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One hundred ninety-eight years ago, in the southern part of your state, four hundred North Carolina militia men took up arms in our War of Independence. Against a force of thirteen hundred British soldiers, the North Carolinians prevailed -- and their battle at Ramsour's Mill became a step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice Americans have had to make time and again in our nation's history, and we have learned that strength is the final protector of liberty.
This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my oldest son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purposes of our armed forces have been the same: to defend our security when it is threatened, and through demonstrated strength to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again.

These words of John Kennedy still guide our actions: "The purpose of our arms is not war but peace, not war."
make certain they will never have to be used."
peace -- to be sure that we will never have to use them."

That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security -- where we now stand, what new circumstances we face, and what we are going to do in the future.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world. That is not the case, as will be proven in this speech and in our actions as a nation.
Another myth is that our Defense budget is too burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal revenues. National defense is of course a large and important item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product, and consumes approximately one-fourth of our current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or nuclear weapons. About 10 percent of our Defense budget goes to strategic forces for nuclear deterrence. More than 50 percent of it is simply to pay and support the men and women in our Armed Forces.

Finally, some believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do
nothing more to guarantee our security. Unfortunately,
it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries
have now built up massive forces armed with conventional
weapons -- tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized
units. Those forces could be used for political
blackmail and could threaten our vital interests --
unless we and our allies and friends have our own
conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Of course, our national security rests on more
than just military forces. It depends partly on
the productive power of our farms and our factories,
on an adequate supply of natural resources, on an
economic system which values human freedom over
centralized control, on the creative ideas of our
best minds, on the hard work, cohesion, moral strength
and determination of our people and on the friendship of our neighbors. Our security depends on strong bonds with our allies, and on whether other nations seek to live in peace and refrain from trying to dominate those around them.

But without adequate and capable military forces we would still lack an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to provide forces equal to the challenges of the world in which we live.

*    *    *

Let us review how national security issues have changed over the past decade or two.

The world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is a division among the
as we can observe today in Africa.

There also has been an ominous support for mercenaries from the satellite countries, with full logistical advisors, with materiel, and with power — to intervene in local conflicts with menacingness of the Soviet Union to use its military

Cut from earlier drafts.

I favor reinstatement.

Also Harold, 28.
Communist powers; the old colonial empires have fallen, and many new nations have risen in their place; old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

There have also been changes in the military balance among nations. Over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own.

This increase in Soviet military power has been going on for a long time. Since 1960 Soviet real military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year, which occurs in -- in constant dollars -- lower than it was in 1960.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, [now rank number two in the forces in new region distant from the Soviet Union world in naval forces.]
In its balanced strategic nuclear forces, the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses -- diplomatic, economic and military.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our Armed Forces, whenever our security requires it. We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy, and out of this process have come some overall principles designed to preserve our national security during the years ahead.
We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friends we will match any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall oppose intervention by others.

While assuming our military capabilities, we shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements where possible, and through existing capabilities when necessary.
We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific, and economic goals -- but if they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such cooperation will erode.

We shall implement this policy in three ways:

-- By maintaining strategic nuclear balance;
-- By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

-- By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation objectively, and to make sensible choices about our purposes and means.

Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the
Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our friends.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets already have reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are not looking for a one-sided advantage, but before I sign a SALT agreement on behalf of the United States, I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as we would be without an agreement.
But in addition to the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union; but, however remote, it is a threat against which we must constantly be on guard.

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles
to reinforce the strategic value of our bombers, and we are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If it becomes necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems as well.

Our strategic defense forces are a triad -- land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and air-breathing systems such as bombers and cruise missiles. Through the plans I have described, all three legs of the triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor.
For thirty years and more we have been committed to the defense of Europe -- bound by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. We continue to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom which, in the past, we have fought together to defend.

For several years we and our allies have been trying to negotiate mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe with the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact nations, but in the meantime the Soviets have continued to increase and to modernize their forces beyond a level necessary for defense. In the face of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO allies have had to take important steps to
cope with short-term vulnerabilities and to respond to long-term threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, and we are improving our ability to speed additional ground and air reinforcements to the defense of Europe in time of crisis.

Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are also improving their readiness and reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be attending a summit meeting in the United States in May, where we will address a NATO long-term defense program which will expand and integrate allied defense plans.
For more than three decades, the United States has been a truly global power. 

Thirdly, our security concerns reach beyond North America and beyond our allies in Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc and, as events in Africa are demonstrating, this involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature -- a development that we cannot view with complacency.

The United States has responsibilities in helping to enhance peace in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and minimize the threat of conflict. But we have the will, and we must also maintain the capacity, to honor our commitments and to protect our interests in these critical areas.
In the Pacific there is reciprocal advantage in our mutual defense treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, and in our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations.

Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where the vital interests of great powers converge. It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable. We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, improving our air strength, and reducing our ground forces as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its own capabilities.
In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries concerned. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests throughout the world.
Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must -- and we will -- proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

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When I leave this auditorium I shall be going to visit with the crew aboard one of our most modern nuclear aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Ocean. The men and women of our Armed Forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic
Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength combat will be prevented. We must always support them in that vigil.

This has been a sober talk, I know. But there is no cause for pessimism. We face a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it. We will preserve and protect our country and continue to promote and preserve peace around the world.

This means that we shall have to continue to support strong and efficient military forces.

For most of human history, people have wished vainly that freedom -- and the flowering of the human spirit which freedom nourishes -- did not finally have to depend upon the force of arms. We,
like our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy liberty are restrained less by their respect for freedom's strength than by their knowledge that those who cherish freedom are strong.

We are a great nation of talented people. We can readily afford the necessary costs of our military forces, as well as an increased level needed to prevent any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend on our nation's defense is not wasted, any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force to keep the peace. This investment purchases our freedom to fulfill our worthy goals.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war,
are particularly determined that war shall not come to us again. All Americans understand the basic lesson of history: that we need firmness and the ability to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that these blessings will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.
One hundred ninety-eight years ago, in the southern part of your state, four hundred North Carolina militiamen took up arms in our War of Independence.

Against a force of thirteen hundred British soldiers, the North Carolinians prevailed -- and their battle at Ramsour's Mill became a step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice Americans have had to make time and again in our nation's history, and we have learned that strength is the final protector of liberty.
This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my oldest son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purposes of our armed forces have been the same: to defend our security when it is threatened, and through demonstrated strength to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again.

These words of John Kennedy still guide our actions: "The purpose of our arms is not war but..."
That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security -- where we now stand, what new circumstances we face, and what we are going to do in the future.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world. That is not the case, as will be explained in this speech and demonstrated in our actions as a nation, by our words and our actions as a nation, proven in this speech and in our actions as a nation.
Another myth is that our Defense budget is too burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal revenues. National defense is of course a large and important item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product, and consumes approximately one-fourth of our current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or nuclear weapons. About 10 percent of our Defense budget goes to strategic forces for nuclear deterrence. More than 50 percent of it is simply to pay and support the men and women in our Armed Forces.

Finally, some believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do
nothing more to guarantee our security. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries have now built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons -- tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail and could threaten our vital interests -- unless we and our allies and friends have our own conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Of course, our national security rests on more than just military forces. It depends partly on the productive power of our farms and our factories, on an adequate supply of natural resources, on an economic system which values human freedom over centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion, moral strength
and determination of our people and on the friendship of our neighbors. Our security depends on strong bonds with our allies, and on whether other nations seek to live in peace and refrain from trying to dominate those around them.

But without adequate and capable military forces we would still lack an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to provide forces equal to the challenges of the world in which we live.

* * *

Let us review how national security issues have changed over the past decade or two.

The world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is division among the
Communist powers; the old colonial empires have fallen, and many new nations have risen in their place; old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

There have also been changes in the military balance among nations. Over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially — both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own.

This increase in Soviet military power has been going on for a long time. Since 1960 Soviet real military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year, in current dollars — it is lower than it was in 1960.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in the world in naval forces. They have been 

A-A attacked

from the Soviet Union.
In its balanced strategic nuclear forces, the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses -- diplomatic, economic and military.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our Armed Forces, whenever our security requires it. We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy, and out of this process have come some overall principles designed to preserve our national security during the years ahead.
Re first sentence of first graph, page 9, Dr. Brzezinski says "it's better as the concluding thought. Otherwise the implication is that we will respond polit, econ, etc.

