

**6/7/78 Annapolis Speech [3]**

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

As you requested, I am writing to provide material to supplement my letter of May 29, 1978, for possible use in your Annapolis speech. In doing so, I will try to minimize repetition of points made in the letter.

I.

The United States and the Soviet Union each face a strategic choice -- do we want to seek broadened areas of mutual interest as we compete in other areas, or will we revert to the days of general antagonism? We prefer the former course. It means a safer world and a more secure America. A relationship of this kind would include the following elements:

A. We would expand areas of cooperation in our mutual interest, such as arms control agreements that enhance our security, or agreements for cooperation in science and technology which promise a better life for our people.

B. We would recognize and accept the continuation of competition, but within moderating limits. The American people should not expect, in this generation, to see an end to competition with the Soviets. We, too, will compete ideologically, politically and economically. But both sides should be fully aware of the dangers, to their bilateral relationship and to world peace, if they fuel local and regional conflicts, rather than work together and with others on peaceful solutions.

The President,  
The White House.

- 2 -

Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa have exacerbated conflicts and increased bloodshed. No one quarrels with the right of a country to appeal to friendly powers for assistance in maintaining territorial integrity. We have helped meet that call from Zaire. But such help should be coupled with a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. And it should not be a pretext for prolonged military intervention and political dominance.

We call on the Soviet Union to adopt a policy of restraint in Africa, forsaking the temptation to achieve short-term political gain at the expense of long-term stability. We also call on the Soviet Union to play a constructive part in finding peaceful solutions for the future of Eritrea and for the remaining problems of decolonization and majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

*Zaire*

Competition in areas like Africa will not deter our efforts to find agreements that serve the security interests of both countries. But when peaceful competition turns to confrontation, it cannot help but erode the political base for cooperation in both nations. This is not a threat, but a fact of life. Our intention is not to gain an advantage, but to try to head off a deterioration in our relations that would follow a continued pattern of excessive competition.

C. We would also expect the continuation of strong defenses on both sides, and the maintenance of the military parity. Despite the Soviet build-up over the past ten years, the United States and our Allies are strong, and fully equal to the challenge we face.

D. Support for human rights, not as an effort to undermine governments, but to uphold an international standard to which both nations are committed.

## II.

As we cooperate and compete, we must also remain strong. This will include:

A. Demonstrated resolve not to allow any nation to gain military superiority over us. This will involve the strengthening of vital military programs in the U.S. and its Allies, as we are doing.

B. Achievement of dependable arms control agreements that enhance our security.

C. Public and Congressional support for efforts to assist old and new friends in need of security or economic assistance.

D. Maintenance of an American leadership that recognizes the necessity of working with other nations, and that acknowledges the desire of many developing nations to preserve real sovereignty and independence, and to resist an unhealthy overdependence on either the United States or the Soviet Union.

E. The continued assertion of our national ideals, the most powerful ideas in the world.

F. Our superior technological capacity, our unmatched industrial base, our expanding trade relations around the world.

G. The cohesion of our society, and our ability to criticize our shortcomings openly, and in a constructive spirit, so as to better correct them.

### III.

We are determined to pursue policies of unsurpassed readiness and cooperation in managing our relations with the Soviet Union. No issue is more central to the foreign interests of the United States, and none is nearly as important in assessing the strategic and nuclear threats to world peace. Our views must be made clear to the people of this country and of the Soviet Union, and they will be. But effective diplomacy can suffer if the tone of public debates between our governments is heated. The resulting atmosphere makes it less likely that firm positions quietly conveyed will be fully understood by the other side.

Providence has destined that both the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers with global interests. Although we do not share a similar world view, neither should seek to impose its conceptions on others or to exclude the other from constructive participation in the issues that face mankind. We are confident of our future and our ability to help build a world at peace.

Taken together with the May 29 letter, I hope that these points may be helpful.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature, possibly initials, consisting of a large, stylized letter 'Q' with a long, thin tail extending downwards and to the right.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

June 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As you requested for the Naval Academy address, enclosed in outline form are some thoughts on our policy toward the Soviet Union.

Parts I and II would be covered in perhaps a paragraph, if at all. Parts III and IV would also be dealt with briefly. The more substantial portion begins with Part V, and is particularly found in Part VI. That would call for the most extended treatment. Parts VII and VIII have points which would be noted in conclusion.

The outline cannot in itself convey the speech's tone, which in my judgment will be important. You want, I believe, to convey our willingness and desire to cooperate with the Soviets on matters of mutual interest, while at the same time reminding both them and others of our resolution firmly to resist Soviet encroachments as our national interests require -- and also reminding them that if they choose to play the role of a global bully or provocateur, they inevitably will jeopardize the cooperation which is in the interest of both our countries.

There has been much discussion lately about what effect the Vietnam experience has had, and should have, on our foreign policy. In my view, it should teach us the need for thought and caution, but we should not overreact to Vietnam or appear immobilized. Paragraph VI. F. is an opportunity to deal with that issue head-on, if you desire.

Please give me a call any time over the weekend if there is any point you would like to discuss, or any further material I can supply. Since I would like a chance to comment on the tone of the speech, I will plan to join you on Sunday evening when you go over it with Cy and Zbig.

*Harold Brown*

Enclosure

Thoughts for Address

U.S. - Soviet Relations

I. How we came to be here--early years.

A. Allies in World War II.

1. Soviets had 20 million dead in "Great Patriotic War."
2. Heroism at Stalingrad.
3. Our naval ships and merchantmen on the hazardous route to Murmansk to supply Soviets.

B. End of the war.

1. Soviets did not disarm; we did except for nuclear deterrent.
2. Soviet troops in Eastern Europe; we pulled out of Western. *300,000?*
3. Partition of Germany.
4. Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey led to the Truman Doctrine, and concerns about Western European security to the return of U.S. troops to Western Europe. (Allusion to NATO Summit and continued resolve.)
5. Soviet support of North Korean aggression against South Korea. United Nations response.

