Now the United Nations is going to meet tomorrow to consider sanction --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is my understanding that there will be a meeting tomorrow, in New York.

MORE

Q Are we of the belief that as they sit down to confer that we have the votes?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are confident, on the basis of the consultations that we have held and on the basis of the vote, or the concensus that previously emerged, and which was a unanimous concensus of 15 members, that the international community recognizes that the issue at stake involves all of them, and calls for a response which is one of solidarity.

Q So we are laying our cards on the December group rather than the January group?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are beginning the process with the December group. Our hope is that it will be ready to take an appropriate response. Obviously if the process goes beyond we will deal with the successor group. The difference isn't that significant in terms of the composition.

Q Anything from the Russians on their attitude?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we don't have any indication from them as to precisely how they will respond. However, I would like to register the fact that they did support the previous position taken by the United Nations --

Q But you don't really know if you have the votes is what you are telling us.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are confident that the international community will support us. I cannot tell you right now precisely what our expectation is regarding the polling pattern.

Q But some have already said that they won't, Kuwait for example. In other words, it doesn't translate one to one. Do you have any idea how many votes it does translate to?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to really play the numbers game at this stage, especially since consultations are still in progress. There are a number of fairly complicated technical issues involved here, and these discussions are ongoing. Accordingly I think it would really be futile for me to try to play around with numbers.

Q What did the Russians say?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Russian position generally is that they do not approve, and are highly critical of, the Iranian action. Their position is that it is not compatible with accepted international norms. At the same time, as you all know from their public statements, they tend to qualify that by some expressions of

MORE

sympathy for the developments and attitudes that have manifested themselves in Iran. Accordingly, I am loath to predict specifically how they will react, whether they will support us or whether they will abstain.

Q Today's statement of the President with respect to Afghanistan said that it required close and extensive consultation between ourselves and with our allies on an urgent basis, and during Christmas vacation. What are the options that either we or our allies have in dealing with this matter, and is one of them some kind of assistance to the rebel forces in Afghanistan?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really think that it would be extremely unwise for me to speculate about options. After all, what happens in Afghanistan itself will influence very much what is done also by the outside community. One can, I believe, predict with a high degree of certainty, that the traditional spirit of independence of the Afghani people would express itself through sustained resistance. I think that one has reasons to believe that this will have an impact on the attitude of Moslem people. The Islamic world has been deeply concerned about the denial of religious and political rights to some 50 million Soviet Moslems. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Islamic world will be indifferent to the use of Soviet arms to suppress and to kill Afghans who wish to be independent.

I believe all of that, cumulatively, over time, will influence the course of events. But precisely how, and what specific actions it will prompt, I cannot predict.

Q Are these consultations -- is it expected that they will come up with a concrete action, or merely are they going to get together and decide how to deplore it, or what?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really think that it would be futile for me to tell you now what will come out of these discussions. After all, they are going to be affected very much, one, by what happens; two, by the attitudes of the other governments concerned.

Q What is the objective? Is the objective to come out with a plan or not?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose is, one, to establish some sense of shared understanding regarding the implications of these actions. These implications pertain first of all to the region itself, which means not only Afghanistan but adjoining countries. Secondly, what are the implications of the justification used by the Soviet Union for this action? You know that the Soviet Union has invoked Article 51, as well as the Peace and Friendship Pact with Afghanistan, as the legitimizing basis for its military intervention. This has some wider implications which need to be analyzed and reacted to.

Q Among the implications --

MORE

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does, in effect, go beyond the previously defined Brezhnev formula. Thirdly, we have to make a judgment as to what is likely to happen on the ground -- what are the options that events themselves will create for the international community? What kind of international pressure on the Soviet Union? What political consequences? These are the kinds of things which need to be discussed. They cannot be foreshadowed today, literally several hours after the decision to send someone to a consultative meeting.

Q Can you give us any idea of other options for bringing pressure on the Soviet Union besides giving the guerrillas aid?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to speculate at all on what options we have. It really wouldn't be very useful. We want to discuss these with our allies.

Q Do we have any options, really?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we have a variety of possible courses of action we could pursue. At the same time I think we have to realistically recognize that there are limitations to what can be done by the United States alone, or by the Western world from the outside. Much will depend on the attitude of the countries more directly affected. Much will depend on the degree to which this action generates a sense of outrage in the Moslem world. Much will depend on the intensity of the Afghani resistance, and indeed, perhaps, on the longer range consequences of that resistance, even for the Moslems within the Soviet Union itself.

Q Are we bound by any kind of treaty commitment, in the sense that if President Zia asked us for help that we would be bound by a treaty commitment, giving military or any other form of help?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have some obligations to Pakistan which go back to 1959, and which do pertain to the eventuality of a direct aggression against Pakistan. In the case of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, that is clearly not the case, insofar as Pakistan is involved. However, it stands to reason that Pakistan must today be very concerned about the transformation of what traditionally was a buffer state between the British Empire and the Russian Empire.