If you agree with Dr. Brzezinski, then I think the sentence should begin with "We will match, together with our allies and friends, any threatening power . . ." (You're beginning each point of emphasis in this section with "we")
We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friends we will match any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

-- We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall oppose intervention by others.

-- While assuming our military capabilities, we shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements where possible, and through nuclear capabilities when necessary.
-- We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific, and economic goals -- but if they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such cooperation will erode.

Three principles mean that, even as we search for agreement on arms control, we will modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces. *

We shall implement this policy in three ways:

- By maintaining strategic nuclear balance;
-- By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

-- By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

Let me take up each of these three in turn.

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Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the
Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our friends.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets already have reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are not looking for a one-sided advantage, but before I sign a SALT agreement on behalf of the United States, I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as we would be without an agreement.
But in addition to the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union; but, however remote, it is a threat against which we must constantly be on guard.

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles
to reinforce the strategic value of our bombers and we are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If it becomes necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems as well.

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* * *
For thirty years and more we have been committed to the defense of Europe -- bound by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. We continue to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom which, in the past, we have fought together to defend.

For several years we and our allies have been trying to negotiate mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe with the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact nations, but in the meantime the Soviets have continued to increase and to modernize their forces beyond a level necessary for defense. In the face of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO allies have had to take important steps to
cope with short-term vulnerabilities and to respond to long-term threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, and we are improving our ability to speed additional ground and air reinforcements to the defense of Europe in time of crisis.

Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are also improving their readiness and reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be attending a summit meeting in the United States in May, where we will address a NATO long-term defense program which will expand and integrate allied defense plans.
power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc and, as events in Africa are demonstrating, this involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature -- a development that we cannot view with complacency.

The United States has [historical] responsibilities in helping to enhance peace in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and minimize the threat of conflict. But we have the will, and we must also maintain the capacity, to honor our commitments and to protect our interests in these critical areas.
In the Pacific there is reciprocal advantage in our mutual defense treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, and in our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations. Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where the vital interests of great powers converge. It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable. We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, improving our air strength, and reducing our ground forces as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its own capabilities.
In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries concerned. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests throughout the world.
Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must -- and we will -- proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

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Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength combat will be prevented. We must always support them in that vigil.

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like our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy liberty are restrained less by their respect for freedom's strength than by their knowledge that those who cherish freedom are strong.

We are a great nation of talented people. We can readily afford the necessary costs of our military forces, as well as an increased level needed to prevent any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend on our nation's defense is not wasted, any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force to keep the peace. This investment purchases our freedom to fulfill our worthy goals.

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are particularly determined that war shall not come to us again. All Americans understand the basic lesson of history: that we need firmness and the ability to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that these blessings will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.
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This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my oldest son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I have spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purpose of our armed forces has been to defend our security when it is threatened, and through demonstrated strength to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again.

These words of John Kennedy still guide our actions: "The purpose of our arms is not war but
peace -- to be sure that we will never have to use
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That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been
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we face,
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Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling
back from protecting its interests around the world.
That is not the case. We remain staunch in our
commitment to our purposes, our interests,
and in our actions as a nation.

Another myth is that our Defense budget is too
burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal
national revenues. Defense is of course a large and important
item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product, and has decreased steadily over the years to only about a fourth quarter of our current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or weapons. About 10 percent of our Defense budget goes to strategic forces for nuclear deterrence. Nearly 60 percent of it is simply for pay and support of our personnel. The Soviets, incidentally, do not pay their military people nearly as much as we do; more of what they spend on military forces goes for hardware.

Finally, some believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do
nothing more to assure our physical security.

Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries have built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons -- tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail and could threaten our vital interests if we and our allies and friends did not have our own conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Or course, our national security -- our physical security -- rests on more than just military forces. It depends partly on the productive power of our farms and our factories, on an adequate supply of natural resources, on an economic system which values human freedom over centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion,
moral strength and determination of our people, it is our security
depends on strong bonds with our allies, and whether other nations seek to live in peace or to dominate those around them.

But without adequate and capable military forces we would lack an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation equal to provide forces adequate to the challenges of the world in which we live.

* * * *

What has been happening over the past decade or two.

First, the world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is division among
the Communist powers; the old colonial empires have fallen, and been succeeded by many new nations, and old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

Second, we must recognize that among nations, changes in the military balance over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviet Union have grown substantially -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own. There also has been an ominous willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power -- to intervene in local conflicts with advisers, with matériel, and with full logistical support for mercenaries from their satellite countries, as we can observe today in Africa.

When did this increase in Soviet military power has been going on steadily, for a
long time. Since 1960 Soviet real military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year.

In contrast, what have we been doing? Our own rate of military spending has been going in the opposite direction. During most of the past decade, our real military spending has been declining; as a percentage of our gross national product (after accounting for inflation), it is now lower than at any time since 1950. Our Army, for example, is smaller than at any time since before the Korean War. Although each modern ship is more formidable, we now have fewer naval vessels than at any time since 1939.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in the world in naval forces.
In its balanced strategic nuclear forces, the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has now achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses -- diplomatic, economic and military.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our armed forces, whenever our security requires it. We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy, and out of this process have come some overall principles designed to preserve our national security over the long haul.
We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friendly powers, we will match any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall discourage other powers from doing so.

We shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements where possible.
We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union, wherever possible, toward common social, scientific, and economic goals. But we must take into account the degree of the Sowet's demonstrated restraint in missile programs and other force levels and missile programs and in the projection of their own or proxy forces into other lands and continents. If they fail to demonstrate such restraint, we must increase our conventional strength and mobility as necessary while maintaining the nuclear balance. So, even as we search for agreement on arms control we must modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces. In short, we are determined to take whatever action is necessary.
to counter the challenge of foreign military expansion.

Until SALT and mutual force reduction efforts are successful we will continue to increase our own defense efforts.

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We shall implement our military policy in three ways:

-- By maintaining strategic nuclear parity,

-- By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

-- By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.
Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation objectively and to make sensible choices about our objectives and means.

Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our allies.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets
already have reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are not looking for any advantage, but you can be assured that before I sign a treaty on behalf of the United States, I will be sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that our strength relative to that of the Soviet Union will be no less than it would be without a treaty.

In addition to But even within the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to
national suicide for the Soviet Union; but it is a threat against a possibility which, however remote, we must guard against.

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development of cruise missiles and we are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems.

All of these strategic options would be preserved in the new SALT agreements we are negotiating.
Our strategic defense forces are a triad—

land-based missiles, sea based missiles, and air-breathing such as bombers and cruise missiles.

Through the plans I have described, all three legs of the triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor who attacks our nation.

* * *

We are also committed to the defense of Europe—

Bonds of kinship, culture, trade, and shared political values link our people, and for thirty years and more we have been bound also by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own.

We continue to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten
their territory or freedom which we have fought together to protect in the past. The Western allies have the strength to deter aggression, and there must be no doubt that we also possess the will.

For several years we have tried to negotiate mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe with the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact nations, but in the meantime the Soviets have continued to add to their forces. In the face of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO allies have had to take important steps to cope with short-term vulnerabilities and to respond to long-term threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, and we are improving our ability to speed larger numbers of ground and air reinforcements to Europe in time of crisis.
Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are also improving their readiness and reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be attending a summit meeting in the United States in May, where we will address a NATO long-term defense program which will expand and integrate allied defense plans in ten key functional areas.

Thirdly, our security concerns reach beyond Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc and, as events in Africa are demonstrating, this involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature -- a development that we cannot view with complacency.
We must maintain forces that can be readily deployed whenever and wherever they are needed in order to counter projection of foreign military power when it threatens our vital interests and those of our allies.

The United States has permanent major interests to enhance peace and responsibilities in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and improve the prospects for peace.

But we have the will, and we must also have the capacity, to maintain our commitments and protect our interests in these critical areas.
Because of our crucial national interests, we will maintain our position as a major power in the
Pacific Basin. There is great mutual advantage in our mutual defense treaties with Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, and in our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations.

Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where
the vital interests of four great powers converge.

It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable.

We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, reducing our ground forces to
improving air strength as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its capabilities.
In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries there. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests throughout the world.
in the Pacific, East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf particularly against new threats which may be posed by other military powers.

Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must -- and we will -- proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

* * * *
When I leave this auditorium I shall be going to visit with the crew aboard one of our most modern nuclear aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Ocean. The men and women of our armed forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength combat will be prevented. We must always support them in that vigil.

