Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [1]

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: 1976 Campaign Transition File; Folder: Foreign Policy, [10/76-1/77] [1]; Container 2

To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

IMM
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FROM: DAVID AARON

TO: THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
ATTN: JODY POWELL

INFO:

RELEASED BY: GE

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

DEX

PAC 076

GPS

LDX

PAGES 5

TTY

CITE

DTG: 301657Z

C

TOR: 3017232

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

TO: PLAINS

TOGOV 86

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1976 DEC 30 15 57

WHCA FORM 8, 22 FEB 74

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO GOV 86 December 30, 1976

MEMO FOR: THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

ATTENTION: JODY POWELL

FROM: DAVID AARON

Attached is a text of the interview with Brezhnev provided to Tony Lake of the State Department transition team with great ceremony by the Chargé at the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vorontsov.

Note the bottom of page 3 where Brezhnev expresses support for a U.S.-USSR summit.

(to be published on Dec 9, '71

ANSWERS BY L. I. BREZHNEV

TO THE QUESTIONS OF JOSEPH KINGSBURY-SMITH

Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, National Edit and Vice President and Director of th Hearst Corporation, asked Leonid I.Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to answer some questions. The questions and the answers follow.

Q: What message would you like to convey to the American people for the New Year?

A: For the Soviet people the coming year will be a jubilee year. It will be the year of the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet State, which was born under the star of Lenin's famous Decree on Peace. And, of course, in the coming year we would like to see new major steps taken to maintain and strengthen peace, to further enhance peaceful coexistence as the only reasonable and the only acceptable norm in relation between states.

History has proved that our two countries, when they act reasonably and take into account their responsible positions in the modern world, can make an important contribution to the cause of peace and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation.

I am glad to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to the women and men of America cordial New Year greetings on behalf of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and on my own behalf.

Q: What do you consider to be the most important measures of cooperation the USSR and the USA could take in 1977 to serve the cause of world peace and to strengthen Soviet-American relations?

A: I believe that our countries could do a lot in this respect. I shall only mention what is most important: We are in favour of the earliest possible completion of the work on a Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement on the basis of the understanding reached in Vladivostok in 1974. On our part, there was, is not and will not be any obstacles to this, which is a matter on concern to all mankind. A Soviet-American agreement would undoubtedly represent at this time a very important step toward effectively ending the arms race. The solution of this task is most directly connected with the main goal of our time - to prevent a nuclear war, while delaying the agreement, when the development of even more horrible types and systems of weapons continues, is fraught with new threats to peace, international stability and security. Judging by recent statements of President elect Carter, the U.S. side is also aware of the urgency of this matter. Let us hope that this promises early success.

I have to say that we in the Soviet Union are baffled by the position of certain circles in the West, both in the United States and in other NATO countries. They behave as if nothing has happened in recent years, as if nothing has changed and the world continues to be in a state of cold war. They instigate one noisy campaign after another about an allegedly increasing military threat from the USSR, demanding more and more military appropriations and intensifying the arms race.

We believe that things should not continue in this way. Having achieved the relaxation of political tension, we have also made it possible to deal seriously with cardinal issues of arms limitation and disarmament. I would like to reaffirm most definitely: The Soviet Union does not threaten anybody and has no intention of attacking anybody. It makes no sense to be frightened by mythical threats; it is better to discuss in a businesslike and constructive manner the problems and opportuniti which exist here. And the continuation of the arms race cannot be justified by assertions that arms limitation allegedly carries a risk to national security. Today a far greater risk to universa security lies in inaction, in letting the unrestrained arms race go on.

We would like very much to see the year of 1977 become a real turning point in ending the arms race. It would then surely find a worthy place in history.

Q: Would you welcome the opportunity to confer early in the New Year with the new American President at a mutually convenient location?

A: Experience, including that of Soviet-American relations, has shown the usefulness and fruitfulness of summit meetings when each participant strives for a constructive, businesslike dialogue. That is why we are for the continuation of this practice. The timing of the next Soviet-American meeting will

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

naturally, be determined by mutual agreement and will depend on progress in appropriate issues.

In conclusion I would like to repeat what has been said at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Our country is firmly determined to follow the line of further improving Soviet-American relations which is in the interests of both the American and the Soviet peoples, as well as in the interests of universal peace.

ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS

By Yigal Allon

Reprinted From

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1976

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1976

Trilateralism: "Partnership" for What? . . *Richard H. Ullman* 1
A China Policy for the Next Administration *Jerome Alan Cohen* 20
Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders . . . . . *Yigal Allon* 38
The Anti-Zionist Resolution . . . . . *Bernard Lewis* 54
Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken? . . . *Amory B. Lovins* 65
Canada: The New Nationalism . . . . . *Abraham Rotstein* 97
The Race to Control Nuclear Arms
Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale and Michael Nacht 119
The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control?
Alexander R. Vershbow 133
Southern Africa: A South African View . . . . . *John Barratt* 147
Inside the Laager: White Power in South Africa
John de St. Jorre 169
TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The United States and the European Balance *Gordon A. Craig* 187
The United States and Latin America:
Ending the Hegemonic Presumption *Abraham F. Lowenthal* 199
Recent Books on International Relations 214
Source Material . . . . . *Janet Rigney* 236

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Editor

JAMES CHACE
Managing Editor

JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER
Associate Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Book Editor

BARBARA GIBSON SCHWARZ
Assistant to the Editor

EVELYN G. MOREL
Assistant to the Managing Editor

DORIS ELIZABETH FOREST
Associate Publisher

GRACE DARLING GRIFFIN
Director, Advertising and Promotion

MARY JANE CASSOTTA
Staff Assistant

SHEILA M. ROSENZWEIG
Staff Assistant

Editorial Advisory Board

A. DOAK BARNETT
C. FRED BERGSTEN
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
HARVEY BROOKS
CARL KAYSEN
WILLIAM L. LANGER
JOHN J. MCCLOY
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
WILLIAM M. ROTH

Vol. 55, No. 1.

Copyright 1976, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.

ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS

By Yigal Allon



IT is impossible to plumb the depths of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to speak of formulating proposals for its solution, if no true understanding exists of the full significance of its cardinal characteristic—the extreme asymmetry of its two sides. This asymmetry is manifest not merely in one or two, but in all, of its aspects. It is obvious in such objective data as the comparison between Arab and Israeli territories (of the Arab League states 8,500,000 square miles; of Israel, including presently administered areas, about 28,500); or of the relative population statistics (of the Arab League states 134,000,000; of Israel 3,500,000 citizens); not to mention their contrasting actual and potential wealth.

But of primary importance are the subjective asymmetric factors affecting relations between the two sides. In this respect, there is absolute polarization. Whereas the Arab states seek to isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world's map, Israel's aim is simply to live in peace and good relations with all its neighbors.

These diverse objectives have determined the war aims of both sides. It is within this context that we should mention the chain of terrorist acts that was designed not merely to sow death and destruction in Israel but also to extend the conflict, and thus embroil the Arab states in full-scale wars. It is almost superfluous, and certainly tiresome, to quote the legion of statements of Arab leaders that represent this aim, ranging from the "Palestine Covenant" to current governmental declarations.

As opposed to this total Arab goal, Israel's war aims have been confined to repelling the offensives of the Arab armies as determined by strategic and political circumstances, whether by reactive counter-offensives such as those of 1948 and 1973 or by preemptive counter-offensives as those of 1956 and 1967. Military defeats, indeed, cost the Arab states losses in lives, destruction of equipment, political setbacks,

---

Yigal Allon has been Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1974, and a member of the Cabinet since 1961. He was Commander of the Palmach, the striking force of the Haganah before the establishment of the State, and during the War of Independence he commanded successively Israel army operations in Eastern Galilee and on the central and southern fronts.

and damage to national prestige—and perhaps even danger to their regimes. However, such defeats have never been, nor ever will be, a threat to their very existence as sovereign states or to the lives of their civilian populations. In contrast, a military defeat of Israel would mean the physical extinction of a large part of its population and the political elimination of the Jewish state. In highly realistic and clear terms, therefore, the Arab states can permit themselves a series of military defeats while Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. Nor does this reflect a historical trauma in any sense. To lose a single war is to lose everything, and this is a most real and stark fact.

As a consequence, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is not fully resolved, Israel must exploit to the utmost its military potential in all of its components and on a level that serves two objectives—to deter its enemies from waging war and, failing this, to be sufficient to repel the attackers and defeat them with the least cost in casualties for Israel. In essence, that Israel today still exists is due only to its success in maintaining such defensive strength. Without it, Israel would never have seen the light of day or would already have been eliminated in the first years of its existence. Such were the Arab intentions, and it was fortunate that the Arab states had not the strength to realize them.

Certainly not all the Arab states are cut from the same cloth; nor are their approaches to Israel identical. In the Arab camp there are more extreme elements that openly express their intention of destroying Israel. And there are other elements and people in the Arab world who, in the last two or three years, have expressed themselves toward Israel in less aggressive, and more realistic, terms than in the none too distant past, particularly when their declarations have been directed to the world at large. All things considered, it is in strengthening these latter elements to the extent that they become decisive in the Arab world that the best chance lies to achieve compromise and reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states—in short, to achieve a full settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the meantime that day, whenever it comes, is still far distant. The antagonisms toward Israel, the desire to see its disappearance, are deeply rooted in the Arab world, and these are fed by the authorities, not merely in speeches and articles but also in school textbooks. In fact the subject of Israel is the only one that unites the Arab states today, for they are deeply riven by splits and conflicts. The elements of realism and peace are represented by a small minority of voices in the discordant Arab chorus against Israel. And even these voices are inhibited by negative preconditions.

It was primarily in order to encourage and strengthen these voices and to convert them into a process with momentum that Israel—with all the considered and inherent dangers—entered into the two Disengagement Agreements with Egypt and Syria in 1974, and the subsequent Interim Agreement with Egypt in September 1975. Because these agreements are double-edged, they may not only be a milestone on the road to a settlement and peace, but also part of a strategy designed to push Israel to the brink, to weaken it in stages, in preparation for the steps to erase it from the map. Israel hopes that the positive side of these agreements will be the valid one, but cannot ignore the possibility of the negative.

II

The polarized asymmetry between the size and intentions of the Arab states and those of Israel, and the extreme contrast in the anticipated fate of each side in the event of military defeat, obliges Israel to maintain constantly that measure of strength enabling it to defend itself in every regional conflict and against any regional combination of strength confronting it, without the help of any foreign army. To our deep regret, this is the first imperative facing us, the imperative to survive. And I would venture to say every other state in our place would behave exactly as we do.

