

6/7/78 Annapolis Speech [1]

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OUTLINE OF A PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH
ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Objective: To explain to the American public the apparent dichotomy of simultaneous competition (e.g., Africa) and cooperation (e.g., SALT) with the Soviet Union

I. Introduction - Perspective

A. Fundamental to recognize that U.S. and Soviets are inherently in competition:

1. Soviets and U.S. are leaders of opposing military alliances which individually have power to destroy the other's civilization.
2. Gap between our aspirations and purposes and those of USSR. Soviets practice and export a totalitarian, repressive, and closed society. The U.S. a democratic/free/open one. We expect the Soviet Union to compete with us when advancing goals and values that are widely divergent from ours.
3. Soviets see military action/assistance at heart of successfully extending influence abroad. This in turn means that they must focus their attention on areas of instability. U.S. prefers to think in terms of assisting lesser-developed nations to uplift their human rights to a free life and to economic well being. This means looking for ways to enhance a more equitable international economic structure that benefits all and promotes stability.

B. Also fundamental to recognize that the U.S. and Soviet Union have important interests in common:

1. Common desire to avert nuclear war provides both the incentive to control our strategic relationship. Both understand that if competition between not bounded by mutual restraint, could quickly and irreversibly assume the most dangerous proportions.
2. Mutual understanding can promote stability and progress in non-military areas, e.g. exchange of economic and technical data. It is not always a zero-sum game.

II. Reasons why competition cannot be abandoned:

- A. We have the clear obligation as leader of free world to counter-balance Soviet increases in real military strength.
- B. We have responsibility to buttress smaller, weaker nations who face subversion by an alien and hostile ideology. We are a nation founded on the principles of freedom and human rights. We have progressively, especially in this century, taken on a world leadership role to help other nations realize their destinies openly, exercising freedom of choice and without fear.
- C. We have the obligation because of our strength and prestige to speak out in exposing the abuses of the Soviet model of society and keep the world informed of their activities and intentions lest they succeed in subverting through deceptive short-term appeals.

III. Reasons why cooperation must be pursued:

- A. Arms control agreements are one of the means we have for enhancing the security of the United States and its allies. A new SALT agreement if successfully concluded, would enlarge the spectrum of

strategic weapon systems to be regulated by mutual agreement. It is our obligation as custodian of the West's nuclear arsenal to enhance the security provided by those weapons by using our leverage to limit Soviet arms development and deployment.

B. We have the obligation to enhance stability by reassurance to Soviets of our rationality and defensive posture.

C. After 33 years of living precariously with nuclear weapons, the world still does not understand their influence on policy let alone on war. Yet the numbers and lethal potential of these weapons continues to expand markedly. We have an obligation not to let this dangerous spiral continue without making a genuine effort to control it.

IV. Difficulties in striking and maintaining the balance between competition and cooperation.

A. Soviet unwillingness to restrain their proclivity to resolve political conflicts with arms, in combination with opportunistic foreign policy, focuses attention on mutual conflict at expense of mutual interest.

1. Driven by Soviets lack of self-confidence in their ability to compete by non-military means.

2. Reinforced by a theology which

- refutes transition by peaceful means

- preaches maintaining stability by repression of freedom.

B. Understandable underlying fear of miscalculation in taking cooperative arms reduction steps.

1. Suspicion generated by 33 years of major power confrontation.
2. Inability to rationalize Soviet's continued arms build ups with their professed desire to limit their strategic force posture is only one element; their proponderance of military hardware such as tanks and artillery in Western Europe must generate questions and doubts as to their intentions.
3. Public misperception that you can't take an action which is in the interest of Soviets, regardless of stated benefits to U.S., without giving something up.

V. Conclusion

A. We are moving to meet our obligations in both directions.

1. Cooperation -

- Have shown willingness to go further in those areas where we have already an established structure for cooperation, i.e. SALT.
- Have sought to broaden areas for cooperation - CTB, Indian Ocean, conventional arms transfers, ASAT.
- Efforts have borne little fruit. Process must involve cooperation on both sides and Soviets have simply not been sufficiently forthcoming.
- Danger now of collapsing the fragile mutual trust so painstakingly built.
- Cannot abrogate our responsibility for security of free world. Prefer the sensible route through mutual limits

and assurance but will take the harder road of arms and other materiel superiority if necessary.

2. Competition

- We will compete with the Soviets.
- The Soviet past attempts at dominance (Egypt-Somalia-Sudan) make their true intent quite clear.
- Their complete flip with Somalia and Ethiopia demonstrates the opportunism of their policy.
- We will keep the world warned of their present activity clearly undertaken for the same purposes in Zaire.
- We will stand behind countries who wish to resist but lack the resources and understanding to compete with Soviet aggressive policies, whether directly exercised or through Cuban, East German or other surrogates.
 - This is not a blank check, we will not assume the load but we will help others who help themselves.
 - Assistance will take any of many forms across spectrum. But must have flexibility to choose the one most appropriate to occasion.
- We work on the conviction that self-realization is a key goal for individuals and for nations. We will conduct our foreign policy toward ensuring that, through negotiation if possible, but strength if not.

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Today

The relationship between the world's two greatest powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - is central to world peace. It is important that the world, the American public, and you as future leaders of the Navy understand the complex and sensitive nature of this relationship.

The word "detente" is often used, and it is necessary to understand

comprehend some of the meanings of this single word. Detente, to be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of ^{cooperation} accommodation.

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must be truly reciprocal, and
not selective.

~~Comprehensive~~. Both nations must

exercise restraint in troubled areas

and in turbulent times. We must

honor meticulously agreements which

have been reached to widen cooper-

ation and mutual restraint in arms

limitation, freedom of movement, ^{of people,} ~~and~~

the expression of ideas and in the

protection of human rights.

We must realize that, for

a very long time, our relationship

with the Soviet Union will be both

Cooperative and Competitive.

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Our social and political systems,
our histories, our ideas and aspirations
are different, and we will and must
④ continue to
live with those differences. They
~~need not cause any major conflict,~~^{threat}
~~to peace~~, however,
but they do create conflicting national
ambitions and policies.

Move up
discussion
of
differences
X

We must be prepared to deal
with these differences persistently
and patiently for many years, and
to avoid extreme swings in our
⑤ public mood from euphoria and an
exaggerated sense of compatibility
on the one hand to despair and
hostility on the other.

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The world is today under-
going the most ^{rapid and} profound transform-
ation in its history - an inherently

⑥ Complex and turbulent process, which
tends to exacerbate the innate
differences between the Soviet Union
and our country.

The ~~individual~~ political awaken-
ing among people around the world
to new prospects for political freedom and economic
progress is a process as pregnant with
hope as it is laden with dangers.

⑦ How we deal with this evolving
challenge can determine whether or not
we are successful in ^{achieving} ~~seeking~~ world
peace.

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(8)

Our long term objective must
be to convince the Soviets of
the advantages of cooperation and
of the costs of ~~unilateral~~ dis-
ruptive behavior.

(9)

Neither the U.S. or
The Soviet Union ^{should entertain} ~~must be~~
~~discouraged~~ of the notion that
military supremacy can either be
attained or exploited. ^{politically,} ~~the~~

We seek a world of peace,

(without victory for either side.)

(10)

We ^{seek} ~~acknowledge~~ that a world of
diversity - social, political and
ideological - ^{since we believe that only such a world} can be a world of

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~~genuine~~ genuine cooperation among
many nations and cultures.

Our principal concern is how
✓ to ^{help} shape a world which is more
1 economic well being and
responsive to the desire for social
① justice, political self-determination,
for peace, and for basic human
rights.

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(14) We can be confident about
the future if we are ^{consistent and} resolute
in our conduct.

~~[Our military strength, our
economic potential, our scientific
and intellectual creativity, have
no equal.]~~

^{repeated later} We desire to domi-
nate no one. We will remain
(13) constructively engaged in widening
our cooperation with the ^{positive} need
forces in the world.

We ~~to~~

not only with the Soviet Union
but also

We want to increase our
friendship with the emerging
nations, with the countries in
Eastern Europe, ^{and} with the People's
Republic of China, ~~and, indeed, with~~
~~the Soviet Union.~~ We are

(14)

prepared to cooperate with
all nations, regardless of their
systems or ideologies. We are
particularly dedicated to the
attainment of genuine self-deter-
mination and majority rule in
those parts of the world where
these goals are yet to be
attained.

(15) We are ~~willing~~ ^{eager} - ~~even sometimes~~
~~eager~~ to ~~accommodate~~ ^{effect} peaceful
change, and in this context we
will continue to seek a stable and
reciprocal ~~and comprehensive~~
detente with the Soviet Union

(16) We will ~~see~~ negotiate
constructively and persistently for
a fair Strategic Arms Limitation
agreement. We have no desire to
link this negotiation with other
competitive relationships nor to impose
other special conditions on the
process. In a democratic society,
however, where public opinion is

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an integral factor in the shaping
and implementation of foreign
policy, we cannot ~~ignore~~ ^{pretend} the fact
that tensions and sharp conflicts

(16) in our mutual relationship brought
about by threats to peace ~~we~~
~~will not~~
~~hesitate~~ to complicate the quest
for an agreement. This is
not a matter of our preference
but a recognition of the ^{fact.} truth.

We will always urge
restraint in areas of tension, to
support multinational or regional
organizations dedicated to peace,
and we will increase as necessary
our defenses to match any
challenge which confronts us or
our allies. Above all, we will
remain constant in our commit-
ment to the principles which
have insured the greatness of
our nation.

(17)

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A strong defense is crucial because it provides us not only safety but a position from which to negotiate for improved relations and for a ^{mutually} lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Both our allies and our potential adversaries must see our strength and be sure of our national will.

(20) I am convinced that the
Soviets do not want war.
~~what you~~

They were our allies in
the Second World War, and they
suffered the ^{terrible} consequences of
that massive conflict ~~by~~ ^{with} the
loss of 20 million Soviet lives.

(21) One of the great historical accom-
plishments of the U.S. Navy was
to guide and protect the ^{tremendous} shipments
of armaments and supplies from
our country to Murmansk and other
Soviet ports, in support of our
joint effort to meet the ^{Nazi} threat,
~~from Nazi Germany~~

22

At the end of that war
these were already strong polit-
ical differences between our
two countries. The Soviets did
not disarm as we did. Our
monopoly on nuclear explosives
ended in 1949, ^{and} our dominant nuclear
advantage was overcome early in
this decade.

23

~~Since then~~ we ^{now} have maintained
roughly equivalent nuclear strength
and ^{have} continued to seek mutual
accommodation ^{with the Soviet Union} as demonstrated by
the Austrian Peace Treaty, the
Quadripartite agreement in Berlin,

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the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space,

(23)

the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Armaments ~~SALT I~~, the limited test ban agreement, and trade agreements.

~~Similar~~

~~These~~ efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries,

(24)

the prohibition of attacks on ^{peaceful} satellites, an agreement to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

> (Insert P on why these efforts are important + worth while) from 361

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25
There are, ^{however,} significant differences
between us and the Soviet Union
caused by conflicting ideologies,
domestic attitudes, and aspirations
for the future. These differences
should be clearly understood
by the American people because
such understanding provides a base
on which ^{we will} build our political
and military policy.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente

26
seems to mean a continuing

9
struggle ~~by all means~~ short of

~~war~~ for advantage and influence
by a variety of means.

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Moreover

military power,

The Soviets ^{apparently} seek ^{proxy} military

action or ^{military} assistance as the best
means of expanding their
influence abroad.

27

Obviously, areas of instability

provide a focus for their effort,
and they always seem to be

28

ready and willing to take advantage

of any such opportunity. ~~For~~
~~example 12 months ago they were arming~~
~~Somalia against Ethiopia and lately they have been~~
~~arming Ethiopia against Somalia.~~
As was ~~also~~ obvious in

Vance
disagrees

Korea, Angola and Ethiopia they

prefer to use proxy forces to
fight their battles.

29

30
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To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive - far beyond any legitimate requirements for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than fifteen years they have maintained a strong commitment to this program of military growth, investing as much as 13% of their gross national product in military expenditures. They now have a massive military capability, including ~~173~~ army ~~divisions~~ and this sustained growth continues.

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31/ Their gross ^{abuse} violation of basic
human rights in their own country
in violation of the agreement reached
at Helsinki. Causes ^{condemnation} ~~concern~~
~~and~~ throughout the freedom-loving
world.

32/ The Soviet Union attempts to
export a totalitarian and re-
pressive form of government, ^{resulting in} imposed
~~on~~ a closed society.

In some ways, even Eurocommunism
poses a challenge to Soviet influence
in the Communist world.

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33 /
Some of these characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves. Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated.

COMMUNISM →

34 /
Many non-aligned countries are becoming concerned that their movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic suste-

31
manoe and for political and
military guidance and direction.

31
Outside the tightly controlled
bloc, the Soviets have little
political compatibility with other
nations. Their cultural bonds
with others are few and frayed.

36
Although the Soviets have
the ^{largest} second strongest economic
system in the world, ^{the rate of} growth of

36
this system has ~~dropped~~ ^{dropped},
reached a very low level,
and their standard of living does not
compare favorably with that within
other nations of equivalent development.

Agricultural production still

remains a serious problem for the

Soviet Union, ~~so~~ so that in

37 / times of average or adverse crop
growing
conditions they must turn to us or
to other nations for food supplies.

and to
outperform

We need not, therefore,
be overly con-
cerned about ^{our ability to compete} ~~competition with~~ the

38

Soviets. There is certainly no cause
for alarm.

Our military capability is
second to none on earth, our
industrial base and productivity
are unmatched in the world,
our technological capacity is superior
to all others, our alliances with
other free nations are strong and
growing stronger. We are sur-
rounded by friendly neighbors and
wide seas. Our societal structure
is stable and cohesive, and our

39

39 /
government policy is bi-partisan
and continuous. Americans are
pragmatists, and we approach our
problems calmly, with common
sense and confidence. Our philo-
sophy is based on personal freedom,
the most powerful of all ideas,
and our ^{democratic} way of life warrants
admiration and emulation by other
people. The ^{political} trends ~~are~~ seem to
be good. (For the first time, all the
member nations of NATO are
democracies.)

40 / One of our goals which is
being accomplished is to expand
our circle of friends among other
nations in Africa, ^{the} Mid East, Latin
America, Asia and Europe. We do
not recognize the hegemony of any
nation (~~over others~~) within these regions.

Because of our military and
political strength, we are in a
unique ~~position~~ position to help

✓ (~~lead~~) ^{move} the world toward peace. Our
enormous economic strength is

41 / also a major potential influence
for ^{the} the benefit of others.
~~for a peace.~~ Our gross national

product exceeds that of all
nine nations in the European
Economic Community, and is more

than twice as great as that
of the Soviet Union. Additionally,

41/ We are now learning how to use
our resources more wisely, creating
a new harmony between our
people and our environment.

42
/

Our analysis of American-
~~Soviet~~^{military} strength also furnishes a
basis for confidence.

43
/

We know that neither nation
can launch a nuclear attack on
the other without suffering a
devastating counterattack which would
cripple the societal structure of
the original attacking power.

44
/

Although the Soviets have more
missile launchers and greater throw-
weight, the United States has more
war heads, ^{generally} greater accuracy, more
bombers, a more balanced nuclear
force, better submarines and anti-

submarine warfare capability. ~~77~~

The fact is that with essential nuclear equivalence, the conventional military forces have an increasing importance. The capability of ourselves and our allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

45

A successful SALT agreement,
which we are working to achieve
without delay, will leave us
with ^{but lower} equal numbers of missile
launchers and missiles with multiple
warheads. We envision in SALT III
an even greater mutual reduction.

46
/

It is ^{likely} ~~obvious~~ that each side tends to exaggerate the ^{relative} military ~~force~~ ^{capability} strength of the other.

47/
Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.

48/
False or excessive estimates or reports of Soviet strength ~~and~~ or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

49/
For example, recent news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense

sacrifice by ~~the~~ ^{the} people of our
country.

Looking beyond our alliances,
We will try to strengthen
worldwide [^]
~~multinational~~ and regional organ-

54 /
izations dedicated to enhancing
international harmony
~~peace~~, such as the United Nations,
Organization of American States, and
the Organization for African Unity.

We will honor the ^{legitimate} desire
of ~~the~~ ^{and nations} people for peace, independence,
~~legitimate nationalism~~, majority rule, ~~and~~
55 /
equality of opportunity, ^{basic human rights,} and the
~~also~~ ^{and the} recognition and honoring of
recognized
national boundaries. We will provide

bilaterally and
aid, through multinational organi-
zations to further the realization
of these hopes.

We will attempt to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons
among nations ~~among nations~~ not
having this capability.

W

57
1
We will seek peace, better
communication and understanding,
cultural and scientific exchange,
and increased trade with the
Soviet Union and other nations

58
1
With our economic, military
and political strength we will at-
tempt to convince the Soviet Union
that a peaceful route into the
future is best for us all.

Sustained world peace can be our
greatest joint achievement.

budget in history* and that
the largest portion of this will
go to the Navy. When small
coastal vessels are included in the
totals, the statistics appear to
show a Soviet advantage in number
49 of ships, but the fact is that
in major seagoing warships the
United States enjoys a — numerical
advantage and, in total tonnage
of warships. In design, technology,
engineering, quietness, and easy access
to the open seas we fare even better.

50 Let there be ~~not~~ no doubt about
our present and future strength.

It would be a mistake for
anyone to confuse a healthy
self-criticism and free debate which
are essential in a democracy with
either confusion, weakness or despair.

51

52/ What future developments might
we expect from existing American
policy toward the Soviet Union?

We will maintain a sustained
real. growth with a prudent increase
in military spending, keyed to
NATO and mobile forces and an
undiminished presence in the Pacific.

53/ We and our Allies ^{must and} will be able
to meet any foreseeable challenge
to our security, from strategic
nuclear forces or from ~~conventional~~
conventional forces. America has
the capability and will to honor
this commitment without excessive

You and I leave here today to ~~meet our separate respon-~~
~~sibilities,~~ and to do our common duty, protecting our Nation's
vital interests by peaceful means if possible, by resolute
action if necessary. *. those responsibilities*

We go forth sobered by ~~our obstacles,~~ but confident in
our strength. We go forth knowing that our nation's goals--
peace, security, liberty for ourselves and others--will
ultimately prevail.

To attain those goals, our Nation will require^s exactly
those qualities of courage, self-sacrifice, idealism, and
self-discipline, which you ^{as Midshipman} have learned so well ~~here~~. That
is why your Nation expects so much of you, and why you have
so much to give.