This has been a sober talk, I know. But there is no cause for fear or pessimism. We have a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it. We will preserve and protect our country's interests and continue to promote and preserve peace around the world.
This means that we shall have to continue to support large and capable military forces.

But for most of human history, people have wished vainly that freedom and security did not have to depend so much upon the force of arms. We, like our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy us are restrained less by their respect for the strength of our values, than by their knowledge that we are physically strong.

We can meet the challenge. We are a great nation of talented people. We can readily afford the costs of our military forces, as well as any increased costs needed to prevent the military buildup of any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend is not wasted,
any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force to keep the peace. It purchases our freedom to fulfill our worthy goals.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war, can be particularly determined that war shall not come to us again. All Americans understand the basic lessons taught by history: of the need for firmness and strength to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that these blessings will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.
ADDRESS BY
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
AT
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY
MARCH 17, 1978

One hundred ninety-eight years ago, in the southern part of your state, four hundred militiamen of North Carolina took up arms in our War of Independence. Against a force of thirteen hundred British soldiers, the North Carolina militia prevailed—and their battle at Ramsour's Mill became a step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice Americans have made time and again in our nation's history, because we know that strength is the final protector of liberty.

This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and one of my oldest sons volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I have spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purpose of our armed forces has been twofold: to defend our security through demonstrated strength, and to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again. The thought that John Kennedy expressed seventeen years ago still guides our actions: "The purpose of our
arms he said, "is not war but peace--to be sure that we will never have to use them."

That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security--where we stand, what changes have taken place, and what we are going to do.

Let me deal at the beginning with a few myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests around the world. That is not the case. [In a few moments I shall give you some specifics.]

Another inaccurate perception is that our Defense budget is large, burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal revenues. Defense is of course a large and important item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5% of our current gross national product, and only about a quarter of the current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to assume that our country's defense spending is mainly for missiles or weapons. Only 10% of our Defense budget goes to forces of nuclear deterrence. About 60% of it is simply to pay our personnel. [The Soviets, incidentally, do not pay their military people nearly as much as we do; more of what they spend on military forces goes for hardware.]
Finally, some may believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do nothing more to assure our physical security. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. [In the first place, the Soviets must not ever have reason to believe that they could knock out any substantial portion of our strategic forces.] Secondly, the Soviets have massive forces armed with conventional weapons—tanks, aircraft, divisions of infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail of our allies and countries which are our friends, and could destroy relationships vital to this country, if we and our allies did not have our own conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Of course, our national security—our physical security—rests on more than just military forces. It depends partly on the productive power of our farms and our factories, on an adequate supply of resources, on an economic system which values human freedom over centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion, moral strength and determination of our people. It depends partly on what other nations do, on whether they seek to live in peace or to dominate their neighbors.

But there is no getting around the fact that adequate and capable military forces are an essential element of our national security. Without an adequate military, we can have no security at all. We may wish that military strength
were not necessary. But it is, and we, like our ancestors, have the obligation to provide forces adequate to the challenges of the world in which we live.

What has been happening over the past decade or two?

First, the world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is division among the Communist nations; the old colonial empires have been succeeded by new states; and old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning, although our nation and its Constitution remain the beacon for persons everywhere who care about human liberty.

Second, you should know that there have been changes in the military balance. Over the past twenty years the military forces of the Soviet Union have grown substantially—both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own. There also has been an ominous willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts with advisors, with materiel, and with full logistical support for Cuban mercenaries. We see the Soviets doing that today in Africa.

How did this increase in Soviet military power occur?

It has been going on steadily, for a long time. Since 1960 Soviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year.

What have we been doing? Our own military spending has been going in the opposite direction. During most of the
past decade, our real military spending has been declining; as a percentage of our gross national product, after accounting for inflation, it is now lower than at any time since 1950. Our Army, for example, is smaller than at any time since prior to the Korean War. We have fewer naval vessels than at any time since 1939.

In strategic nuclear forces, the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup proceeded to the point that it achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

The Soviets have enlarged and improved their other military forces as well. For example, they greatly strengthened both their conventional and nuclear capabilities in central Europe. They added a million men to their armed forces, increased their tanks in Europe to 9,000, and organized, trained and deployed more divisions and aircraft to their frontier in China.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in the world in naval forces. They have built up their navy and expanded its deployment, so that they now are more able to move their own military power—and that of their satellites, like Cuba—into parts of the world which previously they had ignored.

These changes pose new threats to our security. They demand that we develop adequate responses—diplomatic,
economic and military. We always would be reluctant to employ military forces. But some challenges could involve our own security in such a way that it would not be possible for us to ignore them. We must be always prepared to use military power judiciously, effectively, and in a manner consistent with our basic values.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our armed forces, whenever our security requires it. Shortly after taking office, I ordered a major reassessment of where we stood in the world in relation to the Soviets, and what changes were required in our national strategy. I consulted extensively with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other civilian and military leaders, as well as with our allies. Out of this process have come some overall strategic principles designed to assure our national security over the long haul. Let me list what they are.

1. We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friendly powers, we intend to counterbalance Soviet power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

2. We shall seek Soviet cooperation in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall discourage other powers from doing so.
3. We shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms agreements where possible, and through military capabilities where necessary.

4. We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union wherever possible toward common social, scientific, and economic goals. But the extent of our cooperation will depend upon the Soviet demonstration of restraint not only in their missile programs, but also restraint in their own or proxy forces into other lands and continents.

What do these principles mean in concrete terms? How do they affect our planning and our programs?

Our military policy in support of strategy will be to increase our conventional strength and mobility while maintaining the nuclear balance. So, even as we search for agreement on arms control, we must modernize our strategic forces and revitalize our conventional forces. In short, we are determined to take the actions necessary to counter the challenge of Soviet military expansion.

This will require an increase in our defense efforts. In light of the growth in Soviet power, our own spending will have to rise. It will have to continue to rise for as long as is necessary.

We shall implement our military policy in three ways:

-- By maintaining strategic parity;
--- By strengthening and modernizing our defenses in Europe, working closely with our NATO allies, and

--- By maintaining and developing forces to counter new threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation unemotionally, and to make sensible choices about our objectives and means.

Our strategic forces must be--and must be known to be--a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our allies, or countries on which we depend.

Our continuing major effort in the nuclear area, the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic stability. We and the Soviets already have reached agreement on several basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. You can be assured that before I sign a treaty on behalf of the United States, I will be sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that our strength relative to that of the Soviet Union will be no less than it would be without a treaty.
But even with a SALT agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles will make our land-based missile force increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union; but it is a possibility which, however remote, we must guard against. The Soviets must have absolutely no doubt which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development of cruise missiles to diversify and augment our strategic forces. We are working on new ballistic missiles—the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile—which give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If necessary, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems, to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent.

Our strategic defense forces are a triad—land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and air-breathing systems. Through the plans I have described, all three legs of the triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor who attacks our nation. We are also committed to The second point I mentioned was the defense of Europe. Bonds of kinship, culture, trade, and shared political values
link our nation to Europe. For thirty years and more, we have been linked also by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. The second objective of our defense strategy remains what it has been: to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom we have fought to protect in the past.

The Western allies have the resources to deter aggression, and there must be no doubt that we also possess the will.

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its ability to wage nuclear war in Europe. Even more disturbingly—disturbing because conventional war might appear more tempting to wage—both the quantity and the quality of Soviet conventional armaments aimed at Western Europe have also risen dramatically. They have more divisions there than ten years ago, the divisions have more tanks, troops and artillery. The capabilities of that equipment and of their attack aircraft—which have also increased in numbers—is higher. The difference in quality, which we used to rely on to offset the numerical inferiority of us and our allies, has become much less.

We would prefer to negotiate mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe and we and our allies have been discussing this with the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact nations. In the meantime, the Soviets have continued to add to their forces. So in the face of this excessive buildup, we and our NATO allies have agreed on a number of
important steps to cope with short-term vulnerabilities and respond to long-term threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, to sustain our policy of forward defense. We are improving our ability to speed larger numbers of ground and air reinforcements to Europe in time of crisis.

Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, have begun to improve their readiness and reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be attending a summit meeting in Washington in May. There they will address a NATO long-term defense program which has been in preparation and which will expand and integrate allied defense plans in ten key functional areas.

