

11/20/80 [1]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|----------|-------------|
| memo w/att | <p><i>opened per RAC NLC-126-23-9-1-6 2/3/14</i> From Muskie to The President (7 pp.) re: Meeting with Reagan <i>SANATIZED, OPENED 8/12/93</i></p> | 11/19/80 | A |
| memo | <p>From Brzezinski to The President (2 pp.) re: Meeting with Reagan re: Middle East Autonomy Talks <i>SANATIZED, 8/12/93</i></p> | 11/19/80 | A |
| memo | <p>From Brzezinski to The President (2 pp.) re: Conversation with Reagan on National Security Matters <i>SANATIZED 8/12/93</i></p> | 11/18/80 | A |
| memo | <p><i>sanitized per RAC NLC-126-23-9-1-7 2/3/14</i> From Brown to The President (7 pp.) re: Issues to Raise During Meeting with Reagan <i>SANATIZED 8/12/93</i></p> | 11/19/80 | A |

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Hand-writing File 11/20/80 [1] BOX 213

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 18, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZS.*
SUBJECT: Your Conversation with Governor Reagan
and National Security Matters

If you wish, I can provide talking points on any of the items below, but you are so familiar with them (and your meeting is so short) that I thought it might be more useful if I simply gave you a checklist.

As I think of your meeting, the logical division of topics might be into (1) items which you actually may wish to discuss with Governor Reagan, giving him your views, eliciting his cooperation on some, and alerting him to the complexity of others; and (2) sensitive items of which he ought to be aware in a factual sense.

1. Topics to Discuss


- NATO defense spending levels
- The Camp David process (and summit?)
- F-15's for Saudi Arabia and regional security issues
- Poland: (1) short-term economic assistance; (2) deterrence of, and reaction to, Soviet intervention
- Nicaragua and the possibility of a U.S.-Cuban clash
- Sanctions on USSR because of Afghanistan (grain, technology transfer)
- Kim Dae Jung
- Hostages and the point beyond which you cannot go
- How to deal in the weeks ahead with any major policy choices that might additionally arise.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Review November 18, 1986

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *ZS.* RE MAR 11 1982-202
BY *ZS.* NARS. DATE 7/30/93

13453 2111111
ALBARD

2. Sensitive Items to Mention Briefly (and Reagan should be told that they are most sensitive)



You might want me to cover these items briefly with him after you have discussed the regional policy issues. Please indicate if you want me to do so. Moreover, do you want any record kept of your substantive conversation with Reagan (and it might be wise to do so)?

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
~~SECRET~~

11.19.80

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *JB*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President-Elect
Reagan: the Middle East Autonomy Talks (U)

The November 17 trilateral meeting in Cairo accomplished little, and in fact Israel and Egypt dug in on their positions.



Sadat has spoken of a summit after the Inauguration, and has said that 1981 should be a "year of decision," presumably within the Camp David Framework. (C)

In your meeting with President-elect Reagan, I believe you should stress the following themes:

-- the risks, both to the overall peace process and to the region, generally, if the peace process is permitted to languish through the Israeli election period and into 1982. Reagan will have a honeymoon period with states like Saudi Arabia, but it is unlikely that the U.S. would be able to continue building on that cooperative relationship (and an overall Gulf strategy) if the peace process languishes for another year or so;

-- the realistic difficulties, however, of getting any real progress with the Israelis, since their elections can be held in May and must be held by November -- i.e. Begin holds the key to timing of the elections and hence of Israel's ability to move seriously in the peace process; furthermore, there could be additional delays if a Labor government tried to shift to a "Jordanian option";

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Review November 19, 1986

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER *3/24/83 NSL HV RE MR-42-202*
BY *[Signature]* NARS. DATE *7/30/93*

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-- your conviction that the autonomy approach still offers the best hope and should be kept up-front, even if later developments lead the parties to shift to a Jordanian option;

-- your understanding that it would be difficult for Reagan to go into a summit soon after the Inauguration, unless there emerges a clear sense of what could be accomplished in concrete terms. Yet you hope he will consider it seriously, as a means to demonstrate the importance to all concerned that the peace process not be permitted to falter or fail. In any event, early contact with Sadat and Begin is important. (S)

You might also want to share with Reagan your own personal views on dealing with Sadat and Begin; and your continued support after the Inauguration for constructive efforts to move the peace process forward. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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SENSITIVE

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Edmund S. Muskie 
Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Reagan

You have indicated that you intend to raise a number of important international issues in your meeting with Governor Reagan on November 20. I propose that you divide the subjects into two categories: (1) Consultable Issues where an indication of support from the incoming Administration is desirable; and (2) Information Issues where you inform Governor Reagan how you intend to proceed, leaving him an opportunity to comment if he wishes.

It would be of considerable value if Governor Reagan were to designate a person for me and Chris to contact in order to follow up on the issues that the two of you discuss, and to use if urgent consultations on other matters are needed. Richard Allen has been the channel to us on Iran and Kim Dae Jung, but we do not know whether he is the authorized representative of Governor Reagan on other sensitive foreign policy issues.

Attachment:

As stated.

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
SENSITIVE
RDS-3 11/19/00

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 3/29/93 State Dept. MAR-NUC-92-201
BY  NARS, DATE 7/30/93

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CONSULTABLE ISSUES




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
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SENSITIVE

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The Middle East Peace Process



Although the autonomy negotiations have bogged down in recent months, the peace process launched at Camp David remains viable. It will be important for both sides to hear from the President-elect fairly soon that he intends to pursue

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-3-

the Camp David process. You may also wish to tell the President-elect that if it would contribute to the peace process, you are considering inviting Sadat and Begin to a Middle East summit before you leave office.

Finally, you may want to alert Governor Reagan to the dangers of a formal Israeli move to annex the Golan and urge him to signal concern at such a move to those Israeli Government representatives with whom the incoming Administration may be in touch.

Korea

You might express your appreciation to the President-elect for the public and private signals that he has authorized to the Korean Government supporting our stand on Kim Dae Jung. You may wish to mention our consultation with the Japanese on measures we would take if Kim is executed.

In addition to the Kim matter, some 800 active and former Korean politicians and party staff members have been banned from political activity. This may be a step preliminary to the conduct of a thorough review of individual situations. Upon appeal, which is permitted, many of these people may be reinstated. If a substantial number remain under the ban after the review, Governor Reagan may wish to consider commenting.

El Salvador

Conservative military leaders may try to use our election results as a pretext to move against the moderate elements in the ruling Junta. Recent indications are that the immediate danger may have receded but we are nonetheless concerned about the possibility of a rightist coup. Such a development would diminish even further the limited appeal of the Junta in El Salvador and abroad. Unless the incoming Administration resists overtures from the far-right and signals support for the Junta, a rightist coup before January 20 is likely, leaving the incoming Administration to deal with the consequences of a failure of the moderate alternative in El Salvador. A rightist coup in El Salvador also would increase Cuba's audience and role in Central America.

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-4-

Cuba

You have indicated that we should accept the Cuban offer to begin talks soon with us on an orderly departure program that would establish procedures and levels for regularized immigration from Cuba to the U.S. Since any agreement on such immigration flows will not be concluded until after January 20, 1981, you might want to tell Governor Reagan of our reasons for starting the conversations.

CDE

Now that the CSCE Conference has agreed on procedures, we may soon be faced with a decision of whether or not to join with our allies in supporting the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (which they have not yet tabled). There will be an SCC meeting Thursday afternoon which will provide interagency recommendations to you on the matter. Since the CDE could become an ongoing East-West arms control forum, you may want to tell Governor Reagan that we will be in touch with his advisors on the issue before making a final decision on whether to endorse CDE or to remain noncommittal.

INFORMATION ISSUES

Hostages in Iran

We have been keeping Dick Allen informed of our efforts to protect our vital interests in Iran and bring the hostages home safely and as quickly as possible. We will continue to brief Allen on developments. Our response to the Parliament's four conditions for the hostages' release, which was delivered to Iran by the Algerians, is being considered by the special Iranian Government committee charged with assessing the acceptability of our position. This committee has been meeting with the Algerian emissaries briefed by Warren Christopher last week in Algiers on the rationale for our position and the limits to our flexibility. We are inclined to believe serious consideration is being given to the substance of our response as we have learned that the committee is seeking expert advice on the legal constraints that affect our position and ability to be flexible.

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SENSITIVE

-5-

Given the continuing struggle between moderate and extremist revolutionary factions, we are unable to predict how the Iranian authorities will in fact react to our response, or when we might expect to hear from them.