II. How we came to be here--the 50's to now.

A. Have maintained military forces adequate to deter Soviet military adventurism and opportunism.

1. Strategic nuclear forces.
2. Nuclear monopoly of U.S. ended in 1949; places more emphasis on need for conventional forces.
3. Soviet achievement of nuclear parity in the early 1970's makes conventional forces even more important.

B. Have been able over the years to reach agreements with the Soviets on some things, where our interests coincided.

1. Austrian peace treaty and end of partition.
2. End of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.

3. Cooperation in space--Apollo-Soyuz.
4. Trade--Soviet grain purchases.
5. SALT I. *ABM  
limited test ban*

III. The U.S.S.R. today.

- A. A large and powerful country--more powerful militarily than economically or politically or ideologically
- B. Suffers from lack of individual freedom, contrary to the human rights cherished in Western tradition. Soviet people are independent, proud and nationalistic, but they are not free as we understand freedom.
- C. Suffers from inefficient state-operated economy. E.g., agriculture a miserable failure after 60 years of communism.
- D. Suffers from a bloated bureaucracy, who are really the ruling class.
- E. But has continued a steady military buildup, at about 4% per year, for at least 15 years. Has 173 army divisions, fleet of 1000+ vessels, air force, strategic missiles. Why does the U.S.S.R. keep adding to its military forces? *← World wonders*

IV. The United States today.

- A. The most powerful nation in the world, and one which enjoys human rights and individual liberties.
- B. The world's most powerful and productive economy, based on the efficiency of private ownership.
- C. The citizen is more important than the state.
- D. We have decreased our defense spending for the past 20 years (except Vietnam period) from about 9% of GNP in the late 1950's to 5% of GNP in 1977. *Instigation for worldwide growth in armaments*
- E. Finally increased our defense spending in real terms last year in response to continued relentless Soviet military buildup-- forced to do so to preserve military balance in the world. Will continue to spend what is necessary to have adequate U.S. military forces to preserve our national security.

V. Soviet attitudes and activities in the world.

- A. They really believe (evidence to the contrary notwithstanding) that Lenin correctly predicted inevitable fall of capitalist states.

- B. They consider that they are serving inevitable forces of history in trying to disrupt non-Communist states. Their idea of world stability is a Communist World. (Our idea of stability is peaceful commerce, encouragement of human rights, not having one country use military force to force its will on another.) The Soviets do not see stability, as we view it, as in their interest. This tends to create permanent tension in the world, which we must try to reduce by our own strong actions.
- C. They always have been opportunistic in world politics--tendency to try to fill power vacuums if they perceive them. Examples: Europe after World War II, Middle East.
- D. They prefer to use proxy military forces instead of their own. Examples: Korean War, now in Africa.
- E. Although they can maintain dominance outside the Soviet Union by use of Soviet occupation troops (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia), they often fail to sustain influence in other countries even after they temporarily gain it. E.g., Egypt, Ghana, Sudan.
- F. However, after they gain influence and then lose it, they more often leave a legacy of chaos, so that the country is worse off than it was before. E.g., Somalia, Zaire in the early 1960s.

#### VI. U.S. Policy toward Soviets.

- A. It is not simply a policy of reaction, although we must decide proper response when they cause military power to be used in the world, and be able to make a military response if a military response is necessary.
- B. Neither we nor the Soviets can destroy the other without unacceptable damage. Neither of us is likely to overwhelm the other in the world. As long as the Soviets remain aggressive, we are committed to what Kennedy called a "long twilight struggle" to deter war.
- C. Our overall goal is, as it has been for many years, a world in which we and the Soviets help each other where our interests are parallel, and compete in other areas by non-military means.
  - 1. We seek more trade, more cultural exchanges, better understanding.
  - 2. We seek to solve differences by negotiation in good faith.

3. We seek agreements which will reduce tensions and the fear of war.
  4. We seek to encourage human rights, but not interference in the ordinary domestic affairs of other nations.
- D. We have two major concerns in relations with the Soviets:
1. Maintaining sufficient military strength to:
    - (a) Deter nuclear war and Soviet conventional aggression.
    - (b) Successfully limit a war if it begins, and conclude it favorably--though there would be no favorable conclusion for either side in a nuclear war.

We shall sacrifice as necessary to achieve the needed military strength. Nothing is as important as the physical security of our people.

*Indian Ocean  
Arms x few  
ASAT  
CTB*

2. At the same time, working to reduce the chance of military conflict with the USSR by diplomatic means, by cooperation toward stabilizing political conditions where possible, by holding down the growth (and costs and risks) of the arms competition between us, we need at the same time to control and limit the spread of arms in the rest of the world, and encourage its peaceful development.
- E. The two goals need not conflict. We must steer a careful course toward mutual and balanced arms reductions, while not permitting the Soviets to gain an advantage over us. It is possible to improve the security of both nations by such agreements, if each will forgo the hope of reducing the other's while increasing its own.
- F. Vietnam was in some respects an overreaction to Munich. We will not now fall into an overreaction to Vietnam. The lesson of history is that we must have adequate power, that we must not waste it, that we must use it when necessary to protect our interests in the world when they are vital--and be very cautious with it when they are not.
- G. We will show the Soviets that they cannot disrupt other countries--as by encouraging and supporting bloodshed in Africa--without cost to themselves.
1. But we will not punish Soviet-backed aggression in ways which would hurt us as much--e.g., by not continuing to seek equitable strategic arms limitations, in which both we and the Soviets have a common and mutual interest.

?

2. There are non-military ways to show the Soviets we mean to make aggression, even by proxy, unattractive. E.g., by limiting cultural and scientific exchanges that help them more than us; discouraging economic aid to their proteges.
3. We can encourage and help people in countries facing pressure from the Soviets (or Cuban proxies) to take action in their own interest, and give them economic and technical assistance.

#### VII. Effects of Soviet behavior.

Soviets should be aware of the full effects their disruptive activities in the world can have--that the results can be harmful in the long run to both our countries.

We do not want to return to the cold-war days of the 1950's and early 1960's. But economic and technical cooperation with the Soviets will be set back if we see their behavior as disruptive of attempts to solve world problems, as we find them doing in Africa. Moreover, we will strongly oppose political or military attempts by them to dominate Europe or Asia.