Thirdly, our security concerns reach beyond Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet military power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc. As events in Africa are demonstrating, Soviet involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature—a development that we cannot view as benign. The third element of our strategy must be to be able to counter projection of Soviet power that threatens our vital interests and our allies. To do this, we must maintain forces that can be readily deployed whenever and wherever they are needed.

The United States has major interests and responsibilities in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first
and to increase it's capability. 

France found itself confronting an enemy.

For this vital importance we have grown. 

France and Britain 

And her strength, our military strength, is 

After her victory, 

Our friends, our partners, our 

Pathways, We stand, enshrine and 

And in our friendship and cooperation with 

France, in the future, 

That in a great many,

the little nation on our border as a buffer,

Because of our success and our influence.
to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and improve the prospects for peace. But we have the will, and we must also have the capacity, to maintain our commitments and protect our interests in these critical areas.

Japan and North Korea both are closely linked economically to the United States. Both are located geographically where the vital interests of four great powers converge. There should be no mistake about it: we must and will remain a major power in the Pacific basin. We will ensure that Northeast Asia remains stable. As the South Korean army continues to increase its capabilities and to modernize, that goal can be achieved with reduced U.S. ground forces in South Korea. Except for the phased return of the 2nd U.S. Army Division from Korea, which I have therefore ordered, U.S. land, sea, and air forces deployed in this area will be maintained and strengthened.

In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf. We shall maintain a capability to keep that access secure against intervention by hostile outside powers.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of each region rests with the countries there. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent attacks which would threaten their interests and ours. In addition, however, we need forces of
our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces--air, land and sea--to defend our interests in East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf particularly against the new threats posed by Soviet military powers.

Arms control agreements can complement military forces as instruments of national security. In fact, effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must--and we will--proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

When I leave this auditorium I shall be going out in the Atlantic to visit some of the members of our Navy aboard a newly-commissioned aircraft carrier. The men and women of our armed forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that they never do. Combat will be prevented.

We must support them in that vigil.

This has been a sober talk, I know. But it is not a cause for panic or even for pessimism. We have a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it and preserve and protect our country's interests. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that we will succeed.
This means that we shall have to continue to support large and capable military forces. All of us here probably wish that were not so. We wish that our freedom and security did not have to depend so much upon the force of arms. But for most of human history, it has, and there is no doubt that it does today. Sadly, but for the present inescapably, we, like most of our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy us are restrained less by their respect for the knowledge of the strength of our values, than by the knowledge that we [who cherish those values] are strong.

We can meet the challenge. We are a wealthy nation of talented people. We can readily afford the costs of our military forces, as well as any increased costs needed to prevent the Soviet military buildup from destabilizing the world. The money we spend on the programs I have described is not wasted, any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force. It purchases our freedom to fulfill all our other goals.

We have a duty to stand guard against any threat to our existence as a nation. To be naive about this duty, or indifferent toward it, would be to increase the risk of a dangerous miscalculation.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war, can be particularly determined that war shall not happen again. All Americans can understand the lessons history teaches of the need for
firmness and strength to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circum-
stances of our lives may seem, we have no guarantee they will endure. [That is up to us.] That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.

Thank you.
One hundred ninety-eight years ago, in the southern part of your state, four hundred North Carolina militiamen took up arms in our War of Independence.

Against a force of thirteen hundred British soldiers, the North Carolina militia prevailed -- and their battle at Ramsour's Mill became a step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice Americans have had to make time and again in our nation's history, and we have learned that strength is the final protector of liberty.
This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my oldest son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I have spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purpose of our armed forces has been twofold: to defend our security when it is threatened, and through demonstrated strength to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again.

These words of John Kennedy still guide our actions: "The purpose of our arms is not war but
peace -- to be sure that we will never have to use
them."

That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been
changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about
our national security -- where we now stand, what changes
have taken place, and what we are going to do.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling
back from protecting its interests around the world.
That is not the case.

Another myth is that our Defense budget is too
burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal
revenues. Defense is of course a large and important
item of expenditures; but it represents only about
5 percent of our gross national products, and has
decreased steadily over the years to only about a
quarter of our current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's
defense spending is mainly for intercontinental
missiles or weapons. Only _____ percent of our
Defense budget goes to strategic forces of nuclear
deterrence. Nearly 60 percent of it is simply for
pay and support of our personnel. [The Soviets,
incidentally, do not pay their military people nearly
as much as we do; more of what they spend on military
forces goes for hardware.]

Finally, some believe that because we possess
nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do
nothing more to assure our physical security.

Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries have built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons -- tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail and could threaten our vital interests if we and our allies and friends did not have our own conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Or course, our national security -- our physical security -- rests on more than just military forces. It depends partly on the productive power of our farms and our factories, on an adequate supply of resources, on an economic system which values human freedom over centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion,
moral strength and determination of our people. It depends on strong bonds with our allies, on whether other nations seek to live in peace or to dominate their neighbors.

But without adequate and capable military forces we would lack an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to provide forces adequate to the challenges of the world in which we live.

* * *

Let us review what has been happening over the past decade or two.

First, the world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is division among
the Communist powers; the old colonial empires have been succeeded by many new nations; and old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

Second, we must recognize that there have been changes in the military balance. Over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviet Union have grown substantially -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own. There also has been an ominous willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power -- to intervene in local conflicts with advisors, with materiel, and with full logistical support for mercenaries from their satellite countries, as we can observe today in Africa.

When did this increase in Soviet military power occur? It has been going on steadily, for a
long time. Since 1960 Soviet real military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year.

What have we been doing? Our own rate of military spending has been going in the opposite direction. During most of the past decade, our real military spending has been declining; as a percentage of our gross national product, after accounting for inflation, it is now lower than at any time since 1950. Our Army, for example, is smaller than at any time since before the Korean War. Although each modern ship is more formidable, we now have fewer naval vessels than at any time since 1939.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in the world in naval forces.
In its balanced strategic nuclear forces, the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has now achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses -- diplomatic, economic and military.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our armed forces, whenever our security requires it. We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy, and out of this process have come some overall principles designed to assure our national security over the long haul.
1. We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friendly powers, we will match any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

2. We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall discourage other powers from doing so.

3. We shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements where possible.
4. We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our value. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union wherever possible toward common social, scientific, and economic goals to the extent of their demonstration of restraint in force levels and missile programs and in the projection of their own or proxy forces into other lands and continents.

Our military policy in support of this strategy will be to increase our conventional strength and mobility as necessary while maintaining the nuclear balance. So, even as we search for agreement on arms control we must modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces. In short, we are determined to take whatever action is necessary
to counter the challenge of foreign military expansion.

Until SALT and mutual force reduction efforts are successful we will continue to increase our own defense efforts.

* * *

We shall implement our military policy in three ways:

-- By maintaining strategic nuclear parity;

-- By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

-- By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.
Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation unemotionally, and to make sensible choices about our objectives and means.

Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our allies.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets
already have reached agreement on several basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are not looking for any advantage, but you can be assured that before I sign a treaty on behalf of the United States, I will be sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that our strength relative to that of the Soviet Union will be no less than it would be without a treaty.

But even within the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to
national suicide for the Soviet Union; but it is a possibility which, however remote, we must guard against.

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development of cruise missiles and we are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems.
Our strategic defense forces are a triad -- land-based missiles, sea based missiles, and air-breathing systems. Through the plans I have described, all three legs of the triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor who attacks our nation.

We are also committed to the defense of Europe. Bonds of kinship, culture, trade, and shared political values link our people, and for thirty years and more we have been bound also by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. We continue to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten
their territory or freedom which we have fought
together to protect in the past. The Western allies
have the strength to deter aggression, and there
must be no doubt that we also possess the will.

For several years we have tried to negotiate
mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in
Europe with the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact
nations, but in the meantime the Soviets have
continued to add to their forces. So in the face
of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO
allies have had to take important steps to cope with
short-term vulnerabilities and to respond to long-term
threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S.
forces stationed in Western Europe, and we are
improving our ability to speed larger numbers of
ground and air reinforcements to Europe in time of crisis.
Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are also improving their readiness and reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be attending a summit meeting in the United States in May. Here we will address a NATO long-term defense program which will expand and integrate allied defense plans in ten key functional areas.

