3/21/79

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo w/att.	From Brzezinski to The President (3 pp.)re:MAP for the Philiines/enclosed in Hutcheson to Brzezinski 3/21/79	3/21/79	A
memo	~~From Brzezinski to Blumenthal (one page) re:Jackson-Vanik/enclosed in Hutcheson to Brzezinski 3/21/79~~ opened per RAC NLC-126-16-37-2-2 8/6/13	3/21/79	A
telegram	~~From Mondale to Aaron (one page) re:Jackson-Vanik~~ opened per RAC NLC-126-16-37-1-3 8/6/13	3/21/79	A
memo w/att.	~~From Moore to The President (2 pp.) re:Matsunaga's trip to Japan and the Philippines/enclosed in Hutcheson to Moore 3/21/79~~ opened per RAC NLC-126-16-37-3-1 8/6/13	3/21/79	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec.- Pres. Handwriting File 3/21/79 BOX 123

RESTRICTION CODES

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(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

To Joseph Shane

Your letter is very much appreciated, as is your public expression of support. I am grateful for the confidence you have in me as President, and in our great nation. Thank you!

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Mr. Joseph D. Shane
9862 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California 90210

P.S. I hope you can be present when the peace treaty is signed -

J.

Mr. Joseph D. Shane
9862 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, California 90210

9

Editorial in newspaper
handwritten PS

31

7903212140

RECEIVED
MAR 24 19
CEN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

stripping desk--

attached for mailing....
i've already sent informational
copies to gretchen and
ed sanders

thanks--susan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDWARD SANDERS

I thought you would be interested in the attached advertisement that was placed in the Los Angeles Times, by a good friend of mine, Joseph Shane, prior to your departure for the Middle East. The ad cost Mr. Shane $3,000.

Draft letter attached for signature

- ES

Susan
invite to signing
J

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(POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT)

JOSEPH D. SHANE

9862 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210
(213) 274-6393

March 5, 1979

Dear Mr President!

You no doubt have seen the advertisement critical of your policies in the Los Angeles Times of March 2. I could buy the entire newspaper with names of people who think favorably of your accomplishments.

The Presidency is an impossible job; our country has problems unprecedented in total dimension. The most we can do is face these challenges with courage and integrity. I believe most Americans feel you have done this and that you have made important contributions to our country and to the world.

And we believe in human rights as you do.

Sincerely,

Joseph D Shane

March 21, 1979

Dear Mr. Bernstein:

Ms. Carol Benefield has brought to my attention her correspondence with you about interviews for the Cougar Crier, the newspaper of the John F. Kennedy High School in Bellmore, New York.

As much as the President appreciates your interest in wanting to come in to talk with him, we will not be able to arrange this appointment. As you may surmise, he receives many, many requests for interviews for both High School and College newspapers and periodicals. Since the heavy demands of his official schedule do not afford him the opportunity to honor each and every one of these, the President feels he has no recourse, in fairness, but to decline them all. We are sure you will understand.

With our best wishes,

Sincerely,

Fran Voorde
Deputy Appointments Secretary

Mr. David E. Bernstein
1958 Lowell Lane
Merrick, NY 11566

FV/mhr/em

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fran..

Chip is the only family member who gives interviews and he is not interested in doing this. Mrs. C is not interested in doing it either.

So before Mr. Bernstein writes me again asking to see the President, maybe you can send him a nice response.

You will note that the President has indicated he does not remember Mr. Bernstein's uncle.

CB

3/19/79

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1979

Mr. David E. Bernstein
1958 Lowell Lane
Merrick, New York 11566

Dear Mr. Bernstein:

I appreciate your recent letter inquiring further about an interview with a member of the First Family.

I regret that an appointment with one of the Carter children cannot be scheduled. I have, however, forwarded your request to the Presidential Appointments Office for further consideration and am sure you will hear from them soon.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Carol Benefield
Appointments Secretary
to the First Family

bcc: Fran Voorde

file to Fran Voorde

E

MAR 20 1979

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Susan...

Whenever it's convenient, could you find out if the President remembers ~~Bertram~~ Bernstein?

Thanks.
3/12/79

to Carol Benefield

no
I

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David E.Bernstein
1958 Lowell Lane
Merrick,N.Y. 11566

March 9, 1979

Dear Carol Benefield,

On February 21, 1979, I recieved a letter stating that you are unable to schedule an appointment for me at this time. I would like to know if it is possible for you to schedule me for an appointment with a member of the first family for sometime during the summer or in September. This would enable me to have the interview in the first issue of John F. Kennedy High School's newspaper, the Cougar Crier, in October of 1979.

I might add that I have a personal motive for seeking an appointment. I have an uncle, Bertram P. Bernstein, who was friends with the President at Georgia Tech and I would like to find out if the President remembers him.

Thank you very much for your cooperation and your regards to our school newspaper.

Thank you,

David E. Bernstein

David E. Bernstein

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 21, 1979

WP
RP } implement

inform Ghorbal

ZB.

attached should go to
Ouandt and Poats --

ZB's note says: implement,
inform Ghorbal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/20/79

Mr. Preisdent:

Does this meet with your approval?

✓ yes ___ no

Phil

If Sadat wants it

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
DATE: March 20, 1979
FROM: Zbigniew Brzezinski
VIA: Phil Wise

MEETING:	Dinner meeting with President Sadat given by the US-Egyptian Joint Business Council (Chairman Frank Considine, CEO of National Can) and US Chamber of Commerce (Chairman Shearon Harris, CEO of North Carolina Light Power). Sponsors and Egyptian Ambassador wish to convert occasion to dinner in honor of you as well as Sadat. Alternatives: Your attendance at dinner or drop-in during discussion after dinner, about 9:00 p.m.
DATE:	Tuesday, March 27, 1979
PURPOSE:	To carry out your request that 100 US business executives be invited to meet with President Sadat and to encourage US business participation in Egyptian economic development.
FORMAT:	Briefing by State Department official for businessmen at 6:00 p.m.; reception at 7:00 p.m. attended by President Sadat in Main Hall of US Chamber, across Lafayette Square from White House; dinner at 8:00 p.m. About 100 business executives invited.
CABINET PARTICIPATION:	Secretaries Vance, Blumenthal, Kreps; Chairman Moore of Ex-Im and President Llewellyn of OPIC invited, as well as several members of Congress (to be determined).
SPEECH MATERIAL:	Brief remarks on the promise of peace, the importance of US private skills and capital to Egypt's economic development.
PRESS COVERAGE:	Several newsmen will be invited to dinner; the after-dinner discussion will be open to the media.
STAFF:	Rutherford Poats, NSC
RECOMMENDED BY:	Dr. Brzezinski
OPPOSED:	None.
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	None.

BACKGROUND: In your visits to Cairo last week you offered to arrange a meeting with 100 businessmen during Sadat's presence here at the treaty signing. The Egyptians proposed a dinner meeting because Sadat will not be free until late afternoon on March 27 and does not want a cocktail party.

not true →

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dispatched
hand 3-20-79 1690
3:00pm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DATE: March 20, 1979
FROM: Zbigniew Brzezinski
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BACKGROUND: In your visits to Cairo last week you offered to arrange a meeting with 100 businessmen during Sadat's presence here at the treaty signing. The Egyptians proposed a dinner meeting because Sadat will not be free until late afternoon on March 27 and does not want a cocktail party.

ZB:

I spoke with Phil Wise about this. He said he could clear the President's calendar if necessary for this. Please expedite, so that we can tell Chamber of Commerce and Amb. Ghorbal what the President will do.

RP ZB pursuant 3/29/79

Received: 20 Mar Hr: 18 LOG: 1690

NSC/S ACTION PROFILE

U/C S TS SN CO
Log in & Out (✓)

TO: VB FROM: Odom DocDate: 20 Mar

Keywords: Egypt (P) Egypt

Persons: Frank Considine

SUBJECT: Dinner mtg w/Pres Sadat given by the Joint Business Council

27 Mar 1979

Date	To	Sig	Action Received or Taken (Required)	Due	Copy(s) to
3/20	VB	x	Inf Mem & Note	3/22	Jordan
3/20			VB inf Mem & Note		
			Bruce		
3/21			Pres approved Recom		Jordan x— Said x— Poats x—

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/21/79

Mr. President:

Dr. Lukash would like to schedule your annual physical soon. You leave for Elk City at 4:15 pm saturday so it could be set up this coming saturday morning from 7 am to 11 am or wait and work it in later during April.

