6/7/78 Annapolis Speech [2]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 6/7/78 Annapolis Speech [2]; Container 79

To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/libraryfindingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM OF DOCUMENT</th>
<th>CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech Draft</td>
<td>Speech Draft, 30 pp.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memo</td>
<td>Brzezinski to Pres. Carter, 1 pp., re: Speech topics</td>
<td>6/2/78</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Drafts</td>
<td>Speech Draft, 5 pp.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers-Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.-Presidential

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 1429 (8-86)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

June 2, 1978

I believe the speech should outline certain fundamental propositions regarding the relationship -- and not focus much on current policy issues, be they SALT, human rights, or Africa. The public -- and the world -- need to be reminded that what is involved is "a long haul" policy -- not a series of either quick fixes or dramatic shifts. Your statement on the "fundamentals" would thus provide the framework for your specific policies, and reassure all concerned that the United States has a clear sense of direction.

Anything you say will be scanned most carefully for "soft" or "hard" signals, and this makes it all the more important that the tone be consistent with your own sense of measured determination. The press will be only too eager to find evidence of a new turn.

As I see it, the central difficulty we confront -- one truly vital to our national future -- is the Soviet inclination to exploit global turbulence for shortsighted gains, while engaging in a massive military buildup which increasingly gives it additional political leverage. This challenge must be confronted in a responsible way, which is neither alarmist nor escapist.

Accordingly, I attach two items:

1. Some suggested language;

2. Some conclusions from a recent NIE dealing with growing Soviet capabilities, and their political implications.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
PER 9/11/93

BY NARS DATE 11/3/93
Some suggested language

Today, I would like to speak briefly about a relationship that is central to world peace -- the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is important that the American public, indeed the world at large, understand the sensitive and complex nature of that relationship; that all of us see it in a wider historical perspective; and that our and Soviet conduct contribute to global stability and gradual accommodation.

The American-Soviet relationship is often described by the word detente. But we and the Soviets need to understand clearly what is behind that single word. Otherwise, we run the risk of seemingly agreeing while in fact pursuing contradictory and even conflicting policies. Recent events demonstrate that danger quite vividly.

Let me, therefore, put before you several basic propositions regarding our relations with the Soviet Union that guide me as I direct our national policy:

First, I believe that detente to be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be able to genuinely widen the scope of accommodation must be truly reciprocal and comprehensive.
This means, very simply, that both sides must be guided by the same code of conduct; that each side must exercise restraint in troubled areas and turbulent times and in their military builds; that both sides observe commitments recently undertaken to widen cooperation, freedom of movement, and respect for basic human rights.

Secondly, we as a nation must also be aware that for deeply rooted historical reasons, our relations with the Soviet Union will remain for a long time to come both competitive and cooperative. Our histories, systems, and ideas are different. We can live -- we must live -- with these differences. But they do cause conflicting aspirations and ambitions.

The American people must, therefore, be prepared for the long haul. It will take time to moderate Soviet ambitions -- both ideological and historical. The competition will go on for a long time, and we must be prepared to compete persistently and patiently. We must avoid extreme swings in our public mood from euphoria -- whenever we succeed in increasing the margins of cooperation -- to hostility -- whenever the competitive elements become more marked.

Thirdly, we must be aware that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is complicated by the very nature of global change.
The world is today undergoing the most profound transformation in its history. That is a complex and turbulent process. It reflects the sudden political awakening of man, and it is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers.

The United States wishes to promote a more just international system. This is why we are so actively seeking to mediate conflicts in Africa, in the Middle East, and in other parts of the world. This is why we are ready to seek ways to reform the international system.

At issue here is the Soviet approach. Frequently the Soviet Union has not been constructive in its response to this global change. Too often it has sought to undermine moderation and to promote violent solutions — either directly or through military proxies. This is why detente today appears strained. This is why we have to voice our concerns.

Fourthly, our long-term objective must be to moderate this pattern of behavior, to convince the Soviets of the long-term advantages of cooperation, and of the costs of unilateral and tactically shortsighted behavior. The hard and unpleasant reality is that the Soviet Union has in recent years engaged in a sustained effort resulting in a massive military buildup, beyond any obvious defense needs — and that it is beginning to employ its military leverage more directly for political purposes. Through our own
defense efforts, through our own political response we must seek -- and we will -- to disabuse the Soviet Union of any notion that military supremacy is attainable or exploitable.

We seek a world of peace without victory for either side; Soviet conduct gives rise to concern that its goal is victory without war. What we both must understand is that only a world of diversity -- social, political, and ideological -- can be a world of genuine cooperation among so many nations and cultures. Our principal concern is how to shape a world which is more responsive to mankind's desire for social justice, for political self-determination, and for basic human rights. It is to this central goal that my Administration is dedicated.

This brings me to my fifth and last fundamental: our role in the world. We can be confident about the future if we are resolute in our conduct. Our military strength, our economic potential, our scientific and intellectual creativity have no peer. The world also is more responsive to our preference for pluralism over hegemony. We must, therefore, remain constructively engaged in seeking to widen our cooperation with the new forces in the world -- countries that I have recently visited -- as well as many others, including notably the People's Republic of China. Our objective is not domination but cooperation, and the Soviet Union should not see that objective as directed at itself.
Our role in the world is to create a framework for international cooperation which transcends ideological or racial or cultural divisions in a world that cannot be shaped on the basis of a single model. This country is prepared to cooperate with all the nations, irrespective of their systems or ideologies, and we are particularly dedicated towards the attainment of genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world where these goals are yet to be attained. America has always stood for change, and it continues to stand for peaceful change in a world that is undergoing a deeper and more rapid change than at any point in its collective history.

It is in that context that we will continue to seek a stable, reciprocal, and comprehensive detente with the Soviet Union. We will negotiate constructively and persistently for a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement. We believe such an agreement is in our mutual interest. We do not impose other conditions on it, but we cannot ignore also the fact that tensions and conflicts in our relationship are found to complicate our quest for the agreement. This is not a matter of preference but of fact.

We will continue to urge restraint in areas of tension, and we will cooperate with the countries concerned to maintain international peace. We will increase, if necessary, our defenses to match the challenge that is being imposed on us. Above all, we will remain constant.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JERRY DOOLITTLE, RICK HERTZBERG

SUBJECT: Annapolis Speech

In the absence of the Brzezinski, Turner and Brown recommendations, we have put together the attached largely on the basis of Secretary Vance's memo. It is not a formal outline, but rather what seemed like a logical sequence of thoughts to follow in framing the speech. Each would be expanded upon, and strengthened with specific examples. Rick will be standing by Sunday afternoon on your return.
SUGGESTED OUTLINE FOR ANNAPOLIS SPEECH

1. Annapolis graduates are about to take up their role as officers in the defense establishment of what is, without doubt, the strongest nation in the world.

2. It is important for them to understand the nature of that strength -- both in the military sense and the non-military sense.

3. Part of the legacy of the last ten years -- and especially of the frustrations of the Vietnam experience -- is a feeling shared by many Americans that America has grown weak. This feeling is largely the result of psychological factors. The reality is that America is enormously strong.

4. Our military strength is at its peak. (Here would follow a fairly graphic description of American military might, both nuclear and conventional.)

5. Militarily, the Soviet Union is also strong. Although our nuclear arsenal is in many ways superior to theirs, the two are, in a practical sense, equal, in that either country could devastate the other in a nuclear exchange. The Soviet Union has built up its conventional forces as well -- a fact that our military planning, and NATO's, takes into account. But it should be remembered that the Soviets' military strength comes at the expense of other aspects of national strength. In the Soviet Union, resources are heavily concentrated in the military area, leaving them thin elsewhere. We are responding, in a measured way, to this Soviet buildup. There is no reason to fear that we cannot more than hold our own.

6. What is too often lost sight of is that American strength is across the board. In terms of economic, agricultural, political, and cultural health, we are unparalleled -- and these strengths contribute greatly to our national security.

7. Our relationship with the Soviet Union is highly complex. Because of the divergences in our values, we have been in competition with them, and this will continue. But because both countries share a life-or-death interest
in preventing nuclear war or any large-scale confrontation, there have been and will be important areas of cooperation. At any given time, the relationship will reflect both aspects.

8. A SALT agreement would be advantageous to both sides (and indeed to the entire human race), and we will vigorously pursue it. In the absence of such an agreement, an escalated nuclear arms race would result. There is no question about our ability to equal or surpass the Soviets in such a race, or about our will to do so. But we must recognize that such a race would not enhance the security of either side. On the other hand, an agreement would enhance the security not only of our own country, but of the entire world. It would maintain the strategic balance, while lessening tensions and the danger of war, and it would free resources for other military and non-military purposes. Therefore, we will pursue SALT regardless of other irritants in Soviet-American relations.

9. However, this is not to say that we will ignore Soviet adventurism and misbehavior, or that we will fail to respond to it. Our responses will be precise. They will be directly related to the provocation in question. They will be taken with a view to which aspects of Soviet behavior can be changed, and which cannot. These responses include: [list of types of responses].

10. We cannot entirely eliminate the competitive aspects of the relationship. To insist that detente be perfect is to ensure that competition in any area will prejudice the possibility of progress in other areas. But we will oppose military adventures which worsen conflicts, go beyond reasonable defensive efforts, or provoke bloodshed in order to gain political advantage.