Thirdly, our security concerns reach beyond Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc and, as events in Africa are demonstrating, this involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature -- a development that we cannot view with complacency.
We must maintain forces that can be readily deployed whenever and wherever they are needed in order to counter projection of foreign military power when it threatens our vital interests and those of our allies.

The United States has permanent major interests and responsibilities in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and improve the prospects for peace. But we have the will, and we must also have the capacity, to maintain our commitments and protect our interests in these critical areas.
Because of our crucial national interests, we will maintain our position as a major power in the Pacific Basin. There is great mutual advantage in our mutual defense treaties with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Souther Korea, and in our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations.

Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where the vital interests of four great powers converge. It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable. We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, reducing our ground forces but improving air strength as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its capabilities.
In the Middle East and the region of the
Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability.
The economic health and well-being of the United
States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon
continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility
for preserving peace and military stability rests
with the countries there. We shall continue to work
with our friends and allies to strengthen their
ability to prevent threats to their interests and
ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces
of our own which could be called upon if necessary
to support the defense efforts of our friends and
allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is
developing and will maintain quickly-deployable
forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests
In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these regions, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries there. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies. The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests
in the Pacific, East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf particularly against new threats which may be posed by other military powers.

Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must -- and we will -- proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

* * *
When I leave this auditorium I shall be going to visit with the crew aboard one of our most modern nuclear aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Ocean. The men and women of our armed forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength combat will be prevented. We must always support them in that vigil.

This has been a sober talk, I know. But there is no cause for panic or pessimism. We have a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it. We will preserve and protect our country's interests.
any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force to keep the peace. It purchases our freedom to fulfill our worthy goals.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war, can be particularly determined that war shall not come to us again. All Americans can understand the lessons taught by history of the need for firmness and strength to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that these blessings will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.

#   #   #
This means that we shall have to continue to support large and capable military forces.

But for most of human history, people have wished vainly that freedom and security did not have to depend so much upon the force of arms. We, like our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy us are restrained less by their respect for the strength of our values, than by their knowledge that we are physically strong.

We can meet the challenge. We are a great nation of talented people. We can readily afford the costs of our military forces, as well as any increased costs needed to prevent the military buildup of any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend is not wasted,
One hundred ninety-eight years ago, in the southern part of your state, four hundred North Carolina militiamen took up arms in our War of Independence. Against a force of thirteen hundred British soldiers, the North Carolinians prevailed — and their battle at Ramsour's Mill became a step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice Americans have had to make time and again in our nation's history, and we have learned that strength is the final protector of liberty.
This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my own family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolution. My father was a first lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my oldest son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I spent eleven years of my life as a member of the United States Navy. This is typical of many American families.

Down through the generations, the purposes of our armed forces have been the same: to defend our security when it is threatened, and through demonstrated strength to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again.

These words of John Kennedy still guide our actions: "The purpose of our arms is not war but peace."
That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security -- where we now stand, what new circumstances we face, and what we are going to do in the future.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world. That is not the case, as will be explained demonstrated in this speech and in our actions as a nation.
Another myth is that our Defense budget is too burdensome, and consumes an undue portion of our federal revenues. National defense is of course a large and important item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product, and consumes approximately one-fourth of our current federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or nuclear weapons. About 10 percent of our Defense budget goes to strategic forces for nuclear deterrence. More than 50 percent of it is simply to pay and support the men and women in our Armed Forces.

Finally, some believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do
nothing more to guarantee our security. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries have now built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons -- tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail and could threaten our vital interests -- unless we and our allies and friends have our own conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Of course, our national security rests on more than just military forces. It depends partly on the productive power of our farms and our factories, on an adequate supply of natural resources, on an economic system which values human freedom over centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion, moral strength
and determination of our people and on the friendship of our neighbors. Our security depends on strong bonds with our allies, and on whether other nations seek to live in peace and refrain from trying to dominate those around them.

But without adequate and capable military forces we would still lack an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to maintain strength, provide forces equal to the challenges of the world in which we live.

* * * *

Let us review how national security issues have changed over the past decade or two.

The world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is division among the
There also has been an ominous willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power -- to intervene in local conflicts with advisors, with equipment, and with full logistical support for mercenaries from their satellite countries, as we can observe today in Africa.
Communist powers; the old colonial empires have fallen, and many new nations have risen in their place; old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

There have also been changes in the military balance among nations. Over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own.

This increase in Soviet military power has been going on for a long time. Since 1960 Soviet real

military spending has doubled, rising steadily by three to four percent every year, while ours is actually lower than it was in 1960.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in the world in naval forces.
In its balanced strategic nuclear force capability the United States retains important advantages, but we no longer dominate the scene. Over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses -- diplomatic, economic and military.

As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our Armed Forces, whenever our security requires it. We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy, and out of this process have come some overall principles designed to preserve our national security during the years ahead.
-- We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us. Together with our allies and friends, we will match any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

-- We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall oppose intervention by others.

-- While assuming our military capabilities, we shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements where possible.
-- We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific, and economic goals -- but if they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such cooperation will erode.

These principles mean that, even as we search for agreement on arms control, we will modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces.

* * *

We shall implement this policy in three ways:

-- By maintaining strategic nuclear balance;
-- By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

-- By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation objectively, and to make sensible choices about our purposes and means.

Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the
Soviets. The Soviets must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our friends.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now underway in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets already have reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are not looking for a one-sided advantage, but before I sign a SALT agreement on behalf of the United States, I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as we would be without an agreement.
But in addition to the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union; but, however remote, it is a threat against which we must constantly be on guard.

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles
to reinforce the strategic value of our bombers.

and we are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If it becomes necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems.

Our strategic defense forces are a triad -- land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and air-breathing systems such as bombers and cruise missiles. Through the plans I have described, all three legs of the triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor.
For thirty years and more we have been committed to the defense of Europe -- bound by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. We continue to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom which, in the past, we have fought together to defend.

For several years we and our allies have been trying to negotiate mutual and balanced reductions of military forces in Europe with the Soviets and the other Warsaw Pact nations, but in the meantime the Soviets have continued to increase and to modernize their forces beyond a level necessary for defense. In the face of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO allies have had to take important steps to
cope with short-term vulnerabilities and to respond
to long-term threats. We have significantly
strengthened U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe,
and we are improving our ability to speed additional
ground and air reinforcements to the defense of
Europe in time of crisis.

Our European allies, who supply the major
portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are
also improving their readiness and reinforcement
capabilities and their antitank defenses. The
heads of the NATO governments will be attending a
summit meeting in the United States in May, where
we will address a NATO long-term defense program
which will expand and integrate allied defense plans.

* * *
For many years the United States has been a truly global power. Longstanding security interests and those of our allies encompass our own and our security concerns, reach beyond our hemisphere and Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet power is being felt far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc and, as events in Africa are demonstrating, this involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature—a development that we cannot view with complacency.

We have important historical responsibilities to enhance peace in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and minimize the threat of conflict. But we have the will, and we must also maintain the capacity, to honor our commitments and to protect our interests in these critical areas.
In the Pacific there is reciprocal advantage in our mutual defense treaties with Australia,

New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, and our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations.

Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where the vital interests of great powers converge. It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable. We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, improving our air strength, and reducing our ground forces as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its own capabilities.
In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability.

The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe and Japan depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf.

In all these situations, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries concerned. We shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and ours. In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which could be called upon if necessary to support the defense efforts of our friends and allies.

The Secretary of Defense at my direction is developing and will maintain quickly-deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our interests throughout the world.
Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but effective arms control agreements will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must -- and we will -- proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our security requires.

* * *

When I leave this auditorium I shall be going to visit with the crew aboard one of our most modern nuclear aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Ocean. The men and women of our Armed Forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic
Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength combat will be prevented. We must always support them in that vigil.

This has been a sober talk, I know. But there is no cause for pessimism. We face a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it. We will preserve and protect our country and continue to promote and preserve peace around the world.

This means that we shall have to continue to support strong and efficient military forces.

For most of human history, people have wished vainly that freedom -- and the flowering of the human spirit which freedom nourishes -- did not finally have to depend upon the force of arms. We,
like our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy liberty are restrained less by their respect for freedom's strength than by their knowledge that those who cherish freedom are strong.