Poland

You may want to brief the President-elect on the nature of our concerns about the economic situation. You have authorized me to ask the German, French and British Foreign Ministers how much their governments might provide if the U.S. were to agree to some additional CCC credits before the discussions on the rescheduling of Poland's debt begin early next year. We have warned the Soviets and their allies of the seriousness with which we would view any outside intervention in Poland. We have begun discussions with our key Western allies on the measures that we all would take if the Soviets or Polish authorities use force against the Polish trade unionists. You might want to mention that Governor Scranton's conversation in Moscow last week certainly left the Soviets in no doubt that the incoming Administration shares our concern about possible intervention in Poland.

IEA

You might want to review with the President-elect the steps we plan to take in the face of growing oil shortages on the world market.

The interruption of oil exports from Iraq and Iran into 1981 will risk an increase in the price of oil on the order of that which occurred in 1979. The economic consequences for the world economy would be severe. The U.S. and the major oil consuming nations have to move quickly to try to take pressure off the volatile spot market and to reduce demand for imported oil to make up for the shortfall. This week we will begin work in the International Energy Agency to develop an international approach to the problem. We intend to press for the setting of national oil import ceilings which would reduce demand for imports enough to cover the shortfall. Each IEA nation and France would adopt the domestic measures necessary to meet its ceiling. The U.S. will need to take strong, effective, domestic measures. (Such domestic measures might include the decontrol of the price of gas and compulsory industrial use of coal.) At IEA, we will also discuss how to help seriously affected nations such as Turkey and Portugal.

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-6-

NATO Defense Efforts

You will be receiving separately the memo that you asked Harold and me for to use in your meetings with Chancellor Schmidt and Governor Reagan.

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2.02

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 18, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*
SUBJECT: Your Conversation with Governor Reagan
and National Security Matters

*BRZEZINSKI
11/18/80*

If you wish, I can provide talking points on any of the items below, but you are so familiar with them (and your meeting is so short) that I thought it might be more useful if I simply gave you a checklist.

As I think of your meeting, the logical division of topics might be into (1) items which you actually may wish to discuss with Governor Reagan, giving him your views, eliciting his cooperation on some, and alerting him to the complexity of others; and (2) sensitive items of which he ought to be aware in a factual sense.

State Dept. review completed

1. Topics to Discuss

- NATO defense spending levels
- The Camp David process (and summit?)
- F-15's for Saudi Arabia and regional security issues
- Poland: (1) short-term economic assistance; (2) deterrence of, and reaction to, Soviet intervention
- Nicaragua and the possibility of a U.S.-Cuban clash
- Sanctions on USSR because of Afghanistan (grain, technology transfer)
- Kim Dae Jung
- Hostages and the point beyond which you cannot go
- How to deal in the weeks ahead with any major policy choices that might additionally arise.

NLC Review Completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review November 18, 1986

SANITIZED

Per, Rac Project

ESDN; NLC-126-23-9-1-7

BY KS NARA, DATE 1/22/19

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2. Sensitive Items to Mention Briefly

(and Reagan should be told that they are most sensitive)

[Redacted box]

- U.S.-French nuclear cooperation
- Secret allied defense arrangements
- Afghan resistance
- SIOP

You might want me to cover these items briefly with him after you have discussed the regional policy issues. Please indicate if you want me to do so. Moreover, do you want any record kept of your substantive conversation with Reagan (and it might be wise to do so)?

~~TOP SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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SENSITIVE

November 19, 1980

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Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE
RDS-3 11/19/00

DECLASSIFIED
Per: Rac Project
ESDA: NLC-126-23-9-1-6
BY XS NARA DATE 1/24/14

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SENSITIVE

CONSULTABLE ISSUES

Saudi Arabia's Request for F-15 Enhancement Items and AWACS

For over a year the Saudis have been pressing us to provide bomb racks, conformal fuel pods, aerial refueling tankers and AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for the 60 F-15s and recently they have made firm their desire to purchase AWACS. On November 12 Defense Minister Prince Sultan pressed General Jones for a response in two weeks and indicated that the Saudi Government might cancel the F-15 purchase if we do not respond favorably. The F-15 enhancement issue has become a litmus test in our relationship. Saudi cooperation on oil pricing and production, as well as Saudi understanding for our Southeast Asia strategy and Middle East peace developments, could well be affected by our decisions on these items.

Of the items requested, all but the bomb racks would require Congressional notification under 36 (b), and we are committed to consult with the Congress before decisions are made on any of the items. The completion of Congressional consideration and delivery of any equipment approved would take place during the Reagan Administration. Our response to the Saudis should therefore convey a sense that Governor Reagan shares in any decision we might make on these requests. The President has stated publicly that he would not approve items which might give Saudi Arabia an offensive capability against Israel and has specifically cited bomb racks as an example. The Israelis will argue that all of the items except possibly the AIM-9L missiles and the AWACS have such offensive capability, while the Saudis will argue that they will, under no circumstances, use the F-15s offensively against Israel. Of the items requested:

-- The bomb racks are most controversial, are not provided for our own F-15s, although the Israelis are manufacturing them for theirs, and are the sole item on which the Saudis have indicated they might not expect an immediate response.

-- The AIM-9L missile is a new development in the Sidewinder air-to-air series, and while we have sold earlier versions of the AIM-9 to Saudi Arabia we have sold the AIM-9L only to some NATO countries, Australia, Japan and Israel.

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DECLASSIFIED

Per, Rac Project

ESDN: NLC-126-23-9-1-6

BY 125 NARA DATE 1/24/04

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-2-

-- Conformal fuel pods would extend the range of the Saudi F-15s, and the Saudis have argued this is essential to their defensive needs in view of the changed strategic environment in the Gulf and South Arabia.

-- Air refueling capability for the F-15s involves providing the KC-135 tanker and raises essentially the same considerations as the conformal fuel pods except that introduction of the tanker into the Saudi inventory would involve substantial training and support services.

-- The AWACS is a highly complex system that we have refused Israel, but provided to the Shah, and have delivered to NATO countries. However, on the basis of our two AWACS deployments to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis are convinced that they require this system to achieve an adequate air defense.

There has been strong Congressional sentiment -- including Senators Byrd, Baker, Laxalt, Dole, and Warner -- against providing the F-15 enhancement items and AWACS to the Saudis on the basis of Israeli concerns that such equipment will increase the offensive capability of the aircraft. During the 1978 debate on the F-15 sale Harold Brown gave written assurances to Congress that we did not intend to provide equipment which would increase the range or the ground attack capability of the aircraft. The Administration also indicated in 1978 that we had no plans to sell AWACS to the Saudis.

The Middle East Peace Process

The Egyptians very reluctantly agreed to go through with the trilateral autonomy session on November 17 on the understanding that they would not be pressed for further trilateral meetings until they could get a sense of the next Administration's policy. The Egyptian position remains that in the light of the Knesset bill on Jerusalem they cannot agree to further trilateral meetings except for the purpose of preparing for a summit. No progress was made on our draft "Memorandum of Understanding" at the November 17 session; both sides declared it to be inadequate and both have clearly decided to dig in on their respective positions until they have a clearer sense of the new Administration's policies.

Although the autonomy negotiations have bogged down in recent months, the peace process launched at Camp David remains viable. It will be important for both sides to hear from the President-elect fairly soon that he intends to pursue

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-3-

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Finally, you may want to alert Governor Reagan to the dangers of a formal Israeli move to annex the Golan and urge him to signal concern at such a move to those Israeli Government representatives with whom the incoming Administration may be in touch.

Korea

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-4-

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SENSITIVE

-5-

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

-6-

NATO Defense Efforts

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SENSITIVE



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Issues to Raise with the President-elect

Attached is a list of national security issues that I recommend you discuss with the President-elect. The full texts are reminders for you; in few cases will the whole argument be suitable for exposition.

Harold Brown

This letter is unclassified without attachment.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 3/22/93 DOD G RE MR-ALC-92-203
BY *[Signature]* DATE 8/2/93

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Sec Def Cont Nr. X11673

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES.

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I. SECURITY ISSUES

1. Greater Likelihood of Conflict in the 80's. Partly because of Soviet temptations in vulnerable PG/IO, we see a significantly greater likelihood of major regional or global conflict occurring in the 1980's than in the 1970's. This requires emphasizing readiness, even at the expense of some modernizations.

2. Filling Strategic Vacuum in PG/IO. Given great volatility and vulnerability of PG/IO region, our most serious short-term and mid-term security problem is assuring Free World access to Persian Gulf oil. While this oil is more needed by Europe and Japan than the US, the resulting economic chaos if it were cut off would undermine US security as well. Moreover, the Gulf is the key area in which our current capabilities are most lacking. Therefore, our top defense priority has been to create a greater ability to deter or defend against Soviet domination of PG oil. This effort must be accelerated, and our efforts redoubled to acquire facilities in the region without which our RDF can't function.