11. One of the few inherent "advantages" the Soviets have is that they can pursue foreign policy without regard to domestic public opinion. This is because their system contains no mechanisms whereby public opinion can effect policy, and because state control of all organs of information makes it easy for public opinion to be manipulated regardless of the facts. We neither have nor want that "advantage." Indeed, one of the greatest strengths of our system is that public policy must have the weight of public opinion behind it.

12. But this means that other countries must understand that American foreign policy is not made solely by a few officials at the top, but by a process that includes Congress and the people. The Soviets, in particular, must bear in mind the effect of their actions on American
public opinion. This is not linkage in the sense that this Administration will draw away from a SALT agreement because of Soviet actions in other areas. It is merely a reminder of American political reality.

13. We should not be surprised that the Soviets are trying to expand their influence in the Third World. In responding to those efforts, we must avoid two traps: the trap of imagining that we must not respond at all, and the trap of responding in an imprecise or overly general way. The first would needlessly aid the Soviets in their expansionist fantasies; the second would needlessly rule out agreements that are in our national interest.

14. The path we have chosen instead is to strengthen our friends, so that they will be less vulnerable to Russian influence. Southern Africa is an example, as is Zaire and other countries of Western Africa. The sale of defensive arms to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is another. More and more nonaligned states are coming to share our views about Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. We are confident that these activities will come to be seen increasingly for what they are -- affronts to national pride and the independence of the new nations.

15. Finally, in the long run, we are confident that the strengths of our economy, cultural life, technology, and political freedom will not only ensure our own safety and security, in tandem with a judicious strengthening of our military power, but will also increasingly come to serve as a model for nations seeking the best path to development and a fulfilling life for their people.

#  #  #
It's good to be back.

I stand before you this morning as living proof of something I heard the day I graduated from the Naval Academy, back in June of 1946. The speaker that day was Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, then the Chief of Naval Operations. He told us that our standing in the class precedence list would not necessarily affect our chances of future advancement to the highest echelons of command.
Unlike my friend Stan Turner, I have found that to be perfectly true.

The point Admiral Nimitz was making is that your superior officers will pay more attention to your performance of duty than to your position on the list. He quoted a former anchor man as saying to him, "It takes more real ability to stand anchor than it does first, for if you miss first you come out second, but if you miss anchor you come out a civilian."

I missed both first and anchor, but, after some delay, I came out a civilian anyway.

I reluctantly left the Navy after seven years of service as an officer. Nevertheless, I found that the Academy was excellent training for the career I eventually did choose.
As a Plebe, I learned how to move fast under conditions of little sleep and highly irregular meals. I also learned how to give a speech even if I didn't happen to feel like it, and how to bear up under unrelenting criticism. These skills turned out to be very useful to me when I became a Presidential candidate.

When I achieved the glorious status of an upper-classman, I learned that you shouldn't get too puffed up by the deference you receive from those who may be below you in the chain of command. It's usually more a function of the position than of your personal qualities. When I became President, this knowledge made it easier for me to dispense with some of the pomp and ceremony of the office.

In general, I have found the world to be a much less orderly and predictable place than the Naval Academy. Still, the two do have a few things
in common. As Midshipmen Will and McAlpine* are 
learning -- and as Walter Cronkite and I have known
for years -- the anchor man may not get quite as many
honors as the man at the top, but the pay is considerably
better.

But in all seriousness, I congratulate the men
of the class of '78, from top to bottom. I know how
proud you feel today, and how proud your families are.
Your education has just begun, but it will rest on the
firm foundation you have built here. And you have laid
the groundwork for a career that can be as rewarding
and challenging as any in the world.

As officers in the modern Navy, you will be
actors in a worldwide political and military drama.
You will be called upon not only to master the
technicalities of military science and leadership, but

* Midshipman Jonathan E. Will is first in the class of '78; Midshipman William F. McAlpine is anchor.
also to have a sensitive understanding of the international context in which the Navy operates.

I would like this morning to talk to you about one of the most important aspects of that international context -- the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States and Soviet Union.

That relationship is central to world peace. It is important for the world, for the American public, and for you as future leaders of the Navy to understand its complex and sensitive nature.
The relationship between the world's two greatest powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- is central to world peace. It is important that that world, the American public, and you as future leaders of the Navy understand the complex and sensitive nature of this relationship.

The world "detente" is often used, and it is different things to different people. It is important necessary to comprehend some of the meanings of this for us to be clear about what we mean by this word. Detente, to be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of cooperation, must be truly reciprocal, and not selective. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in turbulent times. We must honor meticulously agreements which have been reached
to widen cooperation and mutual restraint in arms
limitation, freedom of movement of people, the expression
of ideas, and the protection of human rights.

We must realize that, for a very long time, our
relationship with the Soviet Union will be both cooperative
and competitive. Instead of destructive and potentially
disastrous, our relationship must be cooperative as well.

Our social and political systems, our histories,
our ideas and aspirations are different, and we must
and must continue to live with those differences.

But we must recognize that these differences
create conflicting national ambitions
and policies.

We must be prepared to deal with these differences
persistently and patiently for many years, and to avoid
extreme swings in our public mood, from euphoria and an
exaggerated sense of compatibility on the one hand to
despair and hostility on the other.
The world is today undergoing the most rapid and profound transformation in its history -- an inherently complex and turbulent process which tends to exacerbate the innate differences between the Soviet Union and our country.

The awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers. How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in achieving lasting world peace.

Our long term objective must be to convince the Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.
Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained or politically exploited.

But a world of peace must be one that permits diversity -- social, political and ideological -- since we believe that only such a world can be a world of genuine cooperation among many nations and cultures.

Our principal concern is how to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire for economic well-being and social justice, political self-determination, peace, and basic human rights.

We can be confident about the future if we are consistent and resolute in our conduct.
We desire to dominate no one. We will remain constructively engaged in widening our cooperation with the positive new forces in the world.

We want to increase our friendship, not only with the Soviet Union but also with the emerging nations, with the countries in Eastern Europe, and with the People's Republic of China. We are prepared to cooperate with all nations, regardless of their systems or ideologies. We are particularly dedicated to the attainment of genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world where these goals are yet to be attained, but we do not seek to further those goals by outside force of arms.

We are eager to effect peaceful change, and in this context we will continue to seek a stable, and reciprocal, detente with the Soviet Union.
We will negotiate constructively and persistently for a fair Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. We have no desire to link this negotiation with other competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we cannot pretend that tensions and sharp conflicts in our mutual relationship brought about by threats to peace will not complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of the fact.

We will always urge restraint in areas of tension, and support multinational or regional organizations dedicated to peace, and we will increase as necessary, our defenses
to match any challenge which confronts us or our allies.

Above all, we will remain constant in our commitment to
the principles which have insured the greatness of our
nation.

A strong defense is crucial because it provides
us not only safety but a position from which to
negotiate for improved relations and for a mutually
lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Both our Allies and our potential adversaries
must see our strength and be sure of our national will.

I am convinced that the Soviets do not want war.

The United States and the Soviet Union were
Their were our allies in the Second World War.

and they suffered the terrible consequences of that
massive conflict with the loss of 20 million Soviet lives.

Millions more recall the horror and the hunger
of that time.

I cannot believe that their
leaders could want war.
One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and other Soviet ports in support of our joint effort to meet the Nazi threat.

At the end of that war there were already strong political differences between our two countries. The Soviets did not disarm as we did. Our monopoly on nuclear military strength, over many of the nations liberated during the war, we sought to hold. Political rivalry, by advantage was overcome early in this decade. We now maintain roughly equivalent nuclear strength and have continued to seek mutual accommodation with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint...
A subject is under active review.

1945, and long after that, when we had
a superpower nuclear weapon, until
we led a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and
then to end the arms race—ever since
we found a thing they’ve called a
which will perhaps never have

skills they’ll use to provide for their

soldiers that’s worthwhile. He sense
scientific explorations in space, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Armaments, the limited test ban agreement,
and trade agreements. We now maintain mutual nuclear
strength because we believe that, in the absence of worldwide nuclear
deterrence, such equivalency is the least threatening, least
Efforts continue now with negotiations toward a
SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions
in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the
prohibition of attacks on satellites, an agreement to
stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian
Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural
exchange.

INSERT A

(insert paragraph from
Brzezinski on why these
efforts are important and
worthwhile)
SUGGESTED INSERT TO PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH; after paragraph 24

We must be prepared and willing to explore these and other avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction. The world has lived uncomfortably for almost thirty-three years with the existence of nuclear weapons. We have little real understanding of the impact of these weapons on the political process in peace or their application to combat in war. Their numbers and destructive potential have been increasing at an alarming rate. Only SALT or some other limitation agreement seems to hold any prospect for ending this dangerous and unpredictable spiral. Our position of leadership in the world demands that we take the initiative to bring this particular arms race under control.

Beyond this, improved trade, technological exchange and cultural interplay are among many immediate and positive benefits of cooperation. Even though we may benefit least, we have an obligation to act on our fundamental conviction that improving the well being and quality of life for all mankind can only promote peace and harmony. That again is the responsibility of leadership.
These efforts to cooperate do not

There are, however, significant differences

between us and the Soviet Union caused by conflicting

ideologies, domestic attitudes, and aspirations for the future. These differences must be clearly understood

by the American people because such understanding provides a base on which we will build our political and military policy.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing struggle for advantage and influence by a variety of means.