There are, of course, many elements constituting the essential strength that Israel must maintain, ranging from its social, scientific and economic standards, as well as its idealistic motivation, to the quality and quantity of its armaments. A discussion of all of these elements is not within the compass of this article; my concern here is with one of them—but one essential to them all and without which Israel might well lack the strength to defend itself. I am referring to the territorial element; to what can be defined as defensible borders that Israel must establish in any settlement, as an essential part of any effective mutual security arrangements and without any desire for territorial expansion per se.

The most cursory glance at a map is sufficient to ascertain how little the armistice lines of 1949—lines which were never in the first place recognized as final—could be considered defensible borders. And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the Arab states as an encouragement to try their strength again against us. The truth of the matter is that Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council has already recognized, in its original English text, the need to provide Israel with secure and recognized boundaries

—in other words, that changes must be introduced in the old lines of the armistice agreements.

It is no coincidence that this resolution does not speak about Israel's withdrawal from *all* the territories that came under its control in the war that was forced upon Israel in June 1967, nor even from *the* territories. In the original text (which was the outcome of long and exhaustive negotiation), Resolution 242 speaks only of withdrawal from territories. That the meaning was clear was demonstrated by the statement of the United States at the time, made by its U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg on November 15, 1967, in the Security Council discussions that preceded the passage of Resolution 242. He stated: "Historically, there never have been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the Armistice Lines of 1949, nor the Cease-Fire Lines of 1967, have answered that description."

As is known, Israel expressed more than once its willingness to withdraw from the cease-fire lines of 1967, within the framework of a peace agreement. On the other hand, it is clear—even according to the Security Council decision—that Israel is not obliged to withdraw to the armistice lines of 1949 that preceded the 1967 war, but to revised lines. The question is what borders will provide Israel with that essential minimum of security? And without such security it is difficult to expect to pacify the area and provide a lasting solution to the conflict within it.

If the sole consideration were the purely strategic-military one, then possibly the most convenient security borders would have been those Israel maintained following the Six-Day War, or perhaps those which it maintains today. There is even a basis for the claim that the 1973 Yom Kippur War—begun as a surprise attack in concert by the armies of Egypt and Syria—proves that these lines were ideally the best. Had the Yom Kippur War commenced on the 1949 armistice lines, for example, there can be little doubt that the price Israel would have had to pay in repelling the aggressors would have been unimaginably higher than that paid so painfully in October 1973. But we are not merely talking about purely military-strategic matters, to the extent that they ever exist in isolation. Nor are we discussing the maximum security that borderlines can provide Israel. As stated, our preoccupation is only with the essential minimum.

One does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is

on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel's population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance.

Of course I do not wish to overlook the fact that there are some who would claim that in an era of modern technological development such factors are valueless. In a nutshell, their claim is that the appearance of ground-to-ground missiles, supersonic fighter-bombers, and other sophisticated instruments of modern warfare has canceled out the importance of strategic depth and topographical barriers. Personally, I do not know of a single state which is willing and ready to give up a convenient borderline for this reason. At any rate, this argument is certainly invalid regarding Israel, and within the context of the Middle East conflict, where the opposite is true. Precisely because of dramatic developments in conventional weaponry the significance of territorial barriers and strategic depth has increased.

With all the heavy damage that warheads and bombs can inflict, they alone cannot be decisive in war, as long as the other side is resolved to fight back. Recent military history demonstrates this only too clearly. The German air "blitz" did not knock England out of World War II, nor did the heavy allied air bombardments bring Germany to its knees. This happened only when the last bunker in Berlin fell. Even the massive American air bombardments did not defeat North Vietnam which, in the final analysis, proved to be the victor in the war. At least as far as conventional wars are concerned, the following basic truth remains: without an attack by ground forces that physically overrun the country involved, no war can be decisive. This is all the more so in the Middle East where the Arab side is no less vulnerable to rocket and aerial bombardment than Israel, a factor that can greatly minimize the use of this kind of weaponry, and will leave to the ground forces the role of really deciding the issue.

Since decisive attack still depends on the land forces, the innovations and sophistication in weaponry and organization of ground forces that have taken place, therefore, not only fail to weaken the

value of strategic depth and natural barriers but in fact enhance their importance. This is even more true given Israel's difficult geographic position. Moreover, masses of swift and modern armor, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, modern engineering corps, marine and airborne commando units—when assisted by tactical airpower—provide ground forces with immense firepower, great mobility, and hence increased breakthrough potential. Since the Arab armies are busily equipping themselves with all of these means to a degree that Israel cannot match, the importance of strategic depth becomes still more apparent.

The danger threatening Israel, therefore, is that such reinforcement of the Arab ground troops with modern weaponry may well tempt the Arab states to act so swiftly on the ground that it will be difficult for Israel to inhibit their forces in the first stage, or to regain territory in a counterattack. In other words, the Arab states may be tempted to hit Israel with a first strike, preventing the latter from hitting back effectively. With such lines as those existing prior to the 1967 war, this would be a concrete and intolerable threat.

Another argument presented to counter Israel's claim to defensible borders is that Israel should be satisfied with guaranties from a single power or a number of powers to ensure its existence. Without detracting from the value of such guaranties, I would not suggest that any country make its very existence dependent upon guaranties of any kind in this changing world. If the reference is to diplomatic guaranties only, these are devoid of any real deterrent value; they are lacking in teeth. And should Israel's enemies be tempted to attack it anew, such guaranties would be of little value in their considerations. Military guaranties, however, can be of some value, but to rely exclusively upon them would be a critical error. Not only might the effectiveness of such a military guaranty prove to be short-lived, but the guaranty itself might hand over almost totally to the guarantor the recipient's power of independent action.

There is scarcely the need to recall the fate of Czechoslovakia after Munich; it is only too easy to draw up a long list of situations in which differences can evolve between the guarantor and the recipient that, in effect, would cancel out the guaranty's inherent value—even such elementary situations as disagreements over evaluation of intelligence information or changes in public opinion within the guarantor state or the position of its government at that time. Were Israel, therefore, to rely on outside guaranties, rather than to maintain a complete ability to defend itself, it would become almost totally dependent upon the guarantor. In effect, it would pass the most critical decisions concerning its fate into the hands of foreigners who, even as the most loyal friends, would always be foreigners, and who, in the last analysis, could be expected to act in accordance with their own changing interests and concerns.

In such a situation, Israel might well be perceived as a burden rather than an asset to those seeking stability and a settlement in the Middle East. While credible military guaranties or pacts can fulfill a positive function in a settlement of the Middle East conflict—and I do not underestimate this function when, and if, the time comes—it will have to be a supplementary function to Israel's own strength, to its defensible borders, and in no way a substitute for them!

III

Fortunately, the geostrategic conditions that have existed in the Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon a fair political compromise. This could provide Israel with the minimal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise, so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides. But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.

According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of a peace settlement—would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.

For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, together with a number of effective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression.

The armistice lines of 1949 ("the green line") extend along the foothills of the Judean and Samarian mountains and along

the Mediterranean coastal plain—that is, flat territory without any topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June 4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop. Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to strike at Israel's densest population and industrial centers, but also in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with surface-to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly equipped.

According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its heart—the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer attack.

In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominating Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest of the entire northern part of our country.

According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in the naïve belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel, following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's southern port entrance at Elath on a tiny strip of shoreline only six miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover, Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian

blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a *casus belli* in both 1956 and 1967.

A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weaknesses in the current geostrategic and demographic situation existing in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be along the following general lines.

Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green line," this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the *east* of the dense Arab population, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains to the west—from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population. Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.

Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south, it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution becomes possible—one that also helps resolve the problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state. (After all, the population of both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians.)

Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being partitioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under

Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its inhabitants[1], a solution for the religious interests connected with it can be found, a *religious* and not a political solution. For example, special status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in the places holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account.

While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at Israeli villagers and fishermen below, which is basically a *tactical* question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal *strategic* reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel's other frontiers.

In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be necessary to place at the disposal of traffic between Gaza and the Jordanian-Palestinian state the use of a land route (as distinct from a land corridor) similar to that, for example, connecting the United States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza Strip to the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to invade the land of Israel, and further north.

A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure security along sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its defense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am refer-

[1] From the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority. Today, the population consists of 260,000 Jews, 84,000 Muslims and 12,000 Christians.

ring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and Kuntilla, which comprise the principal strategic crossroads on the main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Elath shore line which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this vantage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place. In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner of the Sinai—and over a land route reaching it— is not only critical to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing deterrent against such blockade attempts.

To sum up, there were numerous bitterly deficient points in the pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal corrections to them required for an overall peace settlement. The necessity for these corrections is all the more apparent when it is realized that Israel not only faces the military strength of its contiguous neighbors, but may also have to face the combined strength of many other Arab countries. This has already happened to no small extent in the 1973 war, when contingents from Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and other Arab countries participated in the fighting, together with the armies of Egypt and Syria. Thus, in a very practical sense, solid defense lines are indispensible to Israel in order to withstand the attacks of the entire Arab world. In addition, these may well be supported by contingents of so-called volunteers who can be sent from certain countries from outside the area that are hostile to Israel.

Let me stress again that defensible borders are vital to Israel not out of any desire to annex territories per se, not out of a desire for territorial expansion, and not out of any historical and ideological motivation. Israel can compromise on territory but it cannot afford to do so on security. The entire rationale of defensible borders is strategic. This is also the only rationale for the selective settlement policy that

Israel is pursuing, as an integral part of its unique defense system, in those strategic zones so vital to its security.

Of course, when the peace for which we strive is achieved, the borders will not divide the two peoples but be freely open to them. In short, good fences make good neighbors.

IV

As I have pointed out, border adjustments essential for Israel's security, and hence for the long-term stability of the entire area, must also be linked with mutually effective security arrangements designed to prevent surprise attacks by one side on the other, or at least to reduce to a minimum the danger of such attacks. In the geostrategic circumstances of the Middle East, to reduce the possibility of surprise offensives is, in fact, to reduce the danger of all offensives. I am referring to such arrangements as the delineation of both totally and partially demilitarized zones under joint Arab-Israeli control, with or without the participation of a credible international factor; or such arrangements as the delineation of parallel early-warning systems like those functioning in the Sinai according to the terms of the 1975 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt.

I will not enter here into the technical details of such arrangements, their nature, placement and scope. Not that they are unimportant or nonessential; on the contrary, without them, Israel could not permit itself to make the far-reaching territorial compromises which, in my opinion, it should be prepared to make within the context of peace agreements with its neighbors. Let me give one example, albeit the most important, in order to illustrate this point. According to the principles I have already outlined, if Israel were to forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria, it would not be able to forego—under any circumstances—the effective demilitarization of these areas. Apart from civilian police to guarantee internal order, these areas would have to be devoid of offensive forces and heavy arms. In the same way as any other country, Israel would be unable to abandon areas so close to its heartland if they were liable once again to become staging areas for full-scale, limited or guerilla attacks upon its most vital areas.