I think it is important to bear in mind that for that part of the world Afghanistan derived its independence and played a special role by virtue of the function it performed as a buffer state between two competitive empires, the Russian and the British. After the fading of the British in that part of the world, the United States shaped an arrangement in the region which involved primarily Iran and Pakistan, with Afghanistan still performing the buffer state role.

MORE

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS BRIEFING
DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

(AT 5:50 P.M. EST)

DR. BRZEZINSKI:

Let me begin just by making a few general points and then I will try to answer any question that you may have. First of all, we view the Soviet action in Afghanistan as raising a broader strategic issue of more general concern. The Soviet intervention has first of all immediate regional significance. Traditionally, Afghanistan has been a buffer state which played a stabilizing role in a part of the world in which there were two competing imperial drives. The British Empire and the Russian Empire collided in this part of the world.

Afghanistan played a separating role as a buffer state. In so doing, it impeded the traditional Russian drive toward the Indian Ocean. After World War II the United States gradually came to assume partially the role played by the British. Afghanistan continued to play the role of the buffer state, with to the south of it an independent Indian union and Pakistan and Iran tied more directly by security links with the United States.

The present crisis in Iran which has destabilized the political and the military situation in that country, the internal problems of Pakistan and now the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan creates a potentially very volatile situation. This has generated wider concern and the President today consulted a number of Allied leaders on this subject. He spoke by telephone with Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Schmidt, President Giscard, Prime Minister Cossiga and also with President Zia. They were also concerned and they agreed that it would be useful and important to hold urgent consultations on the implications of the events of the last few days.

We are now in the process of scheduling that consultation, to be held presumably in London to include members of the Alliance.

Q Carter will go?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: The President is sending Deputy Secretary Christopher to attend. He has already announced that in his statement.

More generally, but in this context, I think it is important to note that the Soviet aggression is not compatible with the spirit of detente as well as with some of the understandings that detente over the years has generated between the two super powers.

I would like to particularly draw your attention to the declaration of the basic principles of relations of May 29th, 1972 signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. That declaration states, and I quote, "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have a special responsibility to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs." "Will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs."

MORE

We believe that the Soviet aggression is not consistent with that. Similarly, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war June 22, 1973 states that the parties agree to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or the use of force against a party, against the Allies of the other party, and against other countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.

The first point I would like to make is that this development does pose wider international implications which need to be reviewed carefully with our friends.

The second point I would like to make is that there is a more immediate regional problem and the President's discussion with President Zia is a reflection of that. We are concerned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan may contribute to greater instability and insecurity in the region. That region confronts certain problems with which we are all familiar. The injection of Soviet troops into the internal affairs of Afghanistan is an extremely dangerous precedent and it doubtless will have an impact on the attitudes of Afghani neighbors.

Thirdly, I would like to note that the Soviet action represents a challenge to the Moslem world more generally. It involves the Soviet Union in direct military action against Moslems who are fighting for their political and religious self expression. This is bound to cause concern in the Moslem world. It also remains to be seen how in the longer run it will affect the attitudes of Soviet Moslems who number some 50 million people. Indeed, in this connection it is worthy of your attention to note that 1/3 of Afghanistan's population is of the same ethnic identity as some Soviet Moslems. One third of Afghanistan's population is of Tadjik or Uzbek origin and Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan are, as you know, Soviet Socialist Republics. Hence, there is a kinship here that is linguistic, historical, perhaps even familial.

Afghani efforts to protect their independence could therefore have wider ramifications for Soviet relations with the Moslem world.

Finally, I would like to say that the Soviet actions have also implications for the international community more broadly. The justification invoked here for the Soviet action rests on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and on the Peace and Friendship Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan not such a long time ago. To use these two documents together as the basis for armed intervention is to do damage, first of all, to the U.N. Charter and secondly, it is to establish a wider basis for the asserted claim to intervene militarily than previously posited through the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine".

The Brezhnev Doctrine, you will remember, rested on the proposition that the Soviet Union has the right as well as the obligation to defend the socialist or communist order of allied communist states. The combination of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Article 51 establishes a broader and a more inclusive principle to justify Soviet intervention in the affairs of non-communist states. This, I should think, might be of concern to the non-aligned countries and one will have to watch carefully how they respond to this development.

Afghanistan, for example, has been a member of the non-aligned movement and it is now a victim of Soviet action of this sort.

Finally, by way merely of background, there are some specific

aspects of the events of the last days which are likely to have wider international impact. The preparations for the invasion were made by General Pavloski in the course of a two month visit to Afghanistan during which he was the guest of President Amin's government. On the basis of these preparations Soviet troops were then offered to help Amin maintain himself in power.