I leave you ~~today~~ with my congratulations, ~~wih~~ and
with a prayer that both you and I will prove worthy of
the task that is before us and the Nation we have sworn
to serve.

ANNAPOLIS SPEECH
6/6/78 --

(Address dignitaries, etc.)

(Personal remarks)

I congratulate you members of the class of '78.

Although your education has just begun, you have laid the foundation for a career that can be as rewarding and challenging as any in the world.



As officers in the modern Navy, you will be actors in a worldwide political and military drama. You will be called upon not only to master the technicalities of military science and leadership, but also to have a sensitive understanding of the international community in which the Navy operates.

Today I would like to discuss one of the most important aspects of that international context -- the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

~~* h.m.m. 3~~

We must realize that, for a very long time, our relationship with the Soviet Union will be competitive:

If that competition is to be constructive instead of ~~destructive~~ ^{dangerous} and potentially disastrous, then our relationship must be cooperative as well.

We must avoid ^{excessive} swings in our public mood -- from euphoria when things are going well, to despair when they are not; from an exaggerated sense of compatibility to ^{open depression} ~~excessive~~ feelings of ^{achief} hostility.

Navy to understand its complex and sensitive nature.

~~The~~ The word "detente" ~~has a different meaning to~~
~~different people.~~ It is simplistically defined as
"an easing of tension between nations." The word is,
in practice, further defined by experience as those
nations evolve new means by which they can live together
in peace. ~~I~~

To be stable, to be supported by the American
people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of
cooperation, detente must be broadly defined and
truly reciprocal. Both nations must exercise restraint
in troubled areas and in turbulent times. Both must
honor meticulously those agreements which have already
been reached to widen cooperation, mutually ~~restrain~~ ^{limit}
nuclear arms production, permit the free movement of
people and the expression of ideas, and to protect
human rights.

[The awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers. How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in achieving lasting peace.]

[Neither of us should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained, or that any transient military advantage can be politically exploited.]

[Our principal goal is to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire of people everywhere for economic well-being, social justice, political self-determination, ~~peace~~, and basic human rights.]

must be a world that permits diversity -- social,
political and ideological. Only ^{then} in such a world can
there be genuine cooperation among many nations and
cultures.

[We Americans can be confident about the future if
we are consistent and resolute in our conduct.]

We desire to dominate no one. We will continue
to widen our cooperation with the positive new forces
in the world.

We want to increase our collaboration with the
Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with
the countries in Eastern Europe, and with the People's
Republic of China. We are particularly dedicated to ~~the~~
~~attainment of~~ genuine self-determination and majority
rule in those parts of the world where these goals are
yet to be attained.

Our long-term objective must be to convince the
Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the
costs of disruptive behavior.

we remember that the United States and the Soviet

Union were allies in the Second World War. * One of the
great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was
to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of
armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk
and other Soviet ports in support of our joint effort
to meet the Nazi threat.

In the agony of that massive conflict, 20 million
Soviet people died. Millions more still recall the
horror and the hunger of that time.

I am convinced that the Soviets want peace. I cannot
believe that their leaders could want war.

Peace as
is

accommodation with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space, trade agreements, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Armaments and the limited test ban agreement.

Efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition of attacks on satellites, an agreement to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

~~these and other~~ ^{such} avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction. ~~The world has lived uncomfortably for almost 33 years with the existence of nuclear weapons.~~

Their ~~numbers~~ ^{of nuclear weapons} and destructive potential, have been increasing at an alarming rate. That is why ~~the~~ ^a negotiation of a SALT agreement which enhances the security of both nations is of fundamental importance.

We and the Soviets are negotiating in good faith because we both know that failure would precipitate a resumption of a massive nuclear arms race. ^{I am glad to report that} the prospects for a SALT II agreement are good.

Beyond this, improved trade ^{and} technological ~~exchange~~ ^{exchange} and cultural ~~interplay~~ ^{the} are among ~~many~~ immediate ~~and positive~~ benefits of cooperation.

erase the significant differences between us, ~~and the~~
~~Soviet Union in ideology, domestic attitudes, and~~
~~aspirations for the future. These differences must~~
~~be clearly understood by the American people because~~
~~such understanding provides a base on which we build~~
~~our political and military policy.~~]

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a
continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage
and increased influence ⁱⁿ by a variety of ^{ways.} means.

The Soviets apparently see ~~the way of~~ ^{the way of} military power and
military assistance as the best ~~method~~ ^{means} of expanding their
influence abroad.

Obviously, areas of instability provide a
tempting target for their effort, and all too often

they seem ready to exploit any such opportunity.

As became apparent in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia, they prefer to use proxy forces to achieve their purposes.

ok as 15 To other nations ~~the~~ Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive -- far beyond any legitimate requirement for defense of themselves or their allies.

For more than 15 years they have maintained this program of military growth, investing ~~as much as 13~~ ^{almost 15} per cent of their gross national product in armaments, ~~They now have a superfluous capability to wage war,~~ and this ^{effort} sustained ~~growth~~ continues.

~~Their~~ abuse of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached at Helsinki has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom. By their actions they

freely expressed ideas, notions of loyal opposition, and the free movement of peoples.

The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society.

leave as is
Some of their characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves.

Outside their tightly controlled bloc, the Soviets have *difficult* *relations* ~~little~~ political ~~compatibility~~ with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed.

Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be imitated.

non-aligned movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic sustenance and for political and military ^E guidance and ^J direction.

Although the Soviets have the second largest economic system in the world, ^{its} ~~the rate of~~ growth of ^{is} ~~this system has~~ ^{slowing greatly, slowed considerably} ~~reached a very low level~~ and their standard of living does not compare favorably with that of other nations ^{at an} ~~with~~ ^{stage of} equivalent development.

Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of average or adverse crop-growing conditions they must turn to us or to other nations for food supplies.

unmatched; our scientific and technological capability
is superior to all others; our alliances with other
free nations are strong and growing stronger; ^{and} We are

surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas. Our

societal structure is stable and cohesive, and our

foreign policy ^{enjoys} is bi-partisan ~~and continuous~~ ^{public}
~~and fully gives support to our people which gives it continuity.~~

We are also strong because of what we stand

for as a nation: ^{to} the realistic chance for every

^{person}
~~individual~~ to build a better life; protection by

law and custom from arbitrary exercise of government

power; the right of every individual to speak out,

(13)

power.

Our philosophy is based on personal freedom,
the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic
way of life warrants admiration and emulation by
other people.

These incandescent principles remain the
most powerful ideas in the world. They make us
strong. And they help make our foreign policy strong.

international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being a part of it.

Our ~~growing~~ economic strength is also a major potential influence for the benefit of others.

Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine countries in the European Economic Community, and is more than twice as great as that of the Soviet Union.

Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

We know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear assault on the other

without suffering a devastating counterattack which
could destroy the ^{aggressor.} ~~attacking power.~~

Although the Soviets have ^{more} more missile launchers,
greater throw-weight and more air defense; the United States
has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, ~~and~~ more
heavy bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better
missile submarines and ^{superior} anti-submarine warfare capability.

A successful SALT ^{II} agreement will leave both
nations with equal but lower ^{ceilings on} ~~numbers of~~ missile
launchers and missiles with multiple warheads. We
envison in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction
in nuclear weapons.

relative conventional force strength has now become more important. ~~At~~ the military capability of the United States and our Allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

It is possible that each side tends to exaggerate the relative military capability of the other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.

False or excessive estimates of Soviet strength or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts *of the Soviet Union*

For example, recent alarming news reports of military budget proposals for the U. S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy.

a ~~portion of the truth~~. You men are joining a long tradition

of superior leadership, seamanship, tactics and ship design.

I am confident that the U. S. Navy has no peer on the seas

today and that your ~~contribution~~ will ~~be to~~ keep it so.

Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. This brief assessment shows that we need not be overly concerned about our ability to compete and

to outperform the Soviets. There is certainly no cause for alarm.

~~It would be a mistake for anyone~~

~~No one should~~

~~to~~ confuse the healthy self-criticism and free debate

should never be confused

which are essential in a democracy, with confusion,

weakness, or despair, or lack of purpose.

In the light of these comparisons what are the

~~What future developments might we expect from~~

principle elements of

~~existing~~ American policy toward the Soviet Union?

We will continue to maintain equivalent nuclear strength because we believe that, in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament, such equivalency is the least threatening, most stable situation for the world.

We will maintain a prudent and a sustained level of military spending, keyed to ^{a stronger} NATO ~~and~~ ^{more} mobile forces and

an undiminished presence in the Pacific. We and our

Land will

Allies must be able to meet any foreseeable challenge

to our security from strategic nuclear forces or from conventional forces. America has the capability to honor this commitment without excessive sacrifice

by the people of our country, and ~~we will do so.~~ *that commitment to national ^{military} strength will be honored!*

Looking beyond our alliances, we will ~~try to~~ *support* strengthen worldwide and regional organizations

dedicated to enhancing international harmony, such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

In Africa we ~~like~~ *and* our African friends, want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice,

hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work toward these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and ~~African~~ aspirations.

The persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this African vision. We are deeply concerned about this threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed. This is why I have spoken up on this subject. This is why I and the American people will support African efforts to contain such intrusion, as we have done recently in Zaire.

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than weapons of war

majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Eritrea and Angola. Let us all work -- not to divide and seek domination in Africa -- but to help ^{those} ~~the~~ nations of ~~Africa find the fulfillment of~~ their great potential.

We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not now having this capability.

We will continue to negotiate constructively and persistently ~~with the Soviets~~ for a fair Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. We know that there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons. We have no desire to link this negotiation with

special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes, or threats to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of fact.

The Soviet^{Union} can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.

We would prefer cooperation through a detente that increasingly involves similar restraint for both sides, similar readiness to resolve ~~conflict~~^{disputes} by negotiation and not violence, similar willingness to compete peacefully and not militarily. Anything less than that is likely to

undermine detente, and this is why I hope that no one will underestimate the concerns which I have expressed today.

A competition without restraint and without shared rules will escalate into graver tensions, and our relationship as a whole will suffer. I do not wish this to happen -- I do not believe Mr. Brezhnev desires it either -- and this is why it is time ^{for us} to speak frankly and to face the problem squarely.

By a combination of adequate American strength, of quiet self-restraint in the use of ^{it,} ~~that strength,~~ of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of a patient ^{and} persistent development of more peaceful alternatives, we hope eventually to lead international society into a more stable and hopeful ^{future} ~~state of affairs.~~

ENCLOSURE COPY MADE
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BACK, Δ RANK = 32 YRS = NOT OFFICER =
LEAVE, MARRIAGE VS WORLD EVENTS, FUTURE = 15th ASSIGNMENT
WYOMING - HAMPTON ROADS = NIMITZ, BRIEF, DISAPPOINTED =
PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER CONFESS, RETURN AS PRESIDENT = 7 YRS
U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY COMMENCEMENT SPEECH USNA, NAVY TRAINING
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1978 - FOR CAREER CHOSEN =
WASH & ORDERLY, ANNAPOLIS, Δ 30 YRS

ADMIRAL McKEE, GOVERNOR LEE, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,
MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING CLASS, AND FRIENDS.

I CONGRATULATE YOU MEMBERS OF THE CLASS OF '78.

ALTHOUGH YOUR EDUCATION HAS JUST BEGUN, YOU HAVE LAI
THE FOUNDATION FOR A CAREER THAT CAN BE AS REWARDING AND
CHALLENGING AS ANY IN THE WORLD.

AS OFFICERS IN THE MODERN NAVY, YOU WILL BE ACTORS
IN A WORLDWIDE POLITICAL AND MILITARY DRAMA.

YOU WILL BE CALLED UPON NOT ONLY TO MASTER THE
TECHNICALITIES OF MILITARY SCIENCE AND LEADERSHIP,
BUT ALSO TO HAVE A SENSITIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN WHICH THE NAVY OPERATES.

--Today I would like to discuss.....

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THAT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT -- THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD'S TWO GREATEST POWERS,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WE MUST REALIZE THAT, FOR A VERY LONG TIME, OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE COMPETITIVE.

IF THAT COMPETITION IS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE INSTEAD
OF DANGEROUS AND POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS, THEN OUR
RELATIONSHIP MUST BE COOPERATIVE AS WELL.

WE MUST AVOID EXCESSIVE SWINGS IN OUR PUBLIC MOOD --
FROM EUPHORIA WHEN THINGS ARE GOING WELL, TO DESPAIR WHEN
THEY ARE NOT;.....FROM AN EXAGGERATED SENSE OF COMPATIBILITY
TO OPEN EXPRESSIONS OF HOSTILITY.

DETENTE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS CENTRAL TO
WORLD PEACE.

IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE WORLD, FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC,
AND FOR YOU AS FUTURE LEADERS OF THE NAVY TO UNDERSTAND ITS
COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE NATURE.

THE WORD "DETENTE" IS SIMPLISTICALLY DEFINED AS
"AN EASING OF TENSION BETWEEN NATIONS."

THE WORD IS, IN PRACTICE, FURTHER DEFINED BY
EXPERIENCE AS THOSE NATIONS EVOLVE NEW MEANS BY WHICH
THEY CAN LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE.

TO BE STABLE, TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
AND TO BE A BASIS FOR WIDENING THE SCOPE OF COOPERATION,....
DETENTE MUST BE BROADLY DEFINED AND TRULY RECIPROCAL.

BOTH NATIONS MUST EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN TROUBLED
AREAS AND IN TURBULENT TIMES.

--BOTH MUST HONOR METICULOUSLY.....

BOTH MUST HONOR METICULOUSLY THOSE AGREEMENTS
WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN REACHED TO WIDEN COOPERATION,....
MUTUALLY LIMIT NUCLEAR ARMS PRODUCTION,....PERMIT THE
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND THE EXPRESSION OF IDEAS,....
AND TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.

NEITHER OF US SHOULD ENTERTAIN THE NOTION THAT
MILITARY SUPREMACY CAN BE ATTAINED, OR THAT ANY TRANSIENT
MILITARY ADVANTAGE CAN BE POLITICALLY EXPLOITED.

OUR PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO HELP SHAPE A WORLD WHICH
IS MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE DESIRE OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE
FOR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, SOCIAL JUSTICE, POLITICAL
SELF-DETERMINATION, AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

WE SEEK A WORLD OF PEACE.

BUT SUCH A WORLD MUST ACCOMMODATE DIVERSITY --
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL.

ONLY THEN CAN THERE BE GENUINE COOPERATION AMONG
MANY NATIONS AND CULTURES.

WE DESIRE TO DOMINATE NO ONE.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO WIDEN OUR COOPERATION WITH
THE POSITIVE NEW FORCES IN THE WORLD.

WE WANT TO INCREASE OUR COLLABORATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION, BUT ALSO WITH THE EMERGING NATIONS, WITH
THE COUNTRIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND WITH THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY DEDICATED TO GENUINE SELF-
DETERMINATION AND MAJORITY RULE IN THOSE PARTS OF THE WORLD
WHERE THESE GOALS ARE YET TO BE ATTAINED.

--OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE MUST BE.....

OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO CONVINCE THE
SOVIET UNION OF THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION AND OF THE
COSTS OF DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR.

WE REMEMBER THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION WERE ALLIES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

ONE OF THE GREAT HISTORICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
U.S. NAVY WAS TO GUIDE AND PROTECT THE TREMENDOUS SHIPMENTS
OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES FROM OUR COUNTRY TO MURMANSK
AND OTHER SOVIET PORTS IN SUPPORT OF OUR JOINT EFFORT
TO MEET THE NAZI THREAT.

IN THE AGONY OF THAT MASSIVE CONFLICT, 20 MILLION
PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION DIED. MILLIONS MORE STILL RECALL
THE HORROR AND THE HUNGER OF THAT TIME.

I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION
WANT PEACE. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD
WANT WAR.

THROUGH THE YEARS OUR NATION HAS SOUGHT ACCOMMODATION
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE AUSTRIAN
PEACE TREATY, THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT IN BERLIN,
THE TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE,
JOINT SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATIONS IN SPACE, TRADE AGREEMENTS,
THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY, ... AND INTERIM AGREEMENT
ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS AND THE LIMITED TEST BAN
AGREEMENT.

EFFORTS CONTINUE NOW WITH NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A
SALT II AGREEMENT, A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN,
REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, ...
THE PROHIBITION OF ATTACKS ON SATELLITES, AN AGREEMENT
TO STABILIZE THE LEVEL OF FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN, AND INCREASED TRADE, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
EXCHANGE.

--WE MUST BE WILLING TO EXPLORE.....

WE MUST BE WILLING TO EXPLORE SUCH AVENUES OF
COOPERATION DESPITE THE BASIC ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE US.

THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR ALONE PROPEL US IN THIS
DIRECTION.

THE NUMBERS AND DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS HAVE BEEN INCREASING AT AN ALARMING RATE.

THAT IS WHY A SALT AGREEMENT WHICH ENHANCES THE
SECURITY OF BOTH NATIONS IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.

WE AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE NEGOTIATING IN GOOD
FAITH BECAUSE WE BOTH KNOW THAT FAILURE WOULD PRECIPITATE
A RESUMPTION OF A MASSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

I AM GLAD TO REPORT THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A
SALT II AGREEMENT ARE GOOD.

BEYOND THIS, IMPROVED TRADE AND TECHNOLOGICAL
AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ARE AMONG THE IMMEDIATE BENEFITS
OF COOPERATION.

HOWEVER, THESE EFFORTS TO COOPERATE DO NOT ERASE
THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

WHAT ARE THESE DIFFERENCES?

TO THE SOVIET UNION, DETENTE SEEMS TO MEAN A
CONTINUING AGGRESSIVE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE
AND INCREASED INFLUENCE IN A VARIETY OF WAYS.

THE SOVIET UNION APPARENTLY SEES MILITARY POWER
AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS THE BEST MEANS OF EXPANDING
ITS INFLUENCE ABROAD.

--OBVIOUSLY, AREAS OF INSTABILITY.....

OBVIOUSLY, AREAS OF INSTABILITY PROVIDE A
TEMPTING TARGET FOR THEIR EFFORT, AND ALL TOO OFTEN
THEY SEEM READY TO EXPLOIT ANY SUCH OPPORTUNITY.

AS BECAME APPARENT IN KOREA, ANGOLA, AND
ETHIOPIA,.....THEY PREFER TO USE PROXY FORCES TO ACHIEVE
THEIR PURPOSES.

TO OTHER NATIONS THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP
APPEARS TO BE EXCESSIVE -- FAR BEYOND ANY LEGITIMATE
REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES OR THEIR ALLIES.