In short, Israel cannot permit itself to withdraw from a large part of the West Bank unless the area from which it withdraws is shorn of all aggressive potential. For this purpose, absolute Israeli control, as proposed above, of a strategic security zone along the Jordan Basin will not be adequate. Effective demilitarization of the areas from which the Israel Defense Forces withdraw will also be essential. Here as elsewhere, the two elements are interwoven: without a security zone, Israel cannot be satisfied with demilitarization alone; without effective demilitarization, Israel cannot be satisfied with just the security zone.

It should be clear from what I have said, that Israel does not hold most of the territories that fell into its hands in the war, which was imposed on it in 1967, as an end in itself. Despite the paucity of its territory compared with the vast areas of the Arab countries, and despite the historical, strategic and economic importance of these areas, Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential to its security within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal—peace with all its neighbors.

Peace is not only a Jewish and Zionist value and goal, but an imperative national interest for Israel, coinciding with the desires of all peoples and all peaceseeking forces in the world. Because of this, particular care must be taken regarding the nature of the settlement to be reached: whether it is to be fragile, provisional, and containing the seeds of a future war; or whether it is to be stable and enduring, cutting the ground out, to the greatest possible degree, from anyone intent upon war. But just as peace itself is one of the prime elements of national security, so, too, is the ability to defend oneself a prime guaranty for the maintenance of peace. In view of the marked asymmetry existing between the war aims of those participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in light of the unstable internal and regional relations among the Arab states, one should be especially careful to uphold these principles here; this applies even more so to the case of Israel, for whom the threat of total obliteration is always present.

The strategic security principles outlined here are designed to achieve such a peace based on compromise—one that will satisfy the interests of both sides not merely for so limited a period as three, four, or even ten years, but for our children and the children of their children, and beyond. A conflict as complex and prolonged as that between the Arab states and Israel can only be solved through such a farsighted approach; any other settlement will only lead to further hostilities, with all the concomitant repercussions for the entire world.

V

Is this not only desirable but also possible? My answer is yes, it is possible, maybe not today, or tomorrow, or at one time. Of course, if it were possible to achieve this in one fell swoop by an overall agreement that would solve the conflict, this would be splendid. And as

far as Israel is concerned, it desires and is ready for such a settlement as soon as possible. It may be very difficult to leap from the hostility and hatred which the Arab states bear toward Israel to an era of reconciliation and friendship. But this transition—a process if not a solitary act—is possible. It is a process that can lead from the cease-fire situation to an end of hostilities—from violence to nonviolence, from nonacceptance to acceptance, and from there to real peace. The three agreements signed since the 1973 war (two with Egypt and one with Syria) may mark the beginning of the beginning of this process.

All this of course is possible under the appropriate circumstances and requisite conditions. The central two are: first, that the realistic trend become dominant in the Arab camp, i.e., that the Arabs recognize that Israel is a reality which cannot be obliterated by further rounds of war, and that they reconcile themselves to Israel's existence by reaching a compromise agreement with it. To this end, Israel must have sufficient potential for self-defense to deter the Arab states from any additional military adventure; and should they nonetheless be so drawn to such an adventure, Israel's strength must be adequate to repel them with the minimum of damage to itself. Second, that the international community not foster the delusion among the Arab leaders that it is possible—whether by military means or political pressure—to force Israel to give up what is essential to its minimum security needs. Israel will never yield to such pressure nor will it accept any attempt to impose a solution. Its readiness to compromise is not a function of pressure or war but of its desire for peace and of Arab readiness to start moving toward that goal.

The various proposals or plans raised by third parties to the conflict only serve the opposite purpose, including that unfortunate American plan that entered history under the name of the "Rogers plan" of 1969, which erred on two main counts: first, by the very fact of its presentation to the parties instead of leaving it to them to negotiate their differences without prior conditions; second, by its total lack of any consideration for Israel's security needs. The presentation of this plan gave rise to expectation in the Arab States that Washington was about to impose on Israel a scheme favorable to the Arabs and thereby dealt a damaging blow to the hopes for evolution of realistic policies in the capitals of the Middle East. It is doubtful if any positive movement would have been achieved in the Middle East if this plan had not been shelved in 1970. French policy has played a conspicuously negative role since the Six-Day War of 1967 by its openly pro-Arab bias during the hostilities and by the unfounded interpretation given by France to Resolution 242 in flat contradiction to the

expressed intentions of its sponsors. There is no doubt that this French attitude has encouraged even the least extremist of the Arab States to adopt rigid and uncompromising positions. Outside powers and international organs should strictly refrain from making their own proposals for the solution of the conflict. And if one cannot hope for such "monasticism" in the coming period on the part of those powers hostile to Israel, such as the U.S.S.R.—which is interested in perpetuating the conflict in the region at the expense of the welfare of all the peoples living there—one would hope for such behavior on the part of such friendly powers as the United States, that insist upon the region's peace for the benefit of all. If we had not had to deal with such proposals in the past, we would now be nearer to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The actual conditions and details of a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states, and even the next stage toward it, should such a transitional stage prove necessary, must be left in the hands of the parties themselves. Should the Arab states sit at the negotiating table without any preconditions, with full acceptance of Israel's legitimate existence and readiness to make a balanced compromise peace with it, I believe it will be possible to solve all the basic points of conflict, including a constructive solution of the problem of Palestinian identity.

I have no doubt that Israel would be ready and willing, on the basis of such a realistic approach, to negotiate a peace settlement with each of its neighbors, at any time and at any place, within the framework of the Geneva Conference or outside it. If these conditions are achieved, peace in the Middle East becomes not only a desirable goal but a possible one. I will not prophesy when such a turning point will be reached. Very much depends on international circumstances, and on the way these are interpreted by the Arab states. However, it is my firm belief that this stage is bound to come because there is no realistic alternative for the peoples and countries of the region.

For Pres-elect Hor.
Carter
Good
J

AB NITE MONO—1

94th Congress
2d Session
COMMITTEE PRINT

STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1976

A REPORT

BY

SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ON HIS

TRIP TO FRANCE, BRITAIN, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BELGIUM, ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA

NOVEMBER 18–DECEMBER 11, 1976

JANUARY 1977

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-100 WASHINGTON : 1977

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

AB NITE MONO—2

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, *Chairman*

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
DICK CLARK, Iowa
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan

PAT M. HOLT, *Chief of Staff*
ARTHUR M. KUHL, *Chief Clerk*

AB NITE MONO—3
NEW ODD PAGE

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of transmittal
I. British and Italian Monetary Crises
A. Britain
B. Italy
II. France
III. Federal Republic of Germany
IV. European Community
V. Yugoslavia

AB NITE MONO—4
NEW ODD PAGE

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., January 4, 1977.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the postelection recess, under the committee's auspices, I visited six countries in Europe, departing from the United States on November 18 and returning on December 11, 1976. The countries visited were: France, Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Yugoslavia. I was accompanied by my executive assistant, Albert A. Lakeland, Jr.

A major focus of my inquiries was directed to the acute economic crises gripping Britain and Italy, as well as to the broader picture of the economic health and political vitality of our close partners joined together in the European Community. In addition, I visited Yugoslavia for the purpose of acquiring an understanding of and a feel for the situation in that country, as it is my judgment that Yugoslavia could become the focus of a serious European crisis following the departure from the scene of President Tito who is now 84.

The text of my report of my findings is enclosed.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

AB NITE MONO—5
NEW ODD PAGE

STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1976

I. British and Italian Monetary Crises

(A) *Britain:* The essence of the United Kingdom Government's position is that the cooperation of the British trade unions is necessary to the success of any Government policies to turn around Britain's acute monetary, financial and trade crisis and that only the present Labor government is capable of obtaining the unions' cooperation. The Government leaders believe that their room for maneuver is narrowly circumscribed, particularly in view of the ""social contract" wage constraints which the unions have accepted for the past 2 years, which in themselves embody a reduced standard of living in real terms. In the official view, stringent new cutbacks in public spending and welfare benefits on a scale indicated by purely banking criteria may well exceed even the Labor government's ability to carry the unions along.

Officials fear being put in a position of having to destroy the labor movement in Britain, or of rejecting the terms of the IFM loan and plunging Britain onto a go-it-alone course involving a virtual abandonment of its NATO contribution and unilateral protectionist measures which would virtually remove Britain from the European Community (EC). Moreover, they see any IMF loan terms exceeding what they could sell to the unions as self-defeating in any event, as either a union rebellion or a Government rejection would initiate a massive new run on the pound in international currency markets bringing Britain to the brink of bankruptcy.

From my extensive conversations with their principal economic advisers, it seems that the British Government's plans for meeting the current crisis are modeled conceptually on the program devised in 1968, by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins, to pull Britain back from the threat of international bankruptcy which then faced Britain on a similar, though not quite so massive and acute, scale. An important element in their thinking is the securing of a "safety net" under the sterling balances in the form of some sort of international guarantee of convertibility, backed by the United States and the German Federal Republic.

Foreign governments and individuals hold sterling accounts totaling over $9 billion. There is a dispute about how much of this is actually or potentially "volatile" and thus also disagreement over the real dimensions of the "overhang" which could exhaust and then exceed Britain's capacity to meet massive demands for the conversion of sterling into harder currencies in the event of a new run on the pound. Nonetheless, there is logic to providing a "safety net" under the sterling balances as a corollary to an IMF loan as a reinsurance that the loan will serve its intended purpose and not be dissipated by a new run on sterling.

Significant amounts of sterling are held in 7-day demand deposit accounts owned by Arab oil producers. And, one of the big questions must be why only the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are said to be assuming the burden of the safety net, and why are not these Arab sterling deposit holders properly participating too.

In addition, under the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Community, due largely to the artificial exchange rate of the "green pound," Britain is receiving a fund subsidy of almost $2.5 million per day, a subsidy which will be phased out in due course.

Critics of the United Kingdom Government's policies and plans for meeting the crisis are unanimous in the view that the Government is unwilling and unable to take fundamental and long-term measures which alone can put Britain on a road to lasting solvency and prosperity. The harshest critics see the "safety net" scheme as nothing more than an effort to achieve a United States-Federal Republic of Germany subsidization of the pound at an artificially high level so as to permit the Labor Government to continue its massive deficit spending and public sector expansion policies which cater to its hard core electoral constituencies.