In fact, while Pavloski was in Afghanistan Soviet helicopter gunships helped to put down a rebellion against Amin in Kabul itself. Then, on Christmas Day, in a major airlift, Soviet troops were flown into Afghanistan with either the acquiescence or even the invitation of Amin's own government. Amin, in the meantime, was the host to a Soviet delegation headed by the Soviet Minister of Health and Education and, according to some reports, was actually entertaining him when the newly arrived Soviet guests came to fetch him and to make possible his execution. There are reports today that Amin's family was also wiped out. This will probably have some impact on the attitudes of other countries' views.

So so much by way of background and context for the events of the last few days. Let me just now respond to anything else you would wish to raise.

Q Why do you think the Soviets are doing this and what does it say about the present Soviet regime? Does this mean that perhaps the military is having more influence with a perhaps indisposed Mr. Brezhnev? What does this say about Soviet intentions?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think that the Soviet action is the product of several inter-related considerations. First of all, there is objectively a genuine opportunity here, given the crisis in Iran, given the conflict within Afghanistan, given the vulnerability of Pakistan, and given the preoccupation of the outside world and notably the United States with the Iranian problem.

There has been, as I said earlier, a historical interest on the part of the Soviet Union in that part of the world, an interest which was reflected by the presence of a buffer state supported from the south by a countervailing political force, supported from the outside either earlier by the British or more lately by us. With the disappearance of these countervailing forces because particularly of the Iranian crisis, the Soviet Union confronted a genuine opportunity here which it found difficult to resist.

Secondly, the Soviet Union might have calculated that the preoccupation of the United States with the Iranian problem would lower somewhat the cost threshold of such a venture, especially since it would appear that at least some of Moslem hostility was now being directed at the United States.

Thirdly, the Soviets might have concluded that the onset of the Presidential campaign in this country was somewhat reducing the prospects for SALT and that therefore there wouldn't be a direct cause and effect impact on the prospect of SALT in any case. I am simply hypothesizing as to how the Soviets might have viewed the situation before reaching a conclusion of this kind. Whether this represents a major turning point either in internal or in external policies, it is too early to say. But I would merely note that on the whole it is consistent with Soviet behavior in previous situations when either an opportunity or a crisis confronted them. It certainly is consistent with the Soviet behavior regarding Hungary in '56 or Czechoslovakia in '68.

Q Don't the Soviets care about SALT any more? I mean

do they really think that there isn't anything in it for them now?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think the Soviets, by and large, do recognize that SALT, by itself, represents a stabilizing and an equitable arrangement. In that sense they do have some interest in it. They do not feel, however, that this interest is one for which they should pay by refraining from behavior with which we would otherwise be in disagreement.

Q Are you still going to maintain the position that there is no linkage and therefore the SALT Treaty is just going to lie up there for these guys to come back from debating in January or are we going to say that until they behave themselves in a better fashion we are not going to debate this thing when Congress comes back?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: We are going to maintain the position that SALT is in our mutual interest, that it is not linked either to good nor to bad Soviet behavior, and therefore should be discussed on its merits. I want to reiterate that the US-Soviet SALT agreement is not a reward for allegedly good behavior, to be denied for allegedly or actually bad behavior. It is an agreement reached on the basis of mutual interest in stabilizing the most dynamic and potentially most dangerous aspect of the relationship, the strategic relationship.

If our relations with the Soviets were much, much, much better we actually might need SALT less; and if the relations were even worse than they are because of this situation, and they could be much worse, because one should not over-generalize the present aspects of this relationship, we would still need SALT; and perhaps we would need it even more.

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After all, SALT is not an expression of wishful thinking, nor merely make believe. It is an effort to stabilize an aspect of the relationship which it is all the more important to stabilize, as that relationship is deteriorating.

Q This can't help SALT, can it?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I am not claiming it is going to help SALT politically, but I am responding to the question of whether we will try to penalize the Soviets by cutting off --

Q Some of the Senators may seek to link --

DR. BRZEZINSKI: We faced the same problems during the so-called Soviet Brigade in Cuba issue. At that time we also took the position that while we may not like what the Soviets are doing, it has no bearing on an agreement which is reached on the basis of a cold, rational appreciation of the need for greater stability in the most sensitive aspect of the relationship, which is the strategic aspect.

Q Technically no one believes -- if we keep debating SALT -- I mean, does that last indefinitely? Was there any sort of set date on that?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: No.

Q Does it now look like the sole reason for this airlift that started on Monday was to engineer this coup?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: We don't know as of now whether there are additional Soviet deployments in Afghanistan, and particularly whether there are any deployments in other major centers of Afghanistan. There have been some indications that this might have been occurring, but we don't have as of now firm confirmation of such occurrences.