___ approve saturday

_✓_ wait till April

Phil

J

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21 Mar 79

Jim McIntyre

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Stu Eizenstat
Frank Moore
Zbig Brzezinski

OMB: Please convey President's decision to affected agencies.

		FOR STAFFING
		FOR INFORMATION
	/	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
		LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
		IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
		NO DEADLINE
		LAST DAY FOR ACTION

FOR ACTION	FYI	
		VICE PRESIDENT
		JORDAN
	/	EIZENSTAT
		KRAFT
		LIPSHUTZ
	/	MOORE
		POWELL
		RAFSHOON
		WATSON
		WEXLER
	/	BRZEZINSKI
/		MCINTYRE
		SCHULTZE
		ADAMS
		ANDRUS
		BELL
		BERGLAND
		BLUMENTHAL
		BROWN
		CALIFANO
		HARRIS
		KREPS
		MARSHALL
		SCHLESINGER
		STRAUSS
		VANCE

		ARONSON
		BUTLER
		H. CARTER
		CLOUGH
		CRUIKSHANK
		FIRST LADY
		HARDEN
		HERNANDEZ
		HUTCHESON
		KAHN
		LINDER
		MARTIN
		MILLER
		MOE
		PETERSON
		PETTIGREW
		PRESS
		SANDERS
		WARREN
		WEDDINGTON
		WISE
		VOORDE

	ADMIN. CONFIDEN.
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

OMB - P's Pres
convey decisions to
affected agencies

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/19/79

Mr. President:

NSC, DPS and Congressional Liaison join State, HEW and Justice in supporting Option 1.

Memos from Eizenstat and State are attached.

Rick

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAR 9 1979

C

a) State must be careful re attitude & statements not to encourage more refugees from SE Asia.
b) Make no firm commitments for '80 & '81. I will make these decisions later
J.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Director

SUBJECT: Refugee legislation and budget revisions

This memorandum requests your decision on the number of refugees the Administration now intends to admit into the United States over the next three years. Your decision has far-reaching international and domestic implications and is needed for upcoming hearings in the Congress.

Last March you determined an Administration policy on refugees. The 95th Congress failed to pass legislation implementing that policy, although the cognizant subcommittees were generally receptive. A new Administration bill, proposed by State, Justice, and HEW, has been transmitted to this Congress, and Senator Kennedy will begin Judiciary Committee hearings on March 14. The number of expected refugee entries will be requested by the committee.

Several developments over the past year make advisable a restatement of Administration policy, accompanied by revised immigration and refugee assistance legislation and revised budget estimates.

-- During the past year refugee outflows from Indochina and the Soviet Union have sharply increased (as high as 20,000 monthly for the former and 4,000 monthly for the latter). The Attorney General has repeatedly exercised his parole authority to allow entries above the 17,400 annual limit in current immigration law. These higher outflows have also increased budget costs for care and maintenance of refugees abroad and transportation to and resettlement in the U.S.

-- Various committees and Members of Congress, in particular Senators Kennedy and Inouye and Representatives Rodino, Holtzman and Fascell, have called for an early Administration overview of refugee policy and assistance. There is some indication that several Members believe that there is a good chance for legislation to be enacted this year.

-- The authorized Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy will not report before September 1980. Recent refugee developments do not allow such a delay in adopting a refugee policy.

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-- The Attorney General wants refugee immigration policy to be legislated by the Congress. He is reluctant to continue ad hoc paroles, since to do so weakens congressional resolve to legislate.

The Administration's proposed legislation largely reiterates the principles you set out a year ago with some liberalizations. It will--

-- establish a normal flow quota of 50,000 to be allocated by the President among groups of refugees (reflects March 1978 decision);

-- authorize the President to increase at the beginning of each fiscal year the normal flow quota of 50,000 (new proposal);

-- authorize the President, upon consultation with the judiciary committees, to admit emergency situation refugees beyond the annual normal flow, if an unforeseen emergency refugee situation exists and entry is of grave humanitarian concern, is in the national interest, and entry cannot be accomplished under the normal flow quota (reflects March 1978 decision.);

-- revise and expand slightly the authorities for refugee resettlement activities in the U.S., now administered by HEW, and extend them to all refugees (They are now limited to refugees from the Western Hemisphere and Indochina.) (new proposal); and

-- authorize an increase in the appropriation authorization of the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund from $25 to $50 million, thereby allowing the President to seek an additional $25 million contingency appropriation to be readily available to meet any emergency situation beyond the normal flow (new proposal)

Because of recent events illustrating the uncertainty of refugee developments abroad, all interested parties agree with the provision providing flexibility in the determination of annual normal flow quotas. Initial discussions on the Hill by Dick Clark indicate acceptance of such flexibility.

Dick Clark, State, Justice and HEW propose that the Administration authorize the entry of an additional 50,000 refugees during May-September 1979 and indicate to the Congress that normal flow entries are now estimated to be 120,000 in each of fiscal years 1980 and 1981. This current estimate might well increase later. The agencies propose that 1979 supplementals and 1980 budget amendments reflecting these entries be transmitted to the Congress immediately. Those requests would also include additional amounts needed by State for the care, maintenance and resettlement of Indochinese, Soviet and African refugees abroad. Current 1979 State appropriations and 1980 budget requests are inadequate because of the sharp increases in refugees in those areas and will be exhausted

in April. If entry of 50,000 additional in 1979 and 120,000 in each of 1980 and 1981 is authorized and increased care and maintenance is provided for refugees abroad, the total refugee appropriations are estimated as follows:

(Millions of dollars)

	1979		1980		1981	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
In Budget - State	160	111	152	173	154	153
- HEW refugee aid	227	227	166	216	156	167
Total in budget	387	338	318	389	310	320
Additional - State	52	52	128	91	104	102
- HEW refugee aid	15	15	64	64	83	83
- Other Fed. costs	14	14	48	48	67	67
Total additional	81	81	240	203	254	252

The additional estimates above are not yet firm. Indeed, the State amounts in 1980 and 1981 may be $20-$25 low, but short of substantially reducing the annual entry below 120,000 and/or limiting our care and maintenance contributions to the United Nations to aid refugees abroad, any downward adjustments to the additional estimates I may recommend to you after further review can only be minimal.

The entry of 120,000, or any number above a 50,000 normal, flow would tend to exert an undesirable pull effect on refugees by inducing more of them to seek asylum in the U.S. and reducing incentives for them to remain at home or seek asylum elsewhere. It might also weaken the pressures on countries of first asylum to accept refugees for permanent resettlement. The entry of 120,000 annually will require HEW appropriations to be increased substantially. The 100% reimbursement to the States for income support, medical costs, and social and educational services provided for needy refugees for two years, coupled with the matching Federal portion for such activities will be expensive. Furthermore, additional appropriations are likely to be required to the extent refugees utilize food stamps and receive supplemental security income payments. Increased HEW budget requests of the magnitude indicated above for newly arriving refugees are bound to be controversial in view of the many reductions in social services proposed in the 1980 budget. Questions of national priorities are likely to be raised by the elderly, blacks, Hispanics and urban leaders. A large flow of refugees into the country may also result in additional pressures from State and local governments for Federal funding to cover social service costs of illegal aliens.

On the other hand, a restrictive entry policy will also have sharp repercussions. Our national humanitarian reputation would suffer. Sharp diplomatic reactions would be forthcoming from Malasyia and Thailand, perhaps resulting in their refusal to continue as countries of first

asylum. Our ability to influence other nations (France, Canada, Australia, etc.) to continue taking refugees would be weakened. Sharp criticism would be evoked from certain Members of Congress (Kennedy especially) and from refugee and church organizations. All are aware of the 120,000 proposal. Any significant reductions below 120,000 would sharply reduce the flow of Indochinese because of the strong pressures to accept all Soviet refugees desiring to come to the U.S. (now estimated to be 36-40,000 annually).

All agree that the Attorney General should authorize the additional entry of 50,000 refugees for the May-September 1979 period. However, I believe there is an important question as to whether estimates of 120,000 normal flow entries for 1980 and 1981, as proposed by State, Justice and HEW, should be accepted and announced as Administration policy at this time. I have therefore identified four alternatives for your consideration as an Administration position on estimated normal flow for 1980 and 1981.

OPTION 1. Accept proposed 120,000 annual rate through 1981, subject to actual review and Presidential determination prior to each year, and request additional appropriations of $74, $200 and $238 million for 1979-81. (State, Justice and HEW recommendation) (NSC, DPS, CL)

-- Provides a definite entry policy and budget overview as Congress desires.