FOR MORE THAN 15 YEARS THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THIS
PROGRAM OF MILITARY GROWTH, INVESTING ALMOST 15 PERCENT
OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN ARMAMENTS,.....AND
THIS SUSTAINED EFFORT CONTINUES.

THE ABUSE OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEIR OWN
COUNTRY IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT
HELSINKI HAS EARNED THEM THE CONDEMNATION OF PEOPLE
EVERYWHERE WHO LOVE FREEDOM.

BY THEIR ACTIONS THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE
SOVIET SYSTEM CANNOT TOLERATE FREELY-EXPRESSED IDEAS,
NOTIONS OF LOYAL OPPOSITION, AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
PEOPLES.

THE SOVIET UNION ATTEMPTS TO EXPORT A TOTALITARIAN
AND REPRESSIVE FORM OF GOVERNMENT, RESULTING IN A CLOSED
SOCIETY.

THESE CHARACTERISTICS AND GOALS THEMSELVES CREATE
PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

--OUTSIDE A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED.....

OUTSIDE A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED BLOC, THE SOVIET UNION
HAS DIFFICULT POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS.

THEIR CULTURAL BONDS WITH OTHERS ARE FEW AND FRAYED.

THEIR FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY
UNATTRACTIVE TO OTHER NATIONS, SO THAT EVEN MARXIST-
LENINIST GROUPS NO LONGER LOOK ON THE SOVIET UNION AS
A MODEL TO BE IMITATED.

MANY COUNTRIES ARE BECOMING CONCERNED THAT THE
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IS BEING SUBVERTED BY CUBA,.....
WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH AND DEPENDENT
UPON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ECONOMIC SUSTENANCE AND FOR
POLITICAL AND MILITARY GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION.

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE SECOND LARGEST
ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE WORLD, ITS GROWTH IS SLOWING GREATLY,
AND ITS STANDARD OF LIVING DOES NOT COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH
THAT OF OTHER NATIONS AT AN EQUIVALENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION STILL REMAINS A SERIOUS
PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT IN TIMES OF AVERAGE
OR ADVERSE CROP-GROWING CONDITIONS THEY MUST TURN TO US
OR TO OTHER NATIONS FOR FOOD SUPPLIES.

WE ARE IN A MUCH MORE FAVORABLE POSITION.

OUR INDUSTRIAL BASE AND PRODUCTIVITY ARE UNMATCHED;.....
OUR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY IS SUPERIOR
TO ALL OTHERS;.....OUR ALLIANCES WITH OTHER FREE NATIONS
ARE STRONG AND GROWING STRONGER;.....AND OUR MILITARY
CAPABILITY IS SECOND TO NONE.

--WE ARE SURROUNDED BY.....

WE ARE SURROUNDED BY FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS AND
WIDE SEAS.

OUR SOCIETAL STRUCTURE IS STABLE AND COHESIVE,
AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY ENJOYS BI-PARTISAN PUBLIC SUPPORT
WHICH GIVES IT CONTINUITY.

WE ARE ALSO STRONG BECAUSE OF WHAT WE STAND FOR
AS A NATION: THE REALISTIC CHANCE FOR EVERY PERSON TO
BUILD A BETTER LIFE;.....PROTECTION BY LAW AND CUSTOM
FROM ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENT POWER;.....THE
RIGHT OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL TO SPEAK OUT, TO PARTICIPATE
FULLY IN GOVERNMENT -- TO SHARE POLITICAL POWER.

OUR PHILOSOPHY IS BASED ON PERSONAL FREEDOM,
THE MOST POWERFUL OF ALL IDEAS,.....AND OUR DEMOCRATIC
WAY OF LIFE WARRANTS ADMIRATION AND EMULATION BY OTHER
PEOPLE.

OUR WORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MAKES US PART OF AN
INTERNATIONAL TIDE, GROWING IN FORCE.

WE ARE STRENGTHENED BY BEING A PART OF IT.

OUR GROWING ECONOMIC STRENGTH IS ALSO A MAJOR
POTENTIAL INFLUENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS.

OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT EXCEEDS THAT OF ALL
NINE COUNTRIES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,....
AND IS MORE THAN TWICE AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE NOW LEARNING HOW TO USE OUR
RESOURCES MORE WISELY, CREATING A NEW HARMONY BETWEEN
OUR PEOPLE AND OUR ENVIRONMENT.

OUR ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTH ALSO
FURNISHES A BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE.

--WE KNOW THAT NEITHER.....

WE KNOW THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN LAUNCH A NUCLEAR ASSAULT ON THE OTHER WITHOUT SUFFERING A DEVASTATING COUNTERATTACK WHICH COULD DESTROY THE AGGRESSOR.

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS MORE MISSILE LAUNCHERS, GREATER THROW-WEIGHT AND MORE AIR DEFENSE;.....THE UNITED STATES HAS MORE WARHEADS, GENERALLY GREATER ACCURACY, MORE HEAVY BOMBERS, A MORE BALANCED NUCLEAR FORCE, BETTER MISSILE SUBMARINES AND SUPERIOR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE CAPABILITY.

A SUCCESSFUL SALT II AGREEMENT WILL LEAVE BOTH NATIONS WITH EQUAL BUT LOWER CEILINGS ON MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

WE ENVISION IN SALT III AN EVEN GREATER MUTUAL
REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WITH ESSENTIAL NUCLEAR EQUIVALENCE, RELATIVE
CONVENTIONAL FORCE STRENGTH HAS NOW BECOME MORE IMPORTANT.

THE FACT IS THAT THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IS ADEQUATE TO MEET ANY
FORESEEABLE THREAT.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EACH SIDE TENDS TO EXAGGERATE
THE RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE OTHER.

ACCURATE ANALYSES ARE IMPORTANT AS A BASIS FOR
MAKING DECISIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

FALSE OR EXCESSIVE ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRENGTH
OR OF AMERICAN WEAKNESS CONTRIBUTE TO THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, RECENT ALARMING.....

FOR EXAMPLE, RECENT ALARMING NEWS REPORTS OF
MILITARY BUDGET PROPOSALS FOR THE U.S. NAVY IGNORED
THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THE HIGHEST DEFENSE BUDGET IN
HISTORY AND THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF THIS WILL GO
TO THE NAVY.

YOU MEN ARE JOINING A LONG TRADITION OF SUPERIOR
LEADERSHIP, SEAMANSHIP, TACTICS AND SHIP DESIGN.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S. NAVY HAS NO PEER
ON THE SEAS TODAY AND THAT YOU WILL KEEP IT SO.

LET THERE BE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR PRESENT AND
FUTURE STRENGTH.

THIS BRIEF ASSESSMENT SHOWS THAT WE NEED NOT BE
OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO COMPETE SUCCESSFULLY.

THERE IS CERTAINLY NO CAUSE FOR ALARM.

THE HEALTHY SELF-CRITICISM AND FREE DEBATE WHICH
ARE ESSENTIAL IN A DEMOCRACY SHOULD NEVER BE CONFUSED
WITH WEAKNESS, DESPAIR, OR LACK OF PURPOSE.

WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLE ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION?

WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN EQUIVALENT NUCLEAR
STRENGTH BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF
WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SUCH EQUIVALENCY IS THE
LEAST THREATENING, MOST STABLE SITUATION FOR THE WORLD.

--WE WILL MAINTAIN A PRUDENT AND

WE WILL MAINTAIN A PRUDENT AND SUSTAINED LEVEL
OF MILITARY SPENDING, KEYED TO A STRONGER NATO, MORE MOBILE
FORCES, AND AN UNDIMINISHED PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC.

WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST AND WILL BE ABLE TO MEET
ANY FORESEEABLE CHALLENGE TO OUR SECURITY FROM STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR FORCES OR FROM CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

AMERICAN HAS THE CAPABILITY TO HONOR THIS COMMITMENT
WITHOUT EXCESSIVE SACRIFICE BY THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY,
AND THAT COMMITMENT TO MILITARY STRENGTH WILL BE HONORED!

LOOKING BEYOND OUR ALLIANCES, WE WILL SUPPORT
WORLDWIDE AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEDICATED TO
ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL HARMONY, SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS,
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR
AFRICAN UNITY.

IN AFRICA WE AND OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS WANT TO
SEE A CONTINENT THAT IS FREE OF THE DOMINANCE OF
OUTSIDE POWERS,FREE OF THE BITTERNESS OF RACIAL
INJUSTICE,FREE OF CONFLICT,AND FREE OF THE
BURDENS OF POVERTY, HUNGER AND DISEASE.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY TO WORK TOWARD
THESE OBJECTIVES IS THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE POLICIES THAT
RECOGNIZE AFRICAN REALITIES AND ASPIRATIONS.

THE PERSISTENT AND INCREASING MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN AFRICA COULD DENY THIS
VISION.

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS THREAT TO
REGIONAL PEACE AND TO THE AUTONOMY OF COUNTRIES WITHIN
WHICH THESE FOREIGN TROOPS SEEM PERMANENTLY TO BE STATIONED.

--THIS IS WHY I HAVE SPOKEN UP.....

THIS IS WHY I HAVE SPOKEN UP ON THIS SUBJECT.

THIS IS WHY I AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT
AFRICAN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN SUCH INTRUSION, AS WE HAVE
DONE RECENTLY IN ZAIRE.

I URGE AGAIN THAT ALL OTHER POWERS JOIN US IN
EMPHASIZING WORKS OF PEACE RATHER THAN WEAPONS OF WAR
IN THEIR ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA.

LET THE SOVIET UNION JOIN US IN SEEKING A
PEACEFUL AND SPEEDY TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN
RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

LET US SEE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PEACEFULLY THE
CONFLICTS IN ERITREA AND ANGOLA.

LET US ALL WORK -- NOT TO DIVIDE AND SEEK DOMINATION
IN AFRICA -- BUT TO HELP THOSE NATIONS FULFILL THEIR
GREAT POTENTIAL.

WE WILL SEEK PEACE, BETTER COMMUNICATION AND
UNDERSTANDING, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE, AND
INCREASED TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER NATIONS.

WE WILL ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMONG NATIONS NOT NOW HAVING THIS
CAPABILITY.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY
AND PERSISTENTLY FOR A FAIR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
AGREEMENT.

WE KNOW THERE ARE NO IDEOLOGICAL VICTORIES TO BE
WON BY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO LINK THIS NEGOTIATION WITH
OTHER COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIPS NOR TO IMPOSE OTHER
SPECIAL CONDITIONS ON THE PROCESS.

--IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, HOWEVER,.....

IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, HOWEVER, WHERE PUBLIC
OPINION IS AN INTEGRAL FACTOR IN THE SHAPING AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY,WE RECOGNIZE THAT
TENSIONS, SHARP DISPUTES, OR THREATS TO PEACE WILL
COMPLICATE THE QUEST FOR AN AGREEMENT.

THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF OUR PREFERENCE BUT A
RECOGNITION OF FACT.

THE SOVIET UNION CAN CHOOSE EITHER CONFRONTATION
OR COOPERATION.

THE UNITED STATES IS ADEQUATELY PREPARED TO
MEET EITHER CHOICE.

WE WOULD PREFER COOPERATION THROUGH A DETENTE
THAT INCREASINGLY INVOLVES SIMILAR RESTRAINT FOR BOTH
SIDES, SIMILAR READINESS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES BY
NEGOTIATION AND NOT VIOLENCE, SIMILAR WILLINGNESS
TO COMPETE PEACEFULLY AND NOT MILITARILY.

ANYTHING LESS THAN THAT IS LIKELY TO UNDERMINE
DETENTE, AND THIS IS WHY I HOPE THAT NO ONE WILL
UNDERESTIMATE THE CONCERNS WHICH I HAVE EXPRESSED TODAY.

A COMPETITION WITHOUT RESTRAINT AND WITHOUT
SHARED RULES WILL ESCALATE INTO GRAVER TENSIONS,
AND OUR RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE WILL SUFFER.

I DO NOT WISH THIS TO HAPPEN -- I DO NOT BELIEVE
MR. BREZHNEV DESIRES IT EITHER -- AND THIS IS WHY IT IS
TIME FOR US TO SPEAK FRANKLY AND TO FACE THE PROBLEM
SQUARELY.

--BY A COMBINATION OF ADEQUATE.....

BY A COMBINATION OF ADEQUATE AMERICAN STRENGTH,....
OF QUIET SELF-RESTRAINT IN THE USE OF IT,....OF A REFUSAL
TO BELIEVE IN THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR,....AND OF A
PATIENT AND PERSISTENT DEVELOPMENT OF MORE PEACEFUL
ALTERNATIVES,.....WE HOPE EVENTUALLY TO LEAD INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY INTO A MORE STABLE AND HOPEFUL FUTURE.

YOU AND I LEAVE HERE TODAY TO DO OUR COMMON DUTY --
PROTECTING OUR NATION'S VITAL INTERESTS BY PEACEFUL MEANS
IF POSSIBLE,....BY RESOLUTE ACTION IF NECESSARY.

WE GO FORTH SOBERED BY THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT
CONFIDENT IN OUR STRENGTH.

WE GO FORTH KNOWING THAT OUR NATION'S GOALS --
PEACE, SECURITY, LIBERTY FOR OURSELVES AND OTHERS -- WILL
ULTIMATELY PREVAIL.

TO ATTAIN THOSE GOALS, OUR NATION WILL REQUIRE
EXACTLY THOSE QUALITIES OF COURAGE, SELF-SACRIFICE,
IDEALISM, AND SELF-DISCIPLINE, WHICH YOU AS MIDSHIPMEN
HAVE LEARNED SO WELL.

THAT IS WHY YOUR NATION EXPECTS SO MUCH OF YOU,
AND WHY YOU HAVE SO MUCH TO GIVE.

I LEAVE YOU WITH MY CONGRATULATIONS, AND WITH A
PRAYER, ^{TO GOD} THAT BOTH YOU AND I WILL PROVE WORTHY OF THE
TASK THAT IS BEFORE US AND THE NATION WE HAVE SWORN
TO SERVE.

#

I AM GLAD TO BE BACK. ALTHOUGH I RETURN WITH A DIFFERENT RANK, I REMEMBER THAT 32 YEARS AGO I HAD THE SAME EXPERIENCE WHICH MOST OF YOU ARE SHARING TODAY.

I WAS NOT A MIDSHIPMAN OFFICER.

I WAS THINKING MORE ABOUT LEAVE AND MARRIAGE THAN ABOUT WORLD EVENTS OR A DISTANT FUTURE.

I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH MY FIRST ASSIGNMENT.

HAVING ASKED FOR A NEW DESTROYER IN THE PACIFIC, MY ORDERS WERE TO THE OLDEST SHIP IN THE ATLANTIC FLEET -- THE U.S.S. WYOMING -- SO DILAPIDATED THAT FOR REASONS OF SAFETY IT WAS NOT PERMITTED ALONGSIDE THE PIER IN NORFOLK BUT HAD TO ANCHOR IN ISOLATION IN HAMPTON ROADS.

--WE HAD A DISTINGUISHED GRADUATION . . .

WE HAD A DISTINGUISHED GRADUATION SPEAKER,
ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ, -- BUT I DON'T RECALL ANYTHING
HE SAID.

I DO REMEMBER MY HOPE THAT THE CEREMONIES WOULD
BE BRIEF.

I WAS DISAPPOINTED.

AND I HAVE TO CONFESS TO YOU IN CONFIDENCE THAT
AS A NEW ENSIGN I DID NOT EXPECT TO COME BACK HERE LATER
AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I RELUCTANTLY LEFT THE NAVY SEVEN YEARS AFTER
GRADUATION.

THE ACADEMY AND THE NAVY PROVIDED EXCELLENT TRAINING
FOR THE CAREER I HAVE FINALLY CHOSEN -- BUT I HAVE FOUND
WASHINGTON TO BE A LESS ORDERLY AND PREDICTABLE PLACE THAN
HERE AT ANNAPOLIS -- UNLESS IT HAS CHANGED A LOT IN THE
LAST 30 YEARS!

NEW TREND - 5 PRESIDENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICK HERTZBERG *rick*
Subject: Naval Academy speech

Here are two items:

1. Secretary Brown's suggested outline for the speech.
2. A suggested draft by George Ball--Mr. Ball's generous response to our request for advice. It skilfully draws together a number of themes, and strikes a note of confidence and optimism that might form the basis for the kind of speech you discussed with Jerry this morning.

SUGGESTED NAVAL ACADEMY SPEECH BY GEORGE BALL

I can think of no better training to be Captain of our Ship of State than to have survived the stern testing of Annapolis and to have served in the United States Navy. Effective command of any vessel requires the respect and confidence of the crew. But the crew of the Ship of State includes all the American people. To gain and retain their respect and confidence is my first imperative.

During the sixteen months I have been at the helm, I have learned much and am still learning. Navigation of a democracy is a complex and unending task. To steer through the shoals and reefs requires not only a steady hand but a deep knowledge of the waves and the weather and the full cooperation not only of those on board but also those manning the weather and navigation stations on the shore.

Nor is command as simple as the textbooks indicate. For the skipper must satisfy one hundred co-pilots in the Senate and over 500 in the House, while paying attention, also, to those clamorous members of the

press who look constantly over his shoulder forecasting icebergs, squalls and imminent collisions.

Most important of all, the skipper and the crew must both have confidence that the ship is sound, the cargo properly loaded and secure and the compass working accurately. As you leave this beloved campus today, I am here to tell you that your Ship of State has never been more seaworthy. It has been through some choppy weather, and there is a long and adventurous trip ahead. But, whatever the weather we encounter, we will surmount it, as the noble ship America has surmounted turbulence in the past.

The message I bring you today, then, is one of optimism, based not on a frivolous disregard for the hazards of an age in ferment but, rather, on hard facts and our country's proven performance. Optimism is, of course, not a novel attitude for Americans. During the first years of this century, we enjoyed an extraordinary sense of well-being. In the light of the new discoveries of science, men and women, it was thought, could at long last be the masters of nature. No longer need mankind live in terror of natural forces; we could now direct those forces to improve the human condition. No longer need we fear that our relentless scientific curiosity might transgress some forbidden threshold

and unleash forces that could destroy all mankind. Progress, the scientists told us, was inevitable. Mankind was infinitely perfectible.

