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Speech

Austin, Texas
January 7, 1980

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Mr. President:

The following observations on the crisis in Afghanistan were set down in the wake of your invitation to attend the meeting at the White House at 8:00 a. m., January 9. They are evidently made without knowledge of current intelligence or of all U.S. initiatives that may already be under way.

1. The Need for a Multiple, Sustained Response. Like President Truman's situation in 1947 and President Kennedy's in 1961, we now confront multiple crises, deeply rooted, after a considerable period when things have moved against us: in the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. There is, of course, much unique about the present situation and no lessons can be read automatically from the past. What previous experience suggests is that a response should proceed simultaneously on a number of fronts; and we should expect that it may require several years to achieve a turnaround.

2. Five Areas for Initiative. An adequate response requires U.S. initiative on five fronts.

A. Imposing a direct cost on the USSR. Here the Administration has already acted and may have other actions in mind. In this area, my current information is not sufficient to form a confident judgment. I would only make two observations:

-- a good many of our actions are likely to have been anticipated by Moscow and discounted;

-- we should only take such actions as are likely to be sustained by our people (and, where relevant, our allies) over a protracted period of time.

B. Organizing the Front Line States (and others) in Support of Afghan Resistance. Ideally, China, Pakistan, India, and Iran should help Afghans willing to resist the Soviet takeover. The Saudis (as well as OECD countries) should join in supporting this effort financially. A great deal of subtle quiet diplomacy is worth expending to bring India and Pakistan together in this venture as well as India and China. In many ways India is the key to the Afghan crisis. I am confident that Indian leaders are almost as deeply concerned over the Afghan takeover as Pakistani leaders, if less willing to articulate their view. But to achieve Indian concert with Pakistan and China on Afghanistan, other outstanding

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bilateral issues may have to be settled. An Indian-Chinese rapprochement would, of course, help stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia, if both should throw their weight behind ASEAN. As for Iran, I would assume a good many political figures, including some in the present ruling consortium, are shaken and looking for a way out of the present impasse with the United States; but I also assume it will take some time for Iran to turn around. But Iran should not be written off.

The organization and operation of the required diplomatic front should, to the extent possible, be multilateral. European, Canadian, and Japanese political figures should be consulted as well as Sadat and other friendly Middle East figures. Moreover, the diplomatic probes and persuasion should come from others as well as ourselves. Perhaps something like the old Berlin Task Force (which embraced the U.S., France, Britain, and the FRG) might be set up to orchestrate the lines of diplomacy and action agreed, with membership appropriate to current problems.

To achieve and maintain this concert may well require a conviction that the military power of the United States and, where relevant, other advanced industrial states, would be brought into play if a major direct military confrontation occurred, beyond their capacity to manage.

C. Cutting U.S. Oil Imports. No U.S. policy is going to be credible in Moscow, OECD capitals, or the Middle East until we are launched on an all-out production and conservation program to reduce radically our oil imports. I set out the character of such a policy in a memorandum (~~attached~~) of November 30, 1979. It was written in response to a request of Mr. Eizenstat. I would only add that the pressures for hasty, perhaps counter-productive, action from our people will diminish if the nation has at last plunged into such an all-out energy effort, requiring participation and sacrifice by all. Incidentally, I am confident, from talks in many parts of the country, that a majority of our people perceive the connection between our poor energy performance as a nation and our difficulties in Iran, Afghanistan, etc.

D. A New Energy Approach to the Developing World. In many ways the Afghan crisis is an opportunity to improve radically our relations with the developing world. Whatever they may say, their leaders are shaken by the latest Soviet action; although it's fair to say that, as usual, fear and outrage are inversely proportional to their distance from the Soviet frontier. To mobilize the authentic if varying concern that exists in the developing world requires a positive and constructive initiative just as in 1947 we required not merely the Truman Doctrine but also the

Marshall Plan to rally Europe. The occasion for such an initiative is provided -- indeed, made necessary -- by the deteriorating economic and social prospects among the developing countries that import oil and the foreseeable problems for the members of OPEC whose production is in decline or likely soon to decline (e.g., Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria). What the OECD world should offer is concerted assistance in developing a new energy base as conventional oil availability declines. Because of their extremely high rates of growth in energy consumption, the problem is urgent for many of the most vital developing nations. As I have learned from my work with eight experts (under the aegis of the OAS), an awareness of the problem and need for concerted action has emerged in Latin America. I believe there would be a response in the other developing regions.

Although I will not argue the case here, three other resource-related areas should be included in the OECD offer: food production, raw material production, and environmental protection.

In short, we should hold out a truly rational program for a New Economic Order to supplant the agenda of 1974 which is now pretty well defunct.

E. An Approach on Energy to the Russians. When -- but only when -- the other lines of action are credibly in motion, we should initiate a quiet and discreet dialogue with Moscow on the world energy situation. They are confronting an energy problem which will soon become at least as serious as ours. They have little cushion for conservation measures, and their hold on the Eastern European satellites will be threatened. The temptation to convert their hardware and logistical advantages into direct control over Middle East oil must be considerable. The impulse certainly represents the greatest threat of a Third World War since 1945. We should offer them an alternative route out of the impasse closing in on them: to work constructively with us, Western Europe, and Japan to solve their own and the world's energy problem on the understanding that they cool things in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Caribbean, etc. But, as I say, this probe is likely to be fruitful only when initiatives A-D, above, are sufficiently credible or effective to make the Soviet leaders re-think the calculus that made them launch the Afghan initiative in the first place.

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

I have spoken in recent weeks about various aspects of the crisis facing us in the world, today -- a crisis highlighted by the holding of our fellow citizens in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Today, I want to report to the American people on the broader significance of this crisis, and the challenge before us.

Three basic developments in the world have come together to produce the situation we face, today:

-- the steady growth and increased projection abroad of Soviet military power -- power that ^{in recent years} has grown much faster than our own;

-- the overwhelming dependence of Western nations, which now increasingly includes the United States, on vital oil supplies from the Middle East, while our efforts to reduce that dependence have lagged far behind; and

-- the press of change in many nations of the developing world, including the year-old revolution in Iran and uncertainty about the future in many other countries.

Each of these factors has importance in its own right; each interacts with the others; all must be faced squarely and together.

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*Self - "will withdraw troops"
Energy = security
Reassure Iran*

As I said to the nation on January 4, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is of strategic importance -- both for East-West relations and for the future of Southwest Asia itself.

The direct use of Soviet military power in Afghanistan is an ominous departure from past Soviet behavior -- going beyond its invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia -- countries previously under Soviet control -- and going beyond its use of Cuban proxies in places like Angola and Ethiopia. That military departure is itself a matter of grave concern to all nations that care for their own security, for the rule of law, and for the prospects for peace. The potential Soviet threat to Afghanistan's neighbors is real; and so are the new risks to world peace, regional stability, and the flow of oil. This is potentially the most serious crisis we have faced since 1945.

At the same time, in Afghanistan the Soviet Union has shown its contempt for the principles of non-alignment, for the integrity and independence of third world nations, and for one of the world's great religions -- Islam.

And Soviet actions must also be seen in a broader context, as part of the evolution of Soviet involvement in the outside world.

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The stark fact is that the Soviet Union has been steadily increasing its ability to project military power far beyond its borders, and has been increasingly willing to use that power for political purposes.

Since the end of the Second World War, we Americans have assumed responsibility for organizing nations of the West to meet the challenge of emerging Soviet power:

-- in the 1940s, we built the Atlantic Alliance, in reaction to the Soviet Union's creation and consolidation of its East European empire;

-- in the 1950s, we contained further Soviet challenges: in Korea, in Berlin, in the expansion of its nuclear forces;

-- in the 1960s, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, we sought to teach the Soviet Union the importance of moving beyond Cold War and confrontation, to recognize the value of moderating its ambitions and growing power in our mutual interest; and

-- in the 1970s, we engaged the Soviet Union in a major effort to halt the growth of the arms race, to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and to develop with us areas of cooperation that

would make co-existence truly possible and productive, not only for our two nations, but for the world community and global peace.

Yet despite ^{our} ~~these~~ ^{which we} efforts, intensified in the past three years, the Soviet Union has continued to exploit global tensions, particularly in extending its military involvements in the third world -- both directly and through the use of Cuban proxies. The invasion of Afghanistan was thus not a new departure in Soviet policy -- though the scale and manner of this brutal use of power is unprecedented -- but a culmination of the Soviets' indifference to our repeated attempts to broaden their understanding of the limits of power needed for a stable and peaceful world.

In all our efforts during the post-war years, we have recognized two cardinal facts: the need to meet the challenge of Soviet power on its own terms, and the importance of developing means to resolve disputes and regulate relations between our two nations and in international relations in general. We have succeeded when we have been prepared to face squarely the demands placed upon us, and when the Soviet Union has been prepared to respond to the requirements of restraint instead of the opportunities of unilateral exercise of power.

The 1980s now lie before us. Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, it was our earnest hope that we could build upon the patient efforts of the past in developing U.S.-Soviet relations. That is still desirable; it may still be possible -- but it is not for us alone to decide.