We are a great nation of talented people. We can readily afford the necessary costs of our military forces, as well as an increased level needed to prevent any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend on our nation's defense is not wasted, any more than is the cost of maintaining a local police force to keep the peace. This investment purchases our freedom to fulfill the worthy goals of our nation.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war,
are particularly determined that war shall never come to us again. All Americans understand the basic lesson of history: that we need firmness and the ability to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that these blessings will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.
March 17, 1978

To Wes Pippert

Thank you for having Jody give me a copy of your manuscript. I have glanced through it, but because of work schedules the past few weeks, I have not been able to read all of it in detail.

It was thoughtful of you to let me see it.

Sincerely,

JIMMY

Mr. Wesley G. Pippert
Apartment 706
1330 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

JC/jmc/js/em
3/14/18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I agree

MR. PRESIDENT,

I KNOW YOU HAVE
A LOT TO DO. HOWEVER,
IF YOU WANT TO HAVE
ANY CHANGES IN VER
APPERT'S BOOK WE NEED TO
DO SO FAIRLY SOON.

I SUGGEST WE NOT
GET INVOLVED - TELL HIM
YOU ENJOY TO READING IT BUT
DON'T WANT TO ACT AS
EDITOR.

Jody
3/15/78

Joyce Cook --

Please have letter drafted to Wes Pippert..... reporter with UPI/White House correspondent..... presidential signature..... thanking him for sending having Jody give him a copy of the his manuscript..... that he's glanced through it, but because of xxx work schedules of last couple weeks has not been able to read xxx all of it in detail..... etc.

Thanks -- Susan Clough

(Please return all materials to me with presidential response) (thanks)
March 13, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Speech Draft on Defense

I enclose a streamlined version which includes some, though not all, of Harold Brown's suggestions.

However, since Harold made a very large number of changes, many of them stylistic, I felt I had better also attach a copy which incorporated all of his suggestions.

Perhaps you could quickly scan both versions, and then decide from which you would prefer to work.

Personally, I prefer version #1; it is leaner and has fewer four-syllable words.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Frank Press
SUBJECT: East Coast Sonic Booms and the Concorde

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has concluded that the Concorde is responsible for many of the booms heard not only in Nova Scotia but also on the US East Coast. More importantly, they have hypothesized that extremely long-range transmission of the sonic booms from the Concorde can take place as the boom is refracted and travels essentially unhindered at very high altitude (100-200km) before being bent back to earth. For example, booms from Concorde's acceleration out of Paris and London and heading for the US could be heard in the Charleston area, which lies on the great circle route for the flight paths to the US. The large amount of energy carried by the shock waves, according to the theory, could cause large changes in the winds at high altitudes and could therefore affect weather patterns. They could also be the source of high altitude lights which have been seen in conjunction with the booms. The FAS will hold a press conference on Wednesday to announce their results.

The theory is not implausible and if it is upheld it could have serious adverse repercussions for the Concorde because the booms would have originated from the Concorde when it was hundreds or thousands of miles away from the point of impact. I have told Brock Adams of the situation, and have arranged for him to be briefed by the FAS.

At my request, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) had recently completed an investigation of the East Coast booms. NRL agrees that the Concorde was responsible for the Nova Scotia booms, but that the East Coast booms were probably caused by high performance military aircraft operating supersonically in military operating areas off the East Coast. NRL judged that the sonic booms were enhanced by a combination of aircraft acceleration, turns, and weather which was especially favorable to long-range propagation of the booms.

NRL ruled out the theory that the sonic booms were caused by high altitude ignition of methane which had seeped from the earth, as a precursor to a major East Coast earthquake.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Defense Speech

Here is the initial draft of the defense speech. I am sending also a copy to Harold Brown for his comments. Your guidance is needed for the final revision.

David, Jim Fallows, and I have been through it.
One-hundred and ninety-eight years ago, in the southern portion of your state, four-hundred militiamen from North Carolina took up arms in our war of independence.

Against a force of thirteen-hundred British soldiers, the North Carolina militia prevailed -- and the battle of Ramsour's Mill became a major turning point on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice we have made time and again in our nation's history, because we know that strength is the final protector of liberty.

This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolutionary War. My father served as a First Lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I have spent eleven years of my life as a member of the Navy.

Down through the generations, our nation's purpose has been the same: to defend our values, and to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again. The reason that
John Kennedy stated seventeen years ago still guides our actions: "The purpose of our arms," he said, "is not war but peace -- to be sure that we will never have to use them."

That purpose has remained firm, but we have maintained our strength best when we have shown our willingness to adapt -- when we have prepared for the tests of the future, rather than re-fighting the wars of the past.

Now our ability to adapt is once more put to the test. "National security" means something different than it did in the years when I wore a uniform -- and even than it did ten years ago, when my son fought in Vietnam.

-- Our world is more complex now, and the threats to security more numerous and intertwined. Our security rests on the energy and resources we import from abroad, on the stability of our trade, on the safety of our environment, and above all on the moral and economic health of our people. Our own security depends more than ever before on the kind of world we shape -- for we are far safer in a world of harmony and fulfillment than in a world of oppression, inequality, and want. With division in the Communist world, with the end of colonial empires and the rise of new states, old ideological labels have lost much of their meaning -- and historic visions of independence, equality, and human liberty have taken on new force.
-- In this changed world, military force is not sufficient to protect our national security -- but without an adequate military, we can have no security at all. The very complexity and turbulence in the world creates temptations to use force -- temptations which too often are not resisted.

In the last decade, Soviet military forces have grown -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own. There is also an ominous increase in the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power -- to intervene in local conflicts with advisors, materiel, and full logistical support for Cuban mercenaries.

Soviet military spending has risen steadily by three to four percent a year. During much of the past decade, our real military spending declined; as a percentage of GNP, it is now lower than at any time since 1950. In strategic forces, the U.S. retains important advantages but in the last decade the Soviet buildup proceeded to the point that it has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States. They greatly strengthened both their conventional and nuclear capabilities in central Europe. They added a million men to their armed forces, increased their strength in Europe, and sent more divisions to frontier with China.

They improved their navy and expanded its deployment, so that they are now more able to project their own military power -- and that of their satellites -- into new parts of the
world. These changes pose new threats to our security and demand that we develop new responses.

-- And in the last decade, we have changed. We are confident, at peace with ourselves, quietly self-assured. We no longer rise to a provocation simply because it is offered -- but we understand that there are certain challenges in which our deepest values are at stake. We have been tempered and natured by the hardships of the last fifteen years -- and we can see now their real meaning. Their lesson is not that we should deny the need for military power, but that we must use it judiciously, effectively, and in a manner consistent with our most basic values.

As Commander-in-Chief, I am responsible for modernizing, expanding and improving our forces, whenever our security requires it. Shortly after taking office, I ordered a major re-assessment of where we stood in the world in relation to the Soviets, and what changes were required in our national strategy. I consulted extensively with the civilian and military defense leaders and with our allies. Out of this process has come broad strategic principles designed to insure our national security over the long haul.

-- We will not allow any other country to gain military superiority. Together with our allies and friends, we will counterbalance Soviet power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.
We will seek Soviet cooperation in reducing areas of tension. We will not intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or aggravate regional conflicts, and we will oppose interventions by other powers in such conflicts.

We shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms agreements where possible -- and through military capabilities where necessary.

We shall use our great economic, technological, and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union wherever possible, toward common social, scientific, and economic goals. But the extent of our cooperation will depend upon their demonstration of restraint, not only in building missiles but also in projecting their forces into other lands and continents.

Our military policy in support of this strategy is to increase our conventional strength and mobility while maintaining the nuclear balance. So even as we search for agreement on arms control, we must modernize our strategic forces, and revitalize our conventional forces. In short, we are determined to counter the challenge of Soviet military expansion.

This will require an increase in our defense efforts. In light of the growth in Soviet power, our own spending will have to rise for as long as is necessary.
We will implement our military policy in three ways:
-- by maintaining strategic parity;
-- by strengthening our defenses in Europe;
-- by developing forces to counter the new threats to our allies and vital interests in other regions.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear war, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of these fearsome weapons, do not free us from the need for clear-eyed analysis, and for sensible choices about our objectives and means.
Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. The Soviets must not be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our allies and friends.

The SALT talks are one means to this goal, and we have already reached agreement on several basic points, although still others remain to be resolved.

Before we sign a treaty, we will be sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently monitor Soviet compliance, and that we will be as strong or stronger in relation to the Soviet Union as we would be without a treaty.