However, the Soviets apparently see proxy military and power military action or military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad.
Obviously, areas of instability provide a focus for their effort, and they always seem to be ready and willing to take advantage of any such opportunity.

As was obvious in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia, they prefer to use proxy forces to fight their battles.

To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive -- far beyond any legitimate requirements for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than fifteen years they have maintained a strong commitment to this program of military growth, investing as much as 13% of their gross national product in military expenditures. They now have a massive military capability and this sustained growth continues.

Their gross abuse of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached at
The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society. Opposition, and the free movement of peoples challenge their system in many ways—and they often react to these challenges with oppressive force.

Some of these characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves. Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated.
Many non-aligned countries are becoming concerned that their movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic sustenance and for political and military guidance and direction.

Outside the tightly controlled bloc, the Soviets have little political compatibility with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed.

Although the Soviets have the second largest economic system in the world, the rate of growth of this system has reached a very low level, and their standard of living does not compare favorably with that within other nations of equivalent development.

Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of
average or adverse crop growing conditions they must
turn to us or to other nations for food supplies.

We need not, therefore, be overly concerned
about our ability to compete and to outperform the
Soviets. There is certainly no cause for alarm.

- INSERT B -

Our military capability is second to none on
earth; our industrial base and productivity are
unmatched in the world; our technological capacity
is superior to all others; our alliances with other
free nations are strong and growing stronger. We
are surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas.

Our political structure is stable and cohesive, and our
government policy is bi-partisan and continuous.

Americans are pragmatists, and we approach our problems
calmly, with common sense and confidence. Our
We are also strong because of what we stand for as a nation: The realistic chance for every individual to build a better life; freedom from arbitrary exercise of government power; the right of every individual to speak freely, to participate fully, and to share political power.

These incandescent principles remain the most powerful ideas in the world. They make us strong. And they help make our foreign policy strong.

Our work for human rights makes us part of an international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being a part of it.

America will remain strong in the world as long as our foreign policies are true to the principles of our people.
philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic way of life warrants admiration and emulation by other people. The political trends seem to be good. (For the first time, all the member nations of NATO are democracies.)

One of our goals which is being accomplished is to expand our circle of friends among other nations in Africa, the Mid East, Latin America, Asia and Europe. We do not recognize the hegemony of any nation within these regions.

Because of our military and political strength, we are in a unique position to help move the world toward peace. Our enormous economic strength is also a major potential influence for the benefit of others. Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine nations in the European Economic Community, and
is more than twice as great as that of the Soviet Union. Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

We know that neither can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which would destroy the societal structure of the original attacking power.

Although the Soviets have more missile launchers and greater throw-weight, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better submarines and
anti-submarine warfare capability.

The fact is that, with essential nuclear equivalence, the conventional military forces have an increasing importance. The capability of ourselves and our allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

A successful SALT agreement, which we are working to achieve without delay, will leave us with equal but lower numbers of missile launchers and missiles with multiple warheads. We envision in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction.

It is likely that each side tends to exaggerate the relative military capability of the other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.
False or excessive estimates or reports of Soviet strength or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

For example, recent news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy. When small coastal vessels are included in the totals, the statistics appear to show a Soviet advantage in number of ships, but the fact is that in major seagoing warships the United States enjoys a ______ numerical advantage and _____ in total tonnage of warships. In design, technology, engineering, quietness and easy access to the open seas we fare even better.
Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. It would be a mistake for anyone to confuse healthy self-criticism and free debate which are essential in a democracy with confusion, weakness or despair.

What future developments might we expect from existing American policy toward the Soviet Union? We will maintain a sustained real growth with a prudent increase in military spending, keyed to NATO and mobile forces and an undiminished presence in the Pacific. We and our Allies must and will be able to meet any foreseeable challenge to our security from strategic nuclear forces or from conventional forces. America has the capability and will to honor this commitment without excessive sacrifice by the people of our country, and we will have the will to do it.
Looking beyond our alliances, we will try to strengthen worldwide and regional organizations dedicated to enhancing international harmony, such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

We will honor the legitimate desire of people and nations for peace, independence, majority rule, equality of opportunity, basic human rights, and the honoring of recognized national boundaries. We will provide aid bilaterally and through multinational organizations to further the realization of these hopes.

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not having this capability.
Let me summarize briefly the objectives of our African policy. We, like our African friends, want to see an Africa that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty, hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work towards these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and African aspirations.

The growing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this African vision. We cannot object when African nations call for help in the defense of their borders. We are cooperating in the answer to such a call from Zaire. But we can and do object when such actions seem devoted less to finding peace than to fanning the flames of conflict.

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing the works of peace rather than the weapons of war in their assistance to Africa. Let the Soviet Union join us in seeking a peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Eritrea and Angola. Let us all work not to divide and seek domination in Africa, but to help Africa find the fulfillment of its great potential.
We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.

With our economic, military and political strength we will attempt to convince the Soviet Union that a peaceful route into the future is best for us all. [Sustained world peace can be our greatest joint achievement.]

#  #  #  #

Just as we were able to join together, despite our differences, to fight Fascism during World War II, I hope we will be able to join together now, despite our differences, to forge a sustained peace in the world, for the benefit of all the world’s people.
May 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM FALLOWS

Enclosed in outline form are Secretary Brown's suggestions for the President's address at the Naval Academy.

John G. Kester
The Special Assistant

Enclosure
Outline of
Presidential Address
at
U.S. Naval Academy

I. U.S. position in the world--strengths

A. Strong economically
B. Political cohesion
C. Military strength
D. Prosperous, talented people
E. Opportunity for each person to use talents to fullest
F. Leader of the free world
G. Champion of human rights

II. Role of military forces

A. Remember that national security does not rest on military forces alone--yet they are a sine qua non.
B. Soviets have steadily built up their military forces, while we have not; now we need to do so, too.
C. Strategic forces--we insist on rough equivalence, to ensure there will be no temptation for Soviets to start nuclear war.
D. Conventional forces--are even more important in a time of rough nuclear parity. Conventional forces become the lever by which power is exercised.
E. National security, including military security, is and will always be the overriding priority. We will make whatever adjustments are necessary, and whatever sacrifices are required, to assure adequate military forces.

III. Political-military situation

A. We are not pulling back anywhere in the world. Will keep all our commitments.
B. Of course, will not keep forces stationed where allies can adequately protect themselves--e.g., Korea. But add forces where needed--e.g., have increased forces in Europe.
C. Our diplomacy is aimed at enhancing world cooperation. Our military forces are planned to be strong enough so that they will not have to be used.
D. Working as an alliance in NATO--comments on NATO Summit.

IV. Managing our defense

A. We will spend what is necessary in order to assure adequate military forces.

B. However, to spend too much on defense (or on the domestic side of the federal government) would actually weaken our country.

C. Given that resources are not unlimited, we need to spend our defense dollars in the way that produces the greatest military capability.

1. This means eliminating wasteful operations, closing unnecessary or duplicative bases. Have just sent a list of base closure candidates to the Congress.

2. This means buying supplies and equipment from the most efficient producer.

3. This means that the defense budget cannot be used to support inefficient activities.

4. Otherwise, if we do not spend our defense dollars to get the most for the money, we will actually be reducing our military capability.

V. The future

A. Will do whatever we need to do to preserve our country's security in the world.

B. Commitment made by President in spring of 1977 to a 3% real growth in defense.

C. Will continue to work with our NATO allies to integrate our defenses. They also are pledged to 3% growth, and most are coming through.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICK HERTZBERG, JERRY DOOLITTLE, GRIFFIN SMITH

SUBJECT: Annapolis Commencement

Here are some additional suggestions for your Annapolis speech. They include:

1. Advice from Ambassador George Kennan cabled from Norway, where he is vacationing.

2. Advice from Stansfield Turner.

3. Advice from General George Brown.

4. A Woodrow Wilson quotation recommended by Tom Hughes which was delivered at Annapolis.

5. Advice from Gordon Rule, a former Navy analyst who was in the public eye several years ago for exposing cost overruns.
MEMORANDUM FOR: James Fallows, Chief Speech Writer
Office of the Press Secretary
to the President

SUBJECT: President's Remarks at the US Naval Academy

Attached are some thoughts on threats to our strengths which should be of direct concern to the graduates, yet convey a larger message to a broader audience. Specifically:

- Soviet military threat - the fact that this is their only real means of competing internationally today.

- The threat of assuming that military strength and a search for peace (detente, etc.) are antithetical.

- The threat of being complacent and failing to seize opportunities to negotiate toward a better world order.

- The threat of assuming somebody will think about these problems.

STANFIELD TURNER

Attachment
THREATS TO OUR STRENGTH

1. Military - Soviets rely on military strength as the single national strength which can be used to influence world events.

- Economic philosophy inadequate to sustain strong Soviet economic growth. Therefore not exportable as an influence.

- Soviet political philosophy no longer an attractive export to more independent developing nations.

- Therefore, if Soviets are to exert influence, it must be done with military which can be strengthened/increased as necessary.

Danger - Non-superpowers may perceive Soviet military advantage and submit to pressure tactics.

- USA may view military power as less utile - acquiesce to Soviets, permitting them to make the perception that they are the dominant military power a reality.

