Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/21/77 [1]; Container 26

To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE
Tuesday - June 21, 1977

7:15    Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

7:45    Mr. Frank Moore - The Oval Office.

8:00    Congressional Leadership Breakfast.
        (60 min.)
        (Mr. Frank Moore) - The State Dining Room.

9:00    Meeting with Senator Robert C. Bryd and
        Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
        (Mr. Frank Moore) - The Oval Office.

9:45    Mr. Jody Powell - The Oval Office.

10:00   Budget Review Meeting. (Mr. Bert Lance).
        (90 min.)
        The Cabinet Room.

12:30   Lunch with Secretary Michael Blumenthal,
        Dr. Arthur F. Burns, Mr. Bert Lance, and
        Mr. Charles Schultze - The Roosevelt Room.

2:15    Vice President Walter F. Mondale,
        (15 min.)
        Admiral Stansfield Turner, and
        Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski - The Oval Office.

2:30    Secretary Harold Brown. (Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski).
        (20 min.)
        The Oval Office.

3:00    Meeting with Administrator Max Cleland,
        (20 min.)
        Mr. Bert Lance, Ms. Susan Woolsey, Mr. Jack
        Watson, and Mr. Stuart Eizenstat - Cabinet Room.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1977

Hugh Carter -

The attached was returned in the President's outbox. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Bob Lipshutz
    Tim Kraft

Re: Helicopter Reduction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>E Y I</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONDALE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSTANZA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIZENSTAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPSHUTZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOORE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWELL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATSON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR STAFFING</th>
<th>FOR INFORMATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X KRAFT</td>
<td>LANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BOURNE</td>
<td>LINDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRZEZINSKI</td>
<td>MITCHELL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BUTLER</td>
<td>POSTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARP</td>
<td>PRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. CARTER</td>
<td>B. RAINWATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CLOUGH</td>
<td>SCHLESINGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FALLOWS</td>
<td>SCHNEIDERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FIRST LADY</td>
<td>SCHULTZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAMMILL</td>
<td>SIEGEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HARDEN</td>
<td>SMITH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HOYT</td>
<td>STRAUSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HUTCHESON</td>
<td>WELLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JAGODA</td>
<td>VOORDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mr. President:

Costanza, Harden and Jordan concur. No comment from Kraft.

Rick
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HUGH CARTER
SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

At the present time, 13 helicopters are assigned in support of the President. Eight are the large VH-3s (that you normally fly in) and five are the smaller six passenger VH-1Ns. We have evaluated the need for this number of helicopters and have determined that the most significant reduction can be accomplished by eliminating the support provided by the five VH-1Ns. This support at present includes 20 people and costs $4,324,000/year in operations, maintenance and salaries. Support of this magnitude is not needed because:

1. The President seldom has need to use these small helicopters (you have not used a VH-1N at all).

2. The non-executive configured model (UH-1) is available from DOD inventory should one be needed periodically. These can carry 11 passengers versus six on the VH-1N. UH-1s are used now as back up and "Secret Service chase" on trips.

A key point is that eliminating the support of one type of helicopter as opposed to cutting back on both types generates the largest savings. For example, cutting the VH-3s from eight to six and the VH-1Ns from five to three would save only $604,000 and 10 people. We, therefore, recommend the elimination of VH-1Ns from Presidential support.

After approval of this recommendation, we will pursue further cutbacks in the number of VH-3s.

Approve [ ]
Disapprove [ ]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: June 15, 1977

FOR ACTION:
The Vice President
Midge Costanza Jack Watson NC
Stu Eizenstat Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan Tim Kraft NC
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Judy Powell

FOR INFORMATION:

Stu Eizenstat Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan Tim Kraft NC
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Judy Powell

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:
TIME: 10:00 AM
DAY: Friday
DATE: June 17, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:
X Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:

I concur.

No comment.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required material, please telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. (Telephone, 7052)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HUGH CARTER
SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

At the present time, 13 helicopters are assigned in support of the President. Eight are the large VH-3s (that you normally fly in) and five are the smaller six passenger VH-1Ns. We have evaluated the need for this number of helicopters and have determined that the most significant reduction can be accomplished by eliminating the support provided by the five VH-1Ns. This support at present includes 20 people and costs $4,324,000/year in operations, maintenance and salaries. Support of this magnitude is not needed because:

1. The President seldom has need to use these small helicopters (you have not used a VH-1N at all).

2. The non-executive configured model (UH-1) is available from DOD inventory should one be needed periodically. These can carry 11 passengers versus six on the VH-1N. UH-1s are used now as back up and "Secret Service chase" on trips.

A key point is that eliminating the support of one type of helicopter as opposed to cutting back on both types generates the largest savings. For example, cutting the VH-3s from eight to six and the VH-1Ns from five to three would save only $604,000 and 10 people. We, therefore, recommend the elimination of VH-1Ns from Presidential support.

After approval of this recommendation, we will pursue further cutbacks in the number of VH-3s.

Approve___________ Disapprove_________
MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

TO: Bill

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY—☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—
Jack Watson’s Office

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL ☐ PHONE NO.
ICO/ZEXT.

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

No comment re—
Helicopter Reduction
Memos.

RECEIVED BY ______ DATE ______ TIME ______

STANDARD FORM 63
REvised August 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
Date: June 15, 1977

FOR ACTION:
The Vice President
Midge Costanza    Jack Watson
Stu Eizenstat    Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan    Tim Kraft
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Jody Powell

FROM:  Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT:  Helicopter Reduction

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:
TIME:  10:00 AM
DAY:  Friday
DATE:  June 17, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:  
\[\times\]  Your comments
Other: 

STAFF RESPONSE:  
\[\times\]  I concur.
\[\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\]  No comment.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required.
Date: June 15, 1977

FOR ACTION:
The Vice President
Midge Costanza  Jack Watson
Stu Eizenstat  Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan  Tim Kraft
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Jody Powell

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:
TIME: 10:00 AM
DAY: Friday
DATE: June 17, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:
X  Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:
X  I concur.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
 Date: June 15, 1977

FOR ACTION:
The Vice President
Midge Costanza  Jack Watson
Stu Eizenstat  Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan  Tim Kraft
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Jody Powell

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:
TIME: 10:00 AM
DAY: Friday
DATE: June 17, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:
X Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:
X I concur.
____ No comment.

Please note other comments below:

R 6/15/77

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
Date: June 15, 1977

FOR ACTION:
The Vice President
Midge Costanza  Jack Watson
Stu Eizenstat  Richard Harden
Hamilton Jordan  Tim Kraft
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Judy Powell

FROM: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: Helicopter Reduction

FOR INFORMATION:

YOUR RESPONSE MUST BE DELIVERED TO THE STAFF SECRETARY BY:
TIME: 10:00 AM
DAY: Friday
DATE: June 17, 1977

ACTION REQUESTED:
X  Your comments
Other:

STAFF RESPONSE:
1  I concur.

Please note other comments below:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a delay in submitting the required
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Admiral Stansfield Turner
SUBJECT : Background for Presidential Activity
MEETING : Lyman Kirkpatrick
DATE : Tuesday 21 June 1977
TIME : 2:00 p.m.
DURATION : 15 minutes
ADDITIONAL ATTENDEES : Dr. Brzezinski
Admiral Turner
INFORMATION : Provided for the President and Dr. Brzezinski

1. Biography - Lyman Kirkpatrick

2. Applicable News Clips/Articles written by Lyman Kirkpatrick

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes
LYMAN BICKFORD KIRKPATRICK, JR.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Mr. Lyman Bickford Kirkpatrick, Jr., was born in Rochester, New York, on 15 July 1916. He is married and has four children. He graduated from Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Massachusetts in 1934; graduated from Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs in 1938.

Prior to World War II he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation, and during the war he served in the Office of Strategic Services and on the staff of General Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as Intelligence Briefing Officer. For his service in World War II he received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as an editor of "World Report" and then came to CIA.

During the period of the establishment of CIA, he worked untiringly to set up and organize various components and activities of the Agency. In 1952 he was tragically struck with poliomyelitis. Demonstrating his powers of courage and resolution, Mr. Kirkpatrick returned to duty in 1953 to assume one of the most critically important positions in the Agency--that of Inspector General. Rising above a lasting physical handicap, he repeatedly made the rounds of Agency establishments both here and overseas.

In the fall of 1960, Mr. Kirkpatrick's services were made available at the national level when he was named Chairman of the Joint Study Group, a panel established by President Eisenhower to examine all aspects of the foreign intelligence efforts of the United States.

With the approval of President Kennedy, Mr. Kirkpatrick was named in early 1962 to a three-man group established to study the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the organization of the United States intelligence community, and the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency to other departments and agencies.

In 1962 he was appointed Executive Director, an office he held until his retirement in 1965.
Professor Kirkpatrick received many awards during his intelligence career, including the President's award for Distinguished Civilian Service, the highest award that can be given a civilian in the United States Government.

Since 1965 he has been Professor of Political Science at Brown University. He has served as visiting lecturer in government and international affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as well as other U.S. war colleges. He has written a total of seven books, three in the field of intelligence.
Witness from the Inside

The Real CIA, by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (Macmillan, 312 pp., $6.95), is a defense of the Central Intelligence Agency by its former executive director, who served in U.S. intelligence for more than twenty-two years. Harry Howe Ransom is professor of political science at Vanderbilt University.

The most ambiguous organization of American government is the Central Intelligence Agency. Ever since its creation by Congress in 1947 this supposedly secret agency has been in and out of the headlines, causing suspicion, doubt, and confusion in the public mind. To some CIA activities resemble a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta incorporating Parkinson's Law. Others view the CIA as a sinister "invisible government" recklessly pursuing its "own" foreign policy. And there are those who see an organization operating with cool James Bond invincibility, always defending the national interest and saving the day.

Befuddled observers have long wanted to ask, "Will the real CIA please stand up?" Few are qualified to make a positive identification. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., is qualified; indeed, his knowledge should surpass that of any person yet to publish on the subject. Kirkpatrick served in CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, during World War II and was on hand at CIA's birth. He was executive assistant to General Walter Bedell Smith, CIA's director in its most important formative years.

And Kirkpatrick rose through the agency's hierarchy, undaunted by a crippling polio attack in 1992, to become inspector general for eight years. As executive director he was No. 3 man in the agency's high command until he resigned in 1965 to teach political science at Brown University.

In The Real CIA Kirkpatrick traces the evolution of the U.S. intelligence system, as well as the progress of his own career. Only in America could someone with his privileged security knowledge publish such a book. Kirkpatrick's purpose is to set straight the factual record, or at least that part of it proper to disclose. He is convinced that most public information about the CIA has been inaccurate or misleading. Although not uncritical of it, he defends the CIA from its many detractors and argues against those who would alter radically the central intelligence concept or change the assignment of disparate functions to the CIA.

Most of the information Kirkpatrick provides here was already in the public record. The book's greatest value is its validation of certain facts about the CIA's rather obscure organizational history. From this insider's story much is learned about bureaucratic infighting and departmental jealousies. We are told, for example, how the CIA director, considered by some to be one of the two or three most powerful men in government, suffered for years because his "protocol rank" in Washington, D.C., was thirty-fourth. This, writes Kirkpatrick, "could actually affect the willingness of people to listen to him in important meetings." Although the director's rank has recently been elevated, the author tells us, vaguely, that there are still "those who try to reduce the role of the director of Central Intelligence...."

Kirkpatrick's opinions and observations deserve serious consideration because they derive from a thoughtful mind and unique experience. Nevertheless they are important and perhaps crucial questions on which he offers little enlightenment. How did an agency set up by Congress in 1947 to perform intelligence (information) activities come to undertake secret political operations? Did Congress ever intend the CIA to overthrow foreign governments or secretly subsidize American domestic institutions? Here the book falls short of the promise of its title. In his brief discussion of covert political action Kirkpatrick makes clear that he thinks it wise to combine "action" and "intelligence" under the CIA roof. He believes, however, that covert political action should be used "only in the most serious national emergency, and as a last resort before the use of military power."

One can quickly agree with Kirkpatrick that "a strong intelligence organization is an essential element of our national security, provided that it is effective, objective and properly controlled." Less quickly would this reviewer agree that these provisos have been met, or that we have the information to so assume. It has been easier to create committees for control than to effectuate real control of secret operations. The U.S.S. Pueblo incident may be an example of continuing deficiencies in this regard. And with respect to effectiveness, the Southeast Asian crisis may be a tragic example of another colossal American intelligence failure.
Debunking the Scare Myths

The CIA: A Wise Appraisal

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. Hill and Wang, 212 pp., $7.95

By JOSEPH C. GOULDEN

The Allende government crashes, and the fingers of blame reflexively point toward Langley, Va., the pleasant residential suburb five miles north of my desk that is the home of the CIA.

Downtown, other "CIA" hobgoblins are viewed-with-alarm: the pensioned spymaster Hunt using in retirement, against the infidel Ellsberg, the techniques (and Cubans) he once marshaled against heathens elsewhere; ITT scheming to brand CIA a million bucks to bust a Chilean election; stirrings of inscrutable interest even among Congressmen, guys normally as moribund as the stone dinosaurs outside the Smithsonian. The September issue of "Progressive"—edited by men who should and do, know better—features a black-and-white scare cover:

THE CIA'S DIRTY TRICKS UNDER FIRE AT LAST.

As the lynch mob forms, rigorous citizens might pause to read a serious book on the CIA, one which well might send them chasing elsewhere—that is, to the White House and the National Security Council.

- - -

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK JR. is not unbiased. He joined the CIA at its formation in 1947, and although stricken by paralytic polio five years later, served as inspector general and executive director-comptroller until retiring in 1983. But Kirkpatrick has written an eminently objective book, and an eminently sensible one. And he dispassionately debunks some of the more pervasive myths about "The U.S. Intelligence Community."

- - -

Despite such aberrations as the peculiar E. Howard Hunt, the CIA is staffed and run by bureaucrats, men who follow orders and avoid risks on their own initiative.

- - -

"The secret government" does not exist. CIA's orders come from the White House. The men in Langley, and in the field, execute national policy, not make it.

- - -

Congress is blind to CIA by its own choice. The machinery for overview exists.

KIRKPATRICK DOES assert that CIA's furtiveness, although often necessary for logical security, is overdone: that "occasional official release of nonsensitive information...would help to alleviate the (public) fear of the secret and powerful system."

Indeed it could, and Hunt and ITT are prominent cases in point. When Hunt waved a White House badge at CIA in the Ellsberg case, it aided him briefly—then booted him off the premises. CIA listened to ITT (a primary function of intelligence is to do just that), then politely said no thanks.

Further, the public furor over the ITT offer made it operationally impossible for CIA to toss out Allende even had the White House told it to do so; because of the political sensitivity of Chile, the Santiago station was cut to skeleton size months before the coup. Romanticism and James Bond notwithstanding, seven men can't overthrow a government.

A wise book. Read it before you are overwhelmed by the scare headlines.

Joseph C. Goulden, a Washington writer, is now working on books on the federal judiciary and on America between VI-Day and Korea.
In the country of the blind

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Captains Without Eyes

Intelligence Failures in World War II.

303pp. Hart-Davis. £2.25.

The jacket is brightly coloured and sinister, with a representation of a snakes-and-ladders board, the snakes' heads labelled with the names of five battles. In the blue the publishers announce that "this controversial and unprece­dented book by the former Executive Director of the C.I.A. reveals the alarming truth behind the most critical intelligence failures of World War II... and the mistakes on both sides that changed the course of history". In actual fact, however, it is far from being either revelatory or startling, and it is all the better for that. Mr. Kirkpatrick before rising to his senior position in the postwar C.I.A. served as a junior intelligence officer on the headquar­ters of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group, so that he has personal experience of intelligence in the field. His approach to the subject is accordingly practical and down to earth; he un­derstands both the nature of military information and the way in which it is put to use. To illustrate his theme he has chosen five subjects—the German invasion of Russia, Pearl Harbor, Dieppe, Arnhem, and the Ardennes (or Battle of the Bulge)—with the purpose of demonstrating that in each instance there was a vital intelligence failure on one or both sides, in some cases, on both sides. The word "vital" plainly goes too far; but at least Mr. Kirkpatrick sets out with great clarity the intelligence appreciation which both sides made, and the reader can form his own opinion.

It is impossible to argue, and Mr. Kirkpatrick makes little attempt to do so, that Hitler would have re­frained from attacking Russia if he had had better intelligence. Admit­tedly he told the Ciano in August, 1941, that he might not have attacked if he had many tanks to the Russians had, but Mr. Kirkpatrick rightly regards this as a lie; in any case the German general staff had a pretty good idea of their numbers and suspected that the latest models were superior to their own. The fact is that Hitler, and most of his generals, thought little of their intel­ligence service, a tendency not un­known in other armies, but carried to extremes by the Germans. They had not bothered about it in the past—it was anyway very bad—unbroken run of success (except for the Battle of Britain, which was a Luftwaffe failure); they were not going to be deterred now from the advance eastwards which was the pinnacle of their strategy. The Russian failure to form a correct appreciation was more serious, but it was not an intelligence failure. They had had the most excellent informa­tion of the coming attack, including even the date, but they were still taken by surprise. The failure was at the top—like Hitler but with less justification, refused to believe either what his own people told him or the serious, accurate, and detailed warning he received from Churchill.

The Germans failed to conquer Russia, and the Russians failed to stem the first onslaught, but in both cases the responsibility lay with the supreme commanders and not with their intelligence services. Hitler, on the other hand, appears at first sight to give better support to Mr. Kirk¬patrick's thesis. His treatment of it is comprehensive and lucid, with many verbatim extracts from the proceed­ings of the congressional Committee of Investigation. Although he re­marks that the United States govern­ment "had not considered a modern intelligence service essential in peace time", he rightly emphasizes one of the vast triumphs of that service, the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic cipher. By the use of this, and other wireless intelligence, it was possible to deduce the imminence of a decisive blow, but not its direction. Mr. Kirkpatrick points out with justice that when an intelligence service possesses so admirable a source as the ability to read the enemy's cipher messages it tends to regard this as the only thing that counts. Churchill at times fell into the same error: the danger arises from the fact that the circle of those in the know is heavily restricted, and that the top people, Roosevelt and Churchill, are provided with the straight deciphered and left to make their own conclusions. Still, although this supremely important source gave no hint of precise Japanese intentions, the United States services gave enough warnings to the commanders at Pearl Harbor as should have enabled them to take more precautions than they did. The failure appears to have been neither with intelligence, nor at the top, but at the lower operational level. One lucky aerial reconnaissance flight in a northwesterly direction would have been enough to provide the necessary warning.

Dieppe comes in rather strangely. British intelligence was both exten­sive and accurate. The most that Mr. Kirkpatrick can say is that the admirable air photograph, with which the British commanders and troops were supplied did not reveal caves in the flanking headlands which contained machine-gun positions. It is not clear that, even if they had, there would have been much change in the operational plans, let alone that the raid would have been called off. The Germans certainly had no advance warning. Stories of breaches of security on the part of Canadian troops beforehand are shown to be baseless. In fact intelligence played hardly any role, either way, in the development of the operation. The most valuable part of this chapter is the assessment of the results of the Dieppe raid which were so favourable to the Allies as almost to justify the tragically high casualties. Not only were the Germans deceived about Allied intentions but they also made erroneous deductions about likely Allied tactics and the country of the going to; they the Allies learnt lessons which proved of vital importance to Overlord. All this is brought out in Mr. Kirkpatrick's most effective manner.

No account of the airborne operation at Arnhem can fail to bring out that it was the most daring element in an extraordinarily difficult strategy: the launching into enemy territory of three divisions of paratroopers to seize six successive bridges. Unless it is to be accepted that every such enterprise must succeed save for some positive reason, it hardly seems necessary to bring in an intelligence failure. "La guerre est une chose aléatoire", said Foch. Nevertheless, two intelligence errors can be pointed out: the best dropping-zone, near the Rhine bridge, was ruted out on grounds subsequently found to be false, and the strength of the two S.S. Panzer divisions to the area was underesti­mated. Mr. Kirkpatrick considers that, if the facts had been correctly known, the 1st Airborne Division would not have been dropped at Arnhem "or at least not in the area where it did land". In the former case the division would have been spared very heavy casualties, but was an object of the whole operation, to secure a crossing of the Rhine, would have been frustrated. In the second case they might still not have succeeded in their audacious attempt even although their intelligence was perfect.
Field-Marshal Rundstedt protested to the end of his days against calling the German attack in the Ardennes in December, 1944, "the Rundstedt offensive". He was right, and his protest is relevant to Mr. Kirkpatrick's analysis of this, the fifth of his selected battles. For the whole conception was Hitler's alone, and his generals, including all those with high commands in it, were strongly opposed to it. The precise point of attack was Hitler's choice, a choice made, as Mr. Kirkpatrick points out, on September 16 and not dictated, therefore, by the fact that three months later this sector happened to be rather lightly held. The eventual attack came as a complete surprise to the Allies and here Mr. Kirkpatrick most eminently has a case for speaking of an intelligence failure. He clearly regards it as his pièce de résistance, since advance information was not merely inadequate, as with the other battles, but totally lacking. Nevertheless, two points are worth serious consideration: were there any extenuating circumstances and, most important, was the failure, in his words, vital?

The reason why the Allied intelligence authorities did not believe in the likelihood of a German large-scale offensive was that they thought the effect of the attrition of German manpower had been too severe. So it had, and their judgment was corroborated, though they naturally did not know this, by all the senior German commanders (as Mr. Kirkpatrick says, "the close parallel in the views of American intelligence and those of the German commands are noteworthy"). They were prevented from obtaining any positive information about the offensive by the severest negative measures of security ever adopted by the Germans. Intelligence officers are not superhumans: the only way in which they could have had advance warning would have been by reading Hitler's mind. As for the second point, obviously the failure was so far from being vital that the main result of the offensive was to hasten the German collapse. This is the vindication of Allied intelligence. As Sir Kenneth Stroag, then Eisenhower's chief intelligence officer, put it in his book, Intelligence at the Top, our appreciation was that if the Germans did attempt a counter-offensive they might gain a temporary success but would not be strong enough to defeat us. In this view he was right, and so was Rundstedt; it was Hitler who suffered a vital failure.

Whatever the final view on Mr. Kirkpatrick's general thesis, there is much value in his book. It is normally very accurate about facts, except for a few slips over dates and German orthography, and it gives a sensible picture of how intelligence works. He is rather inclined no
A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who—back when they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very, tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, Va., a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There will be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 from the same class as his brother, John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Marchetti

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national-intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where I was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did at the CIA was to explain to Director...
THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad; for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most-cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret. The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big

This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles pointed at North America to threats to U.S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U.S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U.S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U.S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-
THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply
[continued from preceding page]

control, attempted to reduce personnel and expenditures, and done everything possible to eliminate waste and duplication.

Those that have been active and concerned in this process have included the Presidents, the committees of the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, as well as the individual departments and agencies.

To single out one source of intelligence collection or say that competing agencies build similar systems begs the question. In this instance, competition—if it exists—may produce something that does the job for which we can all be thankful.

Contemplate the possibility of success of the strategic-arms-limitation talks if our negotiators did not have adequate information about Russian arms systems—information which the Soviets go to great lengths to conceal. One must envy the Russians in this regard, as there is little we can conceal about our weapons systems—planned or in being.