Q Has the President be in touch with Mr. Brezhnev?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: The President indicated at the end of his press conference that a message was being sent.

Q By telephone?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, they don't usually talk to each other by telephone. No American and Soviet leaders have ever talked to each other by telephone. The purpose of the hot line has been to provide for quick communication between the two, in addition to diplomatic exchanges.

Q Is there any evidence that the Russians are really worried about their own Moslems, or is that simply a theory that people like to talk about and wish for? Is there any evidence that

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they are treating their Moslems any different, doing anything different that would indicate that there is a real concern there?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I can't generalize about that with any degree of confidence. But one can certainly know the following: one the Soviets have kept their Moslems under very strict control. Secondly, there has been an effort to move more Russians and Ukrainians into Moslem areas of the Soviet Union, thereby breaking up the Moslem population demographically. It has moved more rapidly in certain parts than in others. But there has been some of that. Thirdly, the Soviets have been very careful to compartmentalize their Moslems from outside Moslem contact. It is well nigh impossible, for example, for Soviet Moslems to go even on pilgrimages to Mecca. And there are very few direct contacts between Soviet Moslem intellectuals and intellectuals and others in Moslem countries.

Fourthly, the Soviets are extraordinarily sensitive to any suggestion from the outside that their conduct may not be compatible with Moslem values, or may in some fashion adversely affect their relationships with Moslem countries. I made a brief reference to that possibility in an interview that I gave to U.S. News and World Report earlier this week. Within 24 hours there was a long Tass rebuttal, just on one brief comment on Soviet relations with Islam, just on that one issue, which I think reflects a degree of sensitivity, which I have mentioned.

Q Can you say something about the thrust of the President's message?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: No, I --

Q Can you give us any idea of what you hope might come out of this meeting in London?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I would think that the meeting in London would be designed to accomplish the following. First of all, an analysis by concerned governments of the implications in general, and the wider strategies of the Soviet action. Certainly what I said earlier on the subject is not uniquely held by the Americans. The Europeans are also concerned about the wider regional strategic implications of the Soviet action.

Secondly, we need to assess what is the likely reaction of the different parties thereby affected: the Afghanis themselves, their immediate neighbors, the Moslem world more generally. Thirdly, we need to assess the implications of the legitimization for this action that the Soviets have expressed. What does this tell us more generally about Soviet conduct, and about the use of military by the Soviet Union?

And then lastly, on the basis of the foregoing, we might discuss, not necessarily concert, the way we will collectively or individually respond to this situation in its various parts. That is to say, in terms of relationships with the Soviet Union, in terms of

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Afghanistan itself, in terms of Afghanistan's neighbors, in terms of the region more generally.

Q How did the President respond to Pakistan? What did he tell President Zia?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think it would be really inappropriate for me today to foreshadow what we might be doing in that part of the world. Part of the consultations is designed to test our own ideas on the subject and to see how much validity they have in the light of the experience and views of the others. We also will be talking to the governments more directly concerned. The President did talk to Zia, and thereby opened the top level bilateral channel with the Pakistanis themselves.

Q Well, what are the range of possibilities? I mean, the Pakistanis must be sitting there drawing a marked contrast between the way the Soviets react and the way this country reacts, dealing with its interest in that part of the world.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think that the Pakistanis at the same time know that there are some inherent differences between the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States, given the fact that the Soviet Union is right there and the United States is thousands of miles away.

Q That isn't any more comforting.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: That may be less comforting, but it does explain some of the difference between Soviets and the United States in terms of the way each makes his presence felt. We have, over the years, tried to be helpful to Pakistan and to help ensure its security and continue to have that stake. We have reaffirmed our commitment to the understandings of 1959 and we have done this, not today, but weeks ago or months ago.

Accordingly, there is a continuing relationship between the United States and Pakistan which is bound to be of some reassurance to the Pakistanis. We do, however, recognize the need to talk more to them right now and to see whether more should not be done, even in light of the events. But we can't foreshadow what we might do and we certainly cannot discuss our options publicly, literally ours, after the event has taken place.

Q What effect do you think this may have on the Iran situation, if at all?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: In the short run, probably not too much. In the longer run, the Iranians, who as neighbors of the Colossus to the north have frequently been exposed to Soviet or Russian interference in their own affairs, the events in Afghanistan must have a chilling impact. They're bound to remind Iranians of something that I've mentioned to this group before, namely that the independence of Iran and its territorial integrity during the last 30 years were ensured, to a very high degree, by their close friendship with the United States.