3. Increasing Allies' Contributions to the Common Defense. Our NATO initiatives were a big step in this direction, but even greater burdensharing is crucial, because we cannot conceivably carry the whole load alone. Since we prefer to remain the chief free world nuclear defender, our overall policy should be that our Allies and friends contribute a lot more to conventional defense. Japan in particular must no longer rely on the US to provide the bulk of their defense. We must also keep pressure on our European Allies and get the PG oil producers to help finance the security umbrella which only the US can provide over them.

Allied defense spending increases are based on the 1978 NATO Summit pledge to increase defense budgets in real terms by 3% each year, and our steady pressure on Japan for significant budget increases. We are facing serious defections, e.g., FRG plans to increase by only 1.75% in 1981. Secretary Brown's representations to NATO and Tokyo in December will be effective only if we are able to say that the incoming administration shares our views on allied defense spending.

If the US tries to do the whole Free World's job on its own, the financial burden on us will be immense. Even though the spirit of our country is for larger defense expenditures, we will have to maintain those higher expenditures for at least

Review: Nov 19, 2000
Reason: 2-30lc.5&7

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SENSITIVE

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2

the better part of a decade for us to redress the balance. That will require a continuing commitment on the part of the electorate over a long period. The difficulty in maintaining that commitment will depend in part on how painful it is, and in part on whether it's perceived as equitable. Prolonged defense growth rates that represent a high burden on us, coupled with the perception that our allies are getting a free ride, would surely lead to disenchantment on the part of the electorate long before the military balance has been redressed.

Therefore, it is necessary to convince the allies of the problem and the threat, and get their commitment to an equitable share of the burden. This would lower the burden on the US taxpayer, and give him the feeling that our allies care as much as we do about the defense of their homelands.

4. Face up to Making China a More Effective Counterweight to the USSR. Given our acute need to limit Soviet capabilities against NATO and PG oil, and our inability (even with an accelerated buildup) to deal with three widely separate theaters simultaneously, we should urgently address how to strengthen China defensively. Both Japan and Europe should be pressed to share in this effort to create more of a counterweight to Soviet power and the USSR's Pacific flank, thus relieving the pressure on NATO and the PG.

5. Non-DOD Security Contributions Needed. Non-DOD agencies must help in the national defense effort. Our coalition defense and overseas force projection strategy also dictate providing much more security assistance to friends and Allies in maintaining their defense efforts. Such aid is often more cost effective than building up our own forces to compensate for their weakness. Also indispensable are more flexible terms of repayment and some element of grant aid to those key countries which simply cannot repay loans.

6. SALT II Limitations. A major issue for any administration is strategic nuclear arms and arms control. The SALT II Treaty as it now stands will not be ratified. We recognize there are alternative ways of continuing the process and preserving the principal accomplishments of the treaty. Doing that is important to preserving our alliance relationships, as well as for other reasons:

-- The comparison of possible Soviet strategic forces during the 1980s with and without SALT. We do face real challenges from Soviet strategic capability, but it really is the case that those challenges will be greater if the Soviet programs are completely unlimited. In the short run, say to 1985, they are in a better position to add forces quickly than we are, though we could keep a balance. There

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SENSITIVE

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3

are much higher priority ways to spend increased defense budgets -- especially on manpower and conventional forces -- than increasing our strategic forces simply to match a Soviet buildup that arms control could prevent.

-- The various possible ways of modifying the present agreement. Undoubtedly there are limited changes that the Soviets will accept, but even for them -- and certainly for major changes -- the Soviets will insist on something in return.

-- Continuing the present de facto situation in which each side refrains from action inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. This gives time to work out alternative arms control approaches without irrevocable actions that limit options.

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

II. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

1.



2. Poland: Despite the recent agreement between the government and the union Solidarity, the situation in Poland remains unsettled. The government does not appear reconciled to living with the union; the union not only must struggle for its own existence but must consider what position to take on the various worker demands that remain unresolved; the Soviet Union remains unhappy and appears

[redacted] ready to invade if it decides that doing so will be in its interest; and the Polish army appears ready to resist any Soviet invasion. All this comes against the background of a deteriorating economy in Poland, and although orthodox economics would prescribe a tightening up by the government, this would mean that the government would be unable to meet its promises to the workers. The only short and mid-term solutions may be substantial debt relief, by ourselves and our European allies. We have given the allies preliminary indications that we may be willing to take such steps.

3. Saudi Arabia: To prevent serious disruption of our key security relationship with Saudi Arabia, we need to inform the Saudis by December 1 how we intend to respond to their requests for conformal fuel tanks, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, aerial refueling tankers and bomb racks for their F-15s, and early warning surveillance aircraft (AWACS). The decision will have important implications with respect to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Congress, so both administrations now need to be in harmony on this matter.

As to the substance, the SCC has not met, but our current view is that Saudi assistance on oil, defense of the Persian Gulf, and the Arab-Israeli problem is so important that we should take a forthcoming posture. Accordingly:


- we should sell conformal tanks, the AIM-9L and AWACS, all of which are militarily justified to defend

~~TOP SECRET~~


5

Saudi Arabia. Until the AWACS can be delivered in 1985, we would be willing to keep USAF AWACS stationed in the Kingdom.

- we should indicate a willingness to sell an aerial refueling capability, but suggest the need for a study to determine which particular aircraft would be most satisfactory.



5. Golan Heights. The potential annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel not only could undercut future peace efforts, but could have serious regional repercussions for our efforts to deter the Soviets in Southwest Asia.



~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

III. BUDGET AND PERSONNEL

1. FY 82 Budget Design. Spokesmen for the new administration should exercise care in taking positions on new, proposed, or current systems until they have had a chance to look carefully at the issues from the position of having to carry them out. At any practical defense budget level, difficult choices will still have to be made.

2. Civilian Hiring Freeze and Ceilings. DOD civilian employment has declined 61,000 in four years, from 1,047,000 in 1976 to 986,000 in 1980. At the same time, we have experienced substantial real growth in the defense program; more real growth is expected. An across-the-board freeze would severely impair our defense posture. Defense civilians are primarily production workers -- not bureaucrats. The military services are unanimous in the view that the ceilings are a very serious problem. The DOD civilian manpower ceiling should be determined by program size -- as regulated by OMB and the Congress through the budget.

3. Selective Service System. It is essential to the country's ability to mobilize, in the time period we think we will have, that the SSS revitalization continue, and that the scheduled January registration be accomplished. We have learned, as we have gone through the registration process, that the estimates for post-mobilization registration were wildly optimistic. Unless the manpower pool is registered when the decision is made to proceed with conscription, it will be months, not days or weeks, before conscripts will be available to the training base. The Carter Administration paid a political price for restoring registration to help national security. The Ford Administration ended registration without gaining politically from it. It would be ironic if the Reagan administration ends registration and later (as we think likely) has to pay a high political price to restore it a second time.

4. Military Compensation. The compensation increases enacted in 1980 will restore to a substantial extent the pay comparability that existed in 1972. DOD analysis suggests these increases will reverse the trend in retention of senior enlisted personnel. Not until mid-1981 can it be fully evaluated. If an additional increase is needed, a rough estimate indicates that 2% over the FY 82 civilian pay raise will restore the 1972 comparability. Other increases should be selectively targeted to redress specific problems.

SENSITIVE

IV. DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT

1. MX Basing. The need for MX derives from the drastically reduced survivability of our Minuteman ICBM force, as a result of the increased quantity and improved accuracy of Soviet ICBM reentry vehicles. The MX missile itself represents a rather straight-forward development. The basing mode designed to achieve the necessary survivability is the complex element of the new system. Cursory looks might suggest "new" basing systems which would appear to be simpler, cheaper, quicker to implement, or perhaps involve reduced environmental impact. The temptation to do so will be great when the draft MX Environmental Impact Statement is released within the next few weeks. MX has been studied seriously for more than 10 years, and more than 30 basing options have been examined. Before making public statements that may constrain future options, a careful review of the existing study results should be undertaken.

2. New Manned Bomber. This is a complex issue which has been viewed in the context of strategic forces, but must also be viewed in the context of general purpose forces as well. There is a vigorous on-going DOD study examining various bomber alternatives, including the B-1, the FB-111 and new high technology (low observable) alternatives. This study will be completed for submission to the Congress in March 1981. Our on-going low observable programs offer great future payoff.

3. NATO Armaments Cooperation. The outcome of alliance war will depend heavily upon the effectiveness of the Allies fighting on our flanks. Improved armament cooperation in NATO offers high leverage -- leverage that will exceed that which can be achieved on any particular program -- by making effective use of resources on an alliance basis and providing the best equipment for both the US and our Allies. Significant economic roadblocks have been overcome to launch such a NATO armament cooperation program. The program took one year to conceive, two years to gain support from our Allies, and is just now making real, not just symbolic, progress. This program will need special nurturing for at least one more year and should be a high priority near-term effort for the transition.