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The Soviet Union has now reached a point in its development where it should understand that its own security faces no real challenge from the West. Yet it still too often fails to recognize that the best means to advance its security further lies in recognizing the security needs of others -- whether non-aligned countries like Afghanistan, or countries deeply concerned about the future of regions like the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The Soviet Union thus faces an historic choice: whether it will help promote a more stable global environment, where its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued; or whether it will continue to expand its military power far beyond its security needs, and use that power to pursue narrow Soviet interests at the expense of others.

What we in the United States do to help shape the directions of Soviet policy and behavior is as important today as it has been for the past 35 years. This is

particularly important because of the impending change of leadership in the Soviet Union, potentially setting a course that will endure for years to come.

Our earnest desire is to have a peaceful, productive, and cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. Our desire is to move forward with arms control -- and especially SALT -- not as a favor we and the Soviets do for one another, but as a vital necessity to preserve global peace.

But moving in these directions must be based on clear Soviet recognition and acceptance of rules of action and behavior that are tolerable to others and contribute to a more stable, peaceful world. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a violation of those rules -- both those implicit in the development of the international system since World War II, and those explicitly agreed with us in 1972. Because of that violation, I announced on January 4 a series of steps to impress upon Soviet leaders that they cannot expect to be able both to set their own standard of conduct at others' expense, and expect business as usual with the United States. These steps are designed to impose immediate costs on the Soviet Union. They are being fully implemented.

Furthermore, we must continue to make clear that we will protect our own interests, and those of our friends and allies abroad, whatever the Soviet Union does. That is why, through seven Administrations, we have built and maintained

strong military forces and alliances. It is why I have asked for an ^{steady} increase in the U.S. defense budget [of 5% in real terms) to begin compensating for more than a decade's steady growth in Soviet military spending in both strategic and conventional forces. That is why we are working with our NATO allies -- through the Long-Term Defense Program and the modernization of theater nuclear weapons -- to offset growing Soviet military power in Central Europe. And that is why we must now be prepared to meet the growing Soviet challenge to the security of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.

It is vital that we recognize the demands of power in a world where our principal adversary and competitor is prepared to use power as the major instrument to promote its own interests. And we will do so, through substantial efforts to augment our military power in the region and globally.

The challenge of Soviet power -- and abuse of that power -- requires new effort from us today, particularly in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. That region contains more than 90% of the world's exportable oil. Most of its nations are facing the difficulties and demands of rapid modernization. It is a region of great potential for instability which the Soviet Union can exploit. Its forces in Afghanistan are now only

300 miles from the Persian Gulf. Whatever its motives for invading Afghanistan, it is now consolidating a strategic position that is gravely threatening to the security of Middle East oil.

For many years, the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf was relatively secure. The Soviet Union's military power was not oriented towards the Gulf, and it relied exclusively upon its own oil reserves for national development. Thus both its motives and opportunities for interfering in the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the West seemed to be limited. Neither of these facts is true any longer. At the same time Iran was prepared to play an important role in Gulf stability. That fact, too, is no longer true.

We face today a situation in which this nation and its allies are vitally dependent on oil supplies from a region whose own security -- from internal divisions, from external threat -- is now in question. The capacity of local nations to provide regional security is inadequate.

Unresolved, this security problem could undermine our economy and change the way we live; it could touch directly the lives of all Americans in critical ways. Resolving it will require careful thought and resolute action -- not just

now, but sustained over many years. It will involve us in developing a new approach to security in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. It will require a collective effort, including our friends in Europe and Japan who are dependent on oil from the Middle East and concerned with global peace and stability. It will require the understanding and partnership of countries in the region. Our approach must combine national will, military capacity, political wisdom, and economic effort. In short, we will need to call on the best that is in our nation and its resources to meet and master this difficult and vital challenge.

Today, the United States must and will become more directly involved in promoting the security and stability of the Middle East and Southwest Asia:

-- we will defend our vital interests with all means necessary;

-- we will stand by our friends, and honor all of our commitments;

-- we will support the independence and integrity of Iran;

-- we will defend our friends in the Persian Gulf if they are threatened by aggression; and

-- we will continue developing all the means needed to carry out these commitments.

We are therefore increasing our ability to project military power into the region, in defense of our interests and those of regional countries. We are augmenting our naval forces in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis. We are accelerating development of a Rapid Deployment Force. And we will seek contingent access to military facilities in the region. If need be, we will make even further increases in our defense budget.

At the same time, we will work with our friends in the region to increase the prospects for security and stability. I am asking Congress for \$100 million in military assistance and \$100 million in economic assistance for Pakistan, the country most immediately threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And we are seeking support from our allies in strengthening ^{the} security and ~~the~~ economic viability of Pakistan and other countries in Southwest Asia, in the Persian Gulf, and on the exposed Asian flank of NATO.

These efforts can help increase the confidence of regional nations in our reliability as a partner, in their own security, and in their ability to defend themselves. These efforts can make the Soviet Union clearly aware of the stake we and others have in the region, and leave its leaders in no doubt of the gravity of further Soviet expansion -- or even threat of expansion -- within the region.

At the same time, we will need a deeper political engagement:

-- we will develop further our political relations with individual nations in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, and will be prepared to help them deal with problems of internal stability;

-- we will reassure all nations in the region that our intentions and concerns are directed at meeting the threats and difficulties we all share;

-- we will intensify our discussions with oil-exporting nations about the overall relationship of energy supply to the effective management of the global economy; and

-- we will continue to pursue our firm course of helping to reduce the risks of conflict within the region. We will continue on our course of working with Israel and Egypt to complete the Camp David agreements, as a critical step on the road to a comprehensive peace in that part of the Middle East.

Palestine

At the same time, we Americans must finally take the hard decisions needed to put our own energy house in order, and to reduce our dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Events in recent weeks have demonstrated the folly of past delay. We must act and act now, or we will risk losing the future.

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Clearly, our long-range efforts to meet the political and security problems of the Gulf and Southwest Asia -- in the common interest of both regional and Western nations -- has been made far more difficult by the course of events in Iran.

We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution, or the people of Iran. Our relations with that country since World War II have been based on deep common interests: Iran's integrity, independence, and economic development; the flow of oil; and stability in the region. These common interests remain unchanged. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and the misguided actions of Iranian leaders. We are prepared to work with a government in Iran that will accept its obligations as a responsible member of the international community.

But that will not be possible, so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostage, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. The Iranian authorities would be seriously mistaken to assume that we adopted this course out of weakness or uncertainty. Rather, it reflects the deep respect of our nation for the rule of law, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is limited by concern for the well-being of our

fellow citizens. Those who exercise authority in Iran today must be under no illusion that they bear full responsibility for their unlawful acts.

* * * * *

The problems I have discussed with you today are among the most serious our nation has ever faced. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a serious threat to global peace, to East-West relations, and to regional stability and the flow of oil. Change and turmoil within the region pose risks for security and prosperity of every Western nation and thus for the entire global economy. The continuing holding of American hostages in Iran is both an affront to civilized people everywhere, and a serious impediment to meeting serious threats to widely-shared common interests -- including those of Iran.

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We will not shrink from facing the multiple threats and challenges we now face in that troubled region. We will do what we must to meet them. And as a nation -- in concert with friends and allies abroad, within the region and elsewhere -- we ~~met~~ ^{will meet} this challenge.

Our ability to do so promptly and effectively will determine whether the decade of the 1980s will be dominated by conflict and confrontation -- or will be a new era of promise for peace, understanding and human progress. I have no doubts about our ability. With your support, we and the cause of peace, freedom, and justice will prevail.

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Too General
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STATE OF THE UNION

As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our union depends in fundamental ways on the state of our world. And tonight -- as throughout our generation -- it is also true that the state of freedom in the world depends on the state of our American union.

A brutal act of Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, and continuing Soviet efforts to hammer a small but sovereign country into the new shape of a captive state, has called forth from America a firm response. I have no doubt that our people will continue to provide the same unity and strength to our response on Afghanistan that they have shown in responding to acts of terrorism and blackmail in Iran.

As we enter a new decade, these events are further proof that we live in a new era of challenge and turbulence. Our response shows that a strong America can and will deal strongly with every challenge, every threat we face.

Fifty Americans are held captive in Tehran, innocent victims of international terrorism. We have refused to bend to threats and pressures. America will never do so.

Terrorism will not be rewarded.

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[Nations around the world have supported our stand for civilized behavior. The Security Council has clearly and firmly expressed the will of the international community that our people be released.]

The sooner the hostages are released, the sooner Iran can present its grievances in an appropriate international forum. But as long as the hostages are held, we will not rest or relent. Let no one doubt our absolute and total resolve in this matter.

As we address such challenges, it is especially important that we be clear about our goals in the world, and the ways in which we must use our strengths in their pursuit. I would like to discuss with you tonight our policies in four crucial areas.

In these times, as before, our nation must work for our first goal of peace. We will do so -- through strong alliances and strengthened American defense forces, together with arms control measures that enhance our security; through an activist diplomacy in troubled areas; and through sustained policies toward the Soviet Union

that convey the penalties of aggression while holding out the possibility of better relations, if their behavior will allow it.

In these times, as before, we must also pursue the goal of improved American ties with other nations around the world. We must not -- and we will not -- react to specific foreign challenges by lashing out at the world as a whole. In recent years, our influence has increased as we have strengthened relations with many Third World nations. We will continue to pursue the policies that have produced these gains.

At all times, now and in the future, we will promote the compelling goal of human rights. Our nation, today, is firmly on the side of individual freedom. We will stay there.