- A. We, unlike the U.S.S.R., are a democratic country. Government policy responds to the attitudes and desires of the American people.
- B. Many Americans, not without reason, always have been suspicious of any agreements with the Soviets.
- C. Even though this Administration does not desire to link Soviet adventurism in Africa with SALT, many Americans may be inclined to do so. Soviet actions will have a bearing on the views of the American people, and through them the Congress, which may be greater than the Soviets realize or than either the Soviet or American governments would wish.

#### VIII. Conclusion.

- A. Soviet doctrine and interests ensure a long and continuing struggle.
- B. We want that struggle to be peaceful, insofar as is possible, because war would be terrible for all (and because though we are confident that they cannot "win" militarily, we are even more sure of that outcome in a peaceful competition).
- C. We will not shrink from the military requirements of our policy. We will maintain force adequate to deter, even at sacrifice to our people. We will be willing to use it, but hope that we shall not need to.

- D. We shall try to make adventurism unattractive to the Soviets-- partly by keeping strong in the world ourselves--and shall seek to build on areas of common interest.
- E. We may not be able to convert the Soviets to our view of the world. But at least we can hope to present them with realities of strength--military, economic, political--so that they will correctly see the peaceful route as what is in their own best interest.

ANNAPOLIS SPEECH INTRO

(Address dignitaries, etc)

(Personal remarks)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10:00 AM  
BACK ~~WOOD~~  
TUES

~~It's good to be back.~~

I stand before you this morning as living proof of something I heard the day I graduated from the Naval Academy, back in June of 1946. The speaker that day was Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, then the Chief of Naval Operations. He told us that our standing in the class precedence list would not necessarily affect our chances of future advancement to the highest echelons of command.

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BY: KS NARA DATE: 4/17/13

in common. As Midshipmen Will and McAlpine\* are learning -- and as Walter Cronkite and I have known for years -- the anchor man may not get quite as many honors as the man at the top, but the pay is considerably better.

~~But in all seriousness,~~ I congratulate <sup>you members</sup> ~~the men~~ of the class of '78, ~~from top to bottom.~~ I know how proud ~~you feel today,~~ and how proud your families are. <sup>Although</sup> ~~Your~~ education has just begun, but ~~it will rest on the~~ firm ~~foundation you have built here.~~ And you have laid the <sup>foundation</sup> ~~groundwork~~ for a career that can be as rewarding and challenging as any in the world.

As officers in the modern Navy, you will be actors in a worldwide political and military drama. You will be called upon not only to master the technicalities of military science and leadership, but

---

\* Midshipman Jonathan E. Will is first in the class of '78; Midshipman William F. McAlpine is anchor.

also to have a sensitive understanding of the international <sup>community</sup> context in which the Navy operates.

~~I would like~~ <sup>I would like to discuss</sup> ~~this morning~~ <sup>to talk to you about</sup> ~~to talk to you about~~  
one of the most important <sup>aspects</sup> ~~elements~~ <sup>that</sup> of that <sup>community</sup> international context -- the relationship between the world's two

greatest powers, the United States and Soviet Union.

*Detente between our two nations countries*  
~~That relationship~~ is central to world peace.

It is important for the world, for the American public, and for you as future leaders of the Navy to understand its complex and sensitive nature.

*The word "detente" has a different meaning to different people. It is <sup>simplistically</sup> defined as an easing of tension between nations. The word is, in <sup>practice,</sup> effect, further defined as <sup>those</sup> nations evolve new means by which they can live together in peace.*

NO COPIES

See new lead

The relationship between the world's two greatest powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- is central to world peace. It is important that that world, the American public, and you as future leaders of the Navy understand the complex and sensitive nature of this relationship.

~~The world "detente" is often used [and it is different things to different people. It is important necessary to comprehend some of the meanings of this for us to be clear about what we mean by this word. single world.] Detente. To be stable, to be supported~~

~~but it has meant~~

by the American people, and to be a basis for widening ~~detente between us and the Soviet Union~~ the scope of cooperation, must be truly reciprocal, and not selective. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in turbulent times. ~~[we]~~ <sup>Both</sup> must honor meticulously <sup>those</sup> agreements which have <sup>already</sup> been reached

to widen cooperation, ~~and~~ mutual<sup>ly</sup> restraint, <sup>nuclear</sup> in arms production,  
 permit the free  
 limitation, ~~[freedom of]~~ movement of people, ~~and~~ the expression  
 of ideas, and ~~[in the]~~ <sup>to</sup> protection of human rights.

We must realize that, for a very long time, our  
 relationship with the Soviet Union will be ~~[both cooperative~~  
~~and]~~ competitive. <sup>(If that competition is to be constructive</sup>  
<sup>instead of destructive, and potentially</sup>  
<sup>disastrous, ~~then~~ our relationship must be</sup>  
<sup>cooperative as well.</sup>

This has  
 become  
 a cliché,  
 and  
 doesn't  
 explain  
 itself

Our social and political systems, our histories,  
 our ideas and aspirations are different, and we ~~[will]~~ must  
 and ~~[must]~~ <sup>will</sup> continue to live with those differences.

But we must <sup>also</sup> recognize that those differences  
~~[They do, however,]~~ create conflicting national ambitions  
 and policies.

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We must be prepared to deal with these differences  
 persistently and patiently for many years, ~~[and to]~~ <sup>We must</sup> avoid

extreme swings in our public mood, from euphoria ~~[and an]~~ <sup>when things</sup>

~~an~~ exaggerated sense of compatibility ~~[on the one hand]~~ to

~~[despair and]~~ hostility ~~[on the other]~~  
<sup>exaggerated feelings of</sup>  
<sup>excessive</sup>

to  
 despair  
 when  
 they are  
 not, from

① We've now feeling the results of changes that largely took place after WW II.

② the world has changed after before - Industrial Revolution, WW I, the sprout of Telav, the fall of Rome, etc.

completing due of

The world is today undergoing the most rapid and profound transformation in its <sup>3</sup> history -- an inherently complex and turbulent process which tends to exacerbate the <sup>dissimilarity</sup> ~~innate differences~~ between the Soviet Union and our country.

The awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers. How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in achieving <sup>lasting</sup> ~~world~~ peace.

Our long term objective must be to convince the Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.

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*United States*

Neither the ~~U.S.~~ nor the Soviet Union should

entertain the notion that military supremacy can ~~[either]~~  
*that, any transient military advantage in one can be*  
be attained, or ~~politically~~ exploited. *also can be*

*But a world of peace must be*

We seek a world of peace. ~~[We seek]~~ a world ~~[of]~~

*that permits*

^ diversity -- social, political and ideological. ~~[-~~

~~since we believe that]~~ *in* only *there* such a world can be ~~[a world~~  
~~of]~~ genuine cooperation among many nations and cultures.

Our principal *goal is to help* concern is ~~how to help]~~ *ing to* shape a

world which is more responsive to the desire *of people everywhere* for

economic well-being, and social justice, political

self-determination, peace, and ~~[for]~~ basic human rights.

*Americans*  
We can be confident about the future if we are

consistent and resolute in our conduct.

We desire to dominate no one. We will <sup>continue to</sup> ~~remain~~  
~~constructively engaged in~~ widening our cooperation  
with the positive new forces in the world.

We want to increase our friendship, ~~not only~~  
with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations,  
with the countries in Eastern Europe, and with the  
People's Republic of China. We are prepared to  
cooperate with all nations, regardless of their systems  
or ideologies. We are particularly dedicated to the  
attainment of genuine self-determination and majority  
rule in those parts of the world where these goals  
are yet to be attained, ~~but we do not seek to further~~  
~~those goals by outside force of arms.~~

~~We~~ are eager to effect peaceful change, and in ~~this~~  
~~context~~ we will continue to seek a stable, and  
reciprocal, detente with the Soviet Union.

We will <sup>continue to</sup> negotiate constructively and persistently <sup>with the Soviets</sup> for a fair Strategic Arms Limitation agreement. We have no desire to link this negotiation with other competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we <sup>recognize</sup> cannot ~~pretend~~ that tensions, <sup>disputes, or</sup> ~~and sharp conflicts~~ ~~in our mutual relationship brought about by~~ threats to peace will ~~not~~ complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of ~~the~~ fact.

↓  
\*  
P21

We will always urge restraint in areas of tension, ~~and~~ support multinational or regional organizations dedicated to peace, ~~and we will~~ <sup>But we must maintain or</sup> ~~increase as necessary~~ <sup>and we will maintain or increase</sup> our defenses

*as necessary*

to match any challenge which confronts us or our allies.

Above all, we will remain constant in our commitment to the principles which have insured the greatness of our nation.

*Omit  
makes it  
seem as if  
the defense  
forces are  
a bargaining  
chip*

A strong defense is crucial ~~not only~~ because it provides ~~not only~~ us ~~not only~~ safety but <sup>legitimate</sup> also a <sup>sense of security</sup> position from which to negotiate for improved relations and for a mutually lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Both our Allies and our potential adversaries must <sup>know</sup> see our strength and be sure of our national will.

I am convinced that the Soviets ~~do not want war.~~ <sup>want peace.</sup>

The United States and the Soviet Union were

~~[They were our]~~ allies in the Second World War.

~~[and they suffered the terrible consequences of that]~~

In the agony of that massive conflict, ~~[with the loss of]~~ 20 million Soviet <sup>people died.</sup> ~~[lives].~~

Millions more <sup>still</sup> recall the horror and the hunger of that time.

I cannot believe that their leaders could want war.

*ok - move  
to  
p 8*

One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and other Soviet ports in support of our joint effort to meet the Nazi threat.

> INSERT from page 7

At the end of that war there ~~were already~~ strong political differences ~~between~~ our two countries. <sup>that had long divided</sup> ~~between~~ <sup>began to</sup> ~~were~~ reasserting themselves. <sup>^</sup> The

~~Soviets did not disarm as we did. [Our monopoly on nuclear military strength] over many of the nations liberated during the war. we sought explosives ended in 1949, and our dominant nuclear advantage was overcome early in this decade. [We now maintain roughly equivalent nuclear strength]~~ <sup>They sought to hold political sway, by</sup> <sup>instead to free the people whose fate was in our hands at the end of World War II, so that</sup> <sup>they might determine their own futures and choose their own political systems.</sup> <sup>We invested massive sums in countries that had been our friends and foes, so that they might recover from the ravages of war.</sup>

~~We now maintain roughly equivalent nuclear strength]~~  
<sup>^</sup> ~~Our~~ Our nation has <sup>^</sup> and ~~have~~ continued to seek mutual accommodation with the Soviet Union as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin, the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint

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^ Military might has never been the sole basis of our national pride. Traditionally we <sup>have</sup> maintained <sup>relatively small</sup> standing armies, calling ~~instead on~~ our citizens to rally to our nation's defense whenever it was threatened. Modern warfare no longer makes it possible for average citizens <sup>^</sup> (OVER)

to defend their nation with the same  
skills they use to <sup>defend their own</sup> ~~protect~~ for their families  
in time of peace. Yet, <sup>while</sup> ~~as~~ we ~~have~~  
maintained a strong defense, we have remained  
<sup>willing</sup> ~~to~~ to end the arms race - even when  
we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, until  
1949, and long after that, when we had  
a substantial nuclear armament.

*trade agreements,*

scientific explorations in space, <sup>1</sup> the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Armaments, <sup>1</sup> *and* the limited test ban agreement.