That optimism survived in America even after two ghastly world wars had disclosed a new potential for human degradation. Indeed, we emerged from the Second World War with an awesome respect for our own strength. There was, we felt, little we could not do if we only put our mind to it. To be sure, the discovery of nuclear weapons raised once more the ancient spectre that man, through evil or folly, might destroy all he had built. But, even when the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear arms, we still viewed the future with confidence. Yet, today, there are clamorous noises of doubt and pessimism. Shaken by recent experience, some Americans seem no longer certain of our future. The Vietnam War raised doubts as to the wisdom of our policies. The noisome disclosures of Watergate challenged the integrity of our leaders. A growing perception of the fragility of our biosphere has sounded the prudent warning that our current way of life, if recklessly pursued, could endanger our environment. Meanwhile, the armament race proceeds, with increasing resources committed to weapons offering fantasies of destruction.

For a while, misconstruing the meaning of detente,

some Americans believed -- largely because they wanted to believe -- that the Soviet leaders had undergone a fundamental change of heart and that the menace of Soviet adventurism had been largely eliminated. But the Soviets' recent interventions in Africa and the extensive expansion of its military capability have injected a new reality into our foreign policy. Meanwhile, on the home front, inflation and persistent unemployment have challenged the vaunted ability of modern economics to assure stable growth with jobs for everyone.

We Americans are, above all, an ebullient people. Although we have known many disappointments, we have not lost our fundamentally optimistic view of the world. It was optimism that sustained our forefathers as they built a continent-wide nation, broke paths through the wilderness, established farms, villages and, ultimately, cities, and tied the nation together, first through railroads and then air transport. There is a resilience in our national character and a belief in our own competence as a nation. We cannot afford to lose that optimism and we never will. It is a national asset of incalculable worth.

Today there is every reason for us Americans to walk with a firm and assured step -- not in the belief we can go unchallenged -- but knowing we will be able

and willing to do -- and do well -- whatever the future required of us. As an antidote to pessimism, let us draw up a kind of national balance sheet that takes account not only of our material strengths and weaknesses but the health of our society.

Regarding our material strength, there can be no serious doubt. Although other nations have long since recovered from the shattering destruction of two world wars and are more affluent than at any other period in history, America still remains preeminent in wealth and power. Our total Gross National Product is larger than the GNP of all of the nine nations of Western Europe in the European Economic Community together and over twice as large as that of the Soviet Union. Americans live better than other people, consume more and enjoy better medical care. If, in fact -- as many assert -- we consume too much, we are beginning to learn how to utilize our resources more wisely and less wastefully; with an increasing awareness of the ground rules by which mankind must live, we are on the way to achieving a more balanced relationship with nature.

Not only do we have the material resources to meet the formidable problems ahead, we have the intellectual and moral resources as well. Our science is without parallel. Our technology is in demand on all continents,

on both sides of the Iron Curtain and in the Third World. Of course, we have not achieved Utopia. But man has only been on this earth a brief time by geological measure, and improvement is always slower than many would like.

I have complete confidence in the moral soundness of this country and of the American people. Though the fact that we continually criticize ourselves and our institutions no doubt confuses people in other nations who do not enjoy the same freedom of expression, it is a mark of moral good health. If we appear from time to time to be in social disarray, that is part of the price we pay for moving forward. "Progress," observed G. K. Chesterton, "is the maker of problems." Had we no problems, it would mean our society was stagnant, on dead center. That would be grounds for pessimism.

expand

The test of our moral soundness is the extent to which we, as a society, seriously seek to improve the quality of life for all Americans, to eliminate discrimination and assure that everyone will have a fair chance to develop his or her talents to their full potential. Obviously, that is not an easy assignment. It is not a task we can ever completely finish, nor can it be achieved by government alone; it requires a national effort by Americans working together in a variety of ways.

Moreover, progress must be made within the constraints of existing limitations. During the four decades since President Roosevelt first gave tangible meaning to the Federal government's responsibility for the general welfare, a series of Presidents and Congresses has piled social program upon program, seeking to deal with one aspect after another of the complex problem of abolishing poverty and discrimination. Because of the way these programs have evolved, many are overlapping, contradictory and self-defeating. Some are limited in their application to narrow groups who have been able to muster effective political pressure, thus often denying resources to others who need them equally as much. Many need drastic revision; others need to be abandoned, or at least reshaped to respond to radically changed conditions.

Representing an amorphous and often incoherent mass of special laws and regulations, these programs, in their cumulative effect, now severely constrict the flexibility of the Federal government to deal with new situations. Today, _____% of the Federal budget is already committed far into the future, either by the requirements of defense or the continuing costs of government or by ongoing programs in the area of social welfare, some of which benefit only limited groups.

My Administration is severely restricted in the initiation of new programs, for I will not indulge in overspending which would inevitably spur the inflationary cycle. Instead, we are concentrating urgent effort on the massive task of reviewing, revising and overhauling the vast collection of programs already in existence. That will not be easy. Because special interest groups can, by supporting one another, muster substantial opposition to the elimination of any program already established, the task of transforming these programs into a coherent pattern will take both time and effort. But I am determined to make effective progress in that direction.

I am determined, also, that the bureaucracy will not use the unavailability of new spending programs to justify direct regulation, which increasingly extends bureaucratic fiat into areas of decision and action historically reserved for the individual choice of citizens. That means, among other things, that, in approaching the major tasks of eliminating discrimination and assuring fairness, we must clearly define the principles that will guide our actions.

Under my Administration, your government is committed both to enhancing human freedom and assuring to all citizens equality of opportunity and equality before the law. Those are the objectives that guided our founding fathers

in drafting the Constitution in Philadelphia; they did not commit this nation to the achievement of equality of condition -- which is the illusory promise of many socialist and communist states. Thus, while trying to rectify injustices and to make sure that no one suffers the hardships of hunger or deprivation, we cannot promise to every man the same degree of economic prosperity, regardless of his endowments of mind or character or his willingness to work. To accept the objective of achieving equality of condition would stifle initiative and require the building of a vast and suffocating bureaucracy. It would extend the long arm of the state into every aspect of human activity. That was not what our founding fathers were seeking, nor will it be an objective of my Administration. Instead, we shall strive to make it possible for every citizen to have the chance to utilize in full measure the whole range of his or her talents and capabilities.

To recognize and define the purposes of our democratic government is essential if we are to provide the maximum of individual liberty that has made this country strong, while, at the same time, assuring a high measure of justice for all our citizens. Only a free and just society -- a society recognized by the people as free and just -- can move forward with confidence.

A people who feel that they are justly governed will accept whatever burdens are required to maintain the strength of the nation and assure its adequate defense. Thus, in spite of the fact that the burden of armaments amounts in the aggregate to a quarter of our national budget, most Americans are quite prepared to shoulder that burden. While continuing every effort to bring about the limitation of arms and to find political means of avoiding that collision of interests which is the most frequent cause of war, I shall never permit the defenses of this country to fall to the point of weakness or disarray. Obviously, Americans may differ widely and vigorously as to the precise requirements of our national defense and the type of weapons or military establishment that can best meet those requirements. But I am satisfied that no American, if honestly informed by his President and other leaders, would ever willingly wish our defenses to fall to the point where America is unable to defend its vital interests.

Nor do we Americans hold a narrow view of what those interests may include in this period of increasing interdependence, when wars between great nations must inevitably assume an intercontinental character. Concepts such as that of Fortress America are as outmoded as the horse and buggy. America's allies around the world form a strong outer ring of our defenses. They

need us and we need them. They know it and we know it.

Meanwhile, let us take instruction from our recent experiences -- particularly in Vietnam. But let us be sure to learn the proper lessons. The disappointments of Vietnam have emphatically not taught us to renounce the use of force to resist aggression. They have taught us, rather, that we must deploy our forces critically, exerting our power only where our strategic interests are clearly engaged and where the physical and political terrain permit our military resources to be effectively used.

We must try, in other words, to keep our commitments and capabilities in balance. But we do not approach world problems in an attitude of unilateralism. We have no desire to go it alone when other like-minded nations are willing and available to work with us. We have no monopoly of wisdom, and, if there is much we can learn from the advice and experience of our friends, there is even more we can gain from their active assistance. So it is essential that our friends should also view the world in broad, not parochial, terms.

Since the end of the Second World War, when America was strong and Europe was devastated and exhausted, there

has been a vast redistribution of resources. Europe is no longer weak; nor is the United States as relatively strong as it was. The total population of the European Economic Community nations is nearly 260 million, as compared with 212 million for the United States; the Gross National Product of the Nine is as large in volume terms as was America's three years ago. Yet the fact that the relative share of economic power has shifted so markedly from the United States to Western Europe and Japan has not been accompanied by a commensurate sharing of responsibilities.

Though the creation of the European Economic Community has provided an extraordinary stimulus to economic growth of the member nations, Europe has yet to develop and expand the institutions needed to make possible that unity of decision and action which will enable it to contribute to the peace and well-being of the world to the full extent of its potential capability. Only recently have European leaders begun to think seriously of accepting greater responsibility for threats to peace and stability outside the narrow boundaries of Europe.

At the moment, we are working with some of our NATO partners to try to organize cooperative efforts to check the Soviet and Cuban aggression in Africa. That is a pattern which, I hope, can be extended to certain other

geographical areas. I invite our friends, not merely in Europe but in other continents, to share with America to a much greater degree the responsibilities in the employment of both political and military resources.

To move toward a greater sharing of responsibilities will require that the United States increasingly relinquish an independence of decision and action which we have often found convenient. But we will be prepared to do that if Europe responds with active help and not merely advice.

I have spoken recently of our determination to honor our commitments and protect our interests, not only in our own hemisphere but in East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and other areas. There we shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen them in countering threats to their interests and to ours. In addition, we shall be ready, where necessary, to support mutual defense efforts. As I have recently made clear, part of the program we are now undertaking -- the maintenance and improvements of quickly deployable forces (air, land and sea) to defend our interests throughout the world -- provides visible assurance that we will never let down our guard -- or our friends.

The message I bring today is a straightforward one: We Americans have never been so strong as we now

are -- strong because of our economic power and strong because we are steadily developing a more just society -- a society that will enjoy increasing support as we treat our own people with increasing fairness and they know that we are true to our principles. And strong because of our vast and competent military establishment.

The challenge of government today -- the challenge that must be met by your President and the Congress -- is to maintain a balance between competing pressures and obligations -- to try, in other words, to keep our commitments and capabilities in some durable equilibrium. Thus, we shall continue to build our economic strength, while, at the same time, making sure that we do not unduly waste resources or that we do not utilize those resources in such a way as to do irreparable damage to our environment. We shall give concrete expression to our national sense of justice, while never forgetting that individual liberty is the essence of the American idea. Thus, we will rigorously avoid building up a bureaucracy that would excessively impair individual freedom of decision and action. Finally, we will not hesitate to use our power when needed, while, at the same time, making sure that we use it only when vital interests are engaged and in ways where it can be employed effectively.

Finally, while constantly striving to achieve agreed and verifiable limits on the building and utilization of weapons of destruction, we shall undertake no measures of disarmament that in any way impair our ability to defend our interests or to protect the security of America and its allies.

Those are objectives to which my Administration is committed. It is the force of that commitment which gives me the conviction to say to you today: This is a time for confidence. Have faith in your country, and never confuse healthy self-criticism, which is an essential element of our democratic system, with counsels of despair and confusion -- the lamentations of the timid and ill-informed.

Optimism is, after all, the only self-respecting working hypothesis for Americans. It was optimism grounded on reality that made our country strong. It is that same well-grounded optimism that can lead us to fulfill the high purposes for which this country was founded.

Let us, then, hold our heads high.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 23, 1978

*Strength prevents
War - allows SALT, etc*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM FALLOWS
SUBJECT: Naval Academy Speech

Throughout the last week, I have been calling a number of authorities to get their advice about your remarks at Annapolis. Some of them have already called back their suggestions; others say they would like more time to think. I am writing now to pass on the remarks we have received. I will give you another batch on Thursday. Perhaps we could talk over your plans for this speech on the flight home from West Virginia on Friday.

Tony Lake submitted an outline of his suggestions, which I have included as Attachment I.

Sol Linowitz suggests: "You could begin by mentioning some of the successes we've had that have not been widely noted:

"-- we're not involved in any war

"-- we are respecting the rights of others in our diplomacy

"-- we are fulfilling our mission of setting an example of what other nations can accomplish.

"The theme that hits me hardest is this: we ought to be the nation we were always meant to be. That means meeting the challenges to our own security, but also setting an example to the rest of the world of how a free nation can deal with its troubling problems.

"Emerson said that America is not just a country, it is a state of mind. Starting with the Declaration of Independence, we have always cared about how the rest of the world regards us -- whether we live up to our standards. We want to be people concerned not just with ourselves but with others. In this generation that means:

NATO - all
democracies

"(a) first being sure of our own security;

"(b) we must set an example at home of the values we endorse overseas;

"(c) in international relations, we should be a force for peace and understanding -- not pushing others around, but concerning ourselves with what will make a better life for the world's people;

"(d) we are uniquely in a position to lead the world toward peace. No other nation has the position to do so -- in Africa, in the Middle East, in Panama. That is the responsibility and assignment we have taken on ourselves.

"Throughout our history, we have had differences -- but we are stronger because we have had them, and overcame them, than if they did not exist. Democracy is a system which believes in extraordinary possibilities in ordinary people. Our system brings out those possibilities.

"The speech could say that, instead of democracy being on the downfall, we believe that democracy is finally coming of age. We want people all around the world to have the opportunity to rise to the fullest exercise of citizenship.

"Economically, the greatest danger to us is our lack of confidence in our economy. When someone from outside looks at the US and sees our enormous economic strength, it is mind-boggling to them that we could ever have a lack of confidence in our system. All we need is faith in our own future. The responsiveness of our system is its greatest strength. We have economic problems -- such as energy and inflation -- but we are coping with them."

Averell Harriman:

"Fifty years ago, I went to Russia to see how their revolutionary philosophy was working. I found it wasn't that at all -- it was a reactionary philosophy. It rested on the principle of the few dominating the many, a principle which makes an animal out of man, a principle man has been fighting against for centuries. We're on the right side of that fight, and that is what gives us our strength.

"We have nothing to fear if we stick to those principles. That ties in very nicely with the President's human rights policy -- but it's more than those rights I'm talking about. It's the strength that comes from free men, the genius and creativity that comes from free expression -- those are what sustain us. We inherited some of that from the Greeks, of course -- but I think we should base our confidence on the creativeness of the individual when given the right to express himself freely.

"Harry Truman used to say that the British principle of human rights was best expressed in the American Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights."

Lester Brown (of the Worldwatch Institute):

"In discussing our strengths, we ought to emphasize the (1) extent to which our food production and export capacity puts us in a unique position. It's useful to note that whenever the Soviets have a serious crop failure there is no other nation, or combination of nations, that can meet their needs, except us.

"(2) As we look around the world, we see that our society has a great deal of mobility compared to any others. Our great mobility is our greatest strength. The educational system is one of the sources of that strength, since it enables us to perpetually renew our leadership. You could cite the fact that so many of our young people go to college -- that so many blacks are now in college -- as an indication of strength, even at a time when people are complaining about the failure of education.

"(3) We tend to be self-critical, but people on every continent still see this as the society they most want to be part of.

"(4) While we do face economic problems, we should point out the historic progress against unemployment that has been made in the last 16 months. Unemployment was the problem when the President came into office; to the extent people are now concerned about inflation instead, it is a sign of success.

"(5) After listing those strengths, you could say that our most pressing current need is to do something about energy, by applying our enormous traditional know-how to the search to do things more efficiently.

Admiral Zumwalt:

Saying that he spoke as someone "loyal to the President but opposed to the general drift of his foreign policies, especially the naval policies," Zumwalt said:

"A major part of the President's problem is the weakening of Presidential authority in the last few years, and the increasing strength of the Congress." A second part of the problem, he says, is the factual disagreement about the defense balance between the Soviet Union and the US, and whether Russian misbehavior is deliberate. A way to solve those problems -- to heal the breach between Congress and the Executive and to resolve the factual disputes -- would be "to call for a period of hearings by the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate on the military balance. The Foreign Affairs Committees could do the same about the success or failure of detente. The President could say that he would welcome the broadest range of debate on these subjects, and that he would be guided by the outcome of the hearings. That would help him obtain a consensus for his actions, and would reduce the growing polarization over foreign policy."

Arthur Goldberg:

He found at Belgrade that the real issue disturbing people abroad is the political will of the US to keep its commitments and exercise its proper role as leader of the free world. "We are as strong as we ever were. We are not as weak militarily as some would have us think. We are still in excellent shape. Part of the strength of our country is

that we're frank about our problems. The link between the two parts of the speech (our strengths, and our problems) should be that no one around the world should be confused. We remain in a position to discharge our role. The era when Congress is not ready to support the President in foreign affairs is coming to an end. There were abuses in the past, which led Congress to move in. But Jimmy Carter, by his discretion and his plain unwillingness to repeat the excesses of past Presidents on that score, has succeeded in calming the fears of Congress that he will dash off wildly. The balance is therefore swinging back, as it ought to. The power to make war rests with the Congress, as it should. But the authority to conduct the country's foreign relations belongs by law to the President." Goldberg says there is a Supreme Court decision, never challenged, which upholds this. We are no longer interested in being the world's policeman. But we are ready to keep our treaty and moral (this last includes Israel) commitments.

William Scranton:

"A great strength is the widely varied makeup of our people and their extraordinarily different heritages. We possess strengths drawn from all of these sources.

"Our freedom is in sharp contrast to that of other parts of the world. We should point out those aspects of freedom which most strike new immigrants or visitors -- although we are blase about them. Freedom of speech, as demonstrated in press and broadcasting.

"We have a basically sound economy. We're large enough to possess most basic resources, yet politically unified enough not to have distribution problems through frontiers, etc.

"Great strength of our family and church traditions, which two institutions did much to help us through the travail of the Great Depression.

"The only adversaries we could reasonably fear are the Russians, and our sophisticated command and communications systems put us far ahead of them.

"A great problem we face is our hyper-mobility. No opportunity to put down roots. Strains on families, and on psyches."

Alex Haley:

"Except for the Indians, we are all descendants of people who crossed oceans on a great flotilla of ships from other lands. Some were immigrants fleeing poverty or seeking political freedom or religious freedom. Some were the slaves, a legacy with those inevitable results we are still dealing." Haley thinks we could do something with the nautical theme before this particular audience.

William Coleman:

"One of our tremendous strengths is that we have been able to come through some very difficult times without recourse to major violence, and still keep our liberties intact.

"Three great examples are the labor movement in the early 30s, where the rights of labor were established without bayonets etc, the Civil Rights movement, where a weaponless minority was able to bring about great changes; and the removal of a President who had been elected by a huge majority. Through all these major social traumas, no bayonets, no troops."