But even with a SALT agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles will make our land-based missile force increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union, but it is a possibility which, however remote, we must guard against. We are now working on new missiles -- the MX ICBM and Trident II submarine launched ballistic missile -- which give us options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If necessary, I will not hesitate to
order full scale development of these systems to guarantee integrity of our strategic deterrent.

We have under construction new Trident submarines which will give our ballistic missile submarine force greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development of cruise missiles, to diversify and extend the capabilities of our B-52 bomber force. Through these means, we can insure that all three legs of our Triad -- land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers -- will be modernized and improved, and that each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon any aggressor.

Bonds of kinship, culture, trade, and shared political values link our nation to Europe. For thirty years and more, we have also been linked by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. The second objective of our defense strategy remains what it has been: to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom we have fought to protect in the past.

The Western allies have the resources to deter aggression -- there must be no doubt that we also possess the will.

In the last decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its ability to wage nuclear war in Europe. More disturbingly, both the quantity and the quality of Soviet conventional
armaments aimed at Western Europe have also risen dramatically.

We would prefer to negotiate mutual and balanced force reductions, but progress in these talks has been slow. In the face of the continuing Soviet buildup, we have agreed with our allies on a number of important steps to cope with short-term vulnerabilities and respond to long-term threats. We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces now in Western Europe, to sustain our policy of forward defense. We are improving our ability to speed larger numbers of ground and air reinforcements to Europe in time of crisis. Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, have already begun to improve their readiness and reinforcement capabilities. The Long-term Defense Program, which will be detailed at the NATO Summit in Washington next May,
will expand and integrate allied defense plans in ten key areas.

Our security concerns reach beyond Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet military power is being projected far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc into other regions. As events in Africa are demonstrating, Soviet involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature, a development that we cannot view as benign. The third element of our strategy must be to counter the projection of Soviet power wherever it threatens our vital interests and our allies. To do this, we must maintain forces that can be readily deployed whenever they are needed.

The United States has major interests and responsibilities in East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the level of arms and improve the prospects for peace.

But we must also have the capacity, and the will, to maintain our commitments and protect our interests in these critical areas.

Japan and South Korea, both of them closely linked to the United States, are located where the vital interests of four great powers converge. We will remain a major power in the Pacific. We will ensure that Northeast Asia remains stable. As the South Korean army increases its capabilities
and continues its modernization, that goal can be achieved with reduced U.S. ground forces in South Korea. I have therefore ordered the phased withdrawal of the 2nd Division from Korea. Except for this change, U.S. force deployment in this area will remain stable, and the capabilities of our air and naval forces are being strengthened.

In the Middle East, we seek peace and security for all states. Our security also requires continued access to Middle Eastern oil. The wealth and the wellbeing of the United States, Europe, Japan, and many other countries depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf. We will take whatever measures may be necessary to secure that access against intervention by hostile outside powers.

The primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of each region rests with the powers there. We will continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent attacks which would threaten their interests and ours. In addition, however, we must also be prepared to support with our own forces the defense efforts of our friends and allies. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to develop readily deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our vital interests in East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf particularly against the new threats posed by Soviet military power.

Arms control agreements can complement military forces as instruments of national security. In fact, effective arms control agreements will only be possible if we maintain
appropriate military force levels. When we can reach balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries, they may limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But when we cannot agree, we must -- and we will -- rely on efficient arms programs to meet our needs.

Money spent on these programs is not wasted. It purchases our freedom to fulfill our other goals.

All of us here surely wish that were not so. We wish that freedom -- and the flowering of the human spirit which freedom nourishes -- did not finally depend upon the force of arms.

But for most of human history it has, and there is no doubt that it does today. Sadly, wastefully, but for the present inescapably, we live in a time when those who would destroy human values are restrained less by the knowledge of strength of these values than by the knowledge that those who cherish these values are strong.

I want to be realistic, not pessimistic. Americans stand for a set of basic values that we know will ultimately prevail. We are a confident nation, and with good reason: our economy is the world's most powerful, our institutions are sound, there is a new sense of vitality among our people.

But the world we live in is not so safe that we can afford to neglect the possibility of danger through the miscalculations of others. Even to describe modern weaponry, as I have done today, brings us face to face with mankind's potential for destruction; but we must come to terms with this
dark side of human nature and harness it unflinchingly for beneficial ends. We have a duty to stand guard against any threat to our existence as a nation.

To be naive about this duty, or indifferent toward it, is to increase the risk of a miscalculation. And those of us who are Southerners understand, perhaps more vividly than our countrymen, what this would mean. For we have tasted defeat, and we have seen the devastation that war brings. My great grandparents saw the cities of George reduced to ashes; your ancestors from North Caroline suffered a fourth of the Confederacy's casualties. From the burden of the South's difficult and tortured history we can extract lessons that offer wisdom to our nation. The things we know from our heritage are those that our countrymen sense by intuition. No matter how peaceful and secure and far from hard the circumstances of our lives may seem, we have no guarantee they will endure. That is why we must always maintain the strength which, God willing, we will never need to use.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the outline of the defense policy speech which the President plans to deliver on March 17.

At Tab A I enclose some pen comments of my own. At Tab B are comments prepared by some of the DoD staff; I am in general agreement with them. Added thoughts are underlined. The comments attempt in part to give the outline a more positive opening, by rephrasing some of the negative references.

The major need of the outline, as I see it, is one of focus. The address should convey a firm and unapologetic commitment to an adequate defense. It cannot cover every aspect of the national security with equal emphasis.

Therefore I think it should center on a few major items, viz.: the Defense budget is necessary both for the survival of our nation and for protecting our political interests in the world; only a small proportion is devoted to strategic forces; nevertheless, those strategic forces must be kept adequate, and the fact that if the forces survive and penetrate we and the Soviets could inflict great losses on each other does not do away with that need; our conventional forces must be modernized; and, very importantly, the Soviets have been building up their forces steadily for fifteen to twenty years, while our real defense spending except for the period of the Vietnam War, has steadily dropped and is lower than at any time since 1950. Thus, even at a time when we are determined to pursue equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, strategic and conventional, we must: (1) modernize our strategic forces, and (2) revitalize our conventional forces. Arms control and a strong defense are totally compatible.

The President should acknowledge our major conventional forces effort in central Europe since this is where the greatest threat exists, and where the Soviet buildup is most obvious. At the same time, the speech must emphasize our firm commitment in Asia and other parts of the world.
The President should make clear that money spent on defense of the nation is not wasted; that it is not of lesser priority than other spending; and that there is not going to be any reordering of spending priorities which would shrink the Defense budget further. Defense expenditures sufficient to our needs in a changing world have as high a priority as anything. National security depends on more than military forces; thus, we must not build an excessive military force, nor spend wastefully on what we do build. However, I do not believe we are anywhere near the point where defense spending is so enormous as to threaten the overall strength of the nation. At the same time, there is no need for panic. The budget the President has proposed is a carefully measured program which, year by year, will respond to the threat in a balanced and adequate manner.

I hope you find the foregoing useful and would appreciate an opportunity to comment on subsequent drafts.

Harold Brown
DEFENSE SPEECH -- revised by D. Aaron, 3/13/78

One-hundred and ninety-eight years ago, in the southern portion of your state, four-hundred militiamen from North Carolina took up arms in our war of independence.

Against a force of thirteen-hundred British soldiers, the North Carolina militia prevailed -- and the battle of Ramsour's Mill became a major step on the road to victory at Yorktown one year later.

Your ancestors in North Carolina, mine in Georgia, and their neighbors throughout the thirteen colonies earned our freedom in combat. That is a sacrifice we have made time and again in our nation's history, because we know that strength is the final protector of liberty.

This is a commitment, and a sacrifice, that I understand well, for the tradition of military service runs deep in my family. My first ancestor to live in Georgia, James Carter, fought in the Revolutionary War. My father served as a First Lieutenant in the Army during World War One, and my son volunteered to serve in Vietnam. I have spent eleven years of my life as a member of the Navy.

Down through the generations, the purposes of our armed forces have been the same: to defend our values, and to reduce the chances that we will have to fight again. The thought that John Kennedy stated seventeen years ago still
guides our actions: "The purpose of our arms," he said, "is not war but peace -- to be sure that we will never have to use them."

That purpose is unchanged. But the world has been changing, and our responses must change with it.

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security -- where we stand, what changes have taken place, and what we are going to do.

"National security" means something different than it did in the years when I wore a uniform -- and even than it did ten years ago, when my son fought in Vietnam.