“Overwhelming Military Influence”

The allegation is made that an overwhelming military influence has developed in the U.S. intelligence system. To substantiate this, a budget figure is cited and the claim is made that because of this the military influence estimates to support their objectives, and the other intelligence agencies acquire. I heard this identical allegation made while sitting in the office of Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then the Director of Central Intelligence, in 1950.

The statement is also made that intelligence should be the tool of neither the military nor the White House. Amen! We agree. Intelligence—that is, the agencies and personnel in the systems—should be and is the servant of the nation.

The situation as I see it is this: The intelligence system is headed by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms—a career civilian since the end of World War II. He is specifically designated as the personal representative of the President and as such is the chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board, which both guides the intelligence system and is the final body for the consideration and co-ordination of national intelligence estimates. It should be especially noted that national intelligence estimates are specifically those of the Director of Intelligence, a civilian, and those who do not agree with him must take a footnote identifying themselves and their position.

The other agencies which participate in the USIB are the State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Atomic Energy Commission and the three military intelligence services—Army, Navy and Air.

It is true that five of the agencies are military and four civilian. But it is also a fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency reports through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, a civilian, and that, according to reports, Mr. Laird plans to place an Assistant Secretary of Defense over all the military intelligence agencies.

Having studied the system since its creation, I would suggest that the system is very firmly under the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, in whom President Nixon has indicated complete confidence, that there is about the proper balance between military and civilian; that the military do not dispute civilian control, and that if there are arguments over how many Russian missiles or Viet Cong are in a given place, it is because that most elusive of all intelligence ingredients—precise facts—are hard to come by.

The Pentagon Papers which have been published eloquently support my point that the CIA national intelligence estimates are quite independent of “overwhelming military influence.”

Domestic Activities

One of the current American traumas has a federal investigator behind every bush. The social revolution through which we are passing adds to the myth, as every activist group believes itself to be the subject of intense surveillance. The fact is that, unless the group has as its objective the destruction of our National Government, it is the recipient of benign neglect by the intelligence and security agencies. Their attention is elsewhere.

Thus, the charge that CIA and the intelligence system “might” be turning their attention to “the enemy within” strikes a responsive note, and when this is defined as dissident student groups, a most sensitive chord has been struck.

Add to this a clandestine recruitment on a university campus, and you have the stage set.

Who does have the responsibility for intelligence work in the United States?

In the first instance, this rests with local and State governments. Only if federal laws are violated, federal property or personnel affected do Washington agencies become concerned, and the principal one is the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI investigates cases of alleged subversion and espionage—and also violations of civil rights. Its authority and jurisdiction is unassailable and unassailable by other federal agencies.

The military intelligence-and-security services are responsible for the protection of their installations and personnel, both in the United States and overseas. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina, has addressed the issue as to whether the military services have overstepped those bounds.

The Central Intelligence Agency has no internal-security, police or subpoena powers. It investigates its own applicants and persons with whom it must deal, but its attention is directed outside the United States. There are no professors secretly on the CIA’s payroll, although some have assisted the Agency in spotting individuals who might qualify for intelligence work abroad.

As far as depots of “untraceable arms,” airlines and other installations are concerned, one wonders how the CIA could accomplish the tasks required of it in Southeast Asia without such facilities. Or perhaps it is being suggested that the Communists should be allowed to ignore the 1962 Geneva Accord and take over Laos without a struggle.

A “Clandestine Attitude” and “Cold-War Mentality”

One of the most frequently repeated allegations by Moscow is that the United States Government through the CIA perpetuates the cold war. This must be placed in the context of 105 Russians being expelled from Great Britain for subversive activities including planned sabotage. Here we have the criticism that the CIA has a penchant for paramilitary activities, a “talent” for clandestine operations, and by implication, appears to spend much time trying to decide where next to engage in these dark acts. He claims that he is convinced that the CIA was involved in the overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam and of Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Let’s start with the last allegation first:

The events surrounding the overthrow of President Ngo
Dinh Diem of South Vietnam now are quite well known. At the time, the CIA kept the United States Government well informed of the plotting by the South Vietnamese military against Diem.

The CIA did not participate in, nor encourage the plotting and was operating under the direct and detailed control of the State Department and White House. When the plotters became aware of the cooling of American support for Diem, they moved.

As far as Prince Norodom Sihanouk is concerned, to the best of my knowledge the United States had no role in his overthrow.

The critical comments about a "clandestine attitude" and "cold-war mentality" impress me as being in the same vein as the comments of those who oppose military forces because if they exist they will be used. The modern history of Sweden and Switzerland refutes the latter contention.

I note he uses the word "talent" in describing the capability for clandestine operations. This talent is a necessity as long as information essential for our security cannot be obtained openly.

It was with great satisfaction that I read of Secretary of State Rogers's concern that the massive subversive activities of the Russians could affect discussions on European security. Perhaps then, and only then, can there be an agreement to reduce arms and limit clandestine activity. I, for one, am convinced that any lessening of our vigilance before reaching a meaningful and enforceable agreement with the Russians could lead to national catastrophe. Until then, like it or not, there is a cold war!

"Amorality"

The attack by vague generality and innuendo is as old as the war of words. This assault follows that technique. "If you murder—— and "one of the things the CIA clandestine people can do is start up wars" are two quotes. Another statement that is closer to the truth is: "I don't have very much to go on."

Any person who has ever had the privilege of serving with the Central Intelligence Agency will be deeply offended by the charge of amorality.

In the first place, a student of intelligence organizations would be quick to point out that if you cannot trust the people in it, you are doomed to failure. The Russians are now experiencing that in London. The damage that one can do who betrays his trust is incalculable.

The point is that the most important principle that must be used in building an intelligence organization is that its personnel must be of unimpeachable integrity. They are not recruited because they are immoral adventurers, as is implied. They are hired only if they have high intellectual achievement and are of good character.

These are the standards the CIA has followed for nearly a quarter of a century. Happily, it has been correct in its selection of personnel in most instances.

The CIA has not and does not engage in murder. It is not only practically impossible to conceal but it is unnecessary.

The Green Beret case most emphatically demonstrates this. The CIA does not "start wars." Its mission is to stop wars—not start them. That is not to say that it will not assist those who want to defeat Communist insurgency. That is its mission—and, incidentally, is also one of the reasons why the CIA is one of the Russians' favorite targets. It is one of the most effective opponents of Communism.

If one wishes further assurance on these points, examine the controls over the CIA and the intelligence system.

The Controls on CIA

One of the very frequent criticisms of the CIA is that there are not controls over it. This man wants more congressional control and more presidential control. Let's examine the facts.

In the Congress there are four subcommittees that have full authority to review all of the activities of the CIA and the other intelligence agencies. In both the Senate and the House, there are subcommittees of both Appropriations and Armed Services. In the Senate, members of the Foreign Relations Committee are invited to joint briefings of the other subcommittees.

As the executive director-comptroller of the Agency, it was one of my responsibilities to assist the Director in the presentation of the CIA budget to the Appropriations subcommittees. Over the years, I worked closely with the legislative-liaison staff of the CIA. My first appearance before the congressional committee for the CIA was in 1951. My last was in 1965. It is with this background that I speak.

Not only does the CIA fully reveal its budget to the Appropriations subcommittees, it goes into whatever detail the members desire. The CIA has never refused to answer a question forthrightly and frankly from a member of these committees. In fact, the CIA has taken the initiative in insuring that the subcommittees were kept fully informed of its activities.

The President of the United States has four major means for controlling the CIA in the intelligence system: (1) His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger today—has a large staff which works continuously with the CIA and the other intelligence agencies; (2) the Office of Management and Budget critically examines every detail of the CIA and the other budgets; (3) the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of distinguished private citizens, many with extensive Government experience, is charged with a continual review of all intelligence activities of the Government; (4) the Departments of State, Defense and Justice have extensive relations with the CIA at every level and would be quick to report any ill-advised activity or operation. I am tempted to add to this: (5) an all-pervasive press in a society that has few if any secrets.

I will add that within the CIA there is a system of checks and reviews that gives the Director a very tight control over the Agency. These include an inspector general and audit staff and a continual review of all activities.

Beyond all this, however, there is one additional top-level committee before which every covert-action program must go to be judged, before it begins and periodically while it is enduring. This committee sits at the White House and is chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

I submit that there is no federal agency of our Government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and "control" than the CIA.

What Should Be Done?

Obviously I do not believe in this critic—either in the method of attack or in the substance of the comments. He should know that if his views have merit he has several avenues of appeal: to the congressional committees, to the President's board, to the Bureau of the Budget. He has chosen to fight it out in public, yet he should realize that there are few responsible newsmen who believe that such issues can be examined in detail in public without being more destructive than constructive.
Soviet Espionage

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

Introduction

Since the days of Peter the Great (1682-1725), espionage has been a major—if not the predominant—element in the conduct of Russian foreign relations. Whether directed by Tsar or Commissar, Russian missions to other nations have been concerned primarily with intelligence operations. Such missions have always had two main purposes: first, to keep track of all Russian citizens in the area in order to insure that there was no plotting against the regime (for the Russians have never trusted their own); and second, to watch what other nations were doing. Today, Russia has the largest intelligence apparatus in the history of mankind, with the greatest number of agents, actual and potential, ever recruited for espionage.

When the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government in 1917, they already possessed the highest professional qualifications in one area: clandestine operations. Seldom before had leaders attempting to gain control over a nation had so much practical experience in the craft of intelligence. All had been members of secret organizations. Many had been terrorists. Some had published underground newspapers. Several had developed espionage networks within the Tsarist government, even penetrating the Okhrana, the political police charged with the suppression of revolutionary activities. A few of the Bolsheviks had been double agents, working for both the Okhrana and the Communist revolution, and informing each of the other's activities. There were also those skilled in agitation and propaganda, in mob control, and in guerrilla warfare.

But since they did not have an adequate number of their own "trusted" cadres for the new Communist intelligence service, the Bolsheviks initially retained many from the Tsar's service, an organization that had a long history in both internal security and espionage.

Tsarist Intelligence. The origins of Russian intelligence and security operations predate the era of Peter the Great. Tsar Alexis (1645-76) established the Tainyi Prikaz—his so-called "private administration"—in 1656. It became one of the most powerful organizations in Moscow, with espionage as an important aspect of its work, and with agents reporting directly on the activities of Russians abroad. This unit was abolished after the death of Alexis; but Peter recreated a private chancery in 1704, which in 1718 became the Secret Chancery (Kantseliariia Tainykh Rozvysknykh Del) charged with external espionage and internal security. In 1726, the Secret Chancery was merged with the Preobrazhensky Prikaz.
(the security police), and thus became in many respects a precise predecessor to the Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti, the State Security Committee of the 1970s.

The interests and whims of successive Tsars led to the repeated abolition and recreation of this kind of organization over the next two centuries. Catherine the Great (1762-1796), who felt threatened by the French and American revolutions, set up the so-called Secret Expedition (or secret office of the Senate).

Her successor, Paul (1796-1801), supplemented the Secret Expedition with a Yellow Box into which anyone could drop a complaint about anyone or anything—the anonymous denunciation system of repressive societies. In 1801, Alexander I abolished the Secret Expedition. But four years later, he appointed a Special Committee of Higher Police to watch the activities of foreigners in Russia; and in 1807, he named a Special Committee for the Dispatch of Crimes Threatening the State. Diplomatic espionage, political investigation, and surveillance of “correspondence with the enemy” were among the responsibilities of these organizations. Nicholas I (1825-1855) created the Third Section of His Majesty’s Private Imperial Chancery in 1826, an organization which in essence remained in existence until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. It was said that there was no aspect of Russian life that could escape its control.

In 1881, the Okhrannoye Otdyelyeniye or Department of Safety came into being. Known at home and abroad as the Okhrana, it was one of the first modern security intelligence services, dedicated to waging war on all revolutionaries, and to collecting information on all potential enemies of the Russian state, foreign and domestic. Its headquarters abroad were in the Russian Consulate on Rue Grenelle in Paris, which directed operations in Europe, the Near East, and North America. The trademark of the Okhrana was “provocation.” No incitement was beyond limits in its effort to discover and trap the enemies of the Tsar. Its successes were considerable. It penetrated most revolutionary organizations: three Bolshevik delegates to the Sixth Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in Prague in 1912 were Okhrana agents. It also established effective espionage networks outside Russia. Then came the revolution.

**Communist Takeover.** On December 20, 1917, the Bolsheviks created the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage, known as the Cheka. (The word Cheka is an abbreviation of the Russian words for “Extraordinary Commission.”) In an incredibly short time, the Cheka built up an organization of thirty thousand agents to discover and destroy the enemies of the revolution. Men like A. T. Vassilyev, the last chief of police under Tsar Nicholas II, were offered considerable money to work for the Bolsheviks. Members of the Okhrana’s Foreign Department in Paris were urged to become Chekists. By February 6, 1922, when the name of the organization was changed to GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie), the mere mention of its name struck terror into the hearts of the Russians. In the short space of just over four years, it had developed such a reputation that today—a half century and three name changes later—the word Chekist is often still used to describe an employee of the security and intelligence services.

The task facing the Cheka in the first days after the Bolshevik Revolution was formidable. Lenin was aware that the power he had seized was in danger of slipping out of his hands. Both he and Trotsky were acutely conscious of the fact that it had been the
collapse of the Tsarist Army and Police that had made the seizure of power possible. While Lenin devoted himself to building a government and Trotsky concentrated on the organization of the Red Army, another man of extraordinary ability, Felix Dzerzhinsky, was named to head the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage. The first Chekist did his job so well that his name is enshrined on the location of the present headquarters of the Soviet security-intelligence organization, at Two Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow.

The first order of business was to end the war with Germany before Russia disintegrated completely. The Germans, having driven the Tsar's armies out of Poland, had declared it an independent state on November 5, 1917. Two days later, the new Russian government appealed to all belligerents for immediate peace negotiations. But even before the Germans could be persuaded to talk, the Ukrainians proclaimed a People's Republic on November 20; and on November 28, a local diet proclaimed the independence of Estonia. On the same day, the Germans agreed to talk with the Bolsheviks. Discussions began at Brest-Litovsk on December 3, and an armistice went into effect on December 5. The next day, Finland declared its independence. The Russian empire had now lost Poland, the Ukraine, Estonia, and Finland.

Negotiations between Germany and Russia broke down on December 28, when the Germans demanded that the Russians permanently give up Poland and its other western territories. A Moldavian Republic (Bessarabia) had been proclaimed five days before. When discussions were resumed on January 4, 1918, the German terms were much tougher. Trotsky, the chief Russian delegate, tried to win elections in areas seeking to secede from Russia, but was unsuccessful. Latvia declared its independence on January 12. The Central Powers recognized the independence of the Ukraine on February 1, and concluded a separate peace with that republic a week later.

On February 10, Trotsky unilaterally declared that the war had ended. The Germans resumed their offensive on February 18, capturing Dvinsk that day and sweeping forward on a broad front. At Lenin's insistence, Trotsky returned to the talks with the Germans. On March 3, he signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which Russia gave up Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, Finland, and the Transcaucasus.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did not slow the German advance into the Ukraine, where a revolt of the Don Cossacks against the Bolsheviks had started on December 1917. Odessa was captured March 13, Kharkov on April 8, and Sevastopol on May 1. The Ukraine was to be a battleground for nearly three years: conquered by the Germans who wanted its grain; fiercely contested during the Russian Civil War by the Whites and the Reds; and invaded by the Poles. It was not until December 1920 that Moscow finally made a treaty with the Ukraine Soviet government, and another two years before the Ukraine joined the Russian Republic, White Russia, and the Transcaucasus in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Even before the Armistice of November 11, 1918, brought an end to World War I, the Bolsheviks found themselves engaged in combat with Russia's former allies, with the Germans, and also with the Turks, who had advanced into Armenia. The British and French, later joined by the Americans, landed forces in the north primarily to hold German forces in the east and to prevent supplies from falling...
into enemy hands. Japanese forces landed on Russian territory in the Far East and supported a revolt of some hundred thousand Czech soldiers who had been captured by the Russians and were en route back to Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian railway.

The Cheka. It was during this period of violence that a security and intelligence service was first developed by the Communists. Within a matter of weeks, it became an autonomous and all-powerful organ for the maintenance of Bolshevik power. Any pretense of normal procedure was quickly abandoned. By February 1918, summary executions were standard practice. In August of that year, Lenin ordered merciless mass terror. A year later, in October 1919, Cheka executions were cloaked with a measure of administrative authority when a three-man Special Revolutionary Tribunal was established. However, this Tribunal was part of the Cheka and not an external review agency; and its decisions could not be appealed.

The Cheka soon came to dominate every aspect of Russian life—at home, where the uniform of green blouse and peaked cap, black boots and grey overcoat, created panic when seen; and abroad, where emigres and Soviet citizens—and belatedly the rest of the world—learned of its persistent presence. In January 1921, a Frontier Guards Department of the Cheka was established. Special sections were organized in the Red Army. A Foreign Administration was created to expand the espionage network abroad. Already Commissar of Internal Affairs, Dzerzhinsky was given a second major department with his appointment as Commissar of Ways of Communication in April 1921; and the Cheka soon controlled all movement in Russia.

Unimpeachable party credentials were required for all top officials of the Cheka. (There was less scrupulous concern about the lower levels, where criminals, sadists, and degenerates were used in the initial rush to build an organization.) The first head of the Communist intelligence and security service, Felix Dzerzhinsky, had twenty years of prior revolutionary experience as training for his job. Born near Vilna in 1877, he became a revolutionary at the age of nineteen, and for the next two decades lived an underground existence: arrested, imprisoned, exiled, and escaped, and the same again and again. After the February Revolution in 1917, he was released from Butyrski Prison in Moscow, and two months later was appointed to the Revolutionary Council by Lenin. After the October Revolution, he became Headquarters Commandant at the Smolny Institute, the office of the Communist Party. Two months' later, he became head of the Cheka.

Dzerzhinsky may have been as important a factor in the success of the Bolshevik Revolution as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin; or any of the other Bolshevik leaders. Certainly he was one of the strongest personalities of the original Bolsheviks: incorruptible, merciless, and dedicated to but one objective—the success of the revolution. He was an organizer of great ability; thus he was chosen in 1921 to restore the Russian transportation system, and in 1924 to develop Soviet trade and commerce. He considered his organization, the Cheka, as the vanguard of the vanguard; and he in turn was regarded as the saint of the revolution: obviously an avenging saint.

On February 6, 1922, the Cheka was abolished and its functions and personnel absorbed by the GPU; the State Political Administration, which was part of the NKVD, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Its activities outside Russia were greatly expanded, both in fighting counterrevolutionary groups, and in collecting intelligence on the other nations of the world, all of which were regarded as potentially hostile to the Soviet Union.
The Cheka and its successor, the GPU, were but one of several organizations engaged in intelligence and security operations. The development of a military intelligence organization in the Red Army also proceeded rapidly, and in 1926 became the Fourth Department of the General Staff. Its destiny was to play a secondary role to the state security organizations—the GPU, and later the KGB—which viewed their military competitors with suspicion and concern. Almost from the beginning, special sections of state security personnel were assigned to the Red Army to watch for any evidence of disloyalty or deviation from the Communist Party line. Political commissars were also present to insure proper ideological indoctrination. The security and intelligence service was competitive with the military in other ways as well. It organized its own armed forces: to protect the railways against counterrevolutionaries, to guard the frontiers, and to cope with civil unrest. Special units were also trained for guerrilla warfare both inside and outside of Russia.

The Comintern

Nearly simultaneous with the organization of the Cheka and the Fourth Department of the Red Army General Staff, Lenin was building an organization for world revolution. For a quarter of a century, it was to be an all-encompassing political intelligence service. This was the Third International, better known as the Comintern, an abbreviation for Communist International. Lenin was convinced that the world was ripe for revolution, and that an international general staff was needed to direct the Communist takeovers. In March 1919, he convened the First Congress of the Third International; and immediate steps were thereafter taken to build the apparatus for world revolution.

No brief history can do justice to the Comintern, which quickly became a massive espionage organization combining legal and illegal activities, propaganda and agitation, parliamentary procedures and armed rebellion, collaboration with conservatives and the penetration of potential front groups in a bewildering mixture of tactics. It is small wonder that most of the world, even including some of the participants in Comintern activities, never fully appreciated the true scope of this body.

Those who joined with the Russians in organizing the Comintern—the Germans, French, British, Scandinavians, and others—conceived of its as a body in which all national groups would participate as equals. To be sure, they were willing to give the Russians the lead, if for no other reason than that Russia had already had a successful Socialist revolution, and the Soviet Union was thus the logical base for operations that would lead to new soviets in Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, and China. It was the function of the Communist International to be the gravedigger of bourgeois society.

One of the reasons why Lenin proceeded with such haste after the Russian Revolution to create a Third International was the intense disagreement among Socialists in various countries as to the proper tactics to be followed. The moderate Socialists who dominated the Second International were still determined to achieve change through peaceful parliamentary reform. Lenin rejected this approach, and demanded at the Second Congress of the Comintern that all member parties accept 21 conditions in order to remain within the organization. His intention was to split the world Socialist movement in order to build a spearhead of revolutionary parties directed from a single center. Lenin envisaged the Comintern as doing in the world what the Bolsheviks had done in Russia.
Lenin's 21 points not only became the gospel of the Comintern; they also formed the basis for Russian direction of the movement for world revolution over the next half century. To sit with the board of directors in Moscow, foreign Communist parties had to agree to these conditions, among others: to capture the trade unions from within, to propagandize the armed forces, to win over the peasants, to emancipate the colonial peoples, and to build a parallel illegal party. Their parliamentary delegations—those members of the party legally elected to the national legislatures—were also bound to accept decisions of the party's Central Committee, which in turn was required to abide by rulings from Comintern headquarters in Moscow. Finally, parties belonging to the Comintern were pledged to support all Soviet republics, which in practice meant the Soviet Union.

The non-Russian revolutionaries accepted these conditions with the conviction that they constituted the required discipline for revolution. The Russians would provide the leadership, but the recommendations of the other national parties would receive consideration (or so they thought), and each party could follow its own national destiny. But this was an idealistic illusion. In fact, the Comintern was to become simply another arm of Russian foreign policy, and its member parties were to be used or misused as best suited the requirements of the Kremlin.

The Comintern apparatus became a vast intelligence collection and political control mechanism. A West European Bureau was established in Berlin (later moved to Holland when operating conditions in Germany became difficult), and a Far Eastern Bureau at Shanghai. These bureaus directed the activities of agents who served as liaison officers to individual Communist parties. The bureaus also controlled other agents who clandestinely penetrated the national parties to insure obedience to the Comintern's Presidium in Moscow. The bureaus, the agents, and the national parties were required to report in detail on every activity, every conversation, every item of interest. In the early years of the Soviet Union, the Comintern obtained information through the various national Communist parties, both legal and illegal, which the Russians could obtain from no other source. (It should be remembered that at this time, the Soviet Union was isolated internationally, and maintained tenuous diplomatic relations with only a limited number of countries.)

Couriers, frequently clandestine and using false passports, were constantly on the move between Moscow and the headquarters of each national party. Representatives of the Comintern's International Control Commission were all-too-frequent visitors, particularly to the less effective parties, to inspect, discipline, and issue orders. If the minutes of meetings of a party's Politburo, or Central Committee, or Congress did not reach Moscow promptly, there was trouble. If a party publication did not follow the proper line, or an official said the wrong thing, or a resolution was not properly phrased, Moscow was heard from. Party officials who assumed that they had some secrets from the Russians were soon disabused. The GPU, too, had agents throughout the system—both in the Comintern and the local party—reporting independently to Moscow.