Our fourth goal is basic to the others. We must strengthen our economy in the face of a global energy crisis. Until we adopt a strong and effective energy program, inflation and our dependence on foreign oil will sap our national power as surely as they erode the purchasing power of our citizens.

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Let me begin with our first and paramount goal: to build a more secure peace.

Since World War Two, our nation has sought peace through two chief means: through energetic

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An American diplomacy that seeks to work with others to resolve local disputes before they deteriorate into broader confrontations remains at the heart of our foreign policy. For every dispute resolved today is a crisis we will not face tomorrow.

Our diplomacy of peace stands, for all the nations of the world to see, in vivid contrast to the recent behavior of the Soviet Union.

For the last few years, as the United States has shown its commitment to peace, the Soviet Union has shown itself all too willing to resort to force.

Most recently, by moving well over 50,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan; by conspiring in the execution of that country's

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President; by installing a puppet regime in the capital; and by seeking to suppress, by force of arms, the opposition of Muslim nationalists, they have created a new and serious threat to international peace and stability.

This action recalls the sad and brutal history of Soviet military action in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. With this attack on Afghanistan, an independent Third World nation, the Soviet Union crossed a new threshold.

Soviet aggression against Afghanistan has ominous implications for other nations beyond Afghanistan. It endangers the security and independence of Pakistan, Iran, and other nearby countries. It threatens the stability of a vital -- and volatile -- region of the world. It says to the world that no free country, if it is small and weak, is safe from Soviet attempts to extend its influence.

So it was essential that the United States, its allies, and indeed all nations committed to peace and to the U.N. Charter, not only condemn the Soviet invasion, but demonstrate that such behavior will bear serious costs.

That is why I ordered a suspension of grain sales and shipments to the Soviet Union.

That is why I acted to restrict high-technology sales to the Soviet Union.

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And that is why I acted to curtail Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters, and to cut back commercial and diplomatic exchanges.

These stern measures will require real sacrifices on the part of Americans. I have acted -- and I will continue to act -- to spread their burden equitably. But I believe the American people are prepared to sacrifice in the name of a safer and more decent world. I believe our people -- business people, farmers and their families -- understand the need to put the peace of the world above business as usual. I have no fear -- and no doubt -- about the unity and the determination of the American people as we take these measures together.

We should not imagine, however, that we can oppose such Soviet actions only through penalizing them in our direct relations. If we are serious about guarding the peace, we must do more.

In Southwest Asia, and in other threatened areas of the world, we will stand by our commitments and by our friends. We will provide levels of assistance equivalent to the threats they face.

(Add paragraph on actual measures decided on for Pakistan and in region, as an integrated approach. It should note that our aid to Pakistan does not mean that we are abandoning our non-proliferation goals in Pakistan or elsewhere.)

We will continue to strengthen our alliances, in the Pacific as well as Atlantic regions, and help our allies increase their military preparedness.

And we will continue to buttress our diplomacy -- as we have sought to do since World War II -- with strong and credible American defense forces.

That is why, even before the crisis in Afghanistan, I have proposed major increases in our national defense budgets. These new investments will be devoted to what is already the most sweeping and effective upgrading of our military forces in more than a decade:

-- Last year, we launched the first Trident submarine. We are placing a new Trident missile -- with twice the range of its predecessor -- on our existing submarines. These new systems will assure that our underwater nuclear force will remain invulnerable to attack.

-- In 1982, we will begin to place modern cruise missiles on our long-range bombers.

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-- We have decided to build the new mobile M-X missile. It will help preserve the survivability of our land-based strategic arsenal.

-- With our NATO Allies, we are modernizing conventional forces in Europe, and we have reached an historic Alliance decision to deploy long-range nuclear forces in the European theater that will meet the challenge presented by new Soviet military systems there.

-- And we are upgrading the overall flexibility, readiness, and strength of our conventional military forces, including establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force that will enhance our capacity to respond quickly to crises that threaten our vital interests.

Through these and other programs, we will do whatever is necessary to maintain a balance of forces. But that task will be more difficult -- and more costly -- if we do not couple our defense programs with sound, carefully negotiated, verifiable arms control measures.

We therefore remain committed, in spite of our request for deferral of SALT II in the Senate, to a policy of arms limitation -- because we believe that progress in arms control will add to our security.

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Until we ratify the SALT II Treaty, the world will be a more dangerous place than it should be -- or needs to be.

brief

So I have urged that the SALT II treaty remain on the Senate calendar -- as a reflection of our commitment to arms control, and as a sign to the Soviet Union that the way is still open to a lessening of tensions between our two great powers.

For our policy towards the world's other superpower remains one of firmness but balance. Our fundamental competition need not rule out cooperation where our interests converge. But when the competition crosses the threshold from peaceful competition to attempts to gain advantage through direct military means, our relations -- and the prospects for cooperation -- must inevitably suffer.

We will continue to impose costs on aggression. We will continue also to remain open to a more productive relationship, if Soviet actions make that possible.

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Our second goal -- improved relations with nations around the world -- is directly related to the first.

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For our ability to pursue peace, and to oppose terrorism and aggression, depends not only on our own strength, but on the strength of our ties to other nations.

Americans are understandably angry about the holding of hostages in Iran -- and about Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Some Americans, in the grip of that anger, are proposing that we resort to policies of confrontation -- and even belligerence -- in our approach to nations around the world. I disagree. The policy we must pursue is one of firm strength -- but of generous outreach also: a willingness to meet the nations of the world on a basis of mutual respect and with understanding for their concerns as well as ours.

The fact is that our willingness to improve relations with others, if they will accept that the basis must be one of mutual benefit, is paying dividends in terms of our national interest.

Our continuing process of building more normal ties with the People's Republic of China is an advance of both historic and fundamental proportions. During the past twelve months, the successful visits to China of Vice President Mondale and Secretary of Defense Brown have advanced our interests and the prospects for peace and progress in Asia and beyond.

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Similarly, the improvement in our ties to nations in Latin America, in Africa and in Asia has been of direct benefit to our nation.

This is an area of increasing importance to the United States. Our economic ties with the developing nations are growing faster than with any other group of nations; some 800,000 U.S. jobs in manufacturing alone already depend on exports to these countries.

And Third World nations are increasingly important in international politics, as well.

An American perception that they are using their influence in ways generally hostile to us would not only be inaccurate; it could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy, of benefit only to our adversaries.

In recent weeks, it was Third World nations that took the lead in condemning aggression against Afghanistan. [Cuba failed to gain sufficient Third World votes to win a seat on the Security Council.] And agreement on Rhodesia was due not only to the brilliance of British diplomacy, but also to our ability to work closely with African governments in the region.

There is a simplistic view that we can either pursue good relations with Third World nations . . . or oppose

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the adventures there of the Soviet Union and its surrogates . . . but not both. That view is wrong in its facts and wrong as a basis for policy.

SU:VS
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The best way to thwart Soviet ambitions in the Third World is to pursue our own affirmative policy -- one that addresses the real interests we and Third World countries have in common.

This strategy does not mean that we should hide our differences with developing countries. We will not. But we can bargain most effectively, on political and economic issues of importance to us, when developing nations know we share their goals of political independence and economic justice.

When friendly nations feel threatened by Soviet pressures across their borders, we will help them meet their security needs. We cannot and we will not allow local balances to be altered through the military actions of the Soviets and their surrogates, or through excessive and intrusive Soviet military assistance. We will maintain our policy of refusing to be the first to introduce new levels of sophisticated weapons or to fuel unnecessary arms races. But we will not leave our friends at risk when others act recklessly.

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We must also draw upon our unparalleled non-military assets. It is to the West that most developing nations turn for economic assistance, for technological advances, and for mutually beneficial trade. And it is with the West that they can best cooperate in the search for peaceful solutions to regional disputes.

We have another strength in our dealings with Third World nations.

Americans understand -- as the Soviet Union does not -- the irrepressible drive of people to be free . . . free from domination by outside powers, free from arbitrary government harassment and abuse, and free as well to participate in the economic and political decisions that shape their daily lives.

* * * *

Our third goal in the decade ahead, then, must be to continue to translate our commitment to freedom into practical support for the liberty of others.

Our support for the growth of democracy and for the protection of human liberty rests on a pragmatic as well

as a moral judgment: that democratic societies which respect the rights of their citizens are better able to deal with the burgeoning and often conflicting demands of their people for a better life.

We have an interest in helping nations strengthen their own institutions to accommodate these pressures before they explode in violence and radicalism. And although there are notable exceptions, it remains true that more often today, such internal change is taking place peacefully -- and it is leading toward human freedom.

In Portugal and Spain and Greece . . . in India and Bangladesh . . . in Nigeria and Ghana . . . in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, democracy has gained new vitality in recent years.

These countries make a compelling case for the proposition that there is a tide of human rights running in the world, and that it is not only in our national character, but also in our national interest, to be part of it . . . and to support it.

There of course remain many dark corners where justice is denied, where rights are trampled, where dissidents are tormented for their beliefs. We will

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continue to press for full compliance with the obligations governments have undertaken to respect the rights of their citizens -- whether those obligations are embodied in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man or the Helsinki agreements.