Your role - You help reduce that perception by the role you play in US military.

- Beyond that, no amount of hardware, manpower, or training will substitute for a conviction - recognized/perceived by others - that US intends to stand strong.
- You help do this also by what you say, do, believe.

2. Another threat: how we work toward a new order in the world without becoming lulled by the dream of that ideal.

e.g. Detente

- Makes military look less essential; gives great importance to peaceful negotiations, greater friendship. Military power seems inimical to these goals.

- But fact of Soviet actions demonstrates military preparedness indispensable even even while talking peace:

e.g. In Central Europe, Soviets have roughly
- twice as many tanks as NATO
- twice as many artillery pieces
- three times as many anti-tank weapons
- twice as many aircraft

Weapons building/preparedness/military strength do not conflict with ideals of negotiating toward peace.

- Cannot set aside the impetus of fear in negotiations - like SALT - without stimulating complacency
- There would be no reason to negotiate if each side did not perceive the other to be roughly equal in strength, or growing stronger - therefore something to be gained by negotiating.

- Consequently, we must remain strong even, and perhaps especially, when seeking peace.

3. Long range threat

- That because we grow complacent we will not seize the opportunity to negotiate.

- If we do not negotiate where will armament build-up go? Breeders? Plutonium? Proliferation?, etc.

- Too many risks not to find/make opportunities to forestall long term threats to US. To world.

Charge to Class:

Cannot assume others doing this thinking (this might be the ultimate threat)

- Not enough to learn the details of your profession
- Must contribute more
- Must think about broad issues - generate ideas - contribute those ideas.
- Begin now.
Suggestions from Ambassador George Kennan

1. The U.S. faces two orders of problems — those that come from the outside and arise from the actions of others — and those that come from the development of our own society. These two categories are not unconnected, but they must be viewed separately.

2. The most dangerous of the outside problems are again of two sides. First, those that arise from the major ideological conflict of our time, when taken against the background of the vast destructiveness and wide proliferation of nuclear weaponry. Unless carefully handled these, of course, present tremendous dangers. But there is no reason why these dangers need materialize. No one wants that kind of a war. Everyone realizes, in the marxist countries as elsewhere, that there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of such weapons. In the fact that people do realize this we have something solid to build on, and there is no reason to suppose that by a combination of adequate strength on our side, of quiet self-restraint in the use of that strength, of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of the patient persistent development of more hopeful alternatives, we cannot eventually lead international society out into a more stable and hopeful state of affairs.
3. The second category of external problems consists of those conflicts in other parts of the world in which the U.S. is not a major contestant even though it does in some instances have a limited interest. Outstanding, here, are those of the Middle East and Southern Africa. The U.S. cannot itself resolve these conflicts or impose solutions. This being the case, its own military forces ought not to be involved for anything other than peacekeeping or other incidental purposes. The U.S. can, however, use its other means of influence, which are considerable, to oppose those forces that seek sweeping and violent solutions and to encourage those that seek reasonable accommodation. Above all it can exert itself to assure that local conflicts do not grow into global ones. If these principles are followed there is no reason why these regional conflicts should become serious threats to American security.

4. Beyond this there are, of course, the great constructive possibilities of the economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges with other nations -- for which the U.S. is peculiarly fitted by the experience, traditions, and the natural inclinations of its people. We must see that these possibilities are not neglected through our preoccupation with the dangers that confront us.
5. As for the internal problems: some of the most serious of these are, of course, the economic and financial ones, which should be taken to include our dependence on others for sources of energy and industrial raw materials vital to the health of our economy. But to these must be added the peculiar spiritual and social problems that seem everywhere to accompany a condition of material plenty: permissiveness, crime, drugs, corruption, pornography. All these problems are connected and in a failure on our part to make headway against them there lie dangers no smaller than those that face us from outside. For no society can hope for protection from external dangers which cannot preserve the rigor, promise and competence of its own life at home.

6. Here too, there is no reason for defeatism or discouragement. The U.S. has faced greater problems than these and has coped successfully with them when it wanted to. It has the physical means, the analytical resources, the manpower and the know-how. Success implies a readiness of many people to subordinate personal and group interests to those of the community, local and regional as well as national. But those who do this will find their personal and group interests better served in this way, in the end, than by any and all efforts to promote them directly at the expense of the community as a whole.
7. In the long run America's external security and quality of its domestic life will be the true reflections of its view of itself -- of the standards to which it holds itself -- of the expectations it addresses to its own performance. If these are high enough there will be no question of the promise of its future.

#  #  #
Summary of Suggestions from General George Brown

1. You should re-emphasize your determination to maintain strategic nuclear equivalence. This brings up the importance of fleet ballistic missiles, which will make the sailors happy. They are a stable force, and are therefore the bulwark of deterrence.

2. You should also emphasize the importance of the F-14 Phoenix, which means a lot to those sailors. You have personal questions about it, but this is not the time to raise them.

3. In Presidential Decision 18, you mentioned the importance of "power projection" -- a phrase that means a lot to the Navy. It means that they can do what they do wherever they want to do it. Mentioning it will bring up questions about your policy of killing the carriers, but showing that you understand the concept would please them.

4. We are determined to move both on arms programs and on arms control -- and maintaining the balance and harmony between those will be a difficult task, the difficulty of which the military leaders have to understand fully.

#  #  #
Woodrow Wilson, address to the graduating class, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, June 5, 1914.

"The idea of America is to serve humanity, and everytime you let the Stars and Stripes free to the wind you ought to realize that that is in itself a message that you are on an errand which other navies have sometimes forgotten; not an errand of conquest, but an errand of service...You are not serving a government, gentlemen, you are serving a people. For we who for the time being constitute the Government are merely instruments for a little while in the hands of a great Nation which chooses whom it will to carry out its decrees and who invariably rejects the man who forgets the ideals which it intended him to serve...I want you to take these great engines of force out onto the seas like adventurers enlisted for the elevation of the spirit of the human race. For that is the only distinction that America has. Other nations have been strong, other nations have piled wealth as high as the sky, but they have come into disgrace because they used their force and their wealth for the oppression of mankind and their own aggrandizement. America will not bring glory to herself, but disgrace, by following the beaten paths of history...You are all going on the same errand, and I like to feel bound with you in one common organization for the glory of America. And her glory goes deeper than all the tinsel, goes deeper than the sound of guns and the clash of sabers; it goes down to the very foundation of those things that have made the spirit of men free and happy and content."
TO: Jim Fallows
FROM: RANDY JAYNE, AD/NSIA

Jim—
The attached comes from a controversial gentleman, but is by no means a "far-out" idea. FYI in your speech drafting choices.

Randy
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear President Carter:

I take the liberty of writing concerning your upcoming address to the graduating class of the Naval Academy scheduled for 7 June 1978.

I do so as a man who (i) entered the Navy in 1942 as a Junior Grade Lieutenant and was promoted through ranks to Captain while on active duty in 1945, and (ii) who, as a GS-17 civilian in the Navy, was awarded the Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 1971, the highest award the Navy can give a civilian. I am not a double dipper.

You have evidenced interest in "whistle blowers" in the Government service and I am particularly concerned about "whistle blowers" on the producer side of our Navy - not in the fleet - where the taxpayers' money is spent for fleet requirements.

"Whistle blowing" in the military services, Mr. President, is quite a different thing than in civilian agencies. The risks are far greater.

I very respectfully suggest that in your talk on 7 June 1978 to the midshipmen at Annapolis you address this subject as did a senior Admiral who retired not long ago as the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Vice Admiral William P. Mack. In his retirement address to the graduating class at the Academy, Admiral Mack stated:

"As I complete 42 years of service I would like to leave to the brigade of midshipmen a legacy of one idea which represents the distillation of that experience. * * * The one concept which dominates my mind is that of the necessity of listening to and protecting the existence of the dissenter - the person who does not necessarily agree with his commander, or with popularly held opinion, or with you. * * * The point is to begin at this early age to cultivate an open state of mind - to determine to hear all arguments and opinions, no matter how extreme they may seem, and above all to preserve and protect those who voice them."
In this connection, I quote that fine gentlemen, Congressman Bennett, Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services and a proven friend of the Navy (See page 1394 of 21 March 1974 hearings before the Seapower Subcommittee) as follows:

"So I don't know how you get at this. I think it is a problem. I think the problem being that a man who wants to be a real good man in the military knows that to a degree he has to be on the team. But somewhere along the line he should have the ability to dissent and not be kicked out of the stream of additional responsibility simply because he does not mirror the judgment of the people that he is supposed to mirror."

In my opinion, Mr. President, what is required is that an official "dissent channel" should be established on the producer side of the Navy to encourage, receive and consider dissents for all matters pertaining to the spending of the taxpayers' money. Today most officers are selling their project and a "dissent channel" is required to enable all the facts - good and not so good - to be illuminated to higher authority who have the important decisions to make. No such system exists today. Dissenters or "whistle blowers" in the Navy today are branded boat rockers, not team players, trouble makers, non-cooperative, etc.

Vice Admiral Mack's admonition "the necessity of listening to and protecting the existence of the dissenter" has particular significance on the producer side of the Navy, where officers are given important assignments on the beach - for which they are not prepared - involving the prudent spending of the taxpayers' money for fleet requirements, i.e., ships, planes, missiles, etc.