-- Meets currently foreseeable "needs" resulting from the present Indochinese and Soviet refugee situation. Includes 7,000 monthly Indochinese entries which State has conveyed to ASEAN nations and the UN as the U.S. goal and 3,000 others largely to accommodate increased outflows of Soviet Jews.

-- Entry numbers are likely to be controversial, especially among black and Hispanic communities, in view of 1980 budget stringencies for social services.

-- Several Members of Congress and refugee and church groups are aware of the 120,000 proposal and approve it.

OPTION 2. Authorize normal flow entry of 90,000 annually through 1981, subject to actual Presidential determination prior to each year, and transmit lower budget estimates of $74, $141, and $176 million for 1979-81.

-- Sets an arbitrary, lower entry number that could accommodate currently foreseeable Soviet refugees (36-40,000) and continue substantial Indochinese entries.

-- Provides a definite entry policy and budget overview as the Congress desires.

-- May lessen black and Hispanic resentment, but entry of 90,000 in will result in some objections.

-- Disappoints Malaysians and Thais who expect increased flows of Indochinese to the U.S. (7,000 monthly) as essential to their

granting temporary asylum to refugees, particularly "boat cases", and risks sharp diplomatic reaction and refusal to accept such refugees on a temporary asylum basis.

-- Would evoke criticism of inadequacy from some Members of Congress (Kennedy especially) and refugee and church organizations.

OPTION 3. Approve entry of an additional 50,000 refugees during the May-September 1979 period, but inform the Congress that an annual "normal flow" of 50,000 refugees is expected in fiscal years 1980 and 1981. Instruct the agencies to develop a quota system and restrict refugees to this number. Request lower additional appropriations of $74, $59, and $20 for 1979-81 reflecting only the impact of the one time 50,000 addition (in the May-September period.) While the legislation would authorize the President to increase the "normal flow" above 50,000 at the beginning of each fiscal year, the President would announce his intention not to do so under the circumstances now prevailing in Eastern Europe and S.E. Asia. ("Emergency situation" procedures would be available for unexpected upheavals; e.g., Iran, etc.)

-- Provides a definite entry policy and budget overview with a minimum budget impact.

-- Minimizes adverse reaction from the black and Hispanic communities and reduces the impact on "impacted" localities (e.g., Southern California and Texas).

-- May discourage Indochinese from departing. (State disagrees and claims local conditions are the determining factor in decisions to leave.)

-- Better assures successful resettlement efforts by American voluntary agencies and sponsors.

-- Would result in sharp objections from Malaysia and Thailand and seriously risks the former refusing to accept "boat cases" even temporarily.

-- Ignores continuing large outflow from Indochina and Soviet Union. Internal pressures in U.S. would be toward accommodating all of Soviet flow (36-40,000) leaving only 10-14,000 entries for Indochinese and others.

-- Would evoke sharp congressional, church and refugee organization objections.

OPTION 4. A variant of Option 3 would be to authorize entry of an additional 50,000 during the May-September 1979 period and state that the fiscal year 1980 normal flow will be determined in September 1979.

Instruct the Secretary of State, with the assistance of the Attorney General and the Secretary of HEW, to develop a plan by August 1 that includes disincentives and/or limitations directed toward the reduction of refugee immigrants toward the normal flow number of 50,000 set out in the legislation proposed by the three agencies. Announce entry flows for 1980 and 1981 in August or September in the context of that plan. (OMB recommendation)

-- Minimizes apparent budget costs which may lessen black and Hispanic resentments.

-- Softens the objections set out in Option 3, since it would not foreclose a 1980 "normal flow" higher than 50,000.

-- Fails to provide a definite entry policy and budget overview now thereby continuing a policy of ad hoc entry decisions until August thus complicating refugee and budget planning.

✓	Option 1:	50,000 more for 1979; 120,000 flow for 1980 and 1981	
		1979 supplemental:	$ 74 million
		1980 amendment:	$200 million
_____	Option 2:	50,000 more for 1979; 90,000 flow for 1980 and 1981	
		1979 supplemental:	$ 74 million
		1980 amendment:	$141 million
_____	Option 3:	50,000 more refugees for 1979; 50,000 per year for 1980 and 1981	
		1979 supplemental:	$74 million
		1980 amendment:	$59 million
_____	Option 4:	50,000 more refugees only for 1979, defer 1980-81 decisions.	
		1979 supplemental:	$74 million
		1980 amendment:	$59 million

After you have decided among the options above, we will prepare for your signature the relevant budget revisions for early transmittal to the Congress.

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EIZENSTAT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 15, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT
FRANK WHITE
ELLEN GOLDSTEIN

SUBJECT: McIntyre Memo on Refugee Legislation and Budget Revisions

We are in general agreement with OMB's presentation of your options on determining refugee admission numbers and their subsequent budget revisions. We join OMB in agreeing with the State, Justice, and HEW recommendation concerning May-September, 1979 admissions. Swift Congressional action on the '79 supplemental request necessary to meet the needs of these additional refugees is critical. The Congress needs our request this week in order to prevent current refugee assistance program from running out of money next month, a situation that would be embarrassing to the Administration as well as Congress.

The refugee legislation we submitted last week to Senator Kennedy's committee was well received. It sets 50,000 as a normal flow and permits the President, through Congressional consultation, to adjust the number at the beginning of each fiscal year, and even later if there is an emergency situation.

HEW, State, and Justice are recommending that the U.S. plan now to admit 120,000 refugees in FY80 and FY81. (Option One) While OMB's wait and see recommendation (Option Four) is not without merit, we concur with the three agencies for these reasons:

- While we cannot evaluate the foreign policy implications of this admissions policy, we agree that it is a realistic approach considering the known trend of refugee movements in Indochina and out of the Soviet Union. This number may also reflect explicit and implicit commitments made by the State Department and others.

- Senator Clark wisely points out that our May-September, 1979 commitment will require the voluntary agencies, with whom we work closely on refugee processing and resettlement, to staff up their programs this year without knowing in advance what to expect in October and beyond.

- Senator Kennedy and Congressman Holtzman, the Congressional sponsors of the legislation, have expressed emphatically their concern over the large numbers of refugees, to whom we have a humanitarian responsibility, seeking U.S. admission as well as our lack of planning and flexibility required for successful refugee resettlement. The State, Justice, and HEW recommendation provides us with a definite entry policy for the next two years with the required budget overview that Congress desires.

We believe that OMB overstates the opposition that would be expressed by American minorities. We also do not believe that by setting our refugee admission goals now for FY80 and FY81 that we will encourage additional refugees to flee their homes.

CHRISTOPHER/
CLARK

3/13 1553

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting WC

SUBJECT: Refugee Legislation -- Options Concerning the Number of Refugees to be Accepted by the United States

I understand that you have received a memorandum from OMB presenting alternatives for your decision on the number of refugees the United States should accept for resettlement.

Dick Clark and I have considered those alternatives, and we strongly support Option I. This would maintain the current rate of 10,000 refugees per month and permit the entry of up to 120,000 refugees in Fiscal Year 1980. Options II and III would lead to major decreases in the number we accept at a time when more and more refugees are fleeing Indochina, the Soviet Union and other areas. Option IV would defer decisions we should make now.

Acceptance of a number of refugees below 10,000 per month could have serious diplomatic and humanitarian consequences:

-- The ASEAN nations might well close their doors to refugees fleeing Indochina if it appeared to them that the U.S. is reducing its rate of acceptance, leaving them to carry the burden.

-- Other resettlement countries would certainly not increase their rate of acceptances if United States leadership and commitment on this problem seemed to be lacking, and they might well cut back their own programs if we do so.

-- The world, and particularly the ASEAN nations, would view the resulting human disaster as a direct consequence of our decision to reduce the number of refugees we accept.

-- There would be sharp criticism from domestic quarters, including the press, Congress, church groups, and the public.

OMB's Option IV represents a return to the stop-and-go planning system Dick Clark's office was established to bring under control. It would require you to announce in the fall of 1979 and again in the fall of 1980 either that the U.S. was cutting back our refugee programs or that we were stepping them up over previously budgeted levels. Lack of planning by the U.S. will not lead to better planning by other countries, and will only undercut our efforts to get them to do more. Nor does it facilitate effective management of our own complex refugee and resettlement programs.

