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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 9/5/78

Mr. President:

Do you plan to walk Sadat and Begin to their cabins today? Yes

Have you made a decision with regard to a daily meeting with Zbig and Vance? Each a.m. will decide regular time

Sadat arrives at Camp David at 2:30 pm and Begin at 4:45 pm. ok

Do you plan on meeting with Begin tonite? Good idea - I told Cy to set it up.

Phil

PRIORITY
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FROM: EDWARD SANDERS

TO: SUSAN CLOUGH FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFO: (CAMP DAVID)

RELEASED BY: DG

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Dear Mr. President

I was deeply moved by your departure statement. You know that my warmest best wishes, hopes and prayers are with you.

Ed

9/4/78

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 4, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Edward Sanders ES

SUBJECT: Camp David Summit

The following is a summary of the points we discussed this morning:

(1) The most significant questions that I hear raised frequently are:

--if agreement in principle regarding the West Bank is achieved and Jordan still refuses to join the negotiations, will Egypt be under an obligation to proceed bilaterally with Israel?

--will Israel be expected to agree at Camp David to withdraw from the West Bank? If so, what does this mean? Partial withdrawal? Partition?

--will Israel be allowed to maintain a security presence on the West Bank after five years?

--how can a Palestinian Administrative Council or other body be prevented from turning the West Bank into a threatening independent Palestinian state if Israel has no security presence there?

--what are the security measures Israel will accept in terms of territory, rights, and guarantees from the United States?

(2) The following are thoughts that I mentioned during the meeting:

--Israelis will respond most positively to statements which indicate that we clearly understand and agree with their security concerns.

--neither Egypt nor Israel should be surprised by the other two parties.

--inducements to either Israel or Egypt should not make it more difficult for the other side to make concessions.

As we discussed, I am enclosing with this memo a copy of the memo which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 2.

Enclosure:
September 2 memo

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY VANCE

FROM: Edward Sanders

SUBJECT: The Camp David Summit and Israeli Security Concerns

If we are going to assuage Israeli security concerns about territorial concessions, the first thing we must do is to convince them that we recognize the specific kinds of security problems they will face as a result of territorial withdrawal, namely:

--the need for early warning of potential attack preparations.

--the loss of terrain that provides significant military advantages, including strategic depth for defense, and protection of population centers in the event of war.

--borders that create more opportunities for terrorist activities.

--the loss of training and base areas that are necessary for the maintenance of Israeli qualitative advantages to help Israel offset Arab quantitative advantages and the heightened vulnerability that will result from the increased geographic concentration of Israeli forces.

To respond to these security-related problems, the U.S. should make it clear that any settlement should provide for:

--demilitarization of the contested areas.

--Israeli (or joint) presence on key terrain to provide early warning and, at least initially, to control access to populated areas in Israel and perhaps in the West Bank.

--Israeli overflight rights in some areas to provide early warning.

--border adjustments to eliminate particularly dangerous areas such as the Latrun Salient in the West Bank.

--provision of limited Israeli re-entry rights.

--reduction of Arab forces contiguous to demilitarized areas.

--strict limitations on the stationing of foreign forces in Jordan (this would actually have the virtue of improving the present Israeli position).

While the above security-related proposals are essential, they are probably not sufficient to convince the Israelis that they will be more secure and will be able to handle their own security. Because the record of history convinces the Israelis that they can never count on anyone else and that they must depend only on themselves, they must feel certain that they are not entrusting their security to others or to reversible Arab good will.

In order to build Israeli confidence in this regard, we may want to consider a number of bilateral arrangements, such as:

--exempting Israel from restrictions on exceptional technology transfer, and generally indicating a willingness to provide Israel with high technology and force multiplier items.

--increasing foreign military sales credits to Israel to enable her to purchase additional arms and further develop her own production capabilities.

--guaranteeing a U.S. resupply of Israel if a war breaks out because of failure of the agreement.

--including Israel among the nations completely excluded from calculation in the annual arms transfer ceiling.

--offering Israel a Mutual Defense Pact, which would demonstrate in concrete terms that the U.S. views Israel as a strategic asset and, therefore, will take steps to foster Israeli security as an extension of our own security.