Dean Rusk says it is important to re-establish the proper perspective between the abnormal, controversial, violent events that dominate the news, and the great context of normality in which these events take place. He draws considerable hope and confidence from things like our \$200 billion international trade; the 250 million people who pass through

immigration and customs, many of them daily commuters each year at the Canadian and Mexican borders; the 7-8,000 treaties that are in effect with countries all over the world, less than 1 percent of which even come up for discussion at any time during a year. "The overwhelming majority work all the time. The major frontiers of the world are peaceful at any given time. The overwhelming majority of disputes between nations are settled peacefully." He also cites development like the conquest of smallpox, which is an international victory in which the Center for Disease Control has had a major role.

Our Constitutional system is complicated, deliberately so, probably the most complicated in the world and those who must work within it can not do things swiftly.

On current fragmentation -- in a sense we've been fragmented since the beginning of the Republic, but its only within recent years that everyone expected the President and the government to solve every problem. "A kind of insatiability has built up in our society." However good the profits are this year they must be more than a certain percentage higher next year or they're seen as down. Adding \$8 billion to urban programs -- bringing the total to \$60 billion -- is described by leading mayors as "a step in the right direction." Farmers expect to be guaranteed profits without regard to whether they over invested in a \$50,000 tractor. The defense budget is the highest in history, and the largest part of it goes for the Navy -- but the President is seen as gutting the Navy.

Somebody has to start seeing that the President has to represent all these interests and can't go 100 per cent with any of them. If all got all they want it would destroy the country. Growing tendency for each to say "give us ours and to heck with everyone else."

We must look to our fundamental capacity as a people, to our assets: it's been 33 years since nuclear weapon was fired in anger; our constitutional system has shown over and over its great strength and resilience; our economic system, despite occasional aches and pains, has shown its ability to work miracles regularly. Truman always had great faith that the people would do what had to be done, if they understand what they were doing, and why. None of the democratic governments -- U.S., Japan, Western Europe -- seem able to call up that spirit right now (Willy Brandt said something similar a few months ago, that Western governments were experiencing revolt and terrorism by young elite because they weren't asking enough of their people).

On current Russian moves -- the Soviets have always been ready and willing to take advantage of any and all opportunities. Some Americans tried to abolish the cold war, but Russia didn't join them. They made a judgment that if they did something in Angola and Ethiopia we would not respond with force. NATO should be talking right now about whether the battle for Africa has opened. Western Europe is a small peninsula on top of a great bulging continent and ought to be more concerned than we. Recent events indicate at last they may be. When Rusk was Secretary of State, the Europeans wouldn't even talk about the continent of Africa, insisting it was beyond their borders and concern.

The Russians may believe that, because of Watergate and Vietnam and attempts by some Congressmen to interfere with foreign policy on a piecemeal basis, we would be less likely to react in Africa and elsewhere. (He doesn't see the Republican resolution as real indication that Republicans will stick together to make foreign policy partisan -- if they ever won the Presidency they'd be far more dependent on bi-partisanship than Democrats are.) It's very difficult for a democracy to convince Soviets that we are serious -- and thereby avoid confrontations such as the one over Cuban missiles. But if we concentrate on what the Russians do and not what they say, and if we make sure the rest of the world is aware of what they do, we have a better chance. The Russians listen more to what we say to our allies than to them through our ambassadors.

He tells about taking a canoe on the lake at Potsdam as a student and pulling it up for lunch at a restaurant, finding it was stolen when he'd finished. They got it back for him but fined him 5 marks for "tempting thieves" by not locking it to anything. "It's very difficult for a democracy not to tempt thieves. We have an open society sending out millions of signals a day. It's easy for them to get confused about which to follow." Dean Acheson once made a major speech on Total Diplomacy, urging everyone to speak with a single voice. It can't be done, and it's foolish to try, but the administration should speak with a single voice, be consistent in human rights position, for instance.

It's right for the President to affirm our human rights commitments, but he can't underestimate how seriously the Soviet Union and Republic of China will take it. They've built their societies on keeping out ideas of freedom, and they see ideas as more dangerous than nuclear weapons. They've gone to extraordinary lengths to isolate their people from

these ideas and won't take our activities lightly. But they are clamping down on their own people for their own reasons -- whatever we do, they'll stop dissidents when dissidents seem to be too much of a threat.

For a long time, a strong liberal wing has been eager to take out after South Korea and Nicaragua but not to be rude to the Soviet Union or China about their violations of human rights. Now that is changing, as the euphoria of detente is dissipating. It's only been in the last few years that Russia has used the word "detente." Before that they always called it "peaceful co-existence" -- defined as a continuing struggle by all means short of war. That is a very different thing from the liberal view of detente.

Linking human rights with other things can be dangerous. There are only about 30 constitutional democracies, and 120 "flawed" systems. If we begin to link human rights to other issues the path of isolation will be self-selected. We haven't earned the right to preach to other countries; only 15 years ago, black ambassadors couldn't get a house in Washington, were turned away at the Maryland beaches if they took their families down on a Saturday, and often had to take a State Department wife with them to go shopping without incident. Ambassadors would ask him as Secretary of State where could they get a haircut. "We haven't earned the right to preach yet. I don't like unrighteous indignation."

McGeorge Bundy says that the theme -- of confidence and strength -- is a very timely and important one. "I've been involved in the General Advisory committee, working on the SALT negotiations. As we listen to the political noises from both sides, what we hear -- both from those like Culver who are gearing up to support the treaty, or those like Scoop Jackson who are gearing up to fight it -- is that "retreat," or "losing" is the most important political issue. There is the perception that we are losing ground, in Africa, over the neutron bomb, after the B-1 decision. The Republicans are getting ready to argue that things were better for the country under their leadership.

He recommends three documents for you to look at: President Kennedy's address at the Academy, exactly 17 years before yours (Attachment II), and two speeches by Henry Kissinger in 1976 (Attachments III and IV), about the basic goals of his foreign policy. "The reason the President should look at them is that if he can figure out where he agrees and disagrees, he can define his policy all the more sharply."

"Beyond that, there are two points the President could address if he is ready to. One is military-civilian relations, which are at an important and critical phase right now. Whether you think about SALT, or the Navy, or African commitments, the problem is that we are still building our forces for missions no President wants -- and not building them for missions the President might want. We need a serious understanding between military planners and civilian leaders about the real needs and options for the future. This is genuinely unfinished business, which the next generation of military leaders will have to confront. The Rear Admirals of today are better than those of a generation ago -- but those of the next generation will have to be that much better still."

As an example of the kinds of options a President does not now have, Bundy mentioned the Dominican Republic -- where Johnson decided to send in a modest contingent of troops, but because of pre-arranged deployment plans, we ended up sending in more than 11,000. "If you figured out whose side you want to be on in Rhodesia and felt it necessary to intervene, the forces to do it in a sensitive way don't exist, partly because that capacity was handed over to the CIA long ago. I'm not suggesting that you want to build forces of counter-insurgency to carry out a cold-war mission -- but there are plenty of cases where you want to use armed forces in consonance with political purposes. The President is very wisely staying away from some of the things we said in the early sixties. But I think this is a problem he must confront. The positive side of it is that this is a problem we can face and solve -- unlike a closed society. One of the most touching passages in Sakharov's book is one where engineers are trying to give advice about altering missiles -- and the commissar cuts them off. We sometimes make that mistake too, but we don't have to. The President has reopened contacts with the scientific and technical communities that had been closed for 8 years. The knowledge, and creativity, and complaint of those sectors is a great source of strength.

"My second point is this: all our leaders finally talk about getting national policy above the partisan level -- but they only give those speeches at the end of their administrations. That's a mistake. If you look at the Panama Treaties, and the Middle East vote, you find nearly as many Republicans on his side as Democrats. If you look down the road toward SALT and other tough ones, you'll need support that's far wider than any sector of any party. You need to acknowledge those conditions now.

*Sputnik →
Moon
Spur now
to greater*

Ernest May (an historian from Harvard) says that in many ways the concerns of this era are like those of the late fifties and early sixties, the time of Sputnik and the "missile gap." "In that era, there was excessive worry at a time when there was no real danger. I think concerns can arise in two different ways -- one healthy, one not. The unhealthy and unrealistic way is comparisons between Soviet and American strength. There was no reason for thinking that Sputnik meant that Soviet technology was substantially ahead of ours; but it did spur us to the other, healthy concern, about whether we were realizing our full potential. We should have been concerned in the 1950s about American science -- not because the Soviets were ahead, but because we had room for improvement. Now we should be concerned about American education -- not because any other system comes close to it, but because it may not be meeting our own standards.

"If you looked at the United States at the end of the 19th century and asked what made it a great power, different from all the others, there were two factors. One was sheer material and productive wealth. The other was the quality of the highly-educated population. Both of those are still true today."

May says there are several ways in which the basic conditions of life have changed for the United States. Militarily, we must accept parity with the Soviet Union. Economically, we must accept our vulnerability to foreign supplies of oil -- and our reliance on foreign markets for our products. "But these changes -- toward the kind of

interdependence we have encouraged -- can be signs of strength. They just mean we have to change some of our attitudes about independence. For example, the relationship between government, business, and labor, and the idea that they are adversaries in an isolated arena. If we are more interdependent, it becomes harder for any of the three parties to engage in conflict on the assumption that their interests are the only ones involved. The Japanese were able to adapt quickly to our pressure on steel -- because they worked out a relationship between government, business, and labor that all of them could live with.

We have not yet received comments from Secretary Brown, Admiral Turner, George Kennan, George Ball, General Jones, and others.



Attachment I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James Fallows
The White House

FROM: S/P - Anthony Lake ^{TL}

SUBJECT: President's Annapolis commencement speech

I. Title: "A strong and confident America"

II. Purpose: To address the anxiety among Americans that we have lost our preeminent position in the world -- to speak to the crisis of national confidence.

III. Theme: That the strengths we possess as a nation are unmatched in the world, affording us an unprecedented opportunity -- and responsibility -- to exercise vigorous and constructive world leadership.

IV. Outline

1. The present context:

A. We are emerging from a difficult and self-rending period in our history. Vietnam, Watergate, other scandals tore at the fabric of our society, turned us inward, discouraged us.

B. Yet they also demonstrated the extraordinary resiliency of our society: the deep divisions have dissipated, without the bitter recriminations many feared. We have emerged from these ordeals, stronger and wiser.

C. As we reassert a confident American leadership in the world, we must also recognize that the world has fundamentally changed during the past generation:

-- more complicated world setting: the number of important players on the world scene, countries large and small that have real economic and political power, has dramatically increased;

-- the stake of the average citizen in what goes on in the world has increased: individual economic well-being, as well as peace, increasingly depend upon actions of others as well as ourselves;

-- the nature of East-West relations has changed, with the Soviets increasingly exercising their power globally.

2. Challenges of leadership:

A. These changes create a new pattern of international life and a new set of challenges for American leadership:

-- can we counteract Soviet interventionism in the Third World?

-- can we work together effectively with our international economic partners to stimulate steady and sustained recovery?

-- can we sustain an active diplomacy for peace, helping to find peaceful resolutions to festering and dangerous regional conflicts?

-- can we curb, and ultimately reverse, the dangerous growth in world armaments?

-- can we build international consensus for tackling the difficult global problems that challenge our future: nuclear proliferation, resource management, human development around the world?

B. I am confident that the answer to every one of these questions is "Yes".

3. Prospects for the future:

A. We will meet these challenges because we are stronger than we have ever been in the past and because we are prepared to exercise our leadership, not to impose "American solutions", but to bring nations together to solve common problems. This is an important change in the nature of our leadership. It responds to a new world setting. It requires more patience and skill than when we could act unilaterally. But it works, if we remain strong and firm.

B. As we exercise a new kind of leadership in a new world, let us recognize the unparalleled strengths we possess as a nation. (Each of the succeeding sections would be illustrated with concrete facts and examples):

1. A military capability second to none. The strength of our strategic arsenal. 3% increase in defense spending. Modernizing NATO defense.

2. Our unmatched industrial base.

3. Our superior technological capacity.

4. The essential cohesiveness of our society. Although there are differences, we are not paralyzed by deep ideological divisions. Bipartisanship. Continuity.

5. Our way of life. The fact is that people around the world want to come to this country, not the other way around.

6. Our democratic institutions and principles. Respect for the rights and potential of the individual continues to be the most powerful idea in the world.

7. Our basic pragmatism. We have never rested long on our laurels, or spent too much time wringing our hands; we are a forward-looking, problem-solving, optimistic people.

4. Conclusion: Reiteration of importance of Armed Forces to national strength and confidence, in terms of future of members of audience.

*Free Allies
(No occupying troops)*

ATTACHMENT II

Attachment II

[231] June 6

Public Papers of the Presidents

believe that the prospects for freedom in those areas are uncertain. We must, I believe, assist them if we are determined to meet with commitments of assistance our words against the Communist advance. The burden is heavy; we have carried it for many years. But I believe that this fight is not over. This battle goes on, and we have to play our part in it. And therefore I hope again that we will assist these people so that they can remain free.

It was fitting that Congress opened its hearings on our new foreign military and economic aid programs in Washington at the very time that Mr. Khrushchev's words in Vienna were demonstrating as nothing else could the need for that very program. It should be well run, effectively administered, but I believe we must do it, and I hope that you, the American people, will support it again, because I think it's vitally important to the security of these areas. There is no use talking against the Communist advance unless we're willing to meet our responsibilities, however burdensome they may be.

I do not justify this aid merely on the grounds of anti-Communism. It is a recognition of our opportunity and obligation to help these people be free, and we are not alone.

I found that the people of France, for example, were doing far more in Africa in

the way of aiding independent nations than our own country was. But I know that foreign aid is a burden that is keenly felt and I can only say that we have no more crucial obligation now.

My stay in England was short but the visit gave me a chance to confer privately again with Prime Minister Macmillan, just as others of our party in Vienna were conferring yesterday with General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. We all agreed that there is work to be done in the West and from our conversations have come agreed steps to get on with that work. Our day in London, capped by a meeting with Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip was a strong reminder at the end of a long journey that the West remains united in its determination to hold to its standards.

May I conclude by saying simply that I am glad to be home. We have on this trip admired splendid places and seen stirring sights, but we are glad to be home. No demonstration of support abroad could mean so much as the support which you, the American people, have so generously given to our country. With that support I am not fearful of the future. We must be patient. We must be determined. We must be courageous. We must accept both risks and burdens, but with the will and the work freedom will prevail.

Good night, and thank you very much.

232 Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the United States Naval Academy. *June 7, 1961*

Admiral, Mr. Secretary, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, members of the faculty, members of the Graduating Class and their families:

I am proud as a citizen of the United States to come to this institution and this

room where there is concentrated so many men who have committed themselves to the defense of the United States. I am honored to be here.

In the past I have had some slight contact with this Service, though I never did reach

the state of professional and physical perfection where I could hope that anyone would ever mistake me for an Annapolis graduate.

I know that you are constantly warned during your days here not to mix, in your Naval career, in politics. I should point out, however, on the other side, that my rather rapid rise from a Reserve Lieutenant, of uncertain standing, to Commander-in-Chief, has been because I did not follow that very good advice.

I trust, however, that those of you who are Regulars will, for a moment, grant a retired civilian officer some measure of fellowship.

Nearly a half century ago, President Woodrow Wilson came here to Annapolis on a similar mission, and addressed the Class of 1914. On that day, the graduating class numbered 154 men. There has been, since that time, a revolution in the size of our military establishment, and that revolution has been reflected in the revolution in the world around us.

When Wilson addressed the class in 1914, the Victorian structure of power was still intact, the world was dominated by Europe, and Europe itself was the scene of an uneasy balance of power between dominant figures and America was a spectator on a remote sideline.

The autumn after Wilson came to Annapolis, the Victorian world began to fall to pieces, and our world one-half a century later is vastly different. Today we are witnesses to the most extraordinary revolution, nearly, in the history of the world, as the emergent nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia awaken from long centuries of torpor and impatience.

Today the Victorian certitudes which were taken to be so much a part of man's natural existence are under siege by a faith committed to the destruction of liberal civiliza-

tion, and today the United States is no longer the spectator, but the leader.

This half century, therefore, has not only revolutionized the size of our military establishment, it has brought about also a more striking revolution in the things that the Nation expects from the men in our Service.

Fifty years ago the graduates of the Naval Academy were expected to be seamen and leaders of men. They were reminded of the saying of John Paul Jones, "Give me a fair ship so that I might go into harm's way."

When Captain Mahan began to write in the nineties on the general issues of war and peace and naval strategy, the Navy quickly shipped him to sea duty. Today we expect all of you—in fact, you must, of necessity—be prepared not only to handle a ship in a storm or a landing party on a beach, but to make great determinations which affect the survival of this country.

The revolution in the technology of war makes it necessary in order that you, when you hold positions of command, may make an educated judgment between various techniques, that you also be a scientist and an engineer and a physicist, and your responsibilities go far beyond the classic problems of tactics and strategy.

In the years to come, some of you will serve as your Commandant did last year, as an adviser to foreign governments; some will negotiate as Admiral Burke did, in Korea, with other governments on behalf of the United States; some will go to the far reaches of space and some will go to the bottom of the ocean. Many of you from one time or another, in the positions of command, or as members of staff, will participate in great decisions which go far beyond the narrow reaches of professional competence.

You gentlemen, therefore, have a most important responsibility, to recognize that your education is just beginning, and to be

prepared, in the most difficult period in the life of our country, to play the role that the country hopes and needs and expects from you. You must understand not only this country but other countries. You must know something about strategy and tactics and logic—logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone. When I say that officers today must go far beyond the official curriculum, I say it not because I do not believe in the traditional relationship between the civilian and the military, but you must be more than the servants of national policy. You must be prepared to play a constructive role in the development of national policy, a policy which protects our interests and our security and the peace of the world. Woodrow Wilson reminded your predecessors that you were not serving a government or an administration, but a people. In serving the American people, you represent the American people and the best of the ideals of this free society. Your posture and your performance will provide many people far beyond our shores, who know very little of our country, the only evidence they will ever see as to whether America is truly dedicated to the cause of justice and freedom.

In my inaugural address, I said that each citizen should be concerned not with what his country can do for him, but what he can do for his country. What you have chosen to do for your country, by devoting your life to the service of our country, is the greatest contribution that any man could make. It is easy for you, in a moment of exhilara-

tion today, to say that you freely and gladly dedicate your life to the United States. But the life of service is a constant test of your will.