796 ******* S E C R E T *******S CHPY

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DE WTE 2 #0001 0801730
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FM THE VICE PRESIDENT ABOARD AF TWO

TO DAVID AARON

S E C R E T

I AM TENTATIVELY OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE AT THIS TIME TO PROCEED AS PROPOSED TO WAIVE THE JACKSON-VANIK RESTRICTIONS ON MFN FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRC. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE DONE, BUT I SEE NO COMPELLING REASON TO MOVE UNTIL AFTER SALT IS RATIFIED. TO DO SO BEFORE MIGHT JEOPARDIZE DALT. I ALSO THINK WE MUST PIN DOWN THE LEGALITY OF WHAT IS PROPOSED. ALAN CRANSTON, I BELIEVE, RECOMMENDS THAT WE PROCEED NOW AND I THINK HE IS OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM TO GET HIS REASONS. BUT UNLESS HE HAS STRONGER REASONS FOR PROCEEDING NOW THAN THOSE I AM AWARE OF, I RECOMMEND THAT WE HOLD THIS UNTIL AFTER SALT'S RATIFICATION.
0140

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Per: Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-126-16-37-1-3
BY KS NARA DATE 7/29/13

******* S E C R E T *******S COPY


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


21 Mar 79

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson





	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
/	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

ACTION
FYI

		VICE PRESIDENT
		EIZENSTAT
		JORDAN
		KRAFT
		LIPSHUTZ
/		MOORE
		POWELL
		WATSON
		WEXLER
		BRZEZINSKI
		MCINTYRE
		SCHULTZE

		ADAMS
		ANDRUS
		BELL
		BERGLAND
		BLUMENTHAL
		BROWN
		CALIFANO
		HARRIS
		KREPS
		MARSHALL
		SCHLESINGER
		STRAUSS
		VANCE

		ARAGON
		BOURNE
		BUTLER
		H. CARTER
		CLOUGH
		COSTANZA
		CRUIKSHANK
		FALLOWS
		FIRST LADY
		GAMMILL
		HARDEN
		HUTCHESON
		JAGODA
		LINDER
		MITCHELL
		MOE
		PETERSON
		PETTIGREW
		PRESS
		RAFSHOON
		SCHNEIDERS
		VOORDE
		WARREN
		WISE

done
J

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK MOORE FM/BB

SUBJECT: Senator Matsunaga's Trip to Japan and the Philippines

Spark Matsunaga went to Japan and the Philippines ten days ago. Before going he asked us whether he could carry a message from you to Prime Minister Ohira and President Marcos. We checked with the NSC Staff and were told that there was no appropriate substantive message to be sent at this time. Since Senator Matsunaga has been a consistent supporter and loyal soldier, we felt some minimal message was in order. Therefore, while you were in the Middle East we sent the attached cable coordinated through the NSC.

When you call Spark, he will thank you for the cable. He will also want to give you a very brief report on his conversations with Ohira and Marcos. We suggest that you call him back early Wednesday morning.

Attachment (1)

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OP IMMED
DE YERAQS #1983 0691548
O 1215427 MAR 79 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS WH92492

TO SENATOR SPARK MATSUNAGA

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE NOW VISITING JAPAN AND WILL SHORTLY BE TRAVELING TO THE PHILIPPINES. PLEASE GIVE MY BEST REGARDS TO PRIME MINISTER OHIRA AND TO PRESIDENT MARCOS. BEST WISHES FOR A GOOD TRIP.

JIMMY CARTER

085

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * WHSR COMMENT * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

VP

PSN:040193 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:1269/1548Z DTG:121542Z MAR 79

*******C O N F I D E N T I A L********S COPY

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Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-126-16-37-3-1
BY K3 NARA DATE 7/29/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/21/79

Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Hamilton Jordan
Stu Eizenstat
Bob Lipshutz
Frank Moore
Jody Powell

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ March 21, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Jackson-Vanik (U)

The President has disapproved the recommendation set forth in your memorandum of March 16, concerning the use of waiver authority under the Trade Act of 1974 to normalize commercial relations with China and the Soviet Union. Instead, the President has directed that you: (C)

1. Continue consultations on the Jackson-Vanik question with interested Members of Congress and the American Jewish community. (C)

2. Urge the Congressional leadership to postpone consideration of Jackson-Vanik related issues until after SALT and the MTN package are through the Congress. (C)

3. Develop a contingency strategy in the event the Administration is forced by Congressional hearings or other events to take a public position on the desirability of amending or repealing the Jackson-Vanik provisions of the Trade Act. In that regard, you should consider: (a) whether it is in our interest to support or oppose legislation to amend the Act already before the Congress such as the Stevenson Bill (S.339), or (b) whether the Administration should submit its own legislation. (C)

4. Obtain an advisory opinion from Justice on the legality of the proposed exercise of the waiver authority in the Trade Act as suggested in your memorandum. (C)

5. Proceed with ongoing efforts to conclude a trade agreement with China under existing legislative authority. (C)

The President has asked for a progress report by April 20. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review March 21, 1985

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ESDN; NLC-126-16-37-2-2
BY KS NARA, DATE 7/29/13

the ch
CEN
the christian CENTURY
ARCH 21, 1979

JAMES M. WALL
EDITOR

407 SOUTH DEARBORN STREET
CHICAGO, ILL. 60605
312 - 427-5380
HOME 312 - 279-7166

The Contemporary Resource of Liberal Theology

William R. Barnett

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A Challenge to the Eco-Doomsters


Walter W. Benjamin

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A Third World View of U.S. Foreign Policy

Joseph E. Mulligan, S.J.

Farmers stage protest in Washington, D.C.



No Higher Parity for Farmers

The Abortion Debate: A Call for Civility

Are Christians 'Honorary Jews'?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/21/79

Tim Kraft
Arnie Miller

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: The Vice President

		FOR STAFFING
		FOR INFORMATION
	✓	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
		LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
		IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
		NO DEADLINE
		LAST DAY FOR ACTION

FOR ACTION	FYI	
	✓	VICE PRESIDENT
		JORDAN
		EIZENSTAT
✓		KRAFT
		LIPSHUTZ
		MOORE
		POWELL
		RAFSHOON
		WATSON
		WEXLER
		BRZEZINSKI
		MCINTYRE
		SCHULTZE
		ADAMS
		ANDRUS
		BELL
		BERGLAND
		BLUMENTHAL
		BROWN
		CALIFANO
		HARRIS
		KREPS
		MARSHALL
		SCHLESINGER
		STRAUSS
		VANCE

		ARONSON
		BUTLER
		H. CARTER
		CLOUGH
		CRUIKSHANK
		FIRST LADY
		HARDEN
		HERNANDEZ
		HUTCHESON
		KAHN
		LINDER
		MARTIN
✓		MILLER
		MOE
		PETERSON
		PETTIGREW
		PRESS
		SANDERS
		WARREN
		WEDDINGTON
		WISE
		VOORDE

	ADMIN. CONFIDEN.
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

Patti - make sure
TK has no
objection to VP
getting - copy

Let V.P. help to identify a good director. J

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: TIM KRAFT TK
ARNIE MILLER AM

SUBJECT: Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

We contacted Jerry Apodaca, Mike Dukakis, and Bob Krueger to learn if they would be interested in being considered for FEMA Director. Each declined.

OMB subsequently requested that Gordon Vickery, your recent appointment as Administrator of the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, be designated as Acting FEMA Director, since the FEMA reorganization plan requires the agency be created by April 1. We concur with OMB's recommendation.

As you recall, the FEMA Director must be able to marshall the respect of both the national security establishment and civilian volunteer groups, sensitively handle State and local concerns, and possess sufficient prestige to deal effectively on your behalf while exercising budgetary restraint. We have identified six individuals that merit your serious consideration. Please check off the people you would like us to pursue further:

✓ Pat Lucey: He would have to be convinced to leave Mexico, but his solid administrative record while Governor and insight into both domestic and international issues highly commend him for FEMA.

✓ Scott Mathison: He is highly regarded by many. Though it is unlikely he would be willing to leave Utah in mid-term, a direct appeal from you or the Vice President might attract him.

✓ Bob McKinney: He possesses the administrative and political skills to make FEMA work and would bring a fresh, new perspective to disaster relief and civil defense issues. You should probably talk with him personally if his appointment to FEMA interests you.

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✓ Mike O'Callaghan: O'Callaghan told you he was not interested, but we believe this reflected his reaction to opposition to his appointment expressed by Senator Cannon and some in the defense community. Other than George Elsey, who declined, O'Callaghan is the most qualified for the job. If you would like to have this option re-explored we will talk with Cannon and others again to learn how deeply they feel.