I have long advocated a course or courses at the Naval Academy to educate (there is a difference between training and educating) midshipmen in the business aspects of their future careers when they are assigned to positions of great importance on the beach, where they then must become executives vice Naval officers and where dissenting opinions become important. Such education is woefully lacking today for officers up to and including four-star Admirals, the majority of whose careers have been spent with the fleet and who have never been educated or prepared to deal properly and astutely with shipbuilding claims, contract types, overruns, buy-ins, constructive changes, etc.
Basically, these are Navy management problems and cannot – or rather should not – be dealt with via the "Aye, Aye, Sir" Navy Regs properly required in the fleet. They must, or at least should be intelligently considered, discussed and evaluated, from all points of view – including dissents – until the proper position is hammered out. (Admittedly, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "Questions are often decided, without being answered.")

Private industry welcomes dissent, divergent views, constructive criticism, etc. and Secretary of the Navy Claytor certainly must know this and should welcome a formalized dissent channel to help him manage the Navy.

Additionally, I suggest that if Secretary Claytor embraced such a dissent channel, it would be a clear indication that (i) he understood the real magnitude of the Navy's unhappy management position today and (ii) he was dedicated to putting the Navy's house in order as the OMB, the Secretary of Defense, and some members of the Congress have clearly indicated is a prerequisite to larger ship appropriations.

I suggest that if such a recognized dissent channel were established in the Navy – and perhaps other agencies of the Government – there would be much less need for "whistle blowers". Let them have their day, record their views and have them considered as Admiral Mack has recommended. Deny them that privilege – or right – and the Navy is simply asking for more "whistle blowers" and criticism of Navy management.

In summary, so far as potential "whistle blowers" are concerned, I urge we recognize that the majority of these people are highly motivated and rather than stress protection for them, we should recognize their function and provide legitimacy for that function via an official dissent channel.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, and I consider such a talk by you will not only inspire these young people but be of inestimable value to our Navy in the future.

Sincerely,

GORDON W. RULE

Copy to:
Mr. Edward R. Jayne
Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget
May 25, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE JAMES FALLOWS
CHIEF SPEECH WRITER TO THE PRESIDENT

Responding to your request, and as we discussed on the phone, General Jones has asked me to forward the enclosed material for possible use in the President's address at Annapolis. Secretary Brown will also be sending some ideas under separate cover.

Please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

John G. Kester
The Special Assistant

Enclosure

cc: SecDef
Gen Jones
In my own analysis of our society's health, I find reason for an enduring confidence in the political, economic, and military vitality of the United States. Fully recognizing the seriousness of the stresses on our political process that have occurred over the past decade, we must not overlook a fundamental fact: our system has absorbed the most punishing blows since the divisive War between the States over a century ago and has survived with our precious freedoms, vital institutions, and democratic processes intact. History shows us that few nations have been able to cope with such stresses without falling victim to repression, violent overthrow of governments, or even collapse of the society itself. The United States has shown once again that she has the two ingredients essential to the success of a political system: people who are devoted to their country and a strong and resilient Constitution—in the physical and the political sense. This combination is the bedrock of my confidence in the future of the American system.

Another source of confidence—and pride—springs from the many conversations I have had with leaders of other nations around the world. I have learned that, although others don't always agree with our policies and are often puzzled by the peculiar American capacity for self-criticism, the rest of the world genuinely looks up to the United States—and not just because of our power and our wealth. There still survives a widespread wonder at our "Noble Experiment" in
democratic government which so quickened the pulse of the world two centuries ago. For much of the world, particularly the newly emerging nations of the post-war era, the United States remains the beacon of individual freedom and human rights. As an American, I take great pride in that image of our form of government.

I also take pride in the growing maturity of our relationships with the rest of the world. We are steering a responsible middle course, avoiding the extremes of either Fortress America or World Policeman. We are actively seeking to strengthen the ties with our key Allies within the framework of a more cooperative world system. The United States has acknowledged the interdependence among nations and is learning to define its national interests in that broader perspective.

The Senate's ratification of the Panama Canal treaties and, more recently, their endorsement of the Middle East aircraft sale are two examples of an encouraging trend toward even greater statesmanship. Legislation has recently been introduced to alleviate some of the excessive restrictions on Executive action which were passed in the heat of the Vietnam backlash; I'm hopeful that this legislation will receive early consideration and approval in order to restore the flexibility a President needs to respond quickly to fast-breaking crises around the world.
Perhaps most important of all, Government policy both at home and abroad has become more deeply rooted in the moral values which have always been the wellspring of American greatness. We have announced to the world that our highest priority is to work toward the day when every individual has a fair chance to achieve a full measure of human potential. This is obviously not a task which can be accomplished by a single Administration, but it is a goal which can guide and sustain a great nation such as ours for generations to come. I am confident it will.

I am equally confident about the continued economic vitality of our nation. Ours is the largest, most diverse, and most advanced industrial engine in the world, powered by the genius of American technology, the wisdom of American management, and the productivity of American working men and women. American farmers and ranchers comprise only a small fraction of our population, yet, using the most modern agricultural and breeding techniques, produce enough food for every table in the country and have enough left over to sell to other, less bountiful nations. We have pledged to take the lead in helping to accelerate not only our own economic growth, but that of the free world, with particular attention to cooperative ventures with developing nations.

We believe the path to global prosperity begins with the recognition of a responsibility, shared by all nations, to
solve common problems. Unfortunately, despite the world's soaring progress in science, industry, culture, and communications, some nations still view resort to violence as a legitimate means of expanding influence and settling differences. Therefore, as the leader among free societies, the United States must continue to bear the burden of maintaining an unassailable defense posture which, in concert with the forces of our allies, can turn back any military threat to our collective security. We will bear this burden resolutely, striving all the while for comprehensive and reciprocal reductions in the arsenals of all nations.

The nation can be confident of its military Services. Over thirty years ago, I sat where you are now sitting, filled with pride that I was about to become an officer in the most professional, capable, and sophisticated armed force in the world. My pride is swelled a thousandfold to serve today as the Commander in Chief of that force, whose greatest distinction--now, as then--is the quality of its people.

All the way from the newest recruit I have seen in my travels to the senior military leadership whose judgments and counsel I rely on so heavily, I have been keenly impressed with the caliber of the U.S. men and women in uniform. Our country can justly be proud of the quality of young Americans who enter our armed forces. They make up the heart and soul of our nation's defenses.
You are about to enter a new life in an elite organization—elite not in the sense of being remote from the mainstream of your country's values, but elite precisely because such core values as integrity, dedication, patriotism, and self-sacrifice are living hallmarks of the military profession.

The weapon systems which form the bone and sinew of our nation's deterrent and combat capability are the best in the world, the legacy of America's technological superiority. Many of our older systems are being modernized and we are pledged, along with our NATO allies, to increase our defense spending annually in real terms to offset the disturbing growth in Soviet and Warsaw Pact offensive capability on land, at sea and in the air.

Equally important as we modernize our hardware, we are also modernizing our strategy and the concepts for employment of forces if we are compelled to use them to defend our global security interests.

Today, the military power of the United States is second to none and I can assure you that as long as I am your Commander in Chief, I will use every means at my disposal to insure that our armed forces will always have the resources necessary to carry out their assigned missions. I have complete confidence that our combination of the finest people, the best systems, and the highest readiness, will insure that neither we nor our allies will ever have to bend to force or the threat of force by another nation.
Overall, the tenor of my remarks has been deliberately upbeat, because I truly believe that this country's detractors and prophets of doom are wide of the mark. As citizens and future naval leaders, you should know that the values of the Constitution which you have sworn to uphold and defend are alive and well; that the economy is regaining its momentum and the "vital signs" are favorable; and that the American people respect and support the profession of which you are a part.

But I do not want to leave the impression that all is clear sailing ahead. Quite the contrary. In the years ahead, the United States faces some of the most severe threats in its history. The optimism I feel simply refutes those who believe the struggle is lost before it is begun. I believe that our political, economic, and military vitality are the keel, engine, and armor which will see us through the turbulent period ahead of us, but they must be used wisely or the Jeremiahs will fulfill their own prophecies.

From my vantage point, I see serious challenges to almost every aspect of our national purpose.

Domestically, we have to insure that we frame our collective view of national interest in the broader perspective of an interdependent world. Our dealings with our friends and neighbors in the world community would be based upon a realistic assessment of mutual interest and mutual benefit, not unilateral advantage to any party. The United States
will conclude no agreements which undermine our security or well being, but we can afford to be cooperative and forthcoming when the long term interests of all parties can be served.

The greatest international political challenge we face, of course, is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship. For as far into the future as I can see, this relationship will remain a mixture of cooperation and competition. The key to success in our policy of detente will be to promote the broadest possible pattern of cooperation while working to defuse the areas of dangerous competition.

However, the Soviet Union must not misjudge our resolve nor misread our patience. If we are to preserve the stability of our relationship and avoid perilous confrontations which neither side wants, it is not just the United States which must exercise restraint.

For many years, we have listened expectantly to Soviet words of peace and conciliation, but have seen only the lengthening shadow of Soviet offensive arms. We have noted with growing concern the tracks of Soviet armor and the footprints of Soviet proxies in the soil of nations on three continents. We believe that the fabric of detente is elastic, but not infinitely so. Keeping the fabric from being torn will continue to be a delicate diplomatic challenge and I fervently hope it will always remain in the realm of diplomacy.