~~and trade agreements.~~ *We ~~will~~ maintain ~~equivalent~~ nuclear strength because we believe that, in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament, such equivalency is the least threatening, ~~least~~ <sup>most</sup> ~~stable~~ <sup>stable</sup> situation for the world.*

Efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition of attacks on satellites, an agreement to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

**INSERT A**

(insert paragraph from Brzezinski on why these efforts are important and worthwhile)

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INSERT A

The negotiation of a ~~SALT~~ Salt agreement which enhances the ~~mutual~~ security of <sup>both</sup> nations

SUGGESTED INSERT TO PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH; after paragraph 24

We must be prepared and willing to explore these and other avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction. The world has lived uncomfortably for almost thirty-three years with the existence of nuclear weapons. We have <sup>no full comprehension</sup> ~~little real understanding~~ of the impact of these weapons on the political process in peace or their application to combat in war. Their numbers and destructive

potential have been increasing at an alarming rate. <sup>That is why</sup> Only SALT or <sup>is of great ~~important~~ fundamental importance.</sup> ~~some other~~ limitation agreement seems to hold any prospect for <sup>the Soviets are negotiating in good faith. The prospects for</sup> ending this dangerous and unpredictable spiral. ~~Our position of~~ <sup>a SALT II agreement are good.</sup>

Leadership in the world demands that we take the initiative to ~~bring this particular arms race under control.~~ <sup>because we both know that failure would precipitate a resumption of a massive nuclear arms race.</sup>

Beyond this, improved trade, technological exchange and cultural interplay are among many immediate and positive benefits of cooperation. Even though we may <sup>not gain a unilateral advantage,</sup> ~~benefit least,~~ we have an obligation to act on our fundamental conviction that improving the well being and quality of life for all <sup>people</sup> ~~mankind~~ can only promote peace and <sup>for the world.</sup> harmony. That ~~again~~ is the responsibility of leadership.

insert after #24  
by Stan Turner

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These efforts to cooperate do not,

~~[There are]~~ however, <sup>erase the</sup> significant differences  
between us and the Soviet Union <sup>in</sup> ~~[caused by conflicting]~~  
ideologies, <sup>W/</sup> domestic attitudes, and aspirations for the  
future. These differences <sup>must</sup> ~~[should]~~ be clearly understood  
by the American people because such understanding  
provides a base on which we will build our political  
and military policy.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a  
continuing <sup>aggressive</sup> struggle for <sup>political</sup> advantage and <sup>increased</sup> influence by  
a variety of means.

~~[However]~~ The Soviets apparently see ~~[proxy]~~ military  
power ~~[proxy and ]~~ <sup>and</sup> military assistance as the  
best means of expanding their influence abroad.

Obviously, areas of instability provide a focus for their effort, and they always seem to be ready and willing to <sup>exploit</sup> ~~take advantage of~~ any such opportunity.

<sup>become apparent</sup>  
As ~~[was obvious]~~ in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia, they prefer to use proxy forces to fight their battles.

To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive -- far beyond any legitimate requirements for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than fifteen years they have ~~maintained a~~ ~~strong commitment to~~ this program of military growth, investing as much as 13% of their gross national product in <sup>armaments.</sup> ~~military expenditures.~~ They now have a <sup>superfluous</sup> ~~massive~~ <sup>to wage war,</sup> ~~military capability,~~ and this sustained growth continues.

Their gross abuse of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached at

has earned them the of people everywhere who love  
Helsinki ~~(causes)~~ condemnation ~~(throughout the)~~ freedom.  
~~(loving world)~~

The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian  
and repressive form of government, resulting in a

closed society. *freely expressed ideas, and notions of loyal  
opposition, and the free movement of peoples  
challenge their system in basic ways — and they often react  
to these challenges with oppressive force.*

Some of these characteristics and goals create  
*their*

problems for the Soviets themselves. Their form of

government is becoming increasingly unattractive to  
other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups  
no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be  
emulated.

ok to  
# Move  
to 13 →

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~("20 communism")~~

Many ~~non-aligned~~ <sup>non-aligned</sup> countries are becoming concerned that their ~~movement~~ <sup>movement</sup> is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic sustenance and for political and military guidance and direction.

Outside the tightly controlled bloc, the Soviets have little political compatibility with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed.

→ # INSERT FROM P. 12

Although the Soviets have the second largest economic system in the world, the rate of growth of this system has reached a very low level, and their standard of living does not compare favorably with that <sup>of</sup> ~~within~~ other nations <sup>with</sup> of equivalent development.

Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of

Greater

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average or adverse crop growing conditions they must turn to us or to other nations for food supplies.

*This assessment shows that we*

We need not, ~~therefore~~, be overly concerned about our ability to compete and to outperform the Soviets. There is certainly no cause for alarm.

~~INSERT B~~

Our military capability is second to none on earth; our industrial base and productivity are unmatched ~~in the world~~; our <sup>scientific and</sup> technological capacity is superior to all others; our alliances with other free nations are strong and growing stronger. We are surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas.

Our <sup>political</sup> [societal] structure is stable and cohesive, [and our <sup>foreign</sup> government policy is bi-partisan and continuous.]

~~Necessary?~~

Americans are pragmatists, and we approach our problems calmly, with common sense and confidence. ~~out~~

INSERT B

INSERT B

insert with #331 p14 (by Cy Vance)

We are also strong because of what we stand for as a nation: The realistic chance for every individual to build a better life; ~~freedom~~ <sup>protection by law and custom</sup> from arbitrary exercise of government power; the right of every individual to speak ~~freely~~ <sup>out</sup>, to participate fully <sup>in government --</sup> and to share political power.

⊗ fin p.  
15

→ These incandescent principles remain the most powerful ideas in the world. They make us strong. And they help make our foreign policy strong.

ok

Our work for human rights makes us part of an international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being a part of it.

America will remain strong in the world as long as <sup>our</sup> ~~national~~ <sup>foreign</sup> policies are true to ~~ourselves~~ <sup>the principles of our people.</sup>

④  
To insert  
B

Our philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic way of life warrants admiration and emulation by other people.

~~(The political trends seem to be good. For the first time, all the member nations of NATO are democracies.)~~

*use of our successful efforts*  
One ~~of our~~ goals which is being accomplished is

to expand our circle of friends among other nations in Africa, the Mid East, Latin America, Asia and Europe. ~~We do not recognize the hegemony of any nation within these regions.~~

→ This fuzzes the meaning. Do we mean we'll resist Soviet domination? Why not say it clearly - say something else.