In November 1918, Bela Kun was sent by Lenin to Hungary to
only four months. In 1921, Bela Kun was again sent abroad by the Comintern, this time to Mansfeld to organize revolt in the German coal fields. That effort also failed, as did the later attempt of the Third International (in 1923) to organize a Communist revolution in Germany.

But failure in revolutionary activities did not in any way lessen the Comintern’s control over the non-Russian parties in the organization. The history of the Third International is replete with evidence of its authority. In July 1921, for example, the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was directed by the Comintern representative to ally with the Kuomintang. In 1929, the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent British Communist Harry Pollitt and German party member Philip Dengel to America to tell the Communist Party of the United States to oppose “right deviationists.” In 1936, the entire Central Committee of the underground Yugoslav Communist Party was dismissed and a new one appointed. In 1938, the Polish Communist Party was ordered to disband on the ground that it had been penetrated by government agents.

The day after the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the Comintern ordered its faithful followers throughout the world to drop revolution as its principal objective and to substitute the cause of liberation from Fascist oppression. During the course of the war, the partisans in Yugoslavia were cautioned against Communist revolutionary activity and urged to concentrate on defeating the Nazis. Tito later commented, “In fact, the Comintern wanted a resistance movement in Yugoslavia that would serve Russia’s great power policy.”

Foreign Communists who deviated from the Comintern line were disciplined or removed. National parties reluctant to control their members faced the loss of financial support from Moscow or, in the extreme, expulsion from the Comintern. Extensive training and indoctrination in Russia were important to foreign Communists, and work in Comintern headquarters was a stepping stone to greater power, although no guarantee for survival. Operatives of the Comintern included such names as Josef Broz-Tito of Yugoslavia, Palmiro Togliatti of Italy, Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, and Otto Kuusinen of Finland.

The Comintern did not succeed in world revolution, and it was frequently an embarrassment to Russian foreign policy. But these facts should not overshadow the importance of what it did accomplish for the Communists. It provided a vehicle for participation in the creation and development of local Communist parties that were to become important weapons in political warfare, used openly as legitimate parliamentary organs where practical, or covertly as bases for recruitment and subversion where necessary. It helped to create the base for worldwide information-gathering. Agents were recruited or placed in key locations in government and industry. Safe houses were set up in most major cities of the world for clandestine meetings. Established methods were developed for couriers to transit international boundaries with vital documents, money, or arms.

The Comintern also produced a cadre of dedicated operatives skilled in every aspect of the acquisition and maintenance of power by legal or illegal means. Alumni of the Comintern were not always an unmixed blessing to the Russian leaders. Tito led his partisans to victory with only belated help from the Red Army, and then defied Moscow’s efforts to force Yugoslavia into the Russian mold. Togliatti of Italy, leader of the largest Communist Party in a non-Communist country, was a frequent critic of Russian policy.
The decline of the Comintern began with the death of Lenin. As Stalin acquired greater and greater power, the Third International became less important as a factor in interparty relations as the Russian dictator developed the Foreign Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the principal mechanism for controlling the activities of foreign parties. The constantly expanding role of the GPU-KGB provided a parallel worldwide network to check on the activity of local parties, collect intelligence, and to implement whatever political operations Moscow ordered.

When Stalin ordered the disbandment of the Comintern in 1943, the action was widely hailed by non-Communist nations as a friendly gesture and interpreted as the renunciation of world revolution by the Russians. It was neither. Rather it was a cheap tactic on the part of Stalin who was anxious to obtain all possible military and economic aid from the Western allies. It cost him nothing to demobilize an organization he had never trusted. Better ways to accomplish the same purpose already existed in the vast apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Russian intelligence-security organizations.

No account of the development of the Russian intelligence system would be complete without brief mention of the Foreign Ministry, a minor factor in Moscow's overseas operations. Overshadowed and apparently uninformed on occasion by the Comintern, it declined into an organization of technicians to man the consular service and handle the social aspects of representation in other nations—its existence a concession to the diplomatic niceties of international relations. Its embassies and consulates still provide cover facilities for the intelligence operators and security officers who constitute a sizable proportion of the Russian officials allowed to serve abroad.

Espionage Activities

Extent of Operations. It would be a mistake to assume that there is a Russian agent in every file cabinet and under every bush all over the world. It would be correct to recognize that Russian intelligence operations will saturate any area considered vital by the leadership in Moscow. In addition, any country where the slightest possibility exists for the development of communism will receive its share of attention.

With the Russians, intelligence begins at home. Traditionally suspicious of all foreigners, the Russians maintain the most careful watch over members of the diplomatic community and all other representatives, government or commercial, of other nations assigned to duties within its territories. Mail is intercepted and read. Key personnel of foreign missions are under surveillance. Wherever possible, Russians are placed in foreign embassies and consulates in Moscow in such relatively innocuous positions as chauffeurs and switchboard operators to report in detail to state security on all that they see or hear.

With the advent of highly sophisticated methods of electronic espionage in recent years, the physical premises of foreign missions in the Russian capital have been penetrated by the KGB with relative ease. Telephone conversations are recorded. Microphones embedded in the walls keep the Russians informed of all that is said or done. It could be claimed that there are no secrets in Moscow except those of the Russians.
The surveillance of foreigners in Russia is not an innovation of the Bolsheviks. Catherine the Great expelled more than one diplomat whose private mail revealed uncomplimentary allusions to her person. The diplomatic establishments of all nations were subject to coverage by Russian security and intelligence. All foreigners were watched with suspicion.

Operations abroad concentrated on the areas of greatest concern to Russia's leaders at the time. During the nineteenth century, agents of the Tsars were most active in the capitals of Western Europe: concerned with France during the Napoleonic era; with the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and with the unified and aggressive Germany of the Kaisers. But Russia was not solely preoccupied with Europe. It had expansionist designs against formidable opponents in other directions; the Ottoman Empire to the south; the British throughout the Middle East from Persia to Afghanistan to India; and China. Intelligence activities in these areas were also emphasized.

The Okhrana of the Tsars concentrated its efforts primarily in Western Europe, in the Middle East, and along the Asian borders of Russia. Intelligence and security operations under the Communists have been extended to all continents.

Method of Operation. Every permanent mission of the Soviet Union overseas has a sizable proportion of its staff engaged in clandestine intelligence collection activities or security work—frequently as high as seventy percent. Those assigned to security work—perhaps as many as a third—are charged with watching the activities of all other Russians. Those assigned to intelligence operations are responsible for recruiting agents and developing networks designed to collect the secrets of the host government. Other Russians may engage in liaison with the local Communist Party, subsidize and direct front organizations, other political parties, or elements of the public media.

Not satisfied with operations from the so-called "legal" base in official Soviet missions (the term "legal" meaning that the Russian personnel engaged in such work have been accepted by the host country as official representatives of their government), there are also extensive "illegal" networks in key areas of the world. The " illegals" are senior officers of the KGB operating with false identities, usually well-documented as citizens of the country to which they are assigned. Such a man was Emill Robert Goldfus, who was arrested in New York City's Hotel Latham on June 21, 1957, and whose true name was Colonel Rudolf Abel.

Every department of the Russian government sending representatives abroad is required to provide cover for the KGB. All that the KGB must do to obtain such cover is to secure the approval of the Secretariat of the Communist Party. Technically, the Central Committee and the Politburo give approval to assignments for duty outside the Soviet Union; but in practice, the Secretariat handles the details. Of course, all security and intelligence work is highly secret and very sensitive, and this provides the justification needed by the Secretariat not to inform the other top-ranking officials of the party.

No Russian group travelling abroad is without its KGB representatives. In some cases, delegation members will be recruited by the KGB to act as security officers. A second violinist in the Leningrad Symphony, a dancer in the Bolshoi, or an engineer on a purchasing mission may be summoned to a KGB office and informed that he will be responsible for watching the activities of a specific number of travelling companions. Refusal is impossible. Furthermore, nobody outside of State Security is advised as to how many in the delegation
are regular KGB personnel. A sad fate awaits the traveller recruited by the KGB if any of his companions publicly makes uncomplimentary remarks about the Soviet-Union or, worse, defects.

In many instances, the State Security representatives on Russian delegations overseas are charged solely with watching the other delegates to insure complete loyalty. Above all, these KGB men must make certain that their compatriots return to Russia when the mission is complete. Of course, all members are expected to keep their eyes and ears open, and to report any matters of interest, including any suspicious behavior or inappropriate statements on the part of their comrades. But even the KGB does not expect the average Russian abroad to produce top secrets. That is a job for the professionals.

Covers. The professional State Security personnel assigned to permanent duty outside Russia may appear in a great variety of guises. The Foreign Ministry is most frequently called upon to provide cover for intelligence and security operations. Any official in a Soviet embassy from the Ambassador to the chauffeur may in fact be a senior KGB officer. The visibility and responsibility of an ambassador does not make this position a good one for clandestine intelligence work. However, Russian ambassadors not only can be KGB men, but are always responsive to that organization's demands and needs. Most frequently, the KGB Resident—the senior KGB officer in any given country—will occupy the relatively low-level "official" position of an attache or first secretary. His known title is no indication of his unknown power. He can issue orders to any Russian official in the embassy, including the Ambassador, and he reports only to KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

The other security and intelligence officers in the "legal" organization will be covered in whatever "official" position offers the best facility for operations. If the Ambassador should happen to be an official of the Foreign Ministry, that is, a professional diplomat—and some of them are, there is a strong possibility that his chauffeur may direct a net of agents when he is not driving the Ambassador to diplomatic receptions. The Cultural Attache, the Military Attache, and many others could well be KGB agents. While TASS (Telegrafnoye Agenstvo Sovetskoy Savyza), the Soviet wire service, does have a newsgathering function with representatives all over the world as well as throughout Russia, it can be and is used by the KGB to cover its operatives when necessity arises. In short, security and intelligence is served first in the Russian system.

Alexander Kaznacheev's book Inside A Soviet Embassy describes a typical Russian intelligence setup: this one in Rangoon, Burma. "More than two-thirds of the Embassy's personnel, which consisted of sixteen diplomats and twenty technicians, were at the same time also members of Soviet intelligence, responsible directly to intelligence headquarters in Moscow." Kaznacheev, whose original assignment was as a representative of the Foreign Ministry in Rangoon, later was recalled to Moscow and asked to work for State Security. He said he accepted because he felt that he had no other choice. Kaznacheev identifies various Russian intelligence units operating in Burma and staffed by individuals who were ostensibly representatives of such organizations as TASS, Soviet Film Export, the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Information Mission; the Military Attache's Office, plus attaches, second secretaries, consuls and vice consuls purportedly from the Foreign Ministry.
An "illegal" (one who does not have the convenience of an official cover) will develop his own fictitious identity based upon his aptitudes, interests, and abilities. He must have some occupation or avocation and an explainable source of money. The "illegal" must know something about what he is claiming as his chosen occupation. It is not unusual to find Russian intelligence officers operating photographic shops or electronic businesses. Both are necessary capabilities for clandestine operators and provide a built-in facility for developing a cover.

Obviously the cover job, whether for a "legal" or an "illegal," must not be so time-consuming that there is no time left for the real assignment—intelligence operations. Inasmuch as only Russians are employed in Soviet embassies and are in a position to know what is going on inside their official missions, the "legal" cover is much easier to use in this respect. The Attache who attends a few official functions and occasionally carries a note to the local foreign ministry can spend ninety percent of his time on intelligence work. There are few nonofficial covers that can provide this much opportunity for clandestine work.

Every intelligence officer must know something about cameras. He may have to take pictures of a new warship or aircraft or defense installation, or even a person of interest. If he runs a successful operation, he will obtain highly classified "borrowed" documents which must be photographed and returned before they are discovered to be missing. Lengthy reports will have to be put on microfilm for ease of transmission to Moscow. The developing and printing of his own film is an obvious requirement; and the ability to use microdot—the reduction of an entire message to the size of one typewriter "period"—may also become a requirement. A camera and photography store provides ideal cover—customers coming and going to shield agents or couriers, and a logical excuse for using cameras and developing film.

In many areas of the world, the "illegal" must also become an electronics expert in order to operate effectively. When he leaves the Soviet Union to migrate to his place of assignment, his physical possessions must be the most innocent possible: clothes, toilet articles, and very little else; certainly nothing to attract attention. Therefore, everything he will need for his clandestine intelligence work must be acquired when he reaches his destination, has established his "citizenship," and can do whatever the natives do. Even though much of his material may go back to Moscow by mail or via a courier carrying microfilm, if the officer is assigned to a key area of the world, he will also be required to have a radio transmitter and receiver. The purchase of a transmitter in many countries raises questions. Licenses are required, and buying a transmitter powerful enough to reach Moscow might arouse curiosity. The "illegal" must be well enough qualified in electronics to buy the parts and build his own transmitter. Hence an electronics business might provide a feasible cover.

The cover to be used will be decided upon in Moscow, which also provides the necessary money to buy a business or stock a new shop. There are an almost limitless number of possibilities available: export-import businesses (excellent because they afford a legitimate reason to meet foreigners and travellers), travel agencies (ditto), stamp and coin shops (ditto), specialty shops. Konon T. Molody operated as an "illegal" in England under the name of Gordon Lonsdale for a period of six years, from March 1955 until late 1960. His ostensible means of livelihood was selling jukeboxes and bubblegum machines. Two of his principal subordinates were Morris...
and Lola Cohen, who used the names Peter and Helen Kroger. "Peter Kroger" ran a bookstore on the Strand, in London, and was eventually elected to the Antiquarian Booksellers Association. He did a great deal of business by mail, including a considerable amount abroad. The Krogers bought a bungalow at Ruislip, near London, and furnished it with the complete paraphernalia required for an espionage operation, as was discovered when they were finally apprehended.

KGB Colonel Rudolf Abel started building his cover for eventual assignment in the United States as an "illegal" by entering a displaced persons camp in Austria and identifying himself as a refugee from the Baltic area named Andrew Kayotis. He obtained permission to emigrate to Canada in 1947, and from there moved on to the west coast of the United States. By 1950, he had established himself in the New York City area and set up an artist's studio in a loft at 232 Fulton Street in Brooklyn. His paintings and sketches were sufficiently good to be credible, and his studio provided an excellent base for operations.

Selection of Personnel. KGB personnel assigned to posts abroad have been carefully selected after the successful completion of assignments within the USSR in which their performance has been flawless. They will have been through several training courses in competition with other State Security personnel and under careful observation by both instructors and security officers. Those going to "illegal" assignments also receive tutorial training and are watched even more closely. Aside from their qualities as intelligence officers, loyalty to the party must be complete. Ideological indoctrination is thorough. Security investigations are made down to the last detail.

Mistakes are made. Lieutenant Colonel Reino Hayhanen, whose alcoholic intake was exceeded only by a liquor store, betrayed his senior officer, Colonel Rudolf Abel, to United States authorities. Alexander Kaznacheev had acquired a genuine friendship for the Burmese, was repulsed by Russian operations against them, and left the service to seek asylum in another country. But such occurrences are rare considering the number of personnel in the KGB.

The training of KGB personnel is comprehensive, and may take many years before the officer is considered qualified for assignment abroad. The training of a "legal" will be different and separate from that of an "illegal," the latter's "tutoring" being done under the most secure conditions and on an individual basis.

The "legal," assuming that he has passed through the equivalent of secondary school, either vocational or in the liberal arts, may be sent to the International Relations Institute for college-level education. There he will receive intensive language training to acquire competence in the language of the country of assignment. He will also take numerous courses in the specialized schools of the KGB, a year or two being devoted to learning intelligence techniques such as the recruitment and handling of agents. Considerable time will be spent on the area of assignment and the operating conditions to be faced: What are the people like? How best to approach them? What can be done to recruit them as agents? How to find "safe houses"? Where to meet and where not to meet agents? How good is the local security service?

The "illegal," unlike his counterpart who will be going abroad under official cover, has no classroom work, or—to put it more
graphically—no classmates who might recognize him at an unfortunate moment. His schooling takes place under clandestine conditions in Moscow or its suburbs. He meets his tutor or tutors in “safe houses” or apartments, and is instructed on how to lead a life under deep cover in the country of his assignment. In essence, he is taught how to become and act like a native of that country. Only by doing just that will he be successful as a clandestine intelligence operator. The very nature of the training conditions him for the life he will lead.

Recruitment of Agents. Whether “legal” or “illegal,” one of the most specialized subjects the KGB officer-in-training will be concerned with is how to recruit an agent. This is the most important of the KGB assignments; for without agents, neither intelligence nor security operations can be accomplished effectively. To collect intelligence, there must be an agent who has access to the information needed; to provide effective security coverage, there must be an agent or agents who can closely observe the individual or group under observation.

Agent recruitment is an art, not a science, and the KGB schools in Moscow provide doctrine and guidance rather than specific instructions. The precise orders will come later, when the officer is in the field and assigned agents who have already been recruited, or required to seek out potential agents.

Over the years, the Russians have varied their methods for recruiting agents, but one point of consistency has always been apparent—as with the espionage activities of all nations. There are always individuals willing to betray their country for money or power, and there are always people with personal weaknesses who are susceptible to blackmail. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these were the prototypes of Russian spies.

With the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians acquired a new reservoir of potential agents: the Communists of the world. Communist parties of all nations became information-gathering organizations in the service of Moscow. All “loyal” party members were required to provide information as requested. Specifically qualified individuals were recruited to work directly with the Soviet intelligence services. The Communist parties provided valuable, and in some instances otherwise unobtainable, information to Russia during the 1920s and 1930s when the Soviet Union’s diplomatic relations with other countries were tenuous.

As the true nature of the Communist Party became apparent, and as more and more Russian espionage operations were exposed, the Soviet intelligence agencies realized that they would no longer be able to obtain much vital information using known or identifiable Communists as agents. The revelation of the extent of Russian espionage during and following World War II—in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, against NATO, and elsewhere—resulted in strengthened security measures in many nations, and made the collection of intelligence by known Communists much more difficult.

In those nations where the Communist Party is legal, and where a party member can be employed in a sensitive government bureau, the party organization still provides ready-made intelligence nets for Moscow. But where the party is illegal, new sources have to be found. With the broadening of Soviet diplomatic representation to most nations of the world, Russian diplomats are more and more active in seeking individuals not openly identified with communism but sympathetic to the system or inclined toward Moscow’s policies. These silent sympathizers become grist for the intelligence mill. Not
all of them, of course, are willing to work for the Soviet intelligence services; but those who are become agents of the highest caliber, ideologically convinced and dedicated to the cause.

An individual viewed by the Russians as favorably inclined to the Soviet Union is approached with the greatest care. The initial meetings are innocent and sociable, and may take place over an extended period of time. The initial contacts may not even be made by an intelligence officer, but by a "clean" Russian who has been directed to determine the views of the potential agent. If the attitude seems favorable, a KGB representative may move in to make the recruitment.

To these must be added the Moscow "recruits": those naive and susceptible individuals who have fallen prey to the Russian intelligence services while on duty in Moscow. One would not be far wrong in saying that a favorite pastime of the Russians is to recruit agents in foreign missions. No foreigner assigned to Moscow, from diplomat to clerk, is immune from approach; and no enticement, from sex to terror, is neglected in the effort.

The most frequently used recruitment technique in Moscow is sex. The male diplomat (or clerk) will be assisted in quickly making the acquaintance of a lovely Russian girl, who is all too available and who will later produce pictures of their most intimate moments or else will have an enraged "husband" arrive, all to be followed up by the KGB with their "work with us and we won't tell" approach. The embassy secretary will find an attractive Russian male who will try "love" as the first approach, but failing that will not hesitate to use coercion. There are many adaptations and variations in the scenarios. In many instances, the Moscow "recruit" is used only sparingly while in the Soviet Union, but saved for use on reassignment to his or her foreign office or to another sensitive post.

John W. C. Vassall was assigned to the British Embassy in Moscow in March 1954. Not long after his arrival, he was invited to a party by one of the locals employed in the Embassy as an interpreter and administrative officer. Eight years later at his trial, Vassall said that at the party he was plied with liquor, involved in a homosexual act, and photographed. The KGB showed him the photographs and said that they would make an international incident out of the affair unless he worked for them. Vassall agreed. His first assignment was to abstract documents from the office of the Naval Attache in the British Embassy. He returned to London in June 1956, and was assigned to the Naval Intelligence Division for a year. He next worked two and a half years for a Member of Parliament, then three years in the Fleet Section of the Ministry of Defense (including one year when his Soviet contact ordered him to be inactive because of the exposure of other Russian spies in Britain). He was paid about $3000 a year by the Russians.

Stig Wennerstrom, a career officer in the Swedish Air Force, was "cultivated" during his early career by attachés of the Russian Embassy in Stockholm, whom he frequently accompanied on trips around Sweden. In 1948, he was recruited in Moscow and assigned to cover the American Embassy in Stockholm. This, no doubt, led to Wennerstrom's assignment to Washington on April 1, 1952, where for five years his contact was the Air Attache in the Russian Embassy. When he was arrested in Stockholm in May 1952, the
done to the defense of that nation—and Wennerstrom was described by the Swedish press as the most hated man in the country.

Scope of Operations

All Russian intelligence operations are directed from Moscow; and, in practice, all are controlled by the KGB from Two Dzerzhinsky Square. In every large country, there are at least two networks, and probably many more. One net is operated from the “legal” base of the Russian Embassy or Consulate, and is under the direction of the KGB Resident. The other net is “illegal.” The two nets or operations are separate and report to different units in Moscow.

In important target areas—the United States, China, NATO, Sweden, or West Germany, for example—there may be several “legal” and “illegal” nets or operations, some involving many persons and others only one. Whether “legal” or “illegal,” the officer in charge is given specific targets, and assigned agents when the latter are available. There is little distinction in targets or agents between the “legal” and “illegal” net: availability and opportunity are the criteria.

A Resident operating “legal” agents or networks out of a Russian Embassy has other KGB personnel on the staff of the mission working with him. These are other attaches, first or second secretaries, chauffeurs, code clerks, or typists. Each of these may be handling agents, acting as couriers, servicing letter drops (where messages are left in the hollow of a tree or leg of a park bench), or doing the multiplicity of jobs required in any intelligence operation. All are looking for recruits. In most instances, the agents are nationals of the country in which the Russian Embassy is located. Some are recruited by the Resident and his men from the Embassy. Others are recruited in Moscow or elsewhere by the Soviet intelligence services, and assigned by Moscow.

Under the Tsars. Russian intelligence operations traditionally have been directed at those nations considered potential threats—even allies that might at some time in the future disavow their mutual interests. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the agents of the Tsars were especially active in Western Europe, in the capitals of France, Britain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Prussia (later Germany).

In Paris, the Okhrana operated out of the Russian Embassy on Rue Grenelle. This Paris headquarters ran operations throughout Europe, in the Near East, and in North America. In May 1884, an Austrian High Court reviewed evidence which implicated the Russian Military Attache in a trial involving espionage. In 1904, an Okhrana agent obtained the cipher used by the Japanese Embassy in the Hague. Another Okhrana agent reported in detail to St. Petersburg on the Fifth Congress of the Social Democratic Party held in London in May 1907. Sweden was a major target area in Scandinavia, and Turkey to the south of Russia. Tsarist agents competed fiercely with the British throughout the Middle East and South Asia, and with the Chinese across the contested borders of northern Asia. The scale and intensity of the effort was in direct proportion to the threat, presumed or otherwise, to Mother Russia, and with the Tsar’s ambitions for expansion.

