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### Withdrawal Sheet (Presidential Libraries)

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<th>Correspondents or Title</th>
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<td>Letter</td>
<td>PM Sadat to Pres. Carter, w/attachments 4 pp., re:request for mapping assistance</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>Phil Wise to Pres. Carter, w/attachments 3 pp., re:Peace Corps</td>
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<td>Sam Brown to Pres. Carter, 2 pp., re:Peace Corps</td>
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<td>Kraft &amp; Miller to Pres. Carter, w/attachments 17 pp., re:HEW appointments</td>
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**File Location**
Carter Presidential Papers-Staff Offices, Office of Staff Sec.-Presidential Handwriting File, 11/22/78 Box 110

**Restriction Codes**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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**National Archives and Records Administration**
NA Form 1429 (6-86)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

22 Nov 78

Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Arnie Miller
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| SANDERS |
| VOORDE |
| WARREN |
| WISE |
Tim,

Reuben is very high on Tim Williams for AG job. "Completely qualified to be Governor or to hold any other top job."

J
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT: Chairperson of the White House Conference on Families

We have worked closely with Secretary Califano's staff during recent weeks in selecting candidates to be the Chairperson of the White House Conference on Families. As indicated in the Secretary's memorandum, we all agree that Governor Reubin Askew is the best person for this. His Executive Assistant has advised us that Askew might consider the position.

If Governor Askew is not selected and/or willing, we believe that Sargent Shriver is the best choice from among the alternatives listed. We would want to support him with a good Executive Director. However, we do not believe any of the other alternative candidates should be selected.

Moon Landrieu should be reserved for a full-time job within the Administration.

We agree with Secretary Califano about Governor Jerry Apodaca being a fine Chairperson of the Conference. However, we have checked further on his availability since the transmittal of the Secretary's memorandum and have found that Governor Apodaca would not be willing to relinquish his Chairmanship of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports for the Families Conference Chairmanship. We believe it would be unwise and inappropriate for Governor Apodaca to be Chairman of both.

We agree with Secretary Califano's fine assessment of Jack Conway. However we do not believe that he is sufficiently prominent to be a successful Chairman of this Conference.

As we discussed in our meeting, we think it would be appropriate for you to call Governor Askew and ask him if he would like to serve. If he declines, then we recommend that you ask Sargent Shriver.
RECOMMENDATION:

We recommend that you appoint Governor Askew:

_________ approve  _________ disapprove

We recommend that you appoint Sargent Shriver as second choice:

_________ approve  _________ disapprove
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CHAIRPERSON OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES

On April fourteenth, you issued a statement (at Tab A) announcing the appointment of Wilbur Cohen as Chairman of the White House Conference on Families. On May twenty-eighth, Cohen, who is suffering from a thyroid condition, resigned from the chairmanship. As a result of Cohen's resignation and the interest the states have shown in the Conference, the need for additional planning time caused us to postpone the Conference until 1981. Attached at Tab B is my press announcement.

We are now at a stage in the planning of the Conference and coordinating with state and local initiatives when it is timely to move forward with a new Chairperson. Moreover, you may wish to announce the selection of the Chairperson during the week of November nineteenth, which you have proclaimed as National Family Week.

Over recent weeks, members of my staff have discussed various candidates with Stu Eizenstat, Tim Kraft, Bert Carp, Arnie Miller, and Harley Frankel, of your staff. We agree that Reubin Askew, the outgoing Governor of Florida, is the best person to chair the Advisory Committee to the Conference and to chair the Conference itself.
Before turning to Wilbur Cohen, I had sounded out Governor Askew's interest in taking on the position of Chairperson. At the time, he stated that he planned to dedicate himself fully to private practice after January and that he was therefore not available. More recently, however, we have received indications through Tim Kraft and Arnie Miller that Governor Askew might now be responsive to a request from you personally.

We recommend Askew because of the stature and visibility he would bring to the Conference, because of his experience as an effective administrator and politician, and because of his personal and public concern about American families. (Under Askew's leadership Florida conducted the first statewide conference on families.) A biographical sketch is attached.

In the event that Governor Askew is not available, I suggest four alternatives for your consideration:

1. Sargent Shriver is currently a partner in the Washington law firm of Fried, Frank, Shriver, and Kampelman. He is widely respected in the country for the idealism and energy which he brought to the leadership of the Peace Corps and the Office of Economic Opportunity, and he would bring enormous enthusiasm to the Conference.

2. Moon Landrieu, the former Mayor of New Orleans, was one of the most successful big city mayors in the country. He built a national reputation as a sound administrator and forward-looking politician, and he managed to maintain the support of diverse constituencies. I understand from Tim Kraft that Landrieu is being considered for another position in the Administration, but I believe that he would be a very able Chairperson of the Conference.

3. Jerry Apodaca, the outgoing Governor of New Mexico has expressed interest in the White House Conference on Families. You recently appointed Apodaca as Chairman of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports. We believe, however, that Apodaca, who is deeply committed to families and to this Conference, would accept the chairmanship if he were asked.
4. Jack Conway is currently Senior Vice President of United Way. He is a former Executive Director of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and of the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, and from 1971-1975 was President of Common Cause. Conway currently serves on the Department's Ethical Advisory Board. He is a proven administrator and successful negotiator, but lacks the national recognition of Askew or Apodaca.

While Governor Askew is our first choice, any of the other four candidates would be acceptable to me. They are ranked in the order of my preference and do not necessarily reflect the preference of your staff.

It is important to move promptly on this, as we are receiving increasing questions from the constituencies who are deeply interested, particularly the blacks, ethnics and religious groups (most notably the Catholics and Fundamentalists).

Approve:

Askew
Shriver
Landrieu
Apodaca
Conway
Other
DATE: 09 NOV 78
FOR ACTION: TIM KRAFT

INFO ONLY: STU EIZENSTAT  ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT: CALIFANO'S MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT RE: CHAIRPERSON OF
THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES

RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052)
BY: 1100 AM SATURDAY 11 NOV 78

ACTION REQUESTED:
STAFF RESPONSE: ( ) I CONCUR. ( ) NO COMMENT. ( ✓ ) HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:

Rick
we're working with Califano's
underlings on a shorter
short list

JH
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Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Approve:

Askew
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Landrieu
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Other
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Cohen, 64, of Ann Arbor, Michigan, was with the Social Security Administration from 1935 to 1956, serving as director of the Division of Research and Statistics from 1953 to 1956. From 1956 to 1969 he was a professor of public welfare administration at the University of Michigan.

Cohen served as assistant secretary of health, education and welfare from 1961 to 1965, as under secretary from 1965 to 1968, and as secretary from 1968 to 1969. Since 1969 he has been dean of the School of Education at Michigan. He is resigning as dean effective June 30 of this year, but will remain with the University as a professor of education and public welfare administration.

Cohen is the author of several books and numerous articles on social security. He is considered one of the pioneering leaders in the development of social security in the United States, and was also an early advocate of the Medicare program.

The White House Conference on Families, scheduled for December 9-13, 1979, will explore all facets of family life in America. President Carter has termed the family "both the foundation of American society and its most important institution.

In announcing the Conference, the President said last January 30:

"The main purpose of this White House Conference will be to examine the strengths of American families, the difficulties they face, and the ways in which family life is affected by public policies. The Conference will examine the important effects that the world of work, the mass media, the court system, private institutions, and other major facets of our society have on American families."
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The Conference had previously been scheduled for December 9 - 13, 1979 in Washington, D.C.

The Conference will explore all facets of American family life, as well as examine policies and programs to help strengthen the family.

In announcing the decision to reschedule the conference, Secretary Califano said:

"On May 28, the Conference lost its distinguished chairperson, former HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen, for health reasons. Mr. Cohen's resignation -- as well as the resignation of the Conference's talented Executive Director, Patsy Fleming -- means that we have to start anew in constructing an outstanding leadership team to plan a complex event on a vital subject.

"A second reason for postponing the Conference is the heavy interest that the States have shown in additional planning time at the State and local level.
"Nearly all states have been contacted and many expressed a desire for more lead time in which to hold state conferences and to promote local discussion of family issues among local groups and organizations. Seven states so far have held state-wide conferences on the Family and others are planned for the remainder of 1978 and 1979."
REUBIN O'DONOVAN ASKEW (Democrat) was born September 11, 1928, in Muskogee, Oklahoma. After graduating from high school, the Governor served in the U.S. Army as a paratrooper, 1946-47. He entered Florida State University where he served as student body president, graduating in 1951 with a B.S. degree in public administration. After two additional years of active duty in the air force, Governor Askew was admitted to the University of Florida Law School. In 1956, he received his LL.B. degree. The Governor served as assistant Escambia County solicitor, 1956-58, and was elected to the Florida House of Representatives in 1958 and to the State Senate in 1952. He served as president pro tempore of the Senate before resigning to run for Governor in 1970. Governor Askew won the Florida gubernatorial seat in 1970. In 1974 he became the first Governor in Florida history to be elected to a second consecutive four-year term. He served as chairman of the Education Commission of the States, 1973-74, vice-chairman (1973-74) and chairman (1974-75) of the Southern Governors' Conference and chairman of the Democratic Governors' Conference, 1976-77. Governor Askew was chairman of the National Governors' Conference in 1977. He is a member of the 1977-78 NGA Executive Committee.

Member: First Judicial Circuit, Florida and American Bar Associations, Masons, Shrine, Rotary, American Legion. Married, two children. Presbyterian.

Inaugurated January 1971
Reelected November 1974
Term will expire January 1979
ID 785730  THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:  09 NOV 78
FOR ACTION: TIM KRAFT

INFO ONLY: STU EIZENSTAT          ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT:  CALIFANO'S MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT RE: CHAIRPERSON OF
THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FAMILIES

+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY:  1100 AM SATURDAY 11 NOV 78 +

ACTION REQUESTED:

STAFF RESPONSE: ( ) I CONCUR. ( ) NO COMMENT. ( ) HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 14, 1978

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Term will expire January 1979
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
22 Nov 78

Jim McIntyre

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Stu Eizenstat
Jack Watson
To Secretary Brock Adams

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
Mr. President:

Stu Eizenstat's comment is attached.

Jack Watson concurs with Stu.

Rick
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr.

SUBJECT: Washington, D. C. Metro

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

16 NOV 1978

Some significant Metro-related policy differences have emerged over the last two months among the Department of Transportation, OMB and the Domestic Policy Staff. Because critical meetings with key local political leaders are scheduled for later this month and on December 15, 1978, this memo seeks clarification of the Administration's position.

While we are in agreement on several important points regarding Metro, key differences have emerged concerning: (a) whether the Administration should actually be endorsing construction of the full 101 miles and the implication of such a statement; (b) the 1981-1986 budget implications of whatever course of action we follow; and (c) how assertive the Federal Government should be regarding the design and cost of Metro construction.

System Scope

Regarding the "101 miles", Secretary Adams wants to say that the Administration agrees with the local goal of building the whole system over the next several years. Once Interstate transfer funds are exhausted, the Secretary would use UMTA discretionary grants in 1982 and beyond to fund Metro. There are several major drawbacks to such a position:

- endorsement will be perceived as a "build it no matter what it costs" commitment, thus sharply reducing incentives for design and cost control;

- it apparently commits the Federal Government to building segments in future years that we might otherwise prefer not to build;

- the post-1980 budget implications are potentially very large, as discussed below;

- DOT and OMB assessments show that certain suburban portions of the 40 miles not yet under construction would be among the least cost-effective and most overdesigned rail transit segments ever funded by the Federal Government; and
- unqualified endorsement of recent local analyses and unbuilt segments of Metro seriously weaken DOT's efforts to foster objective analysis and cost-effective projects elsewhere in the country.

**Budget implications**

The budget implications of Metro construction alone are serious (i.e. excluding Metro's $1 billion of federally guaranteed bonds and the prospect of half billion dollar annual operating deficits by the 1990's).

- About $4 billion ($2.4 billion Federal) is being spent on the first 60 miles.

- The 40 miles not yet under construction would cost an additional $2.5 to $3.0 billion, only about $1 billion of which can be covered by Washington area Interstate transfer funds.

- The $1.5 to $2.0 billion "unfunded" balance could put a $1.2 to $1.6 billion (80% matching) burden on the UMTA budget in 1982-1985.

- Metro wants at least $400 million (their "stretched out" Plan II) of Federal funding annually through 1985 to build the 101 miles. Their first preference (Plan I) is even higher.

- The differences between Metro's desire and available Federal funds increase beyond 1980 as shown in the following table:

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☑ Agree with local goal to complete 101 miles. Advise Metro to live with funding constraint decision. (See below.)

☐ Simply state that we understand the local goal. Do not commit to the 101 miles. Advise Metro of cost-effectiveness need and funding constraint. (See below.)

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Strategy on post-Interstate transfer funding:

☐ Fund Metro at their Plan II requested level. I understand this would require $250-300 million per year above the transit levels in the pending highway-transit legislation (Metro's recommendation).

☐ Fund Metro at or near their requested level, but within overall transit totals in pending highway-transit legislation. I understand that this would probably require deferring construction starts on any additional U.S. rapid transit proposals until at least 1985. (Implicit in DOT's approach).

☑ Stretch Metro construction out so that it can be funded within budget planning forecasts and without major disruption to overall transit program. Fund only cost effective segments of Metro. (OMB recommendation).

☐ See me.

Decision on cost and design assumptions

☐ Tilt in favor of local choice.

☑ Exert Federal review to achieve greatest cost savings possible consistent with reasonable local acceptability and state-of-the-art technical feasibility.

☐ See me.

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ATTENTION: Rick Hutcherson, Staff Secretary

FROM: Brock Adams

SUBJECT: Washington Metro Transportation System

I am aware of your concern about the planning, costs, and implementation of the Washington Metro transportation system.

Stu Elizenstat, Jim McIntyre and other representatives of OMB, and myself and other representatives of the Department of Transportation, have been meeting on this matter for the last several weeks, since the Administration has imposed on Metro an August 31 deadline to submit a financial and construction plan, as well as an analysis of alternatives to the original construction for the project.

On Wednesday, August 15, the Metro Board will brief the press on their proposed plan. On Thursday, August 17, at 9:30 a.m., the plan will be presented to the Metro Board and the press will be authorized to release the contents.

At the last meeting of the OMB/Domestic Council/GCT group, we reached agreement on the following points which, if you approve, I would give to the press as the Administration's response to the Metro plan:

1. We are pleased with your serious effort. It provides a basis for local, state, and Federal agencies to comment and develop specific financing programs.

2. Alternatives analysis is over, and we agree with the goal of completing a 100-mile system over the next several years.

3. We will provide detailed comments on the financial plan over the next several months. Today, it is clear that:

   a. We generally favor Plan II, not Plan I, as a more realistic schedule for funds and construction.
b. We can support a Tier I construction program provided it can be financed through the use of interstate transfer funds and provided the segments to be built are usable and contiguous. Available interstate transfer resources, together with local matching funds, will finance approximately $1 billion in construction and represents our good faith commitment toward the 100-mile system goal.

c. Federal funds beyond the interstate transfer account, for fiscal years 1983 and beyond, can be provided under normal procedures from UMTA's Section 3 program on an 80-20 basis. You have already satisfied the alternatives analysis requirement for eligibility for Section 3 funds, and your ability to compete for Section 3 funds will be greatly enhanced if collectively the local and State governments can establish a regional tax or some source of dedicated revenue to provide local capital, operating and debt service funds.

d. We do not agree with your 80-20 assumption on debt service. We are willing to negotiate a new agreement and our staff will have some proposals later this fall as part of our comments on the financial plan.

4. You have already taken giant strides. The next steps are for all affected State and local governments to review this plan with care. We are prepared to support a supplemental appropriation request of $275 million for fiscal 1979 as the first commitment beyond the 60-mile system. By early 1979, we must have a new agreement sharing the debt service, and by next spring a new capital contributions agreement from the local and State governments. And the sooner there is established an adequate regional tax to cover capital, operating, and debt service costs, the easier it will be to qualify for additional Federal funds and proceed toward the goal we all share: a first rate, effective Metro rail system service all parts of this capital region.

Will you please indicate to me whether this meets with your approval, or if you wish me to pursue some other course of action.

Approve [ ]

Disapprove [ ]

Other [ ]

cc: Stu Eizenstat
Jim McIntyre
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
FROM: JIM McINTYRE STU LIZENSTAT

SUBJECT: Metro

As you know, the President has approved the general directions we have agreed to on the future funding of the Washington Metro transportation system. Within those general directions there are several points in your memorandum which we would like to clarify.

We agree that the local jurisdictions should be complimented for the work they have done in conducting the alternatives analysis and for presenting a financial plan. Further, we recognize that those jurisdictions have agreed to the construction of a 100+ mile system. We want it to be clear, however, that while we understand this local goal, we cannot make any commitment now that all the federal resources they wish to finance the system will be available.

With regard to the Tier I construction program we should make it clear that our preference for the use of construction funds is for those usable, contiguous segments with the highest expected ridership.

It should be made clear to the local jurisdictions that funding through UMTA's Section 3 program will be on a competitive basis along with the construction proposals of other areas around the country. Total Section 3 funding levels will be determined in the normal budget process.

Finally, the timing of a 1973 supplemental for Metro will depend on the Administration's final reaction to the financial plan and the conclusion of an agreement on the debt service.
I share some of OMB's concerns with DOT's approach to further funding for the Washington Metro.

According to most experts some of the unbuilt segments of the Metro system compare very unfavorably with alternative projects in other cities. For example, some of the proposed new Metro lines will provide heavily-subsidized, high-cost transportation to relatively few, high-income suburban commuters.

For this reason I agree with OMB that we should adopt a very tough budgetary stance toward Metro. We should insist that further construction should be funded within planning forecasts, and we should not allow Metro to crowd out more worthwhile projects in other cities. Moreover, we should exert greater federal oversight to insure that the system is not overbuilt, and that only the most cost-effective segments are built first.

I disagree, however, with OMB's recommendation that our public position should be only that we "understand" the local goal. Secretary Adams has already stated that he "agrees with the local goal of a 101 mile system." The local press has interpreted this as a commitment to fund the entire system. Any revision now of this statement, such as "we understand the local goal" would be interpreted as a retreat signalling our intention to cut back the system.

As a political matter there is no need for us to explicitly state now that we intend to curtail the system. Approximately $1 billion of interstate transfer money is available for the next phase of construction. Until this money is exhausted it would be premature for us to take a position that we favor curtailment of the system, since, we, or future Administrations, may actually favor completing the entire system.
Moreover, the local governments are bound together in a tenuous political compact based on the belief that the whole system will eventually be built. Local matching shares have been contributed by some jurisdictions based solely on promises of future construction. If the system is not built, complex legal and political battles will certainly ensue.

For us to imply now that we may not be willing to support the entire system could destroy this local compact and prevent local agreement on any further financing of construction or operating deficits. We would then be blamed for halting construction. There could be sharp criticism both locally and nationally from urban supporters.

In summary, I recommend that you allow Adams to continue to state his agreement with the local goal of 101 miles (Issue 1), but that you agree with OMB's tough budgetary stance on the implementation of this goal (Issues 2 and 3).
DATE: 16 NOV 78

INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT

ANNE WEXLER

FOR ACTION: STU EIZENSTAT

JACK WATSON

FRANK MOORE (LES FRANCIS)

LOUIS MARTIN

SUBJECT: MCINTYRE MEMO RE WASHINGTON, D.C. METRO

RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON, STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) 

BY: 1200 PM SATURDAY 18 NOV 78

ACTION REQUESTED: YOUR COMMENTS

STAFF RESPONSE: ( ) I CONCUR. ( ) NO COMMENT. ( ) HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:
FOR STAFFING
FOR INFORMATION
FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
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| LOUIS MARTIN |          |          |           |

| ARAGON | BOURNE | BUTLER | H. CARTER |
| CLOUGH | COSTANZA | CRUIKSHANK | FALLows |
| FIRST LADY | Gammill | HARDEN | HUTcheson |
| JAGODA | LINDER | MITCHELL | MOE |
| PETERSON | PETTIGREW | PRESS | RAFSHOON |
| SCHNEIDERS | VOORDE | WARREN | WISE |

| ADAMS | ANDRUS | BELL | BERGLAND |
| BLUMENTHAL | BROWN | CALIFANO | HARRIS |
| KREPS | MARSHALL | SCHLESINGER | STRAUSS |
| VANCE |          |          |         |
I agree with OMB's assessment of the situation, but endorse Stu's recommendation on the politics of the issue.

For the reasons outlined by Stu, there is no reason for us to send signals about curtailment of the system at this time. I recommend letting Brock's statement stand.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  THE PRESIDENT
FROM:  James T. McIntyre, Jr. (Signed)  Jim
SUBJECT: Washington, D.C. Metro

The Administration was asked to testify before the House District Committee on Metro-related issues. In the course of developing and reviewing the draft testimony some disagreements have emerged among the Department of Transportation, OMB and the Domestic Policy Staff. This memo seeks clarification of the Administration's position.

While we are in agreement on several important points regarding Metro, key differences have emerged concerning: (a) whether the Administration should actually be endorsing construction of the full 101 miles and the implication of such a statement; (b) the 1981-1986 budget implications of whatever course of action we follow; and (c) how assertive the Federal Government should be regarding the design and cost of Metro construction.

System Scope

Regarding the "101 miles", Secretary Adams wants to say that the Administration agrees with the local goal of building the whole system over the next several years. Once Interstate transfer funds are exhausted, the Secretary would use UMTA discretionary grants in 1982 and beyond to fund Metro. There are several major drawbacks to such a position:

- endorsement will be perceived as a "build it no matter what it costs" commitment, thus sharply reducing incentives for design and cost control;

- it apparently commits the Federal Government to building segments in future years that we might otherwise prefer not to build;

- the post-1980 budget implications are potentially very large, as discussed below;

- DOT and OMB assessments show that certain suburban portions of the 40 miles not yet under construction would be among the least cost-effective and most overdesigned rail transit segments ever funded by the Federal Government; and
- unqualified endorsement of recent local analyses and unbuilt segments of Metro seriously weaken DOT's efforts to foster objective analysis and cost-effective projects elsewhere in the country.

Budget Implications

The budget implications of Metro construction alone are serious (i.e., excluding Metro's $1 billion of federally guaranteed bonds and the prospect of half billion dollar annual operating deficits by the 1990's).

- About $4 billion ($2.4 billion Federal) is being spent on the first 60 miles.

- The 40 miles not yet under construction would cost an additional $2.5 to $3.0 billion, only about $1 billion of which can be covered by Washington area Interstate transfer funds.

- The $1.5 to $2.0 billion "unfunded" balance could put a $1.2 to $1.6 billion (80% matching) burden on the UMTA budget in 1982-1985.

- Metro wants at least $400 million (their "stretched out" Plan II) of Federal funding annually through 1985 to build the 101 miles. Their first preference (Plan I) is even higher.

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INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT
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SUBJECT: MCINTYRE MEMO RE WASHINGTON, D.C. METRO

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Strategy on post-Interstate transfer funding:

☐ Fund Metro at their Plan II requested level. I understand this would require $250-300 million per year above the transit levels in the pending highway-transit legislation (Metro's recommendation).

☐ Fund Metro at or near their requested level, but within overall transit totals in pending highway-transit legislation. I understand that this would probably require deferring construction starts on any additional U.S. rapid transit proposals until at least 1985. (Implicit in DOT's approach).

☐ Stretch Metro construction out so that it can be funded within budget planning forecasts and without major disruption to overall transit program. Fund only cost effective segments of Metro. (OMB recommendation).

☐ See me.

Decision on cost and design assumptions

☐ Tilt in favor of local choice.

☐ Exert Federal review to achieve greatest cost savings possible consistent with reasonable local acceptability and state-of-the-art technical feasibility.

☐ See me.

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ATTENTION: Rick Hutcheson, Staff Secretary

FROM: Brock Adams

SUBJECT: Washington Metro Transportation System

I am aware of your concern about the planning, costs, and implementation of the Washington Metro transportation system.

Stu Eizenstat, Jim McIntyre and other representatives of OMB, and myself and other representatives of the Department of Transportation, have been meeting on this matter for the last several weeks, since the Administration has imposed on Metro an August 31 deadline to submit a financial and construction plan, as well as an analysis of alternatives to the original construction for the project.

On Wednesday, August 15, the Metro Board will brief the press on their proposed plan. On Thursday, August 17, at 9:30 a.m., the plan will be presented to the Metro Board and the press will be authorized to release the contents.

At the last meeting of the OMB/Domestic Council/DOE group, we reached agreement on the following points which, if you approve, I would give to the press as the Administration's response to the Metro plan:

1. We are pleased with your serious effort. It provides a basis for local, state, and Federal agencies to comment and develop specific financing programs.

2. Alternatives analysis is over, and we agree with the goal of completing a 100-mile system over the next several years.

3. We will provide detailed comments on the financial plan over the next several months. Today, it is clear that:

   a. We generally favor Plan II, not Plan I, as a more realistic schedule for funds and construction.
b. We can support a Tier I construction program provided it can be financed through the use of interstate transfer funds and provided the segments to be built are usable and contiguous. Available interstate transfer resources, together with local matching funds, will finance approximately $1 billion in construction and represents our good faith commitment toward the 100-mile system goal.

c. Federal funds beyond the interstate transfer account, for fiscal years 1983 and beyond, can be provided under normal procedures from UMTA's Section 3 program on an 80-20 basis. You have already satisfied the alternatives analysis requirement for eligibility for Section 3 funds, and your ability to compete for Section 3 funds will be greatly enhanced if collectively the local and State governments can establish a regional tax or some source of dedicated revenue to provide local capital, operating and debt service funds.

d. We do not agree with your 80-20 assumption on debt service. We are willing to negotiate a new agreement and our staff will have some proposals later this fall as part of our comments on the financial plan.

4. You have already taken giant strides. The next steps are for all affected State and local governments to review this plan with care. We are prepared to support a supplemental appropriation request of $275 million for fiscal 1979 as the first commitment beyond the 60-mile system. By early 1979, we must have a new agreement sharing the debt service, and by next spring a new capital contributions agreement from the local and State governments. And the sooner there is established an adequate regional tax to cover capital, operating, and debt service costs, the easier it will be to qualify for additional Federal funds and proceed toward the goal we all share: a first rate, effective Metro rail system service all parts of this capital region.

Will you please indicate to me whether this meets with your approval, or if you wish me to pursue some other course of action.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

cc: Stu Eisenstat
    Jim McIntyre
MEMORANDUM FOR:  SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
FROM:  JIM MCINTYRE  
STU EISENSTAT  
SUBJECT:  Metro

As you know, the President has approved the general directions we have agreed to on the future funding of the Washington Metro transportation system. Within those general directions there are several points in your memorandum which we would like to clarify.

We agree that the local jurisdictions should be complimented for the work they have done in conducting the alternatives analysis and for presenting a financial plan. Further, we recognize that those jurisdictions have agreed to the construction of a 100+ mile system. We want it to be clear, however, that while we understand this local goal, we cannot make any commitment now that all the federal resources they wish to finance the system will be available.

With regard to the Tier I construction program we should make it clear that our preference for the use of construction funds is for those usable, contiguous segments with the highest expected ridership.

It should be made clear to the local jurisdictions that funding through UMTA's Section 3 program will be on a competitive basis along with the construction proposals of other areas around the country. Total Section 3 funding levels will be determined in the normal budget process.

Finally, the timing of a 1975 supplemental for Metro will depend on the Administration's final reaction to the financial plan and the conclusion of an agreement on the debt service.
You should be aware that the Secretary and the UMTA Administrator feel that the political compact that forms the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority might break apart if the Federal Government mandated a truncation of the local plan. While OMB believes that in the long run less than 101 miles is more sensible, we agree with DOT that it would cause needless controversy for the Federal Government to mandate a cutback in plans at this time. Conversely, to go 100 degrees in the other direction and endorse the 101 miles plan is equally undesirable from a Federal budgetary and programmatic standpoint. We would prefer to keep the fiscal heat on the local jurisdictions and let local rather than Federal finances determine the scope and pace of Metro construction. Thus, a middle ground approach seems best.

OMB recommends that the Administration position simply be that we understand the local goal of 101 miles, but that parts of that system may not be cost effective and we cannot make any commitment to fund everything the localities want to build. We also believe that given the vast amount of Federal aid already provided to Metro that no special increase should be incorporated in UMTA's long range budget, and that a strong signal be given to DOT to encourage cost savings in Metro design.

We are not asking for specific budget decisions in this memo, only that Federal policy on how to deal with Metro be clarified. DOT and OMB will have to respond to Metro in the next few weeks on Metro's long range financial plan for construction, bond service and retirement, and operating costs. Your action on this memo is necessary so that DOT and OMB have a common understanding of your position as we deal with Metro.

Decision on 101 mile scope

☐ Agree with local goal to complete 101 miles. Advise Metro to live with funding constraint decision. (See below.)

☐ Simply state that we understand the local goal. Do not commit to the 101 miles. Advise Metro of cost-effectiveness need and funding constraint. (See below.)

☐ See me.
Strategy on post-Interstate transfer funding:

☐ Fund Metro at their Plan II requested level. I understand this would require $250-300 million per year above the transit levels in the pending highway-transit legislation (Metro's recommendation).

☐ Fund Metro at or near their requested level, but within overall transit totals in pending highway-transit legislation. I understand that this would probably require deferring construction starts on any additional U.S. rapid transit proposals until at least 1985. (Implicit in DOT's approach).

☐ Stretch Metro construction out so that it can be funded within budget planning forecasts and without major disruption to overall transit program. Fund only cost effective segments of Metro. (OMB recommendation).

☐ See me.

Decision on cost and design assumptions:

☐ Tilt in favor of local choice.

☐ Exert Federal review to achieve greatest cost savings possible consistent with reasonable local acceptability and state-of-the-art technical feasibility.

☐ See me.

Attachments
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
22 Nov 78

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT

ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT: Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Board of Directors

The Board of Directors of OPIC consists of eleven members; six are public members and five are officials of the Federal government.

There will be a vacancy occurring on the Board of Directors in December of 1978. Senator Frank Church has strongly endorsed the candidacy of Mr. William Landau, of Scarsdale, New York, for this vacancy. Landau is a managing partner in the firm of Mann Judd Landau Certified Public Accountants. He is also a member of the New York Bar Association.

Frank Moore, Governor Gilligan, and Bruce Llewellyn strongly support the appointment of Mr. Landau.

RECOMMENDATION:

Nominate William Landau to be a Member of the Board of Directors of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

_____ approve   _____ disapprove

[Signature]
EDUCATION

Lehigh University - B.S. Degree
New York Law School - L.L.B. Degree

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY

1951 to Present

U.S. firm of Mann Judd Landau (formerly Fred Landau & Co.) - Certified Public Accountants. Presently Managing Partner.

During my twenty-five years with the firm my responsibilities have included supervision of audits for various industries, including manufacturing, insurance, banking, retailing, etc.

In my present capacity as Managing Partner the firm has expanded from a single U.S. office with under twenty people to an international firm, comprised of six national offices with an employee compliment of approximately two hundred people and offices in twenty-three countries throughout the world, with over two thousand employees.

My responsibilities include formation of national and worldwide policies for the firm, quality standards, expansion, and I am also an advisor to our major clients in acquisitions, mergers and finance. The performance of these responsibilities necessitates that I travel extensively throughout the United States and the world.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Certified Public Accountant - In the States of New York, Illinois, California
Member of the State Societies in New York, Illinois, California
Past Member of the Committee on Cooperation with Bankers and Professional Ethics Committee of the New York State Society of CPAs
Member of the American Institute of CPAs
Member of the New York Bar Association

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

National Campaign Treasurer in 1976 for the election of Senator Frank Church for President of the United States.
ELEEMOSYNARY ORGANIZATIONS

Member of the Board of Trustees - Music for Westchester Symphony Orchestra
Treasurer - Young Men's Division of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine
President and Member of the Board of Trustees - Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Member of the Board of Trustees - Federation of Philanthropies - New York
Member of the Board of Governors - New York United Jewish Appeal

MILITARY SERVICE

United States Army Infantry - Two Years

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Born New York City - September 10, 1926
Health Excellent
Married to Edith Landau; Two Daughters: Margaret, 23; Deborah, 21.
All deputies at White House are Executive Level IV

All special assistants are Executive Level III

(Executive Level IV is the same level of all Assistant Secretaries)

Executive Level V is essentially GS-18's....

per david rubenstein
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM McINTYRE
SUBJECT: Number of Executive Level and Super Grade Positions (or equivalent) in CEA and DPS

Council of Economic Advisers
(a) One Executive Level II
(b) Two Executive Level IV
(c) Currently two people are being paid at the Super Grade Level.

Domestic Policy Staff
The positions in DPS are excepted positions. Currently, there are sixteen people, including those DPS positions on the White House staff, being paid at or above the GS-16 level. Of these, five (including Stu) are paid over $47,500 (which presently is the cap for Executive Level V and Super Grade positions).
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
22 Nov 78

The First Lady
Jerry Rafshoon

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It
is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Phil Wise
Fran Voorde
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

to

1st Lady
Jill Biden

cc Orla
Fran
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Phil has seen.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY
FROM: JERRY RAFSHOO
SUBJECT: Barbara Walters interview

You previously approved a Barbara Walters joint interview on the 90-day agenda. ABC-TV would like to do this as a one-hour special on Thursday, December 14, from 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. This would be taped in the afternoon in the Blue Room and would give us the opportunity to show the Christmas tree and the antique toy decorations. This first half-hour would consist of Barbara's substantive questions and the second half-hour would be of a more human nature. I have ascertained that she will never again ask you questions like the one about your double bed, etc. This type of questioning harms her more than you. The interview could be a good human interest bit of soft exposure. The staff party orginially scheduled for that evening has been changed to December 18.

[Signature]

Check __ Approve ______ Disapprove

[Signature]
DATE: 21 NOV 78

FOR ACTION:

INFO ONLY: JODY POWELL

SUBJECT: MEMO TO PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY RE BARBARA WALTERS INTERVIEW

----------------------------------------
RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052)  

BY:

----------------------------------------

ACTION REQUESTED: YOUR COMMENTS

STAFF RESPONSE: ( ) I CONCUR. ( ) NO COMMENT. ( ) HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:
Jack Watson

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Stu Eizenstat
Anne Wexler
Tim Kraft
Phil Wise
Fran Voorde
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To: Jack Watson

cc Sta, Ann, Tim, Phil, Fran
Mr. President:

This can be scheduled during your holding time while the press file your speech.

Phil
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JACK WATSON
SUBJECT: St. Louis - November 27

As you know, meeting your goals in the FY 80 budget will require significant cuts in numerous programs that state and local officials are most concerned with. It is very important that we engender as much personal political support as possible for you and our anti-inflation efforts since substantive arguments program-by-program will be hard to win. Your trip to the National League of Cities' Annual Meeting in St. Louis on the 27th gives us an excellent opportunity for you to have a brief personal visit with several key elected local officials.

Recommendation

I recommend that you drop by a budget briefing we will set up for about twenty-five to thirty mayors and other key local elected leaders (Coleman Young, Tom Bradley, Mike Bilandic, Nick Carbone, etc.). Immediately following your speech, you would simply do a drop-by for 10-15 minutes to stress the necessity of budget constraint and to ask for their personal support in these difficult times. You would then turn the briefing over to Jim McIntyre or Bo Cutter, who would give a more detailed background briefing on the budget issues.

This kind of personal request for support directly from you is almost impossible for them to refuse and is more effective than anything else we could do at this stage on the budget.

Anne, Tim and Stu join in this recommendation.

APPROVE   V    DISAPPROVE
Alec McCowen

Bible > Spiritual Text
Great Story
Jesus Himself
St. Mark. Reporter
Gospel = Good News
16 Mar - 678 Verses
Works Out A Net
Spontaneously - Credible

white house reception
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
11/22/78

Arnie Miller
Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT
       ARNIE MILLER

SUBJECT: The President's Commission on World Hunger

The President's Commission on World Hunger was established by Executive Order this year. During the first meeting of the Commission on October 5, Chairman Sol Linowitz recommended to you Muriel Humphrey for appointment to the last vacancy on the Commission. Her participation as a member would be very helpful to him.

Muriel Humphrey (Waverly, Minnesota): Former U. S. Senator from Minnesota.

RECOMMENDATION:

Appoint Muriel Humphrey as a member of the President's Commission on World Hunger as recommended by Chairman Sol Linowitz.

[Signature]

approve disapprove
Muriel Fay Buck Humphrey, of Waverly, Minnesota, was born in Huron, South Dakota, on February 20, 1912. She is the daughter of Andrew E. Buck and Jessie M. Pierce Buck. There were two brothers, Merle F. and Gordon.

Following her graduation from Huron High School, she attended Huron College. On September 3, 1936, she married Hubert Horatio Humphrey, of Huron, South Dakota. Their children are Mrs. C. Bruce (Nancy) Solomonson; Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Robert Andrew Humphrey and Douglas Sannes Humphrey. There are eight granddaughters and two grandsons.

Mrs. Humphrey was an active partner in her husband's career -- first in assisting him to complete his education and then in campaigning for him for public office on a local, state and national level.

She is reported to be the first wife of a national nominee of either party to campaign independently for her husband outside her home state. That political history was made when she plunged on her own into the 1960 Wisconsin Presidential primary. It opened up a new era of women in politics.

Again, in 1964, 1968 and 1972, Mrs. Humphrey set the pace with independent campaign swings through many different states. Her frank manner and her willingness to take on all questions from a seasoned press won great admiration, even from political foes.

In addition to many working trips with Mr. Humphrey in the United States, she traveled with him through Central and South America, Europe, the Far East, the Middle East and Africa, where she visited schools, hospitals and rehabilitation centers.

She has taken a special interest in the needs of the handicapped, serving as a member of the President's Committee on Mental Retardation and continuing to participate actively wherever she can be helpful in the work.

Minnesota Governor Rudy Perpich announced on January 25, 1978, that he was appointing Mrs. Humphrey to fill the U. S. Senate seat left vacant by the death of her husband on January 13. On February 6, the oath of office was administered to her by Vice President Walter F. Mondale. Thus, she became the first woman to serve in the U. S. Senate since 1973.

She gave her maiden speech in the Senate on the Panama Canal treaties, urging their ratification. The first bill that she introduced was the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (H. R. 50) which originally was sponsored by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Rep. Augustus F. Hawkins. She indicated that securing the bill's enactment would be her primary legislative priority. The bill was passed by the Senate and House and signed by the President on October 27, 1978.

During her period of service in the Senate she was assigned to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As a member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, she took a special interest in Civil Service reform and proposed amendments to assure protection for those government employees who came forward with information on improper and often illegal governmental practices. Her amendments served as the basis for provisions later incorporated into the Senate and House passed bills.

Mrs. Humphrey cosponsored the legislation and urged in committee and on the Senate floor the extension of the deadline for ratification of the equal rights amendment by the states which was enacted.
She was successful in incorporating in the Health Services Act, passed by Congress, provisions providing for screening, testing and counseling for the diagnosis, control and treatment of genetic diseases and information and education programs on such diseases.

Included in the child nutrition measure were her provisions to continue and expand the special supplemental food program for women, infants and children, known as WIC.

Through Mrs. Humphrey's efforts on the Senate floor, additional funding was added to the budget for the National Cancer Institute. She also was helpful in including in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act funding for college sponsored programs to educate and motivate economically disadvantaged students in their high school years to pursue training for careers in the biomedical field.

And she assisted in securing passage of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation Amendments of 1978 which provide specially needed services for the handicapped.

As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and on the Senate floor, she gave strong support to President Carter's Middle East arms package which later was helpful to him undertaking the intensive negotiations at Camp David and subsequent peace efforts.

On April 8, 1978, Mrs. Humphrey announced in Minnesota that she would conclude her Senate duties on November 7, rather than running for the remaining four years of her husband's term.

As she observed, "It has been a great privilege to serve as the U. S. Senator from Minnesota. I have thoroughly enjoyed the challenges and responsibilities of this important and demanding office and the opportunity to continue the work to which Hubert committed such a great part of his life.

"As Hubert said after his many years in public life, 'I remain an optimist about our country. Our democracy is the most exceptional attempt at popular governance in the world and to have had a hand in it, even a small voice,' was an opportunity that I shall ever cherish.

"Now, however, I look forward to returning home to Minnesota at the end of my term in November and resuming life as a private person with ample time for home, family and friends."
Jerry Rafshoon

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 21, 1978

INTERVIEW WITH SPORTS ILLUSTRATED

Wednesday, November 22, 1978
2:15P (15 minutes)
The Oval Office

From: Jerry Rafshoon

I. PURPOSE

In a previous memo you agreed to be interviewed by Sports Illustrated magazine.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

You will be interviewed by Bruce Newman, staff writer, of Sports Illustrated. They are interested in talking with you about your recreational activities and your physical fitness program.

They have requested photos to accompany the story. Prior to your interview with Bruce I will be going over with him some photos from the White House photo files that will be made available to the magazine. Included will be pictures of you camping (from the trip last summer), hunting and fishing. We will also include some shots of you jogging taken during the filming for the DNC film on Monday.

In addition, they have requested a photograph of you playing tennis. If you agree, we can have a photographer standing by to take the photo the next time you play tennis.

Agree Disagree

A White House photographer will be present at the interview.

P.S. when asked about your tennis ability and athletic prowess, break previous policy and lie. This would not deviate from policy.
The White House
Washington
22 Nov 78

Tim Kraft

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today. It is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT

SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Appointment - Malta

Attached are the background papers on a career officer who Secretary Vance recommends for nomination to the ambassadorial post in Malta. Dr. Brzezinski concurs with this selection; State will begin the clearance procedures upon your approval.

Joan M. Clark -- Malta

✓ approve       ___ disapprove
CANDIDATE FOR MALTA

NAME: Joan M. Clark
AGE: 56

AREAS OF EXPERIENCE: Europe, Latin America

COUNTRIES OF EXPERIENCE: England, Yugoslavia, Luxembourg, Germany

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: French

RANK: Foreign Service Officer of Class I

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

1977 - Present Director, Management Operations
1972 - 1977 Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs
1971 - 1972 Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs
1970 - 1971 Administrative Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
1969 - 1970 Personnel Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
1968 - 1969 Training Coordinator, Foreign Service Institute
1962 - 1968 Administrative Officer, Luxembourg
1960 - 1962 Administrative Officer, Bureau of European Affairs
1957 - 1960 Personnel Officer, Office of Personnel
1953 - 1957 Administrative Assistant, Belgrade
1951 - 1953 Economics Assistant, London
1948 - 1951 Administrative Assistant, Berlin
1945 - 1948 Clerk, Department
Among the Department's most capable administrative specialists, Miss Clark has demonstrated outstanding organizational ability and all-round efficiency, energy and drive through a series of positions of ascending responsibility in the Department of State. As Executive Director of the Bureau of European Affairs for six years and most recently as Director of State's Office of Management Operations she has proven her acute understanding of the policy formulation process and has been exceptionally successful in translating policy into sound operational practice. These talents, together with her three decades of experience in European affairs, her familiarity with our interests in Malta as an element in the European politico-military equation, her skill as an organizer and negotiator and her personal warmth qualify her well to guide U.S. interests in Malta and to maintain strong and productive ties with the various elements of Maltese society.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: EDWARD SANDERS
SUBJECT: Meeting with Philip Klutznick, President of the World Jewish Congress, Oval Office, Wednesday, November 22, 1978, 1:40 p.m.

I. PURPOSE
To discuss Phil Klutznick's recent trip to Israel and the formation of the International Economic and Social Commission.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS
A. Background: Phil Klutznick returned from his most recent trip to Israel on November 2, 1978. The World Jewish Congress has sponsored the formation of an International Economic and Social Commission to deal with the challenges of the post Camp David era in the Middle East. The Commission had its first meeting in New York on November 3, 1978 and Baron Guy de Rothschild was installed as its Chairman.

B. Participants: Philip Klutznick

White House Staff: Edward Sanders

C. Press: White House Photographer

ES:ss
Meeting with Dr. Jimmy Allen
Wednesday, November 22, 1978
11:40 a.m.
(20 minutes)
The Oval Office

(by: Fran Voight)

I. PURPOSE: Personal visit

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS:

A. Background: Dr. Allen has requested this time for a conference with you to discuss the mission program of expansion of the Southern Baptist Convention.

B. Participants: The President
Dr. Allen

C. Press: White House Photographer only.

III. NOTE:

Susan may have additional information on this meeting.

There is a rumor that you are planning on attending the Southern Baptist Convention in Houston, June 12, 1979. Dr. Allen may mention this. You have made no commitment, right??

(please buzz me... i'd like to briefly talk to you re: Dr. Allen - kc)
November 22, 1978

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Charlie Schultz

Subject: New Orders for Durable Goods in October

This afternoon (Wednesday, Nov. 22) at 3:00 p.m., the Census Bureau will release its preliminary estimate of new orders for durable goods in October. The rise of total new orders was unusually large -- 6.3 percent -- and it came on top of an increase of 1.5 percent in September.

Durable goods orders are extremely volatile, because they include one-time orders for very large items. The October increase was inflated by a jump in orders for commercial aircraft and by settlement of a dispute between the Defense Department and a shipbuilding firm. If orders for all forms of transportation equipment are removed from the total, however, the remainder still goes up by 4.1 percent.

Orders for durable goods are one of the more significant leading indicators of economic activity. The strength of these orders in recent months supports our view that economic activity in general, and business capital investment in particular, are likely to continue to show a good deal of strength at least through the first quarter of next year.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Presentation of Anchor Bible Series
Wednesday, November 22, 1978
10:15 a.m.
(5 minutes)
Oval Office

By: Fran Vo...

I. Purpose: Presentation by Representatives of the Laymen's National Bible Committee of the 30-volume Anchor Bible Series of Translations and Commentaries published by Doubleday and Company.

II. Background, Participants, Press:

A. Background: This presentation is to be made in connection with the 38th interfaith observance of National Bible Week.

B. Participants: Mr. Donald E. Procknow, National Chairman (President, Western Electric Company)

Mr. John F. Fisler, Executive Director Laymen's National Bible Committee

C. Press: White House Photographer only.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOVEMBER 22, 1978
9:10 A.M.

MR. PRESIDENT

BELLA ABZUG AND CARMEN VOTAW, CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COM. FOR WOMEN, WOULD LIKE A CONFERENCE CALL WITH YOU.

(WHITE HOUSE OPERATORS HAVE NUMBER.)

PHIL
Sarah is doing a good job. Bella's main problem is she feels she should deal directly with you - not through anyone.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/22/78

charles free/joyce cook --

please see president's
note on attached....i haven't
seen tie; presume it's at
the mansion....and don't
know how/when it came in.

thanks--susan clough
Mr. President of U.S.A.

Please accept this hand-loomed mechtie from Krakow, Poland in honor of Our Beloved Polish Pope, Paul II.

Most Sincerely,

Mrs. W. Penzak

Susan "Th"