Current programs include the "family of weapons" development programs (to avoid duplication of RDT&E expenses), bi- and multi-lateral weapons system co-production, and agreements to assure interoperability among national units.

4. Technological Lead. The preservation of our lead over the Soviets in important defense-related technologies is

essential to sustain a favorable US-Soviet and East-West military balance, in light of the other advantages (e.g., geography) the Soviets enjoy. We are presently 5 to 10 years ahead in the basic technologies vital to advanced weapons development such as microelectronics, computers and jet engines. To retain this lead, we must continue to strengthen our technology base through significant budget support of fundamental research.

SENSITIVE

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday - November 20, 1980

- 8:00 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.
- 10:00 Mr. Jack Watson and Mr. Frank Moore.
The Oval Office.
- 11:30 Meeting and Lunch with Chancellor
(90 min.) Helmut Schmidt.
- 2:00 Meeting with President-elect Ronald Reagan.
(45 min.)
- 3:25 Photograph with Mr. Herky Harris/Family.
(3 min.)
- 3:30 Depart via Helicopter en route Camp David.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Electrostatic Copy~~ November 20, 1980
for Preservation Purposes

MR. PRESIDENT:

Raymond
CONGRESSMAN KOGOVSEK CALLED
AT 6:15 P.M. BILL CABLE SAYS
HE WANTS TO TALK ABOUT A BILL
DEALING WITH UTE INDIANS AND
RECOMMENDS YOU RETURN THE CALL.
YOU SHOULD CONGRATULATE THE
CONGRESSMAN ON HIS RECENT VICTORY
BUT MAKE NO COMMITMENT ON THE
UTE INDIAN BILL.

PHIL

*Previously
Vetoed -*

10-17-80

Private Luncheon 10/17/80

- SIMON CHILEWICH (Expn)
- EDWARD MARDIAN (Hercules)
- STEPHEN MOSES (Dw)
- JOHN STEPHENS (Min)
- MAURICE SONNENBERG
- WM BORDERS (Pres NSA)
- WALTER FRANK (NYC)
- ROBERT RUBIN (Gold-Sachs)
- DARRELL RUTTENBERG (Invest)
- ANDREW FISHER - NYC
- JEROME CHATZKY - Prop
- JOHN Mc MILLIAN (Energy)

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7.30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENE EIDENBERG *Gene*

RE: Meeting with Governor Hugh Gallen, Thursday,
November 20 at 9:30 a.m.

Purpose:

This meeting is a follow up to the November 2 telephone conversation in which you invited Gallen to visit with you when he was next in the area. Gallen is spending 2½ days in Washington visiting with Secretaries Duncan, Goldschmidt, Landrieu, and Marshall regarding several major issues that need to be resolved before January 20.

They include:

- . The Department of Energy making good on a legislative commitment to build two small scale hydro dams in New Hampshire.
- . DOT implementing its commitment to fund the second year of a Concord-to-Boston commuter rail service demonstration project.
- . HUD finalizing its decisions on discretionary housing programs.
- . DOL resolving an outstanding dispute with the state on unemployment insurance benefits.

Gallen is also in town for political discussions.

Participants

Hugh Gallen
Dayton Duncan, Press Secretary
Peter Goelz, Unofficial chief of staff and former campaign chairman

Press: none

Photo Opportunity:

The White House photographer will be available to take some pictures. Governor Gallen would especially appreciate a photograph with his staff who worked extensively for you during the primary campaign in New Hampshire.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/19/80

Rick Hutcheson --

Shouldn't this have
an ack or response of
some sort?

*no
need*

it's not

Is Personnel handling
same?

*a
resignation*

Thanks -- Susan Clough

flc

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

11/17/80

9

Dear Mr President

Thank you for the opportunity to have served you and our country as Attorney General. I am proud of this administration and especially proud of you as President. I have some idea of the burden and difficulty of deciding issues and determining courses which are right but unpopular or misunderstood. I know you have pursued the best interests of this nation with courage and wisdom. I thank you for four years of peace and progress for our country.

There are a few important projects at Justice which I shall complete over the next several weeks, National Union Standards, Federal Guidelines on the Use of Deadly Force, FBI undercover and operational guidelines & guidelines on the Snygg doctrine. At the same time we shall give our full cooperation to the transition for effective continuity.

By January 15, 1980 I shall submit a summary report to you of the principal achievements of the Department of Justice during your administration.

May God continue to bless you and your family.

Respectfully and Sincerely
Ben Civiletti Attorney General

Phil has
been

Thus

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9:30 am

11/18/80

Mr. President

Gov. Gallen will be
in town thursday and would
like to drop by. Shall I
schedule?

yes no

Phil

*Anything he
wants*
J

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3:20

11/19/80

Mr. President:

Frank would like you
to see Cong. Alexander and
Lyndell Lay tomorrow if you
would.

approve disapprove

Phil

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To: Phil
From: Beth

CONGRESSIONAL SCHEDULING PROPOSAL

MEETING: Photo opportunity with Rep. Bill Alexander (D-1-Arkansas), Rep. Beryl Anthony (D-4-Ark.), and Mr. Lyndell Ley, Finance Chairman of the Carter/Mondale Campaign in Arkansas.

LENGTH: 3 minutes

DATE: Mr. Ley will be in Washington this Wednesday and Thursday, November 19th and 20th.

BACKGROUND: Lyndell Ley supported the President in 1976 and was appointed the Finance Chairman of the campaign in Arkansas for 1980. He also served as the Chairman of the entire Carter/Mondale operation in the state. He raised a lot of money for the campaign and Bill Cable and Jim Free feel it would be a good time to thank both Congressman and Mr. Ley. Both Congressmen were very active and early supporters and it would be a good way to thank them also.

EVENT

DETAILS: Location: Oval Office

Press Coverage: White House Photographer

Participants: The President, Rep. Bill Alexander, Rep. Beryl Anthony, Mr. Lyndell Ley, Frank Moore, Bill Cable and Jim Free.

INITIAL

REQUESTER: Bill Cable/Jim Free *BW*

APPROVED BY FRANK MOORE: _____

DATE OF SUBMISSION: November 17, 1980

cc: Phil Wise

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

J
Called
J

Mr. President:

Asbury Stembridge is in the hospital in Macon. About 1 week ago he had a malignant pea-sized lump removed from his neck. The source of the cancer has not been discovered. WH operators have the number.

Phil

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

off the record

3 pm

11/19/80

Mr. President:

Frank just sent in
this request. If I can
get Nunn down here quickly
shall I schedule?

yes no

Phil

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

CONGRESSIONAL SCHEDULING PROPOSAL

MEETING: White House meeting with Senator Sam Nunn

DATE: Afternoon of November 19

LENGTH: 10 minutes

PURPOSE: To meet with the President on a personal matter.

EVENT DETAILS: Location: Oval Office

Participants: The President, Senator Nunn,
Frank Moore

Press Plan: White House photographer

REQUESTED BY: Frank Moore *F.M./m*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Phil has
seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

MR. PRESIDENT:

State and NSC recommend that you accept the credentials of ten new Ambassadors before January 20. (Bulgaria, Burma, Mauritania, India, Nicaragua, Colombia, Honduras, Botswana, Papua-New Guinea and Peru) Both institutions agree that the Ambassadors should not be delayed until the new Administration.


I suggest two 40-minute sessions during the next two months. May I schedule these?

✓ YES NO



PHIL

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CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
Weekly Report

Vol. 38, No. 46

• Pages 3357-3388

• Nov. 15, 1980

C

The Federal Budget

(3359)

State Legislatures

(3374)

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**Changing
Of the
Guard**

(3362)



Monday, November 17, 1980

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS

| | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Les Francis | Primary: DNC staff General: C/M Field Coordinator |
| Marty Franks | Primary: C/M Issues Director General: " |
| Donna Sagemiller | Primary: C/M Comptroller General: " |
| Linda Peek | Primary: C/M Press Secretary General: " |
| Curt Wiley | Primary: Michigan/Wisc./Maryland General: Michigan Coordinator |
| David Doak | Primary: IN/W.VA./Idaho/Kansas General: Maryland Coordinator |
| Joel McCleary | Primary: New York General: New York Coordinator |
| Jerry Weiss (pronounced W-eye-ss) | Primary: New York, deputy to McCleary General: New York " (former ass't to Cuomo) |
| Terry Straub | Primary: Pennsylvania General: Massachusetts coordinator |
| Bob Beckel | Primary: Texas General: Texas Coordinator |
| Larry Hansen (Stevenson's staff) | Primary: Illinois General: Illinois |
| Cheryl Losser | Primary: Oregon General: Maine Coordinator |
| Bob Thompson | Primary: Washington General: Washington coordinator |
| Mike Casey | Primary: Missouri General: Illinois coordinator |
| Scott Burnett | Primary: Missouri General: Missouri coordinator |
| Trisha Segal Davis | Primary: C/M fundraising coordinator General: C/M FR and Administrative coordination |

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Re 2:00

11/20/80

Mr. President:

Jody thought you would like
to see the attached.