Following the Revolution, the Bolsheviks faced a hostile world, one which in their mind necessitated the development of a vast espionage network. The Third International provided the original framework for this effort under Lenin and Trotsky; but with the passing of these leaders from the scene, Stalin phased the effort from...
the Comintern to the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union. With the approach of World War II, the security and intelligence services of Russia were operating with skill and efficiency in most areas of concern to Moscow at that time.

**During World War II.** The coverage of Germany and Japan may serve as illustrations of Soviet espionage activities during the war.

With the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the Soviet Union was put on notice that it was a target for eventual Nazi aggression. Hitler's speeches echoed and reechoed his hatred of Bolshevism and contempt for the Slav. He specifically referred to the lands to the east as areas for eventual expansion of the Third Reich.

Although an accommodation was reached between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939, there is no question that in the mind of Hitler this was a temporary expedient; and perhaps Stalin also viewed it simply as a method to buy time. With the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, and the British and French declarations of war on Germany, the Russians moved rapidly to block, where possible, further German expansion to the east. Russian troops moved into eastern Poland, in accordance with a secret provision of the agreement with Germany; and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were seized. The province of Bessarabia was taken from Rumania; and an expensive war was fought with Finland to secure territory to protect Leningrad. It was an expensive war for the Russians in more ways than one. The valiant defense of the Finns gave the world an erroneous impression of Red Army weakness. Hitler became even more certain that his armies could crush the Communists in a few short weeks. The Western view of the Red Army gave rise to such mistaken estimates as the United States War Department forecast that the Russians would not last three weeks.

But if the Germans and Americans had inadequate intelligence on the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, Stalin's espionage in Germany provided as close to complete coverage of Hitler's activities as could reasonably be expected. The Russians had established networks of agents at the highest levels of the German government, including key positions in the Army, Air Force, and Foreign Office. The German Communist Party had been driven underground by the Nazis and many of its personnel killed or put in concentration camps; but there was an adequate supply of anti-Nazis, including military personnel who had served in Russia in the 1920s as advisors to the Red Army.

German counterespionage gave the Russian intelligence effort the code designation *Die Rote Kapelle* ("the Red Orchestra"), which was both an oversimplification, because it was a whole series of operations run from different bases throughout Europe; and a compliment, because it was indeed a sizable assembly of virtuosos. The Resident Director for West European operations was initially in Berlin, then Brussels, then Paris; but key agents were also directed from Switzerland and elsewhere. With the fall of France in June 1940, Germany became the sole target on the continent for the Russians. The quality of the information produced on German war plans was uniformly good. In May 1941, the Swiss operation advised Moscow of the date Hitler planned to attack Russia, and gave specific details as to the strength of the Army groups to be used and the objective of each attacking force.
From the other side of the Soviet Union, almost identical information was being received from a network in Japan developed by Richard Sorge. Sorge was a German Communist assigned to Tokyo by the Russian military intelligence service. In a five-year period, he had succeeded in personally penetrating the German Embassy and in building a net of agents that covered the top levels of the Japanese government so well that decisions taken at Imperial Conferences with the Emperor were almost immediately available.

Sorge's setup was classic in several respects. He obtained from the German Embassy all the latest information from Berlin, including information that the Germans would not give to the Japanese; and he received from his agents in Tokyo detailed reports on Japanese strength, and plans that the Tokyo government did not give to the Germans. Sorge, too, obtained the precise date that Hitler planned to attack Russia. He also was able to determine a few weeks later that the Japanese did not plan to attack Russia in Asia, but did intend to open military operations in Southeast Asia against Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Tokyo did not advise Berlin of this, no more than the Germans had told the Japanese of their intentions with respect to Russia.

Richard Sorge was an intelligence operator of many talents. He was sufficiently bold to risk Nazi discovery of his Communist background when he sought credentials as a journalist to represent the Frankfurter Zeitung in Tokyo. He gambled on the German Embassy not checking too closely on his credentials when he volunteered his services as an analyst to that mission. He made himself invaluable to the staff of the Embassy as a news analyst and expert on Japanese affairs; and from this base, he was able to develop his role as a senior consultant entitled to all information available, without benefit of a security clearance from Berlin.

Sorge obtained from the Ambassador and the Military Attache the information they had on German war plans. From couriers and other visitors from Berlin, he gathered additional information prior to the German attack on Russia. He was able to radio Moscow not only the planned date of the attack, originally set for May 15, 1941, but also the new date when Hitler postponed it to June 22.

Important as this information was, perhaps equally vital from the Russian point of view was Sorge's detailed report of the decisions taken at the Japanese Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941. It was on this date that the Emperor gave initial approval to the plan to attack Pearl Harbor and for military operations to the south. Based on this report from Sorge and his information that the Japanese were not building up their forces in Manchuria, the War Council in Moscow decided to move Russian troops from the Far East. These units were used in the counteroffensive of December 1941 that drove the Germans back from the Russian capital.

While Stalin may have ignored Sorge's reports on the date of the German attack on Russia, as he did all of the several sources giving him the same information, his successors recognized the value of the Tokyo operation. Richard Sorge, who was executed by the Japanese, has now been immortalized by his likeness appearing on a Russian postage stamp.

The activities of the Russian intelligence services during World War II were not confined exclusively to the enemies of the Soviet
Union. Extensive collection activities in the United States, which had been carried on with great intensity in the 1930s, did not cease when both nations found themselves at war with a common enemy. If anything, the Russians were able to expand their American coverage with the admission to the United States of large numbers of Soviet citizens attached to their Purchasing Mission. One defector claimed that the Russian intelligence services had twenty networks in the United States during the first year of World War II. Another source reported that there were 75 officials in the United States government illegally providing classified information to the Russians.

Operations were directed from the Soviet Embassy in Washington and their consulates in New York and San Francisco. The American government departments concerned with the war effort were major targets; and the atom bomb program, then highly classified and covered under the innocent title of the Manhattan Project, was a special interest. (Similar operations against the same target—nuclear weapons development—were carried on by the Russians in Canada and Great Britain.) What Moscow received from its wartime espionage in the United States can only be estimated on the basis of the known extent of the effort, which may still be incomplete. Certainly the information available from the physicists engaged in the Manhattan Project must have provided valuable intelligence on the direction and progress of the American effort, and left no doubt in Stalin's mind that the Soviet Union needed nuclear weapons to compete with the United States. It is difficult to conceive how the analysts in Moscow could have coped with the mass of information collected on military and industrial production in the United States; nor could it be used at that time for anything but as a base for pressuring Washington to provide more and more assistance to the Soviet Union.

Recent Operations

Against the United States. Following World War II, Russian intelligence activities in the United States continued on a vast scale but under different conditions. The American government and people came to the gradual realization that the Soviet Union had no intention of cooperating in the development of a stable world order on anything but Communist conditions. This was emphasized by the exposure of the extent of Russian espionage against its "ally." The so-called atom spy cases of the Rosenbergs, Klaus Fuchs, Allan Nunn May, and many others came as a shock to those who had looked on the Russians as friends. By the early 1950s, the United States government was purging itself of Communists and destroying at least one base for Russian operations—the known sympathizers.

With the development of extensive security procedures in the United States government, and in industries working on classified projects, Russian intelligence lost its reservoir of Communist Party members and sympathizers who could report on their government agency or factory. A new source of agent material had to be found, individuals who had no taint of Communist activities or sympathies that would attract the attention of American security and disqualify them from serving in any position with access to the kind of sensitive information the Russians wanted most.

The easiest targets for recruitment were Americans with a problem, particularly those in the military service. The history of recent Russian espionage against the United States could be condensed into two words: sex and money. In Moscow, in Germany, in the United
approach Americans, the same techniques were used with continuing success. Three cases, out of many, will suffice to illustrate.

Robert Glenn Thompson, an Air Force enlisted man, was recruited by the Russians in 1957 while on duty in Berlin. Thompson was bitter because of a denial of transfer, a demotion, and so on. Russian intelligence used him in Berlin to advise on other potential recruits. Before his return to the United States, he received some training in the Soviet Union. Another Russian agent contacted him when he was transferred to Malstrom Air Force Base, Great Falls, Montana. He was indicted in January 1965 and pleaded guilty.

Jack Dunlap, a sergeant, was recruited by the Russians while on duty with the United States Embassy in Moscow. Dunlap had expensive tastes: fast cars, power boats, and women. Russian money helped him to satisfy these tastes. When he returned to the United States, Dunlap was assigned to the highly sensitive National Security Agency in the Washington area, where he served the Russians by producing classified documents for which they paid $60,000. When American counterespionage operators started to focus on him, Dunlap committed suicide.

William Henry Whalen, a lieutenant colonel on duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, was paid $1,000 a month by Russian intelligence officers attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. These are but three examples of an intensive and persistent effort that is highly dangerous to the national security of the United States.

While this country is the most important target of Russian intelligence operations, their activities in other parts of the world—against NATO, the West European powers, in Latin America, Asia, and Africa—are on only a slightly less intensive scale, dependent on the opportunities available for agent recruitment.

Against Great Britain. In Great Britain, one of the most successful Russian operations resulted in the recruitment of three men, probably when they were students at Cambridge, who ultimately reached high levels in the British government. H. A. R. Philby, an intelligence officer who at one time was concerned with Russian operations for the British secret service, and on another assignment acted as liaison to the CIA and FBI in Washington, worked for Russian intelligence during his entire career. When it became apparent that the full details of his treason were about to be exposed, he retreated to Moscow. His latest contribution to the Russians is a book entitled My Secret War, prepared under the direction of the KGB and purporting to be Philby's "story" but actually a rather futile psychological effort against the American and British intelligence and security services.

Two of Philby's contemporaries, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, both British foreign service officers and both also Russian agents, had retired to Moscow before him. Maclean had been regarded as "ambassadorial material" by his superiors, and had served in the British Embassy in Washington where one of his responsibilities was liaison to the US Atomic Energy Commission. Guy Burgess was regarded by some as brilliant, even though his homosexuality—he boasted of his conquests—and his drinking were public knowledge.

These three agents in the British government were ideological recruits. They considered themselves against the "establishment." They were knowledgeable and presumably intelligent men, but critical of the British system to the extent of betraying it. They were
aware of the reality of Soviet Russia with its purges, repressions, and inhumanity in the name of communism. But incredible as it may seem, they believed it held some hope for the future. Obviously the reasons for their treason were far more complex than this simple explanation would suggest; but traitors they were. Their services to the Russian system have been rewarded by retirement in Moscow.

The other NATO powers have also been the object of intensive Russian intelligence efforts. France, where the Communist Party is legal and party members are employed throughout the government, has been a base for Soviet espionage activities. West Germany is also a major target, not only as a NATO member, but also because of the inherent Russian fear of Germany.

Against NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization became a major target for Russian espionage immediately upon its organization. Utilizing the standard Soviet technique of attempting to saturate an important target, the KGB recruited agents both in the NATO structure and in related government departments and ministries of member nations. The degree of success is indicated by the following illustrative examples.

In September 1963, George Paques, Deputy Press Secretary of NATO, was arrested by the French police and charged with espionage for the Soviet Union. Paques had the highest NATO security clearance and could see any document in the organization. He had an apparently impeccable background: a reputation as an anti-Communist and as a conservative. Paques previously had served in eleven different ministries of the French government, including the national defense headquarters where he was in a position to be aware of most defense plans. In July 1964, Paques was sentenced by the French State Security Court to life imprisonment. He advised the Court he had worked for the Russians since 1944; but claimed that he was a nationalist and pacifist, and had hoped that by working for the Russians he could save France from destruction in a third world war.

In November 1953, a Czech Communist named Rudolf Roessler, whose code name was "Lucy" and who operated primarily out of Switzerland, where he had been one of the Soviet Union's most successful operators in World War II, was charged in Swiss Federal Court with obtaining more than a hundred secret NATO documents for the Czechs, who obviously turned the material over to the Russians. In August 1969, Francis Roussilhe, who had worked with NATO since 1952 and was employed in the Brussels headquarters as a translator, was arrested by the Belgian police while carrying classified documents. He was charged with copying large numbers of secret documents and receiving substantial payment. Previously, in September 1968, Nahit Imre, the Turkish financial controller at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, had been caught in the act of photographing secret documents in his office. He was arrested and removed by Turkish authorities to Ankara.

Against West Germany. Considerable information on the NATO alliance was also obtained by Russian collection activities against the individual member countries. Following World War II in West Germany, the Russian intelligence services had reestablished contact with many of the agents who had worked for them against the Nazis, and also recruited some of the agents who had worked for Hitler's intelligence services. The efforts of Russian intelligence were supple-
mented by the East German, Czech, and Polish intelligence services. The objective was complete coverage of all activity in West Germany, whether on the part of the Bonn government or the Western alliance.

The Russian effort concentrated heavily on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (the West German security service) and the Federal Intelligence Agency. In 1958, three employees of the Federal Intelligence Agency were tried by the High Court in Karlsruhe on charges of treason, treasonable relations with a foreign power, grave breaches of security, and accepting bribes. They had worked for the Russians since 1951, passed over about fifteen thousand documents and exposed 95 West German agents. Hans Felfe, 45, who received a fourteen-year sentence, was a senior officer in the counterespionage section of the West German service, and was in a position to warn the Russians each time one of their agents came under suspicion. His assistant Hans Clemens, 61, received a ten-year sentence; and a third man, Erwin Tiebel, 61, who was used as a courier, received a three-year sentence. Felfe claimed that his motive was hatred of the United States because of the so-called Morgenthau Plan, which called for the dismantling of German industry at the close of World War II. Clemens attributed his activities to a desire for revenge against the United States because of his treatment in a prisoner-of-war camp, and because of the American bombing of his home town, Dresden.

In Eastern Europe, the Russian intelligence service is ubiquitous. The East German, Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian intelligence and security services are under close observation, and, in effect, the tight control of the Russians. Russian intelligence officers are assigned as “liaison” to each of these services, and Moscow receives copies of all reports produced and takes over any operations of particular concern—all in the interest of Socialist solidarity, no doubt.

The East German, Czech, and Polish intelligence services direct considerable effort at targets in West Germany—the Bonn government and all NATO forces and installations. The East German security service uses what could be described as saturation techniques with hundreds of agents, mostly very low level, trying to cover all activities in the West.

The Hungarians and Bulgarians have special assignments from the Russians for targets in Yugoslavia, but undoubtedly operate with considerable caution because of the formidable opposition. In recent years, the Rumanian services have pursued an increasingly independent course in accord with national policy. In other parts of the world, the Russians use the East European intelligence services to supplement their own efforts.

Against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was the scene of one of the greatest defeats suffered by the Russian intelligence services in recent years. During World War II, the Russians provided only limited assistance to Tito and his partisans, obviously underrating the Yugoslav ability to occupy substantial numbers of German troops who otherwise would have been fighting Russians. Stalin was also concerned that Tito might alienate the British and Americans by too open an indication of his intention to organize a Communist state. In addition, the Russian dictator was not particularly sympathetic to Yugoslav national aspirations which might cause difficulties with the Western allies, and he was reportedly furious when Tito at-
Tito, on the other hand, gave every indication of loyalty to and cooperation with the Soviet Union. It became apparent, however, that the Yugoslavs had no intention of accepting Russian economic and political domination and becoming a satellite. With the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947, composed of the Soviet Union, the East European parties including Yugoslavia, and those of France and Italy, the clandestine war between Stalin and Tito moved into an intensive phase.

Stalin directed that Cominform headquarters be located in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital. Sent to direct the Cominform was Pavel Yudin, described as the best philosopher in the Soviet State Security Service and as the best NKVD man among the philosophers. Yudin quickly indicated his method of operation. He requisitioned one of the largest office buildings in downtown Belgrade; coopted the presses of Borba, the Yugoslav party newspaper; and clearly indicated that a great deal of his work would be “for Russians only.” A direct teletype line to Moscow was installed, and a special Russian Air Force plane placed at his disposal.

Yudin, together with the Russian ambassador formally accredited to Belgrade, Lavrentyev, plus the Red Army military advisors and their subordinates, promptly accelerated their efforts to recruit agents in the Yugoslav party and government and to stir up opposition to Tito. The objective was clear. If Tito could not be brought to heel by direct negotiations with Moscow, he would be attacked from within by dissidents and overthrown.

The effort was an abysmal failure for the Russians. They completely miscalculated the strength of Tito’s support in Yugoslavia, where he was revered as a war hero and as unchallenged leader of the country. They overestimated their own ability to recruit key officials in the Yugoslav party and government, and were able to obtain only a few agents of any consequence. Nor were the Russians appreciative of the quality and skill of the Yugoslav security service, the UDB, which thwarted their efforts at every turn.

By the end of 1948, the Russian intelligence services had been defeated in Yugoslavia and Stalin was forced to use political and economic measures against Tito. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Aid and trade agreements with Russia and the East European satellites were cancelled. Violent attacks in the media denounced the Yugoslav leader. Tito turned to the West for assistance and consolidated his independent position. To this day, the UDB remains the only Communist security service in Europe whose number one target is the Russians.

Tito was explicit in his comment about the Russian effort:¹

“During the past fifteen years, an important role has been acquired by the intelligence service—the NKVD. Instead of a weapon to fight counterrevolution, it has grown into a force in itself; instead of being an instrument of the revolution, it has become a power above Soviet society. The entire activity of the country, the party, the whole foreign policy—all rests upon the intelligence service; its reports are given priority, it really rules the country.”

Against Communist China. The Soviet Union’s neighbor and fellow Socialist power in Asia is rapidly emerging as the first priority and most difficult objective of Russian intelligence operations. It did

---

¹ Vladimirs Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 259
not take the Sino-Soviet rift to precipitate the struggle between the Chinese and Russian intelligence services. Sinkiang Province has been a battleground between the two nations for decades. The frequently advertised border incidents along the frontier between Russia and China, which run into the hundreds each year, are a reflection of the intelligence effort along the entire border. With China's developing nuclear strength, Russian intelligence is accelerating its efforts and using every possible source to develop hard information on the Chinese behemoth.

In the Middle East. In this region, Russian intelligence activities are especially intensive in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. With the thousands of Russian military and technical personnel in Egypt are numerous representatives of the intelligence services, as there are in smaller numbers in Syria and Iraq. It can be assumed that Russian intelligence coverage of the Arab world is of high quality.

With Russia the principal source of arms for the Arabs, there were few inhibitions on KGB activities in the area until after the abortive coup attempt against the government of General Gaafar L. Numeiry of the Sudan in July 1971, which resulted in a strong reaction against the Communists. In Egypt, the principal beneficiary of Soviet aid, the President denounced the Communists and arrested two leaders. Previously Ali Sabry, known in Cairo as "the Kremlin's man in the Cabinet," and other leaders of the so-called May 13 (1971) plot had been arrested. In the Yemen, where Russian diplomats constitute the largest foreign mission in Sana, seven Yemeni officers were detained by security officials after leaving the Soviet Embassy.

In Africa. Massive Soviet aid to Algeria is also the vehicle for extensive intelligence activities in that nation, where there are thousands of Russian technicians. Algeria ranks with Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia, Ghana, Guinea, and the Congo (Kinshasa) as the principal recipients of Russian assistance on the African continent. Not all of these efforts have been successful, and the Arabs and Africans have been quick to react to any evidence of Russian intelligence activities or subversion even prior to the Sudan coup of 1971.

On June 30, 1960, the Congo obtained its independence from Belgium. The Russians established a large mission at Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), and provided immediate support to Patrice Lumumba in his attempt to establish a strong unitary state in lieu of a federal system. Russian aircraft ferried troops to Kasai Province to support Lumumba's effort. Two days after Lumumba's arrest in September 1960, the Russians were expelled from the country.

During the regime of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, the influence of the Russian intelligence services reached considerable proportions. More than a thousand Russian advisors, in all fields of activity from fishing to housing to the cocoa crop, provided an ample base for the recruitment of agents. Arms were provided for four battalions of presidential guards under the guidance of about a dozen KGB advisors. With the popular revolt of February 24, 1966, which deposed Nkrumah, a great deal of the Russian intelligence base was destroyed.

Guinea turned to Russia and the East European countries states for assistance in 1958 after French aid was suspended. Within a short period of time, a deluge of aid and advisors arrived from the Soviet Union and the other Communist nations. To many Western observers, it was only a matter of time before Guinea would be Communist-controlled. In November 1961, President Sekou Touré
mittee of the Guinean teachers' union. Investigation of this conspiracy provided leads directly to the Russian Embassy. Daniel Solod, the Soviet Ambassador, was expelled. The Guineans involved were charged with high treason and received heavy sentences.

Developments in the Sudan in 1971 followed a similar pattern. The Russians had provided extensive assistance to the Sudanese government in a civil war between the Moslem north and the Anya Nya, a black guerrilla movement fighting for the independence of southern Sudan since 1963. Soviet advisors assisted in counterinsurgency operations, while Russian technicians helped to build port facilities and surface-to-air missile sites. In July 1971, General Numeiry, who had seized power in May 1969, was temporarily deposed and some 28 of his followers executed. Numeiry, supported by the Sudanese Army, soon regained power and immediately declared that the coup was Communist-inspired, supported and directed by the Bulgarian and Soviet embassies in Khartoum. Russian advisors in the Sudan were ordered to stay in their quarters. The second-ranking man in the Soviet Embassy, Orlov, was expelled, as was the Bulgarian Ambassador; while the Sudanese recalled their ambassadors from Moscow and Sofia. General Numeiry ordered the military plotters executed; and also tried and hanged Joseph Garange, the Communist Minister for South Sudan, and Abdel Khalek Mahjoub, the Secretary of the Communist Party. Hundreds of other Communists were arrested.

Elsewhere in Africa, Russian support was visible for the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, and for Frelimo, the equivalent movement in Mozambique, both battling the Portuguese authorities in sporadic civil war.

In Latin America, Russian intelligence operations in Latin America began in the 1920s through the mechanism of the Comintern. With diplomatic representation limited, the Russians were forced to rely heavily on local Communists. Prior to World War II, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with only three nations in South America. With a rapid expansion of diplomatic contacts in recent years, the Russian intelligence services have many more bases for operations. The number of Russian intelligence personnel throughout the area totals several scores of agents.

Between 1960 and 1970, the Soviet Union more than tripled the number of personnel officially assigned to its diplomatic missions in Latin America, and increased its intelligence activities by the same proportion. Whereas previously there had been Russian embassies only in Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay, new missions were opened in Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Guyana.

The Reckoning

The extent of Russian espionage must not be underestimated. It is not merely a facet of "international communism," although it can be that if it fits in with Moscow's pattern of priorities. Russian espionage is fundamentally a key element in that nation's determination to be the strongest power on earth and to control or dominate wherever possible. Taken as a whole, the Russian intelligence system is the largest in history, and occupies a greater proportion of that nation's assets than has ever before been true of any society.