Turning again to the field of economics, the problem which overshadows all others is the imminent crisis of energy.
The consequences of our dependence on foreign oil are bearing down on us with the certainty and stealth of a silent avalanche and we have not yet taken sufficient notice to make the difficult trek to safer ground. I am concerned about both the near- and long-term perils of inaction.

The immediate problem is economic; from foreign oil suppliers, we have cultivated a 100 million dollar a day "habit." This outpouring of the nation's wealth has fueled inflation at home and undermined confidence in the dollar abroad. Our financial difficulties are compounded by the physical vulnerability of distant sources and transportation routes.

Our ever-growing appetite for energy carries even greater risks for the longer term. Oil is a plentiful but finite resource and, as diminishing supplies begin to lag the voracious demand, prices will likely skyrocket and shortages may well trigger a divisive competition, even among allies.

Before that can be allowed to happen, we must make a number of painful but ultimately healing choices. The first is to act on the energy bill which I sent to the Congress last year and which is still languishing in Committee. Other hard decisions will follow, but unless we light that first candle while there is still time, future generations may literally curse the darkness.
Finally, I alluded earlier to the buildup of Soviet land, sea and air capability. As professional military people, this particular challenge is the one which concerns you most directly. It is a challenge which our nation must neither ignore nor overdramatize, but one whose momentum we must take seriously. Whether the growth of Soviet destructive potential is governed by sinister intent, an exaggerated sense of insecurity, or simple bureaucratic inertia we cannot know with certainty. We do know that this headlong buildup of nuclear and conventional forces is inconsistent with the principles of mutual restraint and equal security.

Our nation's response must be a blend of patient arms control negotiations and modern military capability to maintain the fact and the perception of an overall military balance. In our view, the world would be far safer with fewer weapons rather than more, but the restraint and the reductions must be reciprocal.

The United States will continue to negotiate in good faith toward comprehensive and reciprocate arms reductions and you young people, as future uniformed leaders, will inherit a heavy responsibility to insure we always negotiate from strength. It will be your task, shared with your comrades in the other Services, to fashion effective and affordable weapons and strategies whose main measure of success will be never having to employ them.
Just as I am confident in the political and economic vitality of the United States, I have boundless faith that our dedicated men and women in uniform are equal to the task.
I congratulate you members of the class of '78. Although your education has just begun, you have laid the foundation for a career that can be as rewarding and challenging as any in the world.

As officers in the modern Navy, you will be actors in a worldwide political and military drama. You will be called upon not only to master the technicalities of military science and leadership, but also to have a sensitive understanding of the international community in which the Navy operates.
This morning I would like to discuss one of the most important aspects of that international context — the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Detente between our two countries is central to world peace. It is important for the world, for the American public, and for you as future leaders of the Navy to understand its complex and sensitive nature.

The word "detente" has a different meaning to different people. It is simplistically defined as an easing of tension between nations. The word is, in practice, further defined as those nations evolve new means by which they can live together in peace.

To be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of
cooperation, detente must be truly reciprocal, and not selective. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in turbulent times. Both must honor meticulously those agreements which have already been reached to widen cooperation, mutually restrain nuclear arms production, permit the free movement of people and the expression of ideas, and to protect human right.

We must realize that, for a very long time, our relationship with the Soviet Union will be competitive. If that competition is to be constructive instead of destructive and potentially disastrous, then our relationship must be cooperative as well.

Our social and political systems, our histories, our ideas and aspirations are different, and we must and will continue to live with those differences.
But we must also recognize that those differences create conflicting national ambitions and policies.

We must be prepared to deal with these differences persistently and patiently for many years. We must avoid extreme swings in our public mood--from euphoria when things are going well, to despair when they are not; from an exaggerated sense of compatibility to excessive feelings of hostility.

The world is today completing one of the most rapid and profound transformations in its history -- an inherently complex and turbulent process which tends to exacerbate the dissimilarity between the Soviet Union and our country.
The awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers. How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in achieving lasting peace.

Our long-term objective must be to convince the Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained, or that any transient military advantage can be politically exploited.
Our principal goal is to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire of people everywhere for economic well-being, social justice, political self-determination, peace, and basic human rights.

We seek a world of peace. But a world at peace must be a world that permits diversity -- social, political and ideological. Only in such a world can there be genuine cooperation among many nations and cultures.

We Americans can be confident about the future if we are consistent and resolute in our conduct.

We desire to dominate no one. We will continue to widen our cooperation with the positive new forces in the world.

We want to increase our friendship with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with
the countries in Eastern Europe, and with the People's Republic of China. We are prepared to cooperate with all nations, regardless of their systems or ideologies. We are particularly dedicated to the attainment of genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world where these goals are yet to be attained.

We will always urge restraint in areas of tension, and support multinational or regional organizations dedicated to peace and we will maintain or increase our defenses as necessary to match any challenge which confronts us or our allies. Above all, we will remain constant in our commitment to the principles which have insured the greatness of our nation.
A strong defense is crucial because it provides not only safety but also a legitimate sense of security from which to negotiate for improved relations and for a mutually lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Both our Allies and our potential adversaries must know our strength and be sure of our national will.

I am convinced that the Soviets want peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the Second World War. One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and other Soviet
ports in support of our joint effort to meet the Nazi threat.

In the agony of that massive conflict, 20 million Soviet people died. Millions more still recall the horror and the hunger of that time.

I cannot believe that their leaders could want war.

At the end of World War II, the strong political differences that had long divided our two countries began to reassert themselves. The Soviets did not disarm as we did. They sought to hold political sway over many of the nations liberated during the war. We sought instead to free the people whose fate was in our hands so that they might determine their own
futures and choose their own political systems.

We invested massive sums in countries that had been
our friends and foes, so that they might recover
from the ravages of war.

Military might has never been the sole basis of
our national pride. Traditionally we have maintained
relatively small standing armies, expecting our
citizens to rally to our nation's defense whenever it
was threatened.

Modern warfare no longer makes it possible for
average citizens to defend their nation with the
same skills they use to defend their own families in
time of peace. Yet, while we maintain a strong defense,
we have remained willing to end the arms race — even
when we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, (until 1949).
and long after that, when we had a substantial nuclear advantage.

Our nation has continued to seek mutual accommodation with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space, trade agreements, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Armaments and the limited test ban agreement.

We will maintain equivalent nuclear strength because we believe that, in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament, such equivalency is the least threatening, most stable situation for the world.
Efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition of attacks on satellites, an agreement to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

We must be prepared and willing to explore these and other avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction. The world has lived uncomfortably for almost 33 years with the existence of nuclear weapons. We have no full comprehension of the impact of these weapons on the political process in peace or their application to combat in war.
Their numbers and destructive potential have been increasing at an alarming rate. That is why the negotiation of a SALT agreement which enhances the security of both nations is of fundamental importance.

We and the Soviets are negotiating in good faith because we both know that failure would precipitate a resumption of a massive nuclear arms race. The prospects for a SALT II agreement are good.

Beyond this, improved trade, technological exchange and cultural interplay are among many immediate and positive benefits of cooperation. Even though we may not gain a unilateral advantage, we have an obligation to promote peace and harmony for the world. That is the responsibility of leadership.
These efforts to cooperate do not, however, erase the significant differences between us and the Soviet Union in ideology, domestic attitudes, and aspirations for the future. These differences must be clearly understood by the American people because such understanding provides a base on which we will build our political and military policy.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence by a variety of means.

The Soviets apparently see military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad.
Obviously, areas of instability provide a focus for their effort, and they always seem to be ready and willing to exploit any such opportunity.

As became apparent in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia, they prefer to use proxy forces to fight their battles.

To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive -- far beyond any legitimate requirement for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than 15 years they have maintained this program of military growth, investing as much as 13 percent of their gross national product in armaments. They now have a superfluous capability to wage war, and this sustained growth continues.

Their gross abuse of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached
at Helsinki has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom.

The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society. Freely expressed ideas, notions of loyal opposition, and the free movement of peoples challenge their system in basic ways -- and they often react to these challenges with oppressive force.

Some of their characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves.

Outside their tightly controlled bloc, the Soviets have little political compatibility with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed.
Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated.

Many countries are becoming concerned that the non-aligned movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic sustenance and for political and military guidance and direction.

Although the Soviets have the second largest economic system in the world, the rate of growth of this system has reached a very low level, and their standard of living does not compare favorably with that of other nations with equivalent development.
Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of average of adverse crop-growing conditions they must turn to us or to other nations for food supplies.

This assessment shows that we need not be overly concerned about our ability to compete and to outperform the Soviets. There is certainly no cause for alarm.

Our military capability is second to none on earth; our industrial base and productivity are unmatched; our scientific and technological capability is superior to all others; our alliances with other free nations are strong and growing stronger. We are surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas. Our societal structure is stable and cohesive, and our foreign policy is bi-partisan and continuous.
Americans are pragmatists, and we approach our problems calmly, with common sense and confidence.

We are also strong because of what we stand for as a nation: The realistic chance for every individual to build a better life; protection by law and custom from arbitrary exercise of government power; the right of every individual to speak out, to participate fully in government -- to share political power.

Our philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic way of life warrants admiration and emulation by other people.