Today, as a consequence of the irresponsible policies pursued by the various elements that comprise Iranian leadership, Iran finds itself isolated in the world and surrounded either by countries in turmoil or by countries that are hostile to it. Its own peripheries are in a state of semi-rebellion. Thus, any concerned Iranian must be deeply preoccupied with the future of his country and the events in Afghanistan must make them wonder if the course pursued in recent

months is a wise one.

Q To the degree that this, this event in Afghanistan reduces the reluctance of the countries in that area to have the United States play a bigger role militarily, a more forceful role, is that something that we want to talk to them about in the next week?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, it reduces it.

Q Their reluctance?

MR. POWELL: Make them more willing.

Q Yes.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, we have been talking -- we have been talking to the countries in the region about the security, in recent times and, of course, off and on earlier. We are aware of the fact that these countries need reassurance. We are aware of the fact that a most important source of every issue is the United States. We are prepared to work with countries that are genuinely interested in the strengthening of their independence, to ensure their security. But this has to be a long-term, sustained and serious commitment, not only by us but also by them.

Q I guess what I am trying to ask you is if this -- could this end up being a pure victory for the Soviets?

Q Yes.

Q I mean, could it end up playing a more vigorous role in the affairs of countries that have held --

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't think that in this stage one should take a Pollyannish view of the future. We will certainly do what we can to contribute to the stability and security of the region. Whether that will be adequate it is literally impossible to predict. We are dealing here with a region which, first of all, for different reasons in different countries, confronts many internal turbulences and we are dealing with a region which is therefore very vulnerable to military and political pressure from the contiguous power to the north, which has now shown its willingness to exploit such opportunities very actively.

I think it is our obligation to make the Soviet Union aware of the wider costs of such aggressive behavior and to work with the countries concerned to stabilize the region. What the net effect of all of that would be one simply cannot predict, and this is one of the reasons why we are consulting with our friends. We also want to make the Soviet Union aware of the fact that precisely because for many years to come we will be living in a turbulent world, it behooves them to exercise much restraint. Only through mutual restraint can the U.S.-Soviet relationship become more cooperative. I think it would be dangerous to both super powers if this were not the case. But it cannot be -- it will not be accomplished except through the principle of reciprocal mutual restraint.

Q Why didn't the President's consultations extend to the Chinese?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: What?

Q Why didn't the President speak to the Chinese about this? Are they not concerned about this?

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DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, the President, in addition to direct consultations with leaders with whom we could talk, incidentally, by telephone, has sent messages to other heads of governments and this includes the Chinese.

Q Did they contact us about this?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't know whether there was any message today from the Chinese.

Q Regarding Afghanistan?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I would have to check it out with the President.

Q What other heads of government?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't want to give you a list.

Q How many?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Quite a number.

Q Did you try to interest the Pakistanis -- I mean did the President try to interest Zia whether he would come to London or send somebody to London?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: No. But the London consultations are with Allies and that is a sort of basic premise for the consultations. There was no discussion.

Q Won't Christopher go out to Pakistan?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't want, at this stage, to speculate as to where he might go. The purpose of this trip is to go to consult with those governments in London. Whether in the next couple of days this trip grows into something else, I really don't know and don't think so, but I really cannot speculate.

MR. SCHECHTER: Let's take a couple more and then wind it up.

Q You said you didn't want to go into deployments. You didn't have firm indications on all Soviet deployments. Could you tell us what you do have? There were stories about five Soviet divisions along the border, whether there are any substantial indications of Soviets outside of Kabul, whatever you can let us know?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't, at this stage, have anything to add to what you already know, which is that there was a substantial airlift into Kabul, and these forces were then used, to some degree, to determine the outcome of the events that transpired.

Q How about casualties?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: We don't have any indications what they were.

Q Does the fact that the Soviets are being quite overtly aggressive in Afghanistan make them more likely to abstain on our economic sanctions? Does it not sort of double the image of being the bad guys in the world?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I really can't speculate on what they might do. Certainly their position has been throughout that the actions in Tehran have not been consistent with international norms, that they do not support them. They did support the 15 to zero consensus that emerged

in the Security Council, accordingly we believe that they have no basis for objecting to what we are now proposing in the U.N. Whether they choose to adopt a varying course or not I really do not know.

Q But they have not related in any way if they have decided how to respond to that?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I certainly don't want to relate them for the Soviets.

Q Isn't that one of the reasons for this briefing and for all of the other things, the President's statement and everything else, to link in the minds of the world to try to serve a pressure and a certain propaganda purpose in all this?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: No. I don't see what -- what is your point on this?