While this study has concentrated exclusively on Russian espionage activities, it should be borne in mind that espionage or clandestine
collection is but one form of intelligence collection. In the Soviet system, moreover, espionage is only one of many clandestine activities. The KGB—the State Security Committee—plays a key, if not exclusive, role in other intelligence-related operations, including political recruitment; covert psychological warfare to undermine confidence in other governments, institutions, and persons; sabotage; liquidations of enemies of the Soviet system; provocation; deception; forgery; disinformation; and so forth. Following the Leninist precept that the end—the total victory of communism (read Russia)—justifies the use of any means, it can be safely assumed that the KGB will utilize whatever means are necessary to carry out the objectives of the Politburo.

In the strictly intelligence collection area, espionage—as already stated—is only one element. In addition to “legal” and “illegal” espionage networks, the Russians have established organizations to collect information by every conceivable means, utilizing whatever techniques are necessary. Space satellites are repeatedly and regularly sent on missions to photograph every inch of the United States and other key areas of the world. Electronic transmissions of other nations are monitored and where possible analyzed. Mail is intercepted and read. Foreign government facilities both in Russia and throughout the world are honeycombed with microphones and other surveillance devices. Newspapers, periodicals, learned journals, and books published in other nations are shipped back to Moscow by the ton. Publications of other governments are purchased for study. Russian travelers report in detail. Foreign Communist parties are ordered to send Moscow voluminous surveys on matters of intelligence interest. There is no end to the demand for more information.

The volume of intelligence that reaches Moscow must tax storage facilities, let alone analytical capabilities. Properly analyzed and understood, this material could provide the Russians with a comprehensive knowledge of the world. But trapped as Communists by their rigid adherence to the invalid assumptions of Marxism-Leninism, the vast intelligence operations serve even more to feed traditional Russian paranoia about everything foreign.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The search for accurate information on Russian espionage is a difficult one. Espionage and publicity are as incompatible as fire and water: publicity kills an espionage operation just as completely as water puts out fire. Governments do not usually acknowledge spies or spying. Only rarely do the files of intelligence organizations become public—and then generally when the organization no longer exists.

Most historians regard spying as contemptible, and the impact of secret intelligence services on world affairs as minimal in most instances. Political scientists may devote a sentence or a paragraph in an entire book, rarely more, to the intelligence services of a nation. The paucity of readily available information is obviously one explanation for this.

The problem is further complicated by the combination of internal security functions and external intelligence operations in one organization. For example, the last of the Tsarist organizations in this field, the Okhrana, was responsible for the suppression of all anti-regime activity in Russia, but it also ran espionage operations against other
nations. The present-day State Security Committee (KGB) of the Soviet Union also is responsible for both functions. One consequence of this, from an historical point of view, is that the activities of both the Okhrana and the KGB in protecting the Russian government—suppressing the opposition—overshadow their not inconsequential intelligence work.

For the Tsarist period, there is frequent mention of the Secret Chancery and the political police in many books, but little on activities outside Russia. Sidney Monas covers The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)—again, as the title indicates, with emphasis on internal security. Maurice La Porte in Histoire De L'Okhrana: La Police Secrète Des Tsars, 1800-1917 (Paris: Payot, 1935), devotes one chapter of twelve to the foreign service. A more subjective approach is given by A. T. Vassilyev, a former member of the Tsarist police, in The Ochrana: The Russian Secret Police (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930).

The principal sources of information on espionage by Russia during the Soviet period are the frequent exposures of intelligence operations in all parts of the world, and the not infrequent defection of Communist state security personnel and agents. The former provide precise evidence of the existence of espionage and clandestine operations especially when the investigations and/or court proceedings are made public, as in the Gouzenko case in Canada, Petrov in Australia, Vassall in England, and the Rosenbergs in the United States. Defectors frequently write detailed memoirs, some of which are valuable, but others of which are more a quick source of income for the author plus self-protection and justification.


The capabilities for conducting effective intelligence gathering and paramilitary operations have long been essential tools in the conduct of national policy. Unfortunately, however, certain misconceptions regarding the manner and circumstances in which they can be employed arose in this country after World War II and led directly to setbacks like the Bay of Pigs. Rather than shunning the possibility of using covert operations in the future to gain policy objectives, experiences like the Bay of Pigs merely underline the fact that policymakers must be educated as to what is possible, and the responsibility for this lies with the career intelligence community.

PARAMILITARY CASE STUDY
THE BAY OF PIGS
A lecture delivered by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

I think that the usual caveat is necessary before I get into the subject at hand. What I am about to say today are my personal views; they do not represent the official CIA view nor the official U.S. Government view. This is an after-action report on an episode in our history which engendered perhaps the most intense emotions and public reaction we have seen since World War II.

President Kennedy in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs made the comment that "Victory has a hundred fathers; defeat is an orphan." I would simply say that as Inspector General of the CIA at the time, I was probably in charge of the orphanage.

There is a very specific definition of covert operations. In the broad literature of intelligence, covert operations are about as old as espionage, which has been called the world's second oldest profession. To be properly considered covert, an operation must be designed in such a way that it can easily be disavowed by the originating government. The hand of the sponsor must not be visible.

Covert operations, on the other hand, must not be confused with irregular warfare. An example of irregular warfare that has received recent worldwide attention is the operation in Laos. Everybody on both sides knows who is doing what to whom; the aid and assistance is obvious. That is irregular warfare. A covert operation, however, to be totally covert must be so clandestine, so well hidden, that its true sources may never be specifically proven. Guesses, allegations, speculations may be made in the public media, but no proof or verification is permissible if the operation is to be properly considered covert.

At this point in our discussion I believe it will prove helpful to simply list some of the questions that must be asked before a covert operation is properly undertaken.

- Can it be done covertly? Can the sponsor's government be sufficiently concealed at each step so as to avoid disclosure and thus either failure or a diplomatic setback for the sponsor? And if the cover of the operation is destroyed at any stage, are alternative measures or withdrawal possible?
- Are the assets available to do the job required? Are the indigenous personnel available who are secure and in the proper place to do the work required? If not, are there those available who can be put into place?
- Are all of the assets of the sponsoring government being used? Can the operation be controlled? Will the indigenous forces being used respond to direction or are they likely to go off on their own? Will they accept cancellation of the operation at any time?
- If it succeeds or fails, will they maintain silence? The maxim "Silence is golden" has never been fully accepted in this country, but it is still worth asking. Also, can it be handled securely within the sponsoring government?
- Finally, and this is perhaps the most important question the United States must ask, is the risk worth the potential gain? Has there been a true evaluation of the chance of success or failure by an objective group not directly or emotionally involved with its implementation? Do the policymakers have a realistic understanding of the operation?

These are some of the basic questions which must be asked prior to the mounting of any clandestine or covert operation.

Before turning to the case study itself, a brief review of recent Cuban history is appropriate. Fidel Castro landed in eastern Cuba in 1956 with what turned out to be 12 men. He gathered forces in the Sierra Maestra in 1956 and 1957. Even more important, however, was the growth of anti-Batista groups in the cities of Cuba among the middle class, the professionals, and the elite. It was the erosion of Batista's vital political support in the cities which led directly to his downfall. The guerrillas in the countryside served merely as a catalyst in this process. And eventually, on January 1959, Batista stepped into the vacuum left by the fleeing Batista.

A fact which many people do not seem to recall was that despite our misgivings about Fidel Castro, and the U.S. Government did have them, we recognized his government fairly promptly. The first cabinet of the Castro regime was probably one of the finest in Cuban history. It is worthy to note, however, that very few of the new Cabinet members stayed very long.

In addition to recognizing Castro, the United States continued its subsidy of Cuba's sugar crop which at that time amounted to approximately $100 million. The three major U.S. oil companies doing business in Cuba advanced him $29 million because his treasury was bare when he took over. Batista and his cohorts had seen to that. Castro was not invited to the United States on an official trip, but he came here unofficially to attend a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, and he did have an interview with the then Vice President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon. Then, one by one, the men around Castro began dropping off. He speedily expropriated U.S. property worth $968 million. Even his closest barbudos—the bearded ones—that had been with him in the hills started to turn against him as he appointed more and more Communists, and by the middle of 1960 it became obvious that the United States, was not going to be able to do business with Fidel. This, I might say, was a very great shock to Americans. Cuba was a country that we regarded as our protégé. We had helped liberate it from Spain; we had taught it to read. And yet, Fidel was the one who ran it.
they were all there. It was most difficult for the State Department, the CIA, the Attorney General, and others involved to persuade the Cubans to work together in a cohesive organization simply because many of them did not want to work together due to prior political associations.

The system of recruiting was done as clandestinely as possible. The recruits were then taken to the deactivated Opa Locka Naval Air Station and were flown out "covertly" to Guatemala where a wealthy landowner had made a sizable portion of his mountainous finca available for training. A training base had been hacked out of the wilderness. The President of Guatemala, Ydigoras, was aware of what was going on and cooperated fully. President Somoz of Nicaragua provided the airfield for the B-26's.

In retrospect, it might have been wiser to have trained everybody in the United States where they could have been isolated somewhere in the vast reaches of a Fort Bragg or a Fort Benning. Latin America is not an easy place to do such training because in countries the size of Guatemala or Nicaragua nearly everybody knows what is going on. As early as 30 October 1960 an article appeared in the Guatemalan paper La Hora which described a military base in the mountains designed to train men for an invasion of Cuba. This was when the cover started to unravel. Paul Kennedy of The New York Times, a very astute journalist whose circuit ran from Mexico City to Panama, was not far behind La Hora in producing a story on the base—who was there, what they were doing, and what they were going to do. The discussions in Miami were such that in his book Schlesinger quotes three separate newsmen who upon returning from Miami were able to describe exactly what was going on without being specific as to where the landing was going to be made or when it was going to be made, but that there was going to be a landing, that it was going to be against Cuba, and that it involved a great number of the exiles.

The operation was exclusively under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked if they would provide evaluations first of the feasibility of the plan and secondly of the quality of training. They also, of course, provided upon request both supplies that were necessary and manpower to assist in training and administration. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not responsible for the plan. It was not their plan, and the postoperation blame that was placed on them was put on them by others running for cover. It was a CIA operation.

Frequent meetings with the President from January through March and periodic progress reports were used to keep the President informed. As the evidence of apparent Russian assistance to Cuba continued to grow, pressure was put on the President to mount the operation. Let me also note that there was a very considerable Cuban lobby operable. The Cuban exiles had considerable money. Many of them were apparently wise enough to have kept the bulk of their wealth in the United States prior to 1959. They were acquainted with Americans and the American political system, and a steady stream of them descended on Washington to urge greater U.S. action in support of the exile movement up to and including a full-scale invasion of Cuba by the United States.

During this period a serious conflict arose within the exile training camp as a result of some of the Batistians being brought into the brigade. These former members of Batista's army were professional military men whose talents were judged to be useful to the operation. A mutiny occurred, however, which quickly became known to the rest of the world. Twelve Cubans were arrested and incarcerated; and the entire affair was written up in the press.

With a brigade of 1,453 trained Cubans in being, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed both the Trinidad plan and the Bay of Pigs plan as being feasible. The U.S. military personnel who reviewed the brigade described them as well trained and capable of doing their job. Here we run into what will perhaps throughout history be the most controversial part of the operation: I label it what the Cubans thought, what the Americans thought, and what Castro thought.

There are no available figures on Castro's intelligence operation in the United States. However, given the great number of Cubans in this country, he undoubtedly had a fairly complete information flow from not only our press and radio, but from his own sources of information as well. Castro was highly nervous in the spring of 1961, to say the least. He was aware that an operation was being mounted. He was not aware of its size or whether U.S. forces would be involved. He feared the latter greatly, without question.

The anti-Castro Cubans in exile, on the other hand, were convinced that the United States would not let the operation fail. One of the aspects of the postoperation inspection was specifically directed to the question of whether any of the U.S. personnel told the Cubans that U.S. military forces would back them up. That, I would submit to you, is almost an impossible question to answer. If you are training a group of men to go into battle, you aren't saying, "Okay fellows, go ahead, but if you don't make it, it's rough." As an instructor you would give your trainees every bit of encouragement, and if you say something like, "We're behind you all the way," does that mean that you are committing U.S. military forces? The best available evidence indicated that no U.S. national who was involved in training, assisting, or direction of the Cubans ever promised U.S. military assistance, but obviously they were not discouraging the Cubans. On the other hand, the Cubans to a man as well as the Cuban Revolutionary Council, expected that should the brigade falter, U.S. Marines would pour out of Guantanamo, airborne units would be dropped, and it would be over about like that.

As to President Kennedy's intentions, however, there can be no question. The President frequently reiterated his statement that no U.S. personnel would be involved, that he wanted no Americans on the beach, that there would not be any commitment of U.S. forces behind the Cubans, that this was to be an exile operation.

The allegation has been made that "the operators" deceived the President. That is not correct. "The operators" principally involved were Allen W. Dulles, Gen. Charles P. Cabell, and Richard Bissell. They are all men of honor and integrity. They were all very much involved in the operation. They were all reasonably convinced that it would succeed or had a good chance of success. Mr. Dulles has been quoted by both Schlesinger and Sorensen as telling the President that he thought that this operation had a better chance of success than the Guatemala operation. Perhaps he did not tell the President the Guatemala operation only succeeded by the narrowest of margins. This was to be a very close matter and entirely different from the operation against Arbenz, who had but a very limited force to support him as opposed to Castro whose 200,000-man army and militia were rapidly increasing in both quality and strength.
when you have to end the support and lose the indigenous forces—as well as your integrity—perhaps never to be regained.

In looking back over both the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs landing, several important lessons can be derived—the most vital of which arises from the operators' failure to secure accurate intelligence. Inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the Bay of Pigs disaster. There is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operation. There was a totally erroneous estimate of the quality of Castro's fighting forces, a lack of realism in evaluating the potential resistance, and therefore as a corollary, a lack of realism in estimating the number of forces required to do the job. There was a lack of knowledge about Castro's control in Cuba, even though the British and French intelligence reports were available on the subject.

Organisationally, a large part of CIA was excluded from the operation. The present Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, who was then Chief of Operations for CIA, was not involved in the operation. It was handled in a separate compartment, and a very great portion of the expertise in the agency was excluded. In like manner, the bulk of the military expertise of the Pentagon was excluded because knowledge of the operation was handled on such a close basis within the Joint Staff.

Now when I say that the bulk of the CIA was excluded, I mean that the operators running the operation were assessing and evaluating the intelligence, not the intelligence directorate, where it should have been done. Much of the intelligence came from the Cuban resistance, which was not always an objective intelligence source, and, as later in the missile crisis, their reports had to be scanned and evaluated based upon other information.

The White House advisers have noted in their books that nobody in the White House was really being critical about the operation. They assumed that the President was accepting the advice of qualified experts, and therefore they were unwilling to submit themselves to being the opposition to the operation. To my knowledge only two documents were written in the Federal Government opposing the operation, one by Chester Bowles, the then Under Secretary of State, who had inadvertently heard about the operation and opposed it. Roger Hilsman, then Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence, also heard about the operation, asked to be briefed on it, and was turned down. Arthur Schlesinger says that he too wrote a memorandum that was opposed to the operation after he had learned about it. But these documents were not given much weight.

The question of whether the same organization collecting intelligence should be permitted to conduct covert operations has provoked continuing debate in the intelligence community over the years. It was a question which was addressed when the National Security Act of 1947 was being considered before Congress. It is a question which has frequently come up, and it is certainly one that is worthy of note. Within an organization such as CIA, it is possible to compartmentalize it so that the intelligence evaluators are separated from the collectors, but in this instance this was not done.

And then, finally, the covertness or lack of visibility of the operation must be examined. It lost all of its veil, all five, before it was ever mounted. By the time the landing took place, it was well known an operation was being mounted. It was well known who was involved. It was well known that it was totally and completely supported by the United States. And at some point along the line somebody, somewhere around the President should have said, "Mr. President, this is going to create one hell of a lot of noise. It is going to be very obvious that we're behind it. If it succeeds, great; if it fails, we are in for deep trouble." Obviously most people thought it was going to succeed. In fact, most of those talking to the President thought it was going to succeed.

Also, trying to mount an operation of this magnitude from the United States is about as covert as walking nude across Times Square without attracting attention. (Although, I must say that the latter is becoming more of a possibility every day.) In retrospect, the use of the U.S. bases would have been more feasible because we did have the capability for controlling access to a sizable geographical area. We could have isolated the brigade; even the training of the B-26 pilots could have been done in the United States; and perhaps, only perhaps, it could have been done without having been disclosed.

Policymakers must be educated as to what is possible. I think they will be in the future. The shock to President Kennedy was great and he blamed the CIA, but he blamed the military just as much. The latter was misplaced. Nevertheless, it is very important that policymakers be educated as to what covert operations can do or cannot do and not look on them as some type of easy device whereby one can simply reach out and press a button and, a resistance group comes up and suddenly an enemy is destroyed. The obligation for destroying this myth lies with the career personnel.

There was nothing more secret about the Bay of Pigs than about nuclear weapons. Yet it was handled as though it was so sensitive that people who were trusted with the highest secrets of the government could not be trusted with it.

The staff work must be complete. Periodic assessments must be made, and
Accent on Intelligence

By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr.

The presumption is that the C.I.A. is engaged in a continual process of deposing governments unpopular with the United States. This is hardly true today. Evidence is accumulating that United States policy is maturing to accept other forms of government even though they might not conform to our criteria. While it has been acknowledged that the United States did succeed in changing a government in Guatemala, and failed in a similar effort at the Bay of Pigs, there is a growing conviction that such efforts are counterproductive in the long run and serve more to defeat than enhance United States policy.

An implied assumption to the question is that the C.I.A. decides what governments to overthrow. This is not, and never has been, the case. The C.I.A.'s covert operations are undertaken only after approval by "higher authority." What is true is that C.I.A. operatives in the field and officers in Washington have influenced policy, and on occasion have acted independently abroad. The first instance reflects poorly on the policy level at State, Defense and the White House, and is obviously not the case today. When C.I.A. men in the field have acted too independently, the United States ambassadors sent them home.

The question assumes that the C.I.A. is training a breed of experts in subversion who will seek employment in the same field upon leaving the agency: an assumption seemingly confirmed by the Watergate affair.

Actually only a small and rapidly diminishing fraction of the C.I.A. personnel are engaged in political warfare, a dying remnant of cold war operations. Most C.I.A. personnel are in intelligence work: collecting, analyzing, estimating, supporting; and it is their unheralded efforts that are sullied and obscured.

The sordid mess of the Watergate re-emphasizes the necessity for tight controls over and persistent and critical review of all intelligence activities by the appropriate committees of the Congress. In my opinion the Congress has done a good job of checking on C.I.A. activities. But if the impression has been created that the C.I.A. is solely the action arm of the executive, then the legislature must assure us this is not so. In fairness to the nation, the President and the Central Intelligence Agency, the public must be confident that the C.I.A. serves the nation and serves it well.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., professor of political science at Brown University, was a high-ranking C.I.A. official from 1947 to 1965.
Lyman Kirkpatrick talks about the CIA

Rumors of a United States role in "destabilizing" Marxist President Salvador Allende's government in Chile were becoming louder and clearer when Lyman Kirkpatrick, a former CIA official, now a Brown professor of political science, was scheduled to speak to incoming freshmen on "The Role of the CIA in American Life." One would have assumed that, while the September "issue forum" was certainly going to be timely, the meeting would not be entirely pleasant for Professor Kirkpatrick, who was to devote a portion of his time to student questions.

Despite whatever mistrust or downright aversion those assembled may have had for the intelligence-gathering system, their response to Kirkpatrick himself — a man who had played a role in the CIA's formation and had worked for it during three decades — was one of genuine and spontaneous admiration. The students listened intently to his opening remarks — a grab bag of history, philosophy, and opinion — and laughed at his anecdotal glimpse into the comical side of cold-war espionage. Then they responded gingerly to the instruction, "Don't be afraid to ask blunt or 'dirty' questions." When all was over, they gave him ringing and prolonged applause. Certainly, many had not agreed with his assessments; but no one had questioned his sincerity or his integrity.

When Lyman Kirkpatrick speaks, whether to groups such as this or in private, he says he tries neither to "defend nor to whitewash" the CIA. While he maintains that intelligence is a necessary part of government — a contention some may question — he is not blind to the agency's failings or to its inherent dangers.

He told his freshman-week audience, among other things, the following:

"I don't agree with interference in the internal affairs of another country."

"Classification is one of the cancers of government. It's used to hide things that shouldn't be hidden."

"The Pentagon Papers gave no aid or comfort to enemies. If anything, reading them tied up a good portion of the Russian personnel."

"In its 27 years of existence, the CIA has been accused of almost everything in the book. Some of it is true, but most of what the CIA does is unseen"
the CIA

continued

"In its twenty-seven years of existence, the CIA has been accused of almost everything in the book. Some of it was true, but most of what the CIA does is unseen. I think President Kennedy was correct in saying (of the CIA), "Your failures are magnified; your successes unseen.""

Kirkpatrick is an eloquent speaker, in a rather flowing, informal way. Whole sentences that naturally divide themselves into paragraphs come pouring out with ease. One is not surprised to find a journalistic bent in his background. "My legitimate career," he called it in jest with the freshmen. That career consisted mainly of an association with the late David Lawrence, editor and publisher of U.S. News and World Report. Kirkpatrick worked for him both before and after World War II, starting in the direct mail and advertising department of the old U.S. News magazine and moving on to cover labor news and, later, congressional news. When the war ended, Lawrence offered Kirkpatrick an editorship of his new magazine, World Report, which the returning wartime intelligence officer held for a year before leaving to join his former military boss in a new venture—the formation of America's first peacetime intelligence-gathering operation.

That was in 1947. The embryonic spy system was called the Central Intelligence Group then. It later became the Central Intelligence Agency, a power which few Americans are ignorant of now, although ignorance of its scope and substance is becoming a public and congressional confession. Kirkpatrick served the agency from 1947 to 1965, holding such positions as inspector general and executive director-comptroller. He joined the Brown faculty in 1965, where he drew on his experience in this aspect of American foreign policy to create four unusual and highly popular courses. The courses are "Cold War Operations," a survey of Russian foreign policy and the techniques used by the Russians during the Cold War, which has had as many as 225 undergraduates a semester; "Problems in National Security," a graduate seminar examining major security issues in the context of historical events such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the war in the Middle East; "American Military Affairs," which usually attracts from forty-five to sixty students for the twenty places available and uses such things as the Pentagon Papers as background for discussion; and "American Security Policy," a spring lecture course dealing with America's role in the Cold War.

"When I left the agency, I severed all connections," Professor Kirkpatrick says. "What I say is my own personal opinion, and I don't mind being quoted anytime on anything." Aside from being quoted fairly often in sources ranging from the Brown Daily Herald to the New York Times, he has written three books on intelligence operations: The Real CIA, Captains Without Eyes, and his latest, published last year, The U.S. Intelligence Community.

In person, he is modest, extremely polite, and able to put people at ease. He is very accessible, both to students and to the public, and he generally doesn't hedge his comments. Perhaps one of the best assessments of Kirkpatrick's credibility comes from Vanderbilt University political scientist Henry Howe Ransom, author of The Intelligence Establishment: "Although we have some policy and judgmental disagreements on the topic, Professor Kirkpatrick is probably the most knowledgeable person writing on the American intelligence agencies today."

With this as background, the BAM presents the following excerpts from conversations with Brown's resident expert on a subject of growing national concern. Perhaps a clue to Professor Kirkpatrick's own personal slant can be gained from one of his most prized mementos. It is a photograph taken in 1965 when he received the award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and sent to him by President Johnson with the inscription, "To a distinguished public servant."