Rick

**Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes**

1020

Remarks Following a Meeting on the Transition With
President-elect Carter. *November 22, 1976*

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Carter and myself have had about an hour's discussion. I reemphasized to Governor Carter that my administration would cooperate 100 percent in making certain that the transition from my administration to his administration would be carried out in the best interests of the American people. That is my obligation and the obligation of those that work with me, because we are all interested in what is best for the United States. It is my judgment that the transition is working smoothly, but we will continue to maximize our efforts to continue that. And it has been a real pleasure and a privilege for Mrs. Ford and myself to have Governor Carter and Mrs. Carter as our guests on this occasion.

PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER. Thank you, Mr. President. There cannot have been a better demonstration of unity and friendship and good will than has been shown to me by President Ford since the election. I believe that this year's debates and the election itself has reached a conclusion which leaves our Nation unified. And I've expressed many times in the last few weeks my deep appreciation to President Ford for the gracious way in which he has welcomed me to meet with his heads of departments to teach me about the future responsibilities which I will assume.

It's very reassuring to me, and I hope to the Nation and to other nations in the world, to realize that the transition period will be handled in a way that's

conducive to unity, to harnessing the tremendous economic and political and human strength of our country. And I believe that the transition will be one which will be conducive to peace in our own Nation and peace around the world.

And I'd like to again express my thanks to President Ford and to Mrs. Ford for being so good to us. My wife and Mrs. Ford had a chance to visit this afternoon. Rosalynn has gone back to Georgia, and I will be staying up here until tomorrow. But I do thank you again, President Ford, for making it possible for me to learn in this way and for being so hospitable to me and my wife.

NOTE: The President spoke at 4:45 p.m. on the South Drive at the White House.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

770000
1020

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/20/80

Rick Hutcheson --

Original for forwarding
to Bolger -- with info
attached for your files....

The President said to
send a bcc only to
Ann Dodson, which has been
done.

Everything else has been
sent to Central Files.

Thanks -- Susa  Clough

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Is ANN DODSON
of Plains, a close personal
friend?

BCC
Ann Dodson

DANIEL E. NATHAN, M.D.

WESTVIEW PROFESSIONAL ASSN.
P.O. Box ~~392~~ 1179
WESTVIEW DOCTORS BUILDING
Fort Valley, Georgia 31030
Telephone: (912) 825-5544

VORIS F. McFALL, M.D., F.A.C.S.

November 14, 1980

Honorable Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. President:

Our friend, Mrs. Ann Dodson, of Plains, suggested that I resubmit this correspondence to you and that you might find time to again urge the issuance of a stamp honoring the Camellia. All the major countries of the world have recently issued new stamps and this year we have imported the yellow Camellia from Mainland China. There are presently several plants growing at the National Arboretum in Washington, D. C.. Dr. William L. Ackerman is over-looking these new imports and is doing a magnificent job in hybridizing Camellias. With these yellow Camellias there should be a color break thru before too long which will be wonderful to see.

Enclosed is a copy of my August 2, 1979 letter and reply from the U. S. Postal Service, as well as a recent letter to The Honorable Jack Brinkley for your information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Daniel E. Nathan, M.D.

DEN:m

Enc: 6

DANIEL E. NATHAN, M.D.

WESTVIEW PROFESSIONAL ASSN.

P.O. Box 352

WESTVIEW DOCTORS BUILDING

Fort Valley, Georgia 31030

Telephone: (912) 825-5544

VORIS F. McFALL, M.D., F.A.C.S.

August 2, 1979

Honorable Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

In 1976 I wrote the Postmaster General and the Chairman of the Citizens Stamp Advisory Committee in an attempt to have a Camellia Commemorative Stamp issued in November of 1978 to honor the first joint meeting of the American Camellia Society and International Camellia Society in this Country and also the first International Camellia Society meeting in this Country. The International Camellia Society is chartered in Glynn Co., Georgia and the American Camellia Society as you well know has it's National Headquarters at Masee Lane-Fort Valley, Georgia. It is the only National Horticulture Society with Headquarters in Georgia. The entire Georgia Delegates of Senators and Representatives entered into the attempt to get the Stamp issued in 1977 in time for this meeting. Enclosed is a copy of some of the correspondence relative to the issuance of the Camellia Commemorative Stamp. Needless to say the joint meeting met in Perry, Georgia November 1978 and was a success without the Commemorative Stamp.

The American Camellia Society Headquarters and Membership in Middle and South Georgia over the years has provided Camellias in season for many of the prestigious affairs at the White House including your Inauguration and the recent White House Dinner for the Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China. Mr. Roy Stringfellow of Shreveport, La. the current President of American Camellia Society, supported by the Chairman and Chairman Emeritus of the American Camellia Society Endowment Fund Mr. G. Stuart Watson and Spencer C. Walton, Jr. both of Albany, Georgia, has designated 1980 as the year of the Camellia. We are also starting a drive to raise \$500,000.00 for the Endowment Fund and your support to obtain the issuance of a Camellia Commemorative Stamp in 1980 would be appreciated. Enclosed is a copy of the form letters we get from the Citizens Stamp Advisory Committee. The last three

DANIEL E. NATHAN. M.D.

WESTVIEW PROFESSIONAL ASSN.
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VORIS F. McFALL. M.D., F.A.C.S.

August 2, 1979
Continued
Page 2

paragraphs are allways the same except for the dates.
Thanking you for your support in this endeavor.
With best wishes and personel regards.

Sincerely,



Daniel E. Nathan, M.D. F.A.A.F.P.
Director of American Camellia Society

ENCL:
DEN/de

Volume Reaches Historic Mark

Annual mail volume reached the 100 billion mark this fall. With preliminary data for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1979 indicating the Postal Service handled 99.9 billion pieces, the current volume—on an annualized basis—is easily at this historic benchmark.

In the past 12 months, mail volume has grown by three billion pieces. Ed McCaffrey, Assistant Postmaster General for Rates and Classification, says that much of the increase in the past year has been in presorted First Class and in the new Carrier Presort for Bulk Third Class.

A decade ago, annual mail volume was 82 billion pieces. At that time, total Postal Service employment was 739,000. Today, 663,000 workers are handling 100 billion pieces per year.

Labels Permitted On Business Reply

Permission to use preprinted adhesive address labels on business reply mail will make this service more convenient for companies wishing to have such mail returned to field offices and salesmen.

Companies wanting business reply mail returned field offices no longer must stock a supply of envelopes and cards for each location.

The Postal Bulletin of Nov. 1 says:

Section 917.52a(5) of the DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL (DMM) is amended to allow business reply cards, envelopes, and cartons to be addressed by means of preprinted adhesive address labels. This will allow permit holders having business reply mail returned to multiple branch offices to standardize the printing and distribution of their BRM pieces.

Amended section 917.52a(5) reads as follows:

The complete address, including ZIP Code, must appear in accordance with 122.1 and 122.2. A margin of at least one inch is required between the left edge and the address. The name of the addressee must always be printed directly on business reply cards, envelopes, and cartons. However, preprinted adhesive address labels may be used for part or all of the remaining items in the address, i.e., attention line; street address; post office box number, city, state, and ZIP Code. A quality adhesive must be used on such address labels to ensure that they will not become detached during postal handling. Permit holders distributing

Commemoratives Scheduled

Special Stamps Often Build Interest In Mailings to Specific Audiences

Commemorative postage stamps and postal stationery items call attention to persons, institutions and cultural activities important in American life.

The series scheduled for release during 1980 is no exception. Commemorative stamps will treat 14 subjects, while another six will be honored by postal stationery items.

Because these commemoratives are often of interest to organizations and companies which can identify with the subject honored, the 1980 stamps and items are listed.

Where there is a relationship, commemoratives can frequently increase interest in the mailing piece among recipients.

Commemorative stamps will be issued on the following subjects:

✓ **W.C. Fields**—A single stamp to be issued January 29.

✓ **Winter Olympics**—A previously-announced block of four stamps to be issued February 1.

Benjamin Banneker—A single stamp in the Black Heritage USA Series will honor the noted mathematician and astronomer who assisted Major Andrew Ellicott in surveying the site for the nation's capital in 1791. The stamp will be issued on a date in February to be announced.

3.1-CENT COIL STAMP

A 3.1-cent Americana Series stamp in coil form was authorized for nonprofit organizations.

The new issue is the first stamp, as opposed to embossed stamped envelopes, identified specifically for use by nonprofit organizations, the Postal Service said. The 3.1-cent denomination reflects the rate for authorized nonprofit organizations effective since July 6.