Q I mean there is a great deal of emphasis on how bad the Russians are being in Afghanistan at a time when we don't want them to be bad at the U.N. also and I assume that -- I have certainly gotten the message that they will be bad at the U.N. if they veto our economic sanctions and that they are already being nasty guys in Afghanistan.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes, but the situation in Afghanistan has to be treated on its own merits and it is a very serious matter that a country injects its armed forces and uses them to determine the outcome of political contests in an otherwise independent country and, incidentally in the process, facilitates the execution of that country's president. That would be of concern to us if there was no Iran. That is of concern to us even though there is Iran. In fact, one could turn your argument around and perhaps say that perhaps we ought to be somewhat quiet or muted about Afghanistan in order to obtain a more positive Soviet attitude at the Security Council on Iran. But we don't believe that this is appropriate. We believe that the case in Iran is an open and shut case. The Soviet Union is on record, the international community has a stake in the outcome. Today it is the American Embassy that is affected. Tomorrow it will be a Soviet embassy that is affected somewhere else. Therefore we share certain continuing interests.

At the same time we are, as you know, very strongly critical of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. We think it is a serious action. It is the first action of its sort conducted outside the Warsaw Pact perimeter. It is the first time that Soviet forces are being used not just to defend a communist order but now militarily to impose it on another organized state. I mean it is an action which in that sense has some analogy to the imposition of the communist system on east European states in '45-'46, but even goes further than that because it involves the imposition of an order on an existing state with a government, an army, and the physical liquidation of the head of the government.

Q But I think the question is isn't there really some short term impact this would have on Iran? You said that there wouldn't be. If there is no short term impact, isn't there something that the United States could do to make it have short term impact, like using this in the U.N. to get the Soviets to do what we want them to do?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I am not sure I understand what you are saying.

MR. POWELL: Seriously, that particular connection or relationship just didn't come up.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes, I honestly don't see it.

Q You mean it hasn't dawned on anybody in this Administration that the Soviets are in a somewhat worse position if everybody is making a big deal out of what they are doing in Afghanistan and holding them up in front of the world community as bad guys, that that doesn't make it somewhat more difficult for them to vote against economic sanctions?

MR. POWELL: Perhaps we feel that they could be somewhat more obtuse and of less value than you apparently do.

Q I am merely curious.

MR. POWELL: It just doesn't -- you know -- first of all -- go ahead.

Q Well, if you take it to the U.N., this Afghanistan situation?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Once we have consulted with our friends we will be in a better position to answer that. I think we need to really consult with others. We have a case before the U.N. already.

Q Can you tell us with as much precision as possible just what Secretary Vance is going to propose tomorrow?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: No. I would rather have him do it and there will be appropriate briefings on that subject tomorrow.

Q Is there anything going on right now that you can see that is of such a crisis nature that the President shouldn't participate in the debate in Iowa?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, you know, I have my own views on that subject and certainly being preoccupied with what is happening worldwide I would have some views of my own on the subject. I don't want to comment on that in this context.

Q Thank you.

Q Can you tell us one thing about that Washington Post story today about the three aides in the Embassy who were not part of this and may be CIA or some kind of operatives whose identity concerns us and who are missing from the Embassy?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: I think that story maintains the tradition of accuracy of the Washington Post.

Q How about the New York Times story that the President is not going to show up at the debate?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: That was a prognosis, right?

Q Yes.

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, prognoses can only be tested by events. They cannot be tested against other prognoses.

Q Since you have already lost your good kicker on the Washington Post can you comment at all on the discrepancy in the 43 to 50 hostages, that discrepancy?

DR. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I don't think there is any dispute

about the fact that the number involved has been larger. The question is what is the condition of those whom no one has seen. We are deeply concerned about that because there are at least six people whom no one has seen for a long time, since the very beginning of the detention of these people by the kidnappers, and therefore we are concerned about their well being, their physical condition, their mental condition. Indeed, one can go even further than that but one wishes not to inflict hardship on the families.

There is no discrepancy about the numbers. Everybody knows the numbers are much larger and even the Iranians don't deny it. But what we want to know is where are they and what shape are they in.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 6:15 P.M. EST)

-- Indeed, do you think perhaps we would consider it as one option to withdrawing from the SALT Treaty.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position throughout has been that SALT should not be linked to other aspects of Soviet behavior, be it positive or negative. If our relations with the Soviet Union were better, we would still want SALT because it is useful to limit strategic arms.

If our relations were to deteriorate with the Soviet Union, we would still want SALT because it is useful to limit the competition on strategic arms. That remains our position. We will not be inhibited by the need to have SALT either from criticizing or opposing Soviet assertiveness, nor will we be inhibited from trying to expand the scope of operation -- cooperation with the Soviets when circumstances for that are more felicitous. I say that because I want to underline the proposition that we think that SALT, in a turbulent world, is a useful and stabilizing factor in the relationship, even if the political aspects of that relationship were to be strained by such assertive and aggressive behavior as demonstrated by the Soviets in the last few days in Afghanistan.