AB NITE MONO-6

There are two contrasting views about the nature of Britain's malaise. The Government view is that there is very little that is fundamentally wrong with Britain's policies and its economy. This view holds that Britain is suffering only somewhat more acutely the ailments common to all the western industrial economies caught in the oil price rise recession, and that correction of current policies at the margins together with the advent of North Sea oil at the end of the decade are all that is needed to put Britain back into shape. Indeed, on this latter point self-sufficiency for the United Kingdom in oil (saving about 4 billion per annum paid in 1975 for mainly Arab oil), and possibly even a modest export position, is predicted for the early 1980's.

Recent statistical studies are claimed to show that Britain's basic economic indicators, including those of rate of investment, levels of taxation and public expenditure, and plant modernization, are all within the range of other OECD and EC nations. The big exception is in the statistics for worker productivity. It is here that Britain lags markedly behind. For instance, a recent Government sponsored study showed that in the auto industry, the British worker equipped with the same tools produces only half as much per shift as his continental counterparts. Studies show similar results in the chemical industry and generally across the board in industry. Moreover, there is great complaint about British industry's record for meeting production and delivery deadlines.

Britain's great lag in worker productivity seems, however, as attributable to often inefficient and even indolent management mentality as to union featherbedding and a pervasively luddite mentality among workers. The net result of glaringly low British industrial productivity, combined with chronic Government deficit spending, is a precarious national monetary and financial posture which leaves Britain extremely vulnerable to shifts in world trade and monetary patterns as it drifts toward the bottom rank in per capita wealth among EC nations.

In contrast to the "official" view that nothing more than adjustments at the margins is required, the need for a drastic reversal of direction is widely perceived in business, press, and Conservative Party circles. Holders of this view plead that Britain not be let off the hook by the IMF, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany, contending that only outside pressure can induce the British Government and nation to take the strong medicine required to make Britain a dynamic society once again.

Under the best of circumstances, Britain's economic balance sheet is certain to worsen in 1977 before it begins to move into greater equilibrium in 1978 and beyond. British Government institutions clearly have the technical competence to carry out the intricate monetary and fiscal measures required to keep Britain from actual default and international insolvency provided it receives adequate external assistance and there are no major new disruptions in world trade. The real question for the United States is how we use our considerable leverage during this transition period with respect to Britain's economic policies, including the questionable future of sterling as an international reserve currency.

Recommendation.—It is my view that the United States should throw its weight toward tighter conditions in the course of our participation in international measures to ward off British monetary collapse. Obviously there is no point in precipitating a financial collapse through the imposition of conditions which are clearly politically impossible for the British Government to accept. However, I am convinced that the greater measure of friendship to Britain and the pursuit of long term U.S. interests is to be found in a more strict attitude.

The root of Britain's problems lies deep within its social structure and attitudes. Decisive changes can be effected mainly by the British people themselves. But the United States can and should, in my judgment, use its influence to strengthen those elements in all strata of British society, but particularly its managerial class (both of labor and employers) who seek a return to the work ethic in Britain. I cannot emphasize this last point too much.

(B) *Italy.*—Italy is caught in the grip of a twin balance-of-payments and domestic inflation crisis. The reasons for the aggravated nature of Italy's twin crises are basically political and social rather than economic. There is enough inherent resiliency in the Italian economy to permit a rapid turn around if there is an exercise of sufficient political discipline and determination. Conversely, a return to political permissiveness and instability could result in Italy's economic collapse and international default.

One of the immediate causes of Italy's inflation and balance-of-payments problems is the "wage indexation" scheme which automatically adjusts most union wages to cost-of-living index increases. In addition, exceptionally large annual wage increases since 1969 have raised Italy's labor costs to levels which threaten its international competitiveness, a problem of real seriousness for an economy so heavily dependent on export trade. Moreover, labor indiscipline and low productivity have reached acute levels. And, public sector deficit spending and inefficiency have added considerably to Italy's problem by aggravating inflation and by shackling Italy's much more efficient and dynamic private sector.

It is clear that the Andreotti government will require the boost of external sanctions imposed by the IMF and the United States if it is to have any hope of succeeding in pushing through the belt-tightening measures across the board which are required to avert economic collapse.

The Christian Democratic Party (DC) which has had power in Italy since 1947 currently governs as a minority government. The party has been plagued by scandal and factionalism and has been perceived over the past decade as progressively dissipating its own moral and political fiber. In a truer sense than ever the next 2 years will be a historic testing time for the Christian Democrats, as it will be for its principal rival and antagonist the Communist Party.

The Christian Democrats have promulgated extensive programs for internal party reform and revitalization. The party elected many new younger faces to the Parliament in the last election and a conscious effort is being made to bring a new generation of Christian Democrats to power. Many Italian and foreign observers are deeply skeptical of the will and the ability of the Christian Democrats to reform and revitalize their party. I can amply appreciate the grounds for such skepticism but I believe it would be a mistake for the United States to discount totally the capacity of the Christian Democrats to rejuvenate.

But, to retain even their current shaky mandate to rule, the Christian Democrats will have to achieve a degree of self-discipline, determination and creativity that has eluded them for many years.

Nonetheless, the road to power for the Italian Communist Party is far from clear and easy. In the June 1976 parliamentary elections, the Communists failed to achieve their goal of supplanting the Christian Democrats as the largest party and they have failed to achieve a place in a coalition government which they sought.

Presently, the Communists are playing the anomalous role of an official parliamentary opposition which has agreed to abstain rather than oppose the minority Christian Democrat Government. In addition, the Communist Party in Parliament, and the leadership of the Communist trade unions have joined publicly in supporting the austerity measures which the Andreotti government has proposed to meet Italy's economic crisis.

AB NITE MONO—8

Advocacy of economic austerity and worker discipline by the Communists in the present situation reverses 30 years of party rhetoric and class war agitation. The motivation of the Communists in adopting this posture of responsibility and patriotism is not one of newfound idealism. Rather, it is the product of a new strategy to achieve power. For years, the Italian Communist Party was unable to achieve much more than about 20 percent of the popular vote, representing largely its "proletarian" constituency. Its pro-Soviet, Marxist and class warfare rhetoric scared off the middle class.

To break out of the confines of this limited proletarian electoral base, the party has adopted a posture designed to attract middle class support. Independence from the Soviet Union in foreign affairs and cooperation with the Christian Democratic Government's austerity measures in internal affairs has given the Italian Communist Party a new face which it styles as "Euro-Communism". But, is this just a strategem to attain power? On the available evidence, I believe we are without as yet any real assurance that any more than the usual Communist syndrome lies beneath the "Euro-Communist" posture of the Italian Communist Party.

The present situation poses deep dilemmas, for the Communist support for the Andreotti austerity program causes dissension and confusion among the party's union cadres and rank and file, conditioned by decades of confrontational rhetoric. The gamble being taken is that the two faces of Euro-Communism—independence from the Soviet Union and support of the Government's austerity program—a masterpiece of ambiguity—will convince potential middle class supporters that the party is responsible and national. It remains to be seen how far the Communist Party can stretch toward the middle classes without eroding seriously its traditional labor base.

Moreover, to a significant degree, the success or failure of the new Communist electoral strategy depends upon the performance of the Christian Democrats. If the Christian Democrats succeed in pulling Italy together and surmounting the economic crisis, even with the help of the Communists, it is quite likely that a lion's share of the credit with the Italian voters will be reaped by the Christian Democrats rather than the Communists. On the other hand, if the Communists give up their posture of cooperation, revert to confrontational tactics causing instability and failure of the emergency measures, thereby forcing new elections, it is possible that all their efforts of recent years to court the middle classes through reasonableness will be undone.

To at least some degree, therefore, the initiative lies with the Christian Democrats. If they revert to back stabbing factionalism and corruption, and make a mess of the emergency, it seems highly possible that the Communists will surpass them as Italy's largest party and win a major place in the government of Italy. However, should the Christian Democrats succeed in managing the crisis adroitly, including Communist support, the next elections could mark a resurgence of Christian Democratic predominance. Equally, the June 1976 elections could prove to have been the high water mark of the Italian Communist Party, as many of the most astute and capable members of the Christian Democratic movement predict.

In Italy the belief is widespread even among staunch anti-Communists that the Italian Communist Party really is different and Italian, rather than subordinate to the Soviet-led international Communist bloc. Outsiders tend to be much more skeptical. The degree of real change or metamorphosis effected by long involvement in electoral politics, strenuous efforts to prove itself to the middle classes, and self-conscious advertisement as Euro-Communists can only be tested if the Communists actually come to power in Italy—and I believe this is a risk to be avoided and not taken.

In Italy the Socialist Party has never succeeded in establishing itself as a vital factor. Some observers think that this anomaly has led the Italian Communist Party into playing at least part of the role traditionally played in other Western European democracies by the Social Democratic Parties. Only in Germany does there seem to be any serious thought given to the possibility of a pan-European Socialist effort to strengthen the Italian Socialist Party as a serious rival to the Communists on the left, as was done successfully in Portugal. Within Italy the idea seems to be dismissed as unworkable and undesirable.

The situation in Italy presents the United States with several alternative policy options. The first option is for the United States to work—with its allies in Western Europe and Japan—in close support of the Andreotti government on the assumption that it has a good chance of surmounting the current economic crisis and that the Christian Democratic Party has at least some reasonable chance of rejuvenating itself.

On the contrary assumption that Communist accession to power in Italy is inevitable, at least three options present themselves.

The first is to abstain from aiding Italy in meeting the present crisis on the rationale that any assistance will merely improve the plum when plucked by the Communists.

A second option is for the United States to spell out in advance, the conditions on which the United States would continue collaboration with an Italian Government having a significant Communist presence, separating this between military (NATO) and nonmilitary.

A third option is to maintain without further elaboration a posture that the United States is opposed to Communist participation in government in Italy. This option is predicated on the assumption also that such a posture could induce the Communists to seek ways of enhancing their acceptability in U.S. eyes.

AB NITE MONO - 10

Recommendation.—For the present, I favor this third option. I believe that the United States—in concert with as much of Western Europe as possible—must support and work closely with the Andreotti government so long as it continues its good faith efforts to do the job needed. In addition, I believe that we should maintain our posture of unelaborated opposition to Communist participation in Italy's Government. I think that such a posture is best calculated to keeping the threshold high in Italy of resistance to a Communist accession to power and is best suited also to require the Communists to come to terms with democratic forces if they do come to power. Also, careful thought should be given to lateral support from other centrist parties in democratic countries—even if only moral—on the analogy with the effect of comparable help in the recent early days to Portugal's Socialist Party of Premier Soares.