It will be hard at times to face the personal sacrifice and the family inconvenience, to maintain this high resolve, to place the needs of your country above all else. When there is a visible enemy to fight, the tide of patriotism in this country runs strong. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediate visible foe, when you watch your contemporaries indulging the urge for material gain and comfort and personal advancement, your choice will seem hard, and you will recall, I am sure, the lines found in an old sentry box at Gibraltar, "God and the soldier all men adore in time of trouble and no more, for when war is over, and all things righted, God is neglected and the old soldier slighted."

Never forget, however, that the battle for freedom takes many forms. Those who through vigilance and firmness and devotion are the great servants of this country—and let us have no doubt that the United States needs your devoted assistance today.

The answer to those who challenge us so severely in so many parts of the globe lies in our willingness to freely commit ourselves to the maintenance of our country and the things for which it stands.

This ceremony today represents the kind of commitment which you are willing to make. For that reason, I am proud to be here. This nation salutes you as you commence your service to our country in the hazardous days ahead. And on behalf of all of them, I congratulate you and thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:04 a.m. at the Field House. His opening words "Admiral, Mr. Secretary" referred to Rear Adm. John F. Davidson, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, and John B. Connally, Jr., Secretary of the Navy.

ATTACHMENT III

Attachment III

Foreign Policy and National Security

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

I have come here today to talk to you about the vital and intimate relationship between America's foreign policy and our national security. It is appropriate that I do so in Texas, a state so long dedicated to a strong and resolute America, a state that has given our nation three distinguished Americans who presently serve in Washington and whom I am proud to consider friends—Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Mahon, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives; and John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All three of these men have worked long and hard to assure a strong defense for America. All three deserve the grateful thanks of their countrymen.

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, directly involved in the preparation of our defense budget or in decisions regarding particular weapons programs. But as the President's principal adviser on foreign policy, no one knows better than I that a strong defense is crucial for our role in the world. For a great and responsible power, diplomacy without strength would be empty. If we were weak we could not negotiate; we could only hope or accommodate. It is the confidence of strength that permits us to act with conciliation and responsibility to help shape a more peaceful world.

Other nations must not be led to doubt

either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. If allies doubt our constancy, retreat and political shifts are certain.

And so as Secretary of State, I am inevitably a partisan of a strong America and a strong defense as the underpinning of a strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility to make clear to the American people and to other nations that our power is indeed adequate to our current challenges, that we are improving our forces to meet changing conditions, that America understands its interests and values and will defend them, and that the American people will never permit those hostile to us to shape the world in which we live.

I do not accept the propositions that other nations have gained military ascendancy over us, that the Administration has neglected our defenses, or that negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. These charges sound remarkably like the "missile gap" claims which aroused anxieties in 1960, only to dissolve suddenly a few weeks after the election.

Ladies and gentlemen, we do face serious challenges to our security. They derive from the unprecedented conditions of the thermo-nuclear age, the ambiguities of contemporary power, and the perpetual revolution in technology. Our task is to understand the real and permanent requirements of our security, rather than to be seduced by the

¹ Made at Dallas, Tex., on Mar. 22 before a dinner meeting sponsored by Southern Methodist University, the World Affairs Council of Dallas, and other local organizations (text from press release 141).

outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time.

What are the national security issues we face? What is the true condition of our national defense?

—First, the inevitable growth of Soviet economic and military power has produced essential strategic equality. We cannot halt this growth, but we must counterbalance it and prevent its use for political expansion.

—Second, America remains the most powerful nation in the world. It will remain so, if the Congress approves the President's proposed defense budget. But evolving technology and the military programs of others impose upon us the need for constant vigilance and continuing major effort.

—Third, technology has revolutionized the instruments of war and introduced an unparalleled complexity into the perceptions of power and the choices that we must make to maintain it. The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally, the decisions we make today will determine our defense posture in the eighties and beyond. And the kind of forces we have will determine the kind of diplomacy we are able to conduct.

—Fourth, as nuclear arsenals grow, the horrors of nuclear war become ever more apparent while at the same time the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less-than-all-out aggression becomes ever less plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic equivalence, testing and probing at the local and regional levels become more likely. Hence over the next decade we must increase and modernize the forces—air, land, and sea—for local defense.

—Fifth, while a weak defense posture produces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense does not necessarily produce a strong foreign policy. Our role in the world depends as well on how realistically we perceive our national interests, on our unity as a people, and on our willingness to persevere in pursuit of our national goals.

—Finally, for Americans, physical strength can never be an end in itself. So long as we are true to ourselves, every Ad-

ministration has the obligation to seek to control the spiral of nuclear weapons and to give mankind hope for a more secure and just future.

The Long-Range Challenge of Defense

Let me discuss each of these challenges.

To cope with the implications of Soviet power has become a permanent responsibility of American defense and foreign policy. Sixty years of Soviet industrial and economic growth, and a political system that gives top priority to military buildup, have—inevitably—brought the Soviet Union to a position of rough equilibrium with the United States. No policy or decision on our part brought this about. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it. Nothing we can do now will make it disappear.

But while we cannot prevent the growth of Soviet military strength, we can and must maintain the strength to balance it and insure that it will not be used for political expansion. There is no alternative to a substantial defense budget over the long term. We have a permanent responsibility and need a steady course that does not change with the fads of the moment. We cannot afford the oscillation between assaults on defense spending and cries of panic, between cuts of \$40 billion in Administration defense budget requests over seven years and charges of neglect of our defenses.

This claim on our perseverance is a new experience for Americans. Throughout most of our history we have been able to mobilize urgently in time of war and then to disarm unilaterally when victory was achieved. After World War II we rapidly demobilized our armies, relying largely on our nuclear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thus, when the Korean war broke out we were little better prepared than we had been 10 summers previously. Only recently have we begun to understand—and then reluctantly—that foreign policy and military strategy are inextricably linked, that we must maintain defense preparedness over the long term, and that we will live for as far ahead

as we can see in a twilight between tranquillity and open confrontation. We need a defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, comprehensible to our friends, credible to our adversaries, and that we are prepared to sustain over the long term.

The Imperatives of Technology

Technology has transformed the conditions and calculations of military strength in unprecedented fashion.

The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a momentous increase in the element of power has eroded the traditional relationship of power to policy. Until the end of World War II, it would never have occurred to a leader that there might be an upper limit to useful military power. Since the technological choices were limited, strength was largely defined in quantitative terms. Today, the problem is to insure that our strength is relevant to our foreign policy objectives. Under current conditions, no matter how we or our adversaries improve the size or quality of our strategic arsenals, one overriding fact remains: an all-out strategic nuclear exchange would kill hundreds of millions on both sides in a matter of hours and utterly devastate the nations involved.

Thus the current strategic problem is virtually the diametric opposite of the historic one. Planners used to pursue increased overall power. Today we have a total strength unimaginable a generation ago, but we must design, diversify, and refine our forces so that they are relevant to—and able to support—rational foreign policy objectives. Historically, military planners could treat the technology of their time as stable; today, technology revolutionizes military capabilities in both strategic and tactical forces every decade and thus presents policymakers with an ever-increasing spectrum of choice.

And yet, the choices we make now will not, in most cases, really affect the structure of our forces for from 5 to 10 years—the time it takes to design new weapons, build them, and deploy them. Thus the policies

Administrations are able to carry out are largely shaped by decisions in which they took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's largely determined our strategic posture for the 1970's. We can do little to change the impact of those earlier decisions; the Administration in power in the eighties will be able to do little to change the impact of the decisions we make today. This is a sobering challenge, and it turns national security policy into a nonpartisan responsibility.

In choosing among the options that technology gives, we—and every Administration—must keep certain principles in mind:

—First, we must not simply duplicate Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a different geopolitical problem, a different force structure, and perhaps a different strategic doctrine.

—Second, because of the costs of modern forces, we face complex choices. In many areas we face a trade-off between quantity and quality, between numbers and sophistication.

—Third, because of our higher wage scales, particularly for our volunteer forces, any increase in our forces will weigh much more heavily on our economy than on that of adversaries whose pay scales are only a fraction of ours. For this reason, and the value we place on human life, we have always had an incentive, *indeed an imperative*, to put a premium on technology—where we are superior—rather than on sheer numbers.

—Fourth, we must see beyond the numbers game. Quality confers advantages as much as quantity and can sometimes substitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford every weapon that technology makes possible.

—Fifth, at some point numbers count. Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for numerical strength. The belief that there is an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the defense budget is an illusion. Reductions almost inevitably translate into a reduction of effectiveness.

America possesses the economic and tech-

nological foundation to remain militarily pre-eminent; we can afford whatever military forces our security requires. The challenge we face is not to our physical strength—which is unequalled—but to our will to maintain it in all relevant categories and to use it when necessary to defend our interests and values.

Strategic Forces

Our nation's security requires, first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that insure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

We have such forces today. Our technology has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. by at least five years; with appropriate effort we can insure that this will continue to be the case.

We are determined to maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required. We will never allow the balance to be tipped against us either by unilateral decision or a buildup of the other side, by a one-sided agreement or by a violation of an agreement.

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious "gaps." Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union; their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

In the middle sixties we could have continued the deployment of heavy throw-weight missiles, following the Titan or the Atlas. But the Administration then in office decided instead to rely—in addition to our large bomber force—on an arsenal of 1,000 new relatively light, sophisticated, and extremely accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems rapidly, halting our buildup of launchers in the 1960's when it was judged that technological improvements were more important than an increase in numbers.

The Soviet Union chose a different course. Because of its more limited technological

capabilities, it emphasized missiles whose greater throw-weight compensated for their substantially poorer accuracy. But—contrary to the expectations of American officials in the 1960's—the Soviets also chose to expand their numbers of launchers beyond what we had. Thus, the Soviets passed our numerical levels by 1970 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year—until we succeeded in halting this buildup in the SALT agreement of 1972.

Therefore—as a consequence of unilateral decisions made a decade ago by both sides—Soviet missile forces today are somewhat larger in number and considerably heavier in throw-weight, while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication. We possess far larger numbers of warheads—8,500 to their 2,500—and we have several hundred more strategic bombers.

Whether we move in the direction of greater throw-weight will largely depend on recommendations made by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is not essentially a foreign policy decision. But in making it we will be governed by our needs, not by a compulsion to duplicate the Soviet force structure.

The destructiveness of missiles depends on a combination of explosive power and accuracy. For most purposes, as accuracy improves, explosive power becomes less important—and heavy land-based missiles become in fact more vulnerable. Since we have stressed accuracy, we may decide that we do not need to approach the level of throw-weight of Soviet weapons, though nothing—certainly no SALT agreement—prevents us from substantially increasing our throw-weight if we choose.

Whatever our decision regarding technical issues, no responsible leader should encourage the illusion that America can ever again recapture the strategic superiority of the early postwar period. In the forties, we had a nuclear monopoly. In the fifties and early sixties, we had overwhelming preponderance. As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union possessed less than 100

strategic systems while we had thousands.

But today, when each side has thousands of launchers and many more warheads, a decisive or politically significant margin of superiority is out of reach. If one side expands or improves its forces, sooner or later the other side will balance the effort.

The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; we matched it. We then added a lead in numbers of strategic missiles to the lead we already had in bombers; they caught up and surpassed us in missile numbers, though we still remain far ahead in numbers of bombers. When our Trident submarines are in production by the end of this decade, we will begin to redress that numerical imbalance as well as improve the flexibility and survivability of our forces.

We were the first to put modern ballistic missiles on submarines, and we were the first to put multiple warheads on missiles. Though we remain ahead in both categories, the Soviets found ways to narrow the gap. And the same will be true in the future, whether in missile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or cruise missile technology.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by *either* side. A perceived inequality could shake the confidence of other countries even when its precise military significance is difficult to define. Therefore we certainly will not permit a perceived or actual imbalance to arise against us and the Soviet Union is likely to follow similar principles.

The probable outcome of each succeeding round of the strategic arms race will be the restoration of equilibrium, at a higher and costlier level of forces and probably with less political stability. Such temporary advantages as can be achieved are not strategically decisive.

The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels.

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore

these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in modern wartime conditions or against an opponent possessing means of retaliation. Indeed, neither side has even tested the launching of more than a few missiles at a time; neither side has ever fired them in a north-south direction as they would have to do in wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise attack would depend on substantial confidence that thousands of reentry vehicles launched in carefully coordinated attacks—from land, sea, and air—would knock out all their targets thousands of miles away with a timing and reliability exactly as predicted, before the other side launched any forces to preempt or retaliate, and with such effectiveness that retaliation would not produce unacceptable damage. Any miscalculation or technical failure would mean national catastrophe. Assertions that one side is "ahead" by the margins now under discussion pale in significance when an attack would depend on decisions based on such massive uncertainties and risks.

For these reasons, the strategic arsenals of the two sides find their principal purpose in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent and in making certain that third countries perceive no inequality. In no recent crisis has an American President come close to considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since 1962—and perhaps not even then—has the strategic balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea, when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it was not relevant to the outcome.

Strategic Arms Limitation

It is against this background that we have vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strategic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing such talks.

—Since successive rounds of competitive programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the

competition and to maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case at lower levels.

—Stabilizing the strategic balance frees resources to strengthen our forces in areas where they are most needed; it will ease the problem of enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and in seapower, the areas where an imbalance could have serious geopolitical consequences.

—Agreed limitations and a more calculable strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to reduce political confrontations and crises.

—And, finally, the American people expect their leaders to pursue every responsible approach to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect them to support the sacrifices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided potentially massive expenditures and instabilities. We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for five years—a period in which, because of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity for deployment of our own. We intended to use that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive agreement based on numerical equality and, failing that, to close the numerical gap by our own efforts as our modernization programs developed.

This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok a year and a half ago and what we are trying to enshrine in a binding treaty that would run through 1985. Both sides would have equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and on multiwarhead missiles; this would require the Soviets to dismantle many weapons, while our planned forces would not be affected. And neither the weapons of our allies nor our forward-based nuclear systems, such as carriers and tactical aircraft, would be included; these had been Soviet demands since 1969.

These are major accomplishments which are overwhelmingly in our interest, particularly when we compare them to the situation

which could have prevailed had we failed to achieve restraints on Soviet programs. Nevertheless, very important issues remain to be resolved. We will make every effort to conclude a satisfactory agreement, but we will be driven solely by the national interest and not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines.

The SALT agreements are the opposite of one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as they are so often portrayed. Soviet offensive programs were slowed; none of ours were affected. Nor has the Administration countenanced Soviet violations of the first SALT agreement, as has been irresponsibly charged. In fact we have carefully watched every aspect of Soviet performance. It is the unanimous view of all agencies of our government—only recently reconfirmed—that no Soviet violation has occurred and that none of the ambiguous actions that we have noted and raised has affected our security. But we will remain vigilant. All ambiguous information will be carefully analyzed. No violations will be tolerated. We will insist on full explanations where questionable activity has occurred.

We will maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required—preferably within the limits of successful SALT negotiations but, if necessary, without those limits. We will not heed those who maintain that all that is required are limited, minimum deterrence forces—to threaten the Soviet civilian population. To follow their advice would deprive us of all options save capitulation and the massive destruction of civilian life; it would create a large numerical imbalance against us, which could have significant political consequences, possibly tempting our adversaries and upsetting our friends.

But neither will we be deflected by contrived and incredible scenarios, by inflated versions of Soviet strength, or by irresponsible attacks on SALT into diverting defense resources away from vital areas—the forces for regional and local defense and our Navy. For these are the areas where shortfalls and imbalances can rapidly turn into geopolitical shifts that jeopardize our fundamental interests and those of our allies.

Military Strength for Regional Defense

Under conditions of nuclear parity, world peace is more likely to be threatened by shifts in local or regional balances—in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, or Africa—than by strategic nuclear attack. Thus, our forces that can be used for local defense deserve our particular attention and increased resources.

The issue is not the simplistic one of the size of the Soviet Army. There is nothing new about the size of the Soviet Army. During the entire postwar period, the Soviet standing army has always been larger than ours; at times it has been three times the size. The Soviet Union has a much greater landmass to defend and perceives major defense problems both in Eastern Europe and on its Asian front, where nearly half of the Soviet Army is now stationed. We, by contrast, enjoy the shields of friendly neighbors and wide oceans. And we are linked with close allies with substantial forces of their own.

The new and long-foreseen problem is that under conditions of nuclear balance our adversaries may be increasingly tempted to probe at the regional level. This temptation must be discouraged. If leaders around the world come to assume that the United States lacks either the forces or the will to resist while others intervene to impose solutions, they will accommodate themselves to what they will regard as the dominant trend. And an unopposed superpower may draw dangerous conclusions when the next opportunity for intervention beckons. Over time, the global balance of power and influence will inevitably shift to the advantage of those who care nothing about America's values or well-being.

Thus our strong capability for local and regional defense is essential for us; and together with our allies, we must build up these forces. In a crisis, the President must have other choices than capitulation or resort to strategic nuclear weapons.

We are not the world's policeman—but we cannot permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to become the world's policeman

either, if we care anything about our security and the fate of freedom in the world. It does no good to preach strategic superiority while practicing regional retreat.

This was the issue in Angola. The United States had no significant stake in a purely Angolan civil war. The issue was—and remains—the unacceptable precedent of massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in a conflict thousands of miles from their shores—with its broad implications for the rest of Africa and, indeed, many other regions of the world. The danger was, and is, that our inaction—our legislatively imposed failure even to send financial help to Africans who sought to resist—will lead to further Soviet and Cuban pressures on the mistaken assumption that America has lost the will to counter adventurism or even to help others do so.

It is time, therefore, to be clear that, as far as we are concerned, Angola has set no precedent. It is time that the world be reminded that America remains capable of forthright and decisive action. The American people know that the United States cannot remain aloof if basic principles of responsible international conduct are flouted and the geopolitical balance is threatened by a pattern of outside interventions in local conflicts.

The United States has made clear its strong support for majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa. We have no stake in, and we will give no encouragement to, illegal regimes there. The President and I have made clear that rapid change is required and that the opportunity for negotiated solutions must be seized. We will make major efforts to promote these objectives and to help all parties to return to the negotiating table. The proposals made today by Foreign Secretary [of the United Kingdom James] Callaghan in the House of Commons seem to us a most constructive approach. We welcome them.

But let no one believe that American support can be extorted by the threat of Cuban troops or Soviet arms. Our cooperation is not available to those who rely on Cuban troops.

The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms.

We have issued these warnings before. I repeat them today. The United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad.

We are certain that the American people understand and support these two equal principles of our policy—our support for majority rule in Africa and our firm opposition to military intervention.