Q Can you evaluate Reuter's dispatch out of Panama for his saying that -- quoting the President Royo as saying, "his government's prepared to consider the extradition of the shah if the American hostages are released?"

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe that that is an accurate rendition of what President Royo was saying. But that's not up to me, it's up to the Panamanians.

Q Is this a new phase in Soviet foreign policy?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Is this a new phase of the Soviet foreign policy?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that depends on one's tastes, I think there's an element of continuity in it.

Q Would you tell us how and what the President communicated to Mr. Brzezinski?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I should discuss confidential communications, but I think you could probably get a general sense of what might have said from what he said publicly.

Q You mean to say it was on Afghanistan or on Iran? I was a little mixed up.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Afghanistan.

Q On Afghanistan?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have a very complete picture as of now, but the following factors seem to be salient. First of all, some time this fall General Pavlovskiy, the commander of Soviet ground forces, spent two months in Afghanistan as a guest of the President of Afghanistan government including President Amin. He undertook a comprehensive study of the military requirements of the regime in its efforts to suppress the insurgency.

In the course of his stay in Afghanistan, there was an aborted military uprising against Amin which Soviet gunships helped to crush. Pavlovskiy was Amin's guest. Upon return to the Soviet Union it appears Soviet preparations to deploy forces in Afghanistan moved forward and preparations were noted over the last several weeks and some of you wrote about them yourselves.

Within the last week or so, with the permission of the Afghanistan Government, Soviet forces started being deployed in Afghanistan, with a major part of them being airlifted in a 24-hour period starting on dawn pre-Christmas day.

Q Was this with Amin's permission?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We assume with Amin's permission because he didn't object to it, he was the President of the country and he was, during this time, the host for a high level Soviet delegation involving the Soviet Minister of Health and Education. Accordingly, one would assume that his attitude was one of positive acquiescence to these developments and perhaps collusion in them.

Once, though, the troops were deployed in Kabul and while he was receiving his Soviet guests, the coup was staged with support from the Soviets. The radio station and national Defense Ministry and the Presidential Palace were seized; Amin was taken into custody and killed and reportedly his family were liquidated as well.

Q Do we have an embassy that is open there?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have an embassy that is operating, it's not a very large embassy but we do have an embassy.

Q One more question on Mr. Christopher's trek to London.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, one more question.

Q Is Mr. Christopher going to confer only with British officials, or are officials allowed --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, I have said earlier that the purpose of the meeting in London is for representatives of allied governments, members of NATO, to meet with one another, and I discussed the implications of this development in the terms that I have previously indicated.

Q Do you think this is the fatal blow to SALT --

MORE



THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: CHARLES W. DUNCAN, JR.
SUBJECT: Alaska Gas Pipeline

CWJ

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

As I mentioned on the telephone this morning, we are optimistic about the progress on the Alaska Gas Pipeline. For several months the Department of Energy has been seeking to initiate direct negotiations between the Alaska North Slope Producers (Arco, Exxon and Sohio) and the Sponsor of the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Alaska Northwest Natural Gas Transportation Company. After a series of meetings and discussions with the Producers and the Sponsor, the Department proposed a basis for the direct negotiation of an agreement in principle among the Producers, the Sponsor and the Department.

This proposal has now been accepted by the Producers and the Sponsor. It is expected that the negotiations will begin during the first week of January and that the agreement will be signed early in February.

Under the agreement in principle the parties would fund the approximate \$500 million cost of design of the Pipeline Project and use their best efforts to achieve the financing and other contracts necessary to complete the Project. The total cost of the Project is estimated to be approximately \$23 billion.

When the agreement in principle is signed, Martin Lipton, Special Advisor to DOE for the Pipeline Project, believes that as a practical matter we will be well on the way to achieving the Pipeline Project.

After we talked this morning, I did a television taped interview for NBC in which I gave emphasis to this promising development and DOE put out a news release giving details.

cc: Vice President
Mr. Eizenstat
Dr. Brzezinski

12/29/79

Lloyd Cutler

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for your
information.

Rick Hutcheson

original to Bob Linder

800074

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 27, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LLOYD CUTLER

LC

SUBJECT: Grants of Executive Clemency

The attached Master Warrant lists fourteen (14) persons whom the Deputy Attorney General has recommended for Executive clemency. We have reviewed and concur with Justice's report in each case. Accordingly, we recommend that you sign the Warrant to effect the proposed grants of clemency. A summary of the cases is attached.