Because of our ~~military and~~ political strength, we are in a unique position to help move the world toward peace. Our <sup>growing</sup> ~~enormous~~ economic strength is also a major potential influence for the benefit of others. Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine nations in the European Economic Community, and

is more than twice as great as that of the Soviet Union. Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

*the United States, nor the Soviet Union*

We know that neither ~~[nation]~~ can launch a nuclear ~~attack~~ <sup>assault</sup> on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which ~~could~~ <sup>destroy</sup> ~~[cripple]~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~the societal~~ <sup>societal</sup> structure of the ~~[original attacking power]~~ <sup>society which launched the</sup> attacking power.

Although the Soviets have more missile launchers and greater throw-weight, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better <sup>missile</sup> submarines and

anti-submarine warfare capability.

The fact is that, <sup>at times of</sup> ~~with~~ essential nuclear equivalence, <sup>relative</sup> ~~the~~ conventional ~~military~~ forces, <sup>strength has now become more</sup> ~~have~~ an increasing importance. <sup>The military</sup> ~~The~~ capability of <sup>the United States</sup> ~~ourselves~~ and our allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.


A successful SALT agreement, ~~which we are~~ <sup>both nations</sup> working to achieve without delay, will leave ~~us~~ with equal but lower numbers of missile launchers and missiles with multiple warheads. We envision in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction, <sup>in nuclear weapons.</sup>

It is <sup>possible</sup> ~~likely~~ that each side tends to exaggerate the relative military capability of the other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.

False or excessive estimates ~~or reports~~ of Soviet strength or of American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

For example, recent <sup>alarming</sup> news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy. When small <sup>a</sup> coastal vessels are included in the totals, the statistics appear to show a Soviet advantage in number of ships, but the fact is that in major seagoing warships the United States enjoys a \_\_\_\_\_ numerical advantage and \_\_\_\_\_ in total tonnage of warships. In <sup>comparing</sup> design, technology, engineering, quietness and easy access to the open seas we fare even better.

get from  
OMB or  
DoD



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Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. It would be a mistake for anyone to confuse <sup>the</sup> ~~(a)~~ healthy self-criticism and free debate which are essential in a democracy with ~~[either]~~ confusion, weakness or despair.

*P* ~~How might our policy toward the~~  
~~[What future developments might we expect from~~  
~~existing American policy toward the Soviet Union?]~~ *Soviet Union*  
*develop in the future*

We will maintain <sup>level of</sup> a sustained ~~real growth with~~  
a prudent <sup>and</sup> ~~increase~~ in military spending, keyed to  
NATO and mobile forces and an undiminished presence  
in the Pacific. We and our Allies must ~~and will~~ be able  
to meet any foreseeable challenge to our security from  
strategic nuclear forces or from conventional forces.

America has the capability ~~[and will]~~ to honor this commit-  
ment without excessive sacrifice by the people of our  
country, *and we will do so.*  
*will honor it.*  
*have the will to do it.*

Looking beyond our alliances, we will try to strengthen worldwide and regional organizations dedicated to enhancing international harmony, such as the United Nations, Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

~~INSERT G~~

We will honor the legitimate desire of people and nations for peace, independence, majority rule, equality of opportunity, basic human rights, and ~~the honoring of~~ recognized national boundaries. We will provide aid bilaterally and through multinational organizations ~~(to further)~~ <sup>to help the people of all <sup>other</sup> nations toward</sup> the realization of these hopes.

- INSERT C -

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations not <sup>now</sup> having this capability.

INSERT C

Insert aft #54 p20 ( by Cy Vance)

In Africa, we,

~~Let me summarize briefly the objectives of our African policy. We, like our African friends, want to see~~ <sup>a Continent</sup> ~~an Africa~~ that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty, hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work towards these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and African aspirations.

The <sup>persistent and increasing</sup> ~~growing~~ military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this African vision. ~~We cannot object when African nations call for help in the defense of their borders. We are cooperating in the answer to such a call from Zaire. But we can and do object when such actions seem devoted less to finding peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed.~~ ~~We are deeply concerned about this threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed.~~

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing ~~the~~ works of peace rather than ~~the~~ weapons of war in their assistance to Africa. Let the Soviet Union join us in seeking a peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve peacefully the conflicts in Eritrea and Angola. Let us all work, not to divide and seek domination in Africa, but to help <sup>the nations of Africa</sup> ~~Africa~~ find the fulfillment of <sup>their</sup> ~~its~~ great potential.

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We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and other nations.

from  
p6  
\* →

With our <sup>tremendous</sup> economic, military and political strength we will attempt to convince the Soviet Union that a peaceful route into the future is best for us all. ~~[Sustained world peace]~~ <sup>This</sup> can be our greatest ~~joint~~ achievement.]

# # #

Just as we were able to join together, despite our differences, to fight Fascism during World War II, I hope we will be able to join together now, despite our differences, to forge a sustained peace in the world, ~~for the benefit of all the world's people.~~

There no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons.

By a combination of adequate American strength, of quiet self-restraint in the use of that strength, of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of a patient persistent development of more hopeful peaceful alternatives, we can eventually lead international society into a more stable and hopeful state of affairs.

Together, world leaders can work to forge a sustained peace in the world. This can be our greatest achievement.

1ST DRAFT  
ORIGINAL

- ① Introduction
- ② Importance of super relation
- ③ There are inherent differences
- ④ Soviets are strong, but have problems
- ⑤ We are stronger - now & future
- ⑥ Desire/plans for peace/harmony

Today

The relationship between the world's two greatest powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - is central to world peace. It is important that the world, the American public, and you as future leaders of the Navy understand the complex and sensitive nature of this relationship.

The word "detente" is often used, and it is necessary to understand

comprehend some of the meanings of this single word. Detente, to be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of accommodation

must be truly reciprocal and comprehensive. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in turbulent times. We must honor meticulously agreements which have been reached to widen cooperation and mutual restraint in arms limitation, freedom of movement <sup>of people,</sup> ~~and~~ the expression of ideas and in the protection of human rights.

We must realize that, for a very long time, our relationship with the Soviet Union will be both cooperative and competitive.

Our social and political systems,  
our histories, our ideas and aspirations  
are different; and we will and must  
continue to  
live with those differences. They  
need not cause any major ~~conflict~~<sup>threat</sup>  
to peace  
but they do create conflicting national  
ambitions and policies.

We must be prepared to deal  
with these differences persistently  
and patiently for many years, and  
to avoid extreme swings in our  
public mood from euphoria and an  
exaggerated sense of compatibility  
on the one hand to despair and  
hostility on the other.

The world is today undergoing the most profound transformation in its history - an inherently

⑥ complex and turbulent process, which tends to exacerbate the innate differences between the Soviet Union and our country.

The individual political awakening among people around the world to new prospects for political freedom and economic progress is a process as pregnant with hope as it is laden with dangers.

⑦ How we deal with this evolving challenge can determine whether or not we are successful in seeking world peace.

Our long term objective must be to convince the Soviets of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of (unilateral) disruptive behavior.

The Soviet Union must be disabused of the notion that military supremacy can either be attained or exploited.

We seek a world of peace, without victory for either side.

We acknowledge that a world of diversity - social, political and ideological - can be a world of

~~genuine~~ genuine. Cooperation among  
many nations and cultures.

(11)

Our principal concern is how  
to shape a world which is more  
responsive to the desire for social  
justice, political self-determination,  
for peace, and for basic human  
rights.

(12)

We can be confident about  
the future if we are <sup>consistent and</sup> resolute  
in our conduct.

[Our military strength, our  
economic potential, our scientific  
and intellectual creativity, have  
no equal.] We desire to domi-  
nate no one. We will remain

repeated  
later

(13)

Constructively engaged in widening  
our cooperation with the <sup>positive</sup> need  
forces in the world.

~~We will~~

We want to increase our  
friendship with the emerging  
nations, with the countries in  
Eastern Europe, with the People's  
Republic of China, and, indeed, with  
the Soviet Union. We are  
prepared to cooperate with  
all nations, regardless of their  
systems or ideologies. We are  
particularly dedicated to the  
attainment of genuine self-deter-  
mination and majority rule in  
those parts of the world where  
these goals are yet to be  
attained.

(14)

(15)

We are willing - even sometimes  
eager - to accommodate peaceful  
change, and in this context we  
will continue to seek a stable,  
reciprocal and comprehensive  
detente with the Soviet Union.

(16)

We will ~~not~~ negotiate  
constructively and persistently for  
a fair Strategic Arms Limitation  
agreement. We have no desire to  
link this negotiation with other  
competitive relationships nor to impose  
other special conditions on the  
process. In a democratic society,  
however where public opinion is

an integral factor in the shaping  
and implementation of foreign  
policy, we cannot ~~ignore~~ <sup>pretend</sup> the fact  
that tensions and sharp conflicts

(16)

in our mutual relationship brought  
about by threats to peace ~~are~~  
will not  
~~lead~~ to complicate the quest  
for an agreement. This is  
not a matter of our preference  
but a recognition of the <sup>fact.</sup> truth.

We will always urge  
restraint in areas of tension, to  
support multinational or regional  
organizations dedicated to peace,  
and we will increase as necessary  
our defenses to match any  
challenge which confronts us or  
our allies. Above all, we will  
remain constant in our commit-  
ment to the principles which  
have insured the greatness of  
our nation.

(17)

A strong defense is crucial because it provides us not only safety but a position from which to negotiate for improved relations and for a <sup>mutually</sup> lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

(18)

Both our allies and our potential adversaries must see our strength and be sure of our national will.

(19)

(20)

I am convinced that the Soviets want peace.

They were our allies in the Second World War, and they suffered the <sup>terrible</sup> consequences of that massive conflict ~~by~~ <sup>with</sup> the loss of 20 million Soviet lives.

(21)

One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the <sup>tremendous</sup> shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and other Soviet ports, in support of our joint effort to meet the threat from Nazi Germany.

22

At the end of that war  
there were already strong polit-  
ical differences between our  
two countries. The Soviets did  
not disarm as we did. Our  
monopoly on nuclear explosives  
ended in 1949, <sup>and</sup> our dominant nuclear  
advantage was overcome early in  
this decade.

23

~~Since then~~ we <sup>now</sup> have maintained  
roughly equivalent nuclear strength  
and <sup>have</sup> continued to seek mutual  
accommodation <sup>with the Soviet Union</sup> as demonstrated by  
the Austrian Peace Treaty, the  
Quadripartite agreement in Berlin,

(23) The termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space, the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, SALT I, the limited test ban agreement, and trade agreements.

Similar  
These efforts continue now with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a Comprehensive Test Ban, reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition of attacks on <sup>peaceful</sup> satellites, <sup>an agreement</sup> to stabilize the level of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade, scientific and cultural exchange.

, however,

(25) There are significant differences between us and the Soviet Union caused by conflicting ideologies, domestic attitudes, and aspirations for the future. These differences should be clearly understood by the American people because such understanding provides a base on which <sup>we will</sup> build our political and military policy.

What are these differences?

(26) To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing struggle by all means short of war.

27/  
The Soviets see military  
action or assistance as the best  
means of expanding their  
influence abroad.

28/  
Obviously, areas of instability  
provide a focus for their effort,  
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As was ~~shown~~ obvious in  
Korea, Angola and Ethiopia they  
prefer to use proxy forces to  
fight their battles.

To other nations the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive - far beyond any legitimate requirements for defense of themselves or their allies. For more than fifteen years they have maintained a strong commitment to this program of military growth, investing as much as 13% of their gross national product in military expenditures.

They now have a massive military capability, including 173 army divisions, and this sustained growth continues.

31/ Their gross <sup>abuse</sup> violation of basic human rights in their own country in violation of the agreement reached at Helsinki causes consternation ~~and~~ throughout the freedom-loving world.

32/ The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, imposed on a closed society.

In some ways, even Eurocommunism poses a challenge to Soviet influence in the Communist world.

33 /

Some of these characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviets themselves. Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated.

Eurocommunism →

34 /

Many non-aligned countries are becoming concerned that their movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with and dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic suste-

nance and for political and  
military guidance and direction.

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Outside the tightly controlled  
bloc, the Soviets have little  
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with others are few and frayed.

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Although the Soviets have  
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system in the world, growth of  
this system has dropped alarmingly,  
and their standard of living does not  
compare favorably with that within  
other nations of equivalent development.

Agricultural production still

remains a serious problem for the

Soviet Union; ~~also~~ so that in

37 /

times of average or adverse crop  
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therefore,  
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38 /

Our military capability is  
second to none on earth, our  
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39 /

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Government policy, is bi-partisan and continuous. Americans are pragmatists, and we approach our problems calmly, with common sense and confidence. Our philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our <sup>democratic</sup> way of life warrants admiration and emulation by other people. The <sup>political</sup> trends ~~are~~ seem to be good. (For the first time, all the member nations of NATO are democracies.)

40 / One of our goals which is  
being accomplished is to expand  
our circle of friends among other  
nations in Africa, <sup>the</sup> Mid East, Latin  
America, Asia and Europe. We do  
not recognize the hegemony of any  
nation (~~or others~~) within these regions.

41 / Because of our military and  
political strength, we are in a  
unique ~~position~~ position to help  
lead the world toward peace. Our  
enormous economic strength is  
also a major potential influence  
for <sup>the</sup> the benefit of others.  
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of the Soviet Union. Additionally,  
we are now learning how to use  
our resources more wisely, creating  
a new harmony between our  
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42  
/

Our analysis of American-Soviet <sup>military</sup> strength also furnishes a basis for confidence.

43  
/

We know that neither nation can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which would cripple the societal structure of the original attacking power.

44  
/

Although the Soviets have more missile launchers and greater throw-weight, the United States has more war heads, greater accuracy, more bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better submarines and anti-

submarine warfare capability. #

45/  
The fact is that with  
essential nuclear equivalence, the  
conventional military forces have an  
increasing importance. The capability  
of ourselves and our allies is adequate  
to meet any foreseeable threat.

A successful SALT agreement,  
which we are working to achieve  
without delay, will leave us  
with <sup>but lower</sup> equal numbers of missile  
launchers and missiles with multiple  
warheads. We envision in SALT III  
an even greater mutual reduction.

46  
/

It is <sup>likely</sup> ~~obvious~~ that each side tends to exaggerate the military force strength of the other.

47/  
Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future.

48/  
False or excessive estimates or reports of Soviet strength ~~are~~ or of American weakness contribute to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda efforts.

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For example, recent news reports of military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense

budget in history, and that  
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to the open seas we fare even better.

50/ Let there be ~~not~~ no doubt about  
our present and future strength.

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It would be a mistake for  
anyone to confuse a healthy  
self-criticism and free debate which  
are essential in a democracy with  
either confusion, weakness or despair.

What future developments might

52/ we expect from existing American  
policy toward the Soviet Union?

We will maintain a sustained  
real growth with a prudent increase  
in military spending, keyed to  
NATO and mobile forces and an  
undiminished presence in the Pacific.

53/ We and our Allies will be able  
to meet any foreseeable challenge  
to our security, from strategic  
nuclear forces or from ~~conventional~~  
conventional forces. America has  
the capability and will to honor  
this commitment without excessive

sacrifice by ~~the~~ people of our  
country.

We will try to strengthen  
worldwide  
multi-national and regional organ-  
izations dedicated to enhancing  
international harmony  
~~peace~~, such as the United Nations,  
Organization of American States, and  
the Organization for African Unity.

We will honor the <sup>legitimate</sup> desire  
of ~~other~~ <sup>and nations</sup> people for peace, independence,  
legitimate nationalism, majority rule, ~~and~~  
equality of opportunity, <sup>basic human rights,</sup> and the  
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national boundaries. We will provide

bilaterally and  
aid through multinational organi-  
zations to further the realization  
of these hopes.

5/- We will attempt to prevent  
the proliferation of nuclear weapons  
among nations ~~among nations~~ not  
having this capability.

W

57  
We will seek peace, better  
communication and understanding,  
cultural and scientific exchange,  
and increased trade with the  
Soviet Union and other nations

58  
With our economic, military  
and political strength we will at-  
tempt to convince the Soviet Union  
that a peaceful route into the  
future is best for us all.

Sustained world peace can be our  
greatest joint achievement.

A mood of exasperation and hostility tends to build up among people because of the complexity and difficulty of perceived problems.

With ~~the~~ <sup>few</sup> exceptions, our  
people are descendants of those  
who crossed the sea to come  
to our country, evidence of an  
adventurous spirit which <sup>has</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>lost</sup> ~~lost~~ <sup>optimized</sup>  
our national attitude toward  
present and future challenges  
and opportunities.

We have had little if any  
help from the Soviets in our  
effort to find a peaceful  
solution to the problems in  
Namibia and Rhodesia.

I am glad to be back. Although I return with a different rank, I remember that 32 years ago I had the same experience which most of you are sharing today.

I was not a midshipman officer.

I was thinking more about peace and marriage than about world events or a distant future.

I was disappointed with my first assignment. I had asked for a new destroyer in the Pacific my orders were to the oldest ship in the <sup>Atlantic</sup> fleet - the USS Wyoming - so dilapidated that for reasons of safety it was not permitted alongside the pier in Norfolk but had to anchor <sup>in isolation</sup> in Hampton Roads.

We had a distinguished graduation speaker, ADM Chester Mimitz - but I don't recall anything he said. I do remember my hope that the ceremonies would be brief. I was disappointed.

And I have to confess to you in confidence that, <sup>as a new ensign</sup> I did not expect to come back here later as President of the United States.

I reluctantly left the Navy seven years after graduation. The Academy and the Navy provided excellent training for the career I have finally chosen - but I have found Washington to be a less orderly and predictable place than ~~my service~~ <sup>my service</sup> here at Annapolis unless it has changed - but in the last 30 years.