"That, to me, is the key," says Kirkpatrick. "Government officials are public servants, and I believe in the necessity of public service by all people. That's probably what I emphasize most in my classes. If you don't like your government, get out and change it. It's yours."

In an article in the New York Times, Seymour Hersh quotes a former high-level official in the CIA as having said history will show that covert action by the agency was "a liberal idea, perhaps even an idealistic concept." Do you agree?

I don't think I'd ever characterize anybody in the CIA as having an intent that was liberal or conservative deliberately. Instincts perhaps, yes. . . . But the CIA's action in the covert field is determined more by circumstances than by liberalism or conservatism. I think I could say that a good portion of the CIA people in the operations field would be described as liberals. They're for freedom for humanity, for all the things to which people aspire. But to say that this has governed CIA operations is also to ignore the fact that in most instances CIA isn't really the determining factor in the covert operation. It's much more the State Department that determines these things. And it's the desires of the State Department that govern whether they will be carried out or not...

Your average CIA operator — both in the past and in the present — is a product of American education. I would describe most products of American education as being liberals by nature. Most products. There is a conservative element, of course. What CIA has recruited for (and still does) is to find the best university graduates, generally with advanced degrees. They are
would say that as we moved under new directorship (John McCone became director of the CIA in November 1961), the issue was perhaps raised to a different level, but no longer did it seem necessary to mount operations everywhere it seemed possible that a government might come under communist control. The Bay of Pigs, of course, was probably the disaster that led to a lot of this.

**What about Chile?**

I had thought, truly, that by the time the Vietnam war had ended, we were really off this intense cold-war type of intervention. In fact, I was quoted a number of times in the last couple of years as saying I didn't think the CIA was doing anything in Chile, because it seemed to me to be very unwise to be doing anything.

Looking at the Chilean situation, Allende was elected by the established government process of Chile. It wasn't a coup; he didn't take over, even though he had a minority of the vote. The Chilean congress legitimately and legally elected him president of Chile. We had supported the liberal-left government of Eduardo Frei. He could not succeed himself, and Allende was more attractive to more of the people than anyone else. It seemed to me that the wise thing to do was to leave it alone.

What has happened now is so counterproductive. The world is never going to believe that Allende fell because the Chilean people were against him. They are going to believe that a pittance of CIA money overthrew him, which I think is sheer nonsense. My attitude and view of Chile is that Allende was trying an interesting experiment; he was having more difficulty with his own people than with the opposition, and [he] seemed to me foredoomed to failure from that alone. It was only a question of time. The Chilean armed forces had always been a very democratic armed force; at least they always considered themselves under civilian control. I didn't expect them to intervene until they felt the situation was out of hand, which I think is when they did intervene. But now you've got a military government — and that's not usually liberal.

Do you feel that covert or clandestine operations are necessary at all, especially in an age of détente?

Let’s examine what covert operations really are and what they’re meant to be. Any foreign policy of any nation should be based upon what that nation conceives to be its best interests in the world, and what it’s trying to achieve in the world. Having laid that out, perhaps the next step is to determine the instrumentalities for achieving the objectives — diplomacy, economic means, military assistance, information, persuasion, and so forth. Somewhere along the bottom line of instrumentalities would lie covert political operations. And I would say that right below that would lie military action.

Then are you saying this sort of thing is extreme?

I am saying that you would not engage in covert political warfare unless it was of extreme importance to your nation or to the friends that you thought it important to help. But then, once you contribute to anyone’s political campaign, you are involved . . .

In the world today, where nationalism is the strongest force by far, and where every nation, regardless of its size and strength, wants to govern its own destiny, it seems to me that a great deal of restraint and patience has to be exercised by the United States government. We have now received a reputation in most of the world as being an interventionist government — whether it be in Greece, or Chile, or wherever — and I believe that this is a reputation we should get away from. The covert operation is not easy to mount. If you say the wrong thing to the wrong person . . . you may see it in headlines the next day. So, I think that political warfare is something that we should have the capacity to engage in if necessary, but something I would not like to see brought to bear under circumstances where it might be revealed, unless it is definitely related to national security.

Let me add, of course, that I don’t think we can talk about this totally in limbo because part of this problem was created by a congressional leak. This, in my mind, is reprehensible, because it simply means that some people, somewhere in Congress . . . decided they didn’t like what was going on, so they let it out to the press. They have hurt national interests by this, regardless of their motivation. It seems to me that if they were responsible statesmen, or worked for responsible statesmen, they would be trying to get the government to stop this sort of thing by working within government channels. I don’t think we can ever expect to have a successful intelligence-gathering service, or to engage in political warfare successfully, or even to conduct a successful foreign policy, if the way our government is going to operate is by somebody always revealing what it’s doing. People say, “Well, open diplomacy, openly arrived at”; that’s nonsense. There’s never been such a thing; never will be in history.

Do you think there is a public paranoia about the CIA?

Of course there is; it’s stimulated by this sort of thing. And the Chilean affair was, in my opinion, rather weakly defended by the administration. I do not consider it a reason for us to engage in covert political warfare just because the Russians engage in it. That’s a wrong reason. I do think that it’s a weapon we should have in existence in case we have to use it, but I think the deliberation to use it should be at the same level of
seriousness as the deliberation to use armed forces. It has the same impact in world affairs.

Are the powers given the executive branch in this area too broad?

Since the Watergate affair, now the Chilean affair, the reaction has been very similar to previous episodes. At the time of the Bay of Pigs, there was a great uproar, with congressional hearings and full pages in the New York Times. At the time the U2 was shot down in 1960, the same thing. Congress has talked a lot about a joint committee. This has gone on for years. Weicker and Baker didn’t introduce anything new [reference is to a bill sponsored by Republican Senators Howard Baker of Tennessee and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut for the supervision and regulation of the CIA]. Mike Mansfield did the same thing in 1955. I think it would be very difficult to legislate without so qualifying the actions of the president as to make things almost ineffective. I think that what really should be worked out for the good of the nation is an agreement between the president and the Congress to consult. We wouldn’t have had this flap if the congressional leadership had stepped up and said, “This is something we’ve dealt with.”

If you could correct what you consider to be the biggest misconception on the part of the public about the intelligence-gathering operations of the United States, what would it be?

I think the biggest misconception is concern over the CIA operating in the United States. It has, of course, things that it does in the United States as a basis for things it does abroad, the National Students Association being an example from the past. What the CIA subsidized that organization to achieve was the ability to send students abroad to youth and student meetings, so that there would be a non-communist point of view represented. The subsidy started in the fifties—the intense anti-communist period. By the time that Ramparts made its revelation (1967), the age of the subsidy was pretty well over, but like anything that is subsidized, NSA wasn’t urging that its subsidy be cut off. It was cut off, however, like a lot of other things that were subsidized for the same reason—to pose an anti-communist viewpoint which was not hard right but more a liberal interpretation. Communists just don’t pay any attention to the hard right. They are much more concerned about things that are proposing a similar type of progressive program.

Do communists worry more, then, about socialists than they do about conservatives?

That’s exactly right. Socialism has appeals that take people away from them. I think this is very clear in the Allende regime in Chile—not just the socialists, but fringes of the Christian Democrats were more liberal than the Communist Party. And in Italy, for example, ever since the Bolshevik revolution, the Italian communists have been trying to work out some way to be accepted by the socialists in Italy... If you put up some sort of extreme conservative against a communist the vote is fragmented on either extreme. If you put up someone with liberal tendencies, as happens in almost every French election, they’re placed in the dilemma of having equal appeal. Today, when most communist parties have renounced open revolution, this situation poses a real threat to them.

You have said that Russia is our main threat in the world. Where does China fit in?

Russia is the only conceivable military threat. Frankly, as I see China building its defense forces and gradually becoming more powerful, it’s all built on Russia. They’re concerned about Russia. I can’t imagine an armed conflict with China because I don’t think they want to cross the Pacific to attack us, or vice versa.

There seems to be a rash of books out lately by former CIA agents and officials which have a critical, disillusioned tone. What is your feeling about the agency, with the benefit of six years of reflection?

The CIA is a necessary organization, and I rather shudder to think what might have happened if we hadn’t had it, especially during the intense period of Russian-American hostility following World War II. We were close to the brink of war over Berlin, very close to war over Cuba in 1962, and near the brink of war over the Middle East in 1973... I think the CIA has a proper place in government, and I frankly think it has done some very good things. It has to be tightly controlled. There’s no doubt about the potential danger of misuse of an intelligence gathering agency. We saw it in Watergate.

What about Watergate?

I was appalled by the domestic “plumbers unit.” It was literally a political police unit against the opponents of the regime. It smacked to me of Nazi Germany and of Russia, and of everything I’ve been conditioned to dislike. I was appalled by the attempt on the part of the President’s assistants to try to use CIA to cover up the Watergate mess. This to me indicates such an abhorrent lack of knowledge about what our government, our people, and our nation stand for that I have absolutely no respect and no consideration for those people.

The CIA, by its very character, is a highly disciplined organization—very highly disciplined. The reason for that is very clear. If you do not control things very tightly in Washington, both financially and operationally, then you’re almost at the mercy of your own people if they decide they want to do something. It is required that no CIA man, no matter where he is, will try to get in touch with, or cultivate, or try to re-
crucial discipline in the whole business of handling classified information. You learn from the start — if you want to stay employed — that you keep your papers turned over, that you put classified papers in a safe at night and lock it . . . You become very disciplined. It isn't very pleasant; lots of people writhe under the secrecy, and I agree with them. It isn't very pleasant to go home and be unable to talk about what you've done during the day. You acquire a reputation for doing something sinister, even though it may be nothing more sinister than looking at the grain production in the Ukraine . . . A part of this kind of discipline has meant that it has been imbued in CIA people that they do not engage in politics domestically.

What was the atmosphere at the agency during the McCarthy years?
When the McCarthy underground was active, there was a hideous atmosphere in Washington generally. They would call wives and say, "Your husband is fooling around with another woman," or perhaps try to blackmail an employee with a family drinking problem. "We won't tell anyone if you will work for us" — this sort of thing. I saw it all because I was then inspector general of the CIA, and people would come in and ask me what to do . . . Allen Dulles — I will say this for him — was very strong against McCarthy compared to his brother. Allen would not allow McCarthy people near the CIA, while John Foster Dulles made little or no effort to protect the State Department. That really destroyed the morale of the Foreign Service.

Coming back to the present, do you think that the CIA has become so large it is bureaucratic?
I don't think so, because by nature they're not bureaucrats. In fact, by nature they're hostile to bureaucracy. The intelligence system . . . grew very large during the Vietnam War, and it is now going through a period of cutbacks. Probably about a 30 percent cutback has taken place in the last several years, which means that a large number of people have been let go. If done correctly, this could be very helpful. It's like pruning a tree or a grapevine; if it's done well, you end up with a great deal more in production than you had originally. I happen to feel that government can be small anyway, much smaller than it is.

Could you elaborate more on what you consider to be the strengths of the CIA?
I think the greatest, which is well documented in the Pentagon Papers, is its ability to work with other intelligence-gathering agencies to provide very accurate estimates of what might develop. A glance through the Pentagon Papers would indicate that CIA estimates were very close to the truth. This certainly is a major accomplishment. If the policy-makers had paid attention to these assessments, the odds on Vietnam having progressed along the path it did would have been less. They kept telling the policy-makers that North Vietnam was not going to collapse and was not going to be forced to surrender by bombing, which would only make them fight harder, or by escalation, which they would match.

They've [the CIA] had some great successes in individual operations. The U2, I think, was certainly one of the greatest innovations in the history of intelligence. This was a unique aircraft for its time; it could fly higher and take better pictures than anybody ever dreamed of, and it could go into areas where nobody else could get. Until it was shot down, the U2 literally changed our entire knowledge of the Soviet Union from an industrial and military point of view . . . The Berlin Tunnel was another innovative collection of very important intelligence information. Laos was an example of a successful covert operation. But the thing I would emphasize is that most intelligence comes from open information. Eighty to 88 percent of our intelligence information is gathered through electronic means.

Should the overt and covert sides of the CIA be separated?
The Bay of Pigs is a perfect illustration of where that fails. That operation was a little component sort of attached onto CIA; it had CIA people and military people in it, but they weren't taking advantage of CIA's analytical side. The operators were telling themselves what the intelligence was and then acting on it. This is very dangerous.

What do you consider the cardinal mistakes of CIA?
Being too willing to act. That's probably the most important mistake. Of course, it's easy to sit here in Providence and criticize the CIA. Why did they give Howard Hunt the wigs and other equipment? Of course, they didn't know what it was going to be used for, but that was a mistake in itself. It's easy to criticize. But being too willing to act, and perhaps being action oriented . . . have led to mistakes. Chile is a good example. Of course, again, I am talking from a good, safe distance.

Let's talk about accountability. I infer from some statements in your latest book that you feel the first place we should look for safeguards against mistake is at the people who man the agency. Is this true, and what other safeguards do we have?
What I am saying, basically, is that intelligence is so complex and so big that the director of CIA has to be someone who, like Colby, is impeccable. The other people who
work there have to be the same . . . I would add to that
that within CIA we have emulated the structure of
government as a whole and have set up a system of
checks and balances. We set up the post of inspector
general, with broad, sweeping powers within the
agency and answerable to no one but the director him-
self. That is a job I held for eight years. It was a tough
job, and unpleasant, because I was constantly criticiz-
ing my peers — cleaning out the closets. We also set
up systems to audit our own funds and control our op-
erations. In effect, we reviewed everything we did.

In Congress, there are four subcommittees on CIA
— one each on the armed services and appropriations
committees of each branch. In recent years, three
people from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
have sat with the appropriations and armed services
subcommittees to talk about CIA. Their staff people,
selected by the chairman, are expected to look at what
CIA is doing. It becomes a mutual responsibility — for
the CIA to keep the subcommittees informed, and for
the congressmen to look at anything that concerns
them. I have to say it's worked on a mixed basis . . .
George Mahon (chairman of the House Appropria-
tions Committee) does a very thorough job and is very
conscientious. Jerry Ford, by the way, sat on that sub-
committee . . .

The armed services subcommittees have to pass
any authorizations for CIA expenditures. They can
look at all of CIA's operations in whatever detail they
want to. One year I spent five full days up there talk-
ing about the budget and what we were doing . . . I
think this could be more thorough, more detailed, and
I think the congressmen on these subcommittees
should not be on any other committees. They should
have time to devote to it. Perhaps a day a week. They
should become true experts.

The greatest accounting, of course, is made through
the Office of Management and Budget. They usually
have about five people who are fully cleared to ex-
amine everything the CIA does . . . The accountability
system is there. In my mind, it's just a matter of clarifying
it and straightening out some of the details.

Then how do you explain the concern over the opposite
— that Congress doesn't know what CIA is doing?

There is no way around it. Congress is the scruti-
nizing body. Much more of the controversy around
CIA emanates from Congress than from anywhere
else, in my opinion. Now Senators Weicker and Baker
are not on any CIA subcommittee, so they don't know
what's going on. Neither does Father Drinan (Mas-
sachusetts Representative Robert Drinan). He and
I had a controversy in the letters column of the Times
after I wrote an op-ed piece on CIA. He is not aware
of what's going on, so he gets up and makes sweep-
ing statements: "Congress doesn't know what CIA
is doing." Well, that's in error. But only thirty or thirty-
five of them know. I think there is a problem there,

and that Congress should straighten it out and stop
fighting over the prostrate body of CIA.

As a college professor, what have you found the student
attitude toward intelligence to be? It varies, I'm sure, but do
you find a lively discussion in your classes?

Yes. Students are very interested in it. Even through
the whole Vietnam War, they were interested. Some
of them, I'm sure, are repulsed by it, feel it is evil and
shouldn't exist, and that it is un-American. My atti-
tude towards that is this: I, too, wish we didn't have
to have it, but until we live in a world where there
is no hostility and an open exchange of information,
the United States government would be negligent
not to have intelligence.
It is easy to jump to the conclusion that this meant that only the FBI conducted operations in the United States, and only the CIA operated abroad. Intelligence and security matters do not stop at national boundaries, however, so a number of agreements and understandings between the FBI and the CIA were developed over the years as actual operations indicated areas of mutual interest.

A listing of some of these common domestic interests illustrates the complexity of internal security matters. Both the CIA and the FBI are prime targets for attempted penetration by foreign intelligence services. The protection of their personnel and the assurance that no new recruits may already have been subverted by a foreign service are of prime concern to both. The FBI, not wanting to assume the heavy burden of field investigations for all CIA personnel, agreed when the agency was established that CIA could investigate its own personnel and those persons or organizations with which it did business. A qualification was that if the CIA discovered any evidence of Communist activities or foreign intelligence associations on the part of an individual, then the FBI immediately would be advised and could take over the investigation.

A second area of agreement concerned collection of present foreign intelligence information in the United States. During World War II a dozen or more federal agencies sought information from recent immigrants, businesses with extensive foreign interests and others. In 1947 it was agreed that this service would be centralized under the CIA, and contact offices were opened in major centers in the United States. Any volunteers with information about possible hostile intelligence agents or alleged illegal activities by American citizens were to be directed to the FBI.

In 1951 the directors of the CIA and the FBI, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and J. Edgar Hoover, reached an agreement on coordination of counterintelligence operations.

The most prolific sources that identify Americans working for or collaborating with hostile intelligence services are defectors, those individuals who for ideological or other reasons decide to seek asylum and tell the CIA everything they know. Each of these not infrequent defectors provides dozens of traces which must be investigated.

It is following up clues originating abroad that leads to the internal security problem. The CIA has been rather successful at penetrating foreign Communist parties and Marxist groups just as the FBI has been with the American Communist Party. These penetrations produce a sizable number of leads.
One question that must be answered is: How much time do the committees wish to devote to CIA and intelligence? The Armed Services Committees have the entire Defense Department to oversee, a subject with political appeal —bases, contracts, jobs, constituents. Appropriations must pass on the federal budget of which intelligence is less than 2 per cent.

There appears to be little merit to adding another committee just to oversee intelligence activities with each senator and congressman already sitting on one or two standing committees as well as special committees. Nor would there seem to be any use in establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence if the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees continued to exercise jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies. This would only add to the competition and rivalry between committees. A Joint Committee would be advisable only with exclusive jurisdiction and members and staff with time available to do the job.

Another question is: To what degree should the Committees examine the details of intelligence operations? It is not easy to persuade foreign nationals (and they are the only ones who are clandestine agents) to engage in highly dangerous work in which their lives may be at stake. If such people believed their names would be publicized they would never work for the United States.

In broad terms the committees must be told enough about the work of the intelligence community so they may responsibly assure the American people that the system is working properly. The Congressional Committees never should be misinformed or uninformed. More specifically, in the areas of espionage, counterespionage and covert political operations the committees should know what is going on and where, but should not ask for details of operations or identity of agents. In counterespionage, the never-ending struggle to protect our own secrets, the overseers should be told in general which agency is carrying out the operations in the United States.

In the area of covert political operations, the suggestion made by President Ford that the "40 Committee", his body for reviewing in advance proposals for such activities, advise the congressional committees of contemplated action seems to make good sense. This would give the congressmen an opportunity —on a confidential basis to raise objections with the President before the mounting of an operation they deemed unwise. However, if such information were to become a vehicle for political opponents of the President's foreign policy to attack it, the partnership would end.

One thing should be obvious: The willingness of the President to allow frank discussion of intelligence operations with congressional committees in executive session will be in direct proportion to the responsible handling of that information by legislators. Neither branch of the government is in a good position to "cast stones" on the subject of leakage of classified information. Nor can we expect leaks to be eliminated by anything except responsible performance in both branches of government. But foreign intelligence assets are too perishable and irretrievable to be destroyed in the pursuit of partisan politics. Most important at this moment in our history is for the Congress to assure itself and the American people that the intelligence and security agencies are working properly.

Mr. Kirkpatrick is a professor of political science at Brown University. He served as inspector general of the CIA from 1953 to 1962 and as executive director-comptroller of the agency from 1962 to 1965. He has written several books and articles concerning U.S. intelligence activities.
At a time when public indignation over the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the overthrow of Chile's elected government had barely begun to subside, the BAM published excerpts in November from a series of interviews with Lyman Kirkpatrick, former inspector general of the CIA and now a professor of political science at Brown. In those interviews, Professor Kirkpatrick responded to a question on public reaction to the agency by saying that the biggest misconception on the part of the American public was "concern over the CIA operating in the United States." He also said that he was "appalled" by the effort made to implicate the agency in the Watergate cover-up and added that "it has been imbued in CIA people that they do not engage in politics domestically."

Since the publication of that article, another public furor has emerged with the CIA at its center. This time, the issue is not clandestine activities outside the United States, but the possibility of a domestic spy force in Washington that has accumulated intelligence information on as many as 10,000 American citizens.

With the continuation of a long debate over CIA activities having been set in motion by recent disclosures in the New York Times, reported by Seymour Hersh; and with the establishment of a special "blue ribbon" commission by President Ford to look into CIA activities, the BAM returned to Professor Kirkpatrick's quiet office near the Van Wickle Gates for a continuation of his personal analysis of the nation's foreign intelligence-gathering agency. His comments on the current controversy follow.

Since December 22, when it reported evidence of "a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon years," the New York Times has printed almost daily stories on alleged improprieties in the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency. What has been your reaction to these stories?

I think that probably the New York Times, and maybe Seymour Hersh himself, feel that if they don't keep on the story, it's going to die. An investigation will take place; the story will be over. My impression has been that occasionally Hersh has been reaching out for stories that didn't really have very much in them. They run the same paragraphs over and over again in Hersh's stories; and it's strange to me, because some of the material they've dug up is rather petty and not terribly pertinent. I don't understand if this is something that the editors have asked him (Hersh) to do, or whether he doesn't want to let it drop.

The Times, in an editorial January 13, expressed concern—and they were quite right in this—that over the years there have been flaps about the CIA...and Congress has talked about doing something and never really did anything. This time, they're hoping that Congress will set up a committee that will be more aggressive in its oversight responsibilities. I agree with them from that point of view. But I think, on the other hand, that some of the material they are printing is misleading and stirs up the public. When you consider that probably a sizeable proportion of people don't read newspaper articles, just look at the headlines and don't know the issues involved, then I don't think this is serving the national interest terribly well.

What are some of the things you would characterize as misleading?

The article January 13 which got front-page treatment in the Times, I forget the exact wording of the headline, but it was something to the effect that the CIA budget was illegal, according to a law study. When you read the story, you realize that this is based on an article in the Yale Law Review (which was written) by a third-year law student (Elliot Maxwell '69) and which has no basis in the law whatever.

Frankly, I disagree with his argumentation of the law because I don't think he looked very carefully at the CIA Act of 1949, which is quite specific in saying that the CIA does not have to abide by the regular reporting procedures on (its) budget. Funds can be transferred to and from departments without regard to standing federal laws. On the other hand, I would go along, in one respect, with Elliot Maxwell, who was a student of mine and whom I know quite well. (I agree with him) that there is no great need to hide the CIA budget. If you published it, I think people would be rather astonished at how small it is...[

[The Times] also had a piece about some former character in CIA who talked about mail surveillance that took place when he was at the agency nineteen years ago. This again, to my mind, is not a major issue that the (investigative) committee people are going to worry about. Practically every major nation in the world engages in some type of mail surveillance for internal security. If they didn't, they'd be out of their minds. They wouldn't be protecting themselves.