The design features a standard six-string guitar and follows the musical instrument theme of previous Americana Series bulk rate coil stamps. Previous bulk rate stamp designs in the series featured a drum, a grouping of saxhorns and a grand piano.

business reply mail pieces with preprinted adhesive address labels assume full liability for the postage and fees on all such pieces returned to them without a complete address.

This amendment to the regulations will be incorporated into the next issue of changes to the DMM.

General Bernardo de Galvez—A single stamp to be issued on a date in March to be announced. Galvez, the governor of Spanish Louisiana during the American Revolution, waged a successful campaign against the British from 1779 through 1781 and thus contributed significantly to the struggle for American independence.

American Architecture—A block of four stamps in the American Architecture Series to be issued on a date to be announced.

✓ **Emily Bissell**—A single stamp honoring the woman who introduced Christmas seals into the United States and was a leader in the fight against tuberculosis. The stamp will be issued May 31.

Veterans Administration—A single stamp marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the VA to be issued on a date in June to be announced.

✓ **Northwest Indian Masks**—A block of four stamps to be issued on a date to be announced.

Helen Keller and Anne Sullivan—A single stamp honoring Miss Keller and her famed teacher will be issued on a date in June to be announced.

Dolley Madison—A single stamp to be issued on a date to be announced.

Space Achievement—A set of eight stamps marking U.S. achievements in space will be issued on a date to be announced. The issue may be delayed until 1981 if the Space Shuttle orbital flight does not take place before late 1980.

✓ **Coral Reefs**—A block of four stamps to be issued on a date in August to be announced.

Edith Wharton—A single stamp to be issued on a date in September to be announced.

Christmas—Two single stamps will be issued on a date in October to be announced.

Commemorative postal stationery items will be issued on the following subjects:

Battle of King's Mountain—A 10-cent postal card to be issued on a date in October to be announced.

Landing of Rochambeau—A 10-cent postal card to be issued on a date in July to be announced.

The Golden Hinde—A 14-cent international surface rate postal card featuring Sir Francis Drake's ship will be issued on a date in September to be announced.

Historic Preservation—A 10-cent postal card featuring the Mormon Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah, will be issued on a date in April to be announced.

✓ **Bicycling**—A 15-cent embossed stamped envelope to be issued on a date to be announced.

✓ **Honey Bee**—A 15-cent embossed stamped envelope to be issued on a date to be announced.



ASSISTANT POSTMASTER GENERAL
Government Relations Department
Washington, DC 20260

October 22, 1979

Dr. Daniel E. Nathan
P.O. Box 1179
Westview Doctors Building
Fort Valley, Georgia 31030

Dear Dr. Nathan:

Your letter of September 26 to the President, expressing continued interest in having a stamp issued to honor the Camellia, has been referred to this office for response. Although we inadvertently returned your letter of August 2 to you, a copy was retained and brought to the attention of the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee.

Thousands of requests for new stamps are received annually. Of course, only a limited number can be issued each year. For this reason, the Committee was established to review all suggestions and to make recommendations for future stamps based on national interest, historical perspective, and other criteria. The Committee has found it necessary to work eighteen months to two years in advance of the stamp issuance date and is presently developing the 1981 stamp program.

You may be assured that your proposal has been brought to the attention of the Committee for their review as future stamp programs are developed.

Sincerely,


Edward E. Horgan, Jr.



UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20260

August 20, 1979

Dr. Daniel E. Nathan
P. O. Box 1179
Fort Valley, Georgia 31030

Dear Dr. Nathan:

Your letter of August 2 to the President, expressing interest in having a stamp issued to honor the camellia, has been referred to this office for response.

This proposal remains with the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee but, thus far, has not been adopted. As you are aware, the Committee has completed the 1980 program and is now working on the 1981 and later programs.

We appreciate your interest in the Postal Service's stamp program.

Sincerely,

Glenn A. Metzdorf
General Manager - Administration
Government Relations Department

AMERICAN *Camellia* SOCIETY

POST OFFICE BOX 1217 • FORT VALLEY, GEORGIA 31030
TELEPHONE (912) 987-2388



January 17, 1980

The Honorable Jack Brinkley
2412 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Jack:

I realize that the attached copy of some stamps is not as attractive as they are in full color. However, I did want you to see what the People's Republic of China has done in 1979. They have printed ELEVEN beautiful stamps displaying eleven different varieties of camellias.

We continue to be bugged by the horrible bureaucracy of Bolger and Company. I notice that they are putting out a stamp in 1980 on the honeybee and another one on the almost non-existent in America coral and various others almost as innocuous as these.

I did want to tell you that Dan Nathan and I and all of the members of ACS greatly appreciate what you and all of the other members of the Georgia delegation have done to try to get the camellia stamp printed in this country. We also had support and letters to the Stamp Committee by Senators and Congressmen of several other important states--I particularly note those of Louisiana and California among a list of several.

Ann and I send our best wishes to you. We hope that you will continue the long-time excellent voting record that you have established in Congress. We hope that you and your family will have a prosperous and enjoyable 1980 - The Year of The Camellia.



I have one other thought, Jack, that I would like to mention. Would it be possible or feasible for you to write, with our assistance if you want it, some remarks about 1980 - The Year of The Camellia as extended remarks to be handed over to the Library of Congress for their printing in the Congressional Record. Again, this need not be as innocuous as some of the items that I have read in the Congressional Record in the past 25 years or so.

Sincerely yours,

Milton H. Brown
Executive Secretary

MHB/hb

cc: ✓ Dr. Daniel E. Nathan



V NEW PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION


DANIEL E. NATHAN, M. D., F.A.A.F.P.
V. F. McFALL, M. D., F.A.C.S.

P. O. BOX 1179
FORT VALLEY, GEORGIA 31030


Honorable Jimmy Carter
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D. C.

SPECIAL TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM DR DAN NATHAN

NATHAN
P.O. BOX 1179
FORT VALLEY, GA. 31030



Ms SUSAN CLOUGH
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/20/80

JIM MCINTYRE

The following was returned in the
President's outbox and is forwarded
to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

CC: LLOYD CUTLER
JACK WATSON
SECRETARY MILLER



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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for Preservation Purposes

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr. *James T. McIntyre, Jr.*

SUBJECT: Initial Salary Levels of the Chairman and
Directors of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation

The statute which establishes the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) [P.L. 96-294, June 30, 1980] provides that the levels of compensation of the Chairman and members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation "shall be fixed initially by the President." Following this initial determination, levels of compensation "may be adjusted from time to time upon recommendation by the Board of Directors and concurrence of the President" [Sec. 116(g)].

Because the Board of Directors of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation were thought to be the best source of recommendation on appropriate compensation levels, the decision was made to defer recommending a compensation level until the Board could be convened and their advice obtained.

The Board contracted with Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby to complete a compensation study. On the basis of their analysis, the Board has provided the following recommendations:

- Salary for Chairman fixed at \$175,000 per annum

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- Compensation for Board members fixed at \$10,000 per annum and \$300 per meeting plus expenses

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

This salary figure is in the middle range of compensation for quasi-governmental corporations (COMSAT, CONRAIL, Fannie Mae), and is below the average salary for chief executives of comparable corporations in the private sector.

Secretary Miller, Jack Watson, Lloyd Cutler and I concur in these recommendations.



**United States
Synthetic Fuels Corporation**

1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

November 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN C. SAWHILL
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Compensation Levels for the Chairman, Members
of the Board, and Selected Corporate Officers

At the October 27, 1980, meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, the following actions were taken relative to compensation levels for the Chairman, Board Members, and selected Corporate Officers.

1. Salary of the Chairman

The Board approved a motion recommending that the salary for the Chairman be fixed at \$175,000 per annum. This recommendation is based on a careful review of compensation levels for chief executives in other quasi-governmental corporations as well as for positions of comparable responsibility in the private sector. The recommended salary figure is in the mid-range of compensation levels for other quasi-governmental corporations (e.g. Conrail, Comsat), but somewhat below the average salary of chief executives of comparable size organizations in the private sector. The Board's view is that the \$175,000 figure is the minimum level necessary to provide the Chairman with the needed flexibility to recruit high-level corporate officers from the private sector (e.g. General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer). This view is supported by the preliminary results of a compensation study undertaken by the Board to assist in establishing competitive salary scales for Corporate officers and technical staff.

2. Compensation for Members of the Board

The Board approved a motion recommending that compensation levels for Members of the Board of Directors be fixed at \$10,000 per annum and \$300 per meeting plus expenses. These figures closely parallel prevailing compensation levels for comparable quasi-governmental corporations and private sector entities.