My memorandum of December 18, 1979 to you recommended grants of clemency for sixty-three (63) persons and indicated that we were reviewing Justice's recommendations on eighty-nine (89) other cases. In the interest of having as many decisions as possible made before Christmas, we forwarded recommendations in the sixty-three cases to you. We have now completed our review of all pending favorable recommendations from Justice. One of the favorable recommendations included in the attached Master Warrant is for Harry Lee Oswald, about whom Senator Pryor spoke to you. A few days before Christmas, following our conversation, I advised Senator Pryor that Mr. Oswald would be receiving a pardon from you.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/29/79

Stu Eizenstat
Lloyd Cutler

The attached was returned in the President's outbox. It is forwarded to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

re EO implementing decision to delay decontrol of marginal wells

original to Bob Linder

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 28, 1979

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**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: STU EIZENSTAT *Sh*
SUBJECT: Executive Order Implementing Your Decision
to Delay Decontrol of Marginal Wells

I recommend that you sign the attached Executive Order which implements the announcement you made last Saturday to delay further decontrol of marginal wells until the windfall profits tax bill is signed.

The order was drafted by DOE, and with some minor revisions, has been approved by OMB and Justice. and Lloyd Cutler.

In order to prevent further price increases for the remaining 20% of production from marginal wells, this Order must be signed by midnight, December 31, 1979. Otherwise the regulations promulgated by the Department of Energy last spring will automatically increase the allowable price for that production from the lower tier to the upper tier.

At the time you sign the windfall profits tax bill, another Executive Order will be required to resume decontrol for these marginal properties.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: LLOYD CUTLER

RE: Executive Order Entitled:
Calculation of Base Production Control
Level for Marginal Properties

The attached Order, drafted at DOE, delays decontrol of marginal wells and would remain in effect until passage of the windfall profits tax.

The Order has been approved by Justice and OMB.

I am informed that in order to prevent the existing decontrol regulation from taking effect on January 1, 1980, the attached order must be signed today so that it can be published in the Federal Register by Monday, December 31.

LNC



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

GENERAL COUNSEL

December 27, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: LLOYD CUTLER
FROM: BILL NICHOLS *Nichols*
SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Order to Delay
Decontrol of Marginal Wells

Enclosed is a proposed Executive order entitled "Base Production Control Level for Marginal Properties."

This proposed order was drafted by a member of the staff of the Department of Energy and submitted informally to this office by Kitty Schirmer.

The intent of this proposal is to delay the decontrol of marginal oil wells. As drafted, the order contained a contingent provision reactivating decontrol. The contingency was the passage of H.R. 3919, "The Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of 1979."

Because the contingent event was uncertain and undefined - the Congress has not yet agreed in conference - it will require subsequent Presidential action. Therefore, we have deleted the contingency and merely indicated that the purpose of the order is to delay decontrol. Upon the enactment and approval of a windfall profits tax, the President may issue another order to effectuate the decontrol of marginal oil wells.

The proposed order has been revised as indicated above after discussions with a representative of the Department of Justice.

In order to preclude existing regulations effecting decontrol from going into effect on January 1, 1980, this proposed Executive order should be signed by the President and published in the Federal Register by Monday, December 31, 1979.

It is our understanding that the form of pending windfall tax legislation would impose a windfall tax on all 1980 profits. Thus, the effect of this Executive order would seem to be a reduction or delay in anticipated decontrol prices along with a reduction in anticipated windfall taxes upon passage of a 1980 windfall tax.

Time has not permitted formal submission to the Department of Justice in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 11030, as amended. However, an attorney in that Department, who normally reviews proposed Executive orders for form and legality, has reviewed this proposed order and has informally advised that there is no legal objection to its issuance.

Your staff may direct any questions concerning this proposed Executive order to Mr. Ronald A. Kienlen of this office (395-5600).

The issuance of this proposed Executive order is in furtherance of the President's announcement over the holidays that he would delay decontrol of marginal oil wells until passage of a windfall tax.

This proposed Executive order has the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE ORDER

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
BASE PRODUCTION CONTROL LEVEL FOR MARGINAL PROPERTIES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended (15 U.S.C. 751 et seq.), and notwithstanding the delegations to the Secretary of Energy in Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive Order No. 12038, and in order to delay the decontrol of marginal oil wells, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1-101. For purposes of the pricing regulations adopted pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, with respect to months commencing after December 31, 1979, the base production control level for marginal properties shall equal 20 percent of the total number of barrels of old crude oil produced and sold from the property concerned during calendar year 1978, divided by 365, multiplied by the number of days during the month in 1978 which corresponds to the month concerned.

1-102. For purposes of this Order, the term "marginal properties" has the same meaning as that term under the crude oil pricing regulations adopted pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, as amended.

1-103. The Secretary of Energy may, pursuant to Executive Order No. 11790, as amended by Executive Order No. 12038, adopt such regulations as he deems necessary or appropriate to conform the crude oil pricing regulations to this Order.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of a horizontal line. Below the signature, there is a small handwritten "X" mark.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

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