II. FRANCE

The French economy is characterized by the maladies common to its recession partners—inflation, stagnation, unemployment, and balance-of-payments problems. Also, it has serious class problems, the gap between rich and poor being reported as the widest among the industrial democracies of Western Europe by a recent OECD study. However, from an economic viewpoint, France's position is not as acute or precarious as that of Britain or Italy. Its foreign exchange reserve position and its international credit worthiness if borrowing becomes necessary are measurably stronger than Britain's or Italy's, and corrective business cycle swings are expected to further ameliorate the economic situation in France in 1977. Also it has a strong agricultural position in respect of self-sufficiency in food.

Prime Minister Barre, a vigorous and impressive professional economist, has conceived what is known as the Barre plan for dealing with France's economic difficulties. In essence, it is an austerity plan which will restrict public spending, hold down wages and prices, and place an absolute money ceiling on petroleum imports. The plan is expected to cut the overall growth rate in France in 1977 to 2 or 3 percent. It is weighted to stimulate activity in the more efficient private sector while reining in the less efficient public sector. Negotiations are under way to try to obtain trade union agreement to the basic thrust of the Barre plan, especially its objective of restraining wage and price increases.

In the political field, however, the prospects are worrisome indeed and uncertainties respecting the political future discourage private sector investment and expansion, thereby aggravating the economic situation. The specter which haunts France is that of a Socialist-Communist victory in the 1978 parliamentary elections. Current public opinion polls, and recent byelection results, signal enhancing chances of just such a result.

Deep fissures in the anti-Communist camp also seem to be enhancing the prospects of a 1978 Socialist-Communist coalition victory. President Giscard d'Estaing's efforts to build a new coalition of the center—drawing left-of-center strength away from the Socialists and right-of-center strength away from the Gaullists—seems to be faltering. Former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac appears to be flanking President Giscard on the right from within the Gaullist movement. Chirac has recently launched a new political grouping on the right which some observers feel has Bonapartist overtones. The avowed purpose of Chirac's new movement is to rally the forces of the right for an aggressive confrontation with the Socialist-Communist coalition of the left, in the 1978 elections.

AB NITE MONO - 11

Chirac's "call to colors" on the right is causing problems for some important elements of President Giscard d'Estaing's program, particularly his efforts to enact a meaningful capital gains tax and his efforts to move France closer to the United States and NATO. It is expected that Chirac's movement will be well funded by French business entities which have been marked in advance for nationalization by the Socialist-Communist alliance.

The strong personal and philosophical rivalry between President Giscard d'Estaing and former Prime Minister Chirac worries many anti-Communists in France. Many believe, nonetheless, that their strong common interest in preventing a Socialist-Communist victory in 1978 will keep their differences within bounds and induce at least a minimum amount of cooperation.

France continues to be the most polarized of Western democracies politically, socially, and economically. President Giscard d'Estaing's efforts to crack this polarization through a centrist coalition, however brilliantly conceived, is encountering deeply entrenched social and economic patterns and habits of thought. Strong Gaullist opposition to his capital gains tax proposal is a case in point.

The condition of the Socialist-Communist coalition of the left is a subject of great interest in France and throughout Europe. It is generally believed that France provides one example of where the Socialists have gained at the expense of the Communists through their coalition. Even strong anti-Communists reluctantly concede that the French Socialists could succeed in dominating their Communist partners in a coalition government if they won the 1978 parliamentary elections.

Nonetheless, the French Socialists are much more doctrinaire than their British, German, Dutch, or Swedish counterparts and their advent to power would cause major economic disruption in France with repercussions for the entire European community and Western monetary and trading system generally.

In my conversations with President Giscard d'Estaing, Prime Minister Barre and Foreign Minister Guiringaud, I raised the issue of sales of nuclear equipment and technology to Third World nations, emphasizing the very strong feelings of the Congress on this issue. It is clear from the responses that I received that the French Government seems ready to make some concessions on this issue. The importance of the French Cabinet decision of October 11, adopting more stringent principles for nuclear exports, was stressed. Subsequently, even more far-reaching restrictions have been announced and since I have returned, the Cabinet has taken steps to end any new agreements for selling nuclear reprocessing plants.

The French leaders were unanimous in expressing dissatisfaction with U.S. energy policy. They believe that U.S. indecision and drift has hurt not only the United States but has weakened the OECD nations collectively in their dealings with OPEC. Clearly, France, as well as the other EC nations, looks to the United States for leadership on the energy issue which is seen as the principal challenge today to the viability of the industrial democracies, individually and collectively.

French receptivity to U.S. leadership in other areas, while not articulated overtly as in the case of energy, was conveyed unmistakably. This marks a most important change of tone and attitude under the leadership of President Giscard d'Estaing. It is a marked contrast from the tone and attitude which prevailed during the days of De Gaulle and Pompidou. It should be noted however, that President Giscard d'Estaing's efforts to edge France into a more cooperative role in NATO and his support of direct elections to the European Parliament have encountered Gaullist resistance, under the evangelistic leadership of M. Chirac. This opposition may increase to a point which makes it impossible for the French President to continue to move in this direction.

AB NITE MONO - 12

Recommendation.—The United States working with our Western European allies an Japan should evidence by positive actions our willingness to cooperate with France and our encouragement for France's greater participation in international activities in which Gaullist doctrine has been heretofore inhibiting.

III. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Chancellor Schmidt's intellectual dominance of the Federal Republic is undiminished by the narrowness of his coalition government's victory in the October 1976 election. His principal preoccupation is with the broad economic crises which he sees as threatening the entire structure of the western trading system. He perceives Germany's interests and its role through pan European eyes—to such an extent that he sees the British and Italian crises as almost as much German problems as problems of Britain and Italy.

Chancellor Schmidt and his colleagues are acutely conscious of the limitations upon the exercise of the Federal Republic's growing economic power within the European Community. Because they see such a direct German interest in the vitality of the Community partners and in the viability of the Community as a coalescing entity, there is an almost surprising willingness to spend German resources for the immediate benefit of other nations and the Community as a whole. Nonetheless, there is a readily expressed apprehension of a negative reaction to too much German prosperity and economic power, even when it takes the form of loans to Italy or subsidization of Britain's food bill through the Common Agricultural Fund of the EC.

The growing imbalance within the Community between the Federal Republic and the other members—especially with France and Britain being unable to match Germany's economic weight—has created fear of the evolution of an anti-German coalition to offset the weight of the Federal Republic as the too powerful member. The German leadership seems deeply committed to seeking democratic Germany's future in a progressively coalescing European Community in close cooperation with the United States rather than in an increasingly bilateral alliance with the United States. It is for this reason that the weakness of Germany's European partners and the vulnerability of the EC movement to the buffets of the current recession are so acutely painful and worrisome to Chancellor Schmidt and his colleaques. In a sense they have substituted an interest rationale for the older post-war guilt complex as the basis for the Federal Republic's ardent pan-Europeanism.

Notwithstanding the dedication of the German leadership to pan-Europeanism, there is a profound perception of Western Europe and the Federal Republic's community of interest with the United States and a constant instinct to be in agreement with the United States on all important economic and security issues. Even its barest form, the indispensibility of the United States—its troops and its nuclear umbrella—to the Federal Republic's security remains very high in the German consciousness. The German nightmare is that the United States will turn isolationist and the European Community will disintegrate leaving the Federal Republic exposed to the weight and the enmity of the Soviet Union.

On European issues one can perceive the palpable tension between the Federal Republic's impatience to get on quickly with the tension is perceptible between Germany's willingness to commit its own resources to advance the common cause as it sees it, and its realization that helping too much can create reactions that will retard rather than advance its objectives. Chancellor Schmidt finds his greatest difficulty in patience with what may often seem the faint-hearted economic policies of partner governments in the European Community.

→ business of European integration and its realization that patience is its best hope for achieving the future it sees for itself in a dynamic and unified Europe. A similar tension

The domestic political scene in the Federal Republic has been transformed, in ways not yet clear, by the decision of Franz Josepf Strauss to establish his Bavarian-based Christian Socialist Union (CSU) as a separate parliamentary party from the broader Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The motivation, the wisdom and the long-term ramifications of this surprise move by Herr Strauss are subjects of intense speculation and discussion within the Federal Republic. Quite contrary predictions are offered as to the effects of the CDU/CSU divorce. Some observers believe that the breakup will free the CDU to expand into the center left territory now occupied by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) causing that party's demise and an end to its long role as the coalition kingmaker of governments in the Federal Republic. The corollary to this view is that the CSU will whither and disappear also with Strauss' eventual retirement from active politics, leaving the Federal Republic as a truly two-party nation.

A contrary view, however, sees the CDU/CSU split as the precursor to an increasing fractionalization of German politics, with the next move being a split-off of the left wing of the SPD. This school of thought sees a two-party system as being unnatural to European parliamentary democracy and something essentially peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon democracies of Britain and the United States. The prospect of shifting, multiparty coalition governments in the Federal Republic is disturbing to those who value the certainty and discipline of government as highly as do most Germans.

IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The importance of the European Community was a major refrain in all of my bilateral discussions in London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome. In addition, I met with incomeing European Commission President Roy Jenkins in London, as well as outgoing Commission President Ortoli and Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans in Brussels, for the express purpose of discussing the European Community as a Community, in terms of its importance to the United States and to our partners and allies in Europe.

The EC is like the proverbial half a glass of water—some see it as half full, some as half empty. It is clear that the recession of 1974–76 placed a heavy strain on already existing joint economic policies and institutions of the EC and has delayed the adoption of new ones. Nonetheless, I found a greater than ever appreciation of the political importance of the EC in each of the countries I visited, and a determination to find new ways to strengthen the Community as a unit despite the roadblocks which are obstructing the path to greater economic institutional unification at the present time. I was struck by the disposition among European government leaders to seek ways to act through the Community whenever possible. The habit if not the substance of frequent joint consultations on almost the full spectrum of political and economic issues seems to have taken hold firmly, at least partly as a result of rather elaborate political consultation mechanisms that have been established on an ad hoc basis outside the formal text of the Treaty of Rome.

And, within the United Nations General Assembly a very high degree of unified action is in the process of being achieved by the nine members of the EC. This is largely the work of a new unit in the EC developed by Sir Christopher Soames.

Anomalies remain, however. For instance, the nine take a common stand in the Geneva multilateral trade negotiations because trade formally comes within the Commission's jurisdiction, but not in the IMF because monetary issues do not come within the Commission's formal jurisdiction.

Individually and collectively the member nations of the EC consider it vital that the U.S. lead in seeking to achieve a harmonization of policies on economic and political issues.