To say that one of America's greatest strengths is what we stand for is not a pious wish. It is a simple reality. And it is in our interests to draw on that strength and work with other nations, not to impose our particular institutions, but to urge and help others give expression, in their own ways, to the universal human desire -- and right -- to be free.

* * * *

The freedom that we cherish -- and that we seek for others -- can be threatened as well by a failure to gain control of our energy destiny. And that must be a fourth priority for this decade.

The unvarnished truth is that we remain dangerously dependent on others for the energy that drives, not just our cars, but our industrial and military machinery.

That dependence fuels an inflation that eats not only at our incomes but at our confidence.

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And it leaves America vulnerable to instabilities elsewhere in the world.

We refused to let Iranian oil become a lever on our policies. We must apply that same determination to our quest for energy security in coming years.

The strength of America's international position is grounded on the strength of America's economy. And the heart of our effort to maintain a vital and competitive economy must be a sustained effort to decrease our reliance on foreign oil.

Working together, we have made a good beginning.

Through decontrol of our domestic crude and natural gas . . . through the import targets we have established with the other major consuming countries . . . through a new natural gas agreement with Mexico and our efforts to work with developing nations to help increase their energy production . . . through the steps that we have taken to encourage energy conservation in our homes and factories . . . and through the emergency rationing plan that has been adopted -- with each of these steps, we have moved closer to a secure energy future.

And the fact is that, while our economy continued to grow in 1979, our consumption of oil actually declined.

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But the mounting bill we must pay for foreign oil, and the continuing turbulence we see abroad, must give us a renewed sense of urgency: we must continue to act decisively to replace imported oil with our own conservation and to increase our capacity to supply our own energy needs.

The Congress must enact a strong windfall profits tax to assure that domestic oil decontrol will result in more American energy and not more profits for the oil companies.

And we must establish an effective Energy Security Corporation and Energy Mobilization Board so that we can move forward -- decisively and rationally -- to develop new, American sources for our energy needs.

Our democracy has always responded well to immediate challenges. Our energy future poses a different kind of challenge: whether we can rally for the long haul, whether we can make the necessary sacrifices in the present to secure our freedom in the future.

No challenge we face will test our courage and our wisdom more.

* * * *

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By pursuing these four goals -- peace through strength; improved ties with other nations; an expansion of human rights; and a healthier economy -- we Americans will not only maintain our purpose in the world of the eighties. I believe we will also find success.

For our current policies -- policies aimed at achieving these goals -- are working.

In modernizing our own defense forces and those of our allies . . . in the historic steps toward peace in the Middle East and southern Africa . . . in the improvement of our ties with China . . . in the growth of our relations with developing nations . . . in the rising support for human rights in country after country . . . in the measures we have taken on energy and in a new trade agreement -- we have made real progress.

In every case, these accomplishments took sustained and patient efforts, and close cooperation between the Congress and the President.

Our efforts in the future will be equally difficult -- and not without setbacks, for the world is a disorderly place. Success, and safety, will require a

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new sense of unity among the branches of our government, and within our nation.

As we begin now to address . . . and meet . . . the challenges of the eighties, the time has come to move beyond the divisions of the seventies.

I am deeply confident in our nation -- in our strengths, in our people, in our values. I believe that the future belongs . . . not to those whose only strength is armed might . . . but to those who are both strong and firmly devoted to a better, more peaceful world -- a world whose nations are independent and whose citizens are free.

For generations, we Americans have not wavered in our pursuit of such a world.

We hold to that vision tonight.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jan 6 [1981]
Rick Helgeson

~~Susan~~

I came across this
while going through old
files of stuff - it's the
President's file of inputs
for last year's State of
the Union speech -

XX 00

Rick

Daniel P. Moynihan
New York



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 10, 1980

C/

Dear Mr. President:

This is a terribly long speech, but having written it mostly with you in mind I suppose I must send it to you.

If you have not time, and I can imagine that you would not, do read the next to last paragraph.

Best,

DM

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

FROM THE OFFICE OF

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

New York

Embargoed until 2 p.m.
Thursday
January 10, 1980

Contact: Tim Russert
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Speech

"Reflections on United States Foreign Policy"

Statement by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.)

Prepared for Insertion into the Congressional Record

Pro Forma Session, United States Senate

Thursday, January 10, 1980

Mr. President:

There is a quality to large events such that often they can be described in simple words. Woodrow Wilson began his first Inaugural Address seventy-seven years ago with the plain statement: "There has been a change of government."

In just such simple terms it may be stated that there has been a change in American foreign policy. This change has been initiated by President Carter. It is my purpose to declare my support, as one Senator, for what he has done and to offer some thoughts as to what now should follow.

The change, of course, has to do with our relationship with the Soviet Union. It has been the deepest purpose of American foreign policy in this period to reach an accommodation with the rulers of that nation, to establish a "code of detente" by which our respective actions would be as little threatening and unpredictable as possible, and above all to bring stability and finally reductions in our respective strategic nuclear forces. The President's letter of January 3, 1980, to the Majority Leader, Senator Byrd, requesting that consideration of the SALT II Treaty be delayed may be regarded as the precise moment when this fundamental

change took place. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the President had no choice save to make this proposal, and the Senate will have no choice save to accede.

There will be a tendency to think of our policy as reverting now to an earlier stage, that of the Cold War as it was termed. This would be a profound error. For just as the term denotes, that earlier period was one of relative immobility, even stalemate. It was a period of maneuver without essential movement. A great burst of Soviet expansion had been contained; was stopped. American military and economic power was sufficient to that purpose; and just as importantly so was the morale of this nation and the prestige of our institutions.

So much was this the case that the time came when it seemed both reasonable and eminently desirable that Soviet intentions might themselves change, and the imbalance of power between our nations might become less salient in our relations. All such hopes came to a crashing end in Kabul on December 24, 1979.

There will be a tendency also to look back upon these hopes as illusions, and perhaps especially to indict the President for having embraced them with an intensity that partook of the passionate. It seems to me, however, that any such

indictment must fail. If it be said of the President that his hopes for the success of a policy of accommodation were more than the evidence might have warranted, then so be it. If it be said of the Secretary of State that he genuinely felt that President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev shared "similar dreams and aspirations" about the future of the world, let that stand also. Would they be forgiven if they had thought the opposite and had been wrong? No. Our failings, if they have been failings, have been of the category which Dr. Johnson described as the triumph of hope over experience. As at no time since Winston Churchill said it in the darkest moments of the Second World War, if we open up a war between the present and the past, we will surely lose the future.

But what of this future? Here I would ask to be permitted a quite small diversion from the point I have just made for a limited but in my view utterly essential point.

For some time now there have been those of us who have contended that the steady expansion of Soviet military strength was incompatible with a policy of peacemaking, and that elemental prudence dictated that we should pay attention more to what they did than to what they said. This was a view which I believe in retrospect we will come to see as more widely held than was generally recognized. In an

address I gave at the Naval Academy in March of 1979 I cited a White Paper of the British Ministry of Defense released the previous month. Speaking of Soviet arms the White Paper declared:

the growth in quantity in the Soviet forces, together with continued qualitative improvements, has extended their capability well beyond what can be considered necessary for purely defensive purposes.

During this period, which is to say the 1970s, there was a corresponding decline in the quantity, perhaps even in the quality of American and allied forces. This too was the subject of increasing comment.

This is the object of my diversion. In the course of that decade a body of opinion grew which held that a principle source of instability in the world was the excess of American power. This was not an hallucination. For some years -- decades even -- American world power had been unprecedented. That power of such extent is an invitation to excess is hardly an indefensible view. But it ceased to be a relevant one as the reality of American power declined. That this new reality was slow in impressing itself upon us is nothing new in human affairs.

But it is indispensable to the survival of the West that it should now do so. And this then is our moment of maximum peril. For it is entirely possible that those who

have until now so deplored the extent of American power, will now be tempted to wield a fantacized power which once so obsessed them. Let no one misunderstand this point. American power is enormous; the American will to use it is unshaken. It is simply, in relative terms less than it has been, and less than it will be in the not far distant future.

It will be both the irony and the gravest reality of the time now ahead that the counsel of restraint in foreign affairs must come from those who have been depicted in the recent past as somehow the most bellicose. I put it plainly: when we spoke of danger we meant just that. May I refer to an article in the New York Times of this past Monday, January 7, by Drew Middleton who in a career of distinguished journalism has cast a cold eye on more crises than just this most recent. The headline stated, "U.S. MILITARY CAN MATCH SOVIET, OFFICIALS SAY, BUT NOT BEFORE 1990."

At the risk of seeming contradiction -- and we shall face worse risks than this -- I would turn to rather the opposite of the temptation I have just described. On January 7 we also learned of the proposal the Secretary of Defense made a day earlier in Peking that China and the United States join in finding "complementary actions" to counter Russian expansion. The proposal evidently took the Chinese leaders by surprise, and so also, I believe, the American people. Certainly the terms in which the matter was raised surprised the journalists reporting the visit. One has written that Dr. Brown's banquet toast was "so vehement he almost seemed to have taken his text from a New China News Agency denunciation of Moscow."

Can it be that in yet other circles of government the perception of American weakness is so advanced that in response to the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan we turn for help to the people who conquered Tibet?

If we so underestimate our power, we are more surely ruined than if we overestimate it.