3. Salary of the Vice President - Administration

The Board approved a motion recommending a salary of \$95,000 per annum for the position of Vice President - Administration. Preliminary results of the compensation study undertaken by the Board indicate that competitive salaries for equivalent positions in the private sector range from \$90,000-110,000 per annum.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1980

MEETING WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD H. ("WHITEY") MEYDAG

Wednesday, November 26, 1980

11:55 a.m. (3 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Marty Beaman *MB*

Via: Hugh Carter *AK*

I. PURPOSE.

To afford Lieutenant Colonel Meydag and his family the opportunity to bid farewell to, and have a photograph taken with, the President.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN.

A. Background. Lieutenant Colonel Meydag is being re-assigned to the Naval Air Systems Command in Arlington, Virginia, after serving as Commanding Officer of Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) for the past sixteen months.

B. Participants. Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Meydag
Mrs. Meydag (Alice)
Robert Meydag (son)
Karin Meydag (daughter)
John Meydag (son)

Marty Beaman

C. Press Plan. White House Photographer only.

III. TALKING POINTS.

- o Colonel Meydag, as Commanding Officer of HMX-1 since July 1979, piloted Marine One on 144 Presidential missions throughout the United States and several foreign countries.
- o Colonel Meydag is a native of New York City but maintained Tulsa, Oklahoma as his home prior to entering the Marine Corps in 1960.
- o Colonel Meydag piloted the aircraft that transported the President to view Mount St. Helens and on the fishing trip in Alaska.
- o Colonel Meydag has been replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Johnston.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/20/80

FRANK MOORE

The following was returned in the President's outbox and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO CONGRESSMAN JIM WRIGHT

- Because there will be no Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill, those programs will be funded under a Continuing Resolution. The various MDBs can be adequately funded under a Continuing Resolution but only if the Congress first enacts the "IDA Authorization Bill" (H.R. 6811). That legislation provides not only authorization for IDA VI but also provides for U.S. membership and entry into the African Development Bank.
- The Senate has approved this legislation so only lack of House action now prevents U.S. participation in IDA VI. Lack of Congressional action has already prevented the replenishment from taking effect on October 1, as scheduled, and the "bridge loan agreement" arranged with other donors to minimize disruptions in IDA lending would be undermined by further U.S. delay.
- Deferral of finalization until next summer would jeopardize important IDA lending programs (particularly major energy projects) and could be a disaster from a foreign policy viewpoint.
- Finally, United States membership in the African Development Bank has a relatively modest cost but is important for U.S. bilateral relations with African countries and for our growing strategic and economic stake in the region.

NAME James C. WRIGHT

TITLE Congressman (D/Texas)

CITY/STATE Washington, D.C.

Phone Number--Home () _____

Work () 225-5071

Other () _____

2168
FM *FM*
Requested by Frank Moore
Henry Owen
Date of Request Nov. 19, 1980

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INFORMATION (Continued on back if necessary)

Treasury called to suggest that you now phone Jim Wright to ask that he push very hard to get a favorable vote tomorrow on the IDA VI authorization. The Republicans show some signs of being more supportive -- perhaps as a result of nods from the Reagan team. Treasury will decide later today, on the basis of whip counts, whether to proceed with the bill tomorrow. At this point the Democrats are the main uncertainty, and a phone call from you to Jim Wright would help. (continued)

NOTES: (Date of Call 11-19)

Jim agrees that on a point of order the matter can be handled. Wants to talk to Bill Miller prior to 8:45 pm Thursday. I told Bill-

If the vote doesn't take place tomorrow, it will be put off until the 3rd or 4th of December, as indicated in my recent memorandum to you concerning a proposal that you give a dinner for McNamara and Clausen.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 20, 1980

C
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Frank Moore *F.M.*
SUBJECT: Superfund Bill <

The superfund bill is on the Senate floor now. Senator Byrd, through a parliamentary maneuver, arranged to bring the bill up and avoid the first of two possible filibuster opportunities. The second opportunity is a very real one and there are threats by Senators McClure and Helms to filibuster the bill. They have no stated reasons for doing so.

It would be helpful if you could give us any pertinent information from your calls to Byrd and Baker on the bill.

Presumably, Byrd took the bill up by surprise today in an effort to precipitate negotiations between the various factions in the Senate. There are reports that Senator Stafford had almost reached an agreement with Conservative Republicans and having the bill on the floor could expedite Stafford's negotiations with his colleagues as well as negotiations between supporters of the bill and outside interest groups.

The situation still remains chaotic and confused. We will try to keep you posted on developments.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/20/80

ZBIG BRZEZINSKI

The following was returned in the
President's outbox and is forwarded
to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

CC:STU EIZENSTAT
JIM MCINTYRE
CHARLES SCHULTZE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY OWEN 

SUBJECT: Oil Market Response Measures



Secretaries Muskie and Duncan, in the memorandum at Tab A, seek your approval, in order to avoid a repetition of the 1979 oil price run-up, to initiate negotiations in the International Energy Agency (IEA) to establish agreed figures for national oil-import ceilings that could be imposed if market conditions warrant. We would come back to you to ask your approval before agreeing either to specific figures for a US ceiling or to the imposition of that ceiling.

If you concur in this recommendation, the US delegation to the IEA Governing Board meeting on November 21 will attempt to persuade other countries to start a process of establishing contingent oil-import ceilings which could be activated on short notice if the Iran-Iraq war continues to disrupt world oil supplies. Our representatives will make no commitment to accept a particular import level until you have authorized Secretary Duncan to do this at the December 8-9 IEA Ministerial Meeting. Our delegation at the preparatory session November 21 will talk in terms of sharing the world oil shortfall on the basis of each member's share of oil consumption, which probably will mean a US share of about 47% of the estimated shortfall in 1981.

Secretary Duncan is preparing a separate memorandum for you analyzing the domestic consumption-restraint measures which could be used to reduce US oil imports in the event the IEA adopts oil-import ceilings. This memorandum will be sent to you before you are asked to approve any ceiling commitment.

The information, just received, that Iraq may be resuming pipeline exports (perhaps as much as 700,000 barrels/day) via Turkey will be interpreted by many of the European countries and Japan as lessening the need for ceilings, and this will make it difficult to get agreement to impose ceilings at the IEA Ministerial Meeting December 8-9. Preliminary soundings of the Europeans and Japanese indicate that they will now agree to contingency preparation for invoking import ceilings, but that they will be unwilling to impose ceilings until the evidence requiring this action is unequivocal. They now expect this may be the case early next year.

I recommend that you approve the Muskie-Duncan proposal.

Approve Disapprove



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20585

November 19, 1980

C

**Microstatic Copy Made
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
Edmund S. Muskie

SUBJECT: IEA Measures for Dealing with the Continuing Oil Supply Crisis

Summary

The increasing possibility of a longer Iran-Iraq war and a longer repair period for damaged oil facilities once the war ceases lead to the conclusion that stronger measures by consuming countries will be needed if we are to avoid a sharp increase in oil prices such as occurred during the 1979 Iran crisis. We seek your approval of a two stage strategy, involving a U.S. lead effort to secure informal oil allocations by relatively crude-rich multinational oil companies for those IEA countries most immediately hurt by the supply disruption, and rapid negotiation within the IEA of realistic national oil import ceilings for 1981.

Background

The continuation of hostilities, as well as increasing damage in recent weeks to Iraqi oil facilities, leads to the conclusion that a normal oil market is unlikely for the next several months. Both sides seem capable of several more months of war and while the intensity of the fighting should decline due to the advent of winter, our judgment is that hostilities are unlikely to end soon. At present, we estimate a 3- to 6-month period will be needed to repair facilities before Iraq can begin to export more than 1 million barrels per day (MMB/D) (prewar exports were 3.1 MMB/D). Even with the increased production from other OPEC countries, we expect that the shortage in the first quarter of 1981 will be some 2.5 MMB/D. Cumulative losses to the world oil market are, therefore, expected to reach at least 300 MMB, and could exceed 500 MMB or 750 MMB. This can be compared to the 200 MMB shortfall experienced during the Iran crisis of 1979, which resulted in a doubling of world oil prices. We are indeed fortunate that inventories are substantially higher today, but the potential for price increases is real.

While the United States imported no oil from Iran and very little from Iraq (35,000 B/D from Iraq), IEA countries such as Turkey and Portugal lost 70 percent and 50 percent of their consumption

DECLASSIFY
or on: 1986
(date or event)
 REVIEW

NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure subject to
Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.

~~SECRET~~

Jay 11/27/80

Classified by L. Goldman
(Original Authority)

needs respectively, while Spain, Italy, and Japan also lost large volumes. Allowing for production increases and stock drawdowns, these IEA countries will be left with an aggregate shortage in the range of 500 MB/D, moving into the first quarter of 1981. Several non-IEA countries, such as France, Brazil, and India were also hurt.