Then there's a fellow named Agee, who is ex-CIA, or describes himself as an ex-CIA type, who is testifying before the Russell Commission, named for the late Bertrand Russell and made up of people who apparently have a particularly strong bias against the CIA. He...
is talking about a number of things he did in Latin America. All of this, as far as I'm concerned, is sort of regurgitation from people either trying to make headlines or make money.

What about the main charge in the current controversy — domestic spying?

This is a serious matter; and I hope that the Rockefeller Commission and the congressional committees get to the bottom of it, satisfy themselves, and either announce that there are remedial measures that should be taken or that they feel there is somebody in the CIA who has been guilty of criminal wrongdoing. (I hope they) settle it so that the public is confident there isn't a CIA man behind every tree . . .

How large is the CIA stuff working in this country?

CIA's total domestic complement is included in only three offices. These are the only offices that have any work at all in this country. They are the security office, involved totally in checking CIA applicants for employment and people who have contracts with CIA or are doing jobs for CIA; the Domestic Contact Services office, which I was director of from 1948-50, and which simply goes around and picks up foreign information that's available in this country (a large U.S. corporation with interests all over the world gets a great volume of perfectly open information that's valuable to researchers on economies and things like that . . .); and the third office, which is the one that became involved in all this controversy, is one called the Domestic Operations Division. This was set up in 1962 to develop cover for operations abroad, that is, ways of covering clandestine operations and agents. Its work is very limited indeed, and it's a very small office. Part of the argument was that (the Domestic Operations Division) engaged in checking out American political opposition. Another allegation is that this checking was conducted by the counterespionage unit of the CIA; that it involved some 10,000 dossiers that were accumulated on American citizens; that (the agents) engaged in breaking and entering illegally; and that they engaged in mail coverage and wiretaps. This is a much more serious allegation.

Could you explain what is meant by counterespionage, and clarify the jurisdictional difference between the FBI and the CIA?

This is something many people in this country don't know. When the CIA came into existence, it was agreed that the agency would operate outside the United States and that the FBI would operate inside the United States . . . I think it was a wise decision. It was wise because it creates as clear a line of delineation — the geographic limits of the United States — as you can in (these) rather complex matters.

But counterespionage, like any intelligence operation, doesn't stop at borders. People cross borders, and operations are directed from outside countries into countries. So it was necessary for the FBI and the CIA to sit down and work out a rational, sensible way that they could operate together. This started in 1951, when General Walter Bedell Smith, a very dominant and able man, was director. I thought that he and John McConne (named director in 1962) were the two best directors of CIA because they were excellent executives and were very thorough at doing what Washington calls "their homework." In other words, knowing what they should know . . . Smith, very shortly after he was named director, told me to ask J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, to come over to CIA for lunch and a talk about the problems between the two agencies. It was sort of like an amicable meeting in some respects, because there had been a lot of difficulty between the two agencies, a lot of feud and controversy. Hoover came with one of his associate directors and one of his assistant directors. Smith took the same to lunch with him, and I happened to be the assistant director who was present. The two directors didn't mince words. Smith started off with, "Edgar, what seems to be the difficulty with us?" And Hoover came right back with, "Well, General, one of the difficulties is that there are a lot of FBI alumni over here who are sniffing at the FBI and proselytizing FBI personnel; and I won't tolerate it." Smith said quickly, "Well, I won't tolerate it either, so we'll dispose of that problem." And then they settled down and reached an agreement whereby there would be literally daily liaison (between the two agencies) on the assistant director level. We at that level would insure that the operations liaison back and forth went smoothly, and that anything of a serious consequence would be shot up immediately to the directors themselves, so that they could settle it. It set us on a path that was reasonably amicable and was healthy for the nation . . .

The problem arises in the counterespionage field because CIA is worldwide, and (because) counterespionage means operations against, or neutralizing the effect of, all foreign intelligence services. This is primarily the communist intelligence services, particularly the Russians. You get into counterespionage by identifying who their personnel are and then trying to see whether you can recruit their personnel. If you can't recruit, you try to get them to defect, get them to come over to our side. Every time you succeed in a defection, it's really a gold mine in counterespionage information.

When their people come over, they'll start telling us, "Well, we know Moscow has a source in this department." And then they describe what the source produces. They never, or seldom, know the name of the source. This supplies literally hundreds of leads in departments, agencies, and elsewhere.

Here in America?

Yes. To use a case in point, in the 1950s there was a sergeant at the National Security Agency who'd been recruited in Moscow when he worked in a motor pool there. One of these Russian defectors described the source that they had in the National Security Agency, which led to a tremendous investigation that eventually enabled us to find this sergeant, who was in Russian pay and was turning over hundreds of top secret documents. So, as I say, your defectors turn over hundreds of leads — thousands in some cases.

Also, CIA operations abroad have been successful in penetrating foreign communist parties and Marxist groups. The communists are great word merchants. Their meetings are verbose; they're very prolific in their writings; their paper mills are incredible . . . And so, a lot of names are tossed around. These produce leads that have to be followed. Now, during the Vietnam war, when it was a major objective of the communists to stop or destroy the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia, probably every anti-war demonstrator who became a public name in the United States was talked about somewhere in foreign communist circles. This kind of thing
starts tracing, to see whether this is just a name they are talking about, or whether it could possibly be an agent, or someone receiving money, or whatever. When this kind of information comes to Washington — and all information in counterespionage comes into central files in Washington — the FBI and the CIA will consult together to see who follows the leads. Occasionally, it's more than both organizations can do. Occasionally, the FBI says, "We'll take it over; you drop it," or, "You go ahead and do it; we'll drop it." So this is where (some of the present controversy may) stem from. When they talk about 10,000 dossiers or names, it doesn't really impress me; because when you consider the magnitude of the anti-war effort in this country, that really isn't a great number of names.

So the distinction is in whether the investigation of Americans is prompted by information received through the normal channels of counterespionage or is ordered specifically by someone in government?

Yes.

What are the usual means of checking people out? Is wiretapping ever permissible?

No. Wiretapping is not legal in the United States unless you receive a court order. The law is quite specific on that. The new law in 1964 (says) that you must receive, in advance, a court order from the President, then the President is accountable. If he had an order from the President, then the President is accountable. (The employee's recourse is the same in this situation as the military officer's recourse; if he is given an order he considers illegal, he can refuse to obey it. The real question here is, what is illegal? Also, of course, the key question is, where was the action initiated and why? Was it following through a lead from abroad, or was it reacting to a political order in the United States?

According to Hersh's sources, the units responsible for domestic spying were kept shielded from other units within CIA. From your comments on checks and balances within the agency in the BAM's November interview, I was wondering if you felt this sort of thing would be possible?

Yes, it would, there's no question about it. (I have) an anecdote about Joseph P. Kennedy, John Kennedy's father, who was a member of Eisenhower's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, appointed in 1956. (Kennedy) had had a great deal of government experience; he had been ambassador to Great Britain, he had been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he had been chairman of the Maritime Commission, and he was, of course, a very wealthy man in his own right from business. I remember him sitting in my office one day, swinging his leg over the side of the chair, and saying, "Kirkpatrick, this intelligence board is for the birds; you fellows can hide anything you want to hide while we're around. Just push it out of sight and tell us what you want to tell us. Then we go away, and you go back and do what you want to do." Well, there's a lot of truth in that, if somebody wants to willfully hide things. In my eight years and eight months as inspector general of the CIA, we tried to talk to everybody in every unit; we tried to look at every dollar they spent, and so on, to make sure that there was no way of hiding. But there are ways, if the investigation isn't thorough or complete. And there are ways if the President or the director says, "We'll do this on a completely compartmented basis, so that nobody else knows that it's happening." Then, if nobody talks, it can be done. Of course, in our society, everybody talks...

Do you think anything will come out of a study by a commission such as the one appointed by President Ford with Nelson Rockefeller as its head?

Oh yes. I think there will definitely be some recommendations. How these recommendations will affect the future, I really couldn't say. They will try and tighten up the system, whereby CIA is looked at by outside bodies and there are reports provided that will lead to congressional and public confidence in the agency.

(The present controversy) is pretty disgraceful, in my opinion. Here is an agency we've had for twenty-eight years now, and one (which has) done some remarkably able things. Of course, it's made mistakes; if it hadn't made mistakes, I'd worry about it, too. Probably wasn't trying. And yet, it's constantly under attack and constantly suspected. I blame both the Congress of the United States and the President for not defending it when it should be defended. I think the Congress right now is displaying its lack of organization and its lack of ability to focus. Imagine, four different committees are holding hearings on this. Maybe they should get four different directors to satisfy everyone. Congress is really the culprit. They have quibbled about and fought internally about how to police the CIA for twenty years, but they've never come to a conclusion.

CIA Director Colby admitted before the Senate Appropriations Intelligence subcommittee on January 15 that the CIA had reported to wiretaps and other such means for some security surveillances conducted in the U.S. on American citizens. Would you comment on that?

The full text of Colby's statement, which was printed in the New York Times and a few other papers, is quite thorough. I think it puts things in the proper context. What is disturbing about the reporting on the CIA these days, however, is illustrated in the Times article about Colby's testimony. In it, Hersh couldn't help putting in a few of the same paragraphs used over and over again which expound his views of the CIA. In Colby's statement, it is made clear that the wiretaps and break-ins were conducted on CIA personnel themselves. My question to Mr. Hersh would be, "What would you do if you felt the intelligence-gathering system of your country was being infiltrated by the intelligence-gathering system of another country? Would you take it to court?"
A senatorial question about the Bay of Pigs

This letter was written to Professor Kirkpatrick, and is used with the author's permission.

I read with great interest your comments about the CIA in the Brown Alumni Monthly.

In this regard, I was surprised that you used the Bay of Pigs as an illustration of why the overt and covert sides of the CIA should not be separated.

I would have thought just the opposite. Here, I think back to the luncheon I had with Allen Dulles, you, and various top officials in early 1961 when I set forth my own impression that an attempt to overturn Castro would not succeed because those who opposed Castro had either been killed, fled, or imprisoned and that the majority of those remaining supported the regime.

I am sure that my powers of perception were less, and certainly no greater, than those of the CIA representatives in Cuba. And, yet, when the Bay of Pigs came, I was left with the conclusion that because the top command wanted to carry out the operation, the assessments of the intelligence gathering side of the CIA were downgraded or set to one side.

Actually, I have often used the Bay of Pigs as an example of why the intelligence collection and operational sides of the CIA should be separated.

In any case, I was much stimulated and impressed by your article and thought it generally excellent.

CLAIBORNE PELL '72
The United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Professor Kirkpatrick replies:

I remember well the luncheon in 1961 and your concerns about Cuba, a view several of us shared. However, I fear that separating intelligence collection from operations would increase rather than diminish the likelihood of future failures. But I believe there may be some misunderstanding as to where assessments of intelligence are made. The responsibility for the DDI (Deputy Director for Intelligence) and not that of the DDP (now Deputy Director for Operations), which is responsible both for intelligence collection and covert operations.

Under normal conditions — indeed almost always, except when the director (or the President) orders a different procedure as in the Bay of Pigs — all intelligence, whether collected by the Directorate for Operations in CIA, by the foreign service, or by military intelligence, is analyzed by the Directorate for Intelligence, which makes assessments of a given situation or estimates of the future. All that the Directorate for Operations, or any other collector, does with intelligence reports is to give an evaluation of the collector's belief in the accuracy of the intelligence, based on the agent's qualifications and ability to gather the information.

What happened in the Bay of Pigs was that the director authorized a unit outside the general structure of the CIA. This unit analyzed all the raw intelligence coming from Cuba and planned the operation on that basis. No one from that unit ever asked the DDI to produce an analysis of the internal situation in Cuba, or whether such an operation as was planned could succeed. In fact the DDI was not consulted in any way.

Thus the most competent element of the CIA, and probably in the government, was excluded. Separating intelligence collection and covert operations has another serious problem. Covert operations must be based on a solid clandestine intelligence base. If these are in separate agencies, as were British SIS and SOE in World War II, then problems and even disasters are inevitable. We had the same in CIA in the early fifties when intelligence collection and covert operations were in separate offices, and it was chaotic.

LYMAN KIRKPATRICK

"Shocked by his cynicism"

Editor: I found the article by Lyman Kirkpatrick (BAM, November) peculiarly shocking.

He tells a freshman-week audience, "I don't agree with interference in the internal affairs of another country." Then he wanders through Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Greece, Laos, Chile, etc., without a word of disapproval, except a regret that not all of them were clever or successful.

Covert attempts by the U.S. government to overthrow governments of other nations he calls "political warfare." And he says, "I think that political warfare is something that we should have the capacity to engage in if necessary, but something I would not like to see brought to bear under circumstances where it might be revealed, unless it is definitely related to national security."

I take this to mean (since anything at all can be said to be "definitely related to national security") that the United States may do anything it pleases to another country, but should have a care not to get caught at it, if possible. I can put no other translation on his double-talk, and am shocked by its cynicism.

Where then does he get off telling us that "I was appalled by the domestic "plumber's unit." It was literally a political police unit against the opponents of the regime. It smacked to me of Nazi Germany and of Russia . . ."

WILLIAM E. O'CONNOR '42
Daytona Beach, Fla.

"Good reason" for not choosing engineering

Editor: In response to Chairman Clifton's efforts to increase Brown's engineering enrollment (Under the Elms, BAM, November), I must say that there is good reason why today's better students are not choosing an engineering career. They need only read the newspapers to learn of widespread layoffs and unemployment, especially among engineers forty years old, to realize that it is difficult to make engineering a lifetime career.

There are now more engineers than engineering positions. While recent graduates are being welcomed at the front door, the older engineers are being evicted out the back. The perceptive high school senior doesn't want this career insecurity.

This engineering surplus is caused by present economic conditions, federal government policy, the repeated woe of "engineering shortage," and the desire of the engineering departments to graduate more students. A solution, which I advocate, is that there should always be a moderate shortage of engineers, so that all engineers can find satisfying and challenging work. This can only be accomplished by a coordinated effort of government, university, industry, and professional societies. Even though there are the short-term interests of the university and industry, who both profit by more students, with a resulting surplus of engineers, I think the alternative will be worse in the long run. What we are now experiencing is that engineering, which can be such a satisfying profession, is no longer very desirable; consequently, better students are wisely selecting other careers. Therefore urge Professor Clifton to wait a few more years in his efforts to increase enrollments until he can be sure that his new graduates can look forward to a permanent career in engineering.

HARRY M. CRONSON '59
Lexington, Mass.
June 20, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Charlie Schultze
Subject: Third Monthly Meeting with Economic Advisers and Federal Reserve Board Chairman (Quadriad)

The agenda for the third monthly meeting of the Quadriad might center on the following three areas:

-- The outlook for inflation.
-- Recent trends in interest rates and monetary growth.
-- The outlook for economic activity in the second half of the year.

The following material will provide some background for this discussion.

1. Inflation Outlook

We expect the rate of inflation to decelerate significantly in the second half of the year. While the CPI rose at an annual rate of over 10 percent in the first 4 months of the year, the rate should fall to below 6 percent in the second half. Favorable developments in food prices are the primary reason. Wholesale prices of farm products fell about 2-1/2 percent in May after having risen about 12 percent in the previous five months. Good spring rains and large planting figures are helping to keep grain prices down and the winter wheat crop is close to last year's record.

Another favorable price development recently has been the trend of sensitive industrial materials prices. The Federal Reserve Board's index of these prices rose about 12 percent from early November 1976 through early April, but since then has fallen about 6 percent. Declines have been concentrated in scrap metals, cotton, hides, and tallow.
You may want to discuss the implications of these price developments for monetary policy. In particular, can the Federal Reserve Board now afford to be more accommodative in supplying money and credit to finance the expansion?

2. Interest Rates and Monetary Growth

Prior to the last Quadriad meeting, the Federal Reserve had taken actions to restrict the growth of money in response to sharp increases in the money supply in April. The Federal Reserve's actions took the form of pushing up the Federal funds rate (the rate on overnight loans between banks) from 4-5/8 percent in early April to 5-3/8 percent a month later. As a result, short-term market interest rates increased. In order to preserve the spread between these rates and the rates on business loans, most large commercial banks had just announced an increase in their price rate from 6-1/4 to 6-1/2 percent. Several days later, the prime rate rose another notch to 6-3/4 percent.

More recently, one large bank (Morgan Guaranty Trust) reversed this additional increase by reverting to the previous 6-1/2 percent rate. It is not yet clear whether other major banks will follow suit. Loan demand at larger banks has been relatively weak compared to the demand at smaller regional banks -- as is typical at the start of a resurgence of business loan activity.

Over the past month, the narrowly-defined money supply (M1) -- which consists of currency and checking deposits -- has remained unchanged. Short-term market interest rates have come down a little but are still about one-half percentage point above their levels in early April. Long-term rates did not respond much to the Federal Reserve's tightening measures, and they are now generally at or a little below their levels in early April.

In discussing these movements in interest rates, you may want to ask about monetary policy in light of the fact that money growth has slowed down since the Federal Reserve tightening. If money growth continues sluggish so that the money supply moves back within the Fed target range, can we expect some loosening of the reins by the Fed and a reduction in interest rates?

3. The Economic Outlook for the Second Half of the Year

We expect real economic growth to be in the 6-1/2 percent range this quarter, but to slow to about 5 to 5-1/2 percent in the second half. Residential construction, inventory investment and personal consumption are all expected to grow at a slower rate.
State and local government purchases should grow more quickly, however, as the stimulus program begins to take effect. Some catchup from the Federal expenditure shortfall is also expected.

We now forecast that business fixed investment will grow strongly in the second half and this should help to keep the growth of real GNP above 5 percent. However, there is considerable uncertainty here. The Commerce Department survey of plant and equipment expenditures indicates a slower growth. In discussing the outlook for business investment, you may want to ask about business confidence, the recent behavior of the stock market, and its impact on investment.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1977

TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT
    STU EIZENSTAT
    HAMILTON JORDAN
    JACK WATSON
    BERT LANCE

FROM: RICK HUTCHESON

SUBJECT: Charles Schultze's Memo 6/20/77
re Third Monthly Meeting with
Economic Advisers and Federal
Reserve Board Chairman (Quadriad)

The President has the original memo. A
copy is attached for your information.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Charlie Schulze

Subject: Third Monthly Meeting with Economic Advisers and Federal Reserve Board Chairman (Quadriad)

The agenda for the third monthly meeting of the Quadriad might center on the following three areas:

--- The outlook for inflation.

--- Recent trends in interest rates and monetary growth.

--- The outlook for economic activity in the second half of the year.

The following material will provide some background for this discussion.

1. **Inflation Outlook**

   We expect the rate of inflation to decelerate significantly in the second half of the year. While the CPI rose at an annual rate of over 10 percent in the first 4 months of the year, the rate should fall to below 6 percent in the second half. Favorable developments in food prices are the primary reason. Wholesale prices of farm products fell about 2-1/2 percent in May after having risen about 12 percent in the previous five months. Good spring rains and large planting figures are helping to keep grain prices down and the winter wheat crop is close to last year's record.

   Another favorable price development recently has been the trend of sensitive industrial materials prices. The Federal Reserve Board's index of these prices rose about 12 percent from early November 1976 through early April, but since then has fallen about 6 percent. Declines have been concentrated in scrap metals, cotton, hides, and tallow.
You may want to discuss the implications of these price developments for monetary policy. In particular, can the Federal Reserve Board now afford to be more accommodative in supplying money and credit to finance the expansion?

2. Interest Rates and Monetary Growth

Prior to the last Quadriad meeting, the Federal Reserve had taken actions to restrict the growth of money in response to sharp increases in the money supply in April. The Federal Reserve's actions took the form of pushing up the Federal funds rate (the rate on overnight loans between banks) from 4-5/8 percent in early April to 5-3/8 percent a month later. As a result, short-term market interest rates increased. In order to preserve the spread between these rates and the rates on business loans, most large commercial banks had just announced an increase in their price rate from 6-1/4 to 6-1/2 percent. Several days later, the prime rate rose another notch to 6-3/4 percent.

More recently, one large bank (Morgan Guaranty Trust) reversed this additional increase by reverting to the previous 6-1/2 percent rate. It is not yet clear whether other major banks will follow suit. Loan demand at larger banks has been relatively weak compared to the demand at smaller regional banks -- as is typical at the start of a resurgence of business loan activity.

Over the past month, the narrowly-defined money supply (M1) -- which consists of currency and checking deposits -- has remained unchanged. Short-term market interest rates have come down a little but are still about one-half percentage point above their levels in early April. Long-term rates did not respond much to the Federal Reserve's tightening measures, and they are now generally at or a little below their levels in early April.

In discussing these movements in interest rates, you may want to ask about monetary policy in light of the fact that money growth has slowed down since the Federal Reserve tightening. If money growth continues sluggish so that the money supply moves back within the Fed target range, can we expect some loosening of the reins by the Fed and a reduction in interest rates?

3. The Economic Outlook for the Second Half of the Year

We expect real economic growth to be in the 6-1/2 percent range this quarter, but to slow to about 5 to 5-1/2 percent in the second half. Residential construction, inventory investment and personal consumption are all expected to grow at a slower rate.
State and local government purchases should grow more quickly, however, as the stimulus program begins to take effect. Some catchup from the Federal expenditure shortfall is also expected.

We now forecast that business fixed investment will grow strongly in the second half and this should help to keep the growth of real GNP above 5 percent. However, there is considerable uncertainty here. The Commerce Department survey of plant and equipment expenditures indicates a slower growth. In discussing the outlook for business investment, you may want to ask about business confidence, the recent behavior of the stock market, and its impact on investment.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE

SUBJECT: Weekly Legislative Report
dated June 18, 1977

You raised two questions about items on this week's legislative report. Further information is as follows:

HR 5023, Indian Claims Filing Extension

The Department of Interior supports extending "until December 31, 1981, the statute of limitations for suits for money damages brought by the United States on behalf of Indians where the cause of action arose prior to 1966. The present statute will expire on July 18, 1977." Interior reports that at least two amendments will be offered (the bill will be on the House floor Thursday), to extend the law for one or two years.

Interior gives these reasons for its position in support of the four and one-half year extension:

1. The four and one-half years are necessary to sufficiently allow this Department and Justice to identify, research, and prosecute valid claims;

2. The Department is now examining or processing over 340 pre-1966 claims. This number omits many claims not yet fully identified or researched;

3. The identification phase alone is time-consuming. It involves surveys of trust land; inventories of road, railroad and power line rights-of-way across such land; inventories of water use; search of county tax records and plat books; canvassing individual Indian allottees; and review of contracts with Indian tribes;

4. Once these claims are identified the BIA must thoroughly research them in conjunction with the Solicitor's office both in Washington and in the field;
5. The Solicitor's office is then responsible for developing each case and assisting the Justice Department in such case's prosecution -- each case often taking many years and manpower resources;

6. Significantly, this process also includes negotiation and settlement of as many claims as possible to avoid costly and lengthy litigation;

7. We do not anticipate that Interior can complete the foregoing processes, as well as file or settle all valid claims, particularly the larger land claims and water rights cases, within a shorter period than four and one-half years;

8. A shorter extension could result in sudden last-minute filings of massive cases, and ignoring smaller valid claims of Indian individuals; and

9. We are currently organizing our efforts so as to complete all the foregoing by December 31, 1981.

HR 7010, Victims of Crime Act of 1977

Our report to you incorrectly stated that "...the Administration would support enactment of the bill if the maximum compensation for each claim is reduced to $420,000 ...". That was a typographical error. The figure should have read $20,000.