And this, for what the Senate may make of it, is the heart of my contention. For the power of the United States rests upon and derives from the ideas we represent: in international affairs from the standards of conduct which we aver and which we seek to uphold.

For three generations now -- for somewhat more than seven decades -- these standards have been under more or less unremitting assault from totalitarianism. There have been peaks and valleys, slow times and crisis times; the assault has sometimes come from the totalitarian right, but in the first instance, and most often, and now exclusively from the totalitarian left. It may be we have grown used to this and no longer see it for the changed condition it represents. Certainly this chamber will have become used to hearing from me that the high point of the influence of democratic ideals in the world came toward the end of Woodrow Wilson's presidency. No man before and none since

has been so looked to in the world at large. Never before and never since has the expectation been so widespread that liberal democracy would become a near universal form of government. For totalitarianism had appeared in Russia in a second revolution, following an earlier, democratic one, all in 1917.

In one way or another we have been locked in ideological struggle ever since; and we will continue so. Recurrently there have been those who have hoped to see an end to this struggle, who have questioned whether its origin does not lie in the behavior (admittedly often squalid) of the democracies. Or, the most dangerous temptation of all, there have been those who would distinguish among totalitarian regimes, preferring some to others, or positively siding with some against others.

The recent American past has provided more than a few examples of each of these tendencies, but, to repeat, none that is more dangerous than the last. It is the danger best summarized by George Orwell's characterization of those persons in Europe in the 1930s who wished to be anti-Fascist without being anti-totalitarian. It is a lie in the soul and it destroys.

Playing the Chinese card, as it is termed, as if this were all one great game of chance, is the central instance of that tendency in our time. I think it is fair to say of the American position in world affairs in recent years that we have had principles without policy. An excess of principle and a shortage of policy. Is it now to be the reverse?

Policy is principle in action. If it is a lesser calling in the divine order of things, it is of considerably larger significance in what is known as the real world. The object of policy is to make one's nation understood. George Will is only the most recent commentator to note that the Soviets have been obliging in this as in no comparable matter. For seven decades they have declared their purpose to see their principles, which we define as totalitarian, prevail the world over. As a result, the essentials of world politics have not changed for decades. Every post-war administration has understood them, or has come to understand them. They are that the Soviet Union is an implacable, dangerous enemy (not a "potential adversary"), that the Soviets will advance just as far as we, the United States, allow them; that American weakness in this regard, not American strength, threatens world stability and peace; and that only with forceful United States leadership can governments based on liberty be defended and hope to prevail.

The essential task of leadership, then, is so to expound American policy that its connection with our principles is made clear, and its application in practical circumstances is made predictable.

This President Carter has yet to do. I do not fault him; the transformation has been sudden. But much more must be forthcoming, and something in the administration resists this. After all, if the transformation was sudden, the build up to it was gradual and the need for some accounting for changed views has been plain for some time.

Consider the matter of defense expenditures. I was a member of the Democratic Platform Committee in 1976 and well recall the letter received from the President, then a candidate, in which he declared:

...without endangering the defense of our nation or our commitments to our allies, we can reduce present defense expenditures by about \$5 billion to \$7 billion annually.

Since then, as administration spokesmen increasingly point out, the President has in fact raised the defense budget each year, and is the only President in memory to do so in peacetime. I have supported him in this, as has the majority of the Senate. But there came a time when something was required by way of explanation, some accounting for a point of view honestly held and honestly revised.

On September 19 I spoke to this point at some length as the Senate debated the President's proposal for a true 3 percent increase in the 1980 Defense budget:

...The fact is that those in charge of policy today seem to be changing their minds. A great shift is taking place.

I then asked if we could not hear from the President on this point: "What has he learned to change his mind? ...We need to hear from him."

Would it be wrong to state that so far we have not? Which does not mean we will not. The State of the Union address no doubt will be focused on military and strategic issues. But we may hope also to hear more of what the President now proposes as foreign policy.

In particular we may hope to hear that the events of the past few months have brought into place an explicit and enduring policy; one that will persist in the face of the huge political difficulties, already in evidence, it will make for the President here at home and the difficulties it will cause abroad, particularly as the Soviets begin their Spring peace offensive and once again commence to depict the United States as the primary menace to the sovereignty of small nations around the world.

Henry Kissinger has put this well. We and the world need to know "what the countries who rely on us can expect

of us and what we can expect of them." What, I would add, can countries which do not share particularly close ties with us, such as China, expect of us and we of them. We do not depend on one another in any ideological sense. The Chinese regime is as totalitarian and oppressive as any on earth. But in certain circumstances no doubt there are "parallel actions" which we can undertake. Let them be understood, and in particular let them be understood as an undertaking with a regime whose practices we in no way condone. Else let us have no further complaints that the French do not seem to share the thrill of it all.

Clearly it is even more important that the Soviets themselves should know what they can expect of us and what, in a general sense, we expect of them. Here I would offer a final complexity. The Soviets will have reason to be surprised: even, to their view, offended by the response of the President to their invasion of Afghanistan. There has been a succession of events of not less magnitude -- sending the Cuban Army to Africa was a logistic and strategic decision of perhaps even greater magnitude -- to which there has been little or no American response. Most emphatically this sequence did not begin with this administration. Indeed in the early days of this administration a presidential aide was quoted as saying that the Soviets had "viewed the United States under the Ford and Nixon administrations...as running a kind of defensive, rear-guard foreign policy of retreat."

What did change with this administration was the terms in which we described these policies. Or to put it differently, our behavior did not change, but our pronouncements became more consistent with that behavior, with the effect of making it seem more a matter of policy in place. This was first signaled, of course, in the President's commencement address at Notre Dame on May 22, 1977:

Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I'm glad that that's being changed.

For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty...

* * * * *

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained... Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive...

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.

* * * * *

...We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.

* * * * *

Now, I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me it means progress toward peace. But the effects of détente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola.

The President proposed that the sterile conflict of East versus West give way to a new era of cooperation in narrowing the great economic gulf that separated North from South.

Three weeks later, on June 9, 1977,

I gave the commencement address at Baruch College in New York City and I addressed this matter in terms which I hope were as respectful and admiring as these today, but which I see now were not understood if indeed they were even heard.

Eight years ago, at a very different time, it fell to me to give the commencement address at the University of Notre Dame. It will recall the temper of the times if I tell you I published it in The American Scholar under the title "Politics as the Art of the Impossible." Further, that I took as my theme a sentence from the French theologian Georges Bernanos: "The worst, the most corrupting, lies are problems poorly stated."

In a spirit of respect and affection, I would like to put this test to some of the principal themes of President Carter's recent commencement address at Notre Dame which was devoted to the subject of foreign policy. It was a major address, his first comprehensive statement of the administration's views, and has been the subject of wide comment...

...In listing the basic premises of American policy, he declared:

First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.

This is everything I could hope to hear from an American President.

But the matter cannot stop there. The next question is what this commitment requires of us, and where. Here the President leads where I for one would not wish to follow -- and I genuinely wonder whether he fully intends what he plainly proposes. The central thrust of his speech has to do with the developing world, and its central proposition as follows:

...Abraham Lincoln said that our nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know that a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry.

This is a most startling and extraordinary transition. His first sentence reminds us, truly, that by human standards, the world today is half slave and half free. Out of four billion persons, something approaching a billion and a half live in totalitarian Marxist states. We have come to think of this opposition in East-West terms.

But of a sudden the President directs our concern to quite a different matter, that of relations between the industrial North and the developing South. Indeed, he calls on the Soviets, as part of the former group, to join in "common aid efforts" to help the latter.

It is -- as if with no further consideration -- we should divert our attention from the central political struggle of our time -- that between liberal democracy and totalitarian Communism -- and focus instead on something else.

And, are not the consequences of such a transposition already apparent in other places in the President's speech? He says that we are now "free" of our "inordinate fear of Communism...", a fear, which led us at times to abandon our values for the values of the totalitarians, which in turn led us to the "intellectual and moral poverty" of the war in Vietnam.

Now, it is not that one ought to have an inordinate fear of anything that causes me to wonder whether this characterization of our experience in Vietnam is quite so self-evident. Neither the Secretary of State (then Deputy Secretary of Defense) nor the Secretary of Defense (then Secretary of the Air Force) -- men who at one time or another directed the Vietnam enterprise -- are men one readily associates with "intellectual and moral poverty." That the enterprise was doomed, we need not dispute. Some of us said so at the time. But must we so readily embrace what is so very near to our adversaries' depiction of our purposes?

And, perhaps of greater importance, to whom does the President refer when he says that through the failure of Vietnam,

we have found our way back to
our own principles and values,
and we have regained our lost
confidence.

Is this really so, or have we merely regained our composure by an addictive and deepening habit of avoiding reality? For if you say that we never should have fought the war in Vietnam, it is possible to avoid having to face the fact that we lost it.

All manner of defeats can be avoided in that way. We tell ourselves the nation faces an energy crisis. But we do not tell ourselves that this problem has come about through a massive defeat in foreign policy, which is to say the successful quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC oil cartel at the time of the 1973 Mid-East war. A foreign cartel restricts supply: we tell ourselves that a problem of supply is a problem of demand. A foreign cartel raises the price: we tell ourselves that a problem of price is a problem of profligacy.