Spot market prices began increasing in October as an initial response to the fighting. They have been rising slowly but steadily since then, and are now about 30 percent above pre-war levels though volume has been thin thus far. In the coming months one can expect further and perhaps accelerated increases to levels well above \$40, and perhaps approaching \$50 if a way other than the spot market is not found to meet the shortfall of the most affected countries. As happened in 1979, this could give OPEC Oil Ministers a rationale to increase official prices substantially, and press reports indicate this possibility.

The first IEA response to the crisis was appropriate; on October 1, the IEA members agreed to encourage companies to avoid abnormal spot purchases and to draw stocks in the fourth quarter to meet shortfalls. However, with the worsening situation of the West European and Mediterranean countries and the date for resumption of full production receding, these measures will have to be augmented if we are to avoid the potential of significant price pressures in early 1981.

Approach

As the first step in our preferred strategy, the United States and other principal IEA members would launch a vigorous, informal effort to have multinational companies (predominantly the ARAMCO partners) redistribute supplies to those IEA countries most in need. Initially this means Turkey and Portugal, perhaps to be followed by others as we move into the first quarter of 1981.

Simultaneously, we would push for the negotiation and adoption of realistic national oil import ceilings, to be set for 1981 and reviewed quarterly, by the IEA countries and France. Earlier this year the IEA agreed to adopt such a system for converting national oil import yardsticks into binding ceilings if market conditions warranted. Our objective at the December Ministerial would be to adopt the ceilings for 1981; if this proves too difficult, we would at least aim to have completed the difficult ceiling negotiation and put in place a system for immediate adoption by the IEA Secretariat and/or Ministers of binding ceilings if they believe rising spot prices early next year so require.

The United States is in a strong position to initiate this action. The supply shortfall to us is minimal, while our stocks are at historic levels and our consumption is declining. In the

~~SECRET~~

3

IEA negotiations, we would make it clear that we are prepared to urge our companies, particularly the ARAMCO partners, to redistribute supplies to the five troubled IEA countries, in exchange for assurances that all members were prepared to abide by the ceiling levels once established. We have already contacted the four ARAMCO partners (Texaco, Exxon, Mobil, Socal); they have indicated a willingness to discuss an effort to avoid the formal triggering of the IEA allocation system.

Implementation

If you concur in the proposed action, we will need to move quickly with our IEA partners to begin the yardstick/ceilings negotiations with other consuming nations. The IEA Governing Board meets November 20-21, and IEA Ministers meet December 8-9. The Europeans and Japanese are reviewing options and the time to propose a U.S. initiative is now. High-level EC meetings, at which the Europeans will firm up their positions, are scheduled for November 27 with Energy Ministers, and December 1-2, at the Heads of Government level. Our initial soundings with EC officials indicate that if we are able to assist the most severely affected countries in their short run allocation problems via the ARAMCO partners, then the EC may be forthcoming on the ceiling negotiations.

The character of the U.S. domestic response will be a crucial tool in persuading our partners to follow our lead. A separate memorandum concerning recommended domestic initiatives is being prepared for you.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to seek in the IEA an informal allocation agreement to distribute supplies to those IEA countries most seriously affected and to undertake the process of establishing national oil import ceilings. This approach is also supported by Bill Miller, Charlie Schultze, Stu Eizenstat and Henry Owen.

Approve _____ ✓

Disapprove _____

Date _____

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2:00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : JACK WATSON *Jack*
SUBJECT : Meeting with Governor and Mrs. Reagan
Thursday, November 20
2:00 p.m.
The Oval Office

I. PURPOSE

To greet the President-elect and Mrs. Reagan upon their visit to Washington.

II. BACKGROUND AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background: Your first post-election meeting with President Ford was in the third week of November 1976. At that time, your discussion lasted almost an hour and half.

B. Press Plan: You and Mrs. Carter will greet Governor and Mrs. Reagan at the Diplomatic entrance at 2:00 PM. Open press coverage.

Once inside the building, Mrs. Carter will escort Mrs. Reagan upstairs for a tour and an appointment with Rex Scouten. No press coverage.

Once you and Governor Reagan are in the Oval Office, one or two photographers' pools will come through before your meeting begins.

While you are meeting with Governor Reagan, Al McDonald, Harrison Wellford and I will be meeting in my office (at Ed Meese's request) with Jim Baker, Bill Casey, Mike Deaver and Ed. The subject of our meeting will be the general organization and functioning of the White House staff under your administration. Our meeting will be very informal and will last however long your meeting with the Governor lasts.

III. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

1. Jack Watson tells me that he and Ed Meese have developed an excellent working relationship, and that the transition is going smoothly.
2. We have appointed transition officers for over 55 departments and agencies and have briefing materials being prepared by all departments. Initial meetings have already been held with Reagan transition officials in about one-half of them.
3. The attached memorandum contains some domestic legislative issues you may want to raise briefly with Governor Reagan. You already have Zbig's separate list of some international matters you may also want to mention.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : JACK WATSON *Jack*
AL MCDONALD *Al*
FRANK MOORE *ST*
STU EIZENSTAT *Stu*
JIM MCINTYRE *Jim*

SUBJECT : REAGAN MEETING

We believe you should mention the following legislative items to Governor Reagan in your meeting on Thursday.

I. REQUEST FOR HELP

You should ask for the Governor's help on the EMB in the House, and the Synfuels nominations in the Senate.

A. EMB

Chances for a Democratic coalition are slim. Republicans could join Dingell and other Democrats in passing the conference report if a signal from Reagan were forthcoming. You should ask him to contact John Rhodes, Bud Brown and Congressman Stockman, urging them to help obtain passage of an Energy Mobilization Board. Brown and other Republicans have supported the bill all along. Stockman and many other Republicans helped defeat the conference report primarily for political reasons.

B. Synfuels Corporation Board Nominees

You should ask the Governor for his help in getting confirmation of John Sawhill, an Independent, and at least 3 of the other nominees for the Synfuels Board. This would make a quorum. There are two Republican nominees that might be confirmed, John DeButts and Katherine Cleary. The other nominees are Frank Savage, a respected Black businessman, Lane Kirkland and Cecil Andrus.

II. DISCUSSION OF SUPERFUND

You should discuss the Superfund bill with Reagan without asking him specifically for help. The chances for passage are improving since the Senate Committee reported a compromise. Baker and Dole now appear favorably inclined. You should make the following points:

- A. We need to find an acceptable way to encourage the clean-up of chemical and oil spills in our country. Sixty percent of the spills are in ten of our largest states, seven of which have Republican Governors. It passed the House with strong bi-partisan support.
- B. Passage of a compromise Superfund bill much like the two bills that passed the House is a real possibility. However, the momentum was slowed somewhat by rumors that your advisors had told some of the chemical companies that you would likely support a bill next year to provide full Federal reimbursement for clean-up costs -- a significant additional budget expense.
- C. We do not know whether this is true or what your position is on the Superfund bills. We would encourage you, however, to discuss the matter again with your staff. You may find it in your best interests to obtain passage of the House bills this year.

III. RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE REAGAN REQUESTS

Reagan may request access to your preliminary FY 1982 budget figures. Jim McIntyre and the rest of us believe you should not agree.

Casper Weinberger has not yet contacted Jim McIntyre about the FY 1982 Budget. Jim is prepared to be as forthcoming as possible, but he will not authorize any discussion of your FY 1982 Budget until you make your final decisions in late December. OMB will soon complete a set of fairly detailed current services fact sheets for each major program. These fact sheets, and a general discussion of the budget process, will be given to the Reagan transition team by the end of this month. In addition, Jim plans to make the OMB career staff available to the Reagan team as soon as the budget is done -- we expect by Christmas. (You should be aware that this will be several weeks earlier than the OMB staff was made available to your incoming transition team.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANNE WEXLER *Anne*

SUBJECT: Conversation with President-elect Reagan

Wexler Memo

A subject of continuing concern for the future is the conduct of Presidential elections: the primary system, campaign finance laws, the role of television (should the networks donate time) etc.

One thing you might suggest to the President-elect is that he jointly agree to sponsor a Presidential Commission (names to be jointly agreed upon) announced by you both. The Commission would study the Presidential nomination and election process and make recommendations to future Congresses and the political parties.

This might be something in which you might be interested in participating yourself. Pat Cadell concurs with this suggestion and we'd both like to participate.

23

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1980

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY OWEN *HO*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President-elect Reagan

Bill Miller just phoned to suggest that when you meet with President-elect Reagan you emphasize the need for the incoming Administration to urge the special session of the Congress to pass the IDA-VI authorization. If we miss this opportunity, it is unlikely that the authorization will be voted on until next June. This delay would create a major financial crisis for IDA, whose impact would be felt by the poor people and poor countries all over the world that depend on funding from this soft-loan window of the World Bank. I join Bill in urging you to include this in the short list of items to be raised in your talk with the President-elect.