Ladies and gentlemen, Angola reminds us that military capabilities by themselves cannot solve our foreign policy problems. No matter how massive our arsenals or how flexible our forces, they will carry little weight if we become so confused in our decisionmaking and so constrained in defining our interests that no one believes we will ever act when challenged.

The issue is not an open-ended commitment or a policy of indiscriminate American intervention. Decisions on whether and how to take action must always result from careful analysis and open discussion. It cannot be rammed down the throats of an unwilling Congress or public.

But neither can we avoid decisions when their time has clearly come. Global stability simply cannot survive the presumption that our natural choice will always be passivity; such a course would insure that the world will witness dangerous challenges and major changes highly inimical to our interests and our ideals.

The Strength and Will of America

If America's defense is to match the nation's needs, it must meet three basic requirements:

—Our strategic forces must be sufficient to deter attack and credibly maintain the nuclear balance.

—Our forces for regional defense, together with those of our allies, must be

clearly capable of resisting threat and pressure.

—And at home we must once again unite behind the proposition that aggression unresisted is aggression encouraged. We must be prepared to recognize genuine threats to the global balance, whether they emerge as direct challenges to us or as regional encroachment at a greater distance. And we must be prepared to do something about them.

These are the real issues our leaders now face and will surely face in the future. They require answers to some hard questions, such as the following: Where can our defense dollars be most productively spent? What programs are needed that are not already underway? What would be the costs of these programs and over what period of time? What, if anything, would we have to give up? What are the premises of our defense policy—against what threats and with what diplomacy?

Administration and critics alike must answer these questions if we are to have an effective national policy. And in this spirit, I have spoken today about the relationship between defense and foreign policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, military strength is crucial to America's security and well-being. But we must take care not to become so obsessed with power alone that we become a "Fortress America" and neglect our ultimate political and moral responsibilities.

Our nation is the beacon of hope to all who love freedom not simply because it is strong, but because it represents mankind's age-old dream of dignity and self-respect. Others before us have wielded overwhelming military power and abdicated moral responsibility or engendered fear and hatred. Our resources—military, industrial, technological, economic, and cultural—are beyond challenge; with dedication and effort they shall remain so. But a world of tenuous balance, of a nuclear equilibrium constantly contested, is too barren and perilous and uninspiring. America has always stood for something deeper than throwing its weight around; we shall see to it that we shall never relinquish

our moral leadership in the search for a just and lasting peace.

We have gone through a difficult decade not because we were weak, but because we were divided. None of our setbacks has been caused by lack of American power, or even lack of relevant power. The fundamental challenge to America therefore is to generate the wisdom, the creativity, and the will to dedicate ourselves to the peace and progress of humanity.

America's ultimate strength has always been the conviction and basic unity of its people. And despite a decade and more of testing—despite assassination, war, and institutional crisis—we still remain a vital and optimistic and confident people.

It is time once again for Americans to hold their heads high. It is important to recall once again some fundamental truths:

—We are still the strongest nation on the face of the earth.

—We are the most generous nation in history; we have fed the starving, opened our arms and our hearts to refugees from other lands, and given more of our substance

to the poor and downtrodden around the world than any other nation.

—We are needed to maintain the world's security.

—We are essential to any hopes for stability and human progress.

—We remain the bulwark of democracy and the land of promise to millions who yearn for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children.

—We therefore have a responsibility to hold high the banner of freedom and human dignity for all mankind.

Our record of achievements should be but prologue to what this generation of Americans has it within its power to accomplish. For the first time in history, we can work with others to create an era of peace and prosperity for all mankind.

We shall not fail. With faith in the goodness and the promise of America we shall master our future. And those who celebrate America's tricentennial will look back and say that this generation of Americans was worthy of the ideals and the greatness of our history.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Dallas

Press release 141B dated March 23

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the possibilities of a shooting war in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated.

You have the tensions between the Israelis and their neighbors that have plotted for over generations. You have internal tensions in many countries, such as Lebanon, which can spark a conflagration without any particular plan by any country. And therefore the problem in the Middle East is extremely difficult.

On the other hand, in the last two years more progress has been made toward peace

in the Middle East than in the entire post-war period. So if we can create the penalties for irresponsible conduct that I tried to describe in my speech, and if we can continue the efforts to promote negotiations among the parties that we have done in the last two years, I think that considerable progress can be made toward peace and a shooting war can be avoided.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that Egypt's turn to the West is complete and they have renounced the Soviet Union, what in your opinion are the Soviet Union long-range goals now in regard to the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union has

ATTACHMENT IV

THE CONGRESS

The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger¹

There could be no better moment for the "dispassionate public discussion and national self-examination" in foreign policy for which you, Mr. Chairman [Senator John J. Sparkman], have called these hearings.

The moment is propitious not primarily because of the numerical happenstance of our 200th year, or of the political milestone of this Presidential election campaign, but because of the era we have entered in international affairs. It is a moment to take stock of our country's record and consider our future course, to reflect about the transformations of the international order which we can perceive from this vantage point—some already completed and some still in train—that have altered many of the circumstances in which American foreign policy is conducted.

Today I want to focus on what lies ahead of us: the international issues that will confront the American public, the President, and the Congress, regardless of party, as we enter our third century. For we must remember, amid all our debates, that this nation has permanent interests and concerns in the world that must be preserved through and beyond this election year. This nation faces objective conditions in the world that are not the result of the machinations of personalities nor even, often, the product of our national decisions. They are realities

¹ Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 16 during hearings on foreign policy choices for the 1970's and 1980's (text from press release 127). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

brought by the ebb and flow of history. The issues they raise must be addressed with seriousness, understanding, and objectivity if we as a people are to remain masters of events and of our own destiny.

As President Ford has said:²

America has had a unique role in the world since the day of our independence 200 years ago. And ever since the end of World War II we have borne successfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable world order and hope for human progress.

That responsibility continues—not only as a task we shoulder for others or in fulfillment of our ideals, but as a responsibility to ourselves—to create a world environment in which America and its values can thrive.

Mr. Chairman, in foreign policy we stand on the firm ground of America's strength and clear purpose. We face the future with confidence. We have made considerable progress in strengthening partnership with our allies, in managing the global issues of peace and security, and in beginning a new era of cooperation on the global problems of interdependence. The potential for further advance is great.

But today the world looks anxiously to America to gauge whether we will choose to build upon this progress. They ask whether America will use its strength to respond to today's challenges. One of the greatest factors of uncertainty in the world today is concern about America's will and constancy. These doubts are not caused by statements made in the heat of a political campaign

² For an excerpt from President Ford's state of the Union address made on Jan. 19, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1976, p. 145.

but, rather, by a decade of convulsions culminating in a serious question as to the basic direction of American foreign policy. These doubts must be dispelled. I am convinced that they will be dispelled—not by public statements, but by demonstrations of the purposefulness of national policy, the vigor of the American economy, and the renewed unity of the American people, on which all else depends. We are going through a period of adjustment and reappraisal. We must all work together, so that we are the stronger for it when it is completed.

The American people, and the Congress as their elected representatives, have a central part to play in the enterprise of national reaffirmation. Their contribution is essential as a matter of constitutional principle in the making of foreign policy, and as a matter of practical necessity in the implementation of any successful long-term course. As Senator Case has pointed out:

Congress has an important role in helping voters make known their concerns and to guide the executive branch in its conduct of foreign policy. A democracy such as ours cannot hope to successfully carry out for any length of time a foreign policy which does not have firm domestic roots.

These hearings have already provided much insight into the American public's perceptions of foreign policy, which we have found extremely useful.

The International Environment

Through most of our history, Mr. Chairman, our peace and security were provided for us. The successful growth of our democratic society at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and the belief that it was our own choice whether and when we would participate in the world. We entered wars only when overwhelming danger threatened. We identified exertion in foreign affairs as a temporary interruption of our domestic tranquillity. Once aroused, we were implacable, fighting "the war to end all wars," or until "unconditional surrender."

We had margin for error. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without tragedy,

and our resources and good fortune left us without the sense of external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other nation. Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved—once and for all—by determined effort. The qualities on which all other nations in history depended to insure their survival in a hostile or ambiguous environment—subtlety, maneuver, imagination, consistency—were disparaged in America as cynical or immoral. The equilibrium of power which kept the peace for long periods in the turbulent history of Europe was denounced in this country as a preoccupation with power at the expense of moral principle.

Even in the first 25 years after World War II—an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs—we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort. We were encouraged—even impelled—to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires.

At the same time, the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, power takes many forms and our circumstances are more complex. In military power, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. In economic terms we remain the world's most productive economy; but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our moral influence, our democratic principles, are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize; but we must compete with ideologies which assert progressive goals but

pursue them by oppressive methods.

All Americans have a right to be proud of what this nation accomplished in our past 30 years of world leadership. We assisted European and Japanese recovery; we built indispensable alliances; we established an international economic system; and we sustained global peace and global progress for a generation.

We have great things yet to do, requiring our unity, our dedication, and our strength. For we live, and our children will live, in a more complex time:

—First, we face the necessity of drawing on the new strength and vitality of our allies and friends to intensify our partnership with them. They have become, again, major centers of power and initiative. This is a lasting success of our foreign policy. And today, our unity with the great industrial democracies is fundamental to all we seek to accomplish in the world. It is we who maintain the global balance of power that keeps the peace. And it is our unmatched economic dynamism that is the best hope for a world of widening prosperity. Above all, our moral unity and commitment to the values of democracy are crucial to the fulfillment of our own dreams as well as to the creative use of man's energies in solving the problems of the future. In a complex world—of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence—it is our ideals that give meaning and purpose to our endeavors.

—For we face, secondly, the age-old challenge of maintaining peace, but in the unprecedented dimension of an age of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, after 60 years of economic and industrial growth, has—invariably—reached the status of a superpower. As a result, we must conduct a dual policy. We and our allies must restrain Soviet power and prevent its use to upset global stability. At the same time, our generation faces the long-term challenge of putting the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more secure, constructive, and durable basis.

We must, as well, continue the progress we have made in fashioning a new relation-

ship with the People's Republic of China. We consider the opening to the People's Republic of China one of the key elements of our foreign policy.

Beyond this, global security presents other permanent necessities. There is the continuing need to moderate and resolve regional conflicts which threaten global economic or political stability. And there is the urgent and growing challenge of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which gravely increases the risks of nuclear holocaust.

—The third central challenge is to build a wider world community out of the turbulent environment of today's nearly 150 independent nations. Two World Wars in this century and the process of decolonization have broken down the international order of previous centuries. For the first time in history the international community has become truly global. The new nations make insistent demands on the global system, testing their new economic power and seeking a greater role and more equitable share in the world's prosperity. A new pattern of relationships must be fashioned out of cooperation for mutual benefit, impelled by the reality of our global interdependence.

Our friendships with nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, on the basis of mutual respect and practical cooperation, take on a new importance as the building blocks of world community. We must recognize that no world order will be stable over the last quarter of this century unless all its participants consider that they have a stake in it and that it is legitimate and just.

These are the basic challenges facing this nation as we enter our third century.

In such a world, Mr. Chairman, this country can no longer choose whether or not it is involved in international affairs. On a shrinking planet, there is no hiding place. There are no simple answers. This nation cannot afford to swing recklessly between abdication and confrontation; we must pursue a long-term course. Although we are stronger than any other, we cannot operate primarily by throwing our weight around. Lasting peace

is not achievable without an international consensus. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for many centuries, without escape and without respite. We must learn patience, precision, perspective—knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, deriving from our moral conviction the courage to persevere. For America finds itself, for the first time in its history, irrevocably and permanently involved in international affairs.

The world needs desperately our strength and our purpose. Without American strength, there can be no security; without American convictions, there can be no progress.

Americans have always regarded challenges as a test, not an obstacle. We have great opportunities for creative diplomacy, to shape from this turbulence and complexity a world community of greater stability and hope. We, more than any other country, are in a position to determine—or have a decisive impact upon—the evolution of the global order.

Forty years ago when the forces of democracy faced a great threat, the United States was waiting in the wings to come to Europe's rescue. Today there is no one waiting in the wings to come to *our* rescue.

Let me discuss at greater length some of the basic long-term challenges we face.

The Unity of the Industrial Democracies

The cornerstone of our foreign policy is—as it has been for a generation—our partnership with our principal allies in the Atlantic community and Japan. These partnerships began three decades ago as a means of collective security against aggression and of cooperation for economic recovery from the devastation of World War II. In the succeeding period our alliances have been the bulwark of the global balance of power. Our cooperation with the great industrial democracies has been the underpinning of the world economic system which has sustained global prosperity and spread it to the far corners of the earth.

Rarely in history have alliances survived as ours have survived, and indeed flourished, through so many vast changes in the international environment. And in the last few years, we and our allies have not only continued to strengthen our common defenses; we have extended our collaboration successfully into new dimensions of common endeavor—in improved political consultation, in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the Communist countries, in developing a common energy policy and strategy, in reinforcing our respective economic policies for recovery from recession, in environmental cooperation, and in fashioning common approaches for the dialogue with the developing countries.

All these efforts to build peace and promote progress reflect our common belief in freedom and our common hope of a better future for all mankind. These are permanent values of this nation, and therefore our alliances and friendships that are based on them and designed to further them are permanent interests of the United States.

Our cohesion has a more than technical significance. While foreign policy is unthinkable without pragmatism, pragmatism without moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Our ties with the great democracies are thus not an alliance of convenience, but a union of principle in defense of democratic values and our way of life. It is our ideals that inspire not only our self-defense but all else that we do. And the resilience of our countries in responding to all our modern challenges is a testimony to the spirit and moral strength of our free peoples.

As we look to the future, there is no higher priority in our foreign policy than sustaining the vitality of democracy and the unity of democracies. The world will become more, not less, complex; our power will grow more, not less, interwoven with others; our values will be more, not less, challenged. In such a world, the solidarity of our relations with those who share our heritage, our way of life, our ideals, takes on more, and not less, importance for as far ahead as we can see.

Our responsibilities are, first, our common defense. The closeness of our collaboration on defense matters is greater today than at any time in the past decade. We must maintain it because it is the stability of the military balance that has brought about what we ever hope there is of easing tensions in Europe and in Asia.

There is greater sharing of responsibility in North Atlantic defense today. The President has taken the initiative in promoting such improvements as improved standardization of equipment and more effective force structuring. But the United States must remain conscious of its own special responsibility in the alliance—to maintain the strategic balance and to contribute its crucial share to maintaining the conventional balance in Europe and the Mediterranean, and more generally.

Our security is a precondition of all else that we do. On this foundation, we will face over the coming period a broad range of tasks beyond the traditional enterprise of collective defense.

We will continue to seek to enhance our security and general peace through arms control and negotiation of political conflicts. We hope to see progress in the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. We expect that the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, which ended a chronic crisis of more than two decades, foreshadows an era of enhanced security in Central Europe.

In the coming decade, the collaboration of the industrial democracies can be the dynamic force in the building of a more secure and progressive international order. We have made a remarkable beginning. New steps have been taken in the last few years, and further will be taken, to strengthen European unity; this has the strong support of the United States. The new institutions and programs of our collective energy strategy are in place. We have discussed and developed common approaches to the new dialogue with the developing nations. The passage of the Trade Act of 1974 enabled this country to enter into a new round of trade negotiations with Europe and Japan to make basic

improvements in the world trading system. In recent months, the Rambouillet economic summit and the Jamaica reform of the international monetary system demonstrate that the future of our cooperation among the industrial democracies will be as fruitful as the past.

In this regard, I want to mention an important item of business before this committee: approval of our participation in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Financial Support Fund. This is the contingency mechanism, proposed by the United States, to insure mutual support among the industrial nations in the face of financial disruptions or pressures by actions of the oil cartel. At little cost, this mechanism will provide a financial safety net, combat protectionism, and promote our cooperation on energy policy. It is vital for the industrial nations' independence. Seven other OECD members have ratified it, and the rest are expected to do so by the middle of this year. I hope the Congress will move quickly to do the same, to reinforce the solidarity of the industrial democracies.

It is our belief that in an era when our democratic values are under challenge in the world and our societies have been buffeted by economic difficulties at home, the solidarity and cooperation of the great democracies are of crucial importance for giving impetus to all our efforts. We have proved what we can do and vindicated the faith of our people in the values and future of our societies. We have proved that our unity can be as dynamic a force for building a new international order today as it was 30 years ago.

The new solidarity we are building can draw its inspiration from our hopes and ideals, rather than merely our common dangers. A thriving Europe and Japan and North America will not only be secure and prosperous but a magnet to the Communist countries and to the developing world. And so we can enter the last quarter of this century confident that we are masters of our own destiny—and making a decisive contribution to the world's destiny.

Peace and Equilibrium

Of the challenges that the democracies face, none are more fundamental than the issues of peace and war. These issues—the traditional foreign policy agenda—take on in this era an unprecedented dimension.

There are three principal aspects to this problem of peace:

—Relations with the major Communist powers;

—The effort to resolve regional conflicts and disputes peacefully; and

—The increasing danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

We live in a world in which this country must now deal with a country of roughly equal power. This is not a familiar world for modern Americans. Yet it is the kind of world in which we will live for the rest of this century and beyond, no matter what we do in the military field.

Thirty years ago, the United States, alone among the major nations of the world, emerged from the Second World War with its economy and society undamaged by war. We enjoyed a tremendous preponderance in economic power and a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This great physical strength gave impetus to the willingness of the American people to take responsibility for helping to shape a better postwar international order. The creativity and generosity that this nation displayed in that period are a lasting tribute to the American spirit.

Today, because of the inevitable recovery and growth of our allies—and our adversaries—the United States now finds itself in a world of relative kinds of equilibrium. In strategic military power, the world is still bipolar. Economic power is more widely dispersed among many major nations, including the wealthier of the developing nations. In moral and ideological influence, many nations and philosophies contend. The task of consolidating peace thus presents itself in this era as a far more complex problem than ever before, both practically and morally.

With our allies, we have learned to share responsibility and leadership, and this has

enhanced our collaboration in every dimension of common endeavor. But with our adversaries, we face the imperative of coexistence in an age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic parity. We must defend our interests, our principles, and our allies, while insuring at all times that international conflict does not degenerate into cataclysm. We must resist expansionism and pressures, but we must on this foundation seek to build habits of restraint that will over the long term lead to a reliable reduction of tensions.

This government has therefore moved with energy and purpose over the last several years, and in concert with our allies, to consolidate and transform our *relationships with the major Communist powers*, for a new era and for our long-term future.

We have established a new and durable and hopeful relationship with the People's Republic of China, a nation comprising nearly one-quarter of mankind. This new relationship has made an important contribution to peace in Asia and in the world. President Ford is committed to continue the process of normalization of our relations in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai communique.