✓ Frank Pace: He served as President Truman's Budget Director and Army Secretary, Chairman of General Dynamics and now heads two New York-based executive placement agencies. Pace, a vigorous 67, is a distinguished, persuasive and articulate advocate with wide contacts. Though comfortable with his present activities, he might be attracted to return to government by the challenge establishing a new agency represents.

? Bob Straub: We understand he would be interested in a role in the Administration, but perhaps not in Washington. Though his administrative skills were criticized during his term as Governor, Straub appointed strong managers to run State agencies. His appointment would be a political plus in Oregon.

I can see why

We will follow-up on your directions immediately. Some Congressional dissisfaction has developed due to the delay in appointing a director and appointment of an Acting Director will not solve major management decisions demanded by implementation of the reorganization plan.

RECOMMENDATION:

We recommend that you designate Gordon Vickery as Acting Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

✓ approve _____ disapprove

I

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

Mr. President:

At your lunch with George Meany and Lane Kirkland, I think it would be helpful if you also asked their views on oil pricing. As you know, they have frequently complained about not being consulted prior to the making of final decisions. While I believe they are unlikely to support any of the options we are now considering, your seeking their counsel could help moderate their opposition.

For the same reason, it would also be useful if you could ask Doug Fraser his views on this issue.

Stu

Stu Eizenstat

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
21 Mar 79

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Jody Powell
Zbig Brzezinski

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
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	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

ACTION	FYI	
		VICE PRESIDENT
		EIZENSTAT
		JORDAN
		KRAFT
		LIPSHUTZ
/		MOORE
	/	POWELL
		WATSON
		WEXLER
	/	BRZEZINSKI
		MCINTYRE
		SCHULTZE

		ADAMS
		ANDRUS
		BELL
		BERGLAND
		BLUMENTHAL
		BROWN
		CALIFANO
		HARRIS
		KREPS
		MARSHALL
		SCHLESINGER
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		VANCE

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		COSTANZA
		CRUIKSHANK
		FALLOWS
		FIRST LADY
		GAMMILL
		HARDEN
		HUTCHESON
		JAGODA
		LINDER
		MITCHELL
		MOE
		PETERSON
		PETTIGREW
		PRESS
		RAFSHOON
		SCHNEIDERS
		VOORDE
		WARREN
		WISE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ZB.

SUBJECT: Letter on SALT from Senators McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire

Attached at Tab B is a copy of the letter on SALT which Senators McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire have sent to you. The recommended replies at Tab A emphasize that you share their concerns that this SALT agreement not simply result in a reduction of the strategic arms competition into different areas.

You will recall that the Senators released their letter to the press. I believe we should also be prepared to release your reply to the press since it should help to curtail criticism from the Left that there is not enough arms control in this agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Senators McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire at Tab A.

✓ Approve

____ Disapprove

That Jody be authorized to release a copy of your reply to the press.


____ Approve

✓ Disapprove

We may let it leak - The letter is poorly written & almost impossible for any layman to understand - T

The letters have been cleared with the speechwriters.

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To Senator George McGovern

I want to assure you that I fully appreciate the concerns expressed in the letter which you and Senators Hatfield and Proxmire sent me on the impact of the emerging SALT agreement. I agree that if this agreement were to simply redirect the strategic arms competition to a more vigorous technological competition, then it will have been a failure. However, I am confident that this will not be the result.

First, this agreement provides much more restrictive limitations, both quantitative and qualitative, on strategic offensive weapons than were agreed to under the SALT I Interim Agreement. This testifies to the viability of the SALT process, a process which I believe will lead to even more restrictive limitations in the future. I, too, would have preferred to see even more restrictive limitations in this agreement, but that did not prove feasible. However, we will never achieve those more restrictive limitations if we abandon this agreement simply because it did not do enough.

Second, there are a number of important qualitative limitations in this agreement that close off avenues for the type of technological competition for which you express concern. I would call your attention, in particular, to the limitations on new types of ICBMs, missile throw-weight, number of RVs permitted on a MIRVed missile, and the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. The limitations on numbers of MIRVed missiles and MIRVed ICBMs are also important qualitative limitations in that they reduce the incentive to modernize unMIRVed missiles. The agreement also prohibits new types of strategic systems not yet deployed by either side, such as ballistic missile ships, missiles on the seabeds, and fractional orbital systems. These important limitations, which we hope to make more restrictive in future agreements, dramatically limit the avenues now for new strategic arms competition.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that SALT cannot solve all of our strategic problems. In particular, we may find it desirable in the future to deploy ICBMs such as the M-X in a new basing mode to replace the increasingly vulnerable silo-based ICBM force. This critically important and difficult decision for the United States must be made outside the context of SALT. It is not an issue of redirecting the arms competition, but rather a critical issue with respect to maintaining the clear advantages of a Triad of independent strategic systems which protect against both evolutionary threats and technological breakthroughs. I can assure you that I will be consulting closely with the Congress on this issue, and that I will not be influenced by factors relating to SALT ratification in making my decisions on this or any other defense issue.

Finally, I believe that completion and ratification of a comprehensive and restrictive SALT agreement, like the one which has been negotiated, will inject badly needed momentum into the arms control process. It is likely to generate not only needed momentum for additional SALT agreements, but should also give impetus to completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, to progress in the negotiations on force reductions in Europe, and to the creation of new arms-control undertakings in areas such as long-range theater nuclear systems.

I continue to value and appreciate your views on such important national issues as this one. I sincerely believe that the emerging SALT agreement is in the national security interest of the United States. I look forward to bringing this case to you and your colleagues in the Senate. For my part, I assure you that, if the agreement is ratified -- as I expect it will be ---I will not permit the result to be a new strategic arms competition. Rather, I will move with increased energy to seek even more restrictive limitations in all those weapons areas in which we and other nations carry on needless and wasteful competition.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable George McGovern
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable William Proxmire
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510



JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C.
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, MO.
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LA.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, N. DAK.
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.
JIM SASSER, TENN.
DENNIS DE CONCINI, ARIZ.
DALE BUMPERS, ARK.
JOHN A. DURKIN, N.H.

MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
MARK O. HATFIELD, OREG.
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JAMES A. MC CLURE, IDAHO
PAUL LAXALT, NEV.
JAKE GARN, UTAH
HARRISON SCHMITT, N. MEX.

W. FEATHERSTONE REID, STAFF DIRECTOR
JOEL E. BONNER, JR., MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 2, 1979

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

After considerable thought we have concluded that the proposed SALT II treaty is very difficult, if not impossible, for us to support. Your recent argument that it constrains the momentum of Soviet programs while allowing the United States to build up does not give us confidence that the treaty embodies a true step toward arms reductions. It appears simply to redirect the arms race into new arenas of technological exploitation.

We have agreed on the attached statment of principle, which will guide our future disposition on this matter.

We hope you and your advisors will give some consideration to our concerns about the MX and the absence of a "SALT Dividend."

Sincerely,

George McGovern, U.S.S. Mark Hatfield, U.S.S. William Proxmire, U.S.S.

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISS.
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WIS.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
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MILTON R. YOUNG, N. DAK.
MARK O. HATFIELD, OREG.
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JAMES A. MC CLURE, IDAHO
PAUL LAXALT, NEV.
JAKE GARN, UTAH
HARRISON SCHMITT, N. MEX.

W. FEATHERSTONE REID, STAFF DIRECTOR
JOEL E. BONNER, JR., MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PRICE OF SALT II MAY BE TOO HIGH.

IF THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS IN SUPPORT OF SALT II REQUIRES THE COMMITMENT TO THE MX MISSILE SYSTEM, A MANNED PENETRATING BOMBER, A NATIONWIDE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND INCREASING DEFENSE BUDGETS IN SUCCEEDING YEARS, THEN WE BELIEVE THAT SALT IS AS MUCH A FORM OF ARMS DIVERSION AS ARMS CONTROL.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS ON BOTH SIDES EXERT STRONG INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES FOR INCREASING MILITARY SPENDING WITH OR WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL TREATIES. AGREEMENTS WHICH ENCOURAGE THE REDIRECTION OF ARMS RACES RATHER THAN CURTAILING THEM ARE AT BEST TRANSITORY AND AT WORST A DANGEROUS ILLUSION OF SECURITY.

WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE AGAINST ANY SALT PROPOSAL THAT DOES NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CURB THE ARMS RACE.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 3/21/79

Mr. President:

WHCA checked their records and found that a replacement DEX machine had been used to transmit your monday PDB because the usual equipment was being serviced. The replacement machine produced a poor quality product. The operators normally check the cover page of the PDB for quality and then don't examine the rest of it for security purposes which is why the poor copy got to you.