The President, in my view, is entirely correct in the fresh emphasis he has given to what we call North-South relations. But I wish to suggest that this must not be allowed to divert us from the reality of the military and ideological competition with the Soviet Union which continues and, if anything, escalates. I cite Michael Novak on what he calls the "significantly growing imperial power of the Soviet Union."

It is difficult for one who is a liberal to try to sound alarums about grave military dangers. Yet there are such dangers. If we do not awaken from our slumber soon, Israel may be lost and much of Europe, too.

And there is a further consideration. If we genuinely care about the developing world, then we must look to the behavior of the Soviet Union, for with respect to the non-Communist regions of the world, be they developed or underdeveloped, there is one Soviet policy: the worse the better. I speak from what is no longer a brief experience of international affairs. In nation after nation, at conference after conference, what the Soviets seek is failure, breakdown, bitterness, mistrust. They judge that they thrive on this, and history certainly does not disprove them. Our task is twofold. First, to see this ourselves. It is not necessarily a confidence building exercise, but it is indispensable. Second, to bring the developing nations to see it as well. This is never easy. It is at times excruciatingly painful, and ensures a good deal of near term obloquy. But it is the true measure of commitment.

I would not much change those words today, but I would add to them the complexity to which I have alluded. This has to do with the mounting evidence that the Soviet Union is a seriously troubled, even sick society. The indices of economic stagnation and even decline are extraordinary. The indices of social disorder -- social pathology is not too strong a term -- are even more so. In a symposium which Newsweek recently sponsored on the 1980's I was so bold as to suggest that the defining event of the decade might well be the break-up of the Soviet Empire. But that, I continued, could also be the defining danger of the decade. There is a Western expression: "as mean as a gut-shot grizzly." There is something about the behavior of the Soviets that does indeed suggest a wounded bear, and all the more then is an ordinate fear of communism quite in order for the present and for much time to come.

This brings me now to some brief conclusions which I address as much or more to the Senate as to the Administration.

The first is that if we have entered a period of new realism and resolve in our relations with Soviets, then it is quite out of the question that we should simply drop the SALT II treaty, and the whole subject of strategic arms and move on eagerly to a debate of the merits of the Federal Trade Commission.

This would verge on the irresponsible, on the avoidance of difficulty. It would be the worst possible signal to send friend or foe.

We must not allow ourselves to pretend that the President asked us to defer the treaty. He asked us to withdraw it. It will not now be considered by this Congress. The highest and foremost of his foreign policy objectives has been dropped for now, and possibly for good.

This has the makings of a disaster.

We all know why the President acted as he did. It is because we did not have the votes to adopt a resolution of ratification. We did not have them before Afghanistan, and it was only more evident that we did not have them afterwards. As a supporter of the treaty -- a qualified supporter, I will admit, for I much wanted to see if we could strengthen the likelihood of obtaining "significant and substantial" reductions in SALT III -- I have sat for many hours with the Majority Whip, Senator Cranston, counting our votes, and at no time did we have anywhere near the two-thirds we needed. Before Afghanistan.

It seems to me absolutely in order that when the Senate begins the second session we devote a week, if not two, if not three, to reviewing this experience and asking what are we to do now. We should expect to hear from the President on the subject.

In the simplest terms, we were in the process of shaping our strategic forces for the rest of this century according to what would and would not be compatible with the terms of SALT II. It seemed to me, as one Senator, that a good deal of distortion resulted from this exercise. The MX, in my view, is an absurd and dangerous weapons system. Far better to go to sea. But the MX was possible under SALT II. First, because one new system was permitted. Second because the limitations on warheads and missiles themselves would have made it impossible to neutralize the MX as planned. What of these arrangements, these plans? Are they to be scrapped? Or what? Will the Soviets resume testing greater "fractionation" limits; more than one system? Or will they wait for us? Or what? And what will we do?

But there is an even prior question. Many of us have remarked to one another that had there been a secret vote on the Panama Canal Treaties they would have passed by a margin of eighty-eight to eleven or something such. Most Senators thought the treaties were sound; some understandably and legitimately felt that their constituencies did not and that their constituencies ought to have a say in how they voted. By contrast, I doubt if a secret ballot on SALT would have received fifty votes in the last days of the first session of this Congress. Why? In part because of

the deep distress which so many of us felt when we learned just how little the treaty would actually limit strategic arms. (Indeed, how much it provided for their increase.)

There is of course another case to be made for such agreements: an open acknowledgement such as one arms control student has written that "SALT II is not an arms control agreement, but one that primarily ensures the orderly accounting of the strategic forces of one signatory party by the other." Is that something we should think more about? Was it the administration's rhetoric that was flawed, more than its agreement?

Whatever the case, this surely is not a matter which we can record as having been disposed of simply because we have decided not to deal with it.

A second issue, obviously, is that of Middle Eastern oil. The Soviets have been pursuing a deliberate geopolitical course of enveloping it in a giant pincer movement. They are now, or shortly will be, on the borders of Iranian Baluchistan and the pincer is all but completed. The only way we can have any reason to suppose they will not soon move toward the oil fields of the Gulf -- a move which their economy may make desperately desirable in a handful of years -- is to make equally clear that we will stop them.

The only way we can make this clear is to deploy the arms capable of doing so. To say more is to compound the obvious, and in my case to enter a realm of strategy in which there are members of this body who possess far more expertise than I.

A third issue has to do with our interpretation of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. It was scarcely their first interference there. It happens I was ambassador to India when the first Marxist coup took place in Kabul. One felt the tremors in the subcontinent even then. We have now witnessed the third. This one a packaged coup, complete with a new leader, a new currency, a new official newspaper. In each case a pro-Soviet, or at least pro-Marxist regime was replaced by one hoped to be yet more subservient to Moscow. Is the meaning of this that the Brezhnev doctrine, as it is known, has been extended to Marxist regimes outside the until now established perimeter of the Soviet Union and the satellite nations? Certainly there have been evidences of this elsewhere, as in South Yemen. If so, then the clear possibility is that Yugoslavia is next. That is where a general war could begin, and that is why the United States and NATO must make explicitly clear what we will and what we will not accept. We will not accept that the descent on Kabul was a dress rehearsal for the taking of Belgrade. Again, to say more is to compound the obvious.

As for the subcontinent, clearly we must be prepared to resume military aid to Pakistan, for all the difficulties this will cause with India. But I emphasize the phrase that we must "be prepared." Our long postwar experience of arming Pakistan brought us little save bitterness in India, a bitterness which has seemed to me to endure longer than warranted by the outcome of Pakistani recklessness, but a reality still. The present regime in Pakistan took its time coming to the relief of our Embassy when it was being sacked and burned by a Rawalpindi mob not many weeks ago. Even so, we must respond to their needs, having due regard for the sensibilities of neighboring India.

I have not intended a tour of the troubled areas of the world: Southern Africa, the Western Sahara, Central America, the Caribbean. We encounter the Soviets everywhere, and must decide how much we can tolerate.

But before reaching any such array of decisions there is the general question of our commitment. It is a question that can surely be raised first of all here in the Congress. For if America has sent a weak signal to the world -- a world increasingly characterized by what Neal Kozodoy has called a general "thuggishness" -- to the Soviets, that signal has largely come from Capitol Hill.

Consider the matter of our intelligence services, of which I speak as a member of the Select Committee. With what security are we to mount even the most routine clandestine activity when the law requires that eight committees, some 180 Congressmen, and almost as many staff members be informed in advance? What nation which takes its intelligence community seriously would open its archives under a Freedom of Information Act to foreign governments, including of course Marxist governments?

But this is the least of it. The issue of the second session of the 96th Congress, and probably of the remaining Congresses of this century -- as has been the issue of most of the Congresses of this half century -- is whether we as a people will bear the costs of defending our liberty and the cause of liberty generally. I have been shaken by the response of so many presidential candidates to the President's decision not to permit the Soviets to purchase the additional 17 million tons of grain which they had arranged to do. Surely the President had to do something. Surely this was a very small something. Disrupting to a segment of our economy and to whole states even. But disrupting in ways that can be compensated, and should be and will be. I would almost dare to say that the effect of

the minimal actions the President did take in the aftermath of the Afghanistan invasion was near to offset by the evidence that there would be those who would attempt to make him pay a political cost for doing so.

I offer the thought that it should be just the other way around. Those who would impose such costs should be made to pay them. The President should be rewarded in direct measure as the effort is made to punish him. How can men who would lead the richest nation on earth -- yes, we are still that and let us have no statistics about Scandinava -- make a political issue over withholding grain shipments at a time when we are asking the whole of the world, the poorest countries included, to impose economic sanctions on the government of Iran for allowing the seizure by terrorists of our Embassy and its personnel?

The American people have never hesitated to take on whatever burdens have been put to them as necessary, as national, and as equitable. We can't ask the wheat farmers of Iowa to bear it all. And we won't. But we can ask our political leaders to show enough faith in this system to allow it three months to sort things out.

And there is a cost the President must endure also if he is to be followed in his new resolve. This is not going to be a pleasant time. It is not a pleasant subject

to raise, but a necessary one. And that is this. New policies must to some extent mean new people. To say more once again compounds the obvious, but perhaps just a moment of compounding is in order. The leaders of Europe and Asia and certainly those of the Soviet Union will be watching closely now to see whether the President's new pronouncements and actions are accompanied by changes in the administration itself which will signal that the new positions arise not in response to the immediate necessity to do something, anything in the face of overwhelmingly hostile acts, a response that could soon fade as other events come to the fore. Or whether, to the contrary, persons whose past judgments comport with the administration's new policies will appear in the ranks of the administration, with the clear implication that the new positions are to be sustained.