And this country in the last several years has opened up positive relations with countries in Eastern Europe. Two American Presidents have visited Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania, to demonstrate that, in our view, European security and relaxation of tensions apply to Eastern as well as Western Europe. This remains, and must remain, a basic principle of American policy.

In an age when two nations have the power to visit utter destruction on the whole planet in hours, there can be no greater imperative than assuring a rational and secure relationship between the nuclear superpowers. This is a challenge without precedent. Historically a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interest such as now characterizes the international scene has almost invariably led to war. But in the age of strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. War would mean mutual suicide.

Therefore, with respect to the Soviet

Union, the United States faces the necessity of a dual policy. We must preserve stability but not rest upon it. We must firmly resist and deter adventurism. But at the same time we must keep open the possibility of more constructive relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—resolving political disputes by negotiation, such as Berlin; working out stable agreements to limit strategic arms on both sides, as in the SALT One agreements and the accord at Vladivostok; and when political conditions permit it, developing our bilateral cooperation in economic and other fields to give both sides a vested interest in continuing and improving political relations.

We have an obligation to mankind to work for a more secure world. We have an obligation to the American people to insure that a crisis, if it is imposed upon us, does not result from any lack of vision of the United States.

We face a long-term problem, and we must fashion and maintain a long-term policy. An equilibrium of power is indispensable to any hope of peace. But a balance of power constantly contested is too precarious a foundation for our long-term future. So this country, in its third century, must avoid the twin temptations of provocation and escapism. We must maintain a steady and confident course; it must be a policy that our adversaries respect, our allies support, and our people believe in and sustain.

By whatever name we call it, the U.S.-Soviet relationship must be founded on certain fundamental principles, which this country has affirmed consistently for the last seven years:

—First, we will maintain our military *strength*. The United States must maintain an equilibrium of power through a strong national and allied defense. The United States will do what is necessary to maintain the balance in all significant categories of military strength, including conventional as well as strategic forces.

—Secondly, this country is prepared to *negotiate solutions* to political problems. The 1971 agreement on Berlin is an example.

And both superpowers share a basic responsibility to insure that the world is spared the holocaust of a nuclear war. Strategic arms limitation is therefore a permanent, mutual, and fundamental interest. At Vladivostok in 1974, President Ford reached agreement on the outline of a comprehensive agreement putting an equal ceiling on strategic forces on both sides for a 10-year period. The issues that remain in completing that agreement are soluble. An agreement on the basis of strict reciprocity is attainable.

—Both sides have vital interests, but have an overriding interest in avoidance of major conflict. Therefore long-term peace can only be founded on the practice and habit of *restraint*. Exploiting local crises for unilateral gain is not acceptable. This nation will not seek confrontations lightly, but we are determined to defend peace by systematic resistance to pressures and irresponsible actions. The growth of Soviet economic and military power could not have been prevented; what can be prevented is the use of that power to upset the global balance. Without restraint there is no possibility of a meaningful relaxation of tensions.

—If we preserve security on this basis, opportunities exist for creative diplomacy to engage the Soviet Union more firmly in constructive participation in the international system. We are prepared to hold out the prospect of increasing *bilateral cooperation* in the economic, technical, and other fields to give both sides an increasing stake in positive political relations. Over the long term we have it within our capacity to make our coexistence durable and secure and to turn it into cooperation.

This is the broad agenda for the future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More specifically:

—We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

—We must accept the reality that sovereign states, especially ones of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other, and ultimately and inevitably must proceed by compromise.

—The United States will never stand for violation of a solemn treaty or agreement.

—We can never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us, either in unsatisfactory agreements or violations of agreements or by neglect of our own defense requirements.

—We are determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner and more secure strategic balance on equitable terms because it is in our interest and in the interest of world peace.

Any Administration conscious of the long-term requirements of peace will find itself implementing the same dual approach of firmness in the face of pressure and readiness to work for a more cooperative world. Of course, differences are inevitable as to the practical application of these principles. But as President Kennedy said:³

... in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

As the United States and Soviet Union have taken important steps toward regulating their own competition, *the problem of local conflicts* persists and indeed, to some extent, increases. The world begins to take for granted the invulnerability of global stability to local disturbances. The world has permitted too many of the underlying causes of regional conflicts to continue unattended until the parties came to believe their only recourse was to war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained, the world has remained complacent. We cannot forget the ominous lesson of 1914. Tolerance of local conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis will not explode beyond control. We have a responsibility to prevent such crises.

This must be a permanent preoccupation of statesmen who are concerned for the preservation of peace over the next decades. In the modern era, global communications have shrunk our planet and created a global con-

³ For President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

sciousness. Nations and peoples are increasingly sensitive to events and issues in other parts of the globe. Our moral principle extends our concern for the fate of our fellow men. Ideological conflict respects no boundaries and calls into question even the legitimacy of domestic structures.

We cannot expect stability to continue indefinitely unless determined efforts are made to moderate and resolve local political conflicts peacefully.

The United States is not the world's policeman. But we have learned from bitter experience—as recently as 1973—that conflicts can erupt and spread and directly touch the interests and well-being of this country. Helping to settle disputes is a longstanding American tradition, in our interest and the world interest.

Nowhere is there greater urgency than in the Middle East. The agreements negotiated between the parties over the past few years in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338 are unprecedented steps toward an ultimate peace. These efforts must and will continue. Both sides must contribute to the process. The United States remains committed to assist. The elements for further progress toward peace exist. Stagnation runs a grave risk of further upheaval, of benefit to neither side and of grave implications for the peace and economic well-being of the world.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons technology could add a more ominous dimension to a world in which regional political conflicts persist. The dangers so long predicted may be coming closer at hand. As I said to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1974

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used

In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers.

Therefore, halting proliferation is a major foreign policy objective of this Administration, as it has been for all previous Administrations since the dawn of the nuclear age. As I explained to your colleagues on the Senate Government Operations Committee just a week ago, we have intensified our efforts, in international bodies, with other nations who are principal exporters of nuclear materials, with potential nuclear powers—and with Congress—to insure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be spread widely without at the same time spreading the perils of holocaust. It is a challenge to statesmanship to see beyond the immediate economic gains from unrestrained competition in nuclear exports and to act to halt a mushrooming danger.

Shaping a World Community

The upheavals of the 20th century have bequeathed to us another fundamental task: to adapt the international structure to the new realities of our time. We must fashion constructive long-term relationships between the industrial and developing nations, rich and poor, North and South; we must adapt and reinvigorate our friendships in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, taking into account their new role and importance on the world scene; and together with all nations, we must address the new problems of an interdependent world which can only be solved through multilateral cooperation.

A central issue of foreign policy over the next generation will be the relationship between the industrial and developing nations. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to new countries and new centers of power and initiative. The world environment of the next decades can be the seedbed of political instability, ideological confrontation, and economic warfare—or it can become a community marked by international collaboration on an unprecedented scale. The interdependence of nations, the indivisibility of our security and our prosperity, can accelerate our common progress or our common decline.

Therefore, just as we must go beyond

maintaining equilibrium if we are to insure peace, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and seek to build a true world community. In international forums, the United States will resist pressure tactics, one-way morality, and propagandistic assaults on our dignity and on common sense. We will defend our interests and beliefs without apology. We will resist attempts at blackmail or extortion.

We know that world order depends ultimately on cooperative efforts and concrete solutions to the problems in our relations. The price and supply of energy, the conditions of trade, the expansion of world food production, the technological bases for economic development, the protection of the world environment, the rules of law that govern the world's oceans and outer space—these are concerns that affect all nations and that can be satisfactorily addressed only on the basis of mutual respect and in a framework of international collaboration. This is the agenda of an interdependent world.

We have much reason for confidence. It is the West—and overwhelmingly this country—that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability, and the good will that are the key to the success of these international efforts. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds, the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by their irrelevance.

Therefore we have begun the dialogue with the developing nations. At the World Food Conference in 1974, which was called at our initiative, and at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly last September and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, the United States has taken the role of leadership. We have undertaken it with a strong contribution from the Congress and in the spirit of the highest ideals of the American people. This must continue.

The United States has presented a wide range of proposals for practical cooperation that could shape a constructive long-term economic relationship between the developed and developing countries: to safeguard ex-

port earnings against economic cycles and natural disasters, to accelerate growth and agricultural production, to improve conditions of trade and investment in key commodities, and to address the urgent needs of the poorest countries. In every area of concern we have proposed methods of cooperation among all countries, including the other industrial countries, the newly wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries. Many of our proposals of last September have already been implemented. More can be done. If we are met in a constructive spirit, we will respond. There is a full agenda before us, implementing proposals that have already been made, and going beyond.

The United States has longstanding friendships on a bilateral basis with the nations of *Latin America, Asia, and Africa* which we seek to adapt, improve, and build upon.

Latin America, which I have recently visited, is for the United States a region of special ties and special interest. It is as well a continent in a process of transition. Hemispheric relationships—bilateral, regional, multilateral, and global—are in flux. An earlier community of the Americas bounded by exclusivity has given way to a more open relationship which turns not on convention but on mutual respect, common interests, and cooperative problem-solving and a more active role in the events outside the region. At the same time, the importance of Latin America to the United States is steadily increasing—as elements of the global economy, as participants in the world's political forums, and in their new role as the most developed of the developing nations.

The United States must adapt to these changing realities, and it has begun to do so. Equally, we maintain our conviction that the Americas must not reject, but build upon, the precious heritage of our tradition of cooperation. This is the formula for our future progress. The great issues of global interdependence are before us; with this special advantage, and on the basis of respect and sovereign equality, we here in this hemisphere can cooperate to find mutually beneficial solutions. If we succeed, our collaboration can be a model for the wider world

community that we seek.

Our relations with Asia are crucial as well, for in Asia the interests of all the major powers in the world intersect. The stability of the region will be as central to world peace over the coming decades as it has been in past decades. President Ford's trip to Asia in December both reaffirmed America's fundamental stake in Asia and opened a fresh chapter in our relations with the nations of the region. He set forth the premises of our country's future approach to Asia:

—American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and therefore to global stability.

—Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our Asian policy.

—The process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is indispensable. America's ties with one-quarter of mankind are inevitably of crucial importance to the world of the future.

—We have a continuing stake in stability and security in Southeast Asia, an area of great dynamism and promise.

—Peace in Asia depends upon the resolution of outstanding political conflicts, most prominently that of the Korean Peninsula.

—Economic cooperation among the peoples of the Pacific Basin is essential to fulfilling the aspirations of the peoples of the region for a better future.

And very soon I will visit another area of great change and importance: Africa. The dramatic spread of national independence in Africa has had a major impact on world institutions and on the scope of international affairs. Africa's economic importance and its economic relations with other continents are growing. And America's traditional concern for the cause of independence and self-determination and racial justice, and the identification of many Americans with their African heritage, have given a more profound dimension to our interest in the continent's future.

Our African policy over the coming decade will be guided by these principles and concerns:

—We want to see Africa attain prosperity

for its people and become a major participant in the international economic system.

—We support the desire of African nations to chart their own course in domestic, regional, and international affairs, to choose their own social system and a nonaligned foreign policy.

—We want to see self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread throughout Africa. As President Ford has recently made clear again, majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is the unequivocal commitment of the United States.

—We want to see the African continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict. We have our own interest in seeing that local conflicts there not be exploited and exacerbated by outside forces intervening for unilateral advantage.

A broader range of issues facing this country in the coming years has to do with the multilateral challenges of an era of increasing *global interdependence*.

There are many urgent and unprecedented issues that can be addressed only on a global basis and whose resolution will fundamentally shape the future of this planet. A central example is the Conference on the Law of the Sea, which resumes its work this week in New York. In this unprecedented negotiation, over 100 nations are seeking to write new rules of law governing the use of the world's oceans. The implications for international security, for the use of vast resources, for scientific research, and for the protection of the environment are vast. The United States will continue its work with others to assure that the oceans become an arena of global cooperation and enrichment rather than global conflict.

Also of great importance is the use of outer space, which presents us as well with the potential for conflict or the possibility of collaboration. We have the opportunity to substitute international law for power competition in the formative stage of an important international activity.

The modern age has not only given us the benefits of technology; it has also spawned the plagues of aircraft hijacking, interna-

tional terrorism, and new techniques of warfare. The international community must stand together against these affronts to mankind. The United States has promoted and must continue to promote the strengthening of international organizations and international law to deal with these issues.

Compassion for our fellow man requires that we mobilize international resources to combat the age-old scourges of disease, famine, and natural disaster. And concern for basic human rights calls upon the international community to oppose violations to individual dignity wherever and by whomever they are practiced. The practice of torture must be discredited and banished. Human rights must be cherished and promoted regardless of race, sex, religion, or political belief.

We must extend the scope and reach of international institutions for cooperation. The United Nations, an organization in which the American people have invested great hopes, must be a mechanism of practical collaboration instead of an arena of rhetorical confrontation if it is to fulfill the mission of its charter and its responsibilities for peace in the modern era. Procedural abuses and one-sided resolutions cannot be accepted. The value of this organization, if properly used, remains considerable—in peacekeeping, dispute settlement, and promoting cooperation for economic development and health and scores of other endeavors.

Only through a pattern of international cooperation can all these problems be successfully addressed. And only in a structure of global peace can the insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, be eased, and habits of compromise and accommodation be nurtured. Social progress, justice, and human rights can thrive only in an atmosphere of stability and reduced international tension.

Our Debate at Home

This, then, is the design of our foreign policy:

—To promote, together with our allies, the

strength and ideals of freedom and democracy in a turbulent world;

—To master the traditional challenges of peace and war, to maintain an equilibrium of strength, but to go beyond balance to a more positive future; and

—To shape a long-term relationship of mutual benefit with the developing countries and to turn all the issues of interdependence into the cement of a new global community.

These are the challenges of our third century.

Since this nation was born in struggle 200 years ago, Americans have never shrunk from challenge. We have never regarded the problems we face as cause for pessimism or despair. On the contrary, America's traditional spirit and optimism have always given millions around the world the hope that the complex issues of today can and will be solved. The world knows full well that no solutions are possible without the active participation and commitment of a united American people. To describe the complex and long-term tasks we face is therefore the greatest expression of confidence in America.

We remain the world's greatest democracy; we are the engine of the global economy; we have been for 30 years the bulwark of the balance of power and the beacon of freedom. The physical strength, the organizational skill, the creative genius of this country make us—as we have always been since our Revolution—the hope of mankind.

What we face today is not a test of our physical strength, which is unparalleled, but a qualitative challenge unlike anything we have ever faced before. It is a challenge to our will and courage and sense of responsibility. We are tested to show whether we understand what a world of complexity and ambiguity requires of us. It is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of increasing chaos and danger. If it is realized, we shall have begun an era of greater peace and progress and justice.

A heavy responsibility lies with us here in Washington. The Congress and the execu-

tive owe the American people an end to the divisions of the past decade. The divisive issues are no longer with us. The tasks ahead of us are not partisan or ideological issues; they are great tasks for America in a new century, in a new world that, more than ever, impinges upon our lives and cries out for our leadership. Even more than our resources, the creative vitality of this nation has been a tremendous force for good and continues to be so.

We can accomplish great things—but we can do so only as a united people. Beyond all the special concerns and special interests lies the national interest. Congress and the executive, Republicans and Democrats, have a common stake in the effectiveness and success of American foreign policy. Most of the major initiatives this government has taken on fundamental issues—with our allies, with the People's Republic of China, with the Soviet Union, with the developing nations, in the Middle East—have had broad and deep support in the Congress and in the country.

Therefore, just as we have the capacity to build a more durable international structure, so we have the capacity and opportunity to rebuild the consensus among the executive and legislative branches and among our people that will give new impetus to our responsible leadership in the world in our third century. This is the deepest desire of the President and the strongest commitment of all his Administration.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I hope that this discussion of what we see as the issues of the future will be helpful in the building of such a consensus. The issues are complex; the degree of public understanding required to deal with them is higher than at any time in our historical experience. And even if we can reach a consensus on objectives and priorities, our resources and options are limited and we cannot hope always to prevail or to be right.

These hearings are a wise and welcome step in promoting the understanding and consensus that are required. Our gift as a people is problem-solving and harnessing the capacities of widely diverse groups of people

in large-scale common endeavor. This is exactly what is required of us, both in building a new international structure and in developing the public support needed to sustain our participation in it over the long term.

In the last analysis, we must come together because the world needs us, because the horizons that beckon us in the decades to come are as near, or as far, as we have the courage to seek them.

Department Discusses Issues in Southern Africa

*Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss southern African issues with you today. In the wake of the Angolan experience, I think it is generally accepted that the pace of events in the region has recently quickened. The demand for change has been intensified because of the failure so far to reach a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, frustration over lack of real progress toward self-determination in Namibia, and the lack of significant change in the practice of apartheid in South Africa. The objectives of self-determination and majority rule are just as valid as they ever were, but the continued recalcitrance of minority regimes has made their realization more complicated, more likely to be achieved by violence. We must identify ways in which we can help the peoples of southern Africa attain their rightful places among the nations of the world.

I would like to give you a brief description of the present situation, as we see it, in southern Africa and then an outline of present U.S. policy.

The situation in southern Africa today presents the prospect for both progress and

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 19. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

disaster. The isolation of the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia has been dramatized by Mozambique's imposition of economic sanctions. The reports of increased guerrilla activity on the border between those two countries makes the need for settlement more urgent than ever. As for the other side of the continent, a new Security Council resolution passed in January calling again for an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia only serves to emphasize, if that is necessary, the painfully slow process of self-determination there. Guerrilla movements in both areas continue to build their arsenals and the regimes concerned continue strongly to resist just and constructive change.

I would not say there is no progress toward a peaceful resolution of the three great issues in southern Africa. What positive aspects we do see, however, are few. The talks between the African National Council and the Smith regime continue, although some have given up hope for success. In Namibia the constitutional conference sponsored by the illegal South African administration seems to be making some progress toward breaking down some apartheid practices in the territory.

We still have hope for a peaceful resolution in Rhodesia and that South Africa will make a strenuous effort to comply with the Security Council resolution on Namibia before the August 31 deadline.

Overall U.S. policy toward southern Africa is based on several considerations:

—An unequivocal support for majority rule;

—An equally firm condemnation of those governments which perpetuate the political and economic inequality on the basis of race;

—A strong preference for a peaceful realization of self-determination and majority rule; and

—The determination that the area should not become the arena for superpower rivalries.

Wednesday of this week we joined the Security Council in unanimous passage of a resolution of support—moral and material—