Phil

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for Preservation Purposes

EYES ONLY

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lyle E. Gramley

SUBJECT: New Orders for Durable Goods in February

Tomorrow (Wednesday, March 21) at 2:00 p.m., the Census Bureau will release figures on new orders for durable goods in February and a revised estimate for January. The January increase in total new orders for durables was revised down; the increase that month is now 2.6 percent instead of 3.5 percent. In February, the total rose by just 0.3 percent.

Total new orders for durables would have declined in February except for large increases in orders for civilian aircraft and defense goods. These orders are highly volatile on a monthly basis, and often obscure underlying trends in other sectors. The drop in other durable goods orders, however, is a welcome development. Over the past half year, durable goods orders have been rising at a very rapid pace. We need a slower increase to avoid overheating in the durable goods industries. As you know, we have been concerned that capacity constraints, fears of shortages, and accelerating prices might be leading businesses in the durable goods industries to begin scrambling for inventories. These February figures offer some hope that it may not happen.

Orders for nondefense capital goods, excluding aircraft, fell 5.8 percent in February. This series -- a key indicator of business fixed investment -- is still showing substantial growth on a longer-term basis, however. These orders in February were 12 percent at an annual rate above the fourth quarter level, and 27 percent at an annual rate above their level in the third quarter of last year. There is, therefore, good reason for expecting business capital outlays to remain strong this year.

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1669

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Letter of Condolence to Mrs. Jean Monnet

At Tab A is a letter of condolence to Jean Monnet's widow, the text of which has already been delivered by cable to Mrs. Monnet in Paris. (The letter is dated March 17 to conform with the date of the telegraphic delivery.) The speechwriters concurred with this text.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Mrs. Jean Monnet.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ID 1055

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1979

To Silvia Monnet

I was deeply saddened to learn of your husband's death. Jean Monnet left behind a better world than the one into which he was born -- better because of the visionary imagination and statesmanship which he brought to his proud legacy, the reconstruction of Europe.

Jean Monnet lived to see large parts of his dream become political reality, a Europe increasingly united through strong and democratic institutions embodied in the European Communities. He breathed new life into the enduring spirit of Atlantic cooperation as well.

Inspired to a remarkable extent by his tireless efforts and undiminished faith, the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe rests, as never before, on a basis of equality. I can think of no more appropriate tribute in my own country to the memory of this great man than strong and continuing American support for both of those objectives.

Please accept my personal condolences and those of my wife, Rosalynn, at this time of grief.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Mrs. Silvia Monnet
Houjarray
par Monfort l'Amaury
Seine

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

C

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

I just want to underscore again how important I think it is to establish a new position of Ethnic Coordinator at the White House. As I meet with people and travel around the country I see the need for us to relate more effectively to ethnic Americans.

I think establishing this position would be an excellent symbolic step.

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12:00 noon

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM TIM KRAFT TK

Subject: Meeting with Kings' County (Brooklyn) Leader-Meade Esposito

PURPOSE: To solidify relations with one of New York's most important political leaders.

BACKGROUND: Kings' County is the largest Democratically voting county in New York state. In 1976, with Meade's help, it gave the Carter-Mondale ticket a margin of 225,519 votes in a state that was carried by approximately 400,000 votes.

In the media's eye, Meade Esposito is the last of the political leaders who can "deliver". He is the last vestige of Tammany's Irish-Italian political leadership. (Pat Cunningham's fall from grace in the Bronx gave him that dubious distinction.)

Though his abilities to control the county have declined considerably over the last seven or eight years, as Howard Samuels found in 1974, he still can be a powerful ally. His public support of us could be extremely helpful in stabilizing the political environment in New York state during the next year. If he stays friendly with us, it will be taken notice of by Carey, Moynihan, Koch, and Brooklyn's large Congressional delegation, as well as in the news media.

PRESS: Closed; White House photographer only.

PARTICIPANTS: Meade Esposito, Tim Kraft, Joel McCleary

DATE, LOCATION: Wednesday, March 21, 1979 at 12:00pm.; five minutes in the Oval Office.

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TALKING POINTS:

1) Ask him how he has been since you called him last summer. (He was on one of your weekly political call sheets.)

2) Compliment him on how successful he was in re-electing his friend from Brooklyn, Hugh Carey. You might mention what a remarkable campaign it was considering the fact that everyone had written Carey off.

3) Meade has been quoted in the New York papers telling other Democrats to "get off Carter's back". He believes that disloyalty amongst the Party membership is the highest of all crimes. He believes that the demise of the Party is making governing impossible. You might discuss this with him and ask him how we can specifically get public support for the difficult, controversial decisions we must make. Tell him we need statements of support from his Congressional delegation, city leaders, and himself.

1:30pm

C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

Meeting with Dick Celeste
Oval Office 1:30pm (10")

by: Tim Kraft TK

I. PURPOSE: To discuss the Peace Corps and Mr. Celeste's impending leadership of that organization.

II. PARTICIPANTS, BACKGROUND, PRESS:

A. PARTICIPANTS: Dick Celeste

B. BACKGROUND: On February 14, you decided to name Dick Celeste to be the Director of the Peace Corps. The resignation of Carolyn Payton in November 1978 has resulted in considerable controversy, internal morale problems and the need for strong leadership.

Celeste's clearances are almost completed, at which time you will be able to nominate him. He may raise with you the possibility of your playing a visible role when he assumes office.

On February 15, your decision to create an International Development Cooperation Administration (IDCA) was announced. You also directed OMB to complete a review of the appropriate placement of Peace Corps. A Decision Memo on ACTION will be completed by OMB in the next few weeks. Celeste may express concern that a reorganization might not give the Peace Corps enough independence to operate efficiently.

III, TALKING POINTS: 1. You should stress the need for a strong team at Peace Corps which will provide leadership and restore morale to the staff. Suggest that Dick work with Tim and Arnie to find strong deputies.

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2. You should encourage him to take a critical look at the number of countries that Peace Corps is now operating in, to ensure that we are making the most efficient use of a limited budget.

3. You should encourage him to meet with the OMB staff who are developing the reorganization options.

4. You might offer to ask the Vice President to swear Celeste in.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
21 Mar 79

Bob Lipshutz


The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

Hamilton Jordan
Tim Kraft

1059





	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
/	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

ACTION	FYI	
		VICE PRESIDENT
		EIZENSTAT
/		JORDAN
/		KRAFT
/		LIPSHUTZ
		MOORE
		POWELL
		WATSON
		WEXLER
		BRZEZINSKI
		MCINTYRE
		SCHULTZE

		ADAMS
		ANDRUS
		BELL
		BERGLAND
		BLUMENTHAL
		BROWN
		CALIFANO
		HARRIS
		KREPS
		MARSHALL
		SCHLESINGER
		STRAUSS
		VANCE

		ARAGON
		BOURNE
		BUTLER
		H. CARTER
		CLOUGH
		COSTANZA
		CRUIKSHANK
		FALLOWS
		FIRST LADY
		GAMMILL
		HARDEN
		HUTCHESON
		JAGODA
		LINDER
		MITCHELL
		MOE
		PETERSON
		PETTIGREW
		PRESS
		RAFSHOON
		SCHNEIDERS
		VOORDE
		WARREN
		WISE

Bob -
go with
Bloch
J

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3/21/79

To: President Carter

From: Tim Kraft

Both Judge Bell and Hamilton asked me to file with you a 'minority dissent' from their recommendation for a Federal Judgeship in Western Pennsylvania.

It is a far more pronounced case than usual of affirmative action for affirmative action's sake --- at the cost of a good nomination (both in merit and politically) for the gain of one more woman (with markedly mediocre qualifications) on the bench.

I attach the background comparisons that I provided for Judge Bell. Bloch, the male, is patently a better nominee than Sinsenich, the woman. Judge Bell agrees; but he cited your mandate for affirmative action, wherever possible.

What I did not put on my memo to Bell is the political support that Bloch enjoys over Sinsenich. He is by far and away the preference of the Democratic leadership in western Pennsylvania, including Mayor Caligeri of Pittsburgh; she, on the other hand, has not surfaced any support beyond the Commission which put her name on the list.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 5, 1979

TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL GRIFFIN BELL

FROM: TIM KRAFT TK

SUBJ: Federal District Judge Western Pennsylvania - Ida Geanne Sinsenich and Alan Bloch; Summary of Comments

I. Sinserich was admitted to the Bar in 1964 and went to work in her father's firm in Westmoreland County. She was appointed as a Federal Magistrate early in 1971 by the Court.