The recovery and expansion of the U.S. economy is seen as a precondition for the recovery and expansion of Western Europe's "stagflating" economies. There seem no longer to be any lingering suspicions that the United States is ambivalent toward the Community, seeking on the one hand to bolster it while acting on other occasions to divide and weaken it, as was sometimes charged in the recent past.

A major issue facing the European Community is the question of expansion. A formal decision has been made to negotiate Greece's entry into the EC while Portugal and Spain have moved to the threshold of seeking formal admission. In addition, Turkey is anxious to match any status and concessions made to Greece. Though Turkey seems to be not quite ready for the EC at least for the moment, there is an expectation that negotiations for a closer Turkish alignment will ensue. However, given the diversity of Turkey's political and cultural heritage, questions remain as to the feasibility of its formal incorporation in a "united Europe".

It is significant to note that the Council of Ministers, in voting to admit Greece, overrode on political grounds the negative recommendation concerning Greece's application for admission prepared by the Commission on economic grounds. It was clear from my discussions in Brussels and elsewhere that a similar situation may be developing with respect to Spain's desire to enter the European Community.

The ambivalent view of the EC members respecting the admission of Greece is illustrative of many of the paradoxes with which our European allies find themselves confronted, in their slow and painful groping for a truly European nationhood. A reliable foundation for political union can only be achieved through meaningful economic integration—a tedious and slow-paced process. But the slowness and complexity of economic unification retards the process of political unification and highlights the political impotence of the European Community in a world which cries out for a Western European political "personality".

The energy problem remains uppermost in the minds of the EC members. The initiative of Secretary of State Kissinger in the IAEA—the association of major oil consumers—is widely appreciated. I see a new recognition in Western Europe—especially in France—of its own relation to the Middle East oil supply situation and Arab-Israel conflict, a recognition that the ability to play its part has been prejudiced by its fear of its own vulnerability to another Middle East oil embargo and its interest in earning its way back to a more effective consultative role with the United States. The Federal Republic of Germany has generally had this view and current developments involving Saudi Arabia and other Arab States are brining the issue forward again.

The attitude of the other industrial democracies—other than in some cases the Federal Republic of Germany—toward the LDC's and our own in the United States have tended to diverge. The best evidence of this is the Lome Agreement made by the EC with 46 States in February, 1975 which dealt with many of the same subjects on which we could not agree with the LDC's at the Nairobi Conference of April, 1976. From the U.S. point of view a major effort to harmonize these policies regarding the LDC's is perhaps as important—if not more so even than on energy.

Recommendation

(1) If European Community relations with the United States are reasonably harmonious and on the upswing, European Community relations with Japan—the third leg of the industrial triad—remain tentative and troubled. This is an area in which the United States must be particularly alert and adroit in playing a good offices role.

(2) It is most essential to achieve a harmonization of United States, European Community, Western European and Japanese policies in respect of relations with the LDC's and on energy questions. The United States alone is positioned to give the lead required. Nothing less than the continuing political and economic viability of the industrial democracies is at stake and only concerted action by the United States, the European Community and Western Eufope and Japan offers a hope for a creative response to the challenges posed to us jointly by the LDC's and by the OPEC oil monopoly.

V. YUGOSLAVIA

I visited Yugoslavia to acquire some familiarity with the problems and personalities which are likely to surface following Tito's departure. At 84, President Tito indisputably is in the twilight of his long and illustrious career. There are grounds for concern that post-Tito Yugoslavia could become a world crisis center.

The chances of any overt military attack by the Soviet Union seem unlikely. However, a destabilizing resurgence of ethnic animosities and nationality separatism could provide rich opportunities for Soviet political intervention and for subversion and could lead even to something more serious if it got violent.

Yugoslavia's population encompasses the greatest ethnic and religious diversity in Europe. A leading academic expert has recently observed: "A 'Bangladesh' in Europe seems implausible but if it can occur anywhere, Yugoslavia is one such place, for national hatreds of an intensity unsurpassed in modern Europe have been submerged not uprooted."

For a small country, Yugoslavia occupies an extraordinarily strategic position in Europe geographically and ideologically. The elimination of Titoism and the reassertion of political dominance over Yugoslavia—even without overt military action—would provide a rich harvest indeed for the Soviet Union. It could give the Soviet Navy unrestricted access to the Adriatic Coast, thereby revolutionizing the military balance in the Mediterranean and the Near East. It could enable the Soviet Union to leap-frog Romania and flank Albania. Indeed an enhanced political presence in Yugoslavia for the U.S.S.R. could open up the prospect of a base for the naval and air forces of the U.S.S.R. with a profound effect upon Italy and Greece. Moreover, reassertion of Soviet control over the Yugoslav League of Communists could change the nature of the Communist movements in Italy and Greece.

Histroic Russian pan-Slavism has long regarded Serbia as an extension of the greater Russian hinterland. The idea has some analogy to Syria's coucept of Lebanon being part of a greater Syria, and a Soviet "peace-keeping" role in Yugoslavia analogous to that assumed by Syria in strife-torn Lebanon might—if there was a conflict of nationality in Yugoslaiva—have strong appeal in the Kremlin.

President Tito has established a decentralized federal system in Yugoslavia in an effort to contain separatist conflicts following his departure. The "glue" designed to hold the centrifugal ethnic republics together after Tito is to be supplied by the League of Yugoslav Communists—that is the Party and by the Army which is believed to be dominated by "nationalist," Yugoslav-minded leaders.

Economic development is vital to Yugoslavia's future, not only for its own sake but as an indispensible lubricant to subordinate ethnic and regional rivalries. At present, per capita annual income varies from the $2,500 range in Slovenia to the $300 range in the Albanian region. In pursuit of economic development, Yugoslavia has evolved a brand of communism which they call "self-management" based on the individual autonomy of state-owned enterprises, profit-seeking and open competition among such enterprises in domestic and foreign markets. In addition, Yugoslavia actively seeks private foreign investment by transnational enterprises from the industrialized countries. Dow Chemical has recently invested in a major new project.

The Yugoslav leadership downplays speculation concerning possible Soviet military intervention but has expressed private concerns respecting the implications of the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine and of President-elect Carter's statement flatly negating any thought of U.S. troops in Yugoslavia even in the event of fighting there. Yugoslav leaders took the initiative in expressing to me their concerns over the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine as it was interpreted in the Eastern European press. This interpretation was to the effect that the United States was giving the U.S.S.R. a free hand as to the political future of the Eastern European states in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. This is, of course, not the case and any such interpretation has been rejected by the United States but Yugoslavia and how the United States will regard it is considered an important case in point.

Recommendations

(1) I believe that the United States and NATO have a strong interest in the continuing independence and national integrity of Yugoslavia. In this respect, I believe that judicious encouragement should be given trade and investment opportunities helpful to Yugoslavia's economic development. Moreover, the United States should encourage the European Community to maintain a helpful trading and investment relationship with Yugoslavia. Economic relations could be decisive in holding Yugoslavia together as a nation in a crunch.

(2) On appropriate occasions, both public and private, I believe that the President and Secretary of State of the United States should make clear to the Soviet Union and to the world that the United States strongly supports Yugoslav independence and national integrity and will take a most serious view of any outside efforts to compromise continuance of that independence and national integrity.

EMBASSY OF MOROCCO
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Cy Vance

PRESS MEMORANDUM

The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco presents its compliments and has the honor to forward the following for your information:

1. A study published by Mr. Mohammad Galal Keshk, well-known Egyptian writer, who was the first Arab journalist to enter the Sahara region during the Spanish occupation.
2. An interview granted by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco to Mr. Leon Zitrone, Special Representative of the French television.

The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco hopes that this information will be of interest.

Enclosures

EMBASSY OF MOROCCO ★ WASHINGTON, D.C. ★

ELECTROSTATIC REPRODUCTION MADE FOR PRESERVATION PURPOSES

SAHARA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

I - WHAT IS THE WESTERN SAHARA ?

The Western Sahara is an imperialist term, there has never been a state or an entity with such a name. It refers, per se, to a relationship with something in the East. For instance, when the Americans talk about the 'West', they refer to a region in the Western part of the United States of America. The Western Sahara is a western region of the Maghreb. Geographically and historically, Morocco is the farthest western part of the Arab homeland on the Atlantic. There has never been a state between Morocco and the ocean.

If there has been during recent years a political definition of the so-called Western Sahara, it has been a definition created by imperialism and brought about by both the European power struggle to divide Morocco and the Moroccan opposition to imperialist sectarianism. At one time, Spanish colonies in the Moroccan Sahara included Tarfaya and Ifni whose true Moroccan character have never been disputed. These two areas have also in the past been dominated by Spain which for several years refused to recognize their being part of Morocco. Eventually compelled by the national movement and the resolutions of international agencies, Spain withdrew from the territories. There were no problems regarding their joining their mother-country (Morocco) although UN Resolution 1514[...] made reference to the wishes of the peoples of Ifni, Tarfaya and the Western Sahara and to their right to self-determination.

It was unanimously agreed that the peoples of Ifni and Tarfaya fully exercised their right to self-determination when the two territories were reunited with their mother-land, Morocco.

Therefore, the Sahara was not a separate issue until after the restoration of Moroccan sovereignty over Ifni and Tarfaya and when the discovery of phosphate deposits in the area led General Franco to separate the region and to establish an entity around the phosphate mines.

The Spanish authorities governed the region as one unit including Tarfaya and Ifni. The administrative base was Ifni until 1960 when Spain turned the area into a Spanish territory represented in the Cortes.

The Spaniards then, more logical than truthful, invented a new political entity and called it Spanish Sahara. As far as the Arabs are concerned, the Sahara extends from the ocean to the Nile Valley. It is a geographical and not a political term. The Western Sahara is Moroccan in Morocco and the Western Sahara is Egyptian in Egypt.

II - WHY HAVE MOST COUNTRIES CONSIDERED THAT MOROCCO IS THE RIGHTFUL CLAIMANT TO THE SAHARA ?

There are many historical, natural and anthropological reasons.

A. As we have mentioned it previously, the area was not a separate entity until Spain claimed it as a Spanish territory. And according to the decree issued by the International Court, it was never a no-man's land.

Geographically, the region was part of Morocco; its boundaries lie in Dara's Valley. It is Moroccan from the anthropological standpoint, Its tribes, ethnic groupings and dialects extend from the

heartland of Morocco to Nouakchott. Historically, we find that the greatest ruling dynasty of Morocco came originally from the heart of the Saharan region, and Moroccan history would become meaningless if great men such as Ben Tashfin and his troops were looked upon as foreigners or as an army which occupied and colonized Morocco on behalf of an alien state.