--incorporating Israeli legitimate security concerns into our own proposals. For example, we could indicate our support for Israeli military action in the West Bank in the event of increased military tension or terrorist activities.

Because these are items that Israelis perceive as critical to their long-range security, our willingness to offer them will concretely demonstrate to the Israelis that they have much to gain by making reasonable concessions. However, any such offers should not preclude eventual U.S. granting of particular items if, for some reason, the Camp David Summit should not fully succeed.

cc: Vice President Mondale
Secretary Brown
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hamilton Jordan
Ambassador Atherton
Harold Saunders
William Quandt

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9-5-78

To Senator Jackson

Because of concerns expressed in your two letters to me about the Dresser Industries export licenses, I have again reviewed the matter thoroughly. Based on this review, I have decided that the facts do not warrant revoking the licenses already granted.

Knowing of your interest in this matter, I wanted to let you know personally of my decision.

Jimmy Carter

IMM
PRECEDENCE

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FROM: Rick Hutcheson

TO: Susan Clough/C.D.

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Sam Nunn

In reference to our telephone conversation on Sunday, September 3, I have a few thoughts which I hope will be of value to you.

(1) Regardless of the legitimacy of his personal reasons for resigning as chief SALT negotiator, Ambassador Warnke's departure prior to Senate action on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty will almost certainly be greeted with skepticism by his friends, his critics, and the media. It is also likely to be interpreted in some quarters of the Senate as a deliberate ploy to reduce the controversial ambassador's participation in an upcoming debate over a treaty, which many Senators already regard as highly suspect. At a defense correspondents' breakfast on August 25, I was asked how I viewed the rumor of "an Administration plan to have Warnke resign in order to improve the chances of SALT II in the Senate." I responded that in my view, many Senators--including some who voted against Ambassador Warnke's confirmation--would consider such a plan to be a calculated move to "de-Warnkeize" the SALT II agreement.

(2) I believe that it will be difficult to find a qualified arms expert or negotiator outside the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (or the State Department) who would be prepared to assume Ambassador Warnke's responsibilities at this very late stage in the SALT II negotiations. Most of the qualified potential successors whom I know would have a more conservative view, and would be reluctant to assume this responsibility at this time.

(3) As you well know, the emerging SALT II Treaty represents the culmination of long, complex, and arduous negotiations. In my view, only someone who has been intimately involved in these negotiations over the past two years can now safely "take the ball and run with it." I am not personally well acquainted with members of the present SALT negotiating team, and therefore can make no recommendation for a successor to Ambassador Warnke.

(4) Although I fundamentally disagree with many of Ambassador Warnke's views on defense and national security issues, I do believe that he will prove valuable to your Administration in defending before the Senate the SALT II Treaty which he has negotiated. This, combined with the above assessment of the potential political consequences of his early resignation, leads me to the conclusion that Ambassador Warnke should retain a key role through the ratification fight. In my view, he will be asked to testify even if he has become a private citizen. Unless a SALT team composed of new "players" and guided by a substantively different approach to strategic arms control is selected, I think it inadvisable for the "old coach" to leave in the last quarter of the game. If the "old coach" nevertheless has to leave the game, then I would suggest bringing in an assistant coach.

My thoughts and prayers are with you at Camp David, and it is my strong hope that the Middle East summit will encourage a lasting peace in that troubled area of the world.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Susan,

Rosalynn sent this back to the office this morning...the note on the right side looks like the President's writing, and I don't know if it's something that should be followed up.

Tks

mfm
9/5/78

need - please send to Rick Hutcheson + ask him to send cc to Frank more Thanks - RL

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR MRS. CARTER

FROM GRETCHEN POSTON

DATE: 1 September 1978

SUBJECT: GUESTS IN CONCERT HALL TONIGHT

Your guests at "Every Good Boy Deserves Favor" tonight will be Senator and Mrs. Eagleton, (Barbara) and their son, Terry - appoximately 20 years old.

Lt Jones - CCS
Can to Leg

NDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SUBJECT: GUESTS IN CONCERT HALL TONIGHT

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Lt Jaworsky - aide
Can to help