OMB's report stated that:

"The Administration would support enactment of HR 7010 if the maximum compensation for each claim is reduced to $20,000 and the Federal share of compensation to state crime victims not exceed 25 percent of the total of each such claim."
BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP BREAKFAST
Tuesday, June 21, 1977
8:00 a.m.
State Dining Room

From: Frank Moore

This is the second bipartisan leadership breakfast since you took office.

Note: PBS is doing a major documentary on Speaker O'Neill. The film crew doing this special will film (with sound) the first three minutes of the breakfast. You should pay particular attention to the Speaker at that time.

I. PARTICIPANTS

See attached list.

II. TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Foreign assistance legislation is the top priority in the House this week. On Wednesday, the House will take up H.R. 7797, Foreign Assistance Appropriations. It is important for you to stress the need for maintaining funding levels and to solicit the support of the Republicans on this matter.

2. Energy -- The Senate Energy Committee will begin mark-up in the very near future. You may want to discuss the problems connected with coal conversion -- problems with air standards, lack of transportation and means, misuse of present capital investment.

3. Appropriations -- The Senate will likely consider the following appropriations bills:

   Labor/HEW
   ERDA/Public Works (particular emphasis on water projects; you should mention, but not dwell on, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
   Foreign Assistance Appropriations (Senator Inouye favors funding levels lower than the Administration has requested.)
4. **Lock and Dam 26**

The Administration supports a compromise position which calls for new construction only if accompanied by users charges. We oppose new construction without the users charges. The Administration favors a study of the need for new construction as opposed to rehabilitation and we will be pushing that position in Conference and in the House.
PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Vance
Secretary Blumenthal

Senator Byrd
Senator Cranston
Senator Eastland
Senator Humphrey
Senator Inouye
Senator Baker
Senator Curtis
Senator Hansen
Senator Stevens
Senator Tower

Speaker O'Neill
Congressman Wright
Congressman Brademas
Congressman Foley
Congressman Rostenkowski
Congressman Chisholm
Congressman Rhodes
Congressman Anderson (John)
Congressman Michel

Frank Moore
Stu Eizenstat
Bill Smith
Dan Tate
Bill Cable
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance

Subject: Foreign Assistance Appropriations/Leadership Breakfast

The Foreign Assistance appropriation will be debated in the House on Wednesday.

Amounts: I recommend that you urge the leadership to support the Committee bill and fight further cuts. The reported bill totals $6.7 billion; $0.5 billion has already been cut from the IFIs and another $0.4 billion from other aid programs. Unless the United States is prepared to contribute financially to the developing world, our initiatives in human rights and toward new relationships in Africa, Asia and Latin America will ring hollow.

Amendments: We intend to oppose all amendments. You might wish to call the following to the attending of the leadership:

1. Congressman Bill Young, following Dole's lead in the Senate, will seek to deny IFI funds to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Cuba. The bill already prohibits direct assistance to most of these countries, but members may use this amendment as an opportunity to challenge Administration normalization efforts. Not only would this amendment damage our long-term efforts to woo countries like Viet-Nam from the Soviet orbit; it will also disrupt our relationship with the banks and all the countries they serve. (FYI: We may have to resort to a substitute amendment to deflect this one.)

2. Africa. We anticipate a move to cut the $100 million from the Southern African Development Fund and a portion of the Sahel recovery program.
3. Korea. Congressman Harkin may move to cut the FMS program to Korea, citing human rights concerns.

4. UNDP. We expect a move to cut the UN Development Program, which can contribute to the same countries Young's amendment addresses.

Needless to say, the House will have to shift gears substantially after a week of trying to avoid increases in domestic programs.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE

SUBJECT: MEETING ON LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES
9:00 A.M., JUNE 21, 1977

1. Speaker O'Neill and Senator Byrd agree that no written list should be issued. There should be verbal discussion to focus on a list of what items can be considered before October.

2. Attached is the list of legislation Stu Eizenstat and I prepared last week.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1977

Stu Eizenstat
Hamilton Jordan
Jack Watson

The attached was returned in the President's outbox and is forwarded to you for your information and appropriate action.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Administration Actions to Protect Northwest Indian Salmon Fishing Rights
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM STU EIZENSTAT KATHY FLETCHER
SUBJECT: Administration Actions to Protect Northwest Indian Salmon Fishing Rights

This week, the Administration has begun implementation of a difficult but necessary effort to insure that Indian treaty fishing rights are protected in accordance with a 1974 Federal District Court decision (the Boldt decision). Because the situation in Washington State is volatile, and because a major Administration effort is involved, this memorandum will inform you fully in advance of the opening of the fishing season. Protection of Indian treaty rights involves potential civil disobedience and perhaps violence on the part of non-Indian fishermen. This is the "hottest" issue in Washington State.

Background

- Northwest Indian tribes are entitled to 50% of the Washington State salmon catch.
- The only way to protect this right is to allow additional fishing time for Indians, due to their lesser numbers and less sophisticated equipment.
- Non-Indian fishermen are violently opposed to "special treatment" for Indian fishermen.
- Washington State Supreme Court has just ruled that the State fisheries agency cannot enforce fisheries allocation, in other words, federal action is necessary to insure protection of Indian treaty rights.
- The Administration has a three-agency Task Force (Interior, Justice, Commerce) which was established in response to a request from the Washington State delegation to develop short- and long-range resolution of the situation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
FYI

MONDALE
COSTANZA
X EIZENSTAT
X JORDAN
LIPSHUTZ
MOORE
POWELL
X WATSON

ENROLLED BILL
AGENCY REPORT
CAB DECISION
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Comments due to
Carp/Huron within
48 hours; due to
Staff Secretary
next day

FOR STAFFING
FOR INFORMATION
X FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND

ARAGON
BOURNE
BRZEZINSKI
BUTLER
CARP
H. CARTER
CLOUGH
FALLOW
FIRST LADY
GAMMILL
HARDEN
HOYT
HUTCHESON
JAGODA
KING

KRAFT
LANCE
LINDER
MITCHELL
PUSHON
PRESS
B. RAINWATER
SCHLESINGER
SCHNEIDERS
SCHULTZE
SIEGEL
SMITH
STRAUSS
WELLS
VOORDE
• The first fishery to open is the international (Canadian-U.S.) Fraser River salmon run season on June 26.

Administration Plan for Fraser River Season

• After consideration of all options, the Administration Task Force has recommended a plan with which State Department and Transportation are cooperating fully.

• The Plan:

1. Will allow extra fishing days for Indians ("Indian-only" days). This involves an interpretation of our treaty with Canada to exempt U. S. Indians from the two day per week limitation imposed by the international treaty Commission. This interpretation does not affect our obligation to Canada to keep the total Indian and non-Indian catch at 50%, leaving 50% for Canada, nor does it affect our treaty obligations for conservation of the salmon resource.

   Note: This is a "strained" interpretation of the treaty. However, the only other alternative for providing additional fishing time for Indians within the bounds of the treaty would be to cut back non-Indian fishing time to only one day per week, to which non-Indian reaction would be extreme. Canadians have indicated they will not object to this treaty interpretation, if we meet our overall treaty obligations through adequate enforcement. Canada will not join us in a bilateral agreement to exempt U. S. Indians, however. Non-Indian fishermen may challenge the interpretation. If they are successful, the ultimate result would probably be that non-Indians would be cut back to one day per week or that other fisheries in the State would be adjusted to account for the need to increase Indian fish catch. These other adjustments would virtually eliminate non-Indian fishing in the other areas. Of interest is the fact that Canadian Indians are exempt from the treaty under a previous bilateral agreement.

2. Will be enforced through cooperation of Justice (U.S. Marshals); Commerce (National Marine Fisheries Service agents); Transportation (Coast Guard).
Enforcement is critical: a) we need to assure Canada we will meet our overall treaty obligations (which might be jeopardized by illegal non-Indian fishing on "Indian-only" days); and b) maintaining order is essential in this volatile situation.

- Prior to season opening:
  1. Commerce will coordinate extensive public education efforts in the State of Washington. They are already working closely with the delegation. Emphasis in the State will be on our expectation that everyone will comply.
  2. Interior will issue the necessary regulations governing Indian fishing, including emphasis on mandatory Indian fishermen identification cards.
  3. State has communicated our intentions to Canada.

- Enforcement effort:
  1. Secretary Adams has agreed to an adequate initial level of Coast Guard capability in the immediate area (Commerce and Justice enforcement personnel rely on Coast Guard marine equipment). On the first "Indian-only" day, there will be a "low profile" of federal enforcement presence.
  2. If massive civil disobedience is encountered on the first "Indian-only" day (for example, a non-Indian "fish-in"), Coast Guard will supply emergency capability from entire Puget Sound area.
  3. If the situation escalates beyond Coast Guard Puget Sound-area capability, your guidance will be sought, because drawing additional Coast Guard capability would deprive Alaska and other Pacific Coast areas of capability to enforce 200-mile fishing limit. Obviously, this eventuality would be highly visible.
  4. Maximum cooperation will be sought from the State to enforce violation of State laws other than strictly fishing violations.

Follow-up
- The Task Force agencies will keep us fully informed of the situation as the season progresses.
DOT initially resisted assisting in the enforcement of the Indian's rights under the Boldt decision. They have now agreed, following a lengthy White House meeting which was convened with all affected agencies.

Secretary Adams has stressed --- and asked me to convey to you --- his concern that if there is massive resistance by non-Indian fishermen, through a "fish-in" during the Indian-only fishing day, the Coast Guard's reserves are limited absent moving ships from other parts of the world, which he would want to do only at your direction. We are not at this point yet, but you should be advised that the need may arise.
Frank Moore -

The attached was returned in the President's outbox. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Proposed Letters regarding International Development Bank Appropriations
Mr. President:

Frank Moore and the Treasury Department request that you send the attached letters regarding international development bank appropriations to the Speaker and to Cong. Rhodes.

TWO SIGNATURES REQUESTED.

Rick

Too many signatures - redo 155 page

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes
Dear Mr. Speaker:

I understand that the FY 1978 appropriations for the international development banks are scheduled to come to the House floor early next week. I am writing to request your support for passage of the bill with funding levels as close as possible to those which I originally requested.

As you know, the Appropriations Committee reduced our request for the banks by almost half a billion dollars. I believe that any further reductions would seriously impair our ability to participate fully and meaningfully in ongoing activities of the banks and would therefore have a major adverse effect on the foreign policy of the United States.

It is of particularly crucial importance to obtain the largest possible appropriation for the International Development Association (IDA). We are deeply concerned with the Committee's recommendation to cut $225 million from our request for IDA. Any further reductions in the request would be disastrous.

The entire IDA V agreement, negotiated over a period of two years among twenty-three donor countries, will collapse unless the United States contributes its full $800 million share to the first installment. The agreement was given global attention in the communique which I, along with my colleagues from six other nations, issued at the conclusion of the Summit meeting in London in early April. It is a major element in overall North-South relations, and was endorsed as such at the recent Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris. Any disruption of IDA V would trigger an extremely serious
breech in relations between the United States and the developing countries, and would adversely affect relations between the United States and other donor countries as well.

In addition to the $800 million requested for IDA V, the Administration is seeking $375 million for the third installment of our contribution to the fourth replenishment of IDA. All other countries have already made their full contributions to IDA IV, while the United States has contributed only half of its pledge. Any further reduction in the appropriation would give rise to serious doubts as to whether the United States intends to carry through on the contribution which it agreed in 1975 to make to IDA IV.

I also seek your support to avoid any language which would prevent the use of funds appropriated in the bill for bank lending to Indochina. Specifying that U.S. funds could not be used for loans to these countries by the multilateral development institutions would in all probability make it impossible for these institutions to accept our funds. It would, in effect, jeopardize continued U.S. participation in the banks. I support the language on this issue recommended by the Committee, which is similar to language contained in the Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Act for FY 1977.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
To Congressman John Rhodes

I understand that the FY 1978 appropriations for the international development banks are scheduled to come to the House floor early next week. I am writing to request your support for passage of the bill with funding levels as close as possible to those which I originally requested.

As you know, the Appropriations Committee reduced our request for the banks by almost half a billion dollars. I believe that any further reductions would seriously impair our ability to participate fully and meaningfully in ongoing activities of the banks and would therefore have a major adverse effect on the foreign policy of the United States.

It is of particularly crucial importance to obtain the largest possible appropriation for the International Development Association (IDA). We are deeply concerned with the Committee's recommendation to cut $225 million from our request for IDA. Any further reductions in the request would be disastrous.

The entire IDA V agreement, negotiated over a period of two years among twenty-three donor countries, will collapse unless the United States contributes its full $800 million share to the first installment. The agreement was given global attention in the communique which I, along with my colleagues from six other nations, issued at the conclusion of the Summit meeting in London in early April. It is a major element in overall North-South relations, and was endorsed as such at the recent Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris. Any disruption of IDA V would trigger an extremely serious
breech in relations between the United States and the developing countries, and would adversely affect relations between the United States and other donor countries as well.

In addition to the $800 million requested for IDA V, the Administration is seeking $375 million for the third installment of our contribution to the fourth replenishment of IDA. All other countries have already made their full contributions to IDA IV, while the United States has contributed only half of its pledge. Any further reduction in the appropriation would give rise to serious doubts as to whether the United States intends to carry through on the contribution which it agreed in 1975 to make to IDA IV.

I also seek your support to avoid any language which would prevent the use of funds appropriated in the bill for bank lending to Indochina. Specifying that U.S. funds could not be used for loans to these countries by the multilateral development institutions would in all probability make it impossible for these institutions to accept our funds. It would, in effect, jeopardize continued U.S. participation in the banks. I support the language on this issue recommended by the Committee, which is similar to language contained in the Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Act for FY 1977.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John J. Rhodes  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.  20515
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1977

Frank Moore -

The attached letter was signed by the President and is forwarded to you for handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Letter to Paul Friedlander
# For Staffing

JOIN THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>FYI</th>
<th>FOR INFORMATION</th>
<th>FOR STAFFING</th>
<th>IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONDALE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSTANZA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIZENSTAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPSHUTZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOORE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWELL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATSON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Comments due to Carp/Huron within 48 hours; due to Staff Secretary next day.*

**FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX**

LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY

- ARAGON
- BOURNE
- BRZEZINSKI
- BUTLER
- CARP
- H. CARTER
- CLOUGH
- FALLOWS
- FIRST LADY
- GAMMILL
- HARDEN
- HOYT
- HUTCHESON
- JAGODA
- KING
- KRAFT
- LANCE
- LINDER
- MITCHELL
- POSTON
- PRESS
- B. RAINWATER
- SCHLESINGER
- SCHNEIDERS
- SCHULTZE
- SIEGEL
- SMITH
- STRAUSS
- WELLS
- VOORDE
MEMORANDUM TO FRANK MOORE
FROM BOB THOMSON

RE SENATORS MAGNUSON AND JACKSON - PAUL FRIEDLANDER

Senators Magnuson and Jackson nominated Paul Friedlander, a prominent Seattle civic leader and political figure, for one of the three seats available this year on the Board for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He was not selected. The Senators request (Jackson personally) that the President send a letter to Friedlander notifying him of the decision.

Of course, we do not want to get in the position of writing similar letters to every unsuccessful nominee. The Senators realize that, but Senator Jackson, in particular, has requested that a special, one-time exception be granted in this case. Friedlander has been an exceptionally prolific fundraiser for both Jackson and Magnuson in past campaigns, and is a close friend of both Senators. He was carefully considered for the CAB board and is deemed qualified.

I recommend the enclosed letter be sent. Rick Neustadt wrote an original draft which I revised. The Senators wanted a much stronger letter, but I believe they will be satisfied with this.
To Paul Friedlander

Please accept my personal thanks for your interest in serving on the board for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. As you know, I am a strong supporter of public broadcasting, so I am gratified to see persons of stature such as yourself make such substantial commitments to the welfare of public broadcasting.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to nominate you for one of the three seats available this year. As you know, additional vacancies periodically occur, so I trust your name will be resubmitted for consideration on those occasions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Paul S. Friedlander
Friedlander and Sons
Fifth Avenue at Pike
Seattle, Washington 98101

p.s. You are certainly fortunate to have such good friends as Senators Jackson & Magnuson & vice versa. J.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1977

Frank Moore -

The attached letter was signed by the President and is forwarded to you for handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Re: Letter to Paul Friedlander
MEMORANDUM TO FRANK MOORE
FROM BOB THOMSON

RE SENATORS MAGNUSON AND JACKSON - PAUL FRIEDLANDER

Senators Magnuson and Jackson nominated Paul Friedlander, a prominent Seattle civic leader and political figure, for one of the three seats available this year on the Board for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He was not selected. The Senators request (Jackson personally) that the President send a letter to Friedlander notifying him of the decision.

Of course, we do not want to get in the position of writing similar letters to every unsuccessful nominee. The Senators realize that, but Senator Jackson, in particular, has requested that a special, one-time exception be granted in this case. Friedlander has been an exceptionally prolific fundraiser for both Jackson and Magnuson in past campaigns, and is a close friend of both Senators. He was carefully considered for the CAB board and is deemed qualified.

I recommend the enclosed letter be sent. Rick Neustadt wrote an original draft which I revised. The Senators wanted a much stronger letter, but I believe they will be satisfied with this.
Mr. President:

Frank Moore requests that the attached letter be sent to Friedlander.

Rick
MEMORANDUM TO FRANK MOORE
FROM BOB THOMSON
RE SENATORS MAGNUSON AND JACKSON - PAUL FRIEDLANDER

Senators Magnuson and Jackson nominated Paul Friedlander, a prominent Seattle civic leader and political figure, for one of the three seats available this year on the Board for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He was not selected. The Senators request (Jackson personally) that the President send a letter to Friedlander notifying him of the decision.

Of course, we do not want to get in the position of writing similar letters to every unsuccessful nominee. The Senators realize that, but Senator Jackson, in particular, has requested that a special, one-time exception be granted in this case. Friedlander has been an exceptionally prolific fundraiser for both Jackson and Magnuson in past campaigns, and is a close friend of both Senators. He was carefully considered for the CAB board and is deemed qualified.

I recommend the enclosed letter be sent. Rick Neustadt wrote an original draft which I revised. The Senators wanted a much stronger letter, but I believe they will be satisfied with this.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1977

To Paul Friedlander

Please accept my personal thanks for your interest in serving on the board for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. As you know, I am a strong supporter of public broadcasting, so I am gratified to see persons of stature such as yourself make such substantial commitments to the welfare of public broadcasting.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to nominate you for one of the three seats available this year. As you know, additional vacancies periodically occur, so I trust your name will be resubmitted for consideration on those occasions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Paul S. Friedlander
Friedlander and Sons
Fifth Avenue at Pike
Seattle, Washington 98101

p.s. You are certainly fortunate to have such good friends as Senators Jackson & Magnuson - & vice versa. J.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Reserve Mining Company Litigation

Attached is a memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice. The memorandum discusses the history of the litigation pertaining to Reserve Mining Company's discharge of waste into Lake Superior and sets forth the basis for the Department's decision not to oppose the company's motion for a stay of the final shutdown order.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has already refused to uphold an immediate injunction. Given the recent completion of a new filtration plant, the Department concluded that it would not be able to convince a court that an immediate shutdown was warranted. Accordingly, it did not oppose the company's motion for a stay of the final shutdown order.

Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
TO:    Mr. Griffin B. Bell  
       Attorney General

FROM:  James W. Moorman  
       Acting Assistant Attorney General  
       Land and Natural Resources Division

SUBJECT: Reserve Mining Company -- Informational Memorandum

DATE: June 20, 1977

The President has inquired as to why we did not oppose the motion by Reserve Mining Company to stay the District Court's order requiring a termination of the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior by July 7, 1977. The President also asked how long Reserve Mining has been "defying the law."

Responding to the latter question first, we note that the first administrative action declaring Reserve's discharges illegal was by the Conferees on the Pollution of Lake Superior on September 30, 1969 under the aegis of the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. On April 28, 1971, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, which succeeded the Department of the Interior in respect to water pollution control activities, notified Reserve that it was in violation of federally-approved water quality standards. On February 2, 1972, the United States filed a civil complaint against Reserve seeking an injunction against the continued discharge of tailings in violation of the "Refuse Act of 1899", 33 U.S.C. 407 and Section 10 of the old Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1160. The United States was joined in this action by the States of Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan and several environmental groups.

In the early summer of 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency discovered that the tailings contained asbestos fibers and that the fibers entered the water supply of Duluth and other Lake Superior communities. At this point, the major issue in the case became one of adverse effect on public health rather than upon the ecology of Lake Superior. Trial commenced on August 1, 1973 before United States District Judge Miles Lord and continued with little interruption until
April 20, 1974 when the Court issued an injunction effective the following day against any further discharges by Reserve. The plant was closed for a short time until the Court of Appeals stayed Judge Lord's injunction. The United States Army Corps of Engineers proceeded at the direction of Judge Lord to install filtration of Lake Superior water used for drinking purposes to remove asbestos fibers.

Finally, after several petitions to the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entered its order on March 14, 1975, declaring that a potential health hazard was created by the discharges into Lake Superior and that a more immediate hazard was created by the emissions of fibers into the ambient air from the taconite plant. Rather than authorizing the District Court to impose a specific schedule for cessation of the air and water discharges, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case for entry of an order allowing Reserve additional time to install air pollution equipment. With respect to the water pollution, Reserve was allowed to apply to the State of Minnesota for permits authorizing an on-land disposal basin in a totaling closed system. Reserve's first proposed plan was rejected by all parties and its second plan (the Milepost 7 plan) was also rejected by two agencies of the State. These State agency decisions, however, were reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and the Department of Natural Resources were ordered to issue permits to Reserve for the Milepost 7 plan.

At the present time, additional applications by Reserve are pending before the Corps of Engineers for permits pursuant to Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344. These permits are needed for the damming of certain streams by Reserve at the site of the basin. We expect a decision from the Corps in August 1977. There does not appear to be any objection from Federal agencies to the issuance of these permits.

Although Reserve has been in violation of the law since at least 1969, the United States and the State of Minnesota, in view of Reserve's recalcitrance, have pursued the matter in court. It is essentially two facts which have caused the courts to decline to enter an immediate injunction: (1) Reserve employs several thousand workers in Northern Minnesota and supplies Armco and Republic Steel Corporation with the iron needed to produce a large percentage of their
steel; and (2) abatement of the discharge can only be accomplished by construction of an on-land basin covering 10 square miles and costing in the neighborhood of three hundred million dollars.

In response to the President's other question we did not oppose the motion for a stay of the final shutdown order because the Court of Appeals has already refused to uphold an immediate injunction issued by Judge Miles Lord. Also, a new filtration plant has been completed and is operating to filter the water for Duluth. We understand that only a very small fraction of the asbestos fibers remain in the drinking water after filtration. The Eighth Circuit made it very clear that it would allow Reserve Mining Company a reasonable period of time to construct a tailings basin once the necessary permits were secured. Thus, there is nothing happening at the present time which would convince a court that an immediate shutdown is warranted.