We surveyed about ten prominent attorneys in the general Pittsburgh area, and none of them was familiar with her, nor had come across her in their activities in the courts. The Court clerks surveyed were not particularly familiar with her either. The jump from Federal Magistrate (which does preliminary hearings on important cases, and presides over some less important cases) is an unusually large one.

Martindale-Hubble (which provides ratings on lawyers matched against other attorneys in the area) did not have a rating for her either in 1968 or 1978. This is not a negative indication so much as it displays a lack of reputation.

Sources surveyed in the U.S. Attorney's office felt that she is a bit lenient on setting bonds (a major function of Magistrates), and other than that they felt that she performs her duties adequately, but with no distinguishing factors.

II. Alan Bloch was admitted to the Bar in 1959 and began with the firm of Wirtzman, Sikov, and Love, the largest litigating firm in Allegheny County. At the outset he took on a caseload of 300 (a very heavy load) trial cases. He became a partner in 1964 (which is pretty fast) and remained with that firm until 1969. At that point he went into partnership with Jim Flaherty (Flaherty and Bloch) and continued with a heavy trialwork caseload. Flaherty left the firm in 1976 when he became County Commissioner. Bloch is a member of the Academy of Trial Lawyers (admission by invitation only) and is National Secretary of the Academy of Trial Lawyers Workmans Compensation Committee.

In Martindale-Hubble, he receives a "high" recommendation for legal ability, and a "very high" (the best possible) in their general recommendation category.

Bloch was recommended for this judgeship by the Allegheny County Bar, which went through a similar process to the Scweiker-Heinz Commission. He was on the Law Review at the University of Pittsburgh Law School, and graduated 5th in a class of about 150.

III. Summary

The picture that emerges here is that Sinsenich does not have a high negative aspect, but does not seem to have distinguished herself in any significant way. She seems to have, at the very best, a minimum of serious trial experience or community involvement. Bloch, on the other hand has a great deal of trial experience, and has broad experience in both criminal and civil matters. In addition, he has acted as the Solicitor for a number of school districts and other governmental authorities. He also serves as the chief labor negotiator for a number of governmental jurisdictions. All of these aspects combine to make Bloch a very experienced lawyer, and clearly the better defined of the two for appointment to the Federal Bench.

3:00 p.m.

C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Califano will be announcing your NHI decision tomorrow in New York. He is concerned that Senator Kennedy might attack our position before the announcement, as he did last August. Joe believes we can probably prevent that if you ask Kennedy to hold any public statement until after Joe's announcement. I agree with Joe and suggest that you make such a request before the Kennedy meeting ends.

Stu

Stu Eizenstat

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THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lyle E. Gramley LEG

Subject: Preliminary Estimates of First-Quarter GNP

The Department of Commerce has distributed within the Government very tentative estimates of GNP for the first quarter of 1979. These estimates, which are never published, indicate that real GNP growth fell to a 1.4 percent annual rate in the first quarter, compared to 6.9 percent in the final quarter of 1978. The annual rate of increase in the GNP deflator accelerated to 9.1 percent, from 8.2 percent in the preceding quarter.

According to these estimates, real personal consumption expenditures rose very little in the first quarter, after a rapid increase late last year. As a result, the personal saving rate rose to 5.2 percent of disposable income, up from 4.8 percent in the preceding quarter, but approximately equal to the average for all of 1978. Construction outlays declined in the first quarter, largely reflecting adverse weather, and net exports fell as a result of a substantial rise in imports. The expansion in outlays for producers durable equipment, on the other hand, remained strong. Inventory investment is estimated to have risen substantially, as it often does when the pace of final sales slows.

The acceleration in the rise of the GNP deflator to 9.1 percent was about what we had expected. Rapidly rising food and energy prices were the dominant factors.

In assessing these numbers, three facts should be kept in mind. First, these preliminary estimates are as much forecasts as they are estimates based on hard data. For some series, Commerce has data for two months of the quarters; for others, statistics are available for only one month. Consequently, the first estimate of real GNP growth is subject to substantial revision. In the first quarter of 1977, for example, the first estimate of 4.3

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percent real growth was later revised upward to 7.3 percent. Second, Commerce estimates that bad weather may have reduced the annual rate of real GNP growth this quarter by as much as 1-1/4 percent -- through its effects on both residential and nonresidential construction. Third, the increase in real GNP in the fourth quarter of 1978 was very large. Even if first-quarter growth turns out to be as low as this preliminary estimate suggests, both real GNP and real personal consumption expenditures will have increased over the past two quarters at an annual rate of 4.1 percent.

These figures on first-quarter GNP raise as many questions as they answer. They do suggest a considerably slower pace of expansion in the first quarter than we had expected, and this may be a sign that slower growth is now in process. Last year, however, real GNP stopped growing altogether in the first quarter, but then snapped back strongly in the second. It is too early to judge whether slower growth early this year will be temporary or of longer duration. We do expect a rebound of construction to accompany improving weather conditions this spring. Moreover, the decline in real retail sales in January and February -- the basis for the estimate of a weak first-quarter rise in personal consumption -- may prove temporary. Auto sales have been holding up quite well. The strength of the economy over the remainder of the year will depend importantly on growth of business fixed investment. So far, indicators for this key sector still look very strong.

As Charlie has indicated to you in earlier memos, our chief concern is not that the economy will grow too slowly early this year, but that it will grow too fast. This preliminary estimate of first-quarter GNP growth is not sufficient evidence to allay that concern.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/21/79

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

1062

done
J

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 15, 1979

CONGRESSIONAL TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin (D-Calif. 42)
Senator Ernest Hollings (D-N.C.)

DATE: As soon as possible

RECOMMENDED BY: Frank Moore and Bob Maher BM

PURPOSE: To discuss your speaking engagement with the National Association of Broadcasters in Dallas, Texas.

BACKGROUND: Rep. Van Deerlin heard that you would be speaking to the NAB in Dallas soon. We think it might be helpful to you if the two of them could talk to you before leaving. Rep. Van Deerlin is very supportive of the Administration and a little stroking of Senator Hollings is always helpful. Congressman Van Deerlin is Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Communications and Senator Hollings is the Chairman of the same committee in the Senate. They both know what lines and legislative prognoses the NAB will pursue.

disturbed re spectrum fee $80 mil

Date of submission March 15, 1979

V Deer-
NAB- 2nd only to IRS on paperwk
dereg of radio
grad " TV
Thrust of technology
spectrum fee - build → $150m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/21/79

Stu Eizenstat

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for your information.

Rick Hutcheson

1063

	FOR STAFFING
/	FOR INFORMATION
/	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

ACTION
FYI

	VICE PRESIDENT
/	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

8:00 AM
12:30 PM
2:00 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: STU EIZENSTAT Stu
JOE ONEK

SUBJECT: National Health Plan

On Wednesday you are scheduled to hold separate conversations with Senator Kennedy, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and Doug Fraser to discuss the Administration's proposal for a national health plan.

BACKGROUND

You have decided that the Administration will submit "first phase" legislation accompanied by a description of the comprehensive plan you envision for the future. Secretary Califano will announce this decision on Thursday, March 22, after the meetings with Kennedy and labor. He will then work with the DPS, OMB and other agencies to complete development of specific first phase options.

We've come nowhere in the last 12 months

No decision has been made as to the precise content of first phase legislation. However, it is clear that the first phase proposal will include not only increases in catastrophic coverage but significant reforms in Medicaid and Medicare. Therefore, it will benefit the poor and the elderly, as well as working-class Americans with inadequate private insurance.

First phase legislation is the only legislation that can pass. To hold out for comprehensive insurance is simply to deny millions of Americans any improvement in health care coverage for perhaps a decade.

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Kennedy and labor have argued that once catastrophic legislation is passed, the demands of the middle-class will be fulfilled and it will become impossible to develop the necessary political leverage to pass comprehensive legislation later. This argument may have had validity a decade ago; it no longer does. The majority of middle-class Americans now have catastrophic coverage. Indeed, that is why there is no enormous pressure for national health insurance today. Furthermore, over the next few years, private insurance coverage of catastrophic illnesses will continue to increase. Thus, if we delay, there will be even less opportunity to use expanded catastrophic coverage as leverage for other desirable reforms.