These incandescent principles remain the most powerful ideas in the world. They make us strong. And they help make our foreign policy strong.
Our work for human rights makes us part of an international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being a part of it.

America will remain strong in the world as long as our national policies are true to the principles of our people.

One of our successful efforts is to expand our circle of friends among other nations in Africa, the Mid East, Latin America, Asia and Europe.

Because of our political and moral strength, we are in a unique position to help move the world toward peace. Our growing economic strength is also a major potential influence for the benefit of others. Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine countries in the European Economic Community, and
is more than twice as great as that of the Soviet Union. Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

We know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear assault on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which could destroy the societal structure of the attacking power.

Although the Soviets have more missile launchers and greater throw-weight, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more bombers,
a more balanced nuclear force, better missile
submarines and anti-submarine warfare capability.

A successful SALT agreement will leave both
nations with equal but lower numbers of missile
launchers and missiles with multiple warheads. We
envision in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction
in nuclear weapons.

It is possible that each side tends to
exaggerate the relative military capability of the
other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis
for making decisions for the future.

The fact is that with essential nuclear equivalence,
relative conventional force strength has now become
more important. The military capability of the United
States and our Allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

False or excessive estimates of Soviet strength or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

For example, recent alarming news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy. When small coastal vessels are included in the totals, the statistics appear to show a Soviet advantage in number of ships, but the fact is that in major seagoing warships the United States enjoys a two to one numerical advantage and 50% more total tonnage of warships. In comparing design, technology, projections for the next ten years show that these comparisons will be maintained.
engineering, quietness and easy access to the open seas we fare even better.

Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. It would be a mistake for anyone to confuse the healthy self-criticism and free debate which are essential in a democracy with confusion, weakness or despair.

What future developments might we expect from existing American policy toward the Soviet Union?

We will maintain a prudent and a sustained military spending, keyed to NATO and mobile forces and an undiminished presence in the Pacific. We and our Allies must be able to meet any foreseeable challenge to our security from strategic nuclear forces or from
conventional forces. America has the capability to honor this commitment without excessive sacrifice by the people of our country, and we will do so.

Looking beyond our alliances, we will try to strengthen worldwide and regional organizations dedicated to enhancing international harmony, such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not now having this capability.

In Africa we, like our African friends, want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty,
hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work toward these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and African aspirations.

The persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this African vision. We are deeply concerned about this threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed.

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than weapons of war in their assistance to Africa. Let the Soviet Union join us in seeking a peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see
efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Eritrea and Angola. Let us all work -- not to divide and seek domination in Africa -- but to help the nations of Africa find the fulfillment of their great potential.

We will honor the legitimate desire of people and nations for peace, independence, majority rule, equality of opportunity, basic human rights, and recognized national boundaries. We will provide aid bilaterally and through multinational organizations to help the people of other nations toward the realization of these hopes.

We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.
We will continue to negotiate constructively and persistently with the Soviets for a fair Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. We have no desire to link this negotiation with other competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes, or threats to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of fact.

We know that there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.
By a combination of adequate American strength, of quiet self-restraint in the use of that strength, of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of a patient persistent development of more hopeful peaceful alternatives, we can eventually lead international society into a more stable and hopeful state of affairs.

Together, world leaders can work to forge a sustained peace in the world. This can be our greatest achievement.

#  #  #  #
I congratulate you members of the class of '78. Although your education has just begun, you have laid the foundation for a career that can be as rewarding and challenging as any in the world.

As officers in the modern Navy, you will be actors in a worldwide political and military drama. You will be called upon not only to master the technicalities of military science and leadership, but also to have a sensitive understanding of the international community in which the Navy operates.
This morning I would like to discuss one of the most important aspects of that international context -- the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Detente between our two countries is central to world peace. It is important for the world, for the American public, and for you as future leaders of the Navy to understand its complex and sensitive nature.

The word "detente" has a different meaning to different people. It is simplistically defined as an easing of tension between nations. The word is, in practice, further defined as those nations evolve new means by which they can live together in peace.

To be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of
cooperation, detente must be truly reciprocal, and not selective. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in turbulent times. Both must honor meticulously those agreements which have already been reached to widen cooperation, mutually restrain nuclear arms production, permit the free movement of people and the expression of ideas, and to protect human right.

We must realize that, for a very long time, our relationship with the Soviet Union will be competitive. If that competition is to be constructive instead of destructive and potentially disastrous, then our relationship must be cooperative as well.

Our social and political systems, our histories, our ideas and aspirations are different, and we must and will continue to live with those differences.
But we must also recognize that those differences create conflicting national ambitions and policies.

We must be prepared to deal with these differences persistently and patiently for many years. We must avoid extreme swings in our public mood--from euphoria when things are going well, to despair when they are not; from an exaggerated sense of compatibility to excessive feelings of hostility.

The world is today completing one of the most rapid and profound transformations in its history -- an inherently complex and turbulent process which tends to exacerbate the dissimilarity between the Soviet Union and our country.
The awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers. How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in achieving lasting peace.

Our long-term objective must be to convince the Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained, or that any transient military advantage can be politically exploited.
Our principal goal is to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire of people everywhere for economic well-being, social justice, political self-determination, peace, and basic human rights.

We seek a world of peace. But a world at peace must be a world that permits diversity -- social, political and ideological. Only in such a world can there be genuine cooperation among many nations and cultures.

We Americans can be confident about the future if we are consistent and resolute in our conduct.

We desire to dominate no one. We will continue to widen our cooperation with the positive new forces in the world.

We want to increase our friendship with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with
the countries in Eastern Europe, and with the People's Republic of China. We are prepared to cooperate with all nations, regardless of their systems or ideologies.

We are particularly dedicated to the attainment of genuine self-determination and majority rule in those parts of the world where these goals are yet to be attained.

We will always urge restraint in areas of tension, and support multinational or regional organizations dedicated to peace and we will maintain or increase our defenses as necessary to match any challenge which confronts us or our allies. Above all, we will remain constant in our commitment to the principles which have insured the greatness of our nation.
A strong defense is crucial because it provides not only safety but also a legitimate sense of security from which to negotiate for improved relations and for a mutually lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Both our Allies and our potential adversaries must know our strength and be sure of our national will.

I am convinced that the Soviets want peace.

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the Second World War. One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and other Soviet
ports in support of our joint effort to meet the Nazi threat.

In the agony of that massive conflict, 20 million Soviet people died. Millions more still recall the horror and the hunger of that time.

I cannot believe that their leaders could want war.

World War II

At the end of that war the strong political differences that had long divided our two countries began to reassert themselves. The Soviets did not disarm as we did. They sought to hold political sway over many of the nations liberated during the war. We sought instead to free the people whose fate was in our hands so that they might determine their own
futures and choose their own political systems.

We invested massive sums in countries that had been our friends and foes, so that they might recover from the ravages of war.

Military might has never been the sole basis of our national pride. Traditionally we have maintained relatively small standing armies, expecting our citizens to rally to our nation's defense whenever it was threatened.

Modern warfare no longer makes it possible for average citizens to defend their nation with the same skills they use to defend their own families in time of peace. Yet, while we maintain a strong defense, we have remained willing to end the arms race -- even when we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, until 1949.
and long after that, when we had a substantial nuclear advantage.

Our nation has continued to seek mutual accommodation with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space, trade agreements, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Armaments and the limited test ban agreement.

We will maintain equivalent nuclear strength because we believe that, in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament, such equivalency is the least threatening, most stable situation for the world.
Efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition of attacks on satellites, an agreement to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

We must be prepared and willing to explore these and other avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction. The world has lived uncomfortably for almost 33 years with the existence of nuclear weapons. We have no full comprehension of the impact of these weapons on the political process in peace or their application to combat in war.
Their numbers and destructive potential have been increasing at an alarming rate. That is why the negotiation of a SALT agreement which enhances the security of both nations is of fundamental importance.

We and the Soviets are negotiating in good faith because we both know that failure would precipitate a resumption of a massive nuclear arms race. The prospects for a SALT II agreement are good.

Beyond this, improved trade, technological exchange and cultural interplay are among many immediate and positive benefits of cooperation. Even though we may not gain a unilateral advantage, we have an obligation to promote peace and harmony for the world. That is the responsibility of leadership.
These efforts to cooperate do not, however, erase the significant differences between us and the Soviet Union in ideology, domestic attitudes, and aspirations for the future. These differences must be clearly understood by the American people because such understanding provides a base on which we will build our political and military policy.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence by a variety of means.

The Soviets apparently see military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad.
Obviously, areas of instability provide a focus for their effort, and they always seem to be ready and willing to exploit any such opportunity.

As became apparent in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia, they prefer to use proxy forces to fight their battles.

To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive -- far beyond any legitimate requirement for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than 15 years they have maintained this program of military growth, investing as much as 13 percent of their gross national product in armaments. They now have a superfluous capability to wage war, and this sustained growth continues.

Their gross abuse of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached
at Helsinki has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom.

The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society. Freely expressed ideas, notions of loyal opposition, and the free movement of peoples challenge their system in basic ways -- and they often react to these challenges with oppressive force.

Some of their characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves.

Outside their tightly controlled bloc, the Soviets have little political compatibility with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed.
Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated.

Many countries are becoming concerned that the non-aligned movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic sustenance and for political and military guidance and direction.