Saharan dynasties have governed Fez, Marrakesh and Rabat.

Century-old documents show the Sultan of Morocco referring to the Moroccan character of the Sahara and the Saharans pledging allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco, such as a letter from Sultan Moulay Abd Al-Rahman, dated February 2, 1833, which states: 'The Sahara is an integral part of our happy kingdom.' This was written 130 years before the discovery of phosphate deposits and before the emergence of many of the states which currently oppose Morocco.

B. Moroccans inside and outside the region have always believed in the unity of the homeland. The Sahara always supplied men when the ruling family in the capital found itself in a weak position. In recent years, while western powers dominated the Moroccan homeland, nationalist resistance was widespread. In the Sahara, Ma'Ul-Ainain and his son Al-Haiba organized a movement which continued to resist imperialism carrying the banner of the Sultan of Morocco, supporting him and working under him. This went on until the authorities in the capital saw the necessity of accepting the realities of European supremacy. Ma'Ul-Ainain and his son rejected the decision and rebelled against Moroccan authority. They conquerred Marrakesh on August 15, 1912 and asserted their authority as the vanguard of a general movement of resistance against the colonialists. This revolt against the Sultan underlines the cohesive force of nationalist feelings among Moroccans inside and outside the region.who viewed it as an internal dispute over the conduct of foreign policy. The Sultan himself stated: "If I were certain that Al-Haiba could defeat imperialism, I would abdicate in his favor".

Ma'Ul-Ainain who established Al-Smarah as the historical and cultural capital of the Sahara region, gained historical fame because of his struggle against the French occupation of Morocco. He is buried in Tiznit (Morocco). Meanwhile, his son had occupied Marrakesh and proclaimed himself Sultan, pledging to continue the fight to liberate Morocco from French imperialism. Can any objective observer say that they and their sons are not Saharans, i.e. Moroccans?

C. The division of the country by France and Spain gave rise to a nationalist movement whose pre-eminent objective was to unify their homeland by achieving complete political independence.

A review of the history of the nationalist movement in Morocco will reveal that the return of Sahara to the homeland has always been one of its principal aims.

On both sides of the artificial border, the victims of the partition lived in the hope to be one day re-united. For their own reasons, the imperialists felt the same way: The French realized they would not be able to rule Rabat as long as the Saharan nationalist movement and Al-Smarah would survive, In 1958, Spain collaborated with Spain to fight the Moroccan Liberation Army and to expel it, together with the Saharan members of the Nationalist Movement to Morocco who had just been liberated.

D. Immediately after independence and before the emergence of certain facts, i.e., the discovery of phosphate deposits, which

some would like to use as the reason of the Moroccan claim and before the emergence of so-called internal conflicts in Morocco the Moroccan Liberation Army which included a high percentage of Saharans proceeded to the Sahara liberated it raised the Moroccan flag over its towns and declared its unity to Morocco No one thought of describing this liberation as an imperialist conquest or as an expansion manoeuver.

E. The main purpose of the Moslem Party led by Wald Al-Baseer, a movement of opposition which is being studied in depth by the historians of the Saharan separation was to liberate the area and to rejoin with the Kingdom of Morocco.

Its leaders were aware and vigilant enough to use a very precise terminology. They said joining and not uniting with and they said "the kingdom of Morocco" and not Morocco . These were the aims which led to the Saharan revolt and to the death of Al-Baseer in Al-Aiun on June 30 1970.

F. A complete library could be filled with the documents claims, memoranda, newspapers and statements issued by the Royal Palace in Morocco and by the Moroccan government parties and nationalist organizations calling for the liberation of Sahara and its unification. It is sufficient to refer to the speech delivered at Al-Mahmeed on February 26 1958 and to the immediate response of the Saharan leaders at the March 1958 Conference, when they thanked the King and declared that the struggle "for the return of the Sahara to the motherland would go on "under the leadership of the Alawi throne .

G. Following the liberation of Tarfaya and Ifni the Sahara issue became the principal claim of the nationalist move ment. No other issue of the Third World had aroused such national unanimity, thus demonstrating the overwhelming sincerity of the Moroccan people in their determination to liberate and unify the Sahara. This unanimous support was clearly shown by the Green March which is considered a unique popular achievement In any country, it is rare to find the Palace and all political parties, including the Communist Party, in such complete agreement over one position, such as ,in this case over the Sahara, Even the Algerian opposition leaders noted this concensus through statements which stressed the need to respect the will of the people, i.e., to recognize the wishes of 17 million Moroccans who professed their steadfast belief in the Moroccan character of the Sahara by the most forceful means of expression.

H. Morocco has been for the last twenty years the only claimant and the only contestant for the independence of the Sahara. Its claims kept the issue alive all Spanish plans to annex the region to set up a satellite regime or to establish a separate entity with an extremist outlook failed while the international organizations and neighbouring countries consider ed Morocco as the principal concerned party in the Saharan issue.

III - WHY HAS MOROCCO AGREED TO SHARE THE SAHARA WITH MAURITANIA?

When Morocco recognized Mauritania's independence the latter introduced its claims to Sahara. The two countries reached an understanding on the issue with a view to confront Spain and the other powers seeking to exploit Moroccan Mauritanian differences to perpetuate the separation of the Sahara

Whatever can be said about the circumstances which compel led Morocco to accept an agreement with Mauritania the Moroccan attitude cannot be described as a tactical manoeuvre The two countries' borders had not been determined and the union of the two territories had been considered a possibility. When

the two countries chose to e tablish their boundaries, they decided, with justification to define their frontiers inside a territory upon which both had valid and legal claims as stated in the decision handed down by the Internation Court.

It is worth mentioning here that the expression 'partition of the Sahara' between Morocco and Mauritania was first used at the Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat in 1974, by President Boumedienne who stated: "I attended a meeting between the King and the Mauritanian President they have agreed on a formula to solve the problem of Sahara - when it is liberated and to determine how it is to be apportionned. I was present and gave the agreement all my blessings."

IV - WHY DOES MOROCCO REJECT THE SELF-DETERMINATION APPROACH?

Morocco has not denied the right of the Saharans to self-determination indeed, while considering that it was not the only solution, it nevertheless supported a referendum subject to two conditions: Spanish withdrawal and the 'right to vote' of the Saharans exiled in Morocco. Morocco also asked the International Court's opinion as to the no-man's-land status of the Sahara. Spain rejected these conditions and kept imposing a 'fait accompli' on the region. New forces and facters intervened substantiating Morocco's belief that the true will of the people could not be expressed unless outside influences were removed.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that those calling for self-determination were against it when it was to their advantage. The Polisario Front rejected the referendum formula, describing as a 'plot' unless it was held under pre-established rules including the proviso that independence would be the inevitable outcome. (Article 8 of the Popular Front' Program September 1974). An agreement reached during a secret and lengthy meeting held on September 9, 1975 between Al-Wali, the Polisario leader and the Spanish Foreign Minister ignored the right of the people to self-determination while accepting without question Al-Wali's dubious credentials as the official representative of the Saharans empowered to determine their future on their behalf. Moreover some outside interests interpreted the self-determination approach as leading only to independence without regard for the alternative choice: unification.

During the critical moments preceding the successful Green March, the Spanish troops withdrew from some parts of the region handing them over to the Polisario Front which then proceeded to set up its own rule of terror disregarding the wish of the people and ignoring the possibility of holding a referendum.

However, the Moroccan-Mauritanian attitude was based on the following:

1. the historical and geographical facts which underline the unity of the land and the people;

2. the wish of the Saharanz, repeatedly expressed during the last twenty years, to be liberated and united to their motherland.

3. the presence in Morocco of a majority of Saharan refugees who, facing a difficult choice, opted for several years of exile and deprivation,

4. the decision of the leader of the Saharan Assembly (Jama'a) who sided with Morocco and stated the wish of the Assembly to be re-united with the motherland. Chief of the most important tribe, he was a senior officer in the Liberation Army which freed and unified the Sahara in 1957.and was regarded as the official spokesman of the Saharans by the Spanish authorities and the international organizations

5. the resolution approving the Spanish-Moroccan - Mauritanian agreement adopted by the overwhelming majority of the Assembly members (61 for 19 against). It must be noted that those who voted to reject the agreement did not necessarily oppose the return of Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania;

6. The return to their country of several members of the Assembly who had been deported to Algeria and their stated approval of the agreement

7. the friendly reception afforded the Green March whose progress was reportedly without incident. Moreover, King Hassan's representative, Al-Sayed Ahmad Ben Soudah entered the region accompanied only by civilians and rejected the Spanish offers of protection. He insisted on attending the Friday religious services without a guard, and the enthusiastic welcome he received unprecedented in the history of the Sahara, was broadcast live and recorded for posterity.

8. All the incidents which followed the Spanish withdrawal are the work of a particular group and its foreign supporters. They indicate that the group has no connection with the people of Sahara unable to carry out any effective operation on Saharan territory, it had to resort on a raid on Nouakchott the Mauritanian capital. As it claims to be a liberation movement one would expect their activities to be greater inside the region and among the people. The revolutionary fish does not swim away from its own waters to invade the territory of others.

9. All those now in favor of self-determination had asked Spain to exercise its right as the effective power in the area. It is only logical that they accept a solution already approved by the Spanish authorities.

10. The attitude of Morocco towards the right to self - determination is based international and revolutionary interpretations of the principle; it should never mean the division of territorial integrity or the disintegration of the nations of the Third World authorizing particular regions to secede because a) they disapprove of the rulers in power b) they are eager to carry out a social experiment c) they wish to monopolize the wealth of the region or d) they are complying with the wishes of an outside power.

11. Third World public opinion severely condemned the "self-determination" movement in Katanga. Tshombe the hero of the Katanga "liberation" was arrested during the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and emprisonned until his death in Algeria of all places. His death signaled the end of the separatist movement in the Congolese region. The same fate befell the self-determination plots in Biafra, in Southern Sudan, in Northern Iraq and in Western Sahara.

The right to self-determination is the right of free choice: secession or unification. It is the right of the people to achieve their territorial unity and to extend their domination over the whole of their homeland. The United Nations Organization has has determined that it could be achieved through: a) the creation of an independent state, b) free union with an independent state or, c) confederacy with an independent state.

The UN Declaration of Human Rights defines the right to self-determination as the freedom of a people to decide their political status, to manage their economy and to achieve their political and economic development.

Undoubtedly, the situation that prevails in the region is most conducive to the achievement of a full political and economic development which could not be accomplished in an entity lacking infrastructure and devoid of any of the basic ordinary human elements essential to development.