Kennedy and labor have also argued that catastrophic insurance would encourage excessive development of expensive high technology medicine. Again, the crucial point is that most Americans already have catastrophic coverage and that virtually every hospital is already providing expensive high technology medicine. The solution to rising hospital expenditures is not to deny financial security for the remaining segment of the population which lacks coverage but to enact meaningful cost containment measures, such as our hospital bill, that would apply to the entire population.

The Kennedy Proposal

Senator Kennedy may suggest the following scenario:

A. Kennedy and the Administration reach agreement on a comprehensive plan.

B. The Administration submits only a first phase of that plan.

C. Kennedy states that he would have preferred comprehensive legislation but that he agrees with the substance of the first phase. In essence, Kennedy would mute his criticism of the Administration's failure to submit comprehensive legislation.

The problem with this scenario is that it is uncertain that the Administration and Kennedy/labor could ever reach agreement on a comprehensive plan. Possible differences include the use of co-payments, the underwriting role of private insurance companies, and the administration of Medicaid. It is important for us to pursue potential detente with Senator Kennedy on these issues, but it is essential that this not delay development and submission of the Administration bill -- or Senator Long will move forward in the interim.

Our goal is to steer a course between Kennedy and Long. We offer Kennedy our opposition to a catastrophic-only bill and our commitment, in principle, to a comprehensive plan. We offer Long our support of first-phase legislation which resembles Long-Ribicoff and which has a credible chance of passing.

Talking Points

- You remain committed to the goal of a comprehensive plan and will release an outline of a comprehensive plan when you submit first phase legislation. Given the concern with inflation, however, it is impossible to pass comprehensive legislation in this Congress and, therefore, we must begin with a meaningful first phase.

- The Administration's first phase will not be the same as Senator Long's catastrophic proposal. It will include significant Medicaid and Medicare reforms and, therefore, will benefit the poor and the elderly, as well as working-class Americans. It will also include substantial system reforms aimed at controlling costs.

- The Administration must develop its first phase proposal within the next few weeks in order to take the initiative on this issue. It does not seem possible to agree on a comprehensive plan in that time period although the staffs should get together. It makes more sense to develop a first phase proposal which is compatible with all our visions for a

comprehensive plan. Issues that may divide us in a comprehensive plan, such as co-payments, may not have to be resolved in a first phase proposal.

- You are seeking a first phase proposal which will create powerful momentum for a comprehensive national health plan. With their support, we can break the stalemate of the last fourteen years and bring new health care benefits to millions of Americans.

Landon suggests that you make the following points in your meeting with Fraser and Meany:

- Both Fraser and Meany would be pleased to hear the President talk briefly about the Middle East.

- Both Fraser and Meany should probably be told briefly about the rationale for an early announcement of the Carter-Mondale campaign committee. By simply discussing the issue briefly, without asking for a commitment, the President will be paving the way for the low-key effort we are planning to get early support from individual unions.

- Fraser would be pleased to hear about the status of the SALT talks: he is a member of the General Advisory Committee of ACDA, and the UAW is actively supporting several pro-SALT groups.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

To Jay Solomon

I accept your resignation with regret and with gratitude for the services you have rendered to this Administration and to the American taxpayer.

Because of your leadership and integrity, decades of waste and corruption at the GSA are now being exposed, and those who have betrayed the public trust are being identified and punished. That process will be continued and expanded.

Your willingness to be available to assist your successor after March 31st will help me to insure that the investigations, reorganization and administrative improvements you began will be pursued aggressively.

You take with you my warmest personal affection and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

The Honorable
Joel W. Solomon
Administrator
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405

United States of America
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405

Administrator

March 14, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with understandings reached in previous conversations, I hereby tender my resignation as Administrator of The General Services Administration, effective March 31, 1979.

It has been a high privilege and honor to serve my country in the Carter Administration, and I am deeply grateful to you for having made that possible.

Best wishes for your Administration's continued success.

Respectfully,

Joel W. Solomon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

566
12/12

3/21/79

TO : Rick Hutcheson

FROM: Carolyn Shields

Thought you would like to have the attached -- for the archives or whatever.

As far as I know, the original of Solomon's letter to the P is still on the P's desk. I have sent no copies of this anywhere else.

Of course, I'm sending you the draft response because of the President's handwriting on it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1979

To Jay Solomon

I accept your resignation with regret and with gratitude for the services you have rendered to this Administration and to the American taxpayer.

Because of your leadership and integrity, decades of waste and corruption at the GSA are now being exposed, and those who have betrayed the public trust are being identified and punished. That process will be continued and expanded.

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You take with you my warmest personal affection and best wishes.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Joel W. Solomon
Administrator
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405

DRAFT 3/21/79

ok
J

Dear Jay:

I ~~apprecate~~ accept your resignation with regret and with gratitude for the services you have rendered to this Administration and to the American taxpayer.

Because of your leadership and integrity, decades of waste and corruption at the GSA are now being exposed, and those who have betrayed the public trust are being identified and punished. & that process will be continued and expanded.

Your willingness to be available to assist your successor after March 31st will help me to insure that the ~~work~~ investigations, reorganization and administrative improvements you began will be pursued aggressively ~~wherever it may lead~~ in the future.

You take with you my warmest personal affection and best wishes.

Sincerely,

GSA

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United States of America
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405

Administrator

March 14, 1979

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

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It has been a high privilege and honor to serve my country in the Carter Administration, and I am deeply grateful to you for having made that possible.

Best wishes for your Administration's continued success.

Respectfully,

Joel W. Solomon

3-21-79

Fraser - Meany - Ken

Mid E

Oil pricing

SALT

Health - Cat - caid - care

1980

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for Preservation Purposes

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C

March 21, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM

Israel's knesset tonight overwhelmingly approved the peace treaty with Egypt. The final tally was 95 in favor, 18 against, 2 abstentions, and 3 members absent.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/21/79

Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Hamilton Jordan
Phil Wise

1064

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1979

3615 - Get with Hamm & Phil - Try to reduce this list J

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached are requests from NSC for your involvement with foreign travel or invitations to foreign visitors from you. To summarize these requests:

1) Official visit by Japanese Prime Minister Ohira on May 1 or 2;

2) Working lunch with Panamanian President Royo on May 10;

3) Attendance at Economic Summit in Tokyo at the end of June preceded by a two-day state visit to Japan followed by a one-day visit to Korea;

4) State visit by UAE President Zayid in July;

5) Official visit by Polish First Secretary Gierek during the fall or winter;

6) State visit by President Pertini of Italy in 1980 to be announced by April 3;

In addition, you have already approved and have outstanding:

1) Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee on April 24;

2) King Hussein of Jordan tentatively scheduled May 15-16;

3) Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland scheduled during the second half of this year;

4) SALT Summit with Brezhnev;

5) Crown Prince Fahd visit to be rescheduled this year;

6) President Lopez Portillo of Mexico for a visit this year.

7) Helmut Schmidt of West Germany on June 6

I am sure this list will continue to grow. I am very concerned that you strengthen your domestic image during the next few months as you head into late 1979 and early 1980. Given this heavy international schedule, it will be hard to shape this perception.

I feel you need to minimize your visible international interactions for the rest of the year by having the Vice President or others substitute for you or just saying no to some requests.

PHIL

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TO: P RESIDENT CARTER

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN HJ

Phil Wise reviewed with me the calendar for the coming year.

Two observations:

First, our long-term planning for foreign visitors is always grossly violated. And when I reviewed the list of new requests, the reasons why are understandable. We had no way to know six months ago that there would be a new Prime Minister of Japan or that a follow-up meeting with Lopes Portillo would be necessary.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, FEB. 24, 1983
BY [signature] NARS, DATE 6/2/90

Still, we do need to focus as much public attention as possible on you as President working and fighting to solve our growing domestic problems. Particularly when you take into consideration the heavy emphasis that SALT II will need and deserve, I worry very much that you are going to continue to be perceived as being preoccupied with foreign policy problems as our domestic problems grow measurably worse. Jerry and Jody need to work out a plan for greater public emphasis on our domestic programs.

Secondly, we need to spread these things out a lot more. For example, at present you will see three different heads of state in May on successive weeks. Add to this the possibility of a late April or early May SALT summit, and it looks like we find ourselves in the very same posture we are in now. There is no easy answer to this, but we all have to become more sensitive to the appearance of these things, work for a way to counter them, and spread out and defer those things that are less important. I have felt for a long time that the Vice-President could and should be more although I realize that the foreign policy establishment always insists that they have to have you.