Although the Soviets have the second largest economic system in the world, the rate of growth of this system has reached a very low level, and their standard of living does not compare favorably with that of other nations with equivalent development.
Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of average of adverse crop-growing conditions they must turn to us or to other nations for food supplies.

This assessment shows that we need not be overly concerned about our ability to compete and to outperform the Soviets. There is certainly no cause for alarm.

Our military capability is second to none on earth; our industrial base and productivity are unmatched; our scientific and technological capability is superior to all others; our alliances with other free nations are strong and growing stronger. We are surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas. Our societal structure is stable and cohesive, and our foreign policy is bi-partisan and continuous.
Americans are pragmatists, and we approach our problems calmly, with common sense and confidence.

We are also strong because of what we stand for as a nation: The realistic chance for every individual to build a better life; protection by law and custom from arbitrary exercise of government power; the right of every individual to speak out, to participate fully in government -- to share political power.

Our philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic way of life warrants admiration and emulation by other people.

These incandescent principles remain the most powerful ideas in the world. They make us strong. And they help make our foreign policy strong.
Our work for human rights makes us part of an international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being a part of it.

American will remain strong in the world as long as our national policies are true to the principles of our people.

One of our successful efforts is to expand our circle of friends among other nations in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Europe.

Because of our political and moral strength, we are in a unique position to help move the world toward peace. Our growing economic strength is also a major potential influence for the benefit of others. Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine countries in the European Economic Community, and
is more than twice as great as that of the Soviet Union. Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

We know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear assault on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which could destroy the societal structure of the attacking power.

Although the Soviets have more missile launchers and greater throw-weight, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more bombers,
a more balanced nuclear force, better missile submarines and anti-submarine warfare capability.

A successful SALT agreement will leave both nations with equal but lower numbers of missile launchers and missiles with multiple warheads. We envision in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction in nuclear weapons.

It is possible that each side tends to exaggerate the relative military capability of the other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.

The fact is that with essential nuclear equivalence, relative conventional force strength has now become more important. The military capability of the United
States and our Allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

False or excessive estimates of Soviet strength or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

For example, recent alarming news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy. When small coastal vessels are included in the totals, the statistics appear to show a Soviet advantage in number of ships, but the fact is that in major seagoing warships the United States enjoys a two to one numerical advantage and 50% more total tonnage of warships. In comparing design, technology, projections for the next ten years show that these comparisons will be maintained.
engineering, quietness and easy access to the open seas we fare even better.

Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. It would be a mistake for anyone to confuse the healthy self-criticism and free debate which are essential in a democracy with confusion, weakness or despair.

What future developments might we expect from existing American policy toward the Soviet Union?

We will maintain a prudent and a sustained military spending, keyed to NATO and mobile forces and an undiminished presence in the Pacific. We and our Allies must be able to meet any foreseeable challenge to our security from strategic nuclear forces or from
conventional forces. America has the capability to honor this commitment without excessive sacrifice by the people of our country, and we will do so.

Looking beyond our alliances, we will try to strengthen worldwide and regional organizations dedicated to enhancing international harmony, such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not now having this capability.

In Africa we, like our African friends, want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty,
hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work toward these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and African aspirations.

The persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this African vision. We are deeply concerned about this threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed.

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than weapons of war in their assistance to Africa. Let the Soviet Union join us in seeking a peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see
efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Eritrea and Angola. Let us all work -- not to divide and seek domination in Africa -- but to help the nations of Africa find the fulfillment of their great potential.

We will honor the legitimate desire of people and nations for peace, independence, majority rule, equality of opportunity, basic human rights, and recognized national boundaries. We will provide aid bilaterally and through multinational organizations to help the people of other nations toward the realization of these hopes.

We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.
We will continue to negotiate constructively and persistently with the Soviets for a fair Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. We have no desire to link this negotiation with other competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes, or threats to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of fact.

We know that there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviets can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.
By a combination of adequate American strength, of quiet self-restraint in the use of that strength, of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of a patient persistent development of more peaceful alternatives, we can eventually hope to lead international society into a more stable and hopeful state of affairs.

Together, world leaders can work to forge a sustained peace in the world. This can be our greatest achievement.

#  #  #  #
9. What will you do if the child should fall?

Henry Shiba
President, Home Owners' Forum

The first year's homework grade 9:

Sincerely,

[Signature]

9. A continuous duty to serve our

9. A sense of appreciation for what

9. Love back to the child's heart.
The strong defense crucial. We must see our strength.

1. Importance

2. Technology - complexity causes 5-10-15 year lag in defense.

3. History - make again, conventional forces important.

4. Present - nothing could have prevented Su mil build-up.
   a) mil
   > Set 1970 > missiles > throw weight (Su 1st ICBM)
   US > RV's > accuracy > bombers, better submarines

5. Future -
   a) mil
   > 39 SACT - US/SU equal missile, MIRV's, MIRV'd ICBM

6. Comparison - friendly neighbors & oceans vs Soviets -?

Need to strategic equal. Conventional & Allies need any threat.

7. Conflicts
   > Drawing closer to our Allies (Am, Asia, Europe)
   Process will continue.

8. Compatibility

9. Non-Peace
   > Nations don't want to be dominated by Su - we must provide avenue to freedom & peace.

10. Test of military strength & quality of their life.
Social justice, to what we say, to our actions

2.1 Changes and fulfillment: the awareness of any shortcomings

2.2 What is justice? What is fairness?

2.3 Social justice - the greater interest: the human - legal

2.4 Our educational system most complicated in terms

2.5 According to people who express these, the child and

2.6 Social for diversity. Ethic:醫療 to believe

2.7 Live, people must, that love, to remember, otherwise

2.8 Food production

2.9 Literate children - broader vision for open society

2.10 Provision & training from free expression

2.11 Sharing of the few determine the many

2.12 The are uniquely in need, to have words to share

2.13 Prove not our, liberalism, to communicator. Thus

2.14 Sheerly, because two - prison, according (SJV's, etc.)
An human RB statements of serious concern to Soviets

Ideas more dangerous than weapons

US - Continuing struggle by all means short of war

US political briefings - SALT, G7, Panama, MC, India

Sputnik -> US on moon set challenge to greater

(Format) can we: a) b) c) answer is yes

Do we have: a) all cap and to none, b) unmatched

reduced base; c) superior tech capacity; d) free allie

e) no occupying troops; f) friendly neighbors, wide see.

f) Cohesive, bipartisan, continuous society

b) Way of life: i) Freedom - most powerful idea? yes

V is sub leader & opposing military alliances can deter other

sub exports totalitarian, repressive, closed society

US = democratic, free, open society

Sub sees military action as best means of influence abroad

focus on areas of instability

Common desire to avoid war

Limit arms deal & deployment

Assurance = Set of our rationality & defensive plan

Sub lacks self-confidence to prevail in arms race

Theology reflects a by peaceful view

peaceful stability, by expansion of freedom
Both fear miscalculation or arms reduction.

US GNP > 9 in EEC, 6 x USSR
Learning to use resources more wisely.

US science & out paralel.

Arms = 25% budget.

Must keep commitments & capabilities in your vision.

Never confuse healthy self criticism - essential in democracy - w/ confusion or despair or weakness.

History. Allies in WW2 - US lost 20 mil dead.

Nazi ships vs. Murmansk. US did not disarm.

US nuclear monopoly ended in 49 - parity '70.

Austrian peace treaty - Berlin - atmospheric testing.

Space - Trade, SALT 3 - ABM - limited test ban.

+ 4% mil/15 years, 173 army divisions, world.

Wonders why - is cause worldwide arms buildup.

US late 50's 9% GNP -> 5% now I recall.

Soviets prefer to use proxy forces (Korea, Angola, Ethiopia).

We seek trade, cultural exchange, understanding.

Military deter nuclear war - meet regional challenges.

With mil, econ, pol strength, convince USSR peaceful route not.
1. One change on many shores.

2. Bein' lass - malnurished.

3. Restricted by and - minus.

4. She'll not much know more opus - one of.

5. More information & know - spread now.

6. Has kept to minimise alike.

7. Discuss - scenario in precision. Each scenario.

8. Peaceful from day - pressure is the word.


10. To into it mobile force & sustained force. Back to.

11. Was organize: provided me in mid standing, helped.

12. Will direct accept military power?

13. Because of correctness & difficulty & pogo

14. Mood of exclamation. To hostis building up

15. Are complex: or need to prepare expenses.

16. She's choice: broad career &mulder, instead of

17. Lit your find policy. Suffered, remained determina.
paragraph of my e- 

5. In fact, she got married, was pregnant, and gave birth to a child. 

3. She had not all the time to stay. 

Learning Chinese, more into the world. 

For Example: Talked to her/Espera; the European parsley; 

5. St. Anne's and our Pole Parents in Europe. My mizone. 

2. Where's Dad? I'm not married. 

3. This. My dear parents and friends. 

I think on Europe, a chill on DS. 

8. St. Anne and our parents in marriage. 

2. Skills - Sally & some people. 

5. St. Lawrence, common as in our province. 

3. That's London. She is learning so as to adapt. 

2. Church long ago. Feel it formed. 

5. St. Anne and her. 

3. And teaching. 

2. What's it like? Each day, this is exciting. 

2. Nothing means so much. 

2.