V - HAS MOROCCO IGNORED THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY RESOLUTION REGARDING RESPECT OF COLONIAL FRONTIERS?

Morocco knows very well the contents of all the resolutions adopted by the Organization, since it was on Moroccan territory and under the sponsorship of King Mohammed V that the OAU was created. As regards the respect of colonial frontiers, Morocco's position is based upon two supporting facts:

1. The nations of the Third World which have been the victims of colonialist partition should not always cling to the principle of colonial frontiers.. Nationalist movements in the colonies were often based on the rejection of such frontiers. Whenever it has been possible to eradicate artificial borders and to return to natural and national frontiers, the interests of the people have been protected and peace has been guaranteed. When return to national frontiers proved difficult colonial frontiers were accepted as the viable, and not the ideal solution.

2. Morocco believes that the supporters of the principle of colonial frontiers are using hypocritical and specious arguments for the borders of Sahara are the result of the Madrid Agreement between Spain Morocco and Mauritania This reflects exactly the border situation that prevails in Algeria.

VI - WHY DOES MOROCCO OBJECT TO RAISING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?

Morocco feels that the international organizations can no longer intervene in the matter. The United Nations are

required to uphold any peaceful settlement of a dispute involving member-states who had initially raised the issue before the organization. The Sahara is a case in point. The parties of the dispute came to an agreement and so notified the United Nations. The latter should therefore accept the decision of the concerned parties and close the file.

Organizations interested in liberation movements and advocating anti-colonialist policies should consider that the problem has been solved since the colonial power is no longer occupying the territory which has been returned to its rightful owners: Morocco and Mauritania, both members of these organizations.

Morocco considers that the existence of these organizations might indeed be threatened if they condescend to sanction secessionist movements - misrepresenting themselves as liberation movements - engaged in struggles against member-states. These organizations would find themselves in the awkward position of approving imperialism and liber-liberation movements at the same time.

Morocco is anxious to point out to the Third World the possible consequences of a policy which might lead to the destruction of territorial unity and to member-states supporting secessionist movements working against fellow - members.

Indeed, it is through the destruction of territorial unity and the encouragement of secessionist movements that imperialism penetrated the Third World.

VII - IS THE PRESENCE OF SAHARAN REFUGEES IN ALGERIA AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE POLISARIO FRONT AN INDICATION OF THE COUNTRY'S ASPIRATIONS TO INDEPENDENCE?

The right of the refugees to determine their future status has at last been recognized. This was the aim pursued by Morocco on behalf of the refugees who fled the Spanish occupation or were exiled by the Spanish authorities.

Morocco and Mauritania believe that the Saharan refugees whose quantitative importance has been exaggerated are being used by elements hostile to both countries. Even the Spanish authorities who could have used an inflated figure to justify establishing a separate state estimate the total population at about 70.000, while Morocco and Mauritania estimate the number of refugees at approximately 35.000. This differs widely from the publicized number of hundreds of thousands refugees and supports the Moroccan claim that they are not only Saharans but Algerians as well as refugees from other countries who are being assembled for political purposes of which they are unaware.

In this connection we would like to refer to the statement issued by the Polisario Movement outside Algeria which accuses the Algerian authorities of assassinating the leader of the Movement, head of the so-called government of Sahara because he opposed Algerian policies. If such has been the fate of the head of their government one can speculate about the opportunities of self-expression granted to the refugees and the extent to which they can exercise their right to self-determination.

Morocco and Mauritania believe that the liberation movements acted wisely when they refused to recognize the Polisario which they saw as a faction sponsored and supported by the Spanish authorities hoping that the region would secede. Such an attitude on the part of a liberation movement is against the true spirit of all revolutionary traditions. From the very beginning, the Polisario Front has been contributing to regional and international conflicts. It has no popular roots and without exception its leaders are Moroccans or Mauritanians who exercised their right by standing in parliamentary elections in Morocco or entered the Mauritanian diplomatic service and subsequently and for very personal reasons left the service of their respective governments to further the ends of the colonialist regime in the region.

VIII - WHAT ARE THE FORCES SUPPORTING THE SECESSION OF THE SAHARA?

a. Imperialist powers seeking the partition of the African states to create entities lacking independent raisons'dêtre et thus submissive to outside protection.

b. Anti-Arab imperialist powers seeking to divide the Arab homaland, to establish small entities to hinder Arab unity, to squander Arab energies in inter-Arab conflicts and to punish Morocco for its stand at the Islamic Summit Conference and during the October War.

c. World capitalism seeking to perpetuate imperialist plunder of raw materials by preventing the establishment of strong blocs of developing nations which could control prices of such materials. Such powers do not relish the propect of Morocco gaining control of 60% of the phosphate world exports for such a control would give the Arabs and the Third World nations a much better bargaining position. It also opens the door to the processing of phosphates in an Arab land. On the other hand, if a mini-state depends wholly on the assistance of world capitalism to export its phosphate, it will constitute a Trojan horse which can be used to frustrate any attempt to resist imperialist plunder.

It is also in the interest of world capitalism to set up a mini phosphate state whose apparently high revenues would be deposited in international banks or squandered in wa wasteful consumption instead of being used to develop the countries of the Maghreb.

d. The world powers engaged in a cold war and looking for new spheres of influence. They are trying to create trouble spots to market and test their weaponry they are also seeking to destroy the independent stance of African nations to control them, to frustrate their attempts to reach their goals and to initiate disagreements and conflicts between Africans.

EMBASSY OF MOROCCO
WASHINGTON D.C.

I N T E R V I E W

granted by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco to Mr. Leon Zitrone French Television Special Representative. -

---

QUESTION:

Morocco is soon going to hold elections. Could you explain briefly the role of the Special Council whose members are the nine General Secretaries of the political parties?

ANSWER:

Instead of creating a separate group, I wished it had been possible to include the Secretaries of the political parties among the members of the Cabinet - as Ministers of State without portfolio for instance; they could have helped to shape Government policies by discussing with me and my Government issues of general interest instead of limiting themselves to matters purely related to the elections

Circumstances prevented such a policy at the time but it was paramount to associate all political parties to the various phases of the electoral process in order to avoid any dispute or any doubt on the fairness of the popular expression of opinion. this led me to set up a committee which would include besides the Prime Minister the Ministers of Interior, Justice and Information. This taskforce has the responsibility to keep me informed of the development of the operations and of any past or present irregularities.

As I clearly pointed out in my letter addressed to the official representatives of the political parties this does not preclude in any way the use of all ordinary legal channels under the provisions of the Constitution.

QUESTION:

What do these elections represent?

ANSWER:

As far as I am concerned, the elections will give me first of all an excellent opportunity to detect young qualified individuals and to promote the replacement of the governmental management staff

If the elections develop as anticipated and if the successful candidates work hard and discharge to the best of their abilities the responsibles duties they must perform under the Communal Charter we will witness, within two or three years. the emergence of young men well able to fill high positions in the government as Ministers Ambassadors, high executives and senior administrators.

As you know, power consumes mentally as well as physically. Unlike a poet's fantasies, the creative imagination needs now and then infusions of fresh blood. We cannot keep on using the same people and the same administrators. I hope then that the elections will help to bring to the forefront those Moroccans who will have to serve their country during the next decades.

The Sahara

QUESTION:

Everyone thought that the issue - since we refer to it as the Western Sahara issue - was settled, it now seems to crop up again here and there. Why and, in your view, who has an interest in bringing up the subject?

ANSWER:

The Sahara issue is not the only matter being talked about at this time.

Every year and on every occasion, some embittered souls try to dig up old dusty records even those problems that have already been settled factually or legally.

As far as I am concerned, the matter is closed. It could be argued, I suppose, that the two resolutions included a self-determination process which so far has not been officially undertaken. I will reply to those who take me to task on this point: you have never given us a clear field to hold such a process and I challenge anyone to let us create the necessary conditions to hold a referendum. But I know the Algerians will not want a public expression of opinion and will do nothing to facilitate such a vote for the simple reason that it would favor Morocco and would, once and for all, close the last door still opened to them. As I want to avoid an influx of voters coming from Chad, Mali or Algeria, I will hold a plebiscite if Spain hands us the list of the 75.000 Sahravis entered on their electoral rolls for the vote on the self-determination issue.

There will be a vote as soon as the so-called Polisario Front controlled by Algeria gives me enough peace and quiet to hold it in an orderly manner. My good friend Ould Daddah, President of the Republic of Mauritania and I have agreed not to shy away from such a public expression of opinion, but we insist on the maximum conditions of objectivity. However I feel sure that our Algerian neighbours will not permit such conditions to prevail.

Phosphates

QUESTION:

In the field of economic development Morocco seems prepared to offer to the developing countries of the Third World the opportunity to buy phosphate on credit. I have been given to understand that you initiated this program.

ANSWER:

Yes, such was the Moroccan plan when the aftermath of the 1973 October War brought about the first shortage of raw materials which surprised, I would even say shocked the richest and most developed countries of the world. It was unfortunate that the Moroccan proposal was not fully understood because the example could have been followed by other countries not only for phosphates, but also for oil, iron and all other raw materials. Since our phosphate deposits are practically inexhaustible and that nowadays money is not everything, credits extended for phosphate purchases would have in fact enabled us to set up an exchange system. Right now,

exchanges are more important than banknotes if of course the exchanges are not limited to those products which affect the current economic situation.

This year for instance we are going to exchange wood but three years from now we might need something else, this shows that Morocco should not confine itself to a rigid system of exchange. We had proposed the credit plan to help developing countries in need of phosphates but lacking the funds to pay for it because of its high price in the hope of being repaid at the end of the credit period by getting other needed raw materials in exchange.

QUESTION:

One last question. Is Morocco doing well?

ANSWER:

One can never say that a country is not doing well. One can say that things are in poor shape in a country, but one cannot say when referring to legitimate countries such as yours, since you are French, or mine that the nation is in poor health. I only mention France and Morocco but the history books are full of examples. France and Morocco are like those toys with different heads fat bellies and leaded feet. No matter how much they are punched, they immediately stand up again. I would even say that when these countries need anti-bodies to renew their vigor they generate them and need no help from the outside world.

I can say my country is doing well. It could do better. But I know that sometimes it is wise to leave well alone. Let us be content with a steady and patriotic pace. The nationalist spirit must not be thrown to the four winds. The patriotic pressure of the machine as represented by Morocco should be stabilized at a normal cruising speed. No xenophobia no excess. No euphoria provoked by too much contentment or too much laxity, but enough patriotic feeling to keep the machine going at a steady rate, thus Morocco will keep on doing well.