Our world is more complex now, and the threats to security more numerous and intertwined. Our security rests on the energy and resources we import from abroad, on the stability of our trade, on the safety of our environment, and above all on the moral and economic health of our people.

With division in the Communist world, with the end of colonial empires and the rise of new states, old ideological labels have lost much of their meaning -- and historic visions of independence, equality, and human liberty have taken on new force.

Now, American security depends more than ever before on the kind of world we shape -- for we are far safer in a world of harmony and fulfillment than in a world of oppression, inequality, and want.
In this changed world, military force is not sufficient to protect our national security -- but without an adequate military, we can have no security at all. The very complexity and turbulence in the world creates temptations to use armed might. When nations succumb to this, the interests of the United States and the fate of the world is put at risk.

In the last decade, the military power of our principal rival, the Soviet Union, has grown -- both in absolute numbers, and in relation to our own. Soviet military spending has risen steadily by three to four percent a year. There is also an ominous increase in the willingness of the Soviet Union to use its military power -- to intervene in local conflicts with advisors, materiel, and full logistical support for Cuban mercenaries as they are doing today in Africa. The Soviet Union strengthened both their conventional and nuclear capabilities in central Europe. Since 1965 they have added almost a million men to their armed forces, increased their strength in Europe, and sent more divisions to the frontier with China.

The Soviets have improved their navy and expanded its deployment, so that they are now more able to project their own military power -- and that of their satellites -- into new parts of the world. These changes pose new threats to our security and demand that we develop new responses.

But in America during much of the past decade, real military spending declined; as a part of our real GNP it is now
lower than at any time since 1950. Our army is smaller than any time since before the Korean War. Our navy is smaller than it was in 1938.

In strategic forces, the U.S. retains important advantages but in the last decade the steady Soviet buildup proceeded to the point that it has achieved essential equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

Our attitudes have changed. We are confident, at peace with ourselves, quietly self-assured. We no longer rise to a provocation simply because it is offered. But we understand that there are challenges in which our deepest values and global relationships are at stake. We have been tempered by the hardships of the last fifteen years -- and we can see now their real meaning. Their lesson is not that we should deny the need for military power, but that we must use it judiciously, effectively, and in a manner consistent with our most basic values.

As Commander-in Chief, I am determined to meet the new challenges to our security, and modernize, expand, and improve our forces, whenever our security requires it.
Shortly after taking office, I ordered a major reassessment of where we stood in the world, particularly in relation to the Soviets, and what changes were required in our national strategy and military efforts. I consulted extensively with the civilian and military leaders of the defense establishment and with our allies. Out of this process has come a broad strategy designed to insure our national security over the long haul.

It is based on these guiding principles:

-- We will not allow any other country to gain military superiority. Together with our allies and friends, we will counterbalance Soviet power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs.

-- We will seek Soviet cooperation in reducing areas of tension. We will not intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or aggravate regional conflicts, and we will oppose intervention by other powers in such conflicts.

-- We shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms agreements where possible -- and through military capabilities where necessary.

-- We shall use our great economic, technological, and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union wherever possible, toward common social, scientific,
and economic goals. But our cooperation will depend upon their demonstration of restraint, not only in building missiles but also in projecting their own or proxy forces into other lands and continents.

Our military policy is one of increasing our conventional strength and mobility while maintaining the nuclear balance. Even as we search for agreement on arms control, we must modernize our strategic forces, and revitalize our conventional forces, so that both are equal to the demands placed on them. In short, it is our task to counter the challenge of Soviet military expansion.

This will require an increase in our defense budget. In light of the growth in Soviet power, our own spending will have to rise for as long as is necessary.

We will implement our strategy in three ways:

-- by maintaining strategic parity;
-- by strengthening our defenses in Europe;
-- by developing forces to counter the new threats to our allies and vital interests in other regions.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear war, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of these fearsome weapons, do not free us from the need for clear-eyed analysis, and for sensible choices about our objectives and means.
Our strategic forces must be -- and must be known to be -- a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. The Soviets must not be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce, or blackmail us or our allies and friends.

The SALT talks are one means to this goal, and we have already reached agreement on several basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. You can rest assured that before I sign a treaty on behalf of the United States, I will be sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently monitor Soviet compliance, and that we will be as strong or stronger in relation to the Soviet Union as we would be without a treaty.

But even with a SALT agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles will make our land-based missile force increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union, but it is a possibility which, however remote, we must guard against.

We have under construction new Trident submarines which will give our ballistic missile submarine force greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development of cruise missiles, to diversify and extend the capabilities of our bomber forces.
We are now working on new missiles -- the MX ICBM and Trident II submarine launched ballistic missile -- which give us options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If necessary, I will not hesitate to order full scale development of these systems to guarantee integrity of our strategic deterrent.

Through these means, we can insure that our Triad of strategic forces -- land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers -- each will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability to impose devastating retaliation upon any aggressor.

Europe is also a principal focus of our strategy. Bonds of kinship, culture, trade, and shared political values link our nation to Europe. For thirty years and more, we have also been linked by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital to our own. Our defense strategy in Europe remains what it has been: to cooperate with our NATO allies in a strategy of flexible response, combining conventional and nuclear forces, so that no aggressor can threaten the territory or freedom we have fought to protect in the past.

The Western allies have the resources to deter aggression -- there must be no doubt that we also possess the will.

In the last decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its ability to wage nuclear war in Europe. More disturbingly, both the quantity and the quality of Soviet conventional
armaments aimed at Western Europe have also risen dramatically. They have more divisions than a decade ago. These divisions have more tanks, troops and artillery.

We would prefer to negotiate mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe, but progress in these talks has been slow. In the face of the continuing Soviet buildup, we have agreed with our allies on a number of important steps to cope with short-term vulnerabilities and respond to long-term threats.

We have significantly strengthened U.S. forces now in Western Europe, to sustain our policy of forward defense. We are improving our ability to speed larger numbers of ground and air reinforcements to Europe in time of crisis. Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, have already begun to improve their readiness and reinforcement capabilities. The Long-term Defense Program, which will be detailed at the NATO Summit in Washington next May, will expand and integrate allied defense plans.
Our security concerns reach beyond Europe. In this decade, for the first time, Soviet military power is being projected far beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc into other regions. As events in Africa are demonstrating, Soviet involvement abroad is increasingly military in nature, a development that we cannot view as benign. The third element of our strategy must be to counter the projection of Soviet power wherever it threatens our vital interests and our allies. To do this, we must maintain forces that can be readily deployed whenever they are needed.

The United States has major interests and responsibilities in East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf, as well as in our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the level of arms and improve the prospects for peace.

But we must also have the capacity, and the will, to maintain our commitments and protect our interests in these critical areas.

Japan and South Korea, both of them closely linked to the United States, are located where the vital interests of four great powers converge. There should be no doubt that we will remain a major power in the Pacific. We will ensure that Northeast Asia remains stable. As the South Korean army continues to increase its capabilities and to modernize,
that goal can be achieved with reduced U.S. ground forces in South Korea. I have therefore ordered the phased withdrawal of the 2nd Division from Korea. Except for this change, U.S. force deployment in this area will remain stable, and the capabilities of our air and naval forces are being strengthened.

In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek peace and security for all states. Our economic security and the wellbeing of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and many other countries depend upon continued access to oil from the Persian Gulf. We will maintain a capability to keep that access secure against intervention by hostile outside powers.

The primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of each region rests with the countries there. We will continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent attacks which would threaten their interests and ours. In addition, however, we must also be prepared to support with our own forces the defense efforts of our friends and allies. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to develop readily deployable forces -- air, land and sea -- to defend our vital interests in East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf against the new threats posed by Soviet military power.

Arms control agreements can complement military forces as instruments of national security. In fact, effective arms control agreements will only be possible if we maintain
appropriate military force levels. When we can reach balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries, they may limit the costs of security and reduce the risk of war. But when we cannot agree, we must -- and we will -- rely on efficient arms programs to meet our needs.

When I leave this auditorium I shall be going out in the Atlantic to visit some of the members of our Navy aboard a newly-commissioned aircraft carrier. The men and women of our armed forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that they never do.

We must support them in that vigil. Money spent on them and on the programs I have described is not wasted. It purchases our freedom to fulfill our other goals.

All of us here surely wish that were not so. We wish that freedom -- and the flowering of the human spirit which freedom nourishes -- did not finally depend upon the force of arms.

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