And so, in concluding, I declare once more my support for the President in his new course, and if I may be allowed a personal statement, my sense of reunion in matters where I have sensed an estrangement I never expected in those heady days when the 1976 Democratic platform was being drafted. All the more then do I welcome another Presidential year, and prospects of further debate within my Party on the issues that so dominate our era.

Having said that, allow me to close with another line from that Inaugural Address of Woodrow Wilson:

The success of a party means little except when the nation is using that party for a large and definite purpose.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/15/80

Mr. President:

Jody's comment: "I like the idea of two speeches. You can't deal adequately with both in one speech of reasonable length. There is a precedent for a "state of world" message or address. I'll have to check into the details."

Stu Eizenstat's memo is attached. In sum, Stu believes that it is possible to have a speech which includes both.

Rick/Patti

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 14, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : AL MCDONALD *AM*

This is to suggest an approach to transpose your major speech ideas into two separate speeches before you devote a lot of personal time to them. One would be predominately a foreign policy/defense speech and the second an economic and domestic issues report. Both would be prepared for delivery before the end of the month, preferably with the foreign policy one serving as the State of the Union message and the second as a personal economic report to the Congress (or another forum) one week later. If you agree, we would proceed as follows:

1) Draft a new foreign policy/defense speech, building on the materials included in your latest draft and working into it the key points covered in the Vance and Brzezinski drafts. In my view, your two best recent speeches dealing with foreign policy issues were the AFL-CIO address and the Defense speech. Both of these were heavily reworked during the speechwriting process, restructuring the organization of ideas, adding impact and putting the messages into better language. The drafts that have come directly from the foreign policy specialists, and particularly those texts prepared by committee, have not put forward your messages as forcefully or as clearly organized or stated for positive public consumption.

Following the pattern of these two earlier speeches, we would produce a single draft with concurrence on substance by the key parties. With this text completed, you would then have the option of using it as the State of the Union Message or in a special foreign policy forum as you might decide after seeing the actual text.

2. Put together the messages other than those on defense and foreign policy into a single, powerful speech aimed to preempt the middleground from your critics on the economic, energy and social justice issues. This would follow the major "tell the truth" and "face the problems squarely" themes of your last State of the Union draft. We would add to this the specifics on the energy and inflation programs, as well as those on the domestic programs of particular appeal that emphasize the advantages of continuity in Presidential leadership.

We would plan to have a brief comment on the other set of problems in each speech only to provide a bridge. In addition, to emphasize their character as a cohesive series covering the full range of major problems we face, the tone and language would be similar for both.

If this approach sounds reasonable, I would take the Brzezinski and Vance drafts and put them into the normal process. I believe this will be far more productive than the alternate committee approach and should produce a better product for you that will require less of your personal time.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1980

C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT

Stu

SUBJECT: State of the Union Format

I have read the latest draft of the State of the Union speech, and as you can tell from your copy, I have added my comments to it. I think the speech needs work, but under its current format certainly has the potential to be a fine State of the Union address.

I would be very concerned, however, if you were to completely abandon the draft before you in favor of a speech which is fully foreign policy. I know that a foreign policy speech has great appeal, and that is the subject which is foremost on the minds of the public at this time. However, I believe it would be a serious mistake to omit a reasonably full discussion of domestic matters.

My principal concern about a State of the Union that is almost entirely foreign policy is that, despite the public's current preoccupation with foreign policy, you will be criticized for ignoring a discussion of energy, of the economy, or of social justice. The press will have a field day analyzing how you have abandoned your concern with domestic matters and are banking your re-election entirely on foreign policy. That is a mistake which I think we cannot afford to make.

As we discussed the other day, I believe it is possible to have a State of the Union speech which includes both the key foreign policy message you want to give and the basic points that need to be made on the economy, energy, and other domestic concerns. The link can be that we can only be strong abroad if we are strong at home. The domestic actions we are taking, you can properly say, will make us strong domestically.

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Speech Draft	1980 State of the Union Address	1/10/80	A
Speech Draft	1980 State of the Union Address	1/11/80	A
letter	From Walt Rostow to The President (3 pp.) re: Crisis in Afghanistan	1/7/80	A

FILE LOCATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Al McDonald
Rick Hertzberg *Rick*
Gordon Stewart *Gordon*

Subject: State of the Union

Here is a virtually complete rewrite of the State of the Union address. On the basis of your notes to Rick and our conversations with Jody, we did a new outline and discussed that outline with Jody before writing this draft. We have stressed the "truth" theme as the basic organizing principle of the speech.

The speech now consists of three basic parts: an introduction, a section on "facing the facts," and a conclusion. Most of the material is grouped under a series of five facts.

We completed a draft on Thursday and circulated it to the senior staff. This draft incorporates the comments of:

Stu Eizenstadt
Lloyd Cutler
David Aaron for Zbig
Al McDonald

In addition, Charlie Schultz submitted new material on the inflation section and we have substantively incorporated it.

#

Hertzberg/Stewart
Draft A-2
1/11/80

S t a t e o f t h e U n i o n

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the 96th Congress,
fellow citizens --

Three days ago I submitted to the Congress a detailed,
comprehensive document describing the State of our Union and
setting forth goals and directions for the coming years.

I sent that message ahead so that there can be the
fullest discussion of its proposals. Many of them embody
your counsel. All will benefit from your work.

But broad as that message is, our purpose tonight is
still more far-reaching. It is to turn a searchlight into
our future, and illuminate the essential outlines of our

common responsibility. Together we must fix the bearings of our nation's course for the 1980's.

First, let me state what I see and what I believe.

For all the change abroad and controversy at home, we enter this pivotal year as a strong and fundamentally united America.

Further, I believe that we do share a vision for this decade -- a vision of a secure nation, a just society, and a peaceful world. And I believe that the government of the United States can and will lead our people to that vision.

Let us reaffirm tonight that the United States is, and will remain, the strongest power on earth. Our power does not seek the conquest of nations, the suppression of rights, or the domination of any creed. We seek to be and to remain a secure nation at peace in a stable world. We who govern have a responsibility never to let a single interest -- no

matter how passionate or powerful -- override this national interest. Let us consult and discuss, but let us speak to the world as one united nation. And let us act in the world together, with wisdom and courage, as one indivisible Union.

We can only build the world that we want by starting with the hard truth about the world that is.

Together we must choose careful, consistent actions that meet the basic tests of truth. Do our actions deal with the facts about the world as it is? Do they take us steadily towards our common goal? Are we prepared to accept the consequences of the choices we make?

It is important to understand that making these tough choices does not limit our vision -- it defines the true course towards a new greatness for our nation.

There is no safe course for America in fixing our gaze

backward on a simpler world and time. There is no security for America in strong words without realistic sacrifice. There is no justice for America in facile promises that contradict each other. There is no peace for America and the world in posturing, threats and ultimatums. America must share the kind of vision that looks as good with our eyes open as it does with our eyes shut.

Therefore our challenge is to look ahead -- with unblinking honesty -- at some hard facts of life in 1980.

Fact number one: We live in a dangerous world.

Tonight, in the arid hills of Afghanistan, Soviet arms are attempting to crush the proud people of a once-sovereign nation. The background to that act of aggression is that over the past decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its military capacity. I set about to reverse a dangerous

trend by proposing real increases in American defense in each of the years of my Presidency. I propose to you a defense program for the 1980s which will strongly accelerate this effort.*

All three elements of our strategic nuclear forces -- sea, air and land -- are being strengthened. Our new Trident submarines are the most devastatingly effective deterrent in existence. New cruise missiles will modernize our air power. And the new mobile MX will give our land-based strategic forces the security they must have to protect us.

NATO will be stronger now that our European allies have accepted my proposal for new theater nuclear weapons -- weapons that are more than capable of balancing those of the Soviet Union.

*Stu would add: "...by a five per cent real growth each year -- to match the rapid buildup by Soviet forces over the decade of the 1970's."

Our navy, marine and airborne capacity for rapid deployment will be improved so that American power is in constant readiness to aid our friends and protect our worldwide interests.

[As we work to improve our conventional forces the men and women of our armed forces should know the pride the entire nation takes in their courageous and dedicated, sometimes lonely and dangerous, service.]*

Peace has many enemies. Terrorism is an enemy of peace -- as we have seen in Iran. So is aggression -- as the Soviets are demonstrating in Afghanistan.

There are other enemies of peace -- less stark but no less dangerous. Tyranny is one. So is hunger. So are regional conflict and human misery, and their exploitation for political or ideological gain.

*Stu comments on this ¶: "Trite and unnecessary." Sarah Weddington feels strongly that military morale needs this kind of boost from you. (Also, it's a reasonably sure applause line.)

In the coming decade we must build our strength to defeat all of these enemies of peace. I am determined to maintain the military security, the economic stability, and the moral strength of the United States.

The soul of American strength lies in decency, compassion and a commitment to human liberty and human life. That is why I will continue to defend human rights throughout the world. That is why I will continue to seek peaceful settlements of regional disputes. The historic treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel shows what can be done. And that is why I will ask the Congress to join me in rallying the world behind America's leadership of a worldwide battle against hunger and starvation. The plenty of our farm production is not only a powerful weapon when national security demands we withhold it -- it is a still stronger force for good when we provide it.

As a powerful and vigilant nation, we need not be threatened by every internal change that will take place in every country around the world in the 1980s. There will be many such changes. There will be violence and bloodshed; sadly, there always have been. But if we are confident and clear-sighted in our purpose, humane and even-handed in our policies, we can help guide change into positive paths -- and our power will serve not to cause bloodshed but to diminish it.

[Particular Afghanistan measures, e.g.,

Pakistan arms, Persian Gulf bases.

Iran update.]*

*Stu comments: "It is critical that we announce these bases. There has been no military response -- only political and economic and the latter partly damaging to the U.S. Also, we need to say something about our future course of action in Iran and what we intend to do to free the hostages."

The peril in Iran -- indeed throughout western Asia and the Middle East -- drives home

Fact Number Two: The very security of our nation is hostage to our dependence on foreign oil.

Let us face the reality once and for all -- a dependent nation cannot be a secure nation. The more energy-dependent we are, the weaker we are in the eyes of other nations -- and in our own. We risk the loss not only of our self-sufficiency but of our self-respect.

I have said again and again that the energy crisis is not an abstraction. It is a clear and present danger to our security -- military, economic and spiritual.

Oil is still the basic fuel of our armed forces, our industrial civilization, our way of life. Half the oil

we use still comes from abroad -- much of it from unstable, uncertain sources. Iran is once again a warning. Let us agree tonight to ensure that it will be the last such warning this nation ever needs.

We begin the 1980's on the verge of enacting a national energy policy that will develop new production, new sources, new supplies of energy.*

By the end of this decade, our national energy policy will be producing the equivalent of:

¶ _____ million barrels of oil per day from coal;

¶ _____ million barrels per day from solar;

*Stu would add here: "With the programs Congress has passed and with those now before you, we now have a rational, conservation-minded pricing policy -- based on reality, not on vain wishes and false hopes. We have clear incentives for oil and gas production; for a massive shift toward American coal, our most abundant resource, and away from foreign oil; for the development of solar energy; and for the beginning of synthetic fuels, including gasohol and energy from our coal and oil shale. I have called on the Congress to embark in the 1980s on the most massive peacetime investment in American history for energy security -- and you are on the verge of joining me fully that commitment." Rick and Gordon think this is redundant once the numbers above are filled in.

¶ _____ million barrels per day from synfuels;

¶ _____ million barrels per day from biomass;

¶ [etc.]

We are ready to fight dependence by changing the way this nation produces energy. As a result, we at last have one half the map that will lead us to energy freedom. Now we must conquer our dependence once and for all by changing the way we use energy.

Tonight, under my authority as President, I am declaring an energy emergency. I am establishing mandatory conservation and consumption goals for each state. These goals will be publicized and monitored. I will help our states, cities and towns to develop the plans and policies to meet them.

[Conservation battle plan with oil equivalency targets as for production. Stu notes: "We will have information to fill in here from DOE shortly." Rationing proposal?]

In 1979 we paid \$90 billion for foreign oil. Wealth is pouring out of our country as if from an open wound. And that hemorrhage of wealth is the largest single cause of the inflation that is now damaging the standard of living of millions of Americans.

Fact number three: We face a deep, long-term problem of inflation, and there are no quick or easy cures.

Inflation has been building steadily [for more than a decade.]* It afflicts not only the United States but the entire industrial world.

No one needs convincing that the problem is serious.

It is hardest on those who are too poor or too powerless to

*Stu would substitute: "with only transient relief, since the buildup during the Vietnam war."

fight back. But every American family feels the pinch.

We have a strong economy in this country. That strength is reflected in the fact that even after taxes and inflation, the real family income of Americans has continued to rise over the past three years. It is reflected in the nine million new jobs we have created in these three years.* More Americans, and a larger proportion of Americans, are working than ever before in our history.

Inflation threatens that economic progress. Controlling inflation is therefore our most important economic task. We must continue to press the attack, using all the tools at our command.

Energy is by far the largest factor in inflation, and our battle for energy security is the centerpiece of our

*Stu would insert here: "...and the drop of two full percentage points in the unemployment rate.

fight against inflation. But we must also keep on fighting inflation directly -- in four ways:

¶ First, by budget restraint. We cannot spend our way out of inflation. We have cut the Federal deficit by 75 per cent in the last three years. In the opening years of the new decade, we will move the rest of the way to balance.

¶ Second, by regulatory reform. We have done much already to lift unneeded regulatory burdens from our economy. We will do more.

¶ Third, by building on my Administration's historic National Accord with organized labor -- to enlist America's working people as full partners in a fair and equitable fight on inflation.

¶ Fourth -- and most important in the long run -- by increasing the productivity of our economy. Declining

productivity adds more fuel to the inflationary fire than anything except energy. Persistence in budgetary restraint will make future tax cuts possible, and when those cuts come they must be designed to stimulate savings, capital investment and productivity. But even in the tight budgets I have submitted, I have sharply increased support for research and development -- especially basic research, which is the seed of America's future technological strength.

Only by dealing with energy and productivity can we attack root causes -- not just symptoms -- of inflation.

Fact number four: America's promise to all our people is not yet a reality for some of our people.

To be strong and secure, a free society must ultimately be a just society. Neither budget restraint at home nor

crises overseas can be a pretext for abandoning this Nation's continuing struggle to fulfill its founding ideals.

In that struggle, the Constitution of the United States is the shield of freedom. As we enter the new decade, the time has come to extend the protections of that mighty document to men and women alike. This year, let us at last inscribe the Equal Rights Amendment in the charter of our country.

As a people, we have made steady progress in washing the stain of racism from the fabric of our national life. Yet in recent months, we have witnessed scattered instances of renewed violence by the Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups. From this podium tonight, I denounce all who create tensions between racial, religious or cultural groups -- and I pledge to you that as long as I am President, this government will use its powers to press for affirmative action to achieve full equality of opportunity.

I am asking the Congress this year to join me in making a historic investment in our country's most precious, most underused resource: the energies, the talents, the aspirations of our Nation's young people. I will ask Congress to provide basic education and genuine job training opportunities to an additional one and one-half million young Americans. We can no longer afford -- economically or morally -- the terrible waste that results from mass unemployment and mass hopelessness.

Together we will continue to fight for better education, for a sound Social Security System, for a decent environment, for revitalized cities and rural communities.

And in this new decade, we will fulfill a generation of promises by enacting comprehensive health care -- with tough cost controls -- for all our citizens.

Fact number five: When all is said and done, the shadow of nuclear holocaust remains the greatest danger facing the world.

All we would build at home, all that our forebears have given us, all that the genius of human beings has made -- all would end in fire and ashes if the present nuclear stalemate should ever become nuclear war. There can be no peace without strength; but there is no security in the nuclear age without peace.

Making nuclear war less likely is the common responsibility and the common interest of all nations. But that burden falls most heavily on the nuclear superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty -- SALT II -- is one step in a long, painstaking effort that began a generation

ago, has continued under seven Administrations of both parties, and must continue until the scourge of nuclear terror is wiped away. SALT II is an act not of altruism on our part -- it is an act of deliberate self-interest.

Nevertheless, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I have asked the Senate to delay its consideration of the SALT II treaty. I want to repeat tonight why I took that step.

The level of nuclear armaments is not the only factor in the danger of nuclear war. Another factor -- an equally important one -- is the danger of Soviet miscalculation.

We cannot afford to allow the Soviet leaders to misread our will to answer their actions. We cannot afford to let them imagine that they can choose the path of aggression without paying a heavy price.

That is why I have asked for this delay in the completion

of action on SALT. That is why I have acted to withhold from the Soviets the benefits of trade with us. That is why I am seeking with special urgency to strengthen our defense.

None of these actions is free of cost to ourselves. That is one measure of their seriousness. And I am convinced that the American people are willing to shoulder the burdens that go with the responsibilities of power.

I remain committed to negotiated, verifiable limitations on the weapons of nuclear destruction. But the leaders who control those weapons, no less than the weapons themselves, must be subject to limits. American firmness, no less than mutual restraint, is crucial to the prevention of nuclear war.

The beginning of a new century is now less than twenty years away. Whether we enter that century in control of our

destiny will depend on what we do in the decade ahead. We will chart our course in this pivotal year of 1980.

Unflinchingly, we must seize the truth -- because the truth in the hands of a free people is the most powerful weapon on earth.

Our material resources, great as they are, are limited; our problems are too severe, too complex to yield to simple slogans or quick solutions; our world is full of danger; and our system of government is sometimes slow and cumbersome.

These are facts. But it is also a fact -- it is also the truth -- that we possess extraordinary strengths -- strengths that go beyond our military power and our economic wealth.

We have the will to work hard. We have the courage to confront the truth. We have the imagination to dream great dreams.

But the greatest of our strengths is in our land tonight, and it speaks to us across the centuries in the Preamble of our Constitution. Listen to its words:

"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

I find in these opening words to the founding charter of this great and now venerable republic of ours the name of the force which can make our government serve us as it was meant to serve us, now and forever. That force is named right in the Constitution -- at the very first!

"We the people" is its name.

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