JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY PROCESSING NOTE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1992

These documents were taken from Staff-Offices, Special Assistant to the President Louis Martin's file, box 66, folder Miscellaneous [1].

THIS IS NOT PRM-46

FORGERY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 17, 1980

URGENT INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: JODY POWELL
AL FRIENDLY

FROM: JERRY FUNK

SUBJECT: "PRM-46" Forgery

The document is an obvious forgery, but professionally done, and obviously designed to discredit the President, his African policy, and Dr. Brzezinski personally.

Items:

-- The real PRM-46 dealt with an entirely different topic, and an entirely different geographic region.

-- There are no such entities as the "NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa," nor the "NSC Political Analysis Committee," -- as referred to in the first page of the forged document.

-- A thorough computer and physical check of the files reveals no PRM nor any other NSC document of any kind concerning "The US Black Movement."

-- The substance of the 13-page document is often blatantly racist in tone, and obviously completely inconsistent with the tone and substance of the domestic and foreign policy of the Carter Administration.

This scurrilous document was surfaced in a calculated and orchestrated manner on Tuesday, September 16, to a number of media people in the New York area. It came into our possession last night and it was quickly determined to be a complete forgery.

The case will be turned over to the FBI for investigation.

cc: Zbigniew Brzezinski
Christine Dodson
Donald Gregg
Louis Martin

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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DATAFAX

March 17, 1976

TO: BRUCE CONNUCK (FO

FR: HENRY MILLER (USN

#1566
13 pgs

Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-46

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

The President has directed that a comprehensive review be made of current developments in Black Africa from the point of view of their possible impact on the black movement in the United States.

The review should consider:

1. Long-term tendencies of social and political development, and the degree to which they are consistent with or contradict the U.S. interest.

2. Prospects for durable contacts between radical African leaders and leftist leaders of the U.S. black community.

3. Appropriate steps to be taken inside and outside the country in order to inhibit any pressure by radical African leaders and organizations on the U.S. black community for the latter to exert influence on the policy of the Administration toward Afric

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa perform this review.

The review should be forwarded to the NSC Political Analysis Committee by April 20th.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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AF/NSC-IG 78-.
June 12, 1978

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP FOR AFRICA

Study in Response to Presidential Security Review Memorandum/NSC-[illegible]

Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

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objectives of our policy toward black Africa is to prevent social upheavals which could radically change the political situation throughout the area. On the success or failure of our policy in the region depends the solution of international and internal issues whose importance for the United States is on the increase.

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II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA

A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa. The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:

1. Political

If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national interest, our policy toward the white regimes, which is a key element in our relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa which are vital for our defense needs as well as of losing control over the Cape sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to Western Europe.

Moreover, such a development may bring about internal political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the black movement in the United States itself.

It should also be borne in mind that black Africa is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord, economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought and famine are constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders imposed by the former colonial powers, guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia and widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors provide the context

states with ample opportunities for furthering their aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political interests.

2. Economic

Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about $ 1.8 billion and exports $ 2.2 billion. New prospects of substantial profit would continue countries concerned.

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IV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT

Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests, the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst with far-reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result would be likely if Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.

A recurrence of the events of 1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige, especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues. Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation. Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States.

In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.

1. Possibility of Joint Action by U.S. Blacks and African Nationalist Movement

In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be given to the fact that there are 25 million American blacks whose roots are African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathize with African nationalism.

The living conditions of the black population should also be taken into account. Immense advances in the social field are

accompanied by a long-lasting high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth, and by poverty and traditional dissatisfaction with governmental social welfare standards.

These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community. Basically, such actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests, but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be attempts to coordinate their political activity both locally and in international organizations.

Inside the United States, these actions could include protest demonstrations against our policy toward South Africa accompanied by demands for boycotting corporations and banks which maintain links with that country; attempts to establish a permanent black lobby in Congress including active leftist radical groups and black legislators; the reemergence of pan-African ideals; resumption of protest marches recalling the days of Martin Luther King; renewal of the extremist nationalist idea of establishing an "African Republic" on American soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the black community could resume extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black Panther Party.

Internationally, damage could be done to the United States by coordinated activity of African states designed to condemn U.S. policy toward South Africa and to initiate discussion on

the U.S. racial issue at the United Nations where the African representation constitutes a powerful bloc with about one third of all the votes.

A menace to U.S. economic interests, though not a critical one, could be posed by a boycott by black African states against American companies which maintain contact with South Africa and Rhodesia. If the idea of economic assistance to black Americans shared by some African regimes could be realized by their placing orders in the United States mainly with companies owned by blacks, they could gain a limited influence on the U.S. black community.

In the above context, we must envisage the possibility, however remote, that black Americans interested in African affairs may refocus their attention on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking into account the African descent of American blacks, it is reasonable to anticipate that their sympathies would lie with the Arabs who are closer to them in spirit and, in some cases, related to them by blood. Black involvement in lobbying to support the Arabs may lead to serious dissension between American blacks and Jews. The likelihood of extremist actions by either side is negligible, but the discord may bring about tension in the internal political climate of the United States.

2. Political Options

In the context of long-term strategy, the United States cannot afford a radical change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed for maximum protection of

national security. In the present case, emphasis is laid on the importance of black Africa for U.S. political, economic and military interests.

Recommendations

In weighing the range of U.S. interests in black Africa, basic recommendations, arranged without intent to imply priority are:

1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the black nationalist movement in Africa and the black movement in the United States.

2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity of the two forces, and to cause division among black African radical nationalist groups and their leaders.

3. U.S. Embassies to black African countries specially interested in southern Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain political circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and methods of U.S. policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the failure of U.S. strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American standing throughout the world. In addition, this would mean a significant diminution of U.S. influence in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties in our internal situation due to worsening economic prospects.

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4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against black African representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the UN, who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should include facts on their links with the leaders of the black movement in the United States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the adverse effects of their activity.

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V. A. TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MOVEMENT

In connection with our African policy, it is highly important to evaluate correctly the present state of the black movement in the United States and, basing ourselves on all available information, to try to devise a course for its future development. Such an approach is strongly suggested by our perception of the fact that American blacks form a single ethnic group potentially capable of causing extreme instability in our strategy toward South Africa. This may lead to critical differences between the United States and the Third World in general and between the United States and black Africa in particular. It would also encourage the Soviet Union to step up its interference in the region. Finally, it would pose a serious threat to the delicate structure of race relations within the United States. All the above considerations give rise to concern for the future security of the United States.

Since the mid-1960s, when legislation on human rights was passed and Martin Luther King murdered, federal and local measures to improve black welfare have been taken, as a result of which the U.S. black movement has undergone considerable changes.

The principal changes are as follows:

-- Social and economic issues have supplanted political aims as the main preoccupations of the movement, and actions formerly planned on a nationwide scale are now being organized locally.

-- Fragmentation, and a lack of organizational unity in the movement.

-- Decrease of influence in the movement's extremist groups.

-- Sharp social stratification of the black population, and lack of policy options which could reunite them.

-- Want of a national leader of standing comparable to that of Martin Luther King.

B. THE RANGE OF POLICY OPTIONS

The concern for the future security of the United States makes necessary the range of policy options. Arranged without intent to imply priority, they are:

(a) to enlarge programs, within the framework of the present budget, for the improvement of the social and economic welfare of American blacks in order to ensure continuing development of present trends in the black movement;

(b) to elaborate and bring into effect a special program designed to perpetuate divisions in the black movement; to neutralize the most active groups of leftist radical orientation and to diminish their influence among blacks; to stimulate dissension and hostility between organizations representing different social strata of the black community; to encourage divisions in black circles;

(c) to preserve the present climate which inhibits the emergence from within the black leadership of a personality capable of exerting nationwide appeal;

(d) to work out and realize preventive operations in order to impede durable ties between U.S. black organizations and radical groups in African states;

(e) to support actions designed to sharpen social stratification in the black community, which would lead to the widening and perpetuation of the gap between the successful educated blacks and the poor, giving rise to growing antagonism between different black groups and weakening of the movement as a whole;

(f) to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of black business by granting government contracts and loans on favorable terms to black businessmen;

(g) to take every possible measure through the AFL-CIO leaders to counteract the increasing influence of black labor organizations which function in all major unions, in particular the National Coalition of Black Trade Unionists and its leaders, including the creation of real preconditions for adverse and hostile reaction among white trade unionists to demands for improvement of social and economic welfare of the blacks;

(h) to support the nomination at federal and local levels of loyal black public figures to elective offices, to government agencies and the courts. This would promote the achievement of a twofold purpose. First, it would be easier to control the activity of loyal black representatives within existing institutions; second, the idea of an independent black political party now under discussion within black leadership